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Getting Your Users
to Care About Security
   (It’s not the Kobayashi Maru.)




        Room 3004, West Hall
     Presented by Alison Gianotto
Who Am I?


Director of Technology/Corporate Security Officer at
noise.

We work with brands like JP Morgan, Chase, Intel, EA
Games and vitaminwater.

Developer/Sysadmin for 16 years

Crime-fighting social engineer!

Penetration tester
This is how your users view
                 computer security.
                                                                                                            moqA
                                                 oot products or   services. www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgervxM
Used with permission. Not an endorsement of Webr
“Given a choice between a
dancing bear screen-saver and
adhering to a company security
policy, the end user is going for
the dancing bear every time”.

-- Patrick Gray,
host of the Risky Business Podcast, Episode
RB78: Interview with Geekonomics author
Users don’t care
about security
because they
don’t know why
they should.

That’s where
you come in.
Computer Hacking
                                                   Has Grown Up



      Years ago, hacking was often done
      for just fun and bragging rights.

      Today, hacking is a lucrative
      industry often backed by
      organized crime.

      LOTS of $$$ to be made stealing
      identities, credit card info, etc.

                                                                    Ever - January 12, 2012
Source: DarkGovernment.Com: FBI Warning: Cyber Threat Bigger than
Why Hackers Hack
 To steal/sell identities, credit card numbers, corporate
 secrets, military secrets

 Fun, excitement and/or notoriety

 Political (“Hacktivism”)

 Revenge

 Blackhat SEO
The number of successful network
         security breaches over the past 12
                   months (2011)
                                                          ey, June 2011
Source: Ponemon Institute, Juniper Networks Sponsored Surv
“How much did cyber attacks cost your
      company over the past 12 months?”

                                                          ey, June 2011
Source: Ponemon Institute, Juniper Networks Sponsored Surv
Additional Findings




  The top two endpoints from which these breaches
  occurred are employees' laptop computers with
  34% and employees' mobile devices with 29%.
                                                          ey, June 2011
Source: Ponemon Institute, Juniper Networks Sponsored Surv
“My company is too small for
       anyone to bother with.”

       Smaller companies are becoming bigger
       targets because they often don’t have the
       resources to defend themselves, and can be
       easily hit by non-selective, broad attacks.




                                                           hes Declines, Report Says” April 19, 2011
Source: Bloomberg, “Data Theft From Computer Security Breac
Social Engineering:
The act of manipulating people into performing actions
or divulging confidential information, rather than by
breaking in or using technical cracking techniques.
Trickery or deception for the purpose of information
gathering, fraud, or computer system access.
In most cases the attacker never comes face-to-face
with the victim.
Social Engineering attacks are commonly executed
over the phone or through email.
“The human is the new security
perimeter. You can spend a fortune on
technologies, but attackers will send
one email to one of your employees
and you'll be done.

You're only one click away from
compromise.”

-- Eddie Schwartz, CSO at RSA
Cyber attacks: resistance is futile | Sydney Morning Herald.
Meet Stanley
Mark Rifkin

 In 1978, Rifkin stole $10.2
 million from Security Pacific
 Bank using social
 engineering.

 No violence. No viruses. No
 malware.

 The woman who performed
 the funds transfer at Security
 Pacific thanked him before
 hanging up.
“There's a popular saying that a
secure computer is one that's
turned off.

Clever, but false: The pretexter
simply talks someone into going
into the office and turning that
computer on.”

- Kevin Mitnick
The threat landscape has changed.

We can not simply throw technology at
the problem.

The only long-term solution is to educate
users -- which will require a fundamental
shift in the way we are perceived.

And that doesn’t happen by itself.
It’s time for a new job!

Because the problem is not solvable through
technology alone, our responsibilities now
include:


  Understanding new threats as they emerge
  Determining which threats can be mitigated through
  technology, education, or both
  Explaining the nature of threats to our users in a
  way that is clear, accurate and meaningful
  Cutting through Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt (FUD)
It’s not all bad news.
These new responsibilities introduce new,
creative challenges - that sometimes even
involve a little mischief.
What Threats DO Your Users
Need to Care About?

 Network security           Phishing

 Privilege escalation       Better password practices

 DDoS attacks               Click-jacking/Like-jacking

 SQL Injection              Staying safe on public wifi

 Cross-Site Scripting       Mobile security

 Zero Day vulnerabilities   Social engineering
Phishing

Phishing attacks attempt to trick
users into entering their login/
credit card/SS#/etc into a fake
version of a legitimate site so the
sensitive data can be saved and
used later by the attacker.


Many phishing attacks originate
from e-mails and can be VERY
convincing.
What’s the
Point?

Phishers capture login
information even for non-
financial sites because they
know that
MANY PEOPLE RE-USE
THE SAME LOGINS FOR
MULTIPLE WEBSITES.

*cough*Gawker*cough*
Platform
Agnostic
Since Phishing scams take
advantage of vulnerabilities in
the human condition instead of
vulnerabilities in technology,
ALL users are at risk, whether
they are on Mac, PC, Linux, etc.


same password for email +
forgotten password request=
access to hijack any account
Phishing on
Mobile
Smartphone users are
particularly vulnerable to
phishing attacks because the
browser takes up the whole
screen, and doesn’t provide as
much information about a page
as a desktop browser.


This makes it easier to trick
users into thinking the site is
real.
Password Security:
         Analysis of Most Common Gawker
                     Passwords
2516: 123456     318: dragon       255: shadow
2188: password   307: trustno1     241: princess
1205: 12345678   303: baseball     234: cheese
696: qwerty      302: gizmodo
498: abc123      300: whatever
459: 12345       297: superman
441: monkey      276: 1234567
413: 111111      266: sunshine
385: consumer    266: iloveyou
376: letmein     262: [censored]
351: 1234        256: starwars
ALL Passwords are Crackable

Using an eight-core Xeon-powered system, Duo Security brute-
forced 400,000 password hashes of the 1.3 million stolen from
Gawker, cracking the first 200,000 in under an hour.

15 of the accounts for which it had cracked password encryption
belonged to people working at NASA, nine were assigned to users
employed by Congress, and six belonged to employees of the
Department of Homeland Security.

2009 RockYou hack: “123456" was the most common password
in the collection posted on the Web by hackers, followed by
"12345," "123456789," "password" and "iloveyou"
There is NO excuse for bad
 passwords anymore.

1Password and LastPass both allow you to:
      generate long, highly random passwords that
      are unique to each website you log into
      store the passwords in a database and auto-fill
      sync that database across your iPhone, iPad,
      other computers, etc
“Passwords are like
underwear - they
should never be
shared with friends
and should be
changed often!”
Social Media

Make sure profiles are
locked down so only
friends can see
personal information
Turn OFF geotagging
on images in
Smartphones.
Location
Services

Be careful using location
services such as Foursquare,
Facebook Places, etc if your
social media accounts are
open to anyone.
So what’s the problem?

Many security professionals seem to have given up hope.

Many security policies implement techniques that provide the
illusion of security but actually make things less secure.
(Example: rotating passwords = sticky notes) Identify these
barriers and look for alternatives that are as secure but less
frustrating. (Non-rotating password with two-factor
authentication.)

Many system administrators have a reputation for being
unapproachable, arrogant or dictatorial. (“You must always do it
this way. Because I said so!”)
It’s time to get creative!

We know that old tactics don’t work. So stop. “Insanity: doing the
same thing over and over again and expecting different results.” -
Albert Einstein

Approach people as people, not users.

Help them understand how these threats affect both at work and
their personal lives.

Use real-life examples, illustrations and analogies. No geek speak.

Use humor! Getting people to stay awake through security
presentations is hard. Making them laugh helps.
Suggestions
Register a fake domain name that’s similar to your company’s
real domain name. Send around a fake “phishing” email and see
who clicks. (Punycode domains are great for this.)

Drop spiked USB drives in the parking lot or hallway, with a
cheeky reprimand (autorun executable with loud farting noises,
for example.)

Have a company Wall of Shame (or Hall of Fame). Consider perks
for users who really shine.

Position yourself as a security mentor. You are there to help
protect them and the company.
Measuring Success


Determine what your success metrics are at the start.

Ask for short evaluations after security presentations. Learn
where you’re losing or confusing.

Encourage users to ASK if they’re not sure. And when they do
ask, be supportive. Knowing what they don’t know is HUGE
progress.
Great Resources


 http://www.securingthehuman.org

 http://www.social-engineer.org/

 http://stopthinkconnect.org/

 <shamless plug>http://www.moresecure.us (coming soon!) </
 shameless plug>
Questions? Get
in touch!

E-mail: snipe@snipe.net

Twitter: @snipeyhead

http://www.snipe.net

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Getting users to care about security

  • 1. Getting Your Users to Care About Security (It’s not the Kobayashi Maru.) Room 3004, West Hall Presented by Alison Gianotto
  • 2. Who Am I? Director of Technology/Corporate Security Officer at noise. We work with brands like JP Morgan, Chase, Intel, EA Games and vitaminwater. Developer/Sysadmin for 16 years Crime-fighting social engineer! Penetration tester
  • 3. This is how your users view computer security. moqA oot products or services. www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgervxM Used with permission. Not an endorsement of Webr
  • 4. “Given a choice between a dancing bear screen-saver and adhering to a company security policy, the end user is going for the dancing bear every time”. -- Patrick Gray, host of the Risky Business Podcast, Episode RB78: Interview with Geekonomics author
  • 5. Users don’t care about security because they don’t know why they should. That’s where you come in.
  • 6. Computer Hacking Has Grown Up Years ago, hacking was often done for just fun and bragging rights. Today, hacking is a lucrative industry often backed by organized crime. LOTS of $$$ to be made stealing identities, credit card info, etc. Ever - January 12, 2012 Source: DarkGovernment.Com: FBI Warning: Cyber Threat Bigger than
  • 7. Why Hackers Hack To steal/sell identities, credit card numbers, corporate secrets, military secrets Fun, excitement and/or notoriety Political (“Hacktivism”) Revenge Blackhat SEO
  • 8. The number of successful network security breaches over the past 12 months (2011) ey, June 2011 Source: Ponemon Institute, Juniper Networks Sponsored Surv
  • 9. “How much did cyber attacks cost your company over the past 12 months?” ey, June 2011 Source: Ponemon Institute, Juniper Networks Sponsored Surv
  • 10. Additional Findings The top two endpoints from which these breaches occurred are employees' laptop computers with 34% and employees' mobile devices with 29%. ey, June 2011 Source: Ponemon Institute, Juniper Networks Sponsored Surv
  • 11. “My company is too small for anyone to bother with.” Smaller companies are becoming bigger targets because they often don’t have the resources to defend themselves, and can be easily hit by non-selective, broad attacks. hes Declines, Report Says” April 19, 2011 Source: Bloomberg, “Data Theft From Computer Security Breac
  • 12. Social Engineering: The act of manipulating people into performing actions or divulging confidential information, rather than by breaking in or using technical cracking techniques. Trickery or deception for the purpose of information gathering, fraud, or computer system access. In most cases the attacker never comes face-to-face with the victim. Social Engineering attacks are commonly executed over the phone or through email.
  • 13. “The human is the new security perimeter. You can spend a fortune on technologies, but attackers will send one email to one of your employees and you'll be done. You're only one click away from compromise.” -- Eddie Schwartz, CSO at RSA Cyber attacks: resistance is futile | Sydney Morning Herald.
  • 14. Meet Stanley Mark Rifkin In 1978, Rifkin stole $10.2 million from Security Pacific Bank using social engineering. No violence. No viruses. No malware. The woman who performed the funds transfer at Security Pacific thanked him before hanging up.
  • 15. “There's a popular saying that a secure computer is one that's turned off. Clever, but false: The pretexter simply talks someone into going into the office and turning that computer on.” - Kevin Mitnick
  • 16. The threat landscape has changed. We can not simply throw technology at the problem. The only long-term solution is to educate users -- which will require a fundamental shift in the way we are perceived. And that doesn’t happen by itself.
  • 17. It’s time for a new job! Because the problem is not solvable through technology alone, our responsibilities now include: Understanding new threats as they emerge Determining which threats can be mitigated through technology, education, or both Explaining the nature of threats to our users in a way that is clear, accurate and meaningful Cutting through Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt (FUD)
  • 18. It’s not all bad news. These new responsibilities introduce new, creative challenges - that sometimes even involve a little mischief.
  • 19. What Threats DO Your Users Need to Care About? Network security Phishing Privilege escalation Better password practices DDoS attacks Click-jacking/Like-jacking SQL Injection Staying safe on public wifi Cross-Site Scripting Mobile security Zero Day vulnerabilities Social engineering
  • 20. Phishing Phishing attacks attempt to trick users into entering their login/ credit card/SS#/etc into a fake version of a legitimate site so the sensitive data can be saved and used later by the attacker. Many phishing attacks originate from e-mails and can be VERY convincing.
  • 21. What’s the Point? Phishers capture login information even for non- financial sites because they know that MANY PEOPLE RE-USE THE SAME LOGINS FOR MULTIPLE WEBSITES. *cough*Gawker*cough*
  • 22. Platform Agnostic Since Phishing scams take advantage of vulnerabilities in the human condition instead of vulnerabilities in technology, ALL users are at risk, whether they are on Mac, PC, Linux, etc. same password for email + forgotten password request= access to hijack any account
  • 23. Phishing on Mobile Smartphone users are particularly vulnerable to phishing attacks because the browser takes up the whole screen, and doesn’t provide as much information about a page as a desktop browser. This makes it easier to trick users into thinking the site is real.
  • 24. Password Security: Analysis of Most Common Gawker Passwords 2516: 123456 318: dragon 255: shadow 2188: password 307: trustno1 241: princess 1205: 12345678 303: baseball 234: cheese 696: qwerty 302: gizmodo 498: abc123 300: whatever 459: 12345 297: superman 441: monkey 276: 1234567 413: 111111 266: sunshine 385: consumer 266: iloveyou 376: letmein 262: [censored] 351: 1234 256: starwars
  • 25. ALL Passwords are Crackable Using an eight-core Xeon-powered system, Duo Security brute- forced 400,000 password hashes of the 1.3 million stolen from Gawker, cracking the first 200,000 in under an hour. 15 of the accounts for which it had cracked password encryption belonged to people working at NASA, nine were assigned to users employed by Congress, and six belonged to employees of the Department of Homeland Security. 2009 RockYou hack: “123456" was the most common password in the collection posted on the Web by hackers, followed by "12345," "123456789," "password" and "iloveyou"
  • 26. There is NO excuse for bad passwords anymore. 1Password and LastPass both allow you to: generate long, highly random passwords that are unique to each website you log into store the passwords in a database and auto-fill sync that database across your iPhone, iPad, other computers, etc
  • 27. “Passwords are like underwear - they should never be shared with friends and should be changed often!”
  • 28. Social Media Make sure profiles are locked down so only friends can see personal information Turn OFF geotagging on images in Smartphones.
  • 29. Location Services Be careful using location services such as Foursquare, Facebook Places, etc if your social media accounts are open to anyone.
  • 30. So what’s the problem? Many security professionals seem to have given up hope. Many security policies implement techniques that provide the illusion of security but actually make things less secure. (Example: rotating passwords = sticky notes) Identify these barriers and look for alternatives that are as secure but less frustrating. (Non-rotating password with two-factor authentication.) Many system administrators have a reputation for being unapproachable, arrogant or dictatorial. (“You must always do it this way. Because I said so!”)
  • 31. It’s time to get creative! We know that old tactics don’t work. So stop. “Insanity: doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.” - Albert Einstein Approach people as people, not users. Help them understand how these threats affect both at work and their personal lives. Use real-life examples, illustrations and analogies. No geek speak. Use humor! Getting people to stay awake through security presentations is hard. Making them laugh helps.
  • 32. Suggestions Register a fake domain name that’s similar to your company’s real domain name. Send around a fake “phishing” email and see who clicks. (Punycode domains are great for this.) Drop spiked USB drives in the parking lot or hallway, with a cheeky reprimand (autorun executable with loud farting noises, for example.) Have a company Wall of Shame (or Hall of Fame). Consider perks for users who really shine. Position yourself as a security mentor. You are there to help protect them and the company.
  • 33. Measuring Success Determine what your success metrics are at the start. Ask for short evaluations after security presentations. Learn where you’re losing or confusing. Encourage users to ASK if they’re not sure. And when they do ask, be supportive. Knowing what they don’t know is HUGE progress.
  • 34. Great Resources http://www.securingthehuman.org http://www.social-engineer.org/ http://stopthinkconnect.org/ <shamless plug>http://www.moresecure.us (coming soon!) </ shameless plug>
  • 35. Questions? Get in touch! E-mail: snipe@snipe.net Twitter: @snipeyhead http://www.snipe.net