Region V accounts fornearly 35% of all National CHEM NEP inspections
1. Process Safety and OSHA,
Seven Keys to Surviving a Chem NEP
Draft 5 2 2013
Background on CHEM NEP
 Seven Keys to Surviving a CHEM NEP
Top PSM Cited
3. National Emphasis Programs
• Provide for planned inspections in high hazard
• Focus efforts on specific hazards
• Refinery NEP focused on implementation of
PSM in Refineries
• Chemical NEP focuses on implementation of
PSM in all other PSM covered facilities
4. Why an NEP?
• NEPs are the most significant PSM
enforcement actions since the standard was
promulgated in 1992
• Significant differences between current effort
and pre-2007 inspections:
• 73% of early inspections were initiated due to
accidents, complaints or referrals.
• Almost all Refinery NEPs were program
5. Refinery NEP Origins
• NEP inspections have more violations and
higher penalties than prior PSM OR PQV
• 11.2 Violations per inspection
• Chem NEP
• 8.4 Violations per inspection
6. Refinery NEP
• Originally launched June 7, 2007
• Last inspections completed in 2011
• Combined “static” and “dynamic” question
lists with guidance for compliance officers
• Compliance found to be highly uneven
7. Lessons Learned
• List based approach does find hazards
• The listed questions also result in many “off-
• CSHO training works
• OSHA focus on RAGAGEP resulted in large
number of deficiencies
• Facility Siting still a problem 20+ years after
SHELL-Norco & Phillips-Pasadena
8. CHEM NEP
– Congress and CSB asked OSHA to focus
programmed chemical inspections on “high risk”
9. CHEM NEP
• Pilot Chem NEP effective July 27, 2009
• Extended nationwide Nov. 29, 2011
• Less resource-intensive
• State plan participation is required
• CSHO’s check abatement of PSM citations
requiring abatement going back six years
10. CHEM NEP
• Differs from Refinery NEP
• Intent is to perform a larger number of
shorter, less resource intensive, inspections
• A small number of “dynamic” list questions
are applied to a selected unit or units
• No static list questions
11. CHEM NEP
• 300-400 Inspections annually
• Violations Most Cited
– 1910.119 – Process Safety
– 1910.147 – LOTO
– 1910.120 – Hazardous waste
– 1910.1200 – Hazard Communication
– 1910.146 – Confined Space
12. CHEM NEP Approach
• Questions are specific and contain compliance
guidance (similar to Refinery NEP)
• Questions differ by type of facility
• Ammonia refrigeration
• General PSM
• Chemical Processing
• Questions change periodically
• CSHO must document the questions in the file.
13. Sample Questions
• Has the employer revalidated the PHS every
• Does the MI program ensure that the material
is suitable for the process?
• Are Alarms and Controls enabled and in
• Does the employer have a means to verify
that the employees understood the training?
• Ammonia Refrigeration
• Storage Only
• Chemical Processing
• (includes Chlorine)
• Ammonia refrigeration
dynamic list – 10 questions
• PSM General dynamic list – 5
• PSM general dynamic list –
• Chemical Process dynamic
list – 10 questions
• PSM general dynamic list –
15. Region V FY 2012 Total
Percentage of Region V CHEM NEP Total Programmed vs. Unprogrammed
16. Region V FY 2012 Total
Complaint Referral Other
Percentage of Region V CHEM NEP Total Unprogrammed Breakdown
17. National Comparison
Total of CHEM NEP Inspections Nationally during FY 12
18. NAICS Codes
Waste Management and
Percentage of CHEM NEP Inspections in Region V during FY 12
19. PSM A Strong Enforcement Start
Penalty State Major Issues
• $545,000 OH PSM, Chemical comp. release.
• $54,000 IL PSM, Food
• $133,000 MA PSM, candy mfr,
• $46,400 OK PSM contractors, Refinery
• $123,000 NY PSM, Insulation mfr.
• $73,400 MA PSM, food
• $963,200 CA PSM refinery
• $53,000 TX PSM, chem plant
• $99,000 TX PSM, ammonia
• $55,000 AK PSM, Ammonia
• $121,000 TX PSM, Ammonia
• $67,000 LA PSM at VC facility
• $155,000 WY PSM at Refinery
• $51,800 WI PSM at Pharmaceutical
• $121,000 TX PSM Warehouse
20. Citations Issued
• Citations issued Frequency
– 1910.119(j) – Mechanical Integrity
– 1910.119(e) - Process Hazard Analysis
– 1910.119(l) - Management of Change
– 1910.119(f) - Operating Procedures
– 1910.119(d) – Process Safety Information
– 1910.119(c) - Employee Participation
– 1910.119(g) - Training
– 1910.119(i) – Pre-Startup Safety Review
– 1910.119(m) – Incident Investigation
– 1910.119(n) - Emergency Planning and Response
– 1910.119(o) – Compliance Audits
21. Plain View Doctrine
– Compliance officer can
issue citations for any
violations in “plain view.”
– If Compliance Officer
doesn’t see it he/she
can’t cite you for it.
• Relief Valves not in P&ID
• P&ID indicated flame arrestors that did not
• P&ID did not indicate correct piping
connections to vessels. Incorrect diameters of
• P&ID did not show LEL detectors and
• No design basis for relief valves on reactor
• Valve tags were reversed, mislabeled
• HF vent line was not marked
• HF dump tank was not identified.
• Three way valves were not identified
• Equipment were transposed on the diagrams
24. Process Safety Information
PSI did not list:
• Cutout devices and Interlocks
• High and low level sensors
• Ammonia detectors
• High and low pressure devices
• Emergency Stop Buttons
• Electrical Classification of Equipment
• U-1 Form missing for pressure vessel
• Mechanical room for ammonia had no emergency ventilation
• Electrical Classification of equipment missing
• Venting Flanges not meet ANSI/ASME 31.3
• No documentation that piping fit for service per API 570
• Manual block valves were located down stream of automatic dump valves
(Hydrogen Fluoride Industry Practice Institute or HFIPI)
• HF tanks not sized 1.5x for anticipated deliveries. HFIPI
• HF dump tank did not have capacity of largest HF tank. HFIPI
• HF liquid flow velocity exceeded 5.9 feet/second
• Eye wash and shower were not configured to sound in the control room.
• No valve capping kit for HF rail car unloading
• High pressure vent lines were not labeled.
• Relief valve discharge 3.5` above platform vs. 15 feet. (IIAR 2-2008)
• No PHA on the Hydrogen Storage tank
• PHA missing several elements
• PHA did not address failure of ventilation
• PHA did not address previous fires.
• PHA did not previous piping failures.
• PHA did not address previous failures of
• 119(e)(3)(i) The hazards of the process;
• The hazard of power failure was not discussed in the PHA.
• The Hazard of natural gas draining to the surge drum too long.
• The hazard of releasing material in the neutralization pits
• The hazard of weight of hoses on pipe nipples was not
• The Hazards of venting flanges was not addressed in the PHA.
• The hazard of forklift traffic was not addressed.
• No analysis of facility siting issues related to
• Building siting and how affected by the
• Ammonia system including
piping, recirculator, chiller, receiver, and
condensors were located to the roadway and
subject to vehicle impact.
• Human factor
• No consider of opening block valves downstream of
remote operated dump valve
• Second and third shift training
• People on vacation leave
• Operational overload during emergencies
• Operation interactions
• PHA items not resolved for years
• PHA did not address team finding and
recommendations such as
• Installing back flow prevention when adding
flammable liquids in a tank
• Automatic Pressure controls for Nitrogen
• Adding relief valves
• Facility siting for control rooms
• Reconfigurations of valves issue on PHA was not
31. Operating Procedures
• No written procedures for maintaining the ammonia systems
• No procedures for communicating issues during shift changes
• No procedures for upset condition or avoiding deviations
beyond operating limits.
• Transferring chemicals from pit to pit
• Neutralization of chemicals
32. Operating Procedures
• No procedures for when discharge pressure, suction
pressure, discharge temperature, lubrication oil pressure, and
lubrication oil temperature exceed normal operating range
• No Specific steps to stop an emergency
• No identification of emergency upset conditions and
procedures to take to resolve it.
• No procedure for emergency operations for transfer of
chemicals out a Surge tank
• No clear procedures for emptying HF tanks with isolating
33. Operating Procedures
• No certification of operating procedures
34. Safe Work Practices
• No safe work procedures developed for
contractors or maintenance employees
working on PSM covered processes for
• Confined space
• Hot works
35. Mechanical Integrity
• 119(j)(2) No inspection procedures
• Pressure Vessels
• Piping, components, Hose adapters
• Venting Flanges
• Compressors and cutout switches
• Relief Systems and change out schedule
• Emergency Shutdown Systems
• Valves requiring Carseals
• No Procedures for torquing bolts
36. Mechanical Integrity
• 119(j)(4)(i) No inspection of
• Relief valves
• Pressure vessels (Oil pot, Accumulator, Receiver, and
• Ammonia Feed Pumps
• Venting flanges
• Pipe Nipples, Deadlegs, Inspection ports, hose
• High Level alarms and emergency shutdown systems.
37. Mechanical Integrity
• No authorized API 570/574 piping inspector or piping
• No API 510 pressure vessel inspector
• No corrosion rates established for pressure vessels
• Pump not maintained and lubricated per manufacturer’s
• Rupture Disk was not replaced per manufacturer’s
• No 100% Radiography or Ultrasonic testing on process pipe
weld repair per ANSI B31.1
• No fitness for service for repairs per API 579 for tanks
undergoing repair at head nozzles
38. Mechanical Integrity
• No annual piping inspection
• No API internal pressure vessel inspection
• No inspection testing of the condensate vapor
system for buildup that might clog the system.
• No hydrostatic testing of HF tanks
• No testing or exercising of HF vent valves/dump
• Not testing compressor cutout switches
• Blast Evaporators, heat exchangers not inspected
• No pump inspections
39. Management of Change
• No implementation of procedures after
• Replacing manual valves with pneumatic actuated valves.
• Installing a LEL detector
• Disconnection of the Cooling water System
• Installing an alarm on the quench system
• Expanding Toulene tank system
• Leak at Relief Header Rupture disk
• Bolt torquing procedure change
• After making changes in the Ammonia system
• No MOC for condenser removed from process
40. Copyright - EHS Management
Tip 1 Anticipate the NEP Questions
Q: Have appropriate checks and inspections been made to
assure equipment is installed properly and consistent with
design specifications and manufacturer's instructions?
Citation - There is no evidence of a process for installation verification.
Vulnerable - Some staff report that inspections are done, but there is no
consistent documentation or process.
Good - There is evidence of a procedure for equipment installation
checks and inspections, based on review of documentation. Not all new
equipment is consistently reviewed; or, reviews may not be complete.
41. Tip 2 Designate an OSHA Resource
• Designate a manager to deal with the
inspector in the event of an OSHA inspection.
This person could be the safety or human
resources manager, but the person should be
familiar with OSHA, PSM, company policies
42. Tip 3 Do a Sample PSM audit
• Perform your own periodic audits and
• Use Corporate or Outside Eyes
• Review of previous citations for last six years
in the corporation.
• Understand that internal reviews are
discoverable by OSHA and others
43. External Audits
OSHA can subpoena these
Two Large Penalty cases
used the audit findings
against the company.
– Outside audits are not
directed by a counsel
– Company and Outside
Counsel can retain
consultants to create
arguments the audit may
not be discovered by
44. Tip 3 Do a Sample PSM audit (cont.)
• PSM coordinator
• Operators at all levels
• Process engineers
• Inspection dept
• Operating supervisors
• Instrument technicians
45. Tip 4 – Organize Required Documents
• PSM programs in one location or binder.
• Operating instructions are on computer and
• Keep log of all training and missed training
• Put PHA in a separate binder(s)
46. Tip 5 Take Notes
• Throughout the inspection, the OSHA Designee and
any other employer representatives should
• take copious notes on what the inspector sees,
• who he talks to and
• what is said,
• what samples
• and pictures he takes, (take side by side)
• what documents he reviews.
• Bate Stamp documents given
• Best Practice: Designate a scribe who takes notes
47. Tip 6 Employee Interviews
Hourly Employee Interviews
• OSHA takes position no management present
• Up to employee – can have Employee Representative
• Advise employee of his/her rights, appreciation of
cooperation, and to tell the truth’
• Management and supervisor interviews
• – Always another management/counsel present –
agent of Company
48. Tip 7 Correct During Inspections
• Immediately Correct
Identified by The
Without Admitting That
The Condition Constitutes
– May avoid the citation
– May lessen the
classification or penalty of
Letting a violation exist for weeks
during an OSHA inspection can be
used to show duration.
49. SUMMARY PROCESS SAFETY INFORMATION
• Review all of the information
• Check for accuracy and
to see if it is up to date
– Where is it located?
– Cross check with procedures
– Does it match the operations
• You may have to walk the system through and check
• Test ventilation systems, check gauges versus
specifications given etc.
50. SUMMARY PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS
• Check the PHA’s for timeliness
– Initial and recertification
• Document the methodology used
– Is it appropriate?
• Who conducted the PHA?
• Was an hourly employee involved?
• Were participants trained in the
methodology, including employee(s)?
– Review the training.
• Review the system used to track
action items to closure.
– Are the items tracked and on
• Document delays and the reasons
for the delays.
– Are they valid or does it appear
to be procrastination?
• Does anyone assure that the items
were actually corrected or is it just
51. SUMMARY PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS
paragraph e (cont’d)
• Review the PHA
– Are all systems analyzed?
– Are all systems identified?
• Check the validity of the
mitigation systems identified in
– Relief valve vs. sizing criteria
• Kill systems
– Do they work or is injection
pressure less than operating
Documentation • Equipment inspections
– When inspection program is
• Review rejected PHA
– Document the rationale and test
it for accuracy
– Were the hazards of rejected
items resolved in another
• Verify that facility siting and
human factors were
52. SUMMARY PROCEDURES
paragraph f (cont’d)
• Review procedures
– Determine if practice and paper are the same
– Note discrepancies
– Ensure procedures meet the elements of the standard
• Do the operators know the procedures
versus their responsibilities.
– Includes relief operators and subs
– Cross check with training
• Note how the procedures are filed
– Paper or electronic and where they are located
– If computerized check to verify that all employees
who would need access to them have computer skills
and the appropriate logon and password
– Access if the power were to fail?
53. SUMMARY PROCEDURES
paragraph f (cont’d)
• Review the procedure format and check for
consistency between processes.
• Document the dates of certification and who is the
• Review the certification process to determine
how, or if, the procedures are reviewed prior
• Cross check changes made with the Management
of Change procedures.
• Review the safe work practices and verify that they
are being used in the day to day operations. This
includes contractors. Especially note line breaking
54. SUMMARY MECHANICAL INTEGRITY
• Determine if process vessels including pressure vessels
are inspected according to codes. Includes:
– appropriate corrosion rate calculations
– scheduling inspections at the appropriate intervals
• Determine that piping is inspected properly and timely
• Ensure that inspectors have the proper training and
certifications for the inspections they do
– if NDT is used, determine that the inspectors have ASNT
certification or equivalent.
55. SUMMARY MECHANICAL INTEGRITY
paragraph j (cont’d)
• Document the removal from service criteria for pumps
and rotating equipment and verify that they are pulled
– Preventive maintenance vs. breakdown maintenance.
• Determine if the process instrumentation is
inspected/calibrated according to manufacturers
• Do process operators perform maintenance?
– Are they trained?
• Review inspection reports to see if deficiencies are
56. SUMMARY MANAGEMENT OF
paragraph l (cont’d)
• Verify that all changes to the process were
reviewed through the management of change
• Document the system to advise and train
operators in the change.
• Investigate “emergency” management of
changes. Changes that may occur during
second or third shifts.
• How do the P&ID’s and procedures get update?
57. SUMMARY MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE
paragraph l (cont’d)
• Does the company definition
of changes meet the OSHA
definition for MOC?
• Review the MOCs to see if
all provisions were addressed
before the change was made
• Check raw materials for changes
• Check process chemistry conditions vs. practice
(temp, flow, pressure, cooling, solid to solvent ratio
etc), psi information
• Check for controller loop bypasses and MOC
• Identify the top risks in the facility
• Look at corrosion monitoring on pipes and vessels,
• Pump vibration leads to failures and fires.
• Procedures related to boiler startup, hot works,
• Evaluate hydrogen sulfide monitoring, hydrofluoric acid,
• Address fatigue and control panel alarms during start ups,
• Management of change is slipping.
• Gasket torquing procedures should be reviewed as well as
gasket compatibility for service,
• Relief valve inspection and testing is a must.
• Facility siting is ever present
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