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India – ASEAN Relations In 21st Century: Strategic
Implications For India – Analysis
By: Asif Ahmed
July 9, 2012
“India’s Look East Policy is not merely an external economic policy, it is also a strategic shift in India’s vision
of the world and India’s place in the evolving global economy. Most of all it is about reaching out to our
civilisationalneighbours in South East Asia and East Asia”– Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh

Introduction
ASEAN was formed in 1967 and its founding fathers had envisioned an organization which would include all
the ten countries of Southeast Asia (SEA). It began with five Southeast Asian states (Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand); and others including the LMCV countries (Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia
and Vietnam) joined later. An eleventh country, East Timor, is yet to be granted membership. The SEA
countries are diverse and at varying stages of development- with Singapore at the forefront and Myanmar still
a least developed country (LDC). The emergence of India from a gloomy to a glowing position in the global
arena, coupled with a number of virtues like enormous size, huge population, convenient geostrategic location,
progressive military might, meteoric economic growth inspired various states including South-East Asian
nations to devise collaborative ties with India.


India-ASEAN relations are a reflection of the complementariness of interests between the two entities. As
India chooses to embark on a benign projection of its rising power, it has become imperative to chart a foreign
policy commensurate with its ambitions in Asia and the world. For India‘s power to be accepted in the Asian
Continent, it needs to look beyond its immediate neighbours in the sub-Continent, and diversify and cement its
relations mainly with the South-East Asian nations, the very essence of its Look East Policy and its continuing
effort to sustain and improve ties with a regional body like ASEAN1. This paper will discuss the India-
ASEAN cooperation in various fields, the on-going efforts and will also try to explore the Historical Overview,
Bilateral-Dialogue Relations, Political and Security Issues, various possibilities and Strategic Implications of
cooperation including defence cooperation and convergence of interest of both the region in 21st century.


Historical Background
In the annals of its history, India has had extensive cultural, economic and political ties with the Southeast
Asian nations. But in the years after independence, this region was completely overlooked by India because of
various reasons. The tumultuous relationship with Pakistan affected India‘s policy considerations as India
looked to develop and maintain good relations with the Western world, so that they supported India‘s views on
Kashmir. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) afforded a greater degree of interaction between India and
many countries which it had neglected in the immediate years after its independence. India supported the anti-
colonial movement in Southeast Asia—the convening of the Asian Relations Conference in 1947, a special
conference on Indonesia in January 1949, Chairmanship of the International Control Commission on India-
China in 1954 and the sponsoring of the Bandung Conference—all these reflected India‘s deep involvement in
the freedom struggle being waged by the countries of the region. But the growing pro-Soviet tilt in India‘s
foreign policy drove a wedge between India and the Southeast Asian nations. Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand,
Singapore and the Philippines were strongly anti-communist. India‘s proposal for a security arrangement in the
region also did not go down well with the ASEAN countries as it was seen to be part of the Soviet Union‘s
attempts to bring the region under its influence. ASEAN also did not support India‘s cause during the 1971
Indo-Pak war.


India ASEAN Relations After The End Of Cold War




                                                     ASEAN

The end of the cold war marked a turning point in India‘s relations with ASEAN. The resolution of the
Cambodian conflict brought about a change in Indo-ASEAN relations. The then Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi‘s path-breaking visit to China in 1988 also marked a tremendous shift in Sino-Indian relations and had
a bearing on Indo-ASEAN relations as well. With the launching of India‘s economic liberalisationprogramme
in 1991, ASEAN came to be identified as being pivotal to India‘s policy in the Asia-Pacific region. ASEAN
also decided to expand its membership to include all countries which are geographically part of Southeast
Asia. A quantum jump in Indo-Asean relations came with the effort to forge closer links with the Southeast
Asian countries after 1991. This period saw the beginning of its Look-East Policy which was intended to reach
out to the countries of East and Southeast Asia which had been neglected by India in spite of cultural,
religious, geographical proximity and historical links.
The changed global circumstances forced India to adapt itself to the new emerging world order. India began an
overhaul of its foreign policy and it was felt that ASEAN could be of much help to India in this exercise. India
extended support to ASEAN‘s efforts in establishing peace in Cambodia and bring the warring factions to the
negotiating table at the Jakarta Informal Meet (JIM I and JIM II) and later co-operated with the United Nations
Transitional Authority in its efforts to bring peace to Cambodia.


It was in the wake of the failure of SAARC that India decided to ―Look-East‖ as India already had deep-seated
cultural, religious and political links with the Southeast Asian countries. But there were many factors which
impeded India‘s efforts in this process. The ASEAN countries were pro-West in their outlook and projected
Vietnam as their common threat as opposed to India‘s views on Vietnam and Cambodia. The booming
economies of the Southeast Asian countries also attracted India. ASEAN was also on the lookout for new
partners and untapped markets. The break-up of the erstwhile Soviet Union, its withdrawal from Cam Ranh
Bay and the American withdrawal from the Subic Bay naval base created a security vacuum in the region.
India‘s close relations with the Soviet Union acted as a dampener. India‘s position on the Soviet presence in
Afghanistan and the recognition given to the HengSamarin regime in Cambodia also hindered the development
of close ties with ASEAN. However, India ultimately succeeded in becoming a sectoral- dialogue partner of
the ASEAN in 1992 and a full-dialogue partner in 1996. The other full dialogue partners are: Australia,
Canada, China, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia and the US. With the
inclusion of Myanmar, India and ASEAN now share a 1,600-km land border. Despite the economic crisis that
plagued the region in the late 1990‘s, Indo-Asean relations have been continuously on the upswing2.


India’s Look East Policy
India‘s notable presence in the global arena can be evidently discerned from its dynamic foreign policy
orientation as well as from a number of enterprising collaborative ventures with other nations. In the early
nineties the then Indian Prime Minister P.V.NarsimhaRao initiated a new chapter as the ‗Look-East Policy‘ in
Indian foreign policy paradigm. The Look-East Policy portrays a strategic shift in India‘s vision of the world
and India‘s position in the rapidly developing global economy. Since the time of inception of the Policy India
and ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) have embarked upon multiple bilateral, regional and
sub-regional initiatives for the flourishing pursuit of the Policy3.


The Look East Policy of India, framed by the NarasimhaRao government in the early nineties, is a substantial
manifestation of India‘s focused foreign policy orientation towards South East Asia; an immensely resourceful
and flourishing region. The economy of South East Asia is a virtually untapped market which is up for grabs
by major regional economic entities such as India, China, Europe or the USA. India‘s compatibility with the
South East Asian countries with regard to better regional cooperation lies in the fact of its abstinence from
exhibiting hegemonistic ambitions, making it more benign towards South East Asia. The camaraderie between
India and South-East Asia is clearly visible through the dynamic persuasion of India‘s Look-East Policy. India
and ASEAN reciprocally have embarked upon a number of initiatives for rejuvenating their ties in multiple
areas. Frequent tête-à-tête from both the sides promulgates better implementation of the Policy. The improving
intensification of economic linkages with ASEAN has inspired India to enter into the second phase of its
Look-East Policy. Phase 2 is the deviation from complete economic issues to the broader agenda involving
security cooperation, actively constructing transport corridors and erecting pillars of linkages and connectivity.
This phase of India‘s Look-East Policy renders ample relevance to the development of its North-Eastern
Region because of its geographical proximity to South-East Asia. The North-Eastern tip of India consisting of
contiguous seven sister states- Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura
and the state of Sikkim – constitutes a unique narrow passageway connecting the Indian subcontinent to East
and South-East Asia and acts as a crucial corridor for human migration between these areas. The North-East
region because of its favourable geographic location, cradled by the Himalayas in the north , Bay of Bengal in
the south and flanked by 5 Asian countries- Nepal, Bhutan, China, Myanmar and Bangladesh, acts as a
gateway to South-East Asia. There are ample possibilities for North-East India to reap benefits from India‘s
thriving relations with South East Asia as the process of globalisation provides the countries with the
opportunities to grapple with cross-market accessibility and enabling them alleviate their poverty and
economic backwardness4.


The Look-East Policy is being embarked upon with the presupposition that the improving trade ties between
India and ASEAN will certainly elevate the North- East out of the menace of insurgency, poverty and
economic backwardness. The Look-East Policy is expected to usher in a new era of development for the North
East through network of pipelines, connectivity, communication and trade.


The ASEAN-India car rally of 2003 was a notable initiative undertaken by the Indian government to
emphasise on the geographic proximity between North-East India and South-East Asia. Moreover, India has
undertaken some bilateral and multilateral projects for boosting connectivity between the North-East and South
East Asia. The important ongoing and potential infrastructure projects in this regard are Moreh-Tamu-Kalewa
Road, India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, Trans Asian Highway, India- Myanmar rail linkages,
Kaladan Multimodal project, the Stilwell road, Myanmar-India-Bangladesh gas or oil pipeline, Tamanthi
Hydroelectricity project and optical fiber network between North East India and South East Asia5.But certain
obstacles like lack of infrastructural development, absence of enthusiastic response from local people, frequent
insurgencies, poor governance in the states, the easy availability of arms and weapons from across the
international border to be utilised in armed movements and criminal activities impede increased relations
between North-East India and South East Asia. Moreover, the geographic location of the North-Eastern region
makes it more vulnerable to be the core of hostility with massive negative outcomes.
As India‘s External Affairs Minister SM Krishna said during his inaugural address at the recent India-ASEAN
Delhi Dialogue III, ―It has been a gratifying engagement for us, an engagement which has drawn strength from
India‘s rapidly developing bilateral ties with individual ASEAN countries, and from our millennia-old bonds
with the countries and civilizations of the region.‖


Reflecting on the kind of role that India sees for itself and the extension of its own democratic nature to its
regional calculations, India‘s National Security Adviser ShivshankarMenon remarked at the Dialogue III,
―‘From the Indian point of view it (the new Asian security order) should be open, it should be flexible and it
should be inclusive. This is essential for the order to work.‖ India‘s strengthening relations with the individual
countries of the ASEAN and the regional body at large is mutually reinforcing.


The foreign policy vision of a rising India should reflect an enlargement of vision and a continuous effort
towards cultivation of resources to increase its zone of influence, albeit in a more diplomatic and friendly
manner without evoking sentiments that could brand India as a meddling power. Undoubtedly, this is basically
where India could chart out a more benign space for itself in the South-East Asian region despite the
overwhelming presence of the Chinese power. As Krishna said, ―We feel that the principles of State
sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of others must be the bedrock of our cooperative
endeavours.‖ India‘s strategic and diplomatic maneouvers in South-East Asia are signs of its intent to play a
more substantial role in Asia.


As such, India and its relations with the ASEAN countries have a major role in shaping the future of Asia, and
by repercussions the future of international politics. During the Delhi Dialogue III, Menon also reflected on the
success of India-ASEAN cooperation in tackling piracy in the Malacca Straits and called for replicating the
cooperation model for promoting the new security architecture too for the region. He also emphasized that
Asia, as the fastest developing region had to deal with security issues and it had ―the most to lose from
instability and insecurity in the international system.‖ The shifting nature of power is something constant in
international politics, and the 21st century is being already labelled an Asian century, in which the two rising
giants, India and China will definitely play a big role. As the saying goes: With great powers, comes great
responsibilities, India is at a great juncture in its history, travelling an upward journey to major power status.
According to sources, India and ASEAN are expected to widen their trade engagement by signing a free trade
agreement (FTA) next year that will cover services and investment. ―Next year, we will celebrate our 20th
anniversary and it would be a commemorative summit…let‘s hope that at the summit, we will be able to
deliver a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) (between India and ASEAN), because so
far it is only in goods,‖ ASEAN Secretary General SurinPitsuwan said. Recall, India and ASEAN had
implemented Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in goods in January last year and are engaged in intense
negotiations to expand this pact to include services and investments.
According to sources, India and the ASEAN are committed to achieving a trade target of $70 billion by 2012,
up 40 per cent from $50 billion in 20106.


India ASEAN CuluturalSimilarties And Linguistic
Attachments
There are enough avenues through which North East India can be related to South-East Asia. Racial, linguistic
and cultural similarity prevails among the people of North-East India and those of South-East Asia. If the
concerned governments really strive to translate their policies into reality their collaborative endeavors would
invariably revive age-old cultural and historical bonds. To highlight the linguistic attachment it should be
stated that it is an area of extensive linguistic diversity with predominantly three language families
represented- Austro-Asiatic, Indo-European and Tibeto- Burman. Austro-Asiatic languages are now spoken by
a single group in North-East India (the Khasi) but they are also found in East India and South-East Asia
reflecting that they might have been more frequent in North-East in the past. Indo- European language is
spoken from Europe to Central and South Asia with their easternmost occurrence in Nepal, Bangladesh and
North-East India. Tibeto- Burman languages are a branch of Sino- Tibetan family which is mainly spoken in
North-East India, China and South-East Asia. Thus North-East India sets up an important linguistic contact
zone. Through centuries there has been exchange of peoples, goods and services between our North-East and
countries of South and South-East Asia. The Ahoms of Assam migrated several centuries ago from the Shan
state of Burma where the language spoken is almost identical to that spoken in Laos and Thailand. The Chins
from Myanmar migrated over the past centuries to Manipur and Meities of Manipur have ties for over 2000
years with the Burmans of Myanmar.


Similar migration has also occurred to North-East from Yunan province of China. Boosting people to people
contact transcending political barriers is an imperative for facilitating cultural interaction among various
regions. In contemporary era, physical connectivity is of utmost importance as it channelises the means to
accelerate the movement of goods, people and services and thereby acts as a gateway to reviving economic
enterprise. Advanced communication and interaction would foster trade, commerce and tourism prospects in
the entire North-East region. But because of the existing hurdles the people of North East region are quite
apprehensive about the developmental strategies and consider it as mere rhetoric. It will be fatal for India in the
long run if its government ever tries to get integrated with South East Asia by using North-East as a channel
for its economic progress. The people of the North-East should not feel ostracised from the mainstream one
and simultaneously need to be convinced of the genuine concern of the government about the overall
betterment and security of the region. Thence, it can be asserted that India‘s North-East Region is a solid
domain in orchestrating India‘s Look-East Policy. The development of the region is a stepping stone towards
the success of the policy.
India ASEAN Economic Relations After India’s Look
East Policy
India has had close cultural and economic ties with Southeast-Asian countries throughout the history. But with
the significant changes that occurred in the world‘s politics and economic scenario since the early 1990‘s and
India‘s own march towards economic liberalization has compelled India to focus on strengthened and
multifaceted relationship with ASEAN countries.


Besides, ASEAN‘s political and strategic importances in the larger Asia-Pacific-Region and its potential to
become a major partner of India in the area of trade and investment have encouraged India to seek closer
linkage with these countries. Keeping theses points in mind a conscious effort was begun in 1991 to reach out
these ASEAN countries through our ―Look East Policy‖. With the eastward expansion of ASEAN to include
Myanmar, India and ASEAN countries are no longer just remain maritime neighbours but share a land
boundary of over 1600 K.m2. It now provides a land bridge for India to connect with Asia-Pacific-Centred
economic crosscurrents shaping with 21st century market place. On the other hand ASEAN seeks to India‘s
professional and technical strengths. Apart from recognizing India‘s emergence as attractive trade partner and
investment destination, ASEAN has also increasingly comes to see it as a stabilizing factor in the region. The
convergence of interest of India and ASEAN in various fields provides further impetus to explore the
possibilities which takes this relationship at its zenith in 21st century.


India‘s relations with the major powers and her neighbouring nations have been conditioned by the changing
contours of the international environment. Military and domestic political necessities have also influenced the
nature of the policy towards particular regions at different moments. The relations between India and the South
East Asian nations can be explored in this context. The links between India and South East Asia have followed
a non-linear course. While the need to combat colonialism induced a sense of solidarity among the nations in
the early twentieth century, the East-West rivalry of the Cold War era made their political, security and
economic interests divergent. The geo-strategic and economic realities of the post Cold War period have
propelled India and South-East Asia to forge strong economic and security ties. The potential of India and
South East Asian relations and cooperation is yet to be exploited fully but consistent initiatives have made
most analysts and observers hopeful. The role of ASEAN and the Look East policy (Phases 1 and 2) initiative
by the Indian government have been most crucial in this regard. Situated in the Asian subcontinent, South-East
Asian nations form the second ring of neighbouring states for India. Thus, the veering towards Southeast Asian
nations at this juncture found a legitimate platform in India‘s strategic thinking. The visits of Rajiv Gandhi to
various capitals of the member countries of ASEAN were a landmark attempt to establish rapport with the
Southeast Asian nations. Also, his visit to reengage China (December 1988) Japan and Australia was an
indication that India was being driven to the East7. Rising Security Concerns: In the wake of the 9/11 and
especially after Southeast Asia was designated as the ‗second front of terrorism‘, the security dimension has
assumed tremendous importance in India-ASEAN relations. The Bali bombing of 2004 has particularly
exposed the seamier side of the connection between international terror networks and their local outfits8. India
and ASEAN states have explored the possibility of establishing joint working groups to combat this new
threat. Indian leaders have been vocal about pressing for a more coordinated effort to tackle traditional and
non-traditional security threats.


India ASEAN Avenues Of Security Cooperation
Based On Evolving Convergences
    Maritime security, combating and containing terrorism and transnational crime.
    Preventing the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, human trafficking and trafficking in small
    arms.
    Confidence building, conflict prevention and resolution
    Energy and environment preservation
    Promotion of democracy, human rights, peace, development and disarmament9. India-ASEAN
    functional cooperation includes cooperation in sectors such as, Science & Technology, Human
    Resources Development, Health and Pharmaceuticals, Space Sciences, Agriculture, Information &
    Communication Technology, Transport and Infrastructure, Tourism and Culture and Small and
    Medium Enterprises etc.
Strategic Implications For India In Current Scenario
Defence and Security is a major area of future co-operation between India and ASEAN. No longer is security
of South Asia and Southeast Asia separate. Both the region has suffered from new threat of terrorism. Thus, to
get rid of it, a global alliance for Counter Terrorism is need of the hour, where both India and ASEAN can play
the major role. The tsunami in the recent years has brought the issue of Disaster Mitigation as another possible
area of cooperation. Besides, other transnational crimes such as trafficking particularly in women and children,
cyber crimes, international economic crimes, environmental crimes, sea piracy and money laundering needs to
be checked through effective institutional linkages and programmes of cooperation giving priority to
information exchange and capacity building. Making this cooperation more interesting at the 14th annual
meeting of the ARF in 2nd August 2007 in Manila, External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee offers a
training module on Maritime Security, specifically for the ARF member-states, with themes of anti-piracy,
search-and-rescue [missions], offshore and port security, anti-smuggling and narcotics control and anti-
poaching operations.‖ The nucleus of the module would be ―capacity-building‖ for these and related aspects of
maritime security. Thus, the prospect of cooperation in this area is tremendous. Another convergence of
interest to foster closer cooperation in reforming of and democratizing the UN and its institution by making
them more reflective of the contemporary realities, might strengthen the bond between India and ASEAN in
21st century. In fact, both sides are eager for a multilateral world order with genuine role of the UN.
Emphasizing the importance of multilateralism in ASEAN Business Advisory Council at Kula Lumpur, Indian
PM DrManMohan Singh said ―regional building block of multilateralism in an increasingly globalilsed world.
Besides their co-operation in multilateral forum, particularly the WTO and in addressing the challenges of
economic, food, human and energy security will bring these two region more closer than ever before.


Thus, the two sides have to work for more space for the developing and the least developed countries in the
WTO. It is also expected that, India might convince all the ASEAN members to support its candidature for the
permanent membership in Security Council.


India has made impressive progress on the defence and strategic front in changing situations. A sea change in
the political atmosphere that Southeast Asia witnessed in the aftermath of the cold war, especially after the
Cambodian issue was settled and looking at Vietnam as a potential ally of ASEAN, contributed to this in a big
way. Moreover, India‘s military might in the emergent Asian balance of power could not be ignored any
longer. The Southeast Asian nations began to look upon India as a power that could play a kind of ‗balancing
role‘ vis-à-vis China in particular. On the other hand, it was in India‘s interest to ensure that Southeast Asia
would not be dominated by a regional great power once it became obvious that the superpowers were going to
build-down their presence, which coincided with a similar thinking within Southeast Asia. The upshot of
convergence of interests was the genesis of a new strategic interaction with several of the ASEAN nations. A
unique advantage India enjoyed was that its military, despite being dominated by the Moscow supplied
equipment, had continued to maintain links with West Europe.


Critical remarks with regard to the ambitions of the Indian Navy were replaced by many instances of greater
defence cooperation. A number of confidence building measures (CBMs) that India undertook and greater
appreciation by the Southeast Asian countries of Indian maritime concerns ushered in a new era of cooperation
which began to transcend beyond the naval contours. Aside from periodic naval exercises and the biannual get-
together of regional navies, called the Milan, India has entered into bilateral defence cooperation agreements
with Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, Laos, and Indonesia. India has also been actively involved in assisting the
armed forces of Myanmar and Thailand. For instance, Singapore has not only made use of India‘s missile
testing range to test its own guns and missiles, but also uses Indian facilities to train its naval personnel- the
first time ever that India has done for a foreign country. Similarly, the Thai pilots are being trained in India to
gain experience to operate their aircraft carrier, and the Myanmarese get anti-insurgency training. India and
Indonesia have also frequently conduct joint patrolling in the critical straits of Southeast Asia ensuring security
of sealanes of communication. It is notable that India‘s strategic engagement with Southeast Asia is the
strongest compared to any other Asian power. One reason why India has been relatively more successful is
that, apart from the absence of any border/territorial disputes and any historical baggage, India is seen to be not
having any ‗ambitions‘ in and posing no security threat to the region10.
ASEAN-INDIA Dialogue Relations
India dialogue relations have grown rapidly from a sectoral dialogue partnership in 1992 to a full dialogue
partnership in December 1995. The relationship was further elevated with the convening of the ASEAN-India
Summit in 2002 in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. All these took place in a decade, which clearly signifies the
importance of the dialogue partnership to ASEAN and India and the progress made in the cooperation11. This
reflects the confidence both ASEAN and India have in the dialogue partnership which is reflected by the
expanding and intensifying dialogue and cooperation in many sectors. ASEAN-India cooperation covers the
economic, political and security, and development cooperation dimensions with a number of mechanisms
established to promote dialogue and cooperation in these areas. In recent years, sectoral cooperation has been
gaining strength with the establishment of working group level meetings in science and technology, transport
and infrastructure, and small and medium scale enterprises12.


Political And Security Issues
Since India became a Dialogue Partner of ASEAN, the collaboration has transcended the realm of functional
cooperation to cover political and security dimensions. India participates in a series of consultative meetings
with ASEAN which include the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Post Ministerial Conferences (PMCs)
10+1 and 10+10. Since July 1996, India has been an active participant of the ARF. It views the ARF as
valuable process in promoting stable relationships between the major powers, and as a useful complement to
the bilateral alliances and dialogues between India and ASEAN Member Countries, which are at the heart of
the region‘s security architecture13. ASEAN and India committed themselves to jointly contribute to the
promotion of peace, stability and development in the Asia-Pacific region and the world, and respond positively
to the challenges of a dynamic regional and international environment. ASEAN and India are now intensifying
their political and security dialogue to add a new dimension to a mutually beneficial economic and commercial
relationship. Reflective of India‘s interest in intensifying its engagement with ASEAN, both sides now are in
the process of jointly developing an India-ASEAN Vision 2020, as a roadmap to mutually desired objectives.


India ASEAN Bilateral Relations
India has strengthened its bilateral relations with all the South East Asian nations in the last two decades since
launching of the Look East Policy. High level visits of heads of states from most of these nations have taken
place. India has entered into a few bilateral Free Trade Agreements (Thailand) and economic cooperation
agreements (Indonesia and Singapore). The high point of India‘s relations with Malaysia is the defence
cooperation which began in 1993 and has developed over the years with annual meeting of the defence
secretaries, military training and supply of defence equipment. Special attention is being paid to the three
economically under developed countries, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, where there is enough scope and
opportunity for India to extend its influence. Indonesia and Singapore has helped India to get into the East
Asia Summit despite objections from some other ASEAN members and China. Of all the South East Asian
nations, Myanmar has a special place from India‘s strategic and security perspective.


Look-East And The North-East
The North Eastern States of India are often described as land locked. They are joined to the rest of India by a
narrow land corridor that skirts the north of Bangladesh. This land corridor is only 21 to 40 Km in width and
is known as the Chicken‘s Neck. This has been a serious impediment for the development of the region, which
has lagged behind the rest of the country in terms of infrastructure and industrial development. With the
release of the document ―North Eastern Region Vision 2020‖ by the Prime Minister in July 2008 a serious
effort has been made for socio-economic development of this region to match with the objectives of the Look
East Policy. Several measures have been undertaken under the aegis of the Look East policy to uplift North
East India such as the ―Asian Highway‖, ―Asian Railway link‖ and ―Natural Gas pipeline‖. The Kaladan
Multi-modal Transit Transport facility is aimed at establishing connectivity between Indian ports and Sittwe
port in Myanmar through riverine transport and road links in Mizoram. With the Ganga Mekong initiative
there is potential for direct flights between Guwhati -Ho-Chi Minh city – Imphal – Hanoi. This document
(Vision 2020) admits that the Look East Policy has failed to uplift the North East in the last fifteen years or so
as most of the goods from ASEAN is sent through the sea route as the land route is thought highly unsafe for
reasons such as lack of infrastructure and insurgency.


The China Factor: India Getting Preference Over
China
In the cold war era, South East Asian nations perceived China as dangerous because of its military
expansionist scheme in Asia. While now the ―peaceful rise‖ of China is being considered more of an
opportunity despite the challenges. China is virtually dominating the South East Asian region. The ASEAN-
China Free Trade Area created by an accord in 2004 has come into effect from January 2010. This covers
nearly 1.9 billion people. In terms of economic value this is the third largest regional agreement, after only the
EU and the NAFTA. ―A new talking point in East Asia is that of the multi-laterisation or, more precisely, the
likely enlargement of the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) later this year. The CMI is basically a currency pool of
the ASEAN+3 countries (China, Japan and South Korea).The move was a direct response to the recent
outbreak of the US-induced global and financial economic crisis, which has not fully blown away as now‖
(P.S. Suryanarayana-Frontline January 29, 2010). China is predicted to overtake Japan as the world‘s second
largest economy some time in 2010. India must be aware of the fact that it has not been invited to the EAS
because of its rising economic potential alone but more as a balancing force to offset the China factor. Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh has repeatedly mentioned that in a global environment, India is not afraid of
competition and it can complement rather than compete in the East Asia Summit (EAS)14. China is virtually
dominating this region. By the ASEAN-China Accord entered into in November 2004 (during the
10th ASEAN Summit in Vientiane), the world‘s biggest free trade area has been created removing all tariffs.
The tariff cuts that began in 2005 will be completed by 2010 drawing the ASEAN‘s combined economies of
US $ 1 trillion closer to China‘s US $ 1.4 trillion. In the Cold war era, India perceived China as dangerous
country because of its high military expenditure and ambitious plans in this field. But now the image of China
has changed and now is seen as an economic powerhouse. To gain confidence and to build trust among the
Asian countries Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, said in a speech during the last ASEAN Summit that ―China will
continue to seek peace and development through cooperation and will strive to achieve development that will
bring about peace, openness, cooperation and harmony as well as benefit to itself and other countries‖. Despite
the remarks of the Chinese Premier some analysts are of the opinion that China preferred a smaller Asian
grouping (without U.S., India, Australia and New Zealand) that can integrate quickly on the economic front
and which China can influence more significantly. Perhaps it is this increasing influence of China and its
motives that had prompted countries like Singapore and Indonesia to cooperate with India, Australia and New
Zealand into the EAS. Hence India must be aware that it has not been invited to EAS because of its rising
economic potential alone but more as a balancing force to offset the China factor. Although it is being said that
India and China are not rivals and they can complement rather than compete in the EAS.


China‘s growing presence and influence in the region, economic and strategic makes diversified relationship
with India necessary for Southeast Asia. With the US down-scaling its relations with the region, many believe
that India will provide added stability and security to the region. In the immediate future, India and ASEAN
countries must intensify their cooperation both at the bilateral and regional levels to combat common threats to
security that have the potential of shaking the very foundations of the polity. Since India‘s north-eastern region
is being recognised as the ‗corridor to South East Asia, integration with the traditional neighbouring regions
like Myanmar, Bangladesh and Thailand should be facilitated through transportation networks and this would
contribute to sustained peace and development. It maybe stated therefore, that changing political, economic
and security considerations condition the bilateral or multilateral policy ties of any country and India-Southeast
Asia relations is no exception to this. The potential of the relations must be carefully cultivated by
policymakers and strategists as Southeast Asia is likely to remain a viable foreign and security policy option
for India in its quest to establish its geo-political and economic prowess in the years to come. As India deepens
its ties and employs pragmatic diplomacy to increase its influence in South-East Asia, the repercussions in
India-China relations are inevitable. China considers itself the unchallenged ―dragon‖ of the Asian Continent;
hence the Indian ―elephant‖ strides would be unsettling. But if Indian foreign policies manage to ruffle feathers
and unsettle the Chinese strategic community, then India must have been doing something right.


The South China Sea Disputes And Indian Policy
In recent weeks (October2011), statements by Chinese officials reasserting China‘s ―indisputable sovereignty‖
over the South China Sea and warnings to India against investment in the region are seen as signs of Chinese
aggressiveness that would inevitably precipitate conflict. Suggestions for greater Indian involvement in the
South China Sea disputes are made on the grounds that India must be forceful in its dealings with China. The
continuation of ONGC Videsh Limited‘s (OVL) investments in Vietnamese energy fields is certainly
advisable. In fact, there is nothing to indicate that the Indian government is thinking otherwise. OVL‘s
presence in Vietnam is not a recent phenomenon. Its first joint-venture for offshore oil and natural gas
exploration in Vietnam‘s LanTay field along with Petro Vietnam and BP became functional in 2003. Deals for
the investments now in the headlines were signed in May 2006; this is a project that will not be halted because
of oblique Chinese statements. India simply need not take heed of Chinese views on Indian economic ventures.


In the aftermath of statements by the US and skirmishes over fishing vessels, ASEAN and China agreed upon
The Guidelines on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea at
the Bali Summit in July 2010. Recent tensions may well prod the parties towards a more binding code of
conduct. This is not to suggest that territorial claims and sovereignty issues will be resolved, but certainly can
become more manageable to prevent military conflict. A revision of Indian policy on the issue should be based
on a clear understanding of what India stands to gain and how Indian national interest is strengthened. India‘s
relationships with South East Asian countries are not uni-dimensional. They are not geared only towards
checking the Chinese imprint in the region but are reflective of India‘s multifarious interests globally. As
regards military support for OVL‘s operations, the issue should be reflected upon seriously. It is one thing to
build capabilities in order to deter misadventure, quite another to back investment with military might. This is
a matter that will affect Indian ventures globally15.


Advantages Of The India’s Look East Policy
Look east policy has helped India in strengthening its place in the global economy and gets a better deal in its
interactions outside the region. America and European countries had entered into a lot of different mutual
agreement which has further increased their reputation and bargaining power. India was in danger of isolation
in the global economy. India was not getting its due importance. But due to its Look east policy India economy
is getting integrated with the Asian economy, so India gets support from Asian countries which have increased
India‘s importance at global level.


East Asia’s Strengths                               India’s Strengths
1) Electronic equipment                                 Computer Software
2) Heavy engineering                                    Light engineering and pharmaceuticals
3) Product development and marketing                Process development
4) Underutilized capacity in construction            Huge potential demand
Look east policy has helped India in strengthening its place in the global economy and gets a better deal in its
interactions outside the region. America and European countries had entered into a lot of different mutual
agreement which has further increased their reputation and bargaining power. India was in danger of isolation
in the global economy. India was not getting its due importance. But due to its Look east policy India economy
is getting integrated with the Asian economy, so India gets support from Asian countries which have increased
India‘s importance at global level.


Short Comings In The India’s Look East Policy
    India still remains outside the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum
    India has entered into a number of pacts, agreements and FTAs with nations of ASEAN but its record
    for implementation of such accords has been poor. The Indian industry has doubts about its own
    competitive efficiency or it does not want competition at home or it is scared of cheaper exports to
    India from these countries.
    India lags behind China and Japan in almost all spheres of Pan East Asian cooperation, East Asian
    observers reckon that India has so far appeared less proactive than China on some critical issues.
    Some analysts feel that India‘s Look East Policy lacks a strategic vision despite seeking defense
    cooperation with some ASEAN nations (Myanmar, Indonesia and Vietnam) and securing a role for
    joint patrolling in the Malacca Straits. India does not take an assertive role perhaps due to it limited
    military capability
    There are some domestic political compulsions which impinge on the desired reforms and the struggle
    the liberalization process is undergoing in the ―minds of our people‖. India has come under harsh
    criticism for the big negative items list and the delay of over six years in finalizing the ASEAN-India
    FTA.
India should go ahead with proper implementation of the pacts, agreements and FTAs without bothering about
the aforementioned factors. The Indian industry will ensure that India will always gain from these
arrangements.


The Look East policy did not find Japan on its radar and failed to improve India‘s economic ties with it. Trade
with Japan actually declined dramatically dropping its share to one-third of its level of 7 per cent in 1993. One
of the causes, of course, was the fact that the Japanese economy was stagnate during this period. But still it is
difficult to explain the reason behind this dramatic drop. This was the biggest failure of Look east policy.
Failure to involve Japan and a build economic relationship with it also resulted in closing the doors on
Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI). But now the situation is getting better and trade with Japan is
increasing. During 1993-2003, Japan‘s global FDI averaged at $ 50 billion a year, of which India received $
220 million a year or less than one-fourth of 1 per cent! Even at the regional level, India received just 2 per
cent of Japanese FDI. (China‘s share was 10 times higher at 22 per cent).
Improving Border Infrastructure
The lack of proper cross-border transit points and integrated transport networks has posed major challenges.
To facilitate growth of border trade the Union Minister of Commerce has introduced an Export Development
Fund (EDF) for the Northeast traders and entrepreneurs. There is no provision to track where and how these
funds are utilized. International trade centres at the border points and connecting these points through the
existing roads to state capitals is vital, as is coordination in banking operations, such as extending banking
services and ATM booths, telecommunication network at the border points to improve trade activities.


Maintaining and monitoring the functioning of the major border points such as Moreh, Tamu and Tiddim (in
Manipur) and Champhai (in Mizoram) should be the priority. Till date only the 160 km Tamu-Kalaywa-
Kalemyo Road connecting Moreh to Myanmar has been accomplished. This road will eventually become a
part of the Asian Highway. However, the completion of this project has not been able to bring any economic
development for the region, due to increase in informal trade. In addition, exploring and developing new
points-Lungwa/Ledo, Pongru and Pokhungri in Nagaland and Nampong, Vijayanagar and Khimiyang in
Arunachal Pradesh are needed. The Manipur Commerce and Industries Minister had proposed an alternative
border point-Behiang in Manipur‘s Churachandpur district along the Indo-Myanmar border which needs
consideration. The proposal to upgrade the Rih-Tidim and Rih-Falam road, which will operationalize the
India-Myanmar border trading point at Rih-Zokhawthar in Mizoram along with the Moiwa-Chindwin-Thailand
trilateral highway project, needs immediate attention16.


Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has embarked on a journey to the east to Japan, Malaysia and
Vietnam from 24-30 October 2010. The Prime Minister‘s visit is to reiterate India‘s commitment to further
strengthen multifaceted bilateral relations with Southeast Asian and East Asian countries. The first visit by
Manmohan Singh to Malaysia as Prime Minister will be a landmark in reinforcing the rich cultural and
historical links between India and Malaysia. This visit marked by talks on economic cooperation, integration in
terms of infrastructure development, information technology, bio-technology, defence, railways, energy
cooperation and greater-people-to-people linkages. This meeting will see the inauguration of the first meeting
of the Malaysia-India CEO Forum and revival of the highway project between India and Malaysia that has
been long delayed. India is also hoping to conclude the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement
(CECA) with Malaysia that has been in discussion since 2008 and which Kuala Lumpur appears to be
delaying. It needs to be remembered that so far, out of the 10 ASEAN countries, only Vietnam, Malaysia,
Thailand and Singapore have ratified the India-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement with India. Mr Singh visited
Vietnam for the 8th India-ASEAN Summit and the 5th East Asia Summit held on 30 October 2010. Indian
leaders will hold bilateral talks with ASEAN and EAS leaders on the sidelines of the summits. The India-
ASEAN summit will have the India-ASEAN Plan of Action for 2010-15 as the big item on its agenda. Both
India and ASEAN are keen to liberalize the trade in services and investments that will provide new
opportunities for the expansion of trade between them. ASEAN under its connectivity scheme looks forward to
implementing the Comprehensive Asian Development Plan that will provide a road linking India with
ASEAN, creating the Mekong-India economic corridor. The East Asian Summit that will be held on the same
day will deliberate on energy, environment, financial cooperation, education and plans for a Comprehensive
Economic Partnership of East Asia (CEPEA) and the creation of the Economic Research Institute of ASEAN
and East Asia (ERIA). The Indian Prime Minister is likely to also discuss bilateral ties with Vietnamese
leaders. Both India and Vietnam approved setting up of a joint committee to strengthen their cooperation in the
trade, investment and agricultural production sectors earlier this year. India has extended support to Vietnam to
enhance and upgrade its capabilities in the defence sector and to help Vietnam to train forces for maintaining
international peace and stability. Vietnam, on the other hand, will provide assistance in the repair and
maintenance of Indian naval ships. Both the countries will share their experience and knowledge by
developing linkages and cooperation among their defence institutions. All of these have implications for the
South China Sea disputes and show that India is taking a greater interest in security matters in the region.
While the most important drive for Singh‘s visit is economic cooperation, India also needs to address several
other issues. One is the matter of the rights and status of the Indian diaspora settled in Southeast Asian
countries. For instance, ethnic Indians in Malaysia suffer from various kinds of discrimination. Next, India
should revive and deepen its regional engagement through the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation initiative and with
other regional schemes such as BIMSTEC, as well as initiate more cooperation with the ADB, World Bank,
and IMF that will help in providing assistance in facilitating trade and promoting development in the region.
Meanwhile, ASEAN should extend its supportive hand to India‘s entry to Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) and in the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM), a mechanism created in March 2010 to
help manage future regional financial crises. At the same time, India should also continue to pursue bilateral
FTAs with each ASEAN nation17.


Conclusion
Each ASEAN nation has its own characteristics – some are supportive of India, some are predominantly
Muslim, some are economically more developed then India, some are underdeveloped and one is a close
neighbor influencing the security of India. Hence India should tailor the bilateral relations with every country
in different way to suit the requirements of that particular country and that of India. ASEAN and EAS hold
great promise for India. Adequate interaction with these groupings will result in better integration with this
region and facilitate India economic development. Indian businesses which are looking to go global will get
huge markets in other countries. They will be able to export their goods and get a market share because of low
tariffs due to the pacts, agreements and FTAs. Although foreign companies will also get this advantage but
Indian companies will be able to compete with these because of their competitiveness. CMI and emerging
FTAs / RTAs between Asian countries provide foundations for a broader and more ambitious initiative to take
the existing India-ASEAN relationship to a higher level, like an Asian Economic Community, which
constitutes ASEAN, China, Japan, Korea and India as member countries. Such a community would be roughly
the size of the European Union in terms of income, and bigger than NAFTA in terms of trade. It would account
for half the world‘s population and it would hold foreign exchange reserves exceeding those of the EU and
NAFTA put together. This can give a greater push to Indian growth.


Indian policy-makers should create such a scenario where India‘s arrival as a major power in the international
system should not be seen as a liability but as an asset by the ASEAN countries. In recognizing India‘s stature
in regional Asian and international politics, these countries should see a reflection of their rising opportunities
for their own countries in an inclusive, healthy and peaceful Asian order. To make them realize their own
success in the success of India would indeed be the litmus test for present and future Indian policy-makers.
India‘s objectives in Look East Policy can be furthered through areas—education (human resources
development), democracy and culture—where it has a comparative advantage over Asian countries. In this
context the Nalanda project which envisages the setting up of an international university is noteworthy. India
has a lead in Information Technology. Many South East Asians are not only interested in our IITs and IIMs but
also want campuses opened in places like Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta. Tourism is an area where much can be
done to reverse the trend of more Indians going to South East Asia (Singapore) for shopping. Places of
Buddhist interest like, Bodh Gaya, Sarnath and Nalanda and places of Muslim interest like TajMahal,
FatehpurSikri Ajmer, and Hyderabad have to be suitably promoted for establishing people to people contacts.


At the strategic level, India‘s Look East policy envisages the ASEAN states and Japan as key partners in East
Asia. Ties with South Korea are also strengthening. With India-US relations also expanding in scope and
content, India can become a stabilizing and balancing force in this region. India‘s inclusion ab initio into the
Group of Twenty Economies (G-20) has boosted its image in this region. Six of the 20 (Australia, China,
Japan, India, Indonesia and South Korea) are from East Asia. The crux is that this Look East policy should
reinforce and demonstrate India‘s commitment to this region which accounts for about one-third of India‘s
trade. It should also be made clear that this commitment will not be influenced in any way by the improving
relations between India and the US and EU. The dialogue process with ASEAN is meant to complement and
augment India‘s bilateral relations with the Southeast Asian neighbours. There is much more that can be
achieved. It is up to India and ASEAN to seize the initiative. The potential is huge and as they say, the sky is
the limit. However, at the political level, India intends to gain more support for its candidature for permanent
membership of the UN Security Council and to create a framework to mark 20 years of ASEAN-India
Dialogue during the India-ASEAN Commemorative Summit in 2012 in New Delhi.


Besides building defence cooperation, the LEP has also helped India to get its own security needs better
understood in the region. May 1998, when Pokharan-II (the test explosions of five nuclear devices) took place,
the Western members of the ARF as well as Japan and Australia expressed strong reservations and
disapproval, and imposed sanctions on India. These reservations have since melted away and both Japan and
Australia are trying their best to make for the lost time and opportunities in India. The ASEAN countries
showed considerable understanding, at least informally through bilateral diplomatic channels, of India‘s
security predicament. A number of ASEAN members are willing to support India‟ s permanent membership of
the UN Security Council (UNSC). Understanding has also been shown to India‟ s position during the Kargil
conflict and the persisting challenge of cross-border terrorism to India‟ s stability and political harmony.
Thanks to the 9/11 events, today India‟ s concern with regard to cross-border terrorism is also better
understood and appreciated among its eastern neighbours. The security significance of this region has been
further reinforced in the context of 9/11 events and the global war on terrorism, as India is also one of the most
seriously affected victims of this menace. Reports about Al-Qaeda and Jihadi forces having links in the whole
of Southeast Asia surface frequently. With the Islamic rebellions of differing intensity raging in various
countries of the region like Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Myanmar, the threat of global jihad linking up
with regional extremists will continue to loom large on the region.


As there are no basic conflicts in the bilateral relations between India and ASEAN Nations and given their
shared perceptions of the regional strategic environment defence collaboration offers new opportunities for
Both India and ASEAN Nations to further strengthen their relations in the 21st century. Now that India has
become a summit partner of ASEAN, it provides an opportunity for the top leadership to visit Southeast Asia
every year for exchange of views with counterparts. The three distinct features of the Look East policy are:
one, India has managed to develop a multi-faceted relationship; two, successful defence diplomacy has been
put in place; and three India is not averse to participate in regional multilateralism, security or economic.
India‘s connectivity diplomacy in the Southeast Asian region is also Breflective of its invigorating ‗Look East‘
policy. Linking itself to far-flung places in Southeast Asia will not only help integrate India into the region, but
also offer it decisive economic and strategic advantages.


However, New Delhi needs to speed up its efforts, otherwise its sluggish approach will fail to deliver long-
term results. However, Indian policy makers have used this ―opening-up‖ to strengthen ties with the military
regimes in Bangladesh and Myanmar and launch counter insurgency movements against the groups from
North Eastern India. More than the development of backward north eastern states and ending their isolation
through re-establishing their historical cultural and economic ties, the military and security establishment has
high-jacked the policy to fight insurgents from the region.


Author:
Asif Ahmed, is Assistant Professor. Defence& Strategic Studies. Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra.
(Haryana) India asifahmed081@gmail.com


References
1. India-ASEAN Future: Crucial For ASIA Growth, By Monish Tourangbam, Research Scholar, School of
International Studies (JNU) accessed electronically at
http://www.sarkaritel.com/news_and_features/infa/march2011/14india_asean_future.htm
2. Indo-ASEAN Relations on the Upswing. http://www.merinews.com/article/indo-asean-relations-on-the-
upswing/127680.shtml
3. Reinforcing ‗Look East‘ Policy {An article by Minister of State for External Affairs Mr.E.Ahamed}, The
MEA website, accessed electronically at http://www.meaindia.nic.in/interview/2006/01/17in01.htm
4. India‘s Look East Policy: Prospects and Challenges for Northeast India-3, accessed electronically at
http://haokip.bandamp.com/blog/17831.html
5. Julien Levesque, NorthEast in India‘s Look East Policy, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi,
May 6, 2008, accessed electronically at http://www.ipcs.org/article_details.php?articleNo=2558$cID=9
6. Ibid.1
7. S. D. Muni and C. Raja Mohan, ‗Emerging Asia; India‘s Options‘, International Studies, Volume 31
Number 4, Sage Publications, 2004, pp 319-321.
8. KripaSridharan ― The ASEAN Region in India‘s ‗Look East‘ Policy‖ in India and ASEAN; Foreign Policy
Dimensions For the 21st Century, K. Raja Reddy (ed.), New Centuries Publications 2005, Part I, Chapter 7, p
130.
9. A.N Ram, ‗India‘s Foreign Policy in the Asia-Pacific: Contemporary Issues, Area Studies: A Journal of
International Studies and Analyses, Volume 1, Number 1, January 2001, p.23.
10. Looking East: India and Southeast Asia, G. V. C. Naidu ,Research Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies
and Analyses, India. Revised version of the paper presented at the Institute of International Relations (IIR)-
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) Second Roundtable Conference, October 27-28, 2004,
Taipei, Taiwan.
11. accessed electronically at http://exim.indiamart.com/free-trade-agreement/asean-india.html
12. ASEAN-INDIA DIALOGUE RELATIONS. As of March 2011, Accesed from the official website of
ASEAN at http://www.asean.org/5738.html
13. accessed electronically at http://exim.indiamart.com/free-trade-agreement/asean-india.html
14. India‘s Look East Policy - A Review, By C. S. Kuppuswamy Paper no. 3662.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers37/paper3662.html
15. The South China Sea Disputes: Why conflict is not Inevitable. Rukmani Gupta, IDSA COMMENT.
October 17, 2011,
http://idsa.in/idsacomments/TheSouthChinaSeaDisputesWhyConflictisnotInevitable_rgupta_171011
16. Linking India‘s NorthEastwithSouthEast Asia: Significance of Internal Connectivity & Backward
Integration. PanchaliSaikia http://www.ipcs.org/issue-brief/india/linking-indias-northeast-with-southeast-asia-
significance-of-internal-connectivity-175.html IB175-SEARP-Panchali.pdf
17. Manmohan Singh In SouthEast Asia. PanchaliSaikia, Research Officer, IPCS SouthEast Asia – Articles
#3267, 27 October 2010. http://www.ipcs.org/article/southeast-asia/manmohan-singh-in-southeast-asia-
3267.html
16
About the author:
Asif Ahmed
Asif Ahmed is Assistant Professor at the University of Kurukshetra, teaching defense and strategic studies. He
holds an MA in Defence& Strategic Studies (Punjabi University) with couple of other post graduate degrees in
Mass Communications and Journalism. Professor Asif Ahmed has published one book on national security of
India and authored articles in English, Punjabi, and Hindi languages in various newspapers, magazines
journals, and has also edited chapters in books at the national and international levels. For some time he also
participated in Live Radio Talks and Phone in counseling programs at the AIR Patiala station in India.
Professor Ahmed's areas of interests are National Security of India, Distance Education, Human Rights
Education, and Environment Education. He may be reached at asifahmed081@gmail.com. and blogs
at asifahmed081.blogspot.in
AsifAhmedJuly 9, 2012Analysis2 Comments


Nepal: Applying An Integrated Approach To The Struggle Against Poverty – OpEdFederer Back On Top Of
The World With Wimbledon Win
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for-india-analysis/

SAARC AND INDIA’S SECURITY INTERESTS

Guest Column-by Col R Hariharan (retd.)

India pulled out of the Dhaka SAARC summit citing reasons of security considerations. This is the fifth
time India had done so in the brief history of the seven-nation alliance. The take over of power by the
King in Nepal and the security situation in Bangladesh have understandably discouraged the Indian
prime minister from participating in the SAARC summit. The Indian Prime Minister was fully justified in
his decision because the nation cannot afford to take a chance of visiting Dhaka particularly when
intelligence agencies indicated the possibility of a terrorist attack on him there during the summit.
Dhaka’s law enforcing agencies’ poor record of responding to terrorist threats in the past and the
continued failure to protect senior political leaders from bomb attacks there have further increased the
gravity of such warnings.

The event was a big one for Bangladesh and Begum Khaleda who had been trying to refurbish the
country’s image, which had been tarnished by jihadi violence and lawlessness. However, the way Delhi
conveyed its decision did not appear to take Bangladesh’s sensitivity to the issue. This is symptomatic of
the way India handles its neighbours at times and trample upon their sensitivity. This was more so
whenIndia’s Foreign Secretary Mr. Shyam Saran touched upon SAARC in his speech on "India and its
Neighbours" at a meeting organized by the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, at New Delhi and
indicated that there was more to it than Nepal situation or Bangladesh security situation.
While Mr Saran’s pronouncement might not be an official statement of policy, due to the choice of
venue and the mode, it gave an inkling into the official foreign policy perceptions.

Pointedly referring to India's decision not to attend the SAARC summit in Dhaka, Mr. Saran explained,
"Our approach to SAARC was the only one logically sustainable - we set aside our differing political and
security perceptions for the time being, and focus attention on economic cooperation. Our expectation
was that the very dynamic of establishing cross-border economic linkages, drawing upon the
complementarities that existed among different parts of our region, would eventually help us overcome
the mutual distrust and suspicion which prevents us from evolving a shared security perception."

But the record of SAARC founded in 1985, he said, has been "hardly inspiring". "The fact is that SAARC is
still largely a consultative body, which has shied away from undertaking even a single collaborative
project in its 20 years of existence."

From the above pronouncements it would appear that in official thinking in future SAARC might be
considered as a forum less relevant to India. A strong section of foreign policy think tanks have also
highlighted the growing irrelevance of SAARC to India as it is poised to grow as a strong global economic
player. There are very good reasons to draw such a conclusion. The growing India-ASEAN economic
linkages, the improved bilateral India-Myanmar and India-Thai relations as a result of India’s look east
policy, and the continued stagnation in India’s relations with both Pakistan and Bangladesh are some of
these. India’s problems in handling Bangladesh’s fixation with Indian ‘hegemony’ and Pakistan’s five
decade old Kashmir preoccupation and its undisguised sponsorship of anti-Indian terrorism for a long
time have strengthened the growing doubts about the future of SAARC as a viable entity that means
business.

This raises a number of questions on the relevance of SAARC to the countries of the region and in
particular to India. All arguments both in favour and against the viability of SAARC published in the
media appear to have ignored the question of national security. Almost all successful associations of
nations - ASEAN, European Union, and now Organisation of African States – became effective only when
they had security as the first consideration, because nations respond to economic links only when they
feel secure with each other. A good example is the growth of EU from its early beginnings when
Germany and France decided to forget their historic rivalry and felt comfortable with each other.
Significantly, at the same time the Benelux alliance of Britain, Netherlands and Luxemborg failed to take
off when only an economic agenda was there. Even ASEAN came into being initially thanks to the
nudging of the U.S. for countering the strategic threat of China to the trading routes of the West. So if
India has only economic aspects in mind as relevant to the SAARC, it is sure to limp along. Then SAARC
may well be dissolved because it is India’s attitudes that matter to SAARC’s survival. India not only
dwarfs all the other member countries, but it is the only country that shares a border with all other
SAARC countries.

SAARC countries have a direct bearing on our national security. We have to view this in the context of
the concept of strategic security moving away from mere territorial integrity. In the unipolar world with
the U.S. flexing its muscles too often, union of nations has become an important concept in the balance
of power equation. ASEAN and EU are two very good examples of the benefit of such collective wisdom
and action.

In this sub continent, there are three aspects of strategic security very relevant to India. These three –
territorial security and integrity, economic security, and energy security – are core considerations if we
dream of India as a major global power in 2020. In all these three aspects, a strong and vibrant SAARC
can make a true value addition. If we consider territorial integrity in the classical sense, all the countries
of SAARC may be viewed as providing depth to India’s strategic defence. So even if considered purely on
the basis of national security the member nations could be valuable vanguards of security or dangerous
launch pads for offensive. Any collective body, which aims at better relations among these countries,
would automatically strengthen their sense of security in their relations with India, the lynchpin of the
collective body.

So we should view SAARC as a tool for furthering our strategic security in the long term. In this paper, it
is proposed to examine India – Bangladesh relations in this context.

Both Pakistan and Bangladesh have historical reasons rooted in the creation of Pakistan for their fear
and suspicion of a strong India threatening their very existence, due to their perceived threat from India
to their religious, cultural, social exclusivity and national identity. Can our relations with these countries
be ever turned around from latent hostility even in peaceful times, to one of understanding, so that all
the smaller members of SAARC share the prosperity ushered in by bigger countries – India and Pakistan?
Conceptually, this might appear far-fetched if viewed in the current context. But history is full of
examples where diehard enemies became close allies after a few decades of hostility like Germany and
France, and USA and Japan. Closer home Sri Lanka - India relations, which were very strained a few years
back, are not only on the mend but are blooming into a new era of economic growth benefiting both.

From the points of view of our territorial integrity and security as well as economic and energy security,
Bangladesh is a very important power on our eastern border. Geographically it dominates our lines of
communication with the northeast, a valuable source of oil and other commodity resources for the rest
of India. The Machiavellian minds that delineated the territories into India and Pakistan at the time of
Partition, ensured that northeast is connected to the rest of India by a narrow corridor, hemmed in by
three nations. Of these Bangladesh on the south is the biggest. In military terms, the entire corridor is
within artillery range from any of the three countries, notably from the northwestern salient of
Bangladesh. The entire southern border of most of the northeastern region has Bangladesh on the
southern border. This part of the border is easy to cross and any meaningful border control requires the
cooperation of the two countries. Bangladesh also suffers from this vulnerability with India dominating
its entire land border on all sides except for 197 km in remote southeast corner bordering Myanmar. So
both India and Bangladesh will always have over riding territorial security considerations in their
relationship. This by itself becomes a major imperative for building friendly and equitable relations
between the two countries. And it is not the responsibility of only one country.

To hasten the freedom for the country, our founding fathers had accepted the partition of India and the
creation of the two wings of Pakistan. The idea of Pakistan was mooted originally in the erstwhile East
Pakistan, the present day Bangladesh. Bangladeshis have a strong sense of Bangla nationality in addition
to the unity of identity that is part of the very concept of Islam. It had been a part of Pakistan for over
two decades, where schoolbooks have been doctored to show India and Hindus as historical enemies of
Pakistan and Muslims. Entire generations have been fed on these fictions. So there is a historical
element still surviving there which continues to perceive India’s relations with Bangladesh only in terms
of Hindu-Muslim equation, despite India having more Muslims as citizens, living in amity with other
religionists, than these two countries. Bangladesh as a new nation has a greater sense of insecurity
further kindled by external agencies as well as radical Islamic elements. In India also we have sections of
population, which view relations between these two breakaway products of partition, in terms of Hindu-
Muslim antagonism, which aggravates the sense of insecurity.

Some of the projects that are contemplated as part of our ‘look east’ policy like India-Bangladesh-
Myanmar pipeline, the India-Myanmar-Thailand road link project and India’s river transit through
Bangladesh have strong energy and economic security contents. The internal insurgency movements in
northeast have economic backwardness as a major cause. All these projects are essential for the
development of northeast as they open the eastern gateway to the whole ASEAN region. Many of these
projects require Bangladesh’s participation or involvement. And these projects can be inclusive of
Bangladesh and immensely benefit it as well. Unfortunately, narrow considerations have clouded
Bangladesh’s perceptions on this.

While mere bilateralism can clear the air and improve relations, invariably on a quid pro quo, it does not
share a broader vision of the region as a sphere of shared perspectives on strategic security and mutual
prosperity. This is where an organization like SAARC becomes more meaningful if it is sensitive to
national security. Then only it can grow from an economic agenda into a much larger entity with
regional security as a consideration as ASEAN has done.

If India expects to be liked by neighbours at all times on all issues it may never happen. But as in any
mature relationship, there is a need for mutual space between the nations. To create this space India
has to demonstrate both its sensitivity to its national security as well as its readiness to respond to the
sensitivities of hypersensitive countries like Bangladesh. How we do it will determine the future of the
relations between the two countries. From this point of view Mr. Saran’s depth finding exercise in plain
speak on our relations with neighbours is welcome. It clears the air to explain our sensitivity. But we
need to demonstrate what we say on two aspects. These are -

        We are sensitive to our security consideration without impinging upon the national sovereignty
        of our neighbours.

        And the neighbours can prosper along with India and have a share in India’s economic pie.

Our record of translating the platitudes and clichés that crowd our policy statements to meaningful
action is dismal. We have as a nation for decades neglected responding to the security and economic
needs of the country, which are closely connected with our relations with neighbours. Our response to
crises had been only knee-jerk at best. A sensitive and festering issue affecting the existence of national
identity like illegal migration in the northeast, had been used as a part of the political power game. It has
been handled in a slap dash fashion in fits and starts. Naxalite terrorism, which is affecting 152 districts
              in 12 states, is still treated as a law and order issue within the responsibility of the state government.
              This is one reason for the poor credibility India enjoys.

              In foreign policy pronouncements the need for correlation between words and action is even more
              important. If we can do that, SAARC will become a productive association of nations. If we cannot do so,
              we can concentrate only on bilateralism and forget about SAARC as a viable entity. So much would
              depend upon how we translate words into meaningful actions and results. Mr. Saran has said, "In a
              word, we are prepared to make our neighbours full stakeholders in India's economic destiny and,
              through such cooperation, in creating a truly vibrant and globally competitive South Asian Economic
              Community." So Delhi has a challenge as to convince our neighbours that "India is an opportunity, not a
              threat, that far from being besieged by India, they have a vast, productive hinterland that would give
              their economies far greater opportunities for growth than if they were to rely on their domestic markets
              alone". Can we do it? At least we should make a concerted effort to do so.




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    SAARC
    Ineffective in Promoting Economic Cooperation in South Asia
    BY RAGHAV THAPAR

    Since its creation in December 1985, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has sought to increase
    economic unity between India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. While the organization
    was designed to improve both the economic and social progress of its member states, most scholars have focused on
    SAARC’s ability to promote economic cooperation among its members.1 South Asian scholars have attempted to compare
    SAARC efforts to increase economic cooperation with those of other regional trading bodies such as the European Union
    and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

    Unlike the EU or ASEAN, however, trade between the seven SAARC states has remained limited despite the fact that all are
    located within a close proximity of one another and all are part of the World Trade Organization (WTO). A growing
    emphasis on attracting foreign investment and seeking access to new markets in SAARC states indicates that economic
    progress is central to the future of South Asia. SAARC, however, is likely to play only a limited role in that future because of
    India’s considerable position of power over the other SAARC states. This imbalance of power within SAARC allows conflicts
    between India and its neighbors to undermine organizational unity. Clashes between South Asian countries end up
jeopardizing the creation and effectiveness of regional trade agreements. They also lead individual SAARC countries to
advance their economic interests through bi-lateral agreements, reducing the incentive to engage in multi-laterally. In the
future, it seems likely that SAARC will act more as a forum to encourage regional discussion through conferences and
seminars than as an architect for economic policy in South Asia.

This paper will first analyze the growing importance of trade relations among South Asian states. It then discusses SAARC’s
historical problems with cooperation and how bi-lateral deals between member states have undermined the organization
as a whole. Finally, it examines SAARC’s role as a mediating agency and forum for discussion among South Asian leaders.

Newfound Focus on Economic Growth in South Asia

Over the last thirteen years, the Indian government has increased its focus on economic development. Since 1991, when a
debt crisis forced it to undertake a serious program of market oriented economic reform, India has gradually opened up its
economy to the world. Over the time India has moved from a closed economy with heavy central planning to a more
privatized economy with lower tariffs. This reform resulted in a seven percent growth rate for the economy from 1994-
1997.2 Foreign investment in India also increased from $68 million in 1991 to $5 billion from 1996-97.3 To sustain this
growth, New Delhi has sought access to new markets and an increase in foreign investment. India’s foreign policy has
reflected the importance of these economic goals. India is increasing border trade with China and is seeking to establish
trade relations with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).4 New Delhi has placed a serious emphasis on
turning India into an economic power. India is expected to become the world’s 4 th largest economy (in terms of
purchasing power parity).5 It is unlikely that this emphasis on economic development will diminish in the near future. The
movement to market economics in 1991 brought “irreversible” changes in India’s economic thinking—changes that will
force India to constantly remain active in the global economy.6 The majority of Indian leaders, irrespective of their political
parties, believe that globalization and privatization are necessary for India to reduce its mass poverty.7 This has resulted in
the gradual reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers over the past decade and a half. However, India is not the only
state in South Asia seeking to expand its presence in new markets.

Other SAARC states are also seeking to enhance their trade relations across the globe. India’s chief political rival, Pakistan,
is openly seeking new markets and increased aid from countries in the European Union (EU) and Japan.8 It has also
struggled to expand trade into Central Asia because of stiff competition from Japan, the EU and Russia. Nepal and Sri Lanka,
both reliant on the Indian economy as a supplier and market for goods, would like to increase intra regional trade and
foreign investment in its developing industries. Similarly, Bangladesh is also looking for new markets to export goods.9Since
a desire to expand trade in South Asia exists among the majority of SAARC nations, one would assume that SAARC would
receive more attention from South Asian states.

Cooperation Troubles

SAARC is structured in a way that often makes regional cooperation difficult. Thomas Thornton argues that in regional
organizations it is difficult for “countries to establish balanced relations when one has a significant advantage in power over
the other states.”10 In the case of SAARC, India is the most powerful country in terms of its economic might, military power
and international influence. Thus, India’s potential as a regional hegemon gives SAARC a unique dynamic compared to an
organization such as ASEAN.11 Pakistan was initially reluctant to join SAARC due to fears of SAARC succumbing to Indian
hegemony. Indeed, if India does take a prominent role in SAARC, it could further fears that India will use SAARC for
hegemonic purposes.12While the smaller states in South Asia recognize that they will need India’s help to facilitate faster
economic growth, they are reluctant to work with India, fearing that such cooperation will admit Indian dominance in
SAARC.13

Aside from a few overtures to its neighbors, India has done little to allay the fears of other South Asian states. The core of
these fears is likely derived from the displays of India’s power by New Delhi in the past. Realizing its considerable advantage
in military and economic power, India has consistently acted in an “arrogant and uncompromising” manner with its
neighbors.14 Bangladesh is afraid of India exploiting its geographical position to redirect water flows vital to Bangladeshi
agricultural production. Nepal and Bhutan are still worried about India’s control over their world trade and transit links as
their geographical position will always make them dependent on India.15 These disputes between India and its neighbors
have directly affected SAARC.

Namely, disputes between South Asian states have undermined SAARC efforts to promote regional trade. These
disagreements make consensus building and cooperation among SAARC states complicated. Attempting to promote
regional cooperation while doing little to resolve regional conflicts makes SAARC’s mission looks nearly
impossible.16Moreover, SAARC has no institutional mechanisms or punishments capable of preventing or fully resolving a
dispute. Two examples illustrate how conflicts in South Asia have proven detrimental to SAARC.

The first involves Indian intervention in Sri Lanka from 1986-1990. The Indian military intervention to put down an
insurgency by The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam made Indo-Sri Lankan relations tense during these four years.
Subsequently, the apprehension between India and Sri Lanka was considered a primary reason behind Sri Lanka’s
“lukewarm” support for SAARC into economic and social spheres of its member states until relations improved with
India.17

A second, more prominent example of a conflict derailing SAARC progress is the Indo-Pakistani conflict. Pakistan has
demanded a resolution to its dispute with India over the Kashmir Valley before discussing trade relations with New Delhi.
Pakistan has enforced this policy by violating WTO regulation for failing to confer Most Favored Nation (MFN) status on
India.

India has recently attempted to improve its relationship with the rest of South Asia. Under the Gujral Doctrine established
by former Indian Prime Minister I.K Gujral, India signed a 30-year water sharing treaty with Bangladesh and a trade and
transit treaty with Nepal. India also joined a sub regional group within SAARC comprising of Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and
India.18 Despite political impediments to trade, value of goods smuggled from India to Pakistan via a third party generally
totals 250-500 million per year. 19 If trade between the states was opened, Pakistan would receive cheaper imports due to
lower transport costs and the absence of payments to a middleman. This implies that there is potential for lucrative trade
between India and Pakistan. Moreover, if these two states, arguably the largest powers in SAARC, pushed for economic
cooperation, it is likely that other states will follow their lead. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Indo-Pakistani dispute
over Kashmir is considered a primary cause of SAARC’s impotence.20

Due to these conflicts, the desire for South Asian states to trade with one another has been limited. By squelching trade
between South Asian states, the disagreements between India and its neighbors have limited the effectiveness of SAARC
trading initiatives. The South Asian Preferential Trading Agreement (SAPTA) signed in December 1995 had SAARC countries
reduce tariffs in certain economic areas to promote intra regional trade. The proposal was initially met with enthusiasm as
India agreed to reduce tariffs in 106 of the 226 fields recommended by SAARC and Pakistan agreed to concessions in 35
fields. This statistic emphasizes a trend in SAARC— India seems gung ho about intra regional cooperation. In 1995, when
SAPTA was being implemented, only 3 percent of all South Asian trade was conducted in the region.21 Six years later, the
improvements seen in regional trade have been marginal. India’s trade within South Asia accounts for only 4 percent of its
total global trade and Pakistan’s trade in the region accounts for merely 3 percent of its overall trade.22 Compared to other
countries with similar proximities and income levels, intra regional trade among SAARC states is relatively small.23 Much of
the trade that is conducted in South Asia is also considered symbolic and generally does not involve goods vital to the
economies of the South Asian states.24 Moreover, some states still have high tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade,
indicating that the spirit of free trade does not seem alive in SAARC.25 However, SAARC is trying to remedy this problem.

SAARC hopes that the establishment of a South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) by January 1, 2006 will stimulate trade in the
region. However, the agreement to establish this free trade zone will take 10 years of gradual tariff reduction.26 For a
proposal that has already been delayed, it will take some genuine political cooperation for the tariff reduction process to
run smoothly.27 Judging from the experience of ASEAN, an organization with a better track record in producing economic
coordination among member states than SAARC, creating a free trade zone could become difficult. The ASEAN free trade
agreement (AFTA) has been criticized for not producing substantial economic interdependence among the region. This lack
of success results from distrust and protectionism among its member states.28 If SAFTA is implemented, its success will
depend on the resolution of conflicts between South Asian states—something which seems unlikely in the future.

A Bi-lateral Alternative

To counter SAARC’s ineffectiveness, individual states have used bi-lateral agreements to advance their economic interests.
Due to their conflicts, it is not surprising that trade between India and Pakistan has only occurred through the smuggling of
goods by a third party, usually Dubai. However, Pakistan and Bangladesh maintained relatively lucrative trade relations with
one another in the 1980’s. Approximately 60 percent of Bangladesh’s exports during this decade went to
Pakistan.29Bangladesh also saw an upswing in bi-lateral trade with India during the 1990’s. While the trade between India
and Bangladesh was characterized by a significant trade gap, over $1 billion in goods a year went back and forth between
these states. India also signed an agreement with Nepal in December of 1996 that allowed Nepal duty free access to the
Indian market.30 Moreover, on April 1, 1995, India reduced customs on goods imported from Sri Lanka. Therefore, bi-
lateral, not multi-lateral, agreements have facilitated much of the trade that does occur in South Asia.

The existence of these bi-lateral agreements is significant for three reasons. First, the increase of bi-lateral agreements in
South Asia shows that states are not dependent on SAARC to achieve their economic objectives. Therefore, SAARC’s
importance in the future will likely diminish in the eyes of its member states. Second, a focus on bi-lateral negotiations
shifts attention away from the region and onto individual countries. In the future, states are more likely pursue bi-lateral
agreements where they have to negotiate with only one country instead seeking multi-lateral deals, where they have to
negotiate with seven countries. Therefore, states will lack an incentive to pursue their economic interests through SAARC.
Third, the growth in bi-lateral trade agreements between South Asian states highlights the priority states are giving to their
own self-interests at the expense regional economic cooperation. Thus, it seems as if economic regional cooperation is not
a high priority for SAARC member states. So, if SAARC has not met the economic needs of its states, does it have a role in
the future of South Asia?

Another Role for SAARC

SAARC does face some serious problems but could still play a useful role in South Asia. It is important to point out that
SAARC does face some serious obstacles to success. The organization is facing a serious resource crunch and the SAARC
countries have shown little willingness to increase their contributions to the association. Moreover, SAARC must battle the
public perception it is more a figurehead of South Asian unity than an actual facilitator of regional cooperation. SAARC has
been criticized by the public for only reaching agreements on the lowest level of cooperation among states instead of
pushing for cooperation that would actually benefit South Asia. The SAARC conventions on drug trafficking and terrorism
have also been criticized for not producing substantial results. Most of SAARC’s noteworthy achievements have only been
found “on paper.”31 Thus, it does not become surprising when the British based Economist magazine ponders whether
SAARC should be put “out of its misery.”32

Despite these obstacles, SAARC can still play an important communicative role in South Asia. It can serve as a forum for
South Asian leaders to discuss security concerns in South Asia on a regular basis and as an outlet for South Asian countries
to communicate with other regional economic blocks. While SAARC cannot force its member states to trade with one
another, it does make them interact. It provides a neutral forum for leaders to talk and sets a consistent time frame for
these meetings to occur. It does not force them to sign any agreements or commit to policies; it allows them simply to
discuss matters of regional security. Given the poor communication between South Asian leaders, this is not an insignificant
role. SAARC has already shown in the past that it is useful in promoting dialogue among South Asian leaders.

Informal talks between Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers at the second SAARC summit in 1986 led to the diffusion of
tension between the two countries on the issue of India’s Brasstacks exercise.33 In January 2004, conciliatory talks
between India and Pakistan were sparked by an upcoming SAARC conference.34 A breakthrough between Indian and
Pakistani diplomats actually occurred at the conference.35 While the dialogue has yet to produce tangible results, the
experiences indicate that SAARC can help promote political cooperation and serve as a forum for communication among
South Asian leaders. Since political conflicts are a primary cause of SAARC’s inability to foster cooperation among its
members, serving as a forum to alleviate those problems could in turn aid efforts to improve economic integration in the
future.

Conclusion

In essence, the growing movement of emphasis on economic development in foreign policy is changing the priorities of
South Asian states. South Asian countries are emphasizing the importance of access to open markets and increasing foreign
investment in their businesses. It seems likely then that economic growth and development will be central to the future of
the South Asian state. However, whether growth and development occurs because of economic cooperation in the region
is another question. Currently, trade between South Asian states remains relatively low when compared to other regional
blocks. Moreover, political and economic ties between states rest on shaky foundations. Divisions among South Asian
countries have made regional cooperation difficult and have lead states to pursue their economic goals bi-laterally. SAARC
is still a valuable forum for political dialogue in South Asia, but its economic role in the region has been mitigated by conflict
and tension among its member states. Until these conflicts are resolved to the point where South Asian states are willing to
reduce barriers to trade, it seems as if the vision of an economic interdependent South Asia is more of a dream than reality.

Author byline---

ENDNOTES

1 SAARC homepage http://www.saarc-sec.org/main.php. SAARC has expanded its role to address significant issues
impacting South Asia such as Agriculture, Biotech, Communication and Media, Energy, Environment, Human Resources,
Poverty, Legal problems and Tourism.

2    Bhabani Gupta, “ India in the Twenty-First Century”, International Affairs vol 73, no2, (April 1997) p. 297

3    Ibid p. 302

4    “Every man for himself,” The Economist. Oct. 31, 2002 p. 14

5    Gupta, “ India”, p. 205

6 Howard Schaffer and Teresita Schaffer, “Better Neighbours? India and South Asian Regional Politics”, SAIS Review,
(Winter – Spring 1998) p. 120

7    Gupta p. 314

8    J N Dixit, External Affairs: Cross-Border Relations, ( New Delhi: Roli Books, 2003). p. 38

9 Kishore Dash, “The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation in South Asia”, Pacific Affairs vol 69, no 2 (Summer 1996)
p. 196

10 , Thomas P Thornton, “Regional Organizations in Conflict Management”, Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science Vol 518, (Nov 1991), p. 135

11 Ibid p. 136. The countries of ASEAN are all relatively evenly matched in their geographic size, economic strength and
military power. While there are disparities among ASEAN states in some of these areas, they are not nearly as drastic as
those between India and other South Asian states.

12    Dash, “The Political Economy”, p. 192

13 Ananya Mukherjee Reed, “Regionalization in South Asia: Theory and Praxis”, Pacific Affairs, vol 70, no 2, (summer
1997) p. 246

14    Schaffer and Schaffer, “Better Neighbours”, p. 111

15    Schaffer and Schaffer, “Better Neighbours”, p. 111
16   Reed, “Regionalization”, p. 244

17   Dash, “Political Economy”, p. 201

18   Gupta, “ India”, p. 310

19 SankarGhosh and SomenMukherji, Emerging South Asian Order: Hopes and Concerns, (Calcutta: Media South Asia,
1995), p. 197

20 “The Unmagnificent Seven,” The Economist Online, <http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=954547 >
( Jan. 24, 2002).

21   , Ghosh and Mukherji, “Emerging South Asian Order”, p. 147

22   “The Unmagnificent Seven.”

23   Panagariya, Arvind, “ South Asia: Does Preferential Trade Liberalization make sense?”

http://www.columbia.edu/~ap2231/Policy%20Papers/Saarc-wb.pdf

24   “The Unmagnificent Seven”

25   Dash, “Political Economy”, p. 204

26 SAARC website, <http://www.saarc-sec.org/main.php?t=2.1.6>

27 According to Schaffer and Schaffer, SAFTA was supposed to come into existence in 2001. The Economist article, “The
Unmagnificent Seven” also pointed out that the implementation of SAFTA has been rapidly delayed.

28   “More Effort Needed,” The Economist Online,

http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=2968833> ( July 29, 2004), p. 25

29   Dash, “Political Economy”, p. 196

30   Dixit, “External Affairs”, p. 111

31   Dash, “Political Economy”, p. 188

32   “The Unmagnificent Seven”

33   Dash, “Political Economy”, p. 189

34   “Back to jaw-jaw,” The Economist Online,

< http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=2335771> ( Jan 8, 2004)
35   “Giving peace a chance,” The Economist Online

<http://economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=2423053> ( Feb. 15, 2004)




         Copyright © 2006, Stanford Journal of International Relations
         Department of International Relations, Stanford University
         Last updated: 5/24/06, by Hammad Ahmed and Patrick Callier.

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Project

  • 1. India – ASEAN Relations In 21st Century: Strategic Implications For India – Analysis By: Asif Ahmed July 9, 2012 “India’s Look East Policy is not merely an external economic policy, it is also a strategic shift in India’s vision of the world and India’s place in the evolving global economy. Most of all it is about reaching out to our civilisationalneighbours in South East Asia and East Asia”– Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh Introduction ASEAN was formed in 1967 and its founding fathers had envisioned an organization which would include all the ten countries of Southeast Asia (SEA). It began with five Southeast Asian states (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand); and others including the LMCV countries (Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia and Vietnam) joined later. An eleventh country, East Timor, is yet to be granted membership. The SEA countries are diverse and at varying stages of development- with Singapore at the forefront and Myanmar still a least developed country (LDC). The emergence of India from a gloomy to a glowing position in the global arena, coupled with a number of virtues like enormous size, huge population, convenient geostrategic location, progressive military might, meteoric economic growth inspired various states including South-East Asian nations to devise collaborative ties with India. India-ASEAN relations are a reflection of the complementariness of interests between the two entities. As India chooses to embark on a benign projection of its rising power, it has become imperative to chart a foreign policy commensurate with its ambitions in Asia and the world. For India‘s power to be accepted in the Asian Continent, it needs to look beyond its immediate neighbours in the sub-Continent, and diversify and cement its relations mainly with the South-East Asian nations, the very essence of its Look East Policy and its continuing effort to sustain and improve ties with a regional body like ASEAN1. This paper will discuss the India- ASEAN cooperation in various fields, the on-going efforts and will also try to explore the Historical Overview, Bilateral-Dialogue Relations, Political and Security Issues, various possibilities and Strategic Implications of cooperation including defence cooperation and convergence of interest of both the region in 21st century. Historical Background In the annals of its history, India has had extensive cultural, economic and political ties with the Southeast Asian nations. But in the years after independence, this region was completely overlooked by India because of various reasons. The tumultuous relationship with Pakistan affected India‘s policy considerations as India looked to develop and maintain good relations with the Western world, so that they supported India‘s views on Kashmir. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) afforded a greater degree of interaction between India and
  • 2. many countries which it had neglected in the immediate years after its independence. India supported the anti- colonial movement in Southeast Asia—the convening of the Asian Relations Conference in 1947, a special conference on Indonesia in January 1949, Chairmanship of the International Control Commission on India- China in 1954 and the sponsoring of the Bandung Conference—all these reflected India‘s deep involvement in the freedom struggle being waged by the countries of the region. But the growing pro-Soviet tilt in India‘s foreign policy drove a wedge between India and the Southeast Asian nations. Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines were strongly anti-communist. India‘s proposal for a security arrangement in the region also did not go down well with the ASEAN countries as it was seen to be part of the Soviet Union‘s attempts to bring the region under its influence. ASEAN also did not support India‘s cause during the 1971 Indo-Pak war. India ASEAN Relations After The End Of Cold War ASEAN The end of the cold war marked a turning point in India‘s relations with ASEAN. The resolution of the Cambodian conflict brought about a change in Indo-ASEAN relations. The then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi‘s path-breaking visit to China in 1988 also marked a tremendous shift in Sino-Indian relations and had a bearing on Indo-ASEAN relations as well. With the launching of India‘s economic liberalisationprogramme in 1991, ASEAN came to be identified as being pivotal to India‘s policy in the Asia-Pacific region. ASEAN also decided to expand its membership to include all countries which are geographically part of Southeast Asia. A quantum jump in Indo-Asean relations came with the effort to forge closer links with the Southeast Asian countries after 1991. This period saw the beginning of its Look-East Policy which was intended to reach out to the countries of East and Southeast Asia which had been neglected by India in spite of cultural, religious, geographical proximity and historical links.
  • 3. The changed global circumstances forced India to adapt itself to the new emerging world order. India began an overhaul of its foreign policy and it was felt that ASEAN could be of much help to India in this exercise. India extended support to ASEAN‘s efforts in establishing peace in Cambodia and bring the warring factions to the negotiating table at the Jakarta Informal Meet (JIM I and JIM II) and later co-operated with the United Nations Transitional Authority in its efforts to bring peace to Cambodia. It was in the wake of the failure of SAARC that India decided to ―Look-East‖ as India already had deep-seated cultural, religious and political links with the Southeast Asian countries. But there were many factors which impeded India‘s efforts in this process. The ASEAN countries were pro-West in their outlook and projected Vietnam as their common threat as opposed to India‘s views on Vietnam and Cambodia. The booming economies of the Southeast Asian countries also attracted India. ASEAN was also on the lookout for new partners and untapped markets. The break-up of the erstwhile Soviet Union, its withdrawal from Cam Ranh Bay and the American withdrawal from the Subic Bay naval base created a security vacuum in the region. India‘s close relations with the Soviet Union acted as a dampener. India‘s position on the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and the recognition given to the HengSamarin regime in Cambodia also hindered the development of close ties with ASEAN. However, India ultimately succeeded in becoming a sectoral- dialogue partner of the ASEAN in 1992 and a full-dialogue partner in 1996. The other full dialogue partners are: Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia and the US. With the inclusion of Myanmar, India and ASEAN now share a 1,600-km land border. Despite the economic crisis that plagued the region in the late 1990‘s, Indo-Asean relations have been continuously on the upswing2. India’s Look East Policy India‘s notable presence in the global arena can be evidently discerned from its dynamic foreign policy orientation as well as from a number of enterprising collaborative ventures with other nations. In the early nineties the then Indian Prime Minister P.V.NarsimhaRao initiated a new chapter as the ‗Look-East Policy‘ in Indian foreign policy paradigm. The Look-East Policy portrays a strategic shift in India‘s vision of the world and India‘s position in the rapidly developing global economy. Since the time of inception of the Policy India and ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) have embarked upon multiple bilateral, regional and sub-regional initiatives for the flourishing pursuit of the Policy3. The Look East Policy of India, framed by the NarasimhaRao government in the early nineties, is a substantial manifestation of India‘s focused foreign policy orientation towards South East Asia; an immensely resourceful and flourishing region. The economy of South East Asia is a virtually untapped market which is up for grabs by major regional economic entities such as India, China, Europe or the USA. India‘s compatibility with the South East Asian countries with regard to better regional cooperation lies in the fact of its abstinence from exhibiting hegemonistic ambitions, making it more benign towards South East Asia. The camaraderie between
  • 4. India and South-East Asia is clearly visible through the dynamic persuasion of India‘s Look-East Policy. India and ASEAN reciprocally have embarked upon a number of initiatives for rejuvenating their ties in multiple areas. Frequent tête-à-tête from both the sides promulgates better implementation of the Policy. The improving intensification of economic linkages with ASEAN has inspired India to enter into the second phase of its Look-East Policy. Phase 2 is the deviation from complete economic issues to the broader agenda involving security cooperation, actively constructing transport corridors and erecting pillars of linkages and connectivity. This phase of India‘s Look-East Policy renders ample relevance to the development of its North-Eastern Region because of its geographical proximity to South-East Asia. The North-Eastern tip of India consisting of contiguous seven sister states- Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura and the state of Sikkim – constitutes a unique narrow passageway connecting the Indian subcontinent to East and South-East Asia and acts as a crucial corridor for human migration between these areas. The North-East region because of its favourable geographic location, cradled by the Himalayas in the north , Bay of Bengal in the south and flanked by 5 Asian countries- Nepal, Bhutan, China, Myanmar and Bangladesh, acts as a gateway to South-East Asia. There are ample possibilities for North-East India to reap benefits from India‘s thriving relations with South East Asia as the process of globalisation provides the countries with the opportunities to grapple with cross-market accessibility and enabling them alleviate their poverty and economic backwardness4. The Look-East Policy is being embarked upon with the presupposition that the improving trade ties between India and ASEAN will certainly elevate the North- East out of the menace of insurgency, poverty and economic backwardness. The Look-East Policy is expected to usher in a new era of development for the North East through network of pipelines, connectivity, communication and trade. The ASEAN-India car rally of 2003 was a notable initiative undertaken by the Indian government to emphasise on the geographic proximity between North-East India and South-East Asia. Moreover, India has undertaken some bilateral and multilateral projects for boosting connectivity between the North-East and South East Asia. The important ongoing and potential infrastructure projects in this regard are Moreh-Tamu-Kalewa Road, India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, Trans Asian Highway, India- Myanmar rail linkages, Kaladan Multimodal project, the Stilwell road, Myanmar-India-Bangladesh gas or oil pipeline, Tamanthi Hydroelectricity project and optical fiber network between North East India and South East Asia5.But certain obstacles like lack of infrastructural development, absence of enthusiastic response from local people, frequent insurgencies, poor governance in the states, the easy availability of arms and weapons from across the international border to be utilised in armed movements and criminal activities impede increased relations between North-East India and South East Asia. Moreover, the geographic location of the North-Eastern region makes it more vulnerable to be the core of hostility with massive negative outcomes.
  • 5. As India‘s External Affairs Minister SM Krishna said during his inaugural address at the recent India-ASEAN Delhi Dialogue III, ―It has been a gratifying engagement for us, an engagement which has drawn strength from India‘s rapidly developing bilateral ties with individual ASEAN countries, and from our millennia-old bonds with the countries and civilizations of the region.‖ Reflecting on the kind of role that India sees for itself and the extension of its own democratic nature to its regional calculations, India‘s National Security Adviser ShivshankarMenon remarked at the Dialogue III, ―‘From the Indian point of view it (the new Asian security order) should be open, it should be flexible and it should be inclusive. This is essential for the order to work.‖ India‘s strengthening relations with the individual countries of the ASEAN and the regional body at large is mutually reinforcing. The foreign policy vision of a rising India should reflect an enlargement of vision and a continuous effort towards cultivation of resources to increase its zone of influence, albeit in a more diplomatic and friendly manner without evoking sentiments that could brand India as a meddling power. Undoubtedly, this is basically where India could chart out a more benign space for itself in the South-East Asian region despite the overwhelming presence of the Chinese power. As Krishna said, ―We feel that the principles of State sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of others must be the bedrock of our cooperative endeavours.‖ India‘s strategic and diplomatic maneouvers in South-East Asia are signs of its intent to play a more substantial role in Asia. As such, India and its relations with the ASEAN countries have a major role in shaping the future of Asia, and by repercussions the future of international politics. During the Delhi Dialogue III, Menon also reflected on the success of India-ASEAN cooperation in tackling piracy in the Malacca Straits and called for replicating the cooperation model for promoting the new security architecture too for the region. He also emphasized that Asia, as the fastest developing region had to deal with security issues and it had ―the most to lose from instability and insecurity in the international system.‖ The shifting nature of power is something constant in international politics, and the 21st century is being already labelled an Asian century, in which the two rising giants, India and China will definitely play a big role. As the saying goes: With great powers, comes great responsibilities, India is at a great juncture in its history, travelling an upward journey to major power status. According to sources, India and ASEAN are expected to widen their trade engagement by signing a free trade agreement (FTA) next year that will cover services and investment. ―Next year, we will celebrate our 20th anniversary and it would be a commemorative summit…let‘s hope that at the summit, we will be able to deliver a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) (between India and ASEAN), because so far it is only in goods,‖ ASEAN Secretary General SurinPitsuwan said. Recall, India and ASEAN had implemented Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in goods in January last year and are engaged in intense negotiations to expand this pact to include services and investments.
  • 6. According to sources, India and the ASEAN are committed to achieving a trade target of $70 billion by 2012, up 40 per cent from $50 billion in 20106. India ASEAN CuluturalSimilarties And Linguistic Attachments There are enough avenues through which North East India can be related to South-East Asia. Racial, linguistic and cultural similarity prevails among the people of North-East India and those of South-East Asia. If the concerned governments really strive to translate their policies into reality their collaborative endeavors would invariably revive age-old cultural and historical bonds. To highlight the linguistic attachment it should be stated that it is an area of extensive linguistic diversity with predominantly three language families represented- Austro-Asiatic, Indo-European and Tibeto- Burman. Austro-Asiatic languages are now spoken by a single group in North-East India (the Khasi) but they are also found in East India and South-East Asia reflecting that they might have been more frequent in North-East in the past. Indo- European language is spoken from Europe to Central and South Asia with their easternmost occurrence in Nepal, Bangladesh and North-East India. Tibeto- Burman languages are a branch of Sino- Tibetan family which is mainly spoken in North-East India, China and South-East Asia. Thus North-East India sets up an important linguistic contact zone. Through centuries there has been exchange of peoples, goods and services between our North-East and countries of South and South-East Asia. The Ahoms of Assam migrated several centuries ago from the Shan state of Burma where the language spoken is almost identical to that spoken in Laos and Thailand. The Chins from Myanmar migrated over the past centuries to Manipur and Meities of Manipur have ties for over 2000 years with the Burmans of Myanmar. Similar migration has also occurred to North-East from Yunan province of China. Boosting people to people contact transcending political barriers is an imperative for facilitating cultural interaction among various regions. In contemporary era, physical connectivity is of utmost importance as it channelises the means to accelerate the movement of goods, people and services and thereby acts as a gateway to reviving economic enterprise. Advanced communication and interaction would foster trade, commerce and tourism prospects in the entire North-East region. But because of the existing hurdles the people of North East region are quite apprehensive about the developmental strategies and consider it as mere rhetoric. It will be fatal for India in the long run if its government ever tries to get integrated with South East Asia by using North-East as a channel for its economic progress. The people of the North-East should not feel ostracised from the mainstream one and simultaneously need to be convinced of the genuine concern of the government about the overall betterment and security of the region. Thence, it can be asserted that India‘s North-East Region is a solid domain in orchestrating India‘s Look-East Policy. The development of the region is a stepping stone towards the success of the policy.
  • 7. India ASEAN Economic Relations After India’s Look East Policy India has had close cultural and economic ties with Southeast-Asian countries throughout the history. But with the significant changes that occurred in the world‘s politics and economic scenario since the early 1990‘s and India‘s own march towards economic liberalization has compelled India to focus on strengthened and multifaceted relationship with ASEAN countries. Besides, ASEAN‘s political and strategic importances in the larger Asia-Pacific-Region and its potential to become a major partner of India in the area of trade and investment have encouraged India to seek closer linkage with these countries. Keeping theses points in mind a conscious effort was begun in 1991 to reach out these ASEAN countries through our ―Look East Policy‖. With the eastward expansion of ASEAN to include Myanmar, India and ASEAN countries are no longer just remain maritime neighbours but share a land boundary of over 1600 K.m2. It now provides a land bridge for India to connect with Asia-Pacific-Centred economic crosscurrents shaping with 21st century market place. On the other hand ASEAN seeks to India‘s professional and technical strengths. Apart from recognizing India‘s emergence as attractive trade partner and investment destination, ASEAN has also increasingly comes to see it as a stabilizing factor in the region. The convergence of interest of India and ASEAN in various fields provides further impetus to explore the possibilities which takes this relationship at its zenith in 21st century. India‘s relations with the major powers and her neighbouring nations have been conditioned by the changing contours of the international environment. Military and domestic political necessities have also influenced the nature of the policy towards particular regions at different moments. The relations between India and the South East Asian nations can be explored in this context. The links between India and South East Asia have followed a non-linear course. While the need to combat colonialism induced a sense of solidarity among the nations in the early twentieth century, the East-West rivalry of the Cold War era made their political, security and economic interests divergent. The geo-strategic and economic realities of the post Cold War period have propelled India and South-East Asia to forge strong economic and security ties. The potential of India and South East Asian relations and cooperation is yet to be exploited fully but consistent initiatives have made most analysts and observers hopeful. The role of ASEAN and the Look East policy (Phases 1 and 2) initiative by the Indian government have been most crucial in this regard. Situated in the Asian subcontinent, South-East Asian nations form the second ring of neighbouring states for India. Thus, the veering towards Southeast Asian nations at this juncture found a legitimate platform in India‘s strategic thinking. The visits of Rajiv Gandhi to various capitals of the member countries of ASEAN were a landmark attempt to establish rapport with the Southeast Asian nations. Also, his visit to reengage China (December 1988) Japan and Australia was an indication that India was being driven to the East7. Rising Security Concerns: In the wake of the 9/11 and especially after Southeast Asia was designated as the ‗second front of terrorism‘, the security dimension has
  • 8. assumed tremendous importance in India-ASEAN relations. The Bali bombing of 2004 has particularly exposed the seamier side of the connection between international terror networks and their local outfits8. India and ASEAN states have explored the possibility of establishing joint working groups to combat this new threat. Indian leaders have been vocal about pressing for a more coordinated effort to tackle traditional and non-traditional security threats. India ASEAN Avenues Of Security Cooperation Based On Evolving Convergences Maritime security, combating and containing terrorism and transnational crime. Preventing the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, human trafficking and trafficking in small arms. Confidence building, conflict prevention and resolution Energy and environment preservation Promotion of democracy, human rights, peace, development and disarmament9. India-ASEAN functional cooperation includes cooperation in sectors such as, Science & Technology, Human Resources Development, Health and Pharmaceuticals, Space Sciences, Agriculture, Information & Communication Technology, Transport and Infrastructure, Tourism and Culture and Small and Medium Enterprises etc. Strategic Implications For India In Current Scenario Defence and Security is a major area of future co-operation between India and ASEAN. No longer is security of South Asia and Southeast Asia separate. Both the region has suffered from new threat of terrorism. Thus, to get rid of it, a global alliance for Counter Terrorism is need of the hour, where both India and ASEAN can play the major role. The tsunami in the recent years has brought the issue of Disaster Mitigation as another possible area of cooperation. Besides, other transnational crimes such as trafficking particularly in women and children, cyber crimes, international economic crimes, environmental crimes, sea piracy and money laundering needs to be checked through effective institutional linkages and programmes of cooperation giving priority to information exchange and capacity building. Making this cooperation more interesting at the 14th annual meeting of the ARF in 2nd August 2007 in Manila, External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee offers a training module on Maritime Security, specifically for the ARF member-states, with themes of anti-piracy, search-and-rescue [missions], offshore and port security, anti-smuggling and narcotics control and anti- poaching operations.‖ The nucleus of the module would be ―capacity-building‖ for these and related aspects of maritime security. Thus, the prospect of cooperation in this area is tremendous. Another convergence of interest to foster closer cooperation in reforming of and democratizing the UN and its institution by making them more reflective of the contemporary realities, might strengthen the bond between India and ASEAN in 21st century. In fact, both sides are eager for a multilateral world order with genuine role of the UN.
  • 9. Emphasizing the importance of multilateralism in ASEAN Business Advisory Council at Kula Lumpur, Indian PM DrManMohan Singh said ―regional building block of multilateralism in an increasingly globalilsed world. Besides their co-operation in multilateral forum, particularly the WTO and in addressing the challenges of economic, food, human and energy security will bring these two region more closer than ever before. Thus, the two sides have to work for more space for the developing and the least developed countries in the WTO. It is also expected that, India might convince all the ASEAN members to support its candidature for the permanent membership in Security Council. India has made impressive progress on the defence and strategic front in changing situations. A sea change in the political atmosphere that Southeast Asia witnessed in the aftermath of the cold war, especially after the Cambodian issue was settled and looking at Vietnam as a potential ally of ASEAN, contributed to this in a big way. Moreover, India‘s military might in the emergent Asian balance of power could not be ignored any longer. The Southeast Asian nations began to look upon India as a power that could play a kind of ‗balancing role‘ vis-à-vis China in particular. On the other hand, it was in India‘s interest to ensure that Southeast Asia would not be dominated by a regional great power once it became obvious that the superpowers were going to build-down their presence, which coincided with a similar thinking within Southeast Asia. The upshot of convergence of interests was the genesis of a new strategic interaction with several of the ASEAN nations. A unique advantage India enjoyed was that its military, despite being dominated by the Moscow supplied equipment, had continued to maintain links with West Europe. Critical remarks with regard to the ambitions of the Indian Navy were replaced by many instances of greater defence cooperation. A number of confidence building measures (CBMs) that India undertook and greater appreciation by the Southeast Asian countries of Indian maritime concerns ushered in a new era of cooperation which began to transcend beyond the naval contours. Aside from periodic naval exercises and the biannual get- together of regional navies, called the Milan, India has entered into bilateral defence cooperation agreements with Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, Laos, and Indonesia. India has also been actively involved in assisting the armed forces of Myanmar and Thailand. For instance, Singapore has not only made use of India‘s missile testing range to test its own guns and missiles, but also uses Indian facilities to train its naval personnel- the first time ever that India has done for a foreign country. Similarly, the Thai pilots are being trained in India to gain experience to operate their aircraft carrier, and the Myanmarese get anti-insurgency training. India and Indonesia have also frequently conduct joint patrolling in the critical straits of Southeast Asia ensuring security of sealanes of communication. It is notable that India‘s strategic engagement with Southeast Asia is the strongest compared to any other Asian power. One reason why India has been relatively more successful is that, apart from the absence of any border/territorial disputes and any historical baggage, India is seen to be not having any ‗ambitions‘ in and posing no security threat to the region10.
  • 10. ASEAN-INDIA Dialogue Relations India dialogue relations have grown rapidly from a sectoral dialogue partnership in 1992 to a full dialogue partnership in December 1995. The relationship was further elevated with the convening of the ASEAN-India Summit in 2002 in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. All these took place in a decade, which clearly signifies the importance of the dialogue partnership to ASEAN and India and the progress made in the cooperation11. This reflects the confidence both ASEAN and India have in the dialogue partnership which is reflected by the expanding and intensifying dialogue and cooperation in many sectors. ASEAN-India cooperation covers the economic, political and security, and development cooperation dimensions with a number of mechanisms established to promote dialogue and cooperation in these areas. In recent years, sectoral cooperation has been gaining strength with the establishment of working group level meetings in science and technology, transport and infrastructure, and small and medium scale enterprises12. Political And Security Issues Since India became a Dialogue Partner of ASEAN, the collaboration has transcended the realm of functional cooperation to cover political and security dimensions. India participates in a series of consultative meetings with ASEAN which include the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Post Ministerial Conferences (PMCs) 10+1 and 10+10. Since July 1996, India has been an active participant of the ARF. It views the ARF as valuable process in promoting stable relationships between the major powers, and as a useful complement to the bilateral alliances and dialogues between India and ASEAN Member Countries, which are at the heart of the region‘s security architecture13. ASEAN and India committed themselves to jointly contribute to the promotion of peace, stability and development in the Asia-Pacific region and the world, and respond positively to the challenges of a dynamic regional and international environment. ASEAN and India are now intensifying their political and security dialogue to add a new dimension to a mutually beneficial economic and commercial relationship. Reflective of India‘s interest in intensifying its engagement with ASEAN, both sides now are in the process of jointly developing an India-ASEAN Vision 2020, as a roadmap to mutually desired objectives. India ASEAN Bilateral Relations India has strengthened its bilateral relations with all the South East Asian nations in the last two decades since launching of the Look East Policy. High level visits of heads of states from most of these nations have taken place. India has entered into a few bilateral Free Trade Agreements (Thailand) and economic cooperation agreements (Indonesia and Singapore). The high point of India‘s relations with Malaysia is the defence cooperation which began in 1993 and has developed over the years with annual meeting of the defence secretaries, military training and supply of defence equipment. Special attention is being paid to the three economically under developed countries, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, where there is enough scope and opportunity for India to extend its influence. Indonesia and Singapore has helped India to get into the East
  • 11. Asia Summit despite objections from some other ASEAN members and China. Of all the South East Asian nations, Myanmar has a special place from India‘s strategic and security perspective. Look-East And The North-East The North Eastern States of India are often described as land locked. They are joined to the rest of India by a narrow land corridor that skirts the north of Bangladesh. This land corridor is only 21 to 40 Km in width and is known as the Chicken‘s Neck. This has been a serious impediment for the development of the region, which has lagged behind the rest of the country in terms of infrastructure and industrial development. With the release of the document ―North Eastern Region Vision 2020‖ by the Prime Minister in July 2008 a serious effort has been made for socio-economic development of this region to match with the objectives of the Look East Policy. Several measures have been undertaken under the aegis of the Look East policy to uplift North East India such as the ―Asian Highway‖, ―Asian Railway link‖ and ―Natural Gas pipeline‖. The Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport facility is aimed at establishing connectivity between Indian ports and Sittwe port in Myanmar through riverine transport and road links in Mizoram. With the Ganga Mekong initiative there is potential for direct flights between Guwhati -Ho-Chi Minh city – Imphal – Hanoi. This document (Vision 2020) admits that the Look East Policy has failed to uplift the North East in the last fifteen years or so as most of the goods from ASEAN is sent through the sea route as the land route is thought highly unsafe for reasons such as lack of infrastructure and insurgency. The China Factor: India Getting Preference Over China In the cold war era, South East Asian nations perceived China as dangerous because of its military expansionist scheme in Asia. While now the ―peaceful rise‖ of China is being considered more of an opportunity despite the challenges. China is virtually dominating the South East Asian region. The ASEAN- China Free Trade Area created by an accord in 2004 has come into effect from January 2010. This covers nearly 1.9 billion people. In terms of economic value this is the third largest regional agreement, after only the EU and the NAFTA. ―A new talking point in East Asia is that of the multi-laterisation or, more precisely, the likely enlargement of the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) later this year. The CMI is basically a currency pool of the ASEAN+3 countries (China, Japan and South Korea).The move was a direct response to the recent outbreak of the US-induced global and financial economic crisis, which has not fully blown away as now‖ (P.S. Suryanarayana-Frontline January 29, 2010). China is predicted to overtake Japan as the world‘s second largest economy some time in 2010. India must be aware of the fact that it has not been invited to the EAS because of its rising economic potential alone but more as a balancing force to offset the China factor. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has repeatedly mentioned that in a global environment, India is not afraid of competition and it can complement rather than compete in the East Asia Summit (EAS)14. China is virtually
  • 12. dominating this region. By the ASEAN-China Accord entered into in November 2004 (during the 10th ASEAN Summit in Vientiane), the world‘s biggest free trade area has been created removing all tariffs. The tariff cuts that began in 2005 will be completed by 2010 drawing the ASEAN‘s combined economies of US $ 1 trillion closer to China‘s US $ 1.4 trillion. In the Cold war era, India perceived China as dangerous country because of its high military expenditure and ambitious plans in this field. But now the image of China has changed and now is seen as an economic powerhouse. To gain confidence and to build trust among the Asian countries Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, said in a speech during the last ASEAN Summit that ―China will continue to seek peace and development through cooperation and will strive to achieve development that will bring about peace, openness, cooperation and harmony as well as benefit to itself and other countries‖. Despite the remarks of the Chinese Premier some analysts are of the opinion that China preferred a smaller Asian grouping (without U.S., India, Australia and New Zealand) that can integrate quickly on the economic front and which China can influence more significantly. Perhaps it is this increasing influence of China and its motives that had prompted countries like Singapore and Indonesia to cooperate with India, Australia and New Zealand into the EAS. Hence India must be aware that it has not been invited to EAS because of its rising economic potential alone but more as a balancing force to offset the China factor. Although it is being said that India and China are not rivals and they can complement rather than compete in the EAS. China‘s growing presence and influence in the region, economic and strategic makes diversified relationship with India necessary for Southeast Asia. With the US down-scaling its relations with the region, many believe that India will provide added stability and security to the region. In the immediate future, India and ASEAN countries must intensify their cooperation both at the bilateral and regional levels to combat common threats to security that have the potential of shaking the very foundations of the polity. Since India‘s north-eastern region is being recognised as the ‗corridor to South East Asia, integration with the traditional neighbouring regions like Myanmar, Bangladesh and Thailand should be facilitated through transportation networks and this would contribute to sustained peace and development. It maybe stated therefore, that changing political, economic and security considerations condition the bilateral or multilateral policy ties of any country and India-Southeast Asia relations is no exception to this. The potential of the relations must be carefully cultivated by policymakers and strategists as Southeast Asia is likely to remain a viable foreign and security policy option for India in its quest to establish its geo-political and economic prowess in the years to come. As India deepens its ties and employs pragmatic diplomacy to increase its influence in South-East Asia, the repercussions in India-China relations are inevitable. China considers itself the unchallenged ―dragon‖ of the Asian Continent; hence the Indian ―elephant‖ strides would be unsettling. But if Indian foreign policies manage to ruffle feathers and unsettle the Chinese strategic community, then India must have been doing something right. The South China Sea Disputes And Indian Policy
  • 13. In recent weeks (October2011), statements by Chinese officials reasserting China‘s ―indisputable sovereignty‖ over the South China Sea and warnings to India against investment in the region are seen as signs of Chinese aggressiveness that would inevitably precipitate conflict. Suggestions for greater Indian involvement in the South China Sea disputes are made on the grounds that India must be forceful in its dealings with China. The continuation of ONGC Videsh Limited‘s (OVL) investments in Vietnamese energy fields is certainly advisable. In fact, there is nothing to indicate that the Indian government is thinking otherwise. OVL‘s presence in Vietnam is not a recent phenomenon. Its first joint-venture for offshore oil and natural gas exploration in Vietnam‘s LanTay field along with Petro Vietnam and BP became functional in 2003. Deals for the investments now in the headlines were signed in May 2006; this is a project that will not be halted because of oblique Chinese statements. India simply need not take heed of Chinese views on Indian economic ventures. In the aftermath of statements by the US and skirmishes over fishing vessels, ASEAN and China agreed upon The Guidelines on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea at the Bali Summit in July 2010. Recent tensions may well prod the parties towards a more binding code of conduct. This is not to suggest that territorial claims and sovereignty issues will be resolved, but certainly can become more manageable to prevent military conflict. A revision of Indian policy on the issue should be based on a clear understanding of what India stands to gain and how Indian national interest is strengthened. India‘s relationships with South East Asian countries are not uni-dimensional. They are not geared only towards checking the Chinese imprint in the region but are reflective of India‘s multifarious interests globally. As regards military support for OVL‘s operations, the issue should be reflected upon seriously. It is one thing to build capabilities in order to deter misadventure, quite another to back investment with military might. This is a matter that will affect Indian ventures globally15. Advantages Of The India’s Look East Policy Look east policy has helped India in strengthening its place in the global economy and gets a better deal in its interactions outside the region. America and European countries had entered into a lot of different mutual agreement which has further increased their reputation and bargaining power. India was in danger of isolation in the global economy. India was not getting its due importance. But due to its Look east policy India economy is getting integrated with the Asian economy, so India gets support from Asian countries which have increased India‘s importance at global level. East Asia’s Strengths India’s Strengths 1) Electronic equipment Computer Software 2) Heavy engineering Light engineering and pharmaceuticals 3) Product development and marketing Process development 4) Underutilized capacity in construction Huge potential demand
  • 14. Look east policy has helped India in strengthening its place in the global economy and gets a better deal in its interactions outside the region. America and European countries had entered into a lot of different mutual agreement which has further increased their reputation and bargaining power. India was in danger of isolation in the global economy. India was not getting its due importance. But due to its Look east policy India economy is getting integrated with the Asian economy, so India gets support from Asian countries which have increased India‘s importance at global level. Short Comings In The India’s Look East Policy India still remains outside the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum India has entered into a number of pacts, agreements and FTAs with nations of ASEAN but its record for implementation of such accords has been poor. The Indian industry has doubts about its own competitive efficiency or it does not want competition at home or it is scared of cheaper exports to India from these countries. India lags behind China and Japan in almost all spheres of Pan East Asian cooperation, East Asian observers reckon that India has so far appeared less proactive than China on some critical issues. Some analysts feel that India‘s Look East Policy lacks a strategic vision despite seeking defense cooperation with some ASEAN nations (Myanmar, Indonesia and Vietnam) and securing a role for joint patrolling in the Malacca Straits. India does not take an assertive role perhaps due to it limited military capability There are some domestic political compulsions which impinge on the desired reforms and the struggle the liberalization process is undergoing in the ―minds of our people‖. India has come under harsh criticism for the big negative items list and the delay of over six years in finalizing the ASEAN-India FTA. India should go ahead with proper implementation of the pacts, agreements and FTAs without bothering about the aforementioned factors. The Indian industry will ensure that India will always gain from these arrangements. The Look East policy did not find Japan on its radar and failed to improve India‘s economic ties with it. Trade with Japan actually declined dramatically dropping its share to one-third of its level of 7 per cent in 1993. One of the causes, of course, was the fact that the Japanese economy was stagnate during this period. But still it is difficult to explain the reason behind this dramatic drop. This was the biggest failure of Look east policy. Failure to involve Japan and a build economic relationship with it also resulted in closing the doors on Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI). But now the situation is getting better and trade with Japan is increasing. During 1993-2003, Japan‘s global FDI averaged at $ 50 billion a year, of which India received $ 220 million a year or less than one-fourth of 1 per cent! Even at the regional level, India received just 2 per cent of Japanese FDI. (China‘s share was 10 times higher at 22 per cent).
  • 15. Improving Border Infrastructure The lack of proper cross-border transit points and integrated transport networks has posed major challenges. To facilitate growth of border trade the Union Minister of Commerce has introduced an Export Development Fund (EDF) for the Northeast traders and entrepreneurs. There is no provision to track where and how these funds are utilized. International trade centres at the border points and connecting these points through the existing roads to state capitals is vital, as is coordination in banking operations, such as extending banking services and ATM booths, telecommunication network at the border points to improve trade activities. Maintaining and monitoring the functioning of the major border points such as Moreh, Tamu and Tiddim (in Manipur) and Champhai (in Mizoram) should be the priority. Till date only the 160 km Tamu-Kalaywa- Kalemyo Road connecting Moreh to Myanmar has been accomplished. This road will eventually become a part of the Asian Highway. However, the completion of this project has not been able to bring any economic development for the region, due to increase in informal trade. In addition, exploring and developing new points-Lungwa/Ledo, Pongru and Pokhungri in Nagaland and Nampong, Vijayanagar and Khimiyang in Arunachal Pradesh are needed. The Manipur Commerce and Industries Minister had proposed an alternative border point-Behiang in Manipur‘s Churachandpur district along the Indo-Myanmar border which needs consideration. The proposal to upgrade the Rih-Tidim and Rih-Falam road, which will operationalize the India-Myanmar border trading point at Rih-Zokhawthar in Mizoram along with the Moiwa-Chindwin-Thailand trilateral highway project, needs immediate attention16. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has embarked on a journey to the east to Japan, Malaysia and Vietnam from 24-30 October 2010. The Prime Minister‘s visit is to reiterate India‘s commitment to further strengthen multifaceted bilateral relations with Southeast Asian and East Asian countries. The first visit by Manmohan Singh to Malaysia as Prime Minister will be a landmark in reinforcing the rich cultural and historical links between India and Malaysia. This visit marked by talks on economic cooperation, integration in terms of infrastructure development, information technology, bio-technology, defence, railways, energy cooperation and greater-people-to-people linkages. This meeting will see the inauguration of the first meeting of the Malaysia-India CEO Forum and revival of the highway project between India and Malaysia that has been long delayed. India is also hoping to conclude the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) with Malaysia that has been in discussion since 2008 and which Kuala Lumpur appears to be delaying. It needs to be remembered that so far, out of the 10 ASEAN countries, only Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore have ratified the India-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement with India. Mr Singh visited Vietnam for the 8th India-ASEAN Summit and the 5th East Asia Summit held on 30 October 2010. Indian leaders will hold bilateral talks with ASEAN and EAS leaders on the sidelines of the summits. The India- ASEAN summit will have the India-ASEAN Plan of Action for 2010-15 as the big item on its agenda. Both India and ASEAN are keen to liberalize the trade in services and investments that will provide new
  • 16. opportunities for the expansion of trade between them. ASEAN under its connectivity scheme looks forward to implementing the Comprehensive Asian Development Plan that will provide a road linking India with ASEAN, creating the Mekong-India economic corridor. The East Asian Summit that will be held on the same day will deliberate on energy, environment, financial cooperation, education and plans for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership of East Asia (CEPEA) and the creation of the Economic Research Institute of ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA). The Indian Prime Minister is likely to also discuss bilateral ties with Vietnamese leaders. Both India and Vietnam approved setting up of a joint committee to strengthen their cooperation in the trade, investment and agricultural production sectors earlier this year. India has extended support to Vietnam to enhance and upgrade its capabilities in the defence sector and to help Vietnam to train forces for maintaining international peace and stability. Vietnam, on the other hand, will provide assistance in the repair and maintenance of Indian naval ships. Both the countries will share their experience and knowledge by developing linkages and cooperation among their defence institutions. All of these have implications for the South China Sea disputes and show that India is taking a greater interest in security matters in the region. While the most important drive for Singh‘s visit is economic cooperation, India also needs to address several other issues. One is the matter of the rights and status of the Indian diaspora settled in Southeast Asian countries. For instance, ethnic Indians in Malaysia suffer from various kinds of discrimination. Next, India should revive and deepen its regional engagement through the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation initiative and with other regional schemes such as BIMSTEC, as well as initiate more cooperation with the ADB, World Bank, and IMF that will help in providing assistance in facilitating trade and promoting development in the region. Meanwhile, ASEAN should extend its supportive hand to India‘s entry to Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and in the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM), a mechanism created in March 2010 to help manage future regional financial crises. At the same time, India should also continue to pursue bilateral FTAs with each ASEAN nation17. Conclusion Each ASEAN nation has its own characteristics – some are supportive of India, some are predominantly Muslim, some are economically more developed then India, some are underdeveloped and one is a close neighbor influencing the security of India. Hence India should tailor the bilateral relations with every country in different way to suit the requirements of that particular country and that of India. ASEAN and EAS hold great promise for India. Adequate interaction with these groupings will result in better integration with this region and facilitate India economic development. Indian businesses which are looking to go global will get huge markets in other countries. They will be able to export their goods and get a market share because of low tariffs due to the pacts, agreements and FTAs. Although foreign companies will also get this advantage but Indian companies will be able to compete with these because of their competitiveness. CMI and emerging FTAs / RTAs between Asian countries provide foundations for a broader and more ambitious initiative to take the existing India-ASEAN relationship to a higher level, like an Asian Economic Community, which
  • 17. constitutes ASEAN, China, Japan, Korea and India as member countries. Such a community would be roughly the size of the European Union in terms of income, and bigger than NAFTA in terms of trade. It would account for half the world‘s population and it would hold foreign exchange reserves exceeding those of the EU and NAFTA put together. This can give a greater push to Indian growth. Indian policy-makers should create such a scenario where India‘s arrival as a major power in the international system should not be seen as a liability but as an asset by the ASEAN countries. In recognizing India‘s stature in regional Asian and international politics, these countries should see a reflection of their rising opportunities for their own countries in an inclusive, healthy and peaceful Asian order. To make them realize their own success in the success of India would indeed be the litmus test for present and future Indian policy-makers. India‘s objectives in Look East Policy can be furthered through areas—education (human resources development), democracy and culture—where it has a comparative advantage over Asian countries. In this context the Nalanda project which envisages the setting up of an international university is noteworthy. India has a lead in Information Technology. Many South East Asians are not only interested in our IITs and IIMs but also want campuses opened in places like Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta. Tourism is an area where much can be done to reverse the trend of more Indians going to South East Asia (Singapore) for shopping. Places of Buddhist interest like, Bodh Gaya, Sarnath and Nalanda and places of Muslim interest like TajMahal, FatehpurSikri Ajmer, and Hyderabad have to be suitably promoted for establishing people to people contacts. At the strategic level, India‘s Look East policy envisages the ASEAN states and Japan as key partners in East Asia. Ties with South Korea are also strengthening. With India-US relations also expanding in scope and content, India can become a stabilizing and balancing force in this region. India‘s inclusion ab initio into the Group of Twenty Economies (G-20) has boosted its image in this region. Six of the 20 (Australia, China, Japan, India, Indonesia and South Korea) are from East Asia. The crux is that this Look East policy should reinforce and demonstrate India‘s commitment to this region which accounts for about one-third of India‘s trade. It should also be made clear that this commitment will not be influenced in any way by the improving relations between India and the US and EU. The dialogue process with ASEAN is meant to complement and augment India‘s bilateral relations with the Southeast Asian neighbours. There is much more that can be achieved. It is up to India and ASEAN to seize the initiative. The potential is huge and as they say, the sky is the limit. However, at the political level, India intends to gain more support for its candidature for permanent membership of the UN Security Council and to create a framework to mark 20 years of ASEAN-India Dialogue during the India-ASEAN Commemorative Summit in 2012 in New Delhi. Besides building defence cooperation, the LEP has also helped India to get its own security needs better understood in the region. May 1998, when Pokharan-II (the test explosions of five nuclear devices) took place, the Western members of the ARF as well as Japan and Australia expressed strong reservations and disapproval, and imposed sanctions on India. These reservations have since melted away and both Japan and
  • 18. Australia are trying their best to make for the lost time and opportunities in India. The ASEAN countries showed considerable understanding, at least informally through bilateral diplomatic channels, of India‘s security predicament. A number of ASEAN members are willing to support India‟ s permanent membership of the UN Security Council (UNSC). Understanding has also been shown to India‟ s position during the Kargil conflict and the persisting challenge of cross-border terrorism to India‟ s stability and political harmony. Thanks to the 9/11 events, today India‟ s concern with regard to cross-border terrorism is also better understood and appreciated among its eastern neighbours. The security significance of this region has been further reinforced in the context of 9/11 events and the global war on terrorism, as India is also one of the most seriously affected victims of this menace. Reports about Al-Qaeda and Jihadi forces having links in the whole of Southeast Asia surface frequently. With the Islamic rebellions of differing intensity raging in various countries of the region like Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Myanmar, the threat of global jihad linking up with regional extremists will continue to loom large on the region. As there are no basic conflicts in the bilateral relations between India and ASEAN Nations and given their shared perceptions of the regional strategic environment defence collaboration offers new opportunities for Both India and ASEAN Nations to further strengthen their relations in the 21st century. Now that India has become a summit partner of ASEAN, it provides an opportunity for the top leadership to visit Southeast Asia every year for exchange of views with counterparts. The three distinct features of the Look East policy are: one, India has managed to develop a multi-faceted relationship; two, successful defence diplomacy has been put in place; and three India is not averse to participate in regional multilateralism, security or economic. India‘s connectivity diplomacy in the Southeast Asian region is also Breflective of its invigorating ‗Look East‘ policy. Linking itself to far-flung places in Southeast Asia will not only help integrate India into the region, but also offer it decisive economic and strategic advantages. However, New Delhi needs to speed up its efforts, otherwise its sluggish approach will fail to deliver long- term results. However, Indian policy makers have used this ―opening-up‖ to strengthen ties with the military regimes in Bangladesh and Myanmar and launch counter insurgency movements against the groups from North Eastern India. More than the development of backward north eastern states and ending their isolation through re-establishing their historical cultural and economic ties, the military and security establishment has high-jacked the policy to fight insurgents from the region. Author: Asif Ahmed, is Assistant Professor. Defence& Strategic Studies. Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra. (Haryana) India asifahmed081@gmail.com References 1. India-ASEAN Future: Crucial For ASIA Growth, By Monish Tourangbam, Research Scholar, School of
  • 19. International Studies (JNU) accessed electronically at http://www.sarkaritel.com/news_and_features/infa/march2011/14india_asean_future.htm 2. Indo-ASEAN Relations on the Upswing. http://www.merinews.com/article/indo-asean-relations-on-the- upswing/127680.shtml 3. Reinforcing ‗Look East‘ Policy {An article by Minister of State for External Affairs Mr.E.Ahamed}, The MEA website, accessed electronically at http://www.meaindia.nic.in/interview/2006/01/17in01.htm 4. India‘s Look East Policy: Prospects and Challenges for Northeast India-3, accessed electronically at http://haokip.bandamp.com/blog/17831.html 5. Julien Levesque, NorthEast in India‘s Look East Policy, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, May 6, 2008, accessed electronically at http://www.ipcs.org/article_details.php?articleNo=2558$cID=9 6. Ibid.1 7. S. D. Muni and C. Raja Mohan, ‗Emerging Asia; India‘s Options‘, International Studies, Volume 31 Number 4, Sage Publications, 2004, pp 319-321. 8. KripaSridharan ― The ASEAN Region in India‘s ‗Look East‘ Policy‖ in India and ASEAN; Foreign Policy Dimensions For the 21st Century, K. Raja Reddy (ed.), New Centuries Publications 2005, Part I, Chapter 7, p 130. 9. A.N Ram, ‗India‘s Foreign Policy in the Asia-Pacific: Contemporary Issues, Area Studies: A Journal of International Studies and Analyses, Volume 1, Number 1, January 2001, p.23. 10. Looking East: India and Southeast Asia, G. V. C. Naidu ,Research Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, India. Revised version of the paper presented at the Institute of International Relations (IIR)- Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) Second Roundtable Conference, October 27-28, 2004, Taipei, Taiwan. 11. accessed electronically at http://exim.indiamart.com/free-trade-agreement/asean-india.html 12. ASEAN-INDIA DIALOGUE RELATIONS. As of March 2011, Accesed from the official website of ASEAN at http://www.asean.org/5738.html 13. accessed electronically at http://exim.indiamart.com/free-trade-agreement/asean-india.html 14. India‘s Look East Policy - A Review, By C. S. Kuppuswamy Paper no. 3662. http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers37/paper3662.html 15. The South China Sea Disputes: Why conflict is not Inevitable. Rukmani Gupta, IDSA COMMENT. October 17, 2011, http://idsa.in/idsacomments/TheSouthChinaSeaDisputesWhyConflictisnotInevitable_rgupta_171011 16. Linking India‘s NorthEastwithSouthEast Asia: Significance of Internal Connectivity & Backward Integration. PanchaliSaikia http://www.ipcs.org/issue-brief/india/linking-indias-northeast-with-southeast-asia- significance-of-internal-connectivity-175.html IB175-SEARP-Panchali.pdf 17. Manmohan Singh In SouthEast Asia. PanchaliSaikia, Research Officer, IPCS SouthEast Asia – Articles #3267, 27 October 2010. http://www.ipcs.org/article/southeast-asia/manmohan-singh-in-southeast-asia- 3267.html
  • 20. 16 About the author: Asif Ahmed Asif Ahmed is Assistant Professor at the University of Kurukshetra, teaching defense and strategic studies. He holds an MA in Defence& Strategic Studies (Punjabi University) with couple of other post graduate degrees in Mass Communications and Journalism. Professor Asif Ahmed has published one book on national security of India and authored articles in English, Punjabi, and Hindi languages in various newspapers, magazines journals, and has also edited chapters in books at the national and international levels. For some time he also participated in Live Radio Talks and Phone in counseling programs at the AIR Patiala station in India. Professor Ahmed's areas of interests are National Security of India, Distance Education, Human Rights Education, and Environment Education. He may be reached at asifahmed081@gmail.com. and blogs at asifahmed081.blogspot.in AsifAhmedJuly 9, 2012Analysis2 Comments Nepal: Applying An Integrated Approach To The Struggle Against Poverty – OpEdFederer Back On Top Of The World With Wimbledon Win http://www.eurasiareview.com/09072012-india-asean-relations-in-21st-century-strategic-implications- for-india-analysis/ SAARC AND INDIA’S SECURITY INTERESTS Guest Column-by Col R Hariharan (retd.) India pulled out of the Dhaka SAARC summit citing reasons of security considerations. This is the fifth time India had done so in the brief history of the seven-nation alliance. The take over of power by the King in Nepal and the security situation in Bangladesh have understandably discouraged the Indian prime minister from participating in the SAARC summit. The Indian Prime Minister was fully justified in his decision because the nation cannot afford to take a chance of visiting Dhaka particularly when intelligence agencies indicated the possibility of a terrorist attack on him there during the summit. Dhaka’s law enforcing agencies’ poor record of responding to terrorist threats in the past and the continued failure to protect senior political leaders from bomb attacks there have further increased the gravity of such warnings. The event was a big one for Bangladesh and Begum Khaleda who had been trying to refurbish the country’s image, which had been tarnished by jihadi violence and lawlessness. However, the way Delhi conveyed its decision did not appear to take Bangladesh’s sensitivity to the issue. This is symptomatic of the way India handles its neighbours at times and trample upon their sensitivity. This was more so whenIndia’s Foreign Secretary Mr. Shyam Saran touched upon SAARC in his speech on "India and its Neighbours" at a meeting organized by the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, at New Delhi and indicated that there was more to it than Nepal situation or Bangladesh security situation.
  • 21. While Mr Saran’s pronouncement might not be an official statement of policy, due to the choice of venue and the mode, it gave an inkling into the official foreign policy perceptions. Pointedly referring to India's decision not to attend the SAARC summit in Dhaka, Mr. Saran explained, "Our approach to SAARC was the only one logically sustainable - we set aside our differing political and security perceptions for the time being, and focus attention on economic cooperation. Our expectation was that the very dynamic of establishing cross-border economic linkages, drawing upon the complementarities that existed among different parts of our region, would eventually help us overcome the mutual distrust and suspicion which prevents us from evolving a shared security perception." But the record of SAARC founded in 1985, he said, has been "hardly inspiring". "The fact is that SAARC is still largely a consultative body, which has shied away from undertaking even a single collaborative project in its 20 years of existence." From the above pronouncements it would appear that in official thinking in future SAARC might be considered as a forum less relevant to India. A strong section of foreign policy think tanks have also highlighted the growing irrelevance of SAARC to India as it is poised to grow as a strong global economic player. There are very good reasons to draw such a conclusion. The growing India-ASEAN economic linkages, the improved bilateral India-Myanmar and India-Thai relations as a result of India’s look east policy, and the continued stagnation in India’s relations with both Pakistan and Bangladesh are some of these. India’s problems in handling Bangladesh’s fixation with Indian ‘hegemony’ and Pakistan’s five decade old Kashmir preoccupation and its undisguised sponsorship of anti-Indian terrorism for a long time have strengthened the growing doubts about the future of SAARC as a viable entity that means business. This raises a number of questions on the relevance of SAARC to the countries of the region and in particular to India. All arguments both in favour and against the viability of SAARC published in the media appear to have ignored the question of national security. Almost all successful associations of nations - ASEAN, European Union, and now Organisation of African States – became effective only when they had security as the first consideration, because nations respond to economic links only when they feel secure with each other. A good example is the growth of EU from its early beginnings when Germany and France decided to forget their historic rivalry and felt comfortable with each other. Significantly, at the same time the Benelux alliance of Britain, Netherlands and Luxemborg failed to take off when only an economic agenda was there. Even ASEAN came into being initially thanks to the nudging of the U.S. for countering the strategic threat of China to the trading routes of the West. So if India has only economic aspects in mind as relevant to the SAARC, it is sure to limp along. Then SAARC may well be dissolved because it is India’s attitudes that matter to SAARC’s survival. India not only dwarfs all the other member countries, but it is the only country that shares a border with all other SAARC countries. SAARC countries have a direct bearing on our national security. We have to view this in the context of the concept of strategic security moving away from mere territorial integrity. In the unipolar world with the U.S. flexing its muscles too often, union of nations has become an important concept in the balance
  • 22. of power equation. ASEAN and EU are two very good examples of the benefit of such collective wisdom and action. In this sub continent, there are three aspects of strategic security very relevant to India. These three – territorial security and integrity, economic security, and energy security – are core considerations if we dream of India as a major global power in 2020. In all these three aspects, a strong and vibrant SAARC can make a true value addition. If we consider territorial integrity in the classical sense, all the countries of SAARC may be viewed as providing depth to India’s strategic defence. So even if considered purely on the basis of national security the member nations could be valuable vanguards of security or dangerous launch pads for offensive. Any collective body, which aims at better relations among these countries, would automatically strengthen their sense of security in their relations with India, the lynchpin of the collective body. So we should view SAARC as a tool for furthering our strategic security in the long term. In this paper, it is proposed to examine India – Bangladesh relations in this context. Both Pakistan and Bangladesh have historical reasons rooted in the creation of Pakistan for their fear and suspicion of a strong India threatening their very existence, due to their perceived threat from India to their religious, cultural, social exclusivity and national identity. Can our relations with these countries be ever turned around from latent hostility even in peaceful times, to one of understanding, so that all the smaller members of SAARC share the prosperity ushered in by bigger countries – India and Pakistan? Conceptually, this might appear far-fetched if viewed in the current context. But history is full of examples where diehard enemies became close allies after a few decades of hostility like Germany and France, and USA and Japan. Closer home Sri Lanka - India relations, which were very strained a few years back, are not only on the mend but are blooming into a new era of economic growth benefiting both. From the points of view of our territorial integrity and security as well as economic and energy security, Bangladesh is a very important power on our eastern border. Geographically it dominates our lines of communication with the northeast, a valuable source of oil and other commodity resources for the rest of India. The Machiavellian minds that delineated the territories into India and Pakistan at the time of Partition, ensured that northeast is connected to the rest of India by a narrow corridor, hemmed in by three nations. Of these Bangladesh on the south is the biggest. In military terms, the entire corridor is within artillery range from any of the three countries, notably from the northwestern salient of Bangladesh. The entire southern border of most of the northeastern region has Bangladesh on the southern border. This part of the border is easy to cross and any meaningful border control requires the cooperation of the two countries. Bangladesh also suffers from this vulnerability with India dominating its entire land border on all sides except for 197 km in remote southeast corner bordering Myanmar. So both India and Bangladesh will always have over riding territorial security considerations in their relationship. This by itself becomes a major imperative for building friendly and equitable relations between the two countries. And it is not the responsibility of only one country. To hasten the freedom for the country, our founding fathers had accepted the partition of India and the creation of the two wings of Pakistan. The idea of Pakistan was mooted originally in the erstwhile East
  • 23. Pakistan, the present day Bangladesh. Bangladeshis have a strong sense of Bangla nationality in addition to the unity of identity that is part of the very concept of Islam. It had been a part of Pakistan for over two decades, where schoolbooks have been doctored to show India and Hindus as historical enemies of Pakistan and Muslims. Entire generations have been fed on these fictions. So there is a historical element still surviving there which continues to perceive India’s relations with Bangladesh only in terms of Hindu-Muslim equation, despite India having more Muslims as citizens, living in amity with other religionists, than these two countries. Bangladesh as a new nation has a greater sense of insecurity further kindled by external agencies as well as radical Islamic elements. In India also we have sections of population, which view relations between these two breakaway products of partition, in terms of Hindu- Muslim antagonism, which aggravates the sense of insecurity. Some of the projects that are contemplated as part of our ‘look east’ policy like India-Bangladesh- Myanmar pipeline, the India-Myanmar-Thailand road link project and India’s river transit through Bangladesh have strong energy and economic security contents. The internal insurgency movements in northeast have economic backwardness as a major cause. All these projects are essential for the development of northeast as they open the eastern gateway to the whole ASEAN region. Many of these projects require Bangladesh’s participation or involvement. And these projects can be inclusive of Bangladesh and immensely benefit it as well. Unfortunately, narrow considerations have clouded Bangladesh’s perceptions on this. While mere bilateralism can clear the air and improve relations, invariably on a quid pro quo, it does not share a broader vision of the region as a sphere of shared perspectives on strategic security and mutual prosperity. This is where an organization like SAARC becomes more meaningful if it is sensitive to national security. Then only it can grow from an economic agenda into a much larger entity with regional security as a consideration as ASEAN has done. If India expects to be liked by neighbours at all times on all issues it may never happen. But as in any mature relationship, there is a need for mutual space between the nations. To create this space India has to demonstrate both its sensitivity to its national security as well as its readiness to respond to the sensitivities of hypersensitive countries like Bangladesh. How we do it will determine the future of the relations between the two countries. From this point of view Mr. Saran’s depth finding exercise in plain speak on our relations with neighbours is welcome. It clears the air to explain our sensitivity. But we need to demonstrate what we say on two aspects. These are - We are sensitive to our security consideration without impinging upon the national sovereignty of our neighbours. And the neighbours can prosper along with India and have a share in India’s economic pie. Our record of translating the platitudes and clichés that crowd our policy statements to meaningful action is dismal. We have as a nation for decades neglected responding to the security and economic needs of the country, which are closely connected with our relations with neighbours. Our response to crises had been only knee-jerk at best. A sensitive and festering issue affecting the existence of national identity like illegal migration in the northeast, had been used as a part of the political power game. It has
  • 24. been handled in a slap dash fashion in fits and starts. Naxalite terrorism, which is affecting 152 districts in 12 states, is still treated as a law and order issue within the responsibility of the state government. This is one reason for the poor credibility India enjoys. In foreign policy pronouncements the need for correlation between words and action is even more important. If we can do that, SAARC will become a productive association of nations. If we cannot do so, we can concentrate only on bilateralism and forget about SAARC as a viable entity. So much would depend upon how we translate words into meaningful actions and results. Mr. Saran has said, "In a word, we are prepared to make our neighbours full stakeholders in India's economic destiny and, through such cooperation, in creating a truly vibrant and globally competitive South Asian Economic Community." So Delhi has a challenge as to convince our neighbours that "India is an opportunity, not a threat, that far from being besieged by India, they have a vast, productive hinterland that would give their economies far greater opportunities for growth than if they were to rely on their domestic markets alone". Can we do it? At least we should make a concerted effort to do so. SUBMISSIONS » STAFF » ARCHIVES » ABOUT » LINKS » « back to table of contents SAARC Ineffective in Promoting Economic Cooperation in South Asia BY RAGHAV THAPAR Since its creation in December 1985, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has sought to increase economic unity between India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. While the organization was designed to improve both the economic and social progress of its member states, most scholars have focused on SAARC’s ability to promote economic cooperation among its members.1 South Asian scholars have attempted to compare SAARC efforts to increase economic cooperation with those of other regional trading bodies such as the European Union and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Unlike the EU or ASEAN, however, trade between the seven SAARC states has remained limited despite the fact that all are located within a close proximity of one another and all are part of the World Trade Organization (WTO). A growing emphasis on attracting foreign investment and seeking access to new markets in SAARC states indicates that economic progress is central to the future of South Asia. SAARC, however, is likely to play only a limited role in that future because of India’s considerable position of power over the other SAARC states. This imbalance of power within SAARC allows conflicts between India and its neighbors to undermine organizational unity. Clashes between South Asian countries end up
  • 25. jeopardizing the creation and effectiveness of regional trade agreements. They also lead individual SAARC countries to advance their economic interests through bi-lateral agreements, reducing the incentive to engage in multi-laterally. In the future, it seems likely that SAARC will act more as a forum to encourage regional discussion through conferences and seminars than as an architect for economic policy in South Asia. This paper will first analyze the growing importance of trade relations among South Asian states. It then discusses SAARC’s historical problems with cooperation and how bi-lateral deals between member states have undermined the organization as a whole. Finally, it examines SAARC’s role as a mediating agency and forum for discussion among South Asian leaders. Newfound Focus on Economic Growth in South Asia Over the last thirteen years, the Indian government has increased its focus on economic development. Since 1991, when a debt crisis forced it to undertake a serious program of market oriented economic reform, India has gradually opened up its economy to the world. Over the time India has moved from a closed economy with heavy central planning to a more privatized economy with lower tariffs. This reform resulted in a seven percent growth rate for the economy from 1994- 1997.2 Foreign investment in India also increased from $68 million in 1991 to $5 billion from 1996-97.3 To sustain this growth, New Delhi has sought access to new markets and an increase in foreign investment. India’s foreign policy has reflected the importance of these economic goals. India is increasing border trade with China and is seeking to establish trade relations with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).4 New Delhi has placed a serious emphasis on turning India into an economic power. India is expected to become the world’s 4 th largest economy (in terms of purchasing power parity).5 It is unlikely that this emphasis on economic development will diminish in the near future. The movement to market economics in 1991 brought “irreversible” changes in India’s economic thinking—changes that will force India to constantly remain active in the global economy.6 The majority of Indian leaders, irrespective of their political parties, believe that globalization and privatization are necessary for India to reduce its mass poverty.7 This has resulted in the gradual reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers over the past decade and a half. However, India is not the only state in South Asia seeking to expand its presence in new markets. Other SAARC states are also seeking to enhance their trade relations across the globe. India’s chief political rival, Pakistan, is openly seeking new markets and increased aid from countries in the European Union (EU) and Japan.8 It has also struggled to expand trade into Central Asia because of stiff competition from Japan, the EU and Russia. Nepal and Sri Lanka, both reliant on the Indian economy as a supplier and market for goods, would like to increase intra regional trade and foreign investment in its developing industries. Similarly, Bangladesh is also looking for new markets to export goods.9Since a desire to expand trade in South Asia exists among the majority of SAARC nations, one would assume that SAARC would receive more attention from South Asian states. Cooperation Troubles SAARC is structured in a way that often makes regional cooperation difficult. Thomas Thornton argues that in regional organizations it is difficult for “countries to establish balanced relations when one has a significant advantage in power over the other states.”10 In the case of SAARC, India is the most powerful country in terms of its economic might, military power and international influence. Thus, India’s potential as a regional hegemon gives SAARC a unique dynamic compared to an organization such as ASEAN.11 Pakistan was initially reluctant to join SAARC due to fears of SAARC succumbing to Indian
  • 26. hegemony. Indeed, if India does take a prominent role in SAARC, it could further fears that India will use SAARC for hegemonic purposes.12While the smaller states in South Asia recognize that they will need India’s help to facilitate faster economic growth, they are reluctant to work with India, fearing that such cooperation will admit Indian dominance in SAARC.13 Aside from a few overtures to its neighbors, India has done little to allay the fears of other South Asian states. The core of these fears is likely derived from the displays of India’s power by New Delhi in the past. Realizing its considerable advantage in military and economic power, India has consistently acted in an “arrogant and uncompromising” manner with its neighbors.14 Bangladesh is afraid of India exploiting its geographical position to redirect water flows vital to Bangladeshi agricultural production. Nepal and Bhutan are still worried about India’s control over their world trade and transit links as their geographical position will always make them dependent on India.15 These disputes between India and its neighbors have directly affected SAARC. Namely, disputes between South Asian states have undermined SAARC efforts to promote regional trade. These disagreements make consensus building and cooperation among SAARC states complicated. Attempting to promote regional cooperation while doing little to resolve regional conflicts makes SAARC’s mission looks nearly impossible.16Moreover, SAARC has no institutional mechanisms or punishments capable of preventing or fully resolving a dispute. Two examples illustrate how conflicts in South Asia have proven detrimental to SAARC. The first involves Indian intervention in Sri Lanka from 1986-1990. The Indian military intervention to put down an insurgency by The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam made Indo-Sri Lankan relations tense during these four years. Subsequently, the apprehension between India and Sri Lanka was considered a primary reason behind Sri Lanka’s “lukewarm” support for SAARC into economic and social spheres of its member states until relations improved with India.17 A second, more prominent example of a conflict derailing SAARC progress is the Indo-Pakistani conflict. Pakistan has demanded a resolution to its dispute with India over the Kashmir Valley before discussing trade relations with New Delhi. Pakistan has enforced this policy by violating WTO regulation for failing to confer Most Favored Nation (MFN) status on India. India has recently attempted to improve its relationship with the rest of South Asia. Under the Gujral Doctrine established by former Indian Prime Minister I.K Gujral, India signed a 30-year water sharing treaty with Bangladesh and a trade and transit treaty with Nepal. India also joined a sub regional group within SAARC comprising of Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and India.18 Despite political impediments to trade, value of goods smuggled from India to Pakistan via a third party generally totals 250-500 million per year. 19 If trade between the states was opened, Pakistan would receive cheaper imports due to lower transport costs and the absence of payments to a middleman. This implies that there is potential for lucrative trade between India and Pakistan. Moreover, if these two states, arguably the largest powers in SAARC, pushed for economic cooperation, it is likely that other states will follow their lead. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir is considered a primary cause of SAARC’s impotence.20 Due to these conflicts, the desire for South Asian states to trade with one another has been limited. By squelching trade between South Asian states, the disagreements between India and its neighbors have limited the effectiveness of SAARC
  • 27. trading initiatives. The South Asian Preferential Trading Agreement (SAPTA) signed in December 1995 had SAARC countries reduce tariffs in certain economic areas to promote intra regional trade. The proposal was initially met with enthusiasm as India agreed to reduce tariffs in 106 of the 226 fields recommended by SAARC and Pakistan agreed to concessions in 35 fields. This statistic emphasizes a trend in SAARC— India seems gung ho about intra regional cooperation. In 1995, when SAPTA was being implemented, only 3 percent of all South Asian trade was conducted in the region.21 Six years later, the improvements seen in regional trade have been marginal. India’s trade within South Asia accounts for only 4 percent of its total global trade and Pakistan’s trade in the region accounts for merely 3 percent of its overall trade.22 Compared to other countries with similar proximities and income levels, intra regional trade among SAARC states is relatively small.23 Much of the trade that is conducted in South Asia is also considered symbolic and generally does not involve goods vital to the economies of the South Asian states.24 Moreover, some states still have high tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, indicating that the spirit of free trade does not seem alive in SAARC.25 However, SAARC is trying to remedy this problem. SAARC hopes that the establishment of a South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) by January 1, 2006 will stimulate trade in the region. However, the agreement to establish this free trade zone will take 10 years of gradual tariff reduction.26 For a proposal that has already been delayed, it will take some genuine political cooperation for the tariff reduction process to run smoothly.27 Judging from the experience of ASEAN, an organization with a better track record in producing economic coordination among member states than SAARC, creating a free trade zone could become difficult. The ASEAN free trade agreement (AFTA) has been criticized for not producing substantial economic interdependence among the region. This lack of success results from distrust and protectionism among its member states.28 If SAFTA is implemented, its success will depend on the resolution of conflicts between South Asian states—something which seems unlikely in the future. A Bi-lateral Alternative To counter SAARC’s ineffectiveness, individual states have used bi-lateral agreements to advance their economic interests. Due to their conflicts, it is not surprising that trade between India and Pakistan has only occurred through the smuggling of goods by a third party, usually Dubai. However, Pakistan and Bangladesh maintained relatively lucrative trade relations with one another in the 1980’s. Approximately 60 percent of Bangladesh’s exports during this decade went to Pakistan.29Bangladesh also saw an upswing in bi-lateral trade with India during the 1990’s. While the trade between India and Bangladesh was characterized by a significant trade gap, over $1 billion in goods a year went back and forth between these states. India also signed an agreement with Nepal in December of 1996 that allowed Nepal duty free access to the Indian market.30 Moreover, on April 1, 1995, India reduced customs on goods imported from Sri Lanka. Therefore, bi- lateral, not multi-lateral, agreements have facilitated much of the trade that does occur in South Asia. The existence of these bi-lateral agreements is significant for three reasons. First, the increase of bi-lateral agreements in South Asia shows that states are not dependent on SAARC to achieve their economic objectives. Therefore, SAARC’s importance in the future will likely diminish in the eyes of its member states. Second, a focus on bi-lateral negotiations shifts attention away from the region and onto individual countries. In the future, states are more likely pursue bi-lateral agreements where they have to negotiate with only one country instead seeking multi-lateral deals, where they have to negotiate with seven countries. Therefore, states will lack an incentive to pursue their economic interests through SAARC. Third, the growth in bi-lateral trade agreements between South Asian states highlights the priority states are giving to their own self-interests at the expense regional economic cooperation. Thus, it seems as if economic regional cooperation is not
  • 28. a high priority for SAARC member states. So, if SAARC has not met the economic needs of its states, does it have a role in the future of South Asia? Another Role for SAARC SAARC does face some serious problems but could still play a useful role in South Asia. It is important to point out that SAARC does face some serious obstacles to success. The organization is facing a serious resource crunch and the SAARC countries have shown little willingness to increase their contributions to the association. Moreover, SAARC must battle the public perception it is more a figurehead of South Asian unity than an actual facilitator of regional cooperation. SAARC has been criticized by the public for only reaching agreements on the lowest level of cooperation among states instead of pushing for cooperation that would actually benefit South Asia. The SAARC conventions on drug trafficking and terrorism have also been criticized for not producing substantial results. Most of SAARC’s noteworthy achievements have only been found “on paper.”31 Thus, it does not become surprising when the British based Economist magazine ponders whether SAARC should be put “out of its misery.”32 Despite these obstacles, SAARC can still play an important communicative role in South Asia. It can serve as a forum for South Asian leaders to discuss security concerns in South Asia on a regular basis and as an outlet for South Asian countries to communicate with other regional economic blocks. While SAARC cannot force its member states to trade with one another, it does make them interact. It provides a neutral forum for leaders to talk and sets a consistent time frame for these meetings to occur. It does not force them to sign any agreements or commit to policies; it allows them simply to discuss matters of regional security. Given the poor communication between South Asian leaders, this is not an insignificant role. SAARC has already shown in the past that it is useful in promoting dialogue among South Asian leaders. Informal talks between Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers at the second SAARC summit in 1986 led to the diffusion of tension between the two countries on the issue of India’s Brasstacks exercise.33 In January 2004, conciliatory talks between India and Pakistan were sparked by an upcoming SAARC conference.34 A breakthrough between Indian and Pakistani diplomats actually occurred at the conference.35 While the dialogue has yet to produce tangible results, the experiences indicate that SAARC can help promote political cooperation and serve as a forum for communication among South Asian leaders. Since political conflicts are a primary cause of SAARC’s inability to foster cooperation among its members, serving as a forum to alleviate those problems could in turn aid efforts to improve economic integration in the future. Conclusion In essence, the growing movement of emphasis on economic development in foreign policy is changing the priorities of South Asian states. South Asian countries are emphasizing the importance of access to open markets and increasing foreign investment in their businesses. It seems likely then that economic growth and development will be central to the future of the South Asian state. However, whether growth and development occurs because of economic cooperation in the region is another question. Currently, trade between South Asian states remains relatively low when compared to other regional blocks. Moreover, political and economic ties between states rest on shaky foundations. Divisions among South Asian countries have made regional cooperation difficult and have lead states to pursue their economic goals bi-laterally. SAARC is still a valuable forum for political dialogue in South Asia, but its economic role in the region has been mitigated by conflict
  • 29. and tension among its member states. Until these conflicts are resolved to the point where South Asian states are willing to reduce barriers to trade, it seems as if the vision of an economic interdependent South Asia is more of a dream than reality. Author byline--- ENDNOTES 1 SAARC homepage http://www.saarc-sec.org/main.php. SAARC has expanded its role to address significant issues impacting South Asia such as Agriculture, Biotech, Communication and Media, Energy, Environment, Human Resources, Poverty, Legal problems and Tourism. 2 Bhabani Gupta, “ India in the Twenty-First Century”, International Affairs vol 73, no2, (April 1997) p. 297 3 Ibid p. 302 4 “Every man for himself,” The Economist. Oct. 31, 2002 p. 14 5 Gupta, “ India”, p. 205 6 Howard Schaffer and Teresita Schaffer, “Better Neighbours? India and South Asian Regional Politics”, SAIS Review, (Winter – Spring 1998) p. 120 7 Gupta p. 314 8 J N Dixit, External Affairs: Cross-Border Relations, ( New Delhi: Roli Books, 2003). p. 38 9 Kishore Dash, “The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation in South Asia”, Pacific Affairs vol 69, no 2 (Summer 1996) p. 196 10 , Thomas P Thornton, “Regional Organizations in Conflict Management”, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science Vol 518, (Nov 1991), p. 135 11 Ibid p. 136. The countries of ASEAN are all relatively evenly matched in their geographic size, economic strength and military power. While there are disparities among ASEAN states in some of these areas, they are not nearly as drastic as those between India and other South Asian states. 12 Dash, “The Political Economy”, p. 192 13 Ananya Mukherjee Reed, “Regionalization in South Asia: Theory and Praxis”, Pacific Affairs, vol 70, no 2, (summer 1997) p. 246 14 Schaffer and Schaffer, “Better Neighbours”, p. 111 15 Schaffer and Schaffer, “Better Neighbours”, p. 111
  • 30. 16 Reed, “Regionalization”, p. 244 17 Dash, “Political Economy”, p. 201 18 Gupta, “ India”, p. 310 19 SankarGhosh and SomenMukherji, Emerging South Asian Order: Hopes and Concerns, (Calcutta: Media South Asia, 1995), p. 197 20 “The Unmagnificent Seven,” The Economist Online, <http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=954547 > ( Jan. 24, 2002). 21 , Ghosh and Mukherji, “Emerging South Asian Order”, p. 147 22 “The Unmagnificent Seven.” 23 Panagariya, Arvind, “ South Asia: Does Preferential Trade Liberalization make sense?” http://www.columbia.edu/~ap2231/Policy%20Papers/Saarc-wb.pdf 24 “The Unmagnificent Seven” 25 Dash, “Political Economy”, p. 204 26 SAARC website, <http://www.saarc-sec.org/main.php?t=2.1.6> 27 According to Schaffer and Schaffer, SAFTA was supposed to come into existence in 2001. The Economist article, “The Unmagnificent Seven” also pointed out that the implementation of SAFTA has been rapidly delayed. 28 “More Effort Needed,” The Economist Online, http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=2968833> ( July 29, 2004), p. 25 29 Dash, “Political Economy”, p. 196 30 Dixit, “External Affairs”, p. 111 31 Dash, “Political Economy”, p. 188 32 “The Unmagnificent Seven” 33 Dash, “Political Economy”, p. 189 34 “Back to jaw-jaw,” The Economist Online, < http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=2335771> ( Jan 8, 2004)
  • 31. 35 “Giving peace a chance,” The Economist Online <http://economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=2423053> ( Feb. 15, 2004) Copyright © 2006, Stanford Journal of International Relations Department of International Relations, Stanford University Last updated: 5/24/06, by Hammad Ahmed and Patrick Callier.