Identity and Interdependence: Two Views on Groups

Identity and Interdependence: Two Views on Groups
Simon Columbus
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
simon@simoncolumbus.com
November 21, 2016
Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 1 / 49

Three Questions
What does it mean to be a group?
What are the forces that govern group life?
How can (and should) we study group life?

Lewin (1948, p. 84)

Situations are Games
Any interpersonal situation can be represented as a ‘game’, a matrix of
outcomes given choices.
Kelley et al. (2003)

Game Theory
In game theory, each matrix has a solution
a pure or mixed strategy a payoﬀ-maximising player should play

Outcome Controls
Interdependence theory decomposes the matrix into sources of control:
the person’s own actions (‘Actor Control’, AC)
the partner’s actions (‘Partner Control’, PC)
the interaction between their two actions (‘Joint Control’, JC)

Outcome Controls
the person’s own actions (‘Bilateral Actor Control’, BAC)
the partner’s actions (‘Mutual Partner Control’, MPC)
the interaction between their two actions (‘Mutual Joint Control’,
MJC)

Outcome Controls
the person’s own actions (‘Bilateral Actor Control’, BAC)
the partner’s actions (‘Mutual Partner Control’, MPC)
the interaction between their two actions (‘Mutual Joint Control’,
MJC)
Interdependence theory
A theory of how people control their own and other’s outcomes.

Outcome Controls

Dimensions of Interdependence
From ratios of the outcome controls, we can derive four fundamental
dimensions of interdependence, on which all situations vary:
Degree of interdependence =
PC2
e + JC2
e
AC2
e + PC2
e + JC2
e
In some situations, individuals control their own outcomes; in other
situations, they are fully dependent on their partner’s actions.

Basis of interdependence =
PCe
JCe
The basis of interdependence varies from exchange, in which each person
determines their partner’s outcomes, to coordination.

Conﬂict of interest = 2 ×
ACe × PCk + ACk × PCe + JCe × JCk
AC2
e + PC2
e + JC2
e + AC2
k + PC2
k + JC2
k
Interests vary from corresponding to conﬂicting.

Asymmetry of dependence =
PC2
e + JC2
e
AC2
e + PC2
e + JC2
e
−
PC2
k + JC2
k
AC2
k + PC2
k + JC2
k
Dependence ranges from a person having unilateral power over their
partner to depending unilaterally on their partner; with symmetric
dependence in the middle.

PC2
e + JC2
e
AC2
e + PC2
e + JC2
e
PCe
JCe
Conﬂict of interest = 2
AC2
e + PC2
e + JC2
e + AC2
k + PC2
k + JC2
k
PC2
e + JC2
e
AC2
e + PC2
e + JC2
e
−
PC2
k + JC2
k
AC2
k + PC2
k + JC2
k

PC2
e + JC2
e
AC2
e + PC2
e + JC2
e
PCe
JCe
Conﬂict of interest = 2
AC2
e + PC2
e + JC2
e + AC2
k + PC2
k + JC2
k
PC2
e + JC2
e
AC2
e + PC2
e + JC2
e
−
PC2
k + JC2
k
AC2
k + PC2
k + JC2
k
Future interdependence
Information certainty

Summary
Interdependence is the idea that in interpersonal situations, one’s
outcomes are, in part, determined by the actions of others (and one
may likewise control their outcomes)
Any situation can be represented as a matrix of actions and outcomes
A person’s outcomes are controlled by
the person’s own actions
their partner’s actions
the interaction between their two actions
Each situation is characterised by six dimensions of interdependence
Degree of interdependence
Basis of interdependence
Conﬂict of interest
Asymmetry of dependence

The Minimal Group Paradigm
Minimal Group Paradigm
What is the least of a group people will still favour over another?

You can reward and punish other participants. For each matrix, how would
you like to divide rewards and punishments?
Tajfel et al. (1971)

People favour their in-group—even when the group is based on an
arbitrary characteristic.
Tajfel et al. (1971)

Social Identity Theory
The Social Identity Approach
Based on Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1974) and Self-categorisation
Theory (Turner et al., 1987)
Two parts of the self, personal and social identity,
“the part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his
knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups)
together with the emotional signiﬁcance attached to that
membership.” (Tajfel, 1974)

Social Identity Theory
People are motivated to maintain positive self-esteem
As a consequence, people are motivated to maintain a positive social
identity
When people self-categorise as belonging to a group, mere
categorisation initiates thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that attempt
to positively diﬀerentiate the ingroup from the outgroup
The meta-contrast principle
Without the presence of an outgroup, ingroup categorisation does not
occur and subsequent discrimination should not emerge (Van
Knippenberg & Wilke, 1988)

Not as Minimal as You Thought
In Tajfel et al.’s experiments, who rewarded the rewarders?
‘Implicit interdependence’: If I control their outcomes, maybe they
control mine. . . ? (Rabbie, Schot, & Visser, 1989)
i.e., participants assumed mutual partner control (Yamagishi, Jin, &
Kiyonari, 1999)

Not as Minimal as You Thought
In Tajfel et al.’s experiments, who rewarded the rewarders?
‘Implicit interdependence’: If I control their outcomes, maybe they
control mine. . . ? (Rabbie, Schot, & Visser, 1989)
i.e., participants assumed mutual partner control (Yamagishi, Jin, &
Kiyonari, 1999)
Outgroup Favouritism
If participants knew their outcomes were determined by outgroup
members, they favoured—the outgroup (Rabbie et al., 1989).

Not as Robust as You Thought, Either
Yamagishi et al. (1999)

The Essence of a Group
What Makes a Group?
There is a diﬀerence between
“perceiving oneself as merely
subsumed under the ‘same
abstract concept’ versus
‘belonging to a group”’ (Lewin
in Rabbie & Horwitz, 1988)
That diﬀerence, most simply
speaking, is interdependence

“. . . reciprocation of the favor given to a particular ingroup
member is expected to come from any ingroup member rather
than directly from that particular member.” (Yamagishi et al.,
1999)

A System of Generalised Exchange
Nowak & Sigmund (2005)

A System of Generalised Exchange

Cooperation Through Reputation
Concern for their reputation makes people cooperative
When people know that their future interaction partners know about
their history, they behave more cooperative in the present (e.g.
Wedekind & Milinski, 2000; Milinski & Wedekind, 2001, 2002; Seinen
& Schram, 2006)
Both because cooperators are treated nicer, and are more likely to be
chosen as interaction partners in the ﬁrst place (cf. Roberts, 1998)

Cooperation Through Reputation
Concern for their reputation makes people cooperative
When people know that their future interaction partners know about
their history, they behave more cooperative in the present (e.g.
Wedekind & Milinski, 2000; Milinski & Wedekind, 2001, 2002; Seinen
& Schram, 2006)
Both because cooperators are treated nicer, and are more likely to be
chosen as interaction partners in the ﬁrst place (cf. Roberts, 1998)
Reputation Overcomes Boundaries
Observation by an out-group partner can lead people to favour other
out-group members (Chang, n.d.)

Gossip
Gossip spreads one’s reputation
A reputation is built from the
experience of one’s interaction
partners...
... but it is spread by partners
and onlookers alike
The group is the natural
container for gossip
However, networks can
transcend group boundaries

Gossip
Gossip spreads one’s reputation
It is only gossip to future
interaction partners that
enhances cooperation
... and only among those who
do not cooperate voluntarily
The larger the network of
potential recipients of gossip,
the stronger its eﬀect
Wu et al. (2015,2016)

Bounded Generalised Reciprocity
Groups are containers for a network of generalised exchange (Yamagishi et
al., 1999; Kiyonari & Yamagishi, 2000))
People prefer to cooperate with others who have a good reputation
Therefore, people are motivated to maintain a good reputation by
cooperating
As a consequence, people have generalised trust that other in-group
members will cooperate

In-group Favouritism
Comparing Social Identity Theory and Bounded Generalised Reciprocity
Comparison SIT BGR
In- vs. outgroup + +
Ingroup vs. stranger 0 +
Outgroup vs. stranger 0 0
Interdependence +/++ +/++
Reciprocity +/+ +/++
Common knowledge + +
Unilateral knowledge + 0

Meta-Analysing Economics Games
Balliet, Wu, & de Dreu (2014)

In-group Favouritism
Comparing Social Identity Theory and Bounded Generalised Reciprocity
Comparison SIT BGR
In- vs. outgroup + +
Ingroup vs. stranger 0 +
Outgroup vs. stranger 0 0
Interdependence +/++ +/++
Reciprocity +/+ +/++
Common knowledge + +
Unilateral knowledge + 0

There is in-group favouritism in cooperation (d = .32)
Discrimination between in-group members and strangers (d = .30)
But not between out-group members and strangers (d = -.09)
More in-group favouritism in interdependent situations (d = .19)
No intergroup discrimination when reputational concerns are muted
(d = .04)
In contrast, discrimination occurs when reputational concerns are
active (d = .32)
Overall, eight out of eight predictions of BGR were correct

Summary
Even where no objective interdependence exists, people may perceive
a shared fate
The ‘Minimal Group Paradigm’ is not that minimal, after all
Interdependence is crucial to feeling ‘like a group’
Within a group, people expect generalised reciprocity
Generalised reciprocity is based on reputational concern
Reputation spreads via gossip
Generalised reciprocity explains intergroup discrimination better than
social identity theory

Functional Interdependence Theory
How do people make sense of situations?
Over the course of evolution, our mind has been shaped to perceive
variations in interdependence
Take in cues from the environment (Brunswik, 1955)
Cues are integrated into internal regulatory variables (Tooby et al.,
2008)
Four IRV represent the four dimensions of interdependence (Balliet,
Tybur, & van Lange, 2016)

Functional Interdependence Theory
How do people make sense of situations?
People can distinguish ﬁve dimensions of interdependence (Gerpott,
Balliet, & de Vries, forthcoming)
Degree of interdependence
Conﬂict of interest
Asymmetry of dependence

Do perceptions of interdependence matter for cooperation?
Study 1: People played a prisoner’s dilemma
Study 2: People played a prisoner’s dilemma and a dictator game

Do perceptions of interdependence matter for cooperation?
Study 1: People played a prisoner’s dilemma
Study 2: People played a prisoner’s dilemma and a dictator game
Results
Perceptions of interdependence explain 24% of variance in cooperation in
a prisoner’s dilemma.
More cooperative when more interdependent, less conflict, and less
power
People are more cooperative in the PD than the DG
Due to differences in perceived (greater) interdependence and (less)
conflict

Where Do People Live?

Thank You

Identity and Interdependence: Two Views on Groups

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Identity and Interdependence: Two Views on Groups