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RED
                                     BALLOON

                                     Security


                FRAK: Firmware Reverse Analysis Konsole

                                                        Ang Cui
                                       a@redballoonsecurity.com




7.27.2012	
       Defcon	
  20	
  
5th Year Ph.D. Candidate
                                                Intrusion Detection Systems Lab
                                                      Columbia University




 W h o               a m

                I
 What               do   I



 DO
7.27.2012	
                  Defcon	
  20	
  
5th Year Ph.D. Candidate
                                                Intrusion Detection Systems Lab
                                                      Columbia University

                                                     Co-Founder and CEO
                                                   Red Balloon Security Inc.
 W h o               a m                           www.redballoonsecurity.com




                I
 What               do   I



 DO
7.27.2012	
                  Defcon	
  20	
  
5th Year Ph.D. Candidate
                                                Intrusion Detection Systems Lab
                                                      Columbia University

                                                     Co-Founder and CEO
                                                   Red Balloon Security Inc.
 W h o               a m                           www.redballoonsecurity.com




                I                         Past publications:


                                          • 
 What               do   I                       Pervasive Insecurity of Embedded Network
                                                 Devices. [RAID10]

                                          •      A Quantitative Analysis of the Insecurity




 DO
                                                 of Embedded Network Devices. [ACSAC10]

                                          •      Killing the Myth of Cisco IOS Diversity:
                                                 Towards Reliable Large-Scale Exploitation
                                                 of Cisco IOS.          [USENIX WOOT 11]

                                          •      Defending Legacy Embedded Systems with
                                                 Software Symbiotes.           [RAID11]

                                          •      From Prey to Hunter: Transforming
                                                 Legacy Embedded Devices Into
                                                 Exploitation Sensor Grids.   [ACSAC11]



7.27.2012	
                  Defcon	
  20	
  
5th Year Ph.D. Candidate
                                                Intrusion Detection Systems Lab
                                                      Columbia University

                                                     Co-Founder and CEO
                                                   Red Balloon Security Inc.
 W h o               a m                           www.redballoonsecurity.com




                I                         Past Embedded Tinkerings:


                                          • 
 What               do   I                • 
                                                 Interrupt-Hijack Cisco IOS Rootkit
                                                 HP LaserJet Printer Rootkit




 DO
7.27.2012	
                  Defcon	
  20	
  
Interrupt-Hijack Shellcode
                      [blackhat USA 2011]




7.27.2012	
                     Defcon	
  20	
  
HP-RFU Vulnerability
                HP LaserJet 2550 Rootkit
                         [28c3]




                                        Attacker

                                                                          4. Win: Reverse Shell
                                                                             Server -> Kitteh

                                    1. Reverse Proxy
                                    Printer -> Attacker
                                                             Firewall

                                                            2. Reverse Proxy
                                                            Printer -> Victim


                                                                                    Server
                                         Network Printer


                                                  3. Attacker -> Server
                                                   Via Reverse Proxy




7.27.2012	
                 Defcon	
  20	
  
WORKFLOW
                                                       [XYZ Embedded {Offense|Defense}]




                                  Unpacking Process:
Binary Firmware Image




                                                                                          Analysis and Manipulation
                                                                                                   Firmware
                                 Re-Packing Process




                        7.27.2012	
                     Defcon	
  20	
  
WORKFLOW
                                                       [XYZ Embedded {Offense|Defense}]




                                  Unpacking Process:
Binary Firmware Image




                            Parse




                                                                                          Analysis and Manipulation
                           Package
                           Manifest




                                                                                                   Firmware
                                 Re-Packing Process




                        7.27.2012	
                     Defcon	
  20	
  
WORKFLOW
                                                                                         [XYZ Embedded {Offense|Defense}]




                                  Unpacking Process:


                                                                         De{cript,compress}
Binary Firmware Image




                                          For each
                                          "Record"
                                                                                                      Record
                            Parse       In Firmware     Record        Record          Record
                                                                                                     Digitally
                                                      Encrypted?    Compressed?    Checksummed?




                                                                                                                            Analysis and Manipulation
                           Package                                                                   Signed?
                           Manifest
                                                            Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm?




                                                                                                                                     Firmware
                                 Re-Packing Process




                        7.27.2012	
                                                           Defcon	
  20	
  
WORKFLOW
                                                                                         [XYZ Embedded {Offense|Defense}]




                                  Unpacking Process:


                                                                         De{cript,compress}                           For each
Binary Firmware Image




                                          For each
                                          "Record"                                                               "unpacked Record"
                                                                                                      Record        In Firmware
                            Parse       In Firmware     Record        Record          Record
                                                                                                     Digitally                                FileSystem Extraction
                                                      Encrypted?    Compressed?    Checksummed?




                                                                                                                                                                           Analysis and Manipulation
                           Package                                                                   Signed?
                           Manifest
                                                            Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm?                                Known Format or Proprietary Format?




                                                                                                                                                                                    Firmware
                                 Re-Packing Process




                        7.27.2012	
                                                           Defcon	
  20	
  
WORKFLOW
                                                                                         [XYZ Embedded {Offense|Defense}]




                                  Unpacking Process:


                                                                         De{cript,compress}                           For each
Binary Firmware Image




                                          For each
                                          "Record"                                                               "unpacked Record"
                                                                                                      Record        In Firmware
                            Parse       In Firmware     Record        Record          Record
                                                                                                     Digitally                                FileSystem Extraction
                                                      Encrypted?    Compressed?    Checksummed?




                                                                                                                                                                           Analysis and Manipulation
                           Package                                                                   Signed?
                           Manifest
                                                            Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm?                                Known Format or Proprietary Format?




                                                                                                                                                                                    Firmware
                                 Re-Packing Process




                        7.27.2012	
                                                           Defcon	
  20	
  
WORKFLOW
                                                                                         [XYZ Embedded {Offense|Defense}]




                                  Unpacking Process:


                                                                         De{cript,compress}                           For each
Binary Firmware Image




                                          For each
                                          "Record"                                                               "unpacked Record"
                                                                                                      Record        In Firmware
                            Parse       In Firmware     Record        Record          Record
                                                                                                     Digitally                                FileSystem Extraction
                                                      Encrypted?    Compressed?    Checksummed?




                                                                                                                                                                                Analysis and Manipulation
                           Package                                                                   Signed?
                           Manifest
                                                            Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm?                                Known Format or Proprietary Format?




                                                                                                                                                                                         Firmware
                                                                                                                                                                    For each
                                                                                                                                                                   "unpacked
                                                                                                                                                                    Record"
                                                                                                                                     Re-Pack Modified             In Firmware
                                                                                                                                        File System

                                                                                                                           Known Format or Proprietary Format?



                                 Re-Packing Process




                        7.27.2012	
                                                           Defcon	
  20	
  
WORKFLOW
                                                                                             [XYZ Embedded {Offense|Defense}]




                                  Unpacking Process:


                                                                           De{cript,compress}                                For each
Binary Firmware Image




                                          For each
                                          "Record"                                                                      "unpacked Record"
                                                                                                          Record           In Firmware
                            Parse       In Firmware     Record          Record            Record
                                                                                                         Digitally                                   FileSystem Extraction
                                                      Encrypted?      Compressed?      Checksummed?




                                                                                                                                                                                       Analysis and Manipulation
                           Package                                                                       Signed?
                           Manifest
                                                            Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm?                                       Known Format or Proprietary Format?




                                                                                                                                                                                                Firmware
                                                                                                                                                                           For each
                                                                                                                                                                          "unpacked
                                                               Re-{cript,compress}, Recalculate Checksum, etc                                                              Record"
                                                                                                                                            Re-Pack Modified             In Firmware
                                                                                                             Record
                                                           Record          Record           Record
                                                                                                            Digitally                          File System
                                                         Encrypted?      Compressed?     Checksummed?
                                                                                                            Signed?
                                                                                                                                  Known Format or Proprietary Format?
                                                               Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm?


                                 Re-Packing Process




                        7.27.2012	
                                                               Defcon	
  20	
  
WORKFLOW
                                                                                             [XYZ Embedded {Offense|Defense}]




                                  Unpacking Process:


                                                                           De{cript,compress}                                For each
Binary Firmware Image




                                          For each
                                          "Record"                                                                      "unpacked Record"
                                                                                                          Record           In Firmware
                            Parse       In Firmware     Record          Record            Record
                                                                                                         Digitally                                   FileSystem Extraction
                                                      Encrypted?      Compressed?      Checksummed?




                                                                                                                                                                                       Analysis and Manipulation
                           Package                                                                       Signed?
                           Manifest
                                                            Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm?                                       Known Format or Proprietary Format?




                                                                                                                                                                                                Firmware
                                                                                                                                                                           For each
                                                                                                                                                                          "unpacked
                                                               Re-{cript,compress}, Recalculate Checksum, etc                                                              Record"
                                                                                                                                            Re-Pack Modified             In Firmware
                                           Repack                                                            Record
                                                           Record          Record           Record
                                                                                                            Digitally                          File System
                                         All Binary      Encrypted?      Compressed?     Checksummed?
                                                                                                            Signed?
                                         "records"
                                                                                                                                  Known Format or Proprietary Format?
                                                               Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm?


                                 Re-Packing Process




                        7.27.2012	
                                                               Defcon	
  20	
  
WORKFLOW
                                                                                             [XYZ Embedded {Offense|Defense}]




                                  Unpacking Process:


                                                                           De{cript,compress}                                For each
Binary Firmware Image




                                          For each
                                          "Record"                                                                      "unpacked Record"
                                                                                                          Record           In Firmware
                            Parse       In Firmware     Record          Record            Record
                                                                                                         Digitally                                   FileSystem Extraction
                                                      Encrypted?      Compressed?      Checksummed?




                                                                                                                                                                                       Analysis and Manipulation
                           Package                                                                       Signed?
                           Manifest
                                                            Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm?                                       Known Format or Proprietary Format?




                                                                                                                                                                                                Firmware
                                                                                                                                                                           For each
                                                                                                                                                                          "unpacked
                                                               Re-{cript,compress}, Recalculate Checksum, etc                                                              Record"
                             Re-                                                                                                            Re-Pack Modified             In Firmware
                                           Repack                                                            Record
                           generate                        Record          Record           Record
                                                                                                            Digitally                          File System
                                         All Binary      Encrypted?      Compressed?     Checksummed?
                           Package                                                                          Signed?
                                         "records"
                           Manifest                                                                                               Known Format or Proprietary Format?
                                                               Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm?


                                 Re-Packing Process




                        7.27.2012	
                                                               Defcon	
  20	
  
Payload Design
                                      Reasons why Ang stays
                                      home on Friday night




7.27.2012	
        Defcon	
  20	
  
Payload Design
                                      Reasons why Ang stays
                                      home on Friday night
     Payload
   Developement




7.27.2012	
        Defcon	
  20	
  
Payload Design
                                      Reasons why Ang stays
                                      home on Friday night
     Payload
   Developement



 Payload Testing




7.27.2012	
        Defcon	
  20	
  
Payload Design
                                      Reasons why Ang stays
                                      home on Friday night
     Payload
   Developement



 Payload Testing




   STARE

            @

 BINARY

    BLOB
7.27.2012	
        Defcon	
  20	
  
Payload Design
                                               Reasons why Ang stays
                                               home on Friday night
     Payload
   DevelopementDesign
        Payload

          Payload Design
          Payload
 Payload Testing
       Developement




   STARE
                           THIS PART
            @

 BINARY                     L	
  
    BLOB
7.27.2012	
                 Defcon	
  20	
  
F R A K
 irmware          everse                      nalysis   onsole

                [Better Living Through Software Engineering]




7.27.2012	
                Defcon	
  20	
  
F R A K
                                       irmware     everse   nalysis   onsole




    Firmware Unpacking         Firmware Analysis
          Engine                    Engine




   Firmware Modification       Firmware Repacking
          Engine                    Engine




      Programmatic API        Interactive Console
7.27.2012	
   ACCESS       Defcon	
  20	
   Access
F R A K
                                                       irmware     everse   nalysis   onsole


  HP-RFU    Cisco IOS      Cisco-CNU   XYZ-Format      Arbitrary
  Module     Module         Module       Module     Firmware Image
                                                      of Unknown
                                                         Format




    Firmware Unpacking
    Firmware Unpacking                         Firmware Analysis
          Engine
          Engine                                    Engine




   Firmware Modification
   Firmware Modification                      Firmware Repacking
          Engine
          Engine                                   Engine




      Programmatic API
       Programmatic                         Interactive Console
7.27.2012	
   ACCESS
              ACCESS                     Defcon	
  20	
   Access
F R A K
                                                       irmware     everse   nalysis   onsole


  HP-RFU     Cisco IOS     Cisco-CNU   XYZ-Format      Arbitrary
  Module      Module        Module       Module     Firmware Image
                                                      of Unknown
                                                         Format




    Firmware Unpacking
    Firmware Unpacking                         Firmware Analysis
          Engine
          Engine                                    Engine




        Unpacked
        Firmware
          Binary




   Firmware Modification
   Firmware Modification                      Firmware Repacking
          Engine
          Engine                                   Engine




      Programmatic API
       Programmatic                         Interactive Console
7.27.2012	
   ACCESS
              ACCESS                     Defcon	
  20	
   Access
F R A K
                                                            irmware    everse   nalysis   onsole


  HP-RFU     Cisco IOS     Cisco-CNU    XYZ-Format          Arbitrary
  Module      Module        Module        Module         Firmware Image
                                                           of Unknown
                                                              Format




    Firmware Unpacking
    Firmware Unpacking                             Firmware Analysis
          Engine
          Engine                                        Engine




        Unpacked                                       XYZ Dynamic
        Firmware                       Software      Instrumentation
          Binary                       Symbiotes            &
                                                         Rootkit




   Firmware Modification
   Firmware Modification                           Firmware Repacking
          Engine
          Engine                                        Engine




      Programmatic API
       Programmatic                           Interactive Console
7.27.2012	
   ACCESS
              ACCESS                       Defcon	
  20	
   Access
F R A K
                                                            irmware    everse   nalysis   onsole


  HP-RFU     Cisco IOS     Cisco-CNU    XYZ-Format          Arbitrary
  Module      Module        Module        Module         Firmware Image
                                                           of Unknown
                                                              Format




    Firmware Unpacking
    Firmware Unpacking                             Firmware Analysis
          Engine
          Engine                                        Engine




        Unpacked                                       XYZ Dynamic
        Firmware                       Software      Instrumentation
          Binary                       Symbiotes            &
                                                         Rootkit




   Firmware Modification
   Firmware Modification                           Firmware Repacking
          Engine
          Engine                                        Engine




      Programmatic API
       Programmatic                           Interactive Console
7.27.2012	
   ACCESS
              ACCESS                       Defcon	
  20	
   Access
F R A K      irmware   everse                      nalysis   onsole



      Unpack, Analyze, Modify, Repack: Cisco IOS




7.27.2012	
                        Defcon	
  20	
  
Payload Design
      Payload                          Reasons why Ang stays
   Developement
                                       home on Friday night
     Payload
  Developement
 Payload Testing


 Payload Design
 Payload Testing

  STARE @ BINARY
       BLOB




   ?
   STARE
                   THIS PART
            @

 BINARY             L	
  
    BLOB                                     Thanks FRAK!

7.27.2012	
         Defcon	
  20	
  
Demos
                •    Packer/Repacker for Cisco IOS, HP-RFU
                •    Automagic Binary Analysis
                •    IDA-Pro Integration
                •    Entropy-related Analysis
                •    Automated IOS/RFU Rootkit Injection




7.27.2012	
                   Defcon	
  20	
  
FRAK Konsole




7.27.2012	
     Defcon	
  20	
  
FRAK is still WIP. For Early Access

                                                           Contact
                                         Frak-request@redballoonsecurity.com




7.27.2012	
                  Defcon	
  20	
  
7.27.2012	
     Defcon	
  20	
  

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DefCon 2012 - Firmware Vulnerability Hunting with FRAK

  • 1. RED BALLOON Security FRAK: Firmware Reverse Analysis Konsole Ang Cui a@redballoonsecurity.com 7.27.2012   Defcon  20  
  • 2. 5th Year Ph.D. Candidate Intrusion Detection Systems Lab Columbia University W h o a m I What do I DO 7.27.2012   Defcon  20  
  • 3. 5th Year Ph.D. Candidate Intrusion Detection Systems Lab Columbia University Co-Founder and CEO Red Balloon Security Inc. W h o a m www.redballoonsecurity.com I What do I DO 7.27.2012   Defcon  20  
  • 4. 5th Year Ph.D. Candidate Intrusion Detection Systems Lab Columbia University Co-Founder and CEO Red Balloon Security Inc. W h o a m www.redballoonsecurity.com I Past publications: •  What do I Pervasive Insecurity of Embedded Network Devices. [RAID10] •  A Quantitative Analysis of the Insecurity DO of Embedded Network Devices. [ACSAC10] •  Killing the Myth of Cisco IOS Diversity: Towards Reliable Large-Scale Exploitation of Cisco IOS. [USENIX WOOT 11] •  Defending Legacy Embedded Systems with Software Symbiotes. [RAID11] •  From Prey to Hunter: Transforming Legacy Embedded Devices Into Exploitation Sensor Grids. [ACSAC11] 7.27.2012   Defcon  20  
  • 5. 5th Year Ph.D. Candidate Intrusion Detection Systems Lab Columbia University Co-Founder and CEO Red Balloon Security Inc. W h o a m www.redballoonsecurity.com I Past Embedded Tinkerings: •  What do I •  Interrupt-Hijack Cisco IOS Rootkit HP LaserJet Printer Rootkit DO 7.27.2012   Defcon  20  
  • 6. Interrupt-Hijack Shellcode [blackhat USA 2011] 7.27.2012   Defcon  20  
  • 7. HP-RFU Vulnerability HP LaserJet 2550 Rootkit [28c3] Attacker 4. Win: Reverse Shell Server -> Kitteh 1. Reverse Proxy Printer -> Attacker Firewall 2. Reverse Proxy Printer -> Victim Server Network Printer 3. Attacker -> Server Via Reverse Proxy 7.27.2012   Defcon  20  
  • 8. WORKFLOW [XYZ Embedded {Offense|Defense}] Unpacking Process: Binary Firmware Image Analysis and Manipulation Firmware Re-Packing Process 7.27.2012   Defcon  20  
  • 9. WORKFLOW [XYZ Embedded {Offense|Defense}] Unpacking Process: Binary Firmware Image Parse Analysis and Manipulation Package Manifest Firmware Re-Packing Process 7.27.2012   Defcon  20  
  • 10. WORKFLOW [XYZ Embedded {Offense|Defense}] Unpacking Process: De{cript,compress} Binary Firmware Image For each "Record" Record Parse In Firmware Record Record Record Digitally Encrypted? Compressed? Checksummed? Analysis and Manipulation Package Signed? Manifest Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm? Firmware Re-Packing Process 7.27.2012   Defcon  20  
  • 11. WORKFLOW [XYZ Embedded {Offense|Defense}] Unpacking Process: De{cript,compress} For each Binary Firmware Image For each "Record" "unpacked Record" Record In Firmware Parse In Firmware Record Record Record Digitally FileSystem Extraction Encrypted? Compressed? Checksummed? Analysis and Manipulation Package Signed? Manifest Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm? Known Format or Proprietary Format? Firmware Re-Packing Process 7.27.2012   Defcon  20  
  • 12. WORKFLOW [XYZ Embedded {Offense|Defense}] Unpacking Process: De{cript,compress} For each Binary Firmware Image For each "Record" "unpacked Record" Record In Firmware Parse In Firmware Record Record Record Digitally FileSystem Extraction Encrypted? Compressed? Checksummed? Analysis and Manipulation Package Signed? Manifest Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm? Known Format or Proprietary Format? Firmware Re-Packing Process 7.27.2012   Defcon  20  
  • 13. WORKFLOW [XYZ Embedded {Offense|Defense}] Unpacking Process: De{cript,compress} For each Binary Firmware Image For each "Record" "unpacked Record" Record In Firmware Parse In Firmware Record Record Record Digitally FileSystem Extraction Encrypted? Compressed? Checksummed? Analysis and Manipulation Package Signed? Manifest Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm? Known Format or Proprietary Format? Firmware For each "unpacked Record" Re-Pack Modified In Firmware File System Known Format or Proprietary Format? Re-Packing Process 7.27.2012   Defcon  20  
  • 14. WORKFLOW [XYZ Embedded {Offense|Defense}] Unpacking Process: De{cript,compress} For each Binary Firmware Image For each "Record" "unpacked Record" Record In Firmware Parse In Firmware Record Record Record Digitally FileSystem Extraction Encrypted? Compressed? Checksummed? Analysis and Manipulation Package Signed? Manifest Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm? Known Format or Proprietary Format? Firmware For each "unpacked Re-{cript,compress}, Recalculate Checksum, etc Record" Re-Pack Modified In Firmware Record Record Record Record Digitally File System Encrypted? Compressed? Checksummed? Signed? Known Format or Proprietary Format? Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm? Re-Packing Process 7.27.2012   Defcon  20  
  • 15. WORKFLOW [XYZ Embedded {Offense|Defense}] Unpacking Process: De{cript,compress} For each Binary Firmware Image For each "Record" "unpacked Record" Record In Firmware Parse In Firmware Record Record Record Digitally FileSystem Extraction Encrypted? Compressed? Checksummed? Analysis and Manipulation Package Signed? Manifest Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm? Known Format or Proprietary Format? Firmware For each "unpacked Re-{cript,compress}, Recalculate Checksum, etc Record" Re-Pack Modified In Firmware Repack Record Record Record Record Digitally File System All Binary Encrypted? Compressed? Checksummed? Signed? "records" Known Format or Proprietary Format? Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm? Re-Packing Process 7.27.2012   Defcon  20  
  • 16. WORKFLOW [XYZ Embedded {Offense|Defense}] Unpacking Process: De{cript,compress} For each Binary Firmware Image For each "Record" "unpacked Record" Record In Firmware Parse In Firmware Record Record Record Digitally FileSystem Extraction Encrypted? Compressed? Checksummed? Analysis and Manipulation Package Signed? Manifest Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm? Known Format or Proprietary Format? Firmware For each "unpacked Re-{cript,compress}, Recalculate Checksum, etc Record" Re- Re-Pack Modified In Firmware Repack Record generate Record Record Record Digitally File System All Binary Encrypted? Compressed? Checksummed? Package Signed? "records" Manifest Known Format or Proprietary Format? Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm? Re-Packing Process 7.27.2012   Defcon  20  
  • 17. Payload Design Reasons why Ang stays home on Friday night 7.27.2012   Defcon  20  
  • 18. Payload Design Reasons why Ang stays home on Friday night Payload Developement 7.27.2012   Defcon  20  
  • 19. Payload Design Reasons why Ang stays home on Friday night Payload Developement Payload Testing 7.27.2012   Defcon  20  
  • 20. Payload Design Reasons why Ang stays home on Friday night Payload Developement Payload Testing STARE @ BINARY BLOB 7.27.2012   Defcon  20  
  • 21. Payload Design Reasons why Ang stays home on Friday night Payload DevelopementDesign Payload Payload Design Payload Payload Testing Developement STARE THIS PART @ BINARY L   BLOB 7.27.2012   Defcon  20  
  • 22. F R A K irmware everse nalysis onsole [Better Living Through Software Engineering] 7.27.2012   Defcon  20  
  • 23. F R A K irmware everse nalysis onsole Firmware Unpacking Firmware Analysis Engine Engine Firmware Modification Firmware Repacking Engine Engine Programmatic API Interactive Console 7.27.2012   ACCESS Defcon  20   Access
  • 24. F R A K irmware everse nalysis onsole HP-RFU Cisco IOS Cisco-CNU XYZ-Format Arbitrary Module Module Module Module Firmware Image of Unknown Format Firmware Unpacking Firmware Unpacking Firmware Analysis Engine Engine Engine Firmware Modification Firmware Modification Firmware Repacking Engine Engine Engine Programmatic API Programmatic Interactive Console 7.27.2012   ACCESS ACCESS Defcon  20   Access
  • 25. F R A K irmware everse nalysis onsole HP-RFU Cisco IOS Cisco-CNU XYZ-Format Arbitrary Module Module Module Module Firmware Image of Unknown Format Firmware Unpacking Firmware Unpacking Firmware Analysis Engine Engine Engine Unpacked Firmware Binary Firmware Modification Firmware Modification Firmware Repacking Engine Engine Engine Programmatic API Programmatic Interactive Console 7.27.2012   ACCESS ACCESS Defcon  20   Access
  • 26. F R A K irmware everse nalysis onsole HP-RFU Cisco IOS Cisco-CNU XYZ-Format Arbitrary Module Module Module Module Firmware Image of Unknown Format Firmware Unpacking Firmware Unpacking Firmware Analysis Engine Engine Engine Unpacked XYZ Dynamic Firmware Software Instrumentation Binary Symbiotes & Rootkit Firmware Modification Firmware Modification Firmware Repacking Engine Engine Engine Programmatic API Programmatic Interactive Console 7.27.2012   ACCESS ACCESS Defcon  20   Access
  • 27. F R A K irmware everse nalysis onsole HP-RFU Cisco IOS Cisco-CNU XYZ-Format Arbitrary Module Module Module Module Firmware Image of Unknown Format Firmware Unpacking Firmware Unpacking Firmware Analysis Engine Engine Engine Unpacked XYZ Dynamic Firmware Software Instrumentation Binary Symbiotes & Rootkit Firmware Modification Firmware Modification Firmware Repacking Engine Engine Engine Programmatic API Programmatic Interactive Console 7.27.2012   ACCESS ACCESS Defcon  20   Access
  • 28. F R A K irmware everse nalysis onsole Unpack, Analyze, Modify, Repack: Cisco IOS 7.27.2012   Defcon  20  
  • 29. Payload Design Payload Reasons why Ang stays Developement home on Friday night Payload Developement Payload Testing Payload Design Payload Testing STARE @ BINARY BLOB ? STARE THIS PART @ BINARY L   BLOB Thanks FRAK! 7.27.2012   Defcon  20  
  • 30. Demos •  Packer/Repacker for Cisco IOS, HP-RFU •  Automagic Binary Analysis •  IDA-Pro Integration •  Entropy-related Analysis •  Automated IOS/RFU Rootkit Injection 7.27.2012   Defcon  20  
  • 31. FRAK Konsole 7.27.2012   Defcon  20  
  • 32. FRAK is still WIP. For Early Access Contact Frak-request@redballoonsecurity.com 7.27.2012   Defcon  20  
  • 33. 7.27.2012   Defcon  20