1. February 5 & 7|
Explaining Cooperation and Conflict
 Theoretical Foundations
 Major theoretical paradigms
 From premises to theory
 Major theories relevant to
U.S. foreign policy
 Rationalist explanations for war
 Security dilemma and
offense-defense theory
 Alliances and polarity
 Societal-level theories
 Theories of decision-making

2. Othe
Realism Liberalism Constructivism
r
Core concepts & cooperation, interdep ideals, ideology, lang
power, conflict
beliefs endence uage
Key actors / states, institutions,
states states, IGOs, NGOs
organizations IGOs
military power, int’l institutions & law,
Main tools ideas, values
diplomacy commerce
Reality largely objective largely objective largely subjective
Bargaining
zero-sum non-zero-sum non-zero-sum
context
International largely anarchic, anarchic insofar as
anarchic
system growing order assumed to be
Main cause of state pursuit of self- lack of processes to assumptions of
conflict interest regulate competition conflict and hostility
Main approach to interdependence, communication and
balance of power
peace cooperation, int’l law cooperation
shape ideas + norms
Policy cooperate for mutual
pursue self-interest to promote desired
prescriptions interests
outcome
transnational networks,
Explanatory state aggression, globalization,
cultural conflict,
power weakness of institutions democracy-promotion
terrorism

3. Realist theories Theories of rivalry and territory Decision-making theories
• Spiral Models • International Rivalries (Diehl/Goertz; • Individual Level
• Offensive /Defensive Realism Thompson/Rasler/Colaresi) • Popular Beliefs and Images
• Offensive/Defensive Balance • Territory and War • Images of the Enemy
• Balance of Power Theories • “Steps to War” Model (Vasquez) • Misperception and War
• Threat perception and strategic failure
• Balancing vs. Bandwagoning • Learning and War
• Soft Balancing Society-level theories
• Risk theory –
• Regional balancing • Democratic Peace Theories • Prospect theory
• Game-Theoretic Models of BoP • Quantitative Empirical Studies • Poliheuristic Theory (Mintz)
• Theories of polarity & capability • Informational Model (Schultz) • Crisis Decision-making theories
distribution • Theories of Regime Type • Psychoanalytic Approaches
• Alliances and War • Dictatorial Peace? • Organizational Level
• Lateral Pressure Theory (Choucri & • Domestic institutions & political • Bureaucratic Politics / Organizational
North) survival Processes
• Theories of Hegemony / • Diversionary War • Military Doctrine and Innovation
Hegemonic theories • Democracy and war outcome • Civil-Military Relations
• Militarism & strategic culture
• Power Transition Theory • Democratization & regime change
(Organski/Kugler) • Small Group Level
• Social Identity Theory • Arms races and war
• Hegemonic Transition Theory
(Gilpin) • Richardson model
Economic Theories • Theories of crisis-escalation
• Shifting Power and Preventive War
• Long Cycle Theory (Thompson, et al) • Gen. Marxist-Leninist Theories • Entrapment models
• interdependence and trade • Audience costs and domestic politics
• Loss of control and inadvertent war
Institutionalist Theories • Globalization & militarized conflict
• Institutions and Peace • Militarization & commercial rivalry Other / General
• Theories of Collective Security & • Coalitional politics models • Theories of civil war and “new wars”
Security Regimes • Ethno-nationalism and War
• Regional Security Systems Ideational and Cultural Theories • Intervention in Civil Wars
• Ideological sources of conflict and • Termination and Settlement of Civil Wars
Rational Choice Theories cooperation • Alternative theories of causation
• Prisoners' Dilemma Models • Ideas and norms (Schroeder) • Strategic theories
• Cultural differences and war • Nuclear weapons and conflict
• Single-Play and Iterated Games • War duration and termination
• “Clash of Civilizations” (Huntington)
• Bargaining Model of War • Consequences of war: Winners &
• Strategic Culture
• Expected-Utility Models losers, economic costs, diffusion of war
• Attitudinal theories
• Commitment Strategies • New Conceptions of Security
• Religion and War Environmental Scarcity & Conflict
• Selectorate theory (Bueno de •
Mesquita, et al. )
• Feminist theories of peace and war • Demography, Security, &Conflict
• Refugees and Conflict

4. From premises to theory:
Realist framework
 Anarchic system
 State as primary unit /“unitary rational actors”
 Interest defined as power
 Problems
 Concern for relative gains
 Collective action problems

5. From premises to theory:
Realist framework
 Anarchic system
 State as primary unit /“unitary rational actors”
 Decisions based on rational, strategic analysis
 Cost/benefit analysis, preference-maximizing
 Policy driven by national interest
 Interest defined as power
 Is war ever RATIONAL?

6. Rationalist explanations (Fearon)
 Is it ever rational to go to war?
 Observations
 states often have incentives to compete.
 certain modes of competition (e.g., war) are more costly
than other methods (negotiation, bargaining).
 Why don’t states reach prewar bargains that would
avoid the costs and risks of fighting?
 “war is costly and risky, so rational states should have
incentives to locate negotiated settlements that all
would prefer to the gamble of war.”

7. Rationalist explanations (Fearon)
 Why don’t states reach prewar bargains that would
avoid the costs and risks of fighting?
 Possible explanations
 Anarchy (“there’s nothing to stop it”)
 expected benefits exceed expected costs
 rational preventive war
 miscalculation due to lack of information
 miscalculation or disagreement about relative power

8. Rationalist explanations (Fearon)
 Why don’t states reach prewar bargains that would
avoid the costs and risks of fighting?
 Plausible explanations
 miscalculation due to lack of information
 miscalculation or disagreement about relative power
 Key factors
 Bluffing and information asymmetries
 Commitment problems
 Issue indivisibility

9. Security Dilemma and
Offense-Defense Theory (Robert Jervis)
 “Security dilemma”: An increase in one state’s security results
in relative decrease in security of others
 Offense-defense theory (two variants)
 Threat variant: the greater security threat states face, the
more aggressive they become.
 "States seek security, and clash because their efforts to secure
themselves threaten others' security."
 States fear conquest and violence against their citizens and will
aggress to avert them.
 Opportunity variant: The more easily states can conquer, the
more aggressive they become.
 Capacity and imperial cycles

10. Theories of Alliances:
 Alliance
 In/formal arrangement for cooperation between 2+ states
 Mutual commitment and exchange of benefits
 Costs for defection / failing to honor agreement
 Questions
 When and why do alliances form?
 How do leaders choose among potential states or threats
when seeking external support?
 How do great powers choose which states to protect?
 How do weak powers decide whose protection to accept?

11. Theories of Alliances:
Balance of Power (Waltz; Walt)
 Description of existing power distribution
 Conscious policy to achieve BoP and stability
 States will balance threat, rather than power
 Distance, interdependence and ideology are important
 Balancing: External (alliances); internal (increase capacity)
 System characteristics determine behavior
 System is anarchic, self-help
 States = unitary actors that seek@ minimum, self-
preservation; @ maximum: world domination
 Seek goals through balancing (internal + external)

12. Theories of Alliances:
Balance of Power (Waltz; Walt)
 Description of existing power distribution
 Conscious policy to achieve BoP and stability
 System characteristics determine behavior
 System is anarchic, self-help
 States seek goals through balancing (internal + external)
Balance of Threat
 States will balance threat, rather than power
 Threat as a function of
 Aggregate power or strength
 Geographic proximity
 Offensive capability
 Aggressive intentions

13. Theories of Alliances:
Ideological Alliances
 Birds of a feather . . .
 Fly together: common ideology → alliance
 Fly apart: common ideology → conflict

14. Theories of Alliances:
Ideological Alliances
 Birds of a feather . . .
 Fly together: common ideology → alliance
Ideological solidarity:
 States lacking domestic legitimacy likely to seek ideological alliances
to increase internal and external support.
 More pronounced between superpowers and regional allies
 More common in bipolar system
 Greater impact of ideology when defensive advantage is clear
 Fly apart: common ideology → conflict
Ideological division:
 Modest association, but it’s exaggerated as general pattern
 Less powerful motive than threat balancing
 Certain ideologies can be more source for division than unity

15. Theories of Alliances:
Ideological Alliances
 Birds of a feather . . .
 Fly together: common ideology → alliance
 Fly apart: common ideology → conflict
 General patterns
 Ideologically-driven alliances most common when
 states are fairly secure
 the ideology does not require sovereignty be sacrificed
 a rival movement creates a powerful threat to legitimacy
 impact of ideology on choice of partners will be exaggerated
 leaders will overestimate degree of ideological agreement
among both allies and adversaries

16. Theories of Alliances:
Balancing & Bandwagoning (Waltz; Walt)
 Definitions
 Balancing: states align against prevailing power/threat
 Bandwagoning: states align with stronger powers /threats
 Patterns
 Balancing far more common
 More common: in peacetime; during early stages of war; among
stronger states
 Bandwagoning more common when:
 Weak state can’t secure protection through balancing
 State cannot find others to ally with
 Join apparent winner to avoid being on losing side

17. Polarity
 Number of poles
 Unipolar
 Bipolar
 Multipolar
 Degree of polarization
 Tightness / density
 Discreteness / degree of interaction
 Level of animosity
 Relationship to war
 Unipolar: major war less frequent
 War likely during transitions in balance

18. Polarity and Balancing
 Bipolar v. multipolar balancing
 Bipolar balancing occurs internally
 Multipolar balancing tends to occur externally

19. Polarity and Balancing
Multipolar systems Bipolar systems
 characterized by complexity,  Internal balancing is easier
uncertainty and more precise
 Making & maintaining  Unequal burden-sharing
alliances requires expert between partners
strategy, cooperation  major constraints arise from
 States seek alliance partners main adversary, not partners
by adapting to them  Major powers don’t need to
 Weaker partner determines make themselves attractive
policy in moment of crisis to alliance partners
 Flexibility in alliances leads to  Rigidity of bipolar alliances
rigidity in strategy allows more flexible strategy
 Miscalculation is the greatest  Overreaction is the greatest
danger. danger

20. Economic theories
 Marxist & dependency theories
 Primacy of economics – shaping politics + society
 Clash of private interests & economic classes
 Structure as by-product of imperialism
 Capitalist states build empires to secure markets for
excess production (Luxemburg)
 Capitalist states intervene abroad to protect economic
interests, corporations (Magdoff)
 Dependency / dependencia theory
 MNCs & banks exercise control over developing countries

21. Economic theories
 Economic interdependence (variants)
 Liberals: interdependence lowers likelihood of war
by increasing value of trading over aggression
 “better to trade than invade”
 Realists: interdependence increases probability of
war by increasing mutual dependence &
vulnerability
 Incentives to initiate war, if only for continued access to
necessary materials and goods

22. Societal-level theories
 Diversionary war
 To secure support, leaders make bellicose promises,
take dangerous FP positions, or seek “rally” effects
that are difficult to abandon later (Beschloss)
 Democratic Peace
 Democracies seldom fight each other
 consolidated democracies have never fought one another
 Explanations
 prudent diplomacy, similar social structures, regional
attributes, historical alliances.
 democratic self-interest

23. Societal-level theories:
Democratic Peace (Kant, Doyle)
Why don’t liberal-democracies fight one another?
 Doyle: four basic institutions / constitutional features
 citizens are all equal and enjoy equal rights
 representative government
 private property rights
 economics governed by supply and demand.
 Kant: three key factors
 states must be republics
 states will gradually establish a “pacific union”
 all states must respect "cosmopolitan law“

24. Democratic peace (Doyle, Kant)
Why don’t liberal-democracies fight one another?
 Combining Doyle & Kant
 Constitutional law & democratic self interest
 Democratic-republican structures reinforce caution about
high costs of war
 International law – and mutual respect – for other states
 Complements constitutional guarantee of caution, helps
engender future cooperation
 States respect “cosmopolitan law” & “spirit of commerce”
 Adds material incentives to moral commitments
 Together, these conditions create foundation for the
establishment and expansion of a “pacific union”

25. Democratic peace (Doyle, Kant)
Why don’t liberal-democracies fight one another?
 “pacific union” formed by
 Constitutional law & democratic self interest
 International law – and mutual respect – for other states
 States respect “cosmopolitan law” & “spirit of commerce”
 Why do they fight other states?
 Why not push for world-wide democratization?

26. Neoliberal Institutionalism (Keohane)
 Institution
 “general pattern or categorization of activity” – or –
“particular human-constructed arrangement”
 “involve persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and
informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity,
and shape expectations”
 How/why do institutions form?

27. Neoliberal Institutionalism (Keohane)
 Puzzle of formation
 rational choice predicts cooperation & institutions
 prisoner's dilemma not applicable: iterated and multi-
issue PD encourages cooperation
 collective action problems less severe when relatively
small number of parties
 selective incentives
 “rational anticipation” and functionalism
 Actors form institutions based on functions they expect
the institution to serve
 Property rights & legal liability
 Reducing transaction costs
 Reducing uncertainty & providing information
 Adverse selection effects

28. Neoliberal Institutionalism (Keohane)
Puzzle of compliance
 Why comply if regimes can't enforce their rules?
 Continuity and formation costs
 States value institution enough to cooperate even when
they prefer not to (in a single instance) in order to maintain
the institution.
 "Networks of issues and regimes"
 states know that failure to comply may result in tit-for-tat
retaliation.
 states involved in iterated interactions worry about
reputation and affects on future cooperation.

29. Other major theories
 Nationalism (Hayes, Snyder)
 Nationalism complicates imperial rule & support
 Collective action (Hardin, Olson)
 "tragedy of the commons“ & "free rider" problems
 Collective goods are under-provided; collective costs are
over-provided.
 Gender theories
 Foreign policy & state behavior reflects male attributes
found in leaders
 Domino theory
 Conquest of a given state will ease subsequent conquest of
nearby states

30. Theories of decision-making:
Cognitive theories (Jervis)
 Attribution theory: states attribute own behavior to
circumstances; attribute others' behavior to character
 Behavioral corollary: states tend to ascribe others' good
behavior to their own efforts; blame others' bad conduct on
the other's innate character.
 Belief perseverance: states are slow to absorb new facts
and realities that clash with existing beliefs
 Common misperceptions:
 States will exaggerate shared character of information, often
unaware when others‘ perceptions diverge from their own
 States tend to exaggerate the centralized, disciplined, and
coordinated character of others' behavior.