1. CHAPTER THIRTEEN
RELIGION, CULTURE, and CONFLICT
Language & religion are two of the most powerful forces shaping the geography of
culture.
Histories can bitterly divide peoples who speak the same language, have the same ethnic
background, and make their living in similar ways.
Religious conflicts usually involve more than differences in spiritual practices and
beliefs. Religion functions as a symbol of a wider set of cultural and political
differences.

2. INTRAFAITH BOUNDARIES
Intra-faith boundaries are found in
countries that lie entirely within the
realms of an individual religion.
An example of intra-faith
boundaries creating tensions and
violence is Iraq.

3. The U.S. government unintentionally reinforced these intra-faith boundaries following
the first Gulf War in ’91. No-Fly-Zones were created to protect the Kurds in the North
and the Shiites in the South.

4. Following the Iraqi War in ’03, the U.S.
is struggling to establish stability and
a democratic govt. in Iraq. Intra-faith
boundaries are at the heart of the
problem.
The interests & demands of the
Kurds, the Shiite majority, and Sunni
Baathists must be addressed and
reconciled.

6. EXCLAVES and ENCLAVES
Exclaves and enclaves are the products of one country’s territory encroaching and/or
splitting another country’s territory. One country’s exclave is another’s enclave.

7. BOSNIA
The civil war in Bosnia began following the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1992. 3 ethnic
and/or religious groups dominating Yugoslavia fought for control of the new state.

9. For two years (1992-1994), Bosnian
Muslims pleaded for western help;
atrocities committed by Bosnian Serbs
(ethnic cleansing) were revealed to
the world.

10. No direct U.S. military intervention was forthcoming, as the U.S. and European countries
debated over whose responsibility it was to help. The first stage of U.S. involvement
consisted of aerial food drops to besieged Muslims.

11. During the conflict Bosnian Serb invaders would routinely round up young Muslim males
and either execute them, or place them in detention camps. Those Serbs initiating
and/or implementing ethnic cleansing are sought for war crimes.

14. In 1994, a U.S. sponsored peace plan was
proposed that would partition Bosnia into
3 ethnic sections. This plan was not
acceptable to the Muslims or the Serbs.

15. The major breakthrough in 1994 was an
agreement to end the conflict between
Muslims and Croats (they would join
forces against the Serbs).

16. Despite the Muslim/Croat agreement, life for Bosnian Muslims contributed to be grim. In
the fall of ’94, pressure mounts on President Clinton to initiate more forceful action as
Americans are shown a daily photo diary of life for besieged Muslims in
Sarajevo, including residents sifting through trash looking for food, ….

17. … waiting in long, dangerous lines for limited
water, …

18. … residents fearful to venture from their homes because of deadly Serb snipers, …

19. … and children experiencing the trauma of living in the “dead zone,” as Sarajevo was called
by residents.

20. The catalyst for Clinton to issue a final ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs besieging
Sarajevo occurred days before Christmas, 1994, when a Serb artillery shell exploded in a
crowded market, killing many civilians, including young children.
The ultimatum from Clinton was simple: move your artillery back at least 12 miles within
72 hours, or face NATO bombing strikes.

21. The 72 hours comes and goes and the Serb artillery remains around Sarajevo, so the U.S.
becomes directly involved in the conflict when NATO warplanes bomb Serb positions in
response to Serb shelling of Muslims in Sarajevo.
NATO action forces the Serbs to the negotiating table; Muslim and Croat military
victories weaken the Serb position. For the first time, Muslims show a reluctance to
negotiate with the Serbs.

22. Despite direct American military involvement, many Americans remained indifferent to the
conflict.

23. THE DAYTON ACCORDS
In November, 1995, the U.S. sponsored Dayton Accords is signed ending the Bosnian
War.
Provisions included:
1. 51/49 split of Bosnia
2. NATO force (IFOR) to enforce treaty
provisions. This force originally consisted of
60,000 troops (20,000 U.S. troops).
3. The reversing of Serb ethnic cleansing.
4. The capture & prosecution of individuals
(primarily Serbian) for alleged war crimes.
5. A shared, three-way, presidency.

24. Compliance has not been complete to this point, especially with the issues of ethnic
cleansing and other war crimes (rape) unresolved.

25. CURRENTLY in BOSNIA
The collective presidency has not worked – the Serb president pulled out.
The original IFOR mission comes and goes without real peace and NATO’s mission is extended
indefinitely (approx. 1,000 U.S. troops remain).
Permanent peace is not imminent:
1. Continued problems with compliance (Muslim refugees & ethnic cleansing)
2. War crimes issues

26. Since the Dayton Accords, the Bosnian Muslim military has been arming & training. They
may attempt to regain losses and/or reverse ethnic cleansing when NATO leaves.
* The big question for the U.S. president is how long should we/can we stay in Bosnia?
And, do these people truly want peace?
Until the two arch-villains of the conflict were arrested and prosecuted, there would
not be a permanent peace. Milosevic (r) was arrested and he died while standing trial
at the World Court in 2006. Bosnian Serb leader, Karadzic, was arrested in early 2009
and is awaiting a war crimes trial.

27. In 2007, Montenegro formally parted from
the union with Serbia, thus Yugoslavia is not
a functioning political entity any longer.

28. KOSOVO
Kosovo is a province in s.w. Serbia, with a population that is 90% ethnic-Albanian
(Muslim). There has been historic tension between Serbs and ethnic-Albanians in
Kosovo.

30. The break-up of Yugoslavia encourages ethnic-Albanians in Kosovo to seek
independence from Serbia, but the Serb govt. refuses. The Serbs consider
Kosovo to be the cradle of their civilization.
When negotiations fail in the summer of
’98, a rebel ethnic-Albanian force (KLA)
began an attempt to drive the Serbs out of
Kosovo.

31. Early military gains by the KLA are quickly
reversed by a brutal and superior Serb
military response.
The Serbs incorporate the strategy of
ethnic cleansing to end the uprising and
regain control of the province.

33. The U.S. supported more Albanian autonomy, but not independence. The U.S. views the
Serbs as the aggressors, and president Clinton calls for Serbia’s restraint.

34. The U.S. becomes directly involved in the fall of 1998 as accounts of Serb brutality are
documented and published.

35. After several warnings from the Clinton Admin. that the Serbs
ignored, NATO, led by the U.S., began a massive bombing campaign to drive
the Serbs out of Kosovo in the spring of 1999.

36. The primary architects of Clinton’s massive air campaign were Secretary of State
Madeline Albright and NATO Supreme Military Commander, Gen. Wesley Clark.

39. Albanian refugees rapidly returned to Kosovo in
the wake of the Serbian withdrawal.
And ironically, large numbers of new Serbian
refugees followed the Serbian military out of
Kosovo.

40. A NATO peacekeeping force (K-
FOR), led by the U.S., arrived in
June, 1999.
This force remains in Kosovo without an
end in sight. Tensions remained high
between Albanians and Serbs, as the
fate of the province remained unclear
until February of 2008.

44. After 9 years of ethnic-
Albanians and Serbs bickering
over the fate of Kosovo, the
provincial govt. of Kosovo
declared independence on
February 17, 2008.
The U.S. and many members of
the EU quickly recognized the
new country, but Serbia and
Russia were quick to condemn
the declaration, saying it would
foment separatism elsewhere.

45. Serbian anger was violently demonstrated toward
the U.S. support of Kosovo independence when
Serbian mobs attacked the U.S. embassy in
Belgrade.
At present, the long-term fate of Kosovo is
unknown.

46. NORTHERN IRELAND
The fate of N. Ireland is one of
Europe’s longest running conflicts.
N. Ireland comprises 17% of the
island. Currently the fate of N.
Ireland is unresolved.

47. Protestant-dominated Great Britain
remains in control of N.
Ireland, which has a dominant
Protestant population.

49. N. IRELAND COMBATANTS
THE BRITISH: The occupying power in N. Ireland. Their occupation has become the
symbol of resistance for the IRA. At this time, they do not show any signs of
relinquishing N. Ireland.

50. THE IRA: (Irish Republican Army) Nationalist organization created in 1916 and opposed
to the connection of N. Ireland to Britain. It is committed to driving out the
British by resorting to guerilla warfare. Represents Catholic minority (38%).

53. THE UNIONISTS: Protestants living in N. Ireland who are committed to remaining a
part of the U.K. They represent 51% of the population. Unionists
are also guilty of committing deadly acts of violence.

54. SHOULD the BRITISH RELINQUISH?
WHY IT SHOULD ….
1. Enormous costs, both financial & human. The British have budget problems.
2. N. Ireland does not have any strategic or economic value.
3. The island should be unified
WHY IT SHOULD NOT ….
1. N. Ireland has been a part of the UK for centuries – cultural identity.
2. Image – UK can’t be pushed out through terror – must be on their terms.
3. UK has invested tremendously (time & money) – can’t just hand it over.
What do you think the British should do?

55. THE CURRENT SITUATION IN N. IRELAND
The big breakthrough after decades of violence occurred in the spring of 1998 (the
Good Friday Agreement brokered by a U.S. intermediary).

56. The cornerstone of the peace
agreement was a power-sharing plan
between Catholics & Protestants in N.
Ireland (Catholic minority would gain
more political power).
Also under the agreement, the IRA was
required to disarm and relinquish their
weapons (Catholic concession). This had
been an obstacle to fully implementing
the agreement.

57. The British maintain control over N. Ireland for the time being. But despite showing no
signs of relinquishing control, the British have downsized their military presence while
it allows a measure of semi-autonomy (may be a first step of eventual withdraw).

58. Despite consistent bickering between the two sides, the fragile agreement has held-up.
But it does not resolve the central issue – the future fate of N. Ireland.