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Determina’s Vulnerability Protection Suite Saman Amarasinghe CTO, Determina Inc.  Associate Professor, MIT EECS/CSAIL
Corporate Overview ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Overview ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Overview ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Market Trends ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Increasing vulnerabilities, more directed attacks
Recent Example: WMF Vulnerability NO Patch Available Patch fully deployed *Wipro, Ltd 2005, “The Total Cost of Security Patch Management” Day 14 : December 14:  Sites first post WMF Exploits Day 35 : January 5 th :   Microsoft Releases Patch Average exploit window: 25 days* before patches deployed Vulnerable w/no  Official Patch 35 Days Vulnerability Made Public Total exploit window for average organization: 60 days   Day 27: December 27:  Initial Disclosure of Vulnerability Day 28 : December 28:  MS Announces Awareness…No Patch for Issue Day 29: December 29:   50+ variants, 1000+ sites reported: Thursday 12/29  Day 31: December 31:   Instant messaging,Trojan horses & botnets begin exploiting WMF and Unofficial patch released by Ilfak Guilfanov Day 33: January 3rd:   1,000,000+ WMF exploited downloads reported from just 1 site Day 0 : December 1:  Vulnerability Discovered 1  and Exploit Code Being Sold for $4000 Shortly Afterward 1 Computerworld.com, “Russian hackers sold WMF exploit, analyst says”  Patch issued  by MS Determina 0-day protection active before vulnerability is known Zero-days
Vulnerability Protection Suite ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Vulnerability Protection Suite ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Managed Program  Execution Engine Memory Firewall LiveShield
Software Vulnerabilities:  The “Root Cause” of Attacks ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],100% of Microsoft critical vulnerabilities are memory-related
Zero-Day Endpoint Protection  Without Tuning or Maintenance ,[object Object],[object Object], 0 Y (9 days) Vulnerabilities in Graphics Rendering Engine Could Allow Code Execution (WMF) 27-Dec-2005  -- -- IE HTTPS Proxy Basic Authentication Information Leak 13-Dec-2005  8 Y (23 days) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability in MS IE 21-Nov-2005  -- Y (no patch) Memory Allocation Denial of Service via RPC 16-Nov-2005   -- -- Windows Metafile Vulnerability 08-Nov-2005 LiveShield Protection Memory Firewall Protection Days Until Mass Exploit 0-Day? (days before patch) 0-Day Vulnerability Date --  -- COM Object Instatiation Memory Corruption Vulnerability 13-Dec-2005
VPS Advantages ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Overview ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Managed Program Execution Engine Derek Bruening
Overview ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Attack Lifecycle ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],NETWORK KERNEL Make payment Change prefs Read statement Write Record Update Registry Open port HIJACK COMPROMISE ENTER APPLICATIONS
Stop before Hijack ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Processor Execution Environment ABI Restricted Execution Environment
How Program Shepherding Work? Restricted Control Transfer: Is it legal to go from here to there? Restricted Code Origins: Is this code came from a code page? Restricted Control Transfer: Is it legal to go from here to there? Restricted Code Origins: Is this code came from a code page? Program Run-time  System Code Cache Program Counter: Executes the Program Instruction by Instruction Never Let go of the  Program Counter Restricted Code Origins: Is this code came from a code page? jmp  call br  ret call jmp  br
Technique 1:  Restricted Code Origins ,[object Object],[object Object],A B D E Code Cache Unmodified code pages Modified pages
Technique 1:  Restricted Code Origins ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
An Example: Chained Call Attack Local Variables: URL Local Variables: tmp Return Address Argument: h Local Variables: … Return Address Arguments: … Stack http://001110110110111011010001010110101101010110 10110110110110101011010101010110101011010101... URL: 0x7F8B0 Fake arguments handle_URL(handle * h) { char url[64]; … char * tmp =geturl(h) strcpy(url, tmp); … } Code 0x8A234 Fake arguments Libraries setuid() … unlink() … 0x7F8B0 0x8A234
Technique 2: Restricted Control Transfers context switch indirect branch lookup trace branch taken? BASIC BLOCK CACHE TRACE  CACHE non-control-flow instructions non-control-flow instructions Restrict based on source address, destination address, and/or transfer type
Technique 2: Restricted Control Transfers ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Technique 2: Restricted Control Transfers ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Technique 3:  Un-circumventable Sandboxing ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Protecting MPEE Itself ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Memory protection R R Application code RW RW Application data RW R  Code cache RW R MPEE data R  R MPEE code MPEE Privileges Application Privileges Page type
Memory protection R R Application code RW RW Application data RW RE  Code cache RW R MPEE data RE  R MPEE code MPEE Privileges Application Privileges Page type
Overview ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
What is a Vulnerability? ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
LiveShield ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
LiveShield ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
LiveShield ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Different Levels of Updates Power of a Patch, Operates like a DAT             Administration can be fully automated Minutes Within a day Hours Weeks to Months Months Months to never Typical time from  release to deployment       Easy to undo     Patch update     Detect     Protect LiveShield     DAT file update     Dot upgrade     Major upgrade  Manageable at a fine granularity Will not change current behavior No need to reboot or restart app No need to upgrade hardware or other programs
Using MPEE infrastructure as the LiveShield Framework ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
LiveShield Properties  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Detector Requirements ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Remediator Requirements ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
LiveShield Development Operations Flow POC  Exploit  Released Acquire  the  exploit Identify  vulnerability Patch  Released Diff the patched version against previous version Attack Released Trace the  exploit  activity Acquire  the  attack Trace the  attack’s  activity Develop a Shield Port it to multiple  versions Test the  Shield Release to customers Receive LiveShield Push the Shield in detect mode No triggering in 24 hours Put into  protect mode Put in a full QA System in protect mode No problems in 24  hours Report the  problems to Determina Y Y N N best case  is 24 hours,  Cannot take more than 7 days Minimal QA a. la. DAT  update
LiveShield Flow Read - only memory Read - only memory DLL load eventlog Determina Web site Controller @ Customer Site Node  Manager Core Files available MP - v3 - 011604.xml const - v3base.dll const - v3a.dll const - v3b.dll … . const - v3u.dll const - v3v.dll Internet xml file per host Up - to - date  dll cache Mode information Status information Events Controller - Node Manager  Communication Interface Per processor policy data structure with mode info dll cache Stats Events Policy data structure with mode info Loaded  dll ’ s Read - only memory Read - only memory DLL load eventlog Determina Web site Controller @ Customer Site Node  Manager Core Files available MP - v3 - 011604.xml const - v3base.dll const - v3a.dll const - v3b.dll … . const - v3u.dll const - v3v.dll Internet xml file per host Up - to - date  dll cache Mode information Status information Events Controller - Node Manager  Communication Interface Per processor policy data structure with mode info dll cache Stats Events Policy data structure with mode info Loaded  dll ’ s
Overview ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Evaluation Criteria  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
1. Accuracy:   The cure cannot be deadlier than the illness! ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
2. Maintainability:   The cost of the solution should be less than the  attack cleanup cost ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
3. Scalability:  Worms are equal opportunity attackers. Need to protect every box ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
4. Coverage:   No partial band-aid solutions please! % of vulnerabilities  Source: CVE, Microsoft Security Bulletins, 2003-2004
5. Proactivity:   Should be ready to protect when attacked!   Application  Released With a bug Vulnerability  announced Patch released Attack    Released Good guys Patch like crazy Bad guys analyze  patch & create attack 17 Previously Unknown Vulnerability 2 26 Previously Unknown Vulnerability 46 31 06/01 03/02 04/02 07/02 07/02 03/03 07/03 03/04 04/04 11/04 Code Red Digispid Spida Slammer Slapper WebDAV Blaster Witty Sasser Mydoom.ag 185 # of days from the Publication of the Vulnerability (availability of a patch) to Attack 77 34
Speed of Propagation The Witty Worm
6. Uncirumventability:  Don’t be an emperor with no clothes! ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
7. Containment:   What good of stopping an attack after it happens? ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Overview ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
VPS impact on the Project Managed Program Execution Engine Memory Firewall LiveShield Client Interface Injected code detection Patch Generation  and Deployment Constraint Leaning  and Monitoring Data Structure Consistency Checking Application State Probing Repair Generation,  Evaluation and Filtering
Determina Stmt of Work ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Client Interface for MPEE ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Managed Program Execution Engine Memory Firewall LiveShield Client Interface
Application State Probing ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Managed Program Execution Engine Memory Firewall LiveShield Client Interface Application State Probing
LiveShiled Constraint Creation Framework POC  Exploit  Released Acquire  the  exploit Identify  vulnerability Patch  Released Diff the patched version against previous version Attack Released Trace the  exploit  activity Acquire  the  attack Trace the  attack’s  activity Develop a Shield Port it to multiple  versions Test the  Shield Release to customers Receive LiveShield Push the Shield in detect mode No triggering in 24 hours Put into  protect mode Put in a full QA System in protect mode No problems in 24  hours Report the  problems to Determina Y Y N N best case  is 24 hours,  Cannot take more than 7 days Minimal QA a. la. DAT  update
LiveShiled Constraint Creation Framework ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Framework for Constraint Creation Release to customers Receive LiveShield Push the Shield in detect mode No triggering in 24 hours Put into  protect mode Put in a full QA System in protect mode No problems in 24  hours Report the  problems to Determina Y Y N N Minimal QA a. la. DAT  update
LiveShiled Coordination Center ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Receive LiveShield Push the Shield in detect mode No triggering in 24 hours Put into  protect mode Put in a full QA System in protect mode No problems in 24  hours Report the  problems to Determina Y Y N N Minimal QA a. la. DAT  update
Hybrid System for Binary Analysis ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Proactive Situational Awareness ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Vulnerability Analysis ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Integrate, Testing, Deployment ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

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MIT-6-determina-vps.ppt

  • 1. Determina’s Vulnerability Protection Suite Saman Amarasinghe CTO, Determina Inc. Associate Professor, MIT EECS/CSAIL
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  • 6. Recent Example: WMF Vulnerability NO Patch Available Patch fully deployed *Wipro, Ltd 2005, “The Total Cost of Security Patch Management” Day 14 : December 14: Sites first post WMF Exploits Day 35 : January 5 th : Microsoft Releases Patch Average exploit window: 25 days* before patches deployed Vulnerable w/no Official Patch 35 Days Vulnerability Made Public Total exploit window for average organization: 60 days Day 27: December 27: Initial Disclosure of Vulnerability Day 28 : December 28: MS Announces Awareness…No Patch for Issue Day 29: December 29: 50+ variants, 1000+ sites reported: Thursday 12/29 Day 31: December 31: Instant messaging,Trojan horses & botnets begin exploiting WMF and Unofficial patch released by Ilfak Guilfanov Day 33: January 3rd: 1,000,000+ WMF exploited downloads reported from just 1 site Day 0 : December 1: Vulnerability Discovered 1 and Exploit Code Being Sold for $4000 Shortly Afterward 1 Computerworld.com, “Russian hackers sold WMF exploit, analyst says” Patch issued by MS Determina 0-day protection active before vulnerability is known Zero-days
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  • 13. Managed Program Execution Engine Derek Bruening
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  • 17. How Program Shepherding Work? Restricted Control Transfer: Is it legal to go from here to there? Restricted Code Origins: Is this code came from a code page? Restricted Control Transfer: Is it legal to go from here to there? Restricted Code Origins: Is this code came from a code page? Program Run-time System Code Cache Program Counter: Executes the Program Instruction by Instruction Never Let go of the Program Counter Restricted Code Origins: Is this code came from a code page? jmp call br ret call jmp br
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  • 20. An Example: Chained Call Attack Local Variables: URL Local Variables: tmp Return Address Argument: h Local Variables: … Return Address Arguments: … Stack http://001110110110111011010001010110101101010110 10110110110110101011010101010110101011010101... URL: 0x7F8B0 Fake arguments handle_URL(handle * h) { char url[64]; … char * tmp =geturl(h) strcpy(url, tmp); … } Code 0x8A234 Fake arguments Libraries setuid() … unlink() … 0x7F8B0 0x8A234
  • 21. Technique 2: Restricted Control Transfers context switch indirect branch lookup trace branch taken? BASIC BLOCK CACHE TRACE CACHE non-control-flow instructions non-control-flow instructions Restrict based on source address, destination address, and/or transfer type
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  • 26. Memory protection R R Application code RW RW Application data RW R Code cache RW R MPEE data R R MPEE code MPEE Privileges Application Privileges Page type
  • 27. Memory protection R R Application code RW RW Application data RW RE Code cache RW R MPEE data RE R MPEE code MPEE Privileges Application Privileges Page type
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  • 33. Different Levels of Updates Power of a Patch, Operates like a DAT         Administration can be fully automated Minutes Within a day Hours Weeks to Months Months Months to never Typical time from release to deployment       Easy to undo     Patch update     Detect     Protect LiveShield     DAT file update     Dot upgrade     Major upgrade Manageable at a fine granularity Will not change current behavior No need to reboot or restart app No need to upgrade hardware or other programs
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  • 38. LiveShield Development Operations Flow POC Exploit Released Acquire the exploit Identify vulnerability Patch Released Diff the patched version against previous version Attack Released Trace the exploit activity Acquire the attack Trace the attack’s activity Develop a Shield Port it to multiple versions Test the Shield Release to customers Receive LiveShield Push the Shield in detect mode No triggering in 24 hours Put into protect mode Put in a full QA System in protect mode No problems in 24 hours Report the problems to Determina Y Y N N best case is 24 hours, Cannot take more than 7 days Minimal QA a. la. DAT update
  • 39. LiveShield Flow Read - only memory Read - only memory DLL load eventlog Determina Web site Controller @ Customer Site Node Manager Core Files available MP - v3 - 011604.xml const - v3base.dll const - v3a.dll const - v3b.dll … . const - v3u.dll const - v3v.dll Internet xml file per host Up - to - date dll cache Mode information Status information Events Controller - Node Manager Communication Interface Per processor policy data structure with mode info dll cache Stats Events Policy data structure with mode info Loaded dll ’ s Read - only memory Read - only memory DLL load eventlog Determina Web site Controller @ Customer Site Node Manager Core Files available MP - v3 - 011604.xml const - v3base.dll const - v3a.dll const - v3b.dll … . const - v3u.dll const - v3v.dll Internet xml file per host Up - to - date dll cache Mode information Status information Events Controller - Node Manager Communication Interface Per processor policy data structure with mode info dll cache Stats Events Policy data structure with mode info Loaded dll ’ s
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  • 45. 4. Coverage: No partial band-aid solutions please! % of vulnerabilities Source: CVE, Microsoft Security Bulletins, 2003-2004
  • 46. 5. Proactivity: Should be ready to protect when attacked! Application Released With a bug Vulnerability announced Patch released Attack Released Good guys Patch like crazy Bad guys analyze patch & create attack 17 Previously Unknown Vulnerability 2 26 Previously Unknown Vulnerability 46 31 06/01 03/02 04/02 07/02 07/02 03/03 07/03 03/04 04/04 11/04 Code Red Digispid Spida Slammer Slapper WebDAV Blaster Witty Sasser Mydoom.ag 185 # of days from the Publication of the Vulnerability (availability of a patch) to Attack 77 34
  • 47. Speed of Propagation The Witty Worm
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  • 51. VPS impact on the Project Managed Program Execution Engine Memory Firewall LiveShield Client Interface Injected code detection Patch Generation and Deployment Constraint Leaning and Monitoring Data Structure Consistency Checking Application State Probing Repair Generation, Evaluation and Filtering
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  • 55. LiveShiled Constraint Creation Framework POC Exploit Released Acquire the exploit Identify vulnerability Patch Released Diff the patched version against previous version Attack Released Trace the exploit activity Acquire the attack Trace the attack’s activity Develop a Shield Port it to multiple versions Test the Shield Release to customers Receive LiveShield Push the Shield in detect mode No triggering in 24 hours Put into protect mode Put in a full QA System in protect mode No problems in 24 hours Report the problems to Determina Y Y N N best case is 24 hours, Cannot take more than 7 days Minimal QA a. la. DAT update
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Hinweis der Redaktion

  1. Published analyst reports consistent – more vulnerabilities, attack motives changing from fame to fortune. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report marks a shift in the threat landscape. Attackers are moving away from large, multipurpose attacks on network perimeters and towards smaller, more focused attacks on client-side targets. The new threat landscape will likely be dominated by emerging threats such as bot networks, customizable modular malicious code, and targeted attacks on Web applications and Web browsers. Whereas traditional attack activity has been motivated by curiosity and a desire to show off technical virtuosity, many current threats are motivated by profit. They often attempt to perpetrate criminal acts, such as identity theft, extortion, and fraud
  2. Another specific instance. This is even more illustrative that using patching for securing systems is a losing battle because in this case there was no patch available until 30 days after the exploits were 1 st released. Lots of ways to get hurt, costing millions of dollars waiting for a patch and for the patch to be deployed. Recent example – the critical IE vulnerability in late March. Determina issued a stand-alone fix for download, for free, to highlight our capabilities. VPS was the only solution that protected the IE vulnerability. VPS customers were protected without taking any additional actions. No other solution did this! Over 90% of security exploits are carried out through vulnerabilities for which there are known patches (Gartner)
  3. What is the basis of the threat? Vulnerabilities are the root cause. In OS, server apps, desktop apps. Look at the stats, share these with your customers. How to protect vulnerabilities against these attacks and exploits?
  4. Days Until Mass Exploit: --- Means no mass exploit 0-Day?: --- means MS announced the vulnerability with the patch Some examples of recent vulnerabilities to illustrate the protections provided by MF and LS, as well as the threat and window of attacks without the protection.
  5. What is a customer looking for in a Host IPS/endpoint security solution? Stress here that it “just works.” Many solutions out there don’t live up to their claims or simply don’t work properly (crashes, conflicts, etc.). Stress here that while Determina is a young company, VPS is based on mature, proven technology going back over 8 years in development.
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  20. 3:23 Ask Should we give up? Ask about Crypto fool-proof?
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