Nfpa process safety and osha, seven keys to surviving a chem nep audi
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Nfpa process safety and osha, seven keys to surviving a chem nep audi

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  • Region V accounts fornearly 35% of all National CHEM NEP inspections

Nfpa process safety and osha, seven keys to surviving a chem nep audi Nfpa process safety and osha, seven keys to surviving a chem nep audi Presentation Transcript

  • Process Safety and OSHA, Seven Keys to Surviving a Chem NEP Audit Johnanewquist@gmail.com NFPA 2013 Session 41 Draft 5 2 2013
  • Overview Background on CHEM NEP  Seven Keys to Surviving a CHEM NEP Top PSM Cited
  • National Emphasis Programs • Provide for planned inspections in high hazard industries • Focus efforts on specific hazards • Refinery NEP focused on implementation of PSM in Refineries • Chemical NEP focuses on implementation of PSM in all other PSM covered facilities
  • Why an NEP? • NEPs are the most significant PSM enforcement actions since the standard was promulgated in 1992 • Significant differences between current effort and pre-2007 inspections: • 73% of early inspections were initiated due to accidents, complaints or referrals. • Almost all Refinery NEPs were program planned
  • Refinery NEP Origins • NEP inspections have more violations and higher penalties than prior PSM OR PQV inspections: • 11.2 Violations per inspection • $76,800 • Chem NEP • 8.4 Violations per inspection • $31,600
  • Refinery NEP • Originally launched June 7, 2007 • Last inspections completed in 2011 • Combined “static” and “dynamic” question lists with guidance for compliance officers (CSHOs) • Compliance found to be highly uneven
  • Lessons Learned • List based approach does find hazards • The listed questions also result in many “off- script” citations • CSHO training works • OSHA focus on RAGAGEP resulted in large number of deficiencies • Facility Siting still a problem 20+ years after SHELL-Norco & Phillips-Pasadena
  • CHEM NEP Targeting – Congress and CSB asked OSHA to focus programmed chemical inspections on “high risk” operations
  • CHEM NEP • Pilot Chem NEP effective July 27, 2009 • Extended nationwide Nov. 29, 2011 • Less resource-intensive • State plan participation is required • CSHO’s check abatement of PSM citations requiring abatement going back six years
  • CHEM NEP • Differs from Refinery NEP • Intent is to perform a larger number of shorter, less resource intensive, inspections • A small number of “dynamic” list questions are applied to a selected unit or units • No static list questions
  • CHEM NEP • 300-400 Inspections annually • Violations Most Cited – 1910.119 – Process Safety – 1910.147 – LOTO – 1910.120 – Hazardous waste emergency response – 1910.1200 – Hazard Communication – 1910.146 – Confined Space
  • CHEM NEP Approach • Questions are specific and contain compliance guidance (similar to Refinery NEP) • Questions differ by type of facility • Ammonia refrigeration • General PSM • Chemical Processing • Questions change periodically • CSHO must document the questions in the file.
  • Sample Questions • Has the employer revalidated the PHS every five years? • Does the MI program ensure that the material is suitable for the process? • Are Alarms and Controls enabled and in service? • Does the employer have a means to verify that the employees understood the training?
  • Sectors • Ammonia Refrigeration • Storage Only • Chemical Processing • (includes Chlorine) • Ammonia refrigeration dynamic list – 10 questions • PSM General dynamic list – 5 questions • PSM general dynamic list – 15 questions • Chemical Process dynamic list – 10 questions • PSM general dynamic list – 5 questions
  • Region V FY 2012 Total 74% 26% Unprogrammed Programmed Percentage of Region V CHEM NEP Total Programmed vs. Unprogrammed
  • Region V FY 2012 Total 31% 58% 11% Complaint Referral Other Percentage of Region V CHEM NEP Total Unprogrammed Breakdown
  • National Comparison Total of CHEM NEP Inspections Nationally during FY 12 9% 11% 12% 6% 35% 14% 6% 4% 3% Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4 Region 5 Region 6 Region 7 Region 8 Region 10
  • NAICS Codes 60%20% 10% 10% Chemical Manufacturing Food Manufacturing Waste Management and Remediation Other Percentage of CHEM NEP Inspections in Region V during FY 12
  • PSM A Strong Enforcement Start Penalty State Major Issues • $545,000 OH PSM, Chemical comp. release. • $54,000 IL PSM, Food • $133,000 MA PSM, candy mfr, • $46,400 OK PSM contractors, Refinery • $123,000 NY PSM, Insulation mfr. • $73,400 MA PSM, food • $963,200 CA PSM refinery • $53,000 TX PSM, chem plant • $99,000 TX PSM, ammonia • $55,000 AK PSM, Ammonia • $121,000 TX PSM, Ammonia • $67,000 LA PSM at VC facility • $155,000 WY PSM at Refinery • $51,800 WI PSM at Pharmaceutical • $121,000 TX PSM Warehouse
  • Citations Issued • Citations issued Frequency – 1910.119(j) – Mechanical Integrity – 1910.119(e) - Process Hazard Analysis – 1910.119(l) - Management of Change – 1910.119(f) - Operating Procedures – 1910.119(d) – Process Safety Information – 1910.119(c) - Employee Participation – 1910.119(g) - Training – 1910.119(i) – Pre-Startup Safety Review – 1910.119(m) – Incident Investigation – 1910.119(n) - Emergency Planning and Response – 1910.119(o) – Compliance Audits
  • Plain View Doctrine – Compliance officer can issue citations for any violations in “plain view.” – If Compliance Officer doesn’t see it he/she can’t cite you for it.
  • P&IDs • 119(d)(3)(i)(B) • Relief Valves not in P&ID • P&ID indicated flame arrestors that did not exist. • P&ID did not indicate correct piping connections to vessels. Incorrect diameters of piping. • P&ID did not show LEL detectors and interlocks.
  • P&IDs • 119(d)(3)(i)(B) • No design basis for relief valves on reactor • Valve tags were reversed, mislabeled • HF vent line was not marked • HF dump tank was not identified. • Three way valves were not identified • Equipment were transposed on the diagrams
  • Process Safety Information • 119(d)(3)(i)(H) PSI did not list: • Cutout devices and Interlocks • High and low level sensors • Ammonia detectors • High and low pressure devices • Emergency Stop Buttons • Electrical Classification of Equipment
  • RAGAGEP • 119(d)(3)(ii) • U-1 Form missing for pressure vessel • Mechanical room for ammonia had no emergency ventilation • Electrical Classification of equipment missing • Venting Flanges not meet ANSI/ASME 31.3 • No documentation that piping fit for service per API 570 • Manual block valves were located down stream of automatic dump valves (Hydrogen Fluoride Industry Practice Institute or HFIPI) • HF tanks not sized 1.5x for anticipated deliveries. HFIPI • HF dump tank did not have capacity of largest HF tank. HFIPI • HF liquid flow velocity exceeded 5.9 feet/second • Eye wash and shower were not configured to sound in the control room. HFIPI • No valve capping kit for HF rail car unloading • High pressure vent lines were not labeled. • Relief valve discharge 3.5` above platform vs. 15 feet. (IIAR 2-2008)
  • PHA • 119(e)(1) • No PHA on the Hydrogen Storage tank • PHA missing several elements • PHA did not address failure of ventilation • PHA did not address previous fires. • PHA did not previous piping failures. • PHA did not address previous failures of cooling systems
  • PHA • 119(e)(3)(i) The hazards of the process; • The hazard of power failure was not discussed in the PHA. • The Hazard of natural gas draining to the surge drum too long. • The hazard of releasing material in the neutralization pits • The hazard of weight of hoses on pipe nipples was not addressed • The Hazards of venting flanges was not addressed in the PHA. • The hazard of forklift traffic was not addressed.
  • PHA • 119(e)(3)(v) • No analysis of facility siting issues related to formaldehyde dispersion • Building siting and how affected by the ammonia process • Ammonia system including piping, recirculator, chiller, receiver, and condensors were located to the roadway and subject to vehicle impact.
  • PHA • 119(e)(3)(vi) • Human factor • Fatigue • No consider of opening block valves downstream of remote operated dump valve • Second and third shift training • People on vacation leave • Operational overload during emergencies • Operation interactions
  • PHA • 119(e)(5) • PHA items not resolved for years • PHA did not address team finding and recommendations such as • Installing back flow prevention when adding flammable liquids in a tank • Automatic Pressure controls for Nitrogen • Adding relief valves • Facility siting for control rooms • Reconfigurations of valves issue on PHA was not resolved.
  • Operating Procedures • 119(f)(1) • No written procedures for maintaining the ammonia systems • No procedures for communicating issues during shift changes • No procedures for upset condition or avoiding deviations beyond operating limits. • Transferring chemicals from pit to pit • Neutralization of chemicals
  • Operating Procedures • 119(f)(1)(i)(E) • No procedures for when discharge pressure, suction pressure, discharge temperature, lubrication oil pressure, and lubrication oil temperature exceed normal operating range • No Specific steps to stop an emergency • No identification of emergency upset conditions and procedures to take to resolve it. • No procedure for emergency operations for transfer of chemicals out a Surge tank • No clear procedures for emptying HF tanks with isolating nitrogen systems
  • Operating Procedures • 119(f)(3) • No certification of operating procedures annually.
  • Safe Work Practices • 119(f)(4) • No safe work procedures developed for contractors or maintenance employees working on PSM covered processes for • Lockout • Confined space • Hot works
  • Mechanical Integrity • 119(j)(2) No inspection procedures • Pressure Vessels • Piping, components, Hose adapters • Pump • Venting Flanges • Compressors and cutout switches • Relief Systems and change out schedule • Emergency Shutdown Systems • Valves requiring Carseals • No Procedures for torquing bolts
  • Mechanical Integrity • 119(j)(4)(i) No inspection of • Relief valves • Pressure vessels (Oil pot, Accumulator, Receiver, and Transfer Drum) • Ammonia Feed Pumps • Venting flanges • Pipe Nipples, Deadlegs, Inspection ports, hose adapters • High Level alarms and emergency shutdown systems.
  • Mechanical Integrity • 119(j)(4)(ii) • No authorized API 570/574 piping inspector or piping inspections • No API 510 pressure vessel inspector • No corrosion rates established for pressure vessels • Pump not maintained and lubricated per manufacturer’s recommendations • Rupture Disk was not replaced per manufacturer’s recommendations • No 100% Radiography or Ultrasonic testing on process pipe weld repair per ANSI B31.1 • No fitness for service for repairs per API 579 for tanks undergoing repair at head nozzles
  • Mechanical Integrity • 119(j)(4)(iii) • No annual piping inspection • No API internal pressure vessel inspection • No inspection testing of the condensate vapor system for buildup that might clog the system. • No hydrostatic testing of HF tanks • No testing or exercising of HF vent valves/dump valves • Not testing compressor cutout switches • Blast Evaporators, heat exchangers not inspected • No pump inspections
  • Management of Change • 119(L)(1) • No implementation of procedures after • Replacing manual valves with pneumatic actuated valves. • Installing a LEL detector • Disconnection of the Cooling water System • Installing an alarm on the quench system • Expanding Toulene tank system • Leak at Relief Header Rupture disk • Bolt torquing procedure change • After making changes in the Ammonia system • No MOC for condenser removed from process
  • Copyright - EHS Management Partners, Inc. 40 Tip 1 Anticipate the NEP Questions Q: Have appropriate checks and inspections been made to assure equipment is installed properly and consistent with design specifications and manufacturer's instructions? Citation - There is no evidence of a process for installation verification. Vulnerable - Some staff report that inspections are done, but there is no consistent documentation or process. Good - There is evidence of a procedure for equipment installation checks and inspections, based on review of documentation. Not all new equipment is consistently reviewed; or, reviews may not be complete.
  • Tip 2 Designate an OSHA Resource • Designate a manager to deal with the inspector in the event of an OSHA inspection. This person could be the safety or human resources manager, but the person should be familiar with OSHA, PSM, company policies and operations.
  • Tip 3 Do a Sample PSM audit • Perform your own periodic audits and reviews • Use Corporate or Outside Eyes • Review of previous citations for last six years in the corporation. • Understand that internal reviews are discoverable by OSHA and others
  • External Audits OSHA can subpoena these audits. Two Large Penalty cases used the audit findings against the company. – Outside audits are not privileged unless directed by a counsel – Company and Outside Counsel can retain consultants to create arguments the audit may not be discovered by OSHA etc.
  • Tip 3 Do a Sample PSM audit (cont.) INTERVIEWS • PSM coordinator • Operators at all levels • Process engineers • Inspection dept • Operating supervisors • Instrument technicians
  • Tip 4 – Organize Required Documents by Standard • PSM programs in one location or binder. • Operating instructions are on computer and hard copy • Keep log of all training and missed training • Put PHA in a separate binder(s)
  • Tip 5 Take Notes • Throughout the inspection, the OSHA Designee and any other employer representatives should • take copious notes on what the inspector sees, • who he talks to and • what is said, • what samples • and pictures he takes, (take side by side) • what documents he reviews. • Bate Stamp documents given • Best Practice: Designate a scribe who takes notes during inspections.
  • Tip 6 Employee Interviews Hourly Employee Interviews • OSHA takes position no management present • Up to employee – can have Employee Representative • Advise employee of his/her rights, appreciation of cooperation, and to tell the truth’ • Management and supervisor interviews • – Always another management/counsel present – agent of Company
  • Tip 7 Correct During Inspections • Immediately Correct Unsafe Conditions Identified by The Compliance Officer Without Admitting That The Condition Constitutes a Violation – May avoid the citation – May lessen the classification or penalty of a citation Letting a violation exist for weeks during an OSHA inspection can be used to show duration.
  • SUMMARY PROCESS SAFETY INFORMATION paragraph d • Review all of the information that exists • Check for accuracy and to see if it is up to date – Where is it located? – Cross check with procedures – Does it match the operations and layout? • You may have to walk the system through and check the data. • Test ventilation systems, check gauges versus specifications given etc.
  • SUMMARY PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS paragraph e • Check the PHA’s for timeliness – Initial and recertification • Document the methodology used – Is it appropriate? • Who conducted the PHA? • Was an hourly employee involved? – Describe. • Were participants trained in the methodology, including employee(s)? – Review the training. Documentation • Review the system used to track action items to closure. – Are the items tracked and on schedule? • Document delays and the reasons for the delays. – Are they valid or does it appear to be procrastination? • Does anyone assure that the items were actually corrected or is it just paper shuffling?
  • SUMMARY PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS paragraph e (cont’d) • Review the PHA – Are all systems analyzed? – Are all systems identified? • Check the validity of the mitigation systems identified in the PHA – Relief valve vs. sizing criteria • Kill systems – Do they work or is injection pressure less than operating pressure? Documentation • Equipment inspections – When inspection program is poor • Review rejected PHA recommendations – Document the rationale and test it for accuracy – Were the hazards of rejected items resolved in another manner? • Verify that facility siting and human factors were adequately addressed
  • SUMMARY PROCEDURES paragraph f (cont’d) DOCUMENTATION • Review procedures – Determine if practice and paper are the same – Note discrepancies – Ensure procedures meet the elements of the standard • Do the operators know the procedures versus their responsibilities. – Includes relief operators and subs – Cross check with training • Note how the procedures are filed – Paper or electronic and where they are located – If computerized check to verify that all employees who would need access to them have computer skills and the appropriate logon and password – Access if the power were to fail? OSHA
  • SUMMARY PROCEDURES paragraph f (cont’d) DOCUMENTATION (cont’d) • Review the procedure format and check for consistency between processes. • Document the dates of certification and who is the certifying official. • Review the certification process to determine how, or if, the procedures are reviewed prior to certification. • Cross check changes made with the Management of Change procedures. • Review the safe work practices and verify that they are being used in the day to day operations. This includes contractors. Especially note line breaking activities. Plant Operating Procedures
  • SUMMARY MECHANICAL INTEGRITY paragraph j DOCUMENTATION • Determine if process vessels including pressure vessels are inspected according to codes. Includes: – appropriate corrosion rate calculations – scheduling inspections at the appropriate intervals • Determine that piping is inspected properly and timely • Ensure that inspectors have the proper training and certifications for the inspections they do – if NDT is used, determine that the inspectors have ASNT certification or equivalent.
  • SUMMARY MECHANICAL INTEGRITY paragraph j (cont’d) DOCUMENTATION (cont’d) • Document the removal from service criteria for pumps and rotating equipment and verify that they are pulled before breakdown. – Preventive maintenance vs. breakdown maintenance. • Determine if the process instrumentation is inspected/calibrated according to manufacturers schedule. • Do process operators perform maintenance? – Are they trained? • Review inspection reports to see if deficiencies are corrected.
  • SUMMARY MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE paragraph l (cont’d) DOCUMENTATION • Verify that all changes to the process were reviewed through the management of change procedure. • Document the system to advise and train operators in the change. • Investigate “emergency” management of changes. Changes that may occur during second or third shifts. • How do the P&ID’s and procedures get update?
  • SUMMARY MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE paragraph l (cont’d) Supporting line before opening DOCUMENTATION (cont’d) • Does the company definition of changes meet the OSHA definition for MOC? • Review the MOCs to see if all provisions were addressed before the change was made • Check raw materials for changes • Check process chemistry conditions vs. practice (temp, flow, pressure, cooling, solid to solvent ratio etc), psi information • Check for controller loop bypasses and MOC
  • Summary • Identify the top risks in the facility • Look at corrosion monitoring on pipes and vessels, • Pump vibration leads to failures and fires. • Procedures related to boiler startup, hot works, • Evaluate hydrogen sulfide monitoring, hydrofluoric acid, • Address fatigue and control panel alarms during start ups, • Management of change is slipping. • Gasket torquing procedures should be reviewed as well as gasket compatibility for service, • Relief valve inspection and testing is a must. • Facility siting is ever present
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