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Risk Management Practices
                                                for PCI DSS 2.0

                                               Ulf Mattsson
                                             CTO Protegrity
                                     ulf.mattsson [at] protegrity.com




© 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
Ulf Mattsson

           • 20 years with IBM Development & Global Services
           • Inventor of 22 patents – Encryption and Intrusion Prevention
           • Co-founder of Protegrity (Data Security)
           • Research member of the International Federation for
             Information Processing (IFIP) WG 11.3 Data and Application
             Security
           • Member of
                    –    PCI Security Standards Council (PCI SSC)
                    –    American National Standards Institute (ANSI) X9
                    –    Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA)
                    –    Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA)
                    –    Information Systems Security Association (ISSA)
                    –    Cloud Security Alliance (CSA)

     © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
02
ISACA Articles


                                                      Volume 6, November, 2011


                                          Choosing the Most Appropriate Data
                                          Security Solution for an Organization
                                                   Ulf Mattsson, CTO, Protegrity




     © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
03
© 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
04
Agenda

         1.          Present trends in data breaches

         2.          Review data security methods available today

         3.          Discuss emerging technologies for protecting data

         4.          Present what tokenization is and how it differs from
                     other data security methods

         5.          Review case studies on how new technologies can
                     minimize costs and complexities

         6.          Summary and conclusion

     © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
05
Data Breaches


     © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
06
The Attacks on Sony Corporation

        • Majority of attacks were SQL Injection - not advanced
        • Data including passwords and personal details were not encrypted
        • Data stolen
                 –    77 million names, addresses, passwords
                 –    102 million email addresses, birth dates
                 –    25 million phone numbers and payment cards
                 –    54 Mbyte Sony software code
        • 21 uncoordinated attacks during Apr 4 to Jul 6, 2011
        • 55 class action suits in the US (8/16/2011)
        • Sony’s stock dropped 30 percent after attacks were disclosed
        Source: http://defensesystems.com/articles/2011/07/18/digital-conflict-cyberattacks-economy-security.aspx




     © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
07
The Attack on RSA Security

        • Attackers stole information relating to the
          SecurID two-factor authentication technology
        • APT malware tied to a network in Shanghai
        • 60 different types of customized malware to
          launch their attacks
        • Based on a commonly used tool written by a
          Chinese hacker 10 years ago




     © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
08
The AT&T Breach

     •      Security vulnerability in a Web site used by iPad customers
     •      Programming tricked the site into divulging e-mail addresses
     •      100,000 e-mail addresses and iPad identification numbers were exposed
     •      Some examples
              •     New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg,
              •     FBI,
              •     US Departments of Defense and Justice,
              •     NASA,
              •     Executives from Google, Microsoft,
              •     Amazon, Goldman Sachs, and JP Morgan




    Source 2010: http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-20007417-245.html#ixzz1Y9IW9a7o

    © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
9
Best Source of Incident Data*




                             “It is fascinating that the top threat events
                                 in both 2010 and 2011 are the same
                    and involve external agents hacking and installing malware
                    to compromise the confidentiality and integrity of servers.”

      Source: 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report, Verizon Business RISK team
      *: Securiosis
      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
010
Who is Behind Data Breaches*?



                    External agents (+22%)
                                      Insiders (-31%)
                      Multiple parties (-18%)
                Business partners (-10%)

                                                        0        20        40         60           80   100 %




             *: Number of breaches
             Source: 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report, Verizon Business RISK team and USSS
      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
011
Demographics

             • Criminals may be making a classic risk vs.
               reward decision and opting to “play it safe” in
               light of recent arrests and prosecutions following
               large-scale intrusions into Financial Services
               firms.
             • Numerous smaller strikes on
               hotels, restaurants, and retailers represent a
               lower-risk alternative
                      – Cybercriminals may be taking greater advantage of
                        that option

      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
012
Compromised Data Types*

                               Payment card data
                            Personal information
                     Usernames, passwords
                              Intellectual property
                                Bank account data
                                      Medical records
                          Classified information
                               System information
          Sensitive organizational data

                                                        0        20        40        60         80   100 %120
          *: Number of records
          Source: 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report, Verizon Business RISK team and USSS
      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
013
Industry Groups Represented*

                              Hospitality
                                           Retail
             Financial Services
                          Government
                      Tech Services
                      Manufacturing
                     Transportation
                                           Media
                             Healthcare
             Business Services

                                                    0     10              20               30      40   %   50
             *: Number of breaches
             Source: 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report, Verizon Business RISK team and USSS
      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
014
Breach Discovery Methods*

                                Third party fraud detection
                             Notified by law enforcement
        Reported by customer/partner effected
                                  Unusual system behavior
                                           Reported by employee
                          Internal security audit or scan
                                       Internal fraud detection
                     Brag or blackmail by perpetrator
                          Third party monitoring service

                                                                  0      10         20          30   40   50 %
          *: Number of breaches
          Source: 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report, Verizon Business RISK team and USSS
      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
015
Trend in Number of Breaches*


             Hacking (+10%)
             Malware (+11%)
             Physical (+14%)
                 Misuse (-31%)
                    Social (-17%)

                                             0                    20                    40         60 %

             *: Number of breaches
             Source: 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report, Verizon Business RISK team and USSS
      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
016
How are Records Breached*

           Hacking

          Malware

          Physical

                 Error

            Misuse

              Social

                             0             20            40                60                   80   100 %

          *: Number of records
          Source: 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report, Verizon Business RISK team and USSS
      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
017
Most Important Trends in DBIR

      • The industrialization of attacks:
               – There is an industry encompassing many actors, from coders to attackers to
                 money launderers
               – They use automated tools and manage themselves and their operations as
                 businesses – including use of independent contractors
      • All forms of attack are up by all threat actors:
               – APT and IP loss serious issues
      • Law enforcement really does catch some of the bad
        guys:
               – 1,200 arrests over the past several years by the Secret Service alone.
               – Many of these bad guys/gals attack small business



       Source: Securosis comments on 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report, Verizon Business RISK team
      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
018
Data Security - Catch-22

  • We need to protect both data and the business processes
    that rely on that data
  • Enterprises are currently on their own in deciding how to
    apply emerging technologies for PCI data protection
             – Data Tokenization - an evolving technology
             – How to reduce PCI audit scope and exposure to data




      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
019
Protecting the

                                           Data Flow

      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
020
Protecting the Data Flow - Example




            : Enforcement point
                                                 Unprotected sensitive information:
      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
                                                  Protected sensitive information
021
PCI DSS


      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
022
PCI Encryption Rules

           Encrypted                                                       Attacker
                                                  Public




                                           SSL
             Data
           (PCI DSS)                             Network



                                                                     Private Network
                                                 Application
        Clear Text                                                     Clear Text Data
          Data
                                                 Database



              Encrypted                           OS File         Data
                Data                              System         At Rest
              (PCI DSS)                            Storage     (PCI DSS)
                                                   System
      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
023
PCI DSS

                 Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS)

                 The PCI Security Standards Council is an open global forum

                 American Express, Discover Financial Services, JCB
                  International, MasterCard Worldwide, and Visa Inc

                 The PCI standard consists of a set of 12 rules

                 Four ways to render the PAN (credit card number) unreadable

                   Two-way cryptography with associated key management processes
                   Truncation
                   One-way cryptographic hash functions
                   Index tokens and pads

      Source: https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/organization_info/index.php
      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
024
PCI DSS #3 & 4

         Protect Cardholder Data
         • 3.4 Render PAN, at minimum, unreadable anywhere it is
           stored by using any of the following approaches:
                  •    One-way hashes based on strong cryptography
                  •    Truncation
                  •    Index tokens and pads (pads must be securely stored)
                  •    Strong cryptography with associated key-management processes and procedures

         • 4.1 Use strong cryptography to safeguard sensitive
           cardholder data during transmission over open, public
           networks.
         • Comments – Cost effective compliance
                  •    Encrypted PAN is always “in PCI scope”
                  •    Tokens can be “out of PCI scope”


      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
025
PCI DSS - Appendix B:


  • Compensating controls must satisfy the following criteria:
             – Meet the intent and rigor of the original PCI DSS requirement.
             – Provide a similar level of defense as the original PCI DSS requirement, such that the
               compensating control sufficiently offsets the risk that the original PCI DSS
               requirement was designed to defend against.
             – Be “above and beyond” other PCI DSS requirements. (Simply being in compliance
               with other PCI DSS requirements is not a compensating control.)




      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
026
PCI Tokenization Guidelines




      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
027
PCI DSS - Network Segmentation

       • Network segmentation of, or isolating (segmenting), the
         cardholder data environment from the remainder of an
         entity’s network is not a PCI DSS requirement.
       • However, it is strongly recommended as a method that
         may reduce:
                – The scope of the PCI DSS assessment
                – The cost of the PCI DSS assessment
                – The cost and difficulty of implementing and maintaining PCI DSS
                  controls
                – The risk to an organization (reduced by consolidating cardholder
                  data into fewer, more controlled locations)



      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
028
PCI Mandates Risk Assessment

         • PCI 2.0 Requirement 12.1.2 mandates the use of formal risk
           assessment based on established methodologies

         • 12.1.2 Includes an annual process that identifies threats, and
           vulnerabilities, and results in a formal risk assessment

                  – 12.1.2.a Verify that an annual risk assessment process is documented
                    that identifies threats, vulnerabilities, and results in a formal risk
                    assessment

                  – 12.1.2.b Review risk assessment documentation to verify that the risk
                    assessment process is performed at least annually

         • Examples of risk assessment methodologies include but are not
           limited to OCTAVE, ISO 27005 and NIST SP 800-30

       Source: https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/organization_info/index.php

      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
029
Data Security
                                       Methods


      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
030
Advancements in Cryptography

              Year                                Event
             2010 In-memory Data Tokenization introduced as a fully distributed model
                     Centralized Data Tokenization introduced with hosted payment
                                                 service
                       DTP (Data Type Preserving encryption) used in commercial
             2005
                                                databases
                                       Attack on SHA-1 announced
                                           DES was withdrawn
                    AES (Advance Encryption Standard) accepted as a FIPS-approved
             2001
                                                algorithm
             1991                PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) was written
             1988             IBM AS/400 used tokenization in shadow files
             1978                     RSA algorithm was published
             1975       DES (Data Encryption Standard) draft submitted by IBM
            1900 BC                    Cryptography used in Egypt


      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
031
Intrusiveness of Data Formats

                                   Intrusiveness (to Applications and Databases)




                                                                                           Encryption
                                                                                           Standard
                                              !@#$%a^///&*B()..,,,gft_+!@4#$2%p^&
                               Hashing -
                                                  *
                                              !@#$%a^.,mhu7/////&*B()_+!
            Strong Encryption -
                                              @
                                    Alpha -   aVdSaH 1F4hJ 1D3a
              Encoding




                                                                           Tokenizing or
                                              666666 777777 8888            Formatted
                              Numeric -
                                                                            Encryption
                                              123456 777777 1234
                                  Partial -
                                              123456 123456 1234
                  Clear Text Data -                                                        Data
                                                                   I
                                                                                           Length
                                                                Original
      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
032
Encryption vs. Tokenization


                                                             Encryption   Tokenization

                              Used Approach               Cipher System   Code System

                    Cryptographic algorithms
                           Cryptographic keys
                                  Code books
                                  Index tokens




       Source: McGraw-HILL ENCYPLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
033
Use of Enabling Technologies

                     Access controls               1%                                               91% 5%



      Database activity monitoring            18%                                47%        16%



               Database encryption         30%                            35%   10%



       Backup / Archive encryption           21%                            39% 4%



                        Data masking       28%                         28% 7%



       Application-level encryption                 7%                 29% 7%



                         Tokenization        22%                23%       13%


                                           Evaluating    Current Use       Planned Use <12 Months

      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
034
Use of Enabling Technologies, by Maturity




      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
035
Hiding Data in Plain Sight

                   Data Entry

                                                         Y&SFD%))S(            Tokenization
                                                                                 Server

          400000 123456 7899                                     Data Token



                                                                400000 222222 7899


                                           Application
                                           Database




      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
036
Reducing the Attack Surface



             123456 123456 1234                 123456 999999 1234    123456 999999 1234      123456 999999 1234            123456 123456 1234




                                           123456 999999 1234          123456 999999 1234              123456 999999 1234

                                                                                  Applications & Databases

         : Data Token
                                                         Unprotected sensitive information:
      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
                                                           Protected sensitive information
037
Fully Distributed Tokenization

        • How do you deliver tokenization to many locations without the impact of
        latency?


                                           Customer
                                           Application

                               Token
                               Server      Customer
                                           Application




                                                                   Customer
                                                                   Application
                                                         Token
                                                          Token
                                                         Server    Customer
                                                          Server   Application


      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
038
A Fully Distributed Approach

                              Random Static Lookup Tables

                 288910                    Application   • Multi-Use Tokens
                 288910
                 288910
                 288910
                                                         • Random Static Lookup Tables
                                                            – Remains the same size no matter
                 288910
                1,000,000                  Application
                max entries
                                                              the number of unique tokens
                                                         • Example: 50 million = 2 million
                 288910
                 288910
                                           Application     tokens
                                                         • Performance: 200,000 tokens
                 288910
                 288910
                 288910
                1,000,000
                max entries
                                           Application     per second on a commodity
                                                           standard dual core machine



      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
039
Evaluating Encryption & Tokenization

                                                         Database     Database       Old       Memory
               Area                        Impact          File       Column        Token       Token
                                                        Encryption   Encryption    Approach   Approach
                                      Availability

          Scalability                      Latency

                                      CPU
                                   Consumption
                                      Data Flow
                                      Protection
                                    Compliance
                                     Scoping
            Security
                                      Key
                                   Management
                                   Separation of
                                      Duties

                                                 Best                             Worst
      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
040
Evaluating Encryption & Tokenization

                Evaluation Criteria                     Strong Field   Formatted    Memory Token
                                                        Encryption     Encryption     Approach
                Disconnected environments

                Distributed environments

                Performance impact when loading data

                Transparent to applications

                Expanded storage size

                Transparent to databases schema

                Long life-cycle data

                Unix or Windows mixed with “big iron”

                Easy re-keying of data in a data flow

                High risk data

                Security - compliance to PCI, NIST

                                              Best                      Worst
      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
041
Best Practices for Tokenization

          Token Generation                                                 Token Types
                                                                Single Use Token Multi Use Token

          Algorithm and  Known strong
          Key Reversible algorithm                                                      -
                                           Unique Sequence
                                           Number                                       
          One way
                                           Hash                   Secret per         Secret per
          Irreversible
                                                                  transaction        merchant
          Function
                                           Randomly generated
                                           value                                        
           Published July 14, 2010.


      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
042
Comments on Best Practices

             • Visa recommendations should be simply to use a
               random number
             • The only way to discover PAN data from a real token is a
               (reverse) lookup in the token server database
             • The odds are that if you are saddled with PCI-DSS
               responsibilities, you will not write your own 'home-grown'
               token servers




      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
043
Secure Tokenization


      What Makes a “Secure Tokenization” Algorithm?

      • Ask vendors what their token-generating algorithms are

      • Be sure to analyze anything other than strong random
        number generators for security.




      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
044
A Retail Scenario

                                                                 Stores                           Stores   Token
                                           Authorization                                                   Servers




                                                             Aggregating
                                                             Hub for Store
        Token
                                                               Channel
        Servers




                                             Settlement    Loss Prevention       Analysis - EDW      ERP



            Settlement




                                                           : Integration point
      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
045
Case Study – Simplify Compliance

         Case Study - Large Chain Store Uses
          Tokenization to Simplify PCI Compliance

         • By segmenting cardholder data with tokenization, a
           regional chain of 1,500 local convenience stores is
           reducing its PCI audit from seven to three months

         •     “ We planned on 30 days to tokenize our 30 million card
               numbers. With Protegrity Tokenization, the whole
               process took about 90 minutes”



      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
046
Case Study – Simplify Compliance


            • Qualified Security Assessors had no issues with the
              effective segmentation provided by Tokenization

            • “With encryption, implementations can spawn dozens of
              questions”

            • “There were no such challenges with tokenization”




      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
047
Case Study – Simplify Compliance


          • Faster PCI audit – half that time
          • Lower maintenance cost – don’t have to apply all 12
            requirements of PCI DSS to every system
          • Better security – able to eliminate several business
            processes such as generating daily reports for data
            requests and access
          • Strong performance – rapid processing rate for initial
            tokenization, sub-second transaction SLA




      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
048
Why Tokenization?

         Why Tokenization – A Triple Play
         1.                No Masking
         2.                No Encryption
         3.                No Key Management




         Why In-memory Tokenization
         1.
         2.
         3.
                           Better
                           Faster
                           Lower Cost / TCO
                                                        $
      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
049
Risk
                                 Management

      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
050
Data Security - Catch-22
             Risk                                                         Traditional
                                                                            Access
            High –                                                          Control

                                Old and flawed:
                                 Minimal access                              New:
                                levels so people                           Creativity
                                 can only carry                            Happens
                                  out their jobs                          At the edge



             Low -
                                                     Data Tokens                  Access
                                 I                                   I             Level
                               Low                                 High
      Source: InformationWeek Aug 15, 2011
      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
051
Data Masking vs. Tokenization - Risk

                            Risk

                                      Exposure:
                                                             Data display Masking
            High –                    Data is only
                                      obfuscated
                                                                                      Exposure:
                                                                                     Data in clear
                                                                                    before masking
                              Data at rest Masking



                                                             Data Tokens
             Low -
                                                                                           System
                              I                     I           I              I            Type
                         Test / dev            Integration   Trouble       Production
                                                 testing     testing
      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
052
Choose Your Defenses
      Cost
                             Cost of Aversion –                      Expected Losses
                             Protection of Data                      from the Risk

                                           Total Cost


                                             Optimal
                                              Risk




                                                                                   Risk
                                                I                I                Level
                                             Active          Passive
                                           Protection       Protection
      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
053
Cost Effective PCI DSS
                                                   Firewalls
           Encryption/Tokenization for data at rest
                     Anti-virus & anti-malware solution
                             Encryption for data in motion
                              Access governance systems
          Identity & access management systems
      Correlation or event management systems
                        Web application firewalls (WAF)                                       WAF
                              Endpoint encryption solution
                 Data loss prevention systems (DLP)                                     DLP
        Intrusion detection or prevention systems
      Database scanning and monitoring (DAM)                              DAM
                                   ID & credentialing system

             Encryption/Tokenization
                                                               0    10   20   30   40   50    60   70   80   90 %

      Source: 2009 PCI DSS Compliance Survey, Ponemon Institute


      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
054
Matching Data Protection with Risk Level



                  Data         Risk                      Risk Level       Solution
                  Field        Level
         Credit Card Number     25                        Low Risk       Monitor
        Social Security Number  20                          (1-5)
                  CVV           20
           Customer Name        12                                       Monitor, mask, acc
                                                           At Risk
            Secret Formula      10                          (6-15)
                                                                         ess control
           Employee Name         9                                       limits, format
        Employee Health Record   6                                       control encryption
                Zip Code         3
                                                          High Risk      Replacement,
                                                           (16-25)       strong
                                                                         encryption



      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
055
Speed of Different Methods
       Transactions per second (16 digits)

      10 000 000 -

        1 000 000 -

            100 000 -

              10 000 -

                 1 000 -

                    100 -                  I                           I                      I        I
                                                   I
                                Traditional     Format              Data             AES CBC        Memory
                                    Data       Preserving           Type             Encryption      Data
                              Tokenization     Encryption       Preservation          Standard    Tokenization

                                                                  Encryption
      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
056                                               *: Speed will depend on the configuration
Security Level of Different Methods

      Security Level


                   High -




                    Low -


                                           I       I             I             I             I
                                Traditional     Format         Data        AES CBC        Memory
                                    Data       Preserving      Type        Encryption      Data
                              Tokenization     Encryption   Preservation   Standard     Tokenization

                                                             Encryption
      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
057
Speed and Security
                                                                                                                   Security
       Transactions per second (16 digits)
                                                                                                                     Level
      10 000 000 -
                                                Speed*
                                                                                                                  - High
        1 000 000 -

            100 000 -
                                                                                                  Security
              10 000 -
                                                                                                                  - Low
                 1 000 -

                    100 -                  I                           I                      I         I
                                                   I
                                Traditional     Format              Data             AES CBC         Memory
                                    Data       Preserving           Type             Encryption       Data
                              Tokenization     Encryption       Preservation          Standard     Tokenization

                                                                  Encryption
      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
058                                               *: Speed will depend on the configuration
Applications and Data - PCI vs. PII

      Quality of Information (Granularity)                                                                 Performance
                                                                                                               need
                High -
                                                                           123- 12-1234


                                           400000 123456 7899

                                                                                     PII                  777-77-1234




                                                           400000 222222 7899

                                              PCI
                                                                                                                        777-77-8888
                                                                                     111111 222222 7899


                 Low -                                                                                                                # of
                                  I                                                                                     I
                                                                                                                                      Apps
                               Few                                                                                  Many




      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
059
Risk Management Aspects

  • Different data security methods and algorithms
  • Enforcement implemented at different system layers

                           Data Security Method   Hashing   Formatted      Strong        Data
                                                            Encryption   Encryption   Tokenization


               System Layer

               Application

               Database Column

               Database File

               Storage Device


                                              Best                            Worst
      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
060
Risk Management Aspects

  • Different methods integrated at different system layers

                            Data Security Method
                                                    Hashing    Formatted      Strong        Data
                                                               Encryption   Encryption   Tokenization

                System Layer

                Application

                Database Column

                Database File

                Storage Device


                           : N/A                   Best                             Worst


      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
061
Cloud Security


      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
062
Risks with Cloud Computing

            Handing over sensitive data to a
                      third party
                   Threat of data breach or loss
            Weakening of corporate network
                      security
                       Uptime/business continuity
                Financial strength of the cloud
                     computing provider
          Inability to customize applications

                                                           0      10      20      30      40      50      60   70 %


      Dource: The evolving role of IT managers and CIOs Findings from the 2010 IBM Global IT Risk Study

      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
063
What Amazon’s PCI Compliance Means


            •     PCI-DSS 2.0 doesn't address multi-tenancy concerns

            •     You can store PAN data on S3, but it still needs to be encrypted in accordance with
                  PCI-DSS requirements

                     •     Amazon doesn't do this for you -- it's something you need to implement
                           yourself; including key management, rotation, logging, etc.

                     •     If you deploy a server instance in EC2 it still needs to be assessed by your
                           QSA

            •     What this certification really does is eliminate any doubts that you are allowed to
                  deploy an in-scope PCI system on AWS

            •     This is a big deal, but your organization's assessment scope isn't necessarily
                  reduced

                     •     It might be when you move to something like a tokenization service where you
                           reduce your handling of PAN data
      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
064                                                 Source: securosis.com
Summary


      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
065
Data Protection Challenges

              Actual protection is not the challenge
              Management of solutions
                            Key management
                            Security policy
                            Auditing, Monitoring and reporting
              Minimizing impact on business operations
                            Transparency
                            Performance vs. security
              Minimizing the cost implications
              Maintaining compliance
              Implementation Time


      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
066
Best Practices - Data Security



                                           File                       Policy
                                           System                                                 Database
                                           Protector                                              Protector
                                                                                Audit
                                                                                Log
                Application
                Protector
                                                        Enterprise
                                                       Data Security
                                                       Administrator

                                     Tokenization                                       Secure
                                       Server                                           Archive
                                                          : Enforcement point
      © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
067
Risk Management Practices
                                                for PCI DSS 2.0

                                               Ulf Mattsson
                                             CTO Protegrity
                                     ulf.mattsson [at] protegrity.com




© 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.

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Risk Management Practices for PCI DSS 2.0

  • 1. Risk Management Practices for PCI DSS 2.0 Ulf Mattsson CTO Protegrity ulf.mattsson [at] protegrity.com © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.
  • 2. Ulf Mattsson • 20 years with IBM Development & Global Services • Inventor of 22 patents – Encryption and Intrusion Prevention • Co-founder of Protegrity (Data Security) • Research member of the International Federation for Information Processing (IFIP) WG 11.3 Data and Application Security • Member of – PCI Security Standards Council (PCI SSC) – American National Standards Institute (ANSI) X9 – Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) – Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) – Information Systems Security Association (ISSA) – Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 02
  • 3. ISACA Articles Volume 6, November, 2011 Choosing the Most Appropriate Data Security Solution for an Organization Ulf Mattsson, CTO, Protegrity © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 03
  • 4. © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 04
  • 5. Agenda 1. Present trends in data breaches 2. Review data security methods available today 3. Discuss emerging technologies for protecting data 4. Present what tokenization is and how it differs from other data security methods 5. Review case studies on how new technologies can minimize costs and complexities 6. Summary and conclusion © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 05
  • 6. Data Breaches © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 06
  • 7. The Attacks on Sony Corporation • Majority of attacks were SQL Injection - not advanced • Data including passwords and personal details were not encrypted • Data stolen – 77 million names, addresses, passwords – 102 million email addresses, birth dates – 25 million phone numbers and payment cards – 54 Mbyte Sony software code • 21 uncoordinated attacks during Apr 4 to Jul 6, 2011 • 55 class action suits in the US (8/16/2011) • Sony’s stock dropped 30 percent after attacks were disclosed Source: http://defensesystems.com/articles/2011/07/18/digital-conflict-cyberattacks-economy-security.aspx © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 07
  • 8. The Attack on RSA Security • Attackers stole information relating to the SecurID two-factor authentication technology • APT malware tied to a network in Shanghai • 60 different types of customized malware to launch their attacks • Based on a commonly used tool written by a Chinese hacker 10 years ago © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 08
  • 9. The AT&T Breach • Security vulnerability in a Web site used by iPad customers • Programming tricked the site into divulging e-mail addresses • 100,000 e-mail addresses and iPad identification numbers were exposed • Some examples • New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg, • FBI, • US Departments of Defense and Justice, • NASA, • Executives from Google, Microsoft, • Amazon, Goldman Sachs, and JP Morgan Source 2010: http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-20007417-245.html#ixzz1Y9IW9a7o © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 9
  • 10. Best Source of Incident Data* “It is fascinating that the top threat events in both 2010 and 2011 are the same and involve external agents hacking and installing malware to compromise the confidentiality and integrity of servers.” Source: 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report, Verizon Business RISK team *: Securiosis © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 010
  • 11. Who is Behind Data Breaches*? External agents (+22%) Insiders (-31%) Multiple parties (-18%) Business partners (-10%) 0 20 40 60 80 100 % *: Number of breaches Source: 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report, Verizon Business RISK team and USSS © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 011
  • 12. Demographics • Criminals may be making a classic risk vs. reward decision and opting to “play it safe” in light of recent arrests and prosecutions following large-scale intrusions into Financial Services firms. • Numerous smaller strikes on hotels, restaurants, and retailers represent a lower-risk alternative – Cybercriminals may be taking greater advantage of that option © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 012
  • 13. Compromised Data Types* Payment card data Personal information Usernames, passwords Intellectual property Bank account data Medical records Classified information System information Sensitive organizational data 0 20 40 60 80 100 %120 *: Number of records Source: 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report, Verizon Business RISK team and USSS © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 013
  • 14. Industry Groups Represented* Hospitality Retail Financial Services Government Tech Services Manufacturing Transportation Media Healthcare Business Services 0 10 20 30 40 % 50 *: Number of breaches Source: 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report, Verizon Business RISK team and USSS © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 014
  • 15. Breach Discovery Methods* Third party fraud detection Notified by law enforcement Reported by customer/partner effected Unusual system behavior Reported by employee Internal security audit or scan Internal fraud detection Brag or blackmail by perpetrator Third party monitoring service 0 10 20 30 40 50 % *: Number of breaches Source: 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report, Verizon Business RISK team and USSS © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 015
  • 16. Trend in Number of Breaches* Hacking (+10%) Malware (+11%) Physical (+14%) Misuse (-31%) Social (-17%) 0 20 40 60 % *: Number of breaches Source: 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report, Verizon Business RISK team and USSS © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 016
  • 17. How are Records Breached* Hacking Malware Physical Error Misuse Social 0 20 40 60 80 100 % *: Number of records Source: 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report, Verizon Business RISK team and USSS © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 017
  • 18. Most Important Trends in DBIR • The industrialization of attacks: – There is an industry encompassing many actors, from coders to attackers to money launderers – They use automated tools and manage themselves and their operations as businesses – including use of independent contractors • All forms of attack are up by all threat actors: – APT and IP loss serious issues • Law enforcement really does catch some of the bad guys: – 1,200 arrests over the past several years by the Secret Service alone. – Many of these bad guys/gals attack small business Source: Securosis comments on 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report, Verizon Business RISK team © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 018
  • 19. Data Security - Catch-22 • We need to protect both data and the business processes that rely on that data • Enterprises are currently on their own in deciding how to apply emerging technologies for PCI data protection – Data Tokenization - an evolving technology – How to reduce PCI audit scope and exposure to data © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 019
  • 20. Protecting the Data Flow © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 020
  • 21. Protecting the Data Flow - Example : Enforcement point Unprotected sensitive information: © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. Protected sensitive information 021
  • 22. PCI DSS © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 022
  • 23. PCI Encryption Rules Encrypted Attacker Public SSL Data (PCI DSS) Network Private Network Application Clear Text Clear Text Data Data Database Encrypted OS File Data Data System At Rest (PCI DSS) Storage (PCI DSS) System © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 023
  • 24. PCI DSS  Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS)  The PCI Security Standards Council is an open global forum  American Express, Discover Financial Services, JCB International, MasterCard Worldwide, and Visa Inc  The PCI standard consists of a set of 12 rules  Four ways to render the PAN (credit card number) unreadable  Two-way cryptography with associated key management processes  Truncation  One-way cryptographic hash functions  Index tokens and pads Source: https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/organization_info/index.php © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 024
  • 25. PCI DSS #3 & 4 Protect Cardholder Data • 3.4 Render PAN, at minimum, unreadable anywhere it is stored by using any of the following approaches: • One-way hashes based on strong cryptography • Truncation • Index tokens and pads (pads must be securely stored) • Strong cryptography with associated key-management processes and procedures • 4.1 Use strong cryptography to safeguard sensitive cardholder data during transmission over open, public networks. • Comments – Cost effective compliance • Encrypted PAN is always “in PCI scope” • Tokens can be “out of PCI scope” © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 025
  • 26. PCI DSS - Appendix B: • Compensating controls must satisfy the following criteria: – Meet the intent and rigor of the original PCI DSS requirement. – Provide a similar level of defense as the original PCI DSS requirement, such that the compensating control sufficiently offsets the risk that the original PCI DSS requirement was designed to defend against. – Be “above and beyond” other PCI DSS requirements. (Simply being in compliance with other PCI DSS requirements is not a compensating control.) © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 026
  • 27. PCI Tokenization Guidelines © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 027
  • 28. PCI DSS - Network Segmentation • Network segmentation of, or isolating (segmenting), the cardholder data environment from the remainder of an entity’s network is not a PCI DSS requirement. • However, it is strongly recommended as a method that may reduce: – The scope of the PCI DSS assessment – The cost of the PCI DSS assessment – The cost and difficulty of implementing and maintaining PCI DSS controls – The risk to an organization (reduced by consolidating cardholder data into fewer, more controlled locations) © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 028
  • 29. PCI Mandates Risk Assessment • PCI 2.0 Requirement 12.1.2 mandates the use of formal risk assessment based on established methodologies • 12.1.2 Includes an annual process that identifies threats, and vulnerabilities, and results in a formal risk assessment – 12.1.2.a Verify that an annual risk assessment process is documented that identifies threats, vulnerabilities, and results in a formal risk assessment – 12.1.2.b Review risk assessment documentation to verify that the risk assessment process is performed at least annually • Examples of risk assessment methodologies include but are not limited to OCTAVE, ISO 27005 and NIST SP 800-30 Source: https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/organization_info/index.php © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 029
  • 30. Data Security Methods © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 030
  • 31. Advancements in Cryptography Year Event 2010 In-memory Data Tokenization introduced as a fully distributed model Centralized Data Tokenization introduced with hosted payment service DTP (Data Type Preserving encryption) used in commercial 2005 databases Attack on SHA-1 announced DES was withdrawn AES (Advance Encryption Standard) accepted as a FIPS-approved 2001 algorithm 1991 PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) was written 1988 IBM AS/400 used tokenization in shadow files 1978 RSA algorithm was published 1975 DES (Data Encryption Standard) draft submitted by IBM 1900 BC Cryptography used in Egypt © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 031
  • 32. Intrusiveness of Data Formats Intrusiveness (to Applications and Databases) Encryption Standard !@#$%a^///&*B()..,,,gft_+!@4#$2%p^& Hashing - * !@#$%a^.,mhu7/////&*B()_+! Strong Encryption - @ Alpha - aVdSaH 1F4hJ 1D3a Encoding Tokenizing or 666666 777777 8888 Formatted Numeric - Encryption 123456 777777 1234 Partial - 123456 123456 1234 Clear Text Data - Data I Length Original © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 032
  • 33. Encryption vs. Tokenization Encryption Tokenization Used Approach Cipher System Code System Cryptographic algorithms Cryptographic keys Code books Index tokens Source: McGraw-HILL ENCYPLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 033
  • 34. Use of Enabling Technologies Access controls 1% 91% 5% Database activity monitoring 18% 47% 16% Database encryption 30% 35% 10% Backup / Archive encryption 21% 39% 4% Data masking 28% 28% 7% Application-level encryption 7% 29% 7% Tokenization 22% 23% 13% Evaluating Current Use Planned Use <12 Months © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 034
  • 35. Use of Enabling Technologies, by Maturity © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 035
  • 36. Hiding Data in Plain Sight Data Entry Y&SFD%))S( Tokenization Server 400000 123456 7899 Data Token 400000 222222 7899 Application Database © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 036
  • 37. Reducing the Attack Surface 123456 123456 1234 123456 999999 1234 123456 999999 1234 123456 999999 1234 123456 123456 1234 123456 999999 1234 123456 999999 1234 123456 999999 1234 Applications & Databases : Data Token Unprotected sensitive information: © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. Protected sensitive information 037
  • 38. Fully Distributed Tokenization • How do you deliver tokenization to many locations without the impact of latency? Customer Application Token Server Customer Application Customer Application Token Token Server Customer Server Application © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 038
  • 39. A Fully Distributed Approach Random Static Lookup Tables 288910 Application • Multi-Use Tokens 288910 288910 288910 • Random Static Lookup Tables – Remains the same size no matter 288910 1,000,000 Application max entries the number of unique tokens • Example: 50 million = 2 million 288910 288910 Application tokens • Performance: 200,000 tokens 288910 288910 288910 1,000,000 max entries Application per second on a commodity standard dual core machine © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 039
  • 40. Evaluating Encryption & Tokenization Database Database Old Memory Area Impact File Column Token Token Encryption Encryption Approach Approach Availability Scalability Latency CPU Consumption Data Flow Protection Compliance Scoping Security Key Management Separation of Duties Best Worst © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 040
  • 41. Evaluating Encryption & Tokenization Evaluation Criteria Strong Field Formatted Memory Token Encryption Encryption Approach Disconnected environments Distributed environments Performance impact when loading data Transparent to applications Expanded storage size Transparent to databases schema Long life-cycle data Unix or Windows mixed with “big iron” Easy re-keying of data in a data flow High risk data Security - compliance to PCI, NIST Best Worst © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 041
  • 42. Best Practices for Tokenization Token Generation Token Types Single Use Token Multi Use Token Algorithm and Known strong Key Reversible algorithm  - Unique Sequence Number   One way Hash Secret per Secret per Irreversible transaction merchant Function Randomly generated value   Published July 14, 2010. © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 042
  • 43. Comments on Best Practices • Visa recommendations should be simply to use a random number • The only way to discover PAN data from a real token is a (reverse) lookup in the token server database • The odds are that if you are saddled with PCI-DSS responsibilities, you will not write your own 'home-grown' token servers © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 043
  • 44. Secure Tokenization What Makes a “Secure Tokenization” Algorithm? • Ask vendors what their token-generating algorithms are • Be sure to analyze anything other than strong random number generators for security. © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 044
  • 45. A Retail Scenario Stores Stores Token Authorization Servers Aggregating Hub for Store Token Channel Servers Settlement Loss Prevention Analysis - EDW ERP Settlement : Integration point © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 045
  • 46. Case Study – Simplify Compliance Case Study - Large Chain Store Uses Tokenization to Simplify PCI Compliance • By segmenting cardholder data with tokenization, a regional chain of 1,500 local convenience stores is reducing its PCI audit from seven to three months • “ We planned on 30 days to tokenize our 30 million card numbers. With Protegrity Tokenization, the whole process took about 90 minutes” © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 046
  • 47. Case Study – Simplify Compliance • Qualified Security Assessors had no issues with the effective segmentation provided by Tokenization • “With encryption, implementations can spawn dozens of questions” • “There were no such challenges with tokenization” © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 047
  • 48. Case Study – Simplify Compliance • Faster PCI audit – half that time • Lower maintenance cost – don’t have to apply all 12 requirements of PCI DSS to every system • Better security – able to eliminate several business processes such as generating daily reports for data requests and access • Strong performance – rapid processing rate for initial tokenization, sub-second transaction SLA © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 048
  • 49. Why Tokenization? Why Tokenization – A Triple Play 1. No Masking 2. No Encryption 3. No Key Management Why In-memory Tokenization 1. 2. 3. Better Faster Lower Cost / TCO $ © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 049
  • 50. Risk Management © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 050
  • 51. Data Security - Catch-22 Risk Traditional Access High – Control Old and flawed: Minimal access New: levels so people Creativity can only carry Happens out their jobs At the edge Low - Data Tokens Access I I Level Low High Source: InformationWeek Aug 15, 2011 © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 051
  • 52. Data Masking vs. Tokenization - Risk Risk Exposure: Data display Masking High – Data is only obfuscated Exposure: Data in clear before masking Data at rest Masking Data Tokens Low - System I I I I Type Test / dev Integration Trouble Production testing testing © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 052
  • 53. Choose Your Defenses Cost Cost of Aversion – Expected Losses Protection of Data from the Risk Total Cost Optimal Risk Risk I I Level Active Passive Protection Protection © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 053
  • 54. Cost Effective PCI DSS Firewalls Encryption/Tokenization for data at rest Anti-virus & anti-malware solution Encryption for data in motion Access governance systems Identity & access management systems Correlation or event management systems Web application firewalls (WAF) WAF Endpoint encryption solution Data loss prevention systems (DLP) DLP Intrusion detection or prevention systems Database scanning and monitoring (DAM) DAM ID & credentialing system Encryption/Tokenization 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 % Source: 2009 PCI DSS Compliance Survey, Ponemon Institute © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 054
  • 55. Matching Data Protection with Risk Level Data Risk Risk Level Solution Field Level Credit Card Number 25 Low Risk Monitor Social Security Number 20 (1-5) CVV 20 Customer Name 12 Monitor, mask, acc At Risk Secret Formula 10 (6-15) ess control Employee Name 9 limits, format Employee Health Record 6 control encryption Zip Code 3 High Risk Replacement, (16-25) strong encryption © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 055
  • 56. Speed of Different Methods Transactions per second (16 digits) 10 000 000 - 1 000 000 - 100 000 - 10 000 - 1 000 - 100 - I I I I I Traditional Format Data AES CBC Memory Data Preserving Type Encryption Data Tokenization Encryption Preservation Standard Tokenization Encryption © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 056 *: Speed will depend on the configuration
  • 57. Security Level of Different Methods Security Level High - Low - I I I I I Traditional Format Data AES CBC Memory Data Preserving Type Encryption Data Tokenization Encryption Preservation Standard Tokenization Encryption © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 057
  • 58. Speed and Security Security Transactions per second (16 digits) Level 10 000 000 - Speed* - High 1 000 000 - 100 000 - Security 10 000 - - Low 1 000 - 100 - I I I I I Traditional Format Data AES CBC Memory Data Preserving Type Encryption Data Tokenization Encryption Preservation Standard Tokenization Encryption © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 058 *: Speed will depend on the configuration
  • 59. Applications and Data - PCI vs. PII Quality of Information (Granularity) Performance need High - 123- 12-1234 400000 123456 7899 PII 777-77-1234 400000 222222 7899 PCI 777-77-8888 111111 222222 7899 Low - # of I I Apps Few Many © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 059
  • 60. Risk Management Aspects • Different data security methods and algorithms • Enforcement implemented at different system layers Data Security Method Hashing Formatted Strong Data Encryption Encryption Tokenization System Layer Application Database Column Database File Storage Device Best Worst © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 060
  • 61. Risk Management Aspects • Different methods integrated at different system layers Data Security Method Hashing Formatted Strong Data Encryption Encryption Tokenization System Layer Application Database Column Database File Storage Device : N/A Best Worst © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 061
  • 62. Cloud Security © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 062
  • 63. Risks with Cloud Computing Handing over sensitive data to a third party Threat of data breach or loss Weakening of corporate network security Uptime/business continuity Financial strength of the cloud computing provider Inability to customize applications 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 % Dource: The evolving role of IT managers and CIOs Findings from the 2010 IBM Global IT Risk Study © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 063
  • 64. What Amazon’s PCI Compliance Means • PCI-DSS 2.0 doesn't address multi-tenancy concerns • You can store PAN data on S3, but it still needs to be encrypted in accordance with PCI-DSS requirements • Amazon doesn't do this for you -- it's something you need to implement yourself; including key management, rotation, logging, etc. • If you deploy a server instance in EC2 it still needs to be assessed by your QSA • What this certification really does is eliminate any doubts that you are allowed to deploy an in-scope PCI system on AWS • This is a big deal, but your organization's assessment scope isn't necessarily reduced • It might be when you move to something like a tokenization service where you reduce your handling of PAN data © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 064 Source: securosis.com
  • 65. Summary © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 065
  • 66. Data Protection Challenges  Actual protection is not the challenge  Management of solutions  Key management  Security policy  Auditing, Monitoring and reporting  Minimizing impact on business operations  Transparency  Performance vs. security  Minimizing the cost implications  Maintaining compliance  Implementation Time © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 066
  • 67. Best Practices - Data Security File Policy System Database Protector Protector Audit Log Application Protector Enterprise Data Security Administrator Tokenization Secure Server Archive : Enforcement point © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved. 067
  • 68. Risk Management Practices for PCI DSS 2.0 Ulf Mattsson CTO Protegrity ulf.mattsson [at] protegrity.com © 2011 ISACA. All rights reserved.

Hinweis der Redaktion

  1. 90 minutes
  2. HTran, a &quot;rudimentary&quot; bouncer tool written by a well-known Chinese hacker 10 years ago, was being used by various attackers to redirect traffic from infected computers to command and control servers. A piece of code used for debugging purposes in HTran would return an error message to the infected computer if the C&amp;C server was unavailable, Stewart said. That error message revealed the final IP address of the server.The redirect tool routes traffic through several proxy servers to make it look like it is going through servers in the United States, Norway, Japan and Taiwan in order to obscure where the attack is originating, Stewart said. The botnet owners and attackers &quot;didn&apos;t realize fully how HTran works,&quot; and very clearly were unaware of the debugger or the fact that the error message was being displayed, Stewart said.Dell researchers uncovered a few networks, all of which had China-based addresses, according to Stewart. The team scanned a list of 1,000 IP addresses that had previously been identified as being used in an advanced persistent threat attack and uncovered a &quot;short list&quot; of Chinese networks hosting the C&amp;C servers, according to Stewart. While it was not 100 percent certain that the 18 servers it uncovered are the final destination, the fact that so many campaigns traced back to a handful of IP addresses seems promising, Stewart said.The addresses appear to belong to ISPs in Beijing and Shanghai, such as state-owned telecommunications giant China Unicom, but the carriers are big enough that it would be difficult to identify the individuals without assistance from the Chinese government, according to the Dell SecureWorks report.His research answered the question of &quot;where&quot; some of the advanced persistent threats originated, but not &quot;who&quot; the perpetrators were, Stewart said.However, organizations now have a signature that can be used to identify some of the APT activity in their networks. Not all attackers use this tool, but by looking for the error messages and using the Snort-based signatures the team developed to detect this particular Trojan, the IT department would at least be able to stop this particular APT, Stewart said. He also acknowledged that hackers using HTran would likely abandon the tool or fix the bug now that Dell SecureWorks has publicized the issue.“It is our hope that every institution potentially impacted by APT activity will make haste to search out signs of this activity for themselves before the window of opportunity closes,” Stewart wrote in the report.
  3. 40 &quot;Risk management&quot; is just another term for the cost-benefit tradeoff associated with any security decision.Protecting data according to risk enables organizations to determine their most significantsecurity exposures, target their budgets towards addressing the most critical issues,strengthen their security and compliance profile, and achieve the right balance betweenbusiness needs and security demands. As discussed earlier, a report by the Ponemon Institute, a privacy andinformation management research firm, found that data breach incidents cost $202 per compromisedrecord in 2008, with an average total per-incident costs of $6.65 million.All security spend figures produced by government and private research firms indicate that enterprisescan put strong security into place for about 10% the average cost of a breach. You can find the rightbalance between cost and security by doing a risk analysis.
  4. 40 &quot;Risk management&quot; is just another term for the cost-benefit tradeoff associated with any security decision.Protecting data according to risk enables organizations to determine their most significantsecurity exposures, target their budgets towards addressing the most critical issues,strengthen their security and compliance profile, and achieve the right balance betweenbusiness needs and security demands. As discussed earlier, a report by the Ponemon Institute, a privacy andinformation management research firm, found that data breach incidents cost $202 per compromisedrecord in 2008, with an average total per-incident costs of $6.65 million.All security spend figures produced by government and private research firms indicate that enterprisescan put strong security into place for about 10% the average cost of a breach. You can find the rightbalance between cost and security by doing a risk analysis.
  5. 40 &quot;Risk management&quot; is just another term for the cost-benefit tradeoff associated with any security decision.Protecting data according to risk enables organizations to determine their most significantsecurity exposures, target their budgets towards addressing the most critical issues,strengthen their security and compliance profile, and achieve the right balance betweenbusiness needs and security demands. As discussed earlier, a report by the Ponemon Institute, a privacy andinformation management research firm, found that data breach incidents cost $202 per compromisedrecord in 2008, with an average total per-incident costs of $6.65 million.All security spend figures produced by government and private research firms indicate that enterprisescan put strong security into place for about 10% the average cost of a breach. You can find the rightbalance between cost and security by doing a risk analysis.
  6. Just because AWS is certified doesn&apos;t mean you are. You still need to deploy a PCI compliant application/service and anything on AWS is still within your assessment scope. The open question? PCI-DSS 2.0 doesn&apos;t address multi-tenancy concerns AWS is certified as a service provider doesn&apos;t mean all cloud IaaS providers will beYou can store PAN data on S3, but it still needs to be encrypted in accordance with PCI-DSS requirements Amazon doesn&apos;t do this for you -- it&apos;s something you need to implement yourself; including key management, rotation, logging, etc. If you deploy a server instance in EC2 it still needs to be assessed by your QSA What this certification really does is eliminate any doubts that you are allowed to deploy an in-scope PCI system on AWSThis is a big deal, but your organization&apos;s assessment scope isn&apos;t necessarily reducedit might be when you move to something like a tokenization service where you reduce your handling of PAN data