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Effects of Memory Randomization,
          Sanitization and Page Cache on
              Memory Deduplication

                         Kuniyasu Suzaki, Kengo Iijima,
                                  Suzaki          Iijima
                           Toshiki Yagi, Cyrille Artho



                           Research Institute
                           for Secure Systems



EuroSec 2012 at Bern, April 10
Background 1/2
• Infrastructure as a Service(IaaS) type cloud computing
  offers OS hosting service and runs many virtual machines.
   – Examples: Amazon EC2, Rackspace, ...
   – Physical resources are very important. Many techniques are
     developed to save resources.
                       resources
• We concentrate on memory.
   • Memory Deduplication is utilized to share same contents and
     reduces consumption of physical memory.


• Venders want to use this function, but …
Background 2/2
• Some attacks are appeared on IaaS, and users want to
  increase security of Guest OS.
   – For example, Cross VM Side channel attack [CSS2009]
• Guest OSes have some choices of security function.
   – Some of them change the behavior of memory and will work
     to i
        increase or decrease performance of memory deduplication.
                    d           f         f        d d li i


• Our paper measures the affects of security functions on
  real memory deduplication (KSM with KVM).
Contents
1) Background
2) Memory deduplication
3) OS security functions
  – Address Space Layout randomization, Memory Sanitization,
                         randomization         Sanitization
    Page Cache flashing
4) Experimental results
  – On Linux’s KSM (Kernel Samepage Merging) with KVM
    virtual machine monitor
5) Discussion and Conclusion
Memory Deduplication 1/2
• Memory deduplication is a technique to share same
  contents page.
   – Mainly used for virtual machines.
   – Very effective when same guest OS runs on many virtual
     machines.
• Many virtual machine monitors include deduplication
  with different implementations.
                            Guest Pseudo Memory
                      VM1           VM2              VM(n)




                              Real Physical Memory
Memory Deduplication 2/2
• Content-aware deduplication
  – Check contents when data is loaded from disk to memory.
     • Transparent Page Sharing on Disco [OSDI97]
     • Satori on Xen[USENIX09]
• Periodical memory-scan deduplication
  – Scan memory pages and merge when pages are same. It can
    treat dynamically created contents pages.
     • Content-Based Page Sharing on VMWare ESX [SOSP02]
     • Differential Engine on Xen[OSDI08]
     • KSM (Kernel Samepage Merging) [LinuxSymp09]
         – General-purpose memory deduplication for Linux.
         – Used mainly for KVM.

• Our paper uses KSM with KVM virtual machine.
KSM: Kernel Samepage Merging
• KSM has 3 states for pages.
   – Volatile : contents change frequently (not to be candidate)
   – Unshared: candidate pages for deduplication (unique at present)
   – Shared: deduplicated pages with same contents.
• Pages are scanned (default: 20msec)
   – All pages are not scanned at a trial.
                     t       d t ti l
   – The maximum is 25% of the available memory.
   – The time to be deduplicated depends on the situation.
Contents
1) Background
2) Memory deduplication
3) OS security functions
  – Address Space Layout randomization, Memory Sanitization,
                         randomization         Sanitization
    Page Cache flashing
4) Experimental results
  – On Linux’s KSM (Kernel Samepage Merging) with KVM
    virtual machine monitor
5) Discussion and Conclusion
OS Security functions
• Modern OSes have security functions that modify
  memory contents dynamically.
   1. Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
      with Position Independent Executable (PIE)
   2. Memory Sanitization
   3. Page Cache flashing
Address Space Layout Randomization(ASLR)
• Normal binary has fixed Memory layout, and has vulnerability for
  overflow attack.
• ASLR gives randomized offset (aligned page) to code, library, and stack.
         • Early ASLR for Linux is implemented on PaX and Exec Shield Linux.
         • Linux 2.6.12 (June 2005), Windows VISTA.
• Binaries have to be Position Independent Executable (PIE).
    – GCC has options to compile a code for PIE-ELF binary. (“-fPIE” for compiler
                p            p                           y (                p
      and “–pie” for linker)
         • Disadvantage: PIE binaries become fat, because the all addressing are relocatable.
• ASLR and PIE binaries will affect memory deduplication.
 Normal ELF                               PIE-ELF
                                          on ASLR
                                                      Stack      0x????????
               Stack       0xBFFFF000

                                                     Library    0x????????

               Library      0x40000000

                              Position Independent   PIE code    0x????????   The address is
               Code         0x08048000                                        changed for each
                                                                              process on ASLR
Memory sanitization
• Technique for zero-clearing pages after use.
   – Sensitive data remain for long periods after use, and Chow
     proposed Secure deallocation [USENIX Security 04, 05] . It
     prevents information leak.
• Linux has unconditional page sanitization patch.
   – Increased zero-cleared pages will be deduplicated. As a result, it will
     reduces consumption of physical memory.
                                      memory
   – Disadvantage:
       • Linux’s sanitization requires zero-clearing all physical pages at boot time.
       • Do not treat page cache, because cashed pages are not released from a kernel.

                                            Physical Memory
                                            0xXXXX0000


                                  000000
                                 0000000
                                00000000
                             Zero-cleared
                                            0x00000000
Page Cache flushing
• Page Cache flushing reduces possibility of information leak.
• Page Cache reduces I/O overhead when pages are accessed
  repeatedly. However, the page cache may include sensitive data.
• Linux kernel has DropCache for page cache flushing.
   – DropCache released all cached pages from the kernel.
       • “cron” is used to flush page cache at certain intervals (1 sec).
   – Th fl h d memory region i reused f other processes. A a result, it will
     The flushed               i is        d for th          As       lt     ill
     reduce consumption of physical memory.
   – DropCache does not zero-clear the released pages. We need to enable
     sanitization to zero-clear the pages.
   – Disadvantage:
       • Re-loaded data from disk when the same contents are accessed again.
Contents
1) Background
2) Memory deduplication
3) OS security functions
  – Address Space Layout randomization, Memory Sanitization,
                         randomization         Sanitization
    Page Cache flashing
4) Experimental results
  – On Linux’s KSM (Kernel Samepage Merging) with KVM
    virtual machine monitor
5) Discussion and Conclusion
Experiments
• Measure the effects of 3 security functions (ALSR, memory
  sanitization, DropCache: page cache flushing) on memory
  deduplication (KSM with KVM).
• Test environment
   – Intel Core2Quad (Q9650) 3.0GHz processor
   – Host OS: Ubuntu 9.10 (kernel: vanilla-2.6.32.1) with memory
     deduplication KSM and virtual machine monitor KVM
   – 2 type of Guest OSes
      • Normal Gentoo Linux (1.12.13, kernel 2.6.31) on a 32GB virtual disk
        (31GB ext3, 1GB swap)
      • Gentoo Linux which is built as PIE binaries
          – It utilize ALSR
Effects of Position Independent Executable (PIE)

• Gentoo Linux has 1,469 ELF binary files in /bin, /sbin,
  /usr/bin, and /usr/sbin.
   – On Normal Gentoo the total is 88.4MB
   – On PIE Gentoo the total is 94.6MB (7% more).
      • The biggest change: “pampop9” 5 396B -> 9,440B (75% more)
                             pampop9 5,396B > 9 440B          more).
      • The smallest change: “wall” from 9,624B to 9,392B (2% less).


• From after PIE Gentoo is mainly used.
With and without ASLR, DropCache and
              Sanitization on 4VMs
  Security function                                                Stable State
                               ①Peak Mem                                                                     ⑤Guest OS
                                    (MB)                                       ③ Sharing      ④ Unshared+    Boot Time
ASLR   DropCache   Sanitize   Virtual/Physical   ② Physical Mem (MB)           (MB (%))       Volatile         (sec)
                                                                                              (MB (%))
 ○                                574/458                              234.9    106.4(45.3)    128.5(54.7)      62

 ○        ○                       431/332                              206.9     70.7(34.1)    136.3(65.9)      83

 ○                    ○         2063/1661                              204.6     82.1(40.1)    122.5(59.9)      61

 ○        ○           ○         2063/1616                              186.5     39.4(21.1)    147.1(78.9)      83

                                  574/455                              199.0    120.1(60.4)     78.9(39.6)      62

          ○                       429/316                              169.5     83.1(49.0)     86.5(51.0)      82

                      ○         2063/1661                              171.2     94.0(54.9)     77.2(45.1)      62

          ○           ○         2063/1161                              129.9     50.4(38.8)     79.5(61.2)      85
With and without ASLR, DropCache and
                 Sanitization on 4VMs
                                                                                                       DropCache delayed
      Security function                                                  Stable State
                                     ①Peak Mem                                                         the boot time.
                                                                                                                  ⑤Guest OS
                                          (MB)                                       ③ Sharing      ④ Unshared+    Boot Time
  ASLR      DropCache    Sanitize   Virtual/Physical   ② Physical Mem (MB)           (MB (%))       Volatile         (sec)
                                                                                                    (MB (%))
    ○                                   574/458        +18%                  234.9    106.4(45.3)    128.5(54.7)      62

    ○           ○                       431/332                              206.9     70.7(34.1)    136.3(65.9)      83
                                                          -12%
    ○                       ○         2063/1661                              204.6     82.1(40.1)    122.5(59.9)      61
                                                             -13%
                                                              13%
    ○           ○           ○         2063/1616          +43% -21%           186.5     39.4(21.1)    147.1(78.9)      83
                                                                                       Decrease       Increase
                                        574/455                              199.0    120.1(60.4)     78.9(39.6)      62

                ○                       429/316                              169.5     83.1(49.0)     86.5(51.0)      82
                                                           -15%
                            ○         2063/1661                              171.2     94.0(54.9)     77.2(45.1)      62
                                                               -14%
                ○           ○         2063/1161                              129.9     50.4(38.8)     79.5(61.2)      85
                                                                  -35%

Sanitization uses all virtual                                                        ASLR decreases deduplication and
memory, but consumption                                                              increases unique pages. It means
                                ASLR increases physical memory consumption
of physical memory is                                                                ASLR reduces opportunities for
                                Others (DropCache, Sanitization, and Both)
reduced by deduplication.                                                            memory deduplication.
                                decrease.
Virtual and Physical memory consumption
                                       Sanitization use
        MB
        2500
                                         all memory          Virtual Max
                1VM, 2VMs, 4VMs                              Physical Max
         2000


         1500


         1000        Smallest                             Smallest

          500


           0




• Sanitization uses all virtual memory. KSM depress the consumption of physical
  memory but it is still large.
• DropCache, (2) and (6), shows the smallest consumptions, because the flushed
  pages are reused.
    – They shows enabling DropCahe is the best from the view of memory, but DropCache
      affects the time performance of GuestOS.
DropCache: Page Flushing
• DropCache was issued every second. It takes 10 - 20
  microseconds (1% or 2%), thus it does not affect
  performance severely.
• However, the boot time with DropCache increases by
  about 20 seconds (30% more).
   b            d             )
• The other boot procedures read 65MB of data from disk.
  DropCache increases this to 99MB (52% more).

                       PIE Gentoo               Disk Read (MB)
                        (seconds)    Normal           65
        No DropCache      61―62     DropCache         99
        DropCache         82―85      Sanitize         65
Memory Usage in KSM: PIE Gentoo at a stable
         state after booting 1, 2, and 4 VMs
           MB
            250                                                      Shared
                                           1VM,2VMs,4VMs
                                                                     Unshare
            200
                                                                     Volatile

            150



            100



             50



              0




•   Total memory(volatile+unshared+sharing) with ASLR are larger than without ASLR.
•   Volatile and Sharing pages are almost the same. ASLR increases the number of unshared
    pages. It means that ASLR increases pages with different contents.
•   However, it is strange because ASLR dons not change the contests. The reason is not well
    analyzed.
Trace of Memory usage on KSM with 4VMs
• Sanitization sets memory contents to zero on all memory pages at boot
  time. KSM could not catch up.
• However, the performance of Guest OS is not effected, because KSM
  limits the number of pages at a trial, and postpone deduplication.
   – After booting, KSM deduplicates memory pages.
   MB
    2000                                       MB
                                                2000
                             sharing
    1500                     shared             1500                        sharing
                             unshared                                       shared
    1000                     volatile           1000
                                                                            unshared
                                                                            volatile
     500
                                                 500


       0
                                        sec        0
           0   100     200        300                                                    sec
                                                       0    100       200          300


    Without Sanitization(PIE Gentoo on ASLR)               With Sanitization
Contents
1) Background
2) Memory deduplication
3) OS security functions
  – Address Space Layout randomization, Memory Sanitization,
                         randomization         Sanitization
    Page Cache flashing
4) Experimental results
  – On Linux’s KSM (Kernel Samepage Merging) with KVM
    virtual machine monitor
5) Discussion and Conclusion
Discussions
• Co-Design of GuestOS and VMM
   – Some VMMs offers zero-cleared pseudo memory to a VM. If
     memory sanitization recognizes it, the zero-clearing process
     may be removed.
   – If VMM control page flushing (balance page cache and I/O),
     it can achieve global optimization among many VMs.
              hi     l b l ti i ti                   VM
      • It will be a counter part of ballon memory of VMM.
• Consider Scalability on IaaS
   – DropCache reduces the consumption of memory, but it also
     reduce time performance. If a server (IaaS) hosts OSes which
     don’t care time performance, DropCache is effective.
Related Works
• Memory deduplication has potential to change structure of OS.
  – Memory deduplication is used to increase security
       • SLINKY[USENIX ATC 2005] encourages static-linking, because memory
         deduplication reduces the increase memory.
       • Instead of static-linking, Self-contained ELF binaries (binaries which
         include shared libraries) is used for generalization [HotSec 2010]
   – Attack on memory deduplication
       • Memory disclosure attack for Copy-On-Write [EuroSec 2011]
       • OS Fingerprint [IPCCC2011]
• Memory deduplication is improved.
       • KSM++ [RESoLVE 2012]
       • HICAMP [APSOLS 2012] Hardware memory deduplication. The size is
         very small (16-256 Byte).
Conclusions
• Our paper measures the affects of security functions (ASLR,
  sanitization, page cache flushing) on real memory deduplication
  (KSM with KVM).
   – ASLR increases consumption of physical memory, which is more than
     anticipated.
   – Memory sanitization has to initialize all memory, but the CPU overhead
     for GuestOS is low, because memory merging is postponed at heavy load.
                     low                                                load
   – Page cache flushing (DropCache) reduces consumption of physical
     memory by reusing released pages. However, the overhead is large, which
     is caused by re-loading data from a disk.
• We should consider co-design of VMM and security
  function of guestOS and increase the scalability of IaaS.

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EuroSec2012 "Effects of Memory Randomization, Sanitization and Page Cache on Memory Deduplication" by K.Suzaki

  • 1. Effects of Memory Randomization, Sanitization and Page Cache on Memory Deduplication Kuniyasu Suzaki, Kengo Iijima, Suzaki Iijima Toshiki Yagi, Cyrille Artho Research Institute for Secure Systems EuroSec 2012 at Bern, April 10
  • 2. Background 1/2 • Infrastructure as a Service(IaaS) type cloud computing offers OS hosting service and runs many virtual machines. – Examples: Amazon EC2, Rackspace, ... – Physical resources are very important. Many techniques are developed to save resources. resources • We concentrate on memory. • Memory Deduplication is utilized to share same contents and reduces consumption of physical memory. • Venders want to use this function, but …
  • 3. Background 2/2 • Some attacks are appeared on IaaS, and users want to increase security of Guest OS. – For example, Cross VM Side channel attack [CSS2009] • Guest OSes have some choices of security function. – Some of them change the behavior of memory and will work to i increase or decrease performance of memory deduplication. d f f d d li i • Our paper measures the affects of security functions on real memory deduplication (KSM with KVM).
  • 4. Contents 1) Background 2) Memory deduplication 3) OS security functions – Address Space Layout randomization, Memory Sanitization, randomization Sanitization Page Cache flashing 4) Experimental results – On Linux’s KSM (Kernel Samepage Merging) with KVM virtual machine monitor 5) Discussion and Conclusion
  • 5. Memory Deduplication 1/2 • Memory deduplication is a technique to share same contents page. – Mainly used for virtual machines. – Very effective when same guest OS runs on many virtual machines. • Many virtual machine monitors include deduplication with different implementations. Guest Pseudo Memory VM1 VM2 VM(n) Real Physical Memory
  • 6. Memory Deduplication 2/2 • Content-aware deduplication – Check contents when data is loaded from disk to memory. • Transparent Page Sharing on Disco [OSDI97] • Satori on Xen[USENIX09] • Periodical memory-scan deduplication – Scan memory pages and merge when pages are same. It can treat dynamically created contents pages. • Content-Based Page Sharing on VMWare ESX [SOSP02] • Differential Engine on Xen[OSDI08] • KSM (Kernel Samepage Merging) [LinuxSymp09] – General-purpose memory deduplication for Linux. – Used mainly for KVM. • Our paper uses KSM with KVM virtual machine.
  • 7. KSM: Kernel Samepage Merging • KSM has 3 states for pages. – Volatile : contents change frequently (not to be candidate) – Unshared: candidate pages for deduplication (unique at present) – Shared: deduplicated pages with same contents. • Pages are scanned (default: 20msec) – All pages are not scanned at a trial. t d t ti l – The maximum is 25% of the available memory. – The time to be deduplicated depends on the situation.
  • 8. Contents 1) Background 2) Memory deduplication 3) OS security functions – Address Space Layout randomization, Memory Sanitization, randomization Sanitization Page Cache flashing 4) Experimental results – On Linux’s KSM (Kernel Samepage Merging) with KVM virtual machine monitor 5) Discussion and Conclusion
  • 9. OS Security functions • Modern OSes have security functions that modify memory contents dynamically. 1. Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) with Position Independent Executable (PIE) 2. Memory Sanitization 3. Page Cache flashing
  • 10. Address Space Layout Randomization(ASLR) • Normal binary has fixed Memory layout, and has vulnerability for overflow attack. • ASLR gives randomized offset (aligned page) to code, library, and stack. • Early ASLR for Linux is implemented on PaX and Exec Shield Linux. • Linux 2.6.12 (June 2005), Windows VISTA. • Binaries have to be Position Independent Executable (PIE). – GCC has options to compile a code for PIE-ELF binary. (“-fPIE” for compiler p p y ( p and “–pie” for linker) • Disadvantage: PIE binaries become fat, because the all addressing are relocatable. • ASLR and PIE binaries will affect memory deduplication. Normal ELF PIE-ELF on ASLR Stack 0x???????? Stack 0xBFFFF000 Library 0x???????? Library 0x40000000 Position Independent PIE code 0x???????? The address is Code 0x08048000 changed for each process on ASLR
  • 11. Memory sanitization • Technique for zero-clearing pages after use. – Sensitive data remain for long periods after use, and Chow proposed Secure deallocation [USENIX Security 04, 05] . It prevents information leak. • Linux has unconditional page sanitization patch. – Increased zero-cleared pages will be deduplicated. As a result, it will reduces consumption of physical memory. memory – Disadvantage: • Linux’s sanitization requires zero-clearing all physical pages at boot time. • Do not treat page cache, because cashed pages are not released from a kernel. Physical Memory 0xXXXX0000 000000 0000000 00000000 Zero-cleared 0x00000000
  • 12. Page Cache flushing • Page Cache flushing reduces possibility of information leak. • Page Cache reduces I/O overhead when pages are accessed repeatedly. However, the page cache may include sensitive data. • Linux kernel has DropCache for page cache flushing. – DropCache released all cached pages from the kernel. • “cron” is used to flush page cache at certain intervals (1 sec). – Th fl h d memory region i reused f other processes. A a result, it will The flushed i is d for th As lt ill reduce consumption of physical memory. – DropCache does not zero-clear the released pages. We need to enable sanitization to zero-clear the pages. – Disadvantage: • Re-loaded data from disk when the same contents are accessed again.
  • 13. Contents 1) Background 2) Memory deduplication 3) OS security functions – Address Space Layout randomization, Memory Sanitization, randomization Sanitization Page Cache flashing 4) Experimental results – On Linux’s KSM (Kernel Samepage Merging) with KVM virtual machine monitor 5) Discussion and Conclusion
  • 14. Experiments • Measure the effects of 3 security functions (ALSR, memory sanitization, DropCache: page cache flushing) on memory deduplication (KSM with KVM). • Test environment – Intel Core2Quad (Q9650) 3.0GHz processor – Host OS: Ubuntu 9.10 (kernel: vanilla-2.6.32.1) with memory deduplication KSM and virtual machine monitor KVM – 2 type of Guest OSes • Normal Gentoo Linux (1.12.13, kernel 2.6.31) on a 32GB virtual disk (31GB ext3, 1GB swap) • Gentoo Linux which is built as PIE binaries – It utilize ALSR
  • 15. Effects of Position Independent Executable (PIE) • Gentoo Linux has 1,469 ELF binary files in /bin, /sbin, /usr/bin, and /usr/sbin. – On Normal Gentoo the total is 88.4MB – On PIE Gentoo the total is 94.6MB (7% more). • The biggest change: “pampop9” 5 396B -> 9,440B (75% more) pampop9 5,396B > 9 440B more). • The smallest change: “wall” from 9,624B to 9,392B (2% less). • From after PIE Gentoo is mainly used.
  • 16. With and without ASLR, DropCache and Sanitization on 4VMs Security function Stable State ①Peak Mem ⑤Guest OS (MB) ③ Sharing ④ Unshared+ Boot Time ASLR DropCache Sanitize Virtual/Physical ② Physical Mem (MB) (MB (%)) Volatile (sec) (MB (%)) ○ 574/458 234.9 106.4(45.3) 128.5(54.7) 62 ○ ○ 431/332 206.9 70.7(34.1) 136.3(65.9) 83 ○ ○ 2063/1661 204.6 82.1(40.1) 122.5(59.9) 61 ○ ○ ○ 2063/1616 186.5 39.4(21.1) 147.1(78.9) 83 574/455 199.0 120.1(60.4) 78.9(39.6) 62 ○ 429/316 169.5 83.1(49.0) 86.5(51.0) 82 ○ 2063/1661 171.2 94.0(54.9) 77.2(45.1) 62 ○ ○ 2063/1161 129.9 50.4(38.8) 79.5(61.2) 85
  • 17. With and without ASLR, DropCache and Sanitization on 4VMs DropCache delayed Security function Stable State ①Peak Mem the boot time. ⑤Guest OS (MB) ③ Sharing ④ Unshared+ Boot Time ASLR DropCache Sanitize Virtual/Physical ② Physical Mem (MB) (MB (%)) Volatile (sec) (MB (%)) ○ 574/458 +18% 234.9 106.4(45.3) 128.5(54.7) 62 ○ ○ 431/332 206.9 70.7(34.1) 136.3(65.9) 83 -12% ○ ○ 2063/1661 204.6 82.1(40.1) 122.5(59.9) 61 -13% 13% ○ ○ ○ 2063/1616 +43% -21% 186.5 39.4(21.1) 147.1(78.9) 83 Decrease Increase 574/455 199.0 120.1(60.4) 78.9(39.6) 62 ○ 429/316 169.5 83.1(49.0) 86.5(51.0) 82 -15% ○ 2063/1661 171.2 94.0(54.9) 77.2(45.1) 62 -14% ○ ○ 2063/1161 129.9 50.4(38.8) 79.5(61.2) 85 -35% Sanitization uses all virtual ASLR decreases deduplication and memory, but consumption increases unique pages. It means ASLR increases physical memory consumption of physical memory is ASLR reduces opportunities for Others (DropCache, Sanitization, and Both) reduced by deduplication. memory deduplication. decrease.
  • 18. Virtual and Physical memory consumption Sanitization use MB 2500 all memory Virtual Max 1VM, 2VMs, 4VMs Physical Max 2000 1500 1000 Smallest Smallest 500 0 • Sanitization uses all virtual memory. KSM depress the consumption of physical memory but it is still large. • DropCache, (2) and (6), shows the smallest consumptions, because the flushed pages are reused. – They shows enabling DropCahe is the best from the view of memory, but DropCache affects the time performance of GuestOS.
  • 19. DropCache: Page Flushing • DropCache was issued every second. It takes 10 - 20 microseconds (1% or 2%), thus it does not affect performance severely. • However, the boot time with DropCache increases by about 20 seconds (30% more). b d ) • The other boot procedures read 65MB of data from disk. DropCache increases this to 99MB (52% more). PIE Gentoo Disk Read (MB) (seconds) Normal 65 No DropCache 61―62 DropCache 99 DropCache 82―85 Sanitize 65
  • 20. Memory Usage in KSM: PIE Gentoo at a stable state after booting 1, 2, and 4 VMs MB 250 Shared 1VM,2VMs,4VMs Unshare 200 Volatile 150 100 50 0 • Total memory(volatile+unshared+sharing) with ASLR are larger than without ASLR. • Volatile and Sharing pages are almost the same. ASLR increases the number of unshared pages. It means that ASLR increases pages with different contents. • However, it is strange because ASLR dons not change the contests. The reason is not well analyzed.
  • 21. Trace of Memory usage on KSM with 4VMs • Sanitization sets memory contents to zero on all memory pages at boot time. KSM could not catch up. • However, the performance of Guest OS is not effected, because KSM limits the number of pages at a trial, and postpone deduplication. – After booting, KSM deduplicates memory pages. MB 2000 MB 2000 sharing 1500 shared 1500 sharing unshared shared 1000 volatile 1000 unshared volatile 500 500 0 sec 0 0 100 200 300 sec 0 100 200 300 Without Sanitization(PIE Gentoo on ASLR) With Sanitization
  • 22. Contents 1) Background 2) Memory deduplication 3) OS security functions – Address Space Layout randomization, Memory Sanitization, randomization Sanitization Page Cache flashing 4) Experimental results – On Linux’s KSM (Kernel Samepage Merging) with KVM virtual machine monitor 5) Discussion and Conclusion
  • 23. Discussions • Co-Design of GuestOS and VMM – Some VMMs offers zero-cleared pseudo memory to a VM. If memory sanitization recognizes it, the zero-clearing process may be removed. – If VMM control page flushing (balance page cache and I/O), it can achieve global optimization among many VMs. hi l b l ti i ti VM • It will be a counter part of ballon memory of VMM. • Consider Scalability on IaaS – DropCache reduces the consumption of memory, but it also reduce time performance. If a server (IaaS) hosts OSes which don’t care time performance, DropCache is effective.
  • 24. Related Works • Memory deduplication has potential to change structure of OS. – Memory deduplication is used to increase security • SLINKY[USENIX ATC 2005] encourages static-linking, because memory deduplication reduces the increase memory. • Instead of static-linking, Self-contained ELF binaries (binaries which include shared libraries) is used for generalization [HotSec 2010] – Attack on memory deduplication • Memory disclosure attack for Copy-On-Write [EuroSec 2011] • OS Fingerprint [IPCCC2011] • Memory deduplication is improved. • KSM++ [RESoLVE 2012] • HICAMP [APSOLS 2012] Hardware memory deduplication. The size is very small (16-256 Byte).
  • 25. Conclusions • Our paper measures the affects of security functions (ASLR, sanitization, page cache flushing) on real memory deduplication (KSM with KVM). – ASLR increases consumption of physical memory, which is more than anticipated. – Memory sanitization has to initialize all memory, but the CPU overhead for GuestOS is low, because memory merging is postponed at heavy load. low load – Page cache flushing (DropCache) reduces consumption of physical memory by reusing released pages. However, the overhead is large, which is caused by re-loading data from a disk. • We should consider co-design of VMM and security function of guestOS and increase the scalability of IaaS.