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VoIP:
                             Attacks & Countermeasures
                             in the Corporate World




1 © Sense of Security 2007       www.senseofsecurity.com   AusCERT - May 2007
VoIP Security

                             Agenda

• Introduction
• Typical VoIP Network Architecture
• Anatomy of VoIP Attacks
• Demo of a few VoIP Attacks
• Countermeasures




2 © Sense of Security 2007   www.senseofsecurity.com          AusCERT - May 2007
VoIP Security

                             Introduction

• Historically trends and advances in IT outpace security
  requirements. e.g. 802.11 Wireless. VoIP is the same.
• Tools are becoming more readily available.
• Many of the threats against VoIP are the same threats
  inherited from the data networking world.
     e.g. eavesdropping, mitm, replay etc.




3 © Sense of Security 2007      www.senseofsecurity.com          AusCERT - May 2007
VoIP Security

                               Key Threats

• Denial of Service
     – attacks against availability
• Eavesdropping
     - unauthorised interception of voice packets
• Impersonation
     – masquerading as a handset or a piece of VoIP infrastructure




4 © Sense of Security 2007            www.senseofsecurity.com          AusCERT - May 2007
VoIP Security

                             Disclaimer

    The techniques demonstrated are not vendor specific.
    Our attacks are against an “out of the box” or “default”
    implementation of VoIP.
    We are not responsible for what you do with the tools and
    techniques demonstrated!




5 © Sense of Security 2007    www.senseofsecurity.com          AusCERT - May 2007
VoIP Security

                             Typical Cisco VoIP Implementation
                                                                                                                      CISCO IP PHONE
                                                                                                                          7941SERIES




                                                                                                  1      2      3
                                                                                                        ABC     DEF
                                                                                                                                       ?
                                                                                                  4      5      6
                                                                                                 GHI    JKL    MNO

                                                                                                                                 -         +
                                                                                                  7      8      9
                                                                                                 PQRS   TUV    WXYZ


                                                                                                         0      #
                                                                                                  *     OPER




                                                                                       IP Phone #1
                                                                                       x 1000
                                                                                                                                                          IP Phone #2
                                                                                                                                                          x 2000



                                           1   3   5   7   9    11      13   15   17   19   21                 23                                      CATALYST 3550
                                                                                                                                               1              2
                                 SYSTEM
                                    RPS

                                   STAT
                                    UTIL
                                DUPLEX
                                SPEED      2   4   6   8   10   12      14   16   18   20   22                 24




                                                                                                                                                   Cisco Call Manager
                                                                                       IP Phone #3                                                        v4.X
                                                                                       x 3000

                                                Data                   Voice
                                               VLAN 2                 VLAN 6

6 © Sense of Security 2007                                           www.senseofsecurity.com                                                                             AusCERT - May 2007
VoIP Security

                    Anatomy of Attack – Impersonation

• Step 1: Determine MAC address of handset
• Step 2: Change MAC address on PC
• Step 3: Use Softphone to make a call as that extension




7 © Sense of Security 2007        www.senseofsecurity.com          AusCERT - May 2007
VoIP Security

                    Anatomy of Attack - Eavesdropping

• Step 1: Gather initial information
• Step 2: Get access to voice VLAN
• Step 3: Locate phone targets
• Step 4: Execute ARP poisoning attack and record voice call




8 © Sense of Security 2007        www.senseofsecurity.com          AusCERT - May 2007
VoIP Security

                             Information Gathering

• Cisco phone information disclosure




• IP addresses: DHCP, Call Manager, TFTP, DNS Servers



9 © Sense of Security 2007           www.senseofsecurity.com          AusCERT - May 2007
VoIP Security

• Plug into the PC port and sniff!




10 © Sense of Security 2007   www.senseofsecurity.com          AusCERT - May 2007
VoIP Security

                              Get on the Voice Network

• Use the info we have gathered to get on the Voice VLAN.
• Configure the network adapter to tag all ethernet frames
  with the voice VLAN.
• Voila! We are on the voice VLAN.
• Now we can attack any system on the voice network.




11 © Sense of Security 2007            www.senseofsecurity.com          AusCERT - May 2007
VoIP Security

                                        MITM Attack – ARP Theory




                                        1   3   5   7   9    11   13   15   17   19   21   23                  CATALYST 3550
                                                                                                           1          2
                               SYSTEM
                                  RPS

                                 STAT
                                 UTIL
                              DUPLEX
                              SPEED     2   4   6   8   10   12   14   16   18   20   22   24




12 © Sense of Security 2007                                                      www.senseofsecurity.com                              AusCERT - May 2007
VoIP Security

                          MITM Attack - ARP Poisoning Theory


                                                                        Attackers PC
                                                                        IP: 10.6.0.40
                                                                        MAC: D                               IP Phone #2
                                                                                                             IP: 10.6.0.20
                                                                                                             MAC: B


                                   1   3   5   7   9    11   13   15   17   19   21   23                  CATALYST 3550
                                                                                                      1          2
                          SYSTEM
                             RPS

                            STAT
                            UTIL
                         DUPLEX
                         SPEED     2   4   6   8   10   12   14   16   18   20   22   24




                                                                            IP Phone #3
                                                                            IP: 10.6.0.30
                                                                            MAC: C


13 © Sense of Security 2007                                                 www.senseofsecurity.com                              AusCERT - May 2007
VoIP Security

                              MITM Attack – Execution

• Start Cain & Abel and configure ARP poisoning.
• Cain & Abel also has the capability to record a call.
• Sit back and wait!




14 © Sense of Security 2007            www.senseofsecurity.com          AusCERT - May 2007
VoIP Security

                              Game Over!




15 © Sense of Security 2007     www.senseofsecurity.com          AusCERT - May 2007
VoIP Security

                              Some Attack Possibilities..

• Telephone banking / Voicemail PIN disclosure
• Insertion of audio into conversation
• Real-time voicemail capture




16 © Sense of Security 2007             www.senseofsecurity.com          AusCERT - May 2007
VoIP Security

                              Compromising the PIN

• Telephone banking requires a user to enter a customer
  number and PIN using the touchpad.
• Each number pressed sends a unique tone which is
  interpreted by the end system.




17 © Sense of Security 2007          www.senseofsecurity.com          AusCERT - May 2007
VoIP Security




18 © Sense of Security 2007   www.senseofsecurity.com          AusCERT - May 2007
VoIP Security

• But which buttons were pressed?




19 © Sense of Security 2007   www.senseofsecurity.com          AusCERT - May 2007
VoIP Security

                              Countermeasures

Cisco Switch:
• Enable DHCP Snooping
• Enable Dynamic ARP Inspection
• Enable IP Sourceguard
• Enable Port Security
• Implement VLAN ACLs
• Implement 802.1x




20 © Sense of Security 2007        www.senseofsecurity.com          AusCERT - May 2007
VoIP Security

                              Countermeasures (cont.d)

Cisco Call Manager: (Not without some side effects!)
• Disable Settings button on phone
• Disable Span to PC port
• Disable Gratuitous ARP
• Disable PC Voice VLAN Access
• Configure Signaling & Media Encryption!




21 © Sense of Security 2007            www.senseofsecurity.com          AusCERT - May 2007
VoIP Security

                              How Real is the Threat in Australia?

• One Australian organisation suffers a major telephone hack
  each and every day.
• AusCERT Computer Crime and Security Survey 2006 shows
  average value of loss of over $60,000.
• The largest phone hack on record is $1.7M.
• 97% not reported due to risk of adverse publicity.
• Threat to phone service - how would your business cope
  without phones for an entire day?
• Telstra, Optus and Macquarie Telecom have written to
  clients warning of the dangers and confirming the customer
  is liable.
22 © Sense of Security 2007                  www.senseofsecurity.com          AusCERT - May 2007
VoIP Security

                              Conclusion

• Most current implementations of VoIP are insecure.
• VoIP can be secured with the right know how.
• The only way to know if your implementation is secure is
  to have it audited by independent experts.




23 © Sense of Security 2007     www.senseofsecurity.com          AusCERT - May 2007
VoIP Security

                                 Questions?


                  Contact:

                              Jason Edelstein
                              T: +61 2 9290 4441
                              E: jasone@senseofsecurity.com.au
                              www.senseofsecurity.com.au




24 © Sense of Security 2007          www.senseofsecurity.com          AusCERT - May 2007

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VoIP: Attacks & Countermeasures in the Corporate World

  • 1. VoIP: Attacks & Countermeasures in the Corporate World 1 © Sense of Security 2007 www.senseofsecurity.com AusCERT - May 2007
  • 2. VoIP Security Agenda • Introduction • Typical VoIP Network Architecture • Anatomy of VoIP Attacks • Demo of a few VoIP Attacks • Countermeasures 2 © Sense of Security 2007 www.senseofsecurity.com AusCERT - May 2007
  • 3. VoIP Security Introduction • Historically trends and advances in IT outpace security requirements. e.g. 802.11 Wireless. VoIP is the same. • Tools are becoming more readily available. • Many of the threats against VoIP are the same threats inherited from the data networking world. e.g. eavesdropping, mitm, replay etc. 3 © Sense of Security 2007 www.senseofsecurity.com AusCERT - May 2007
  • 4. VoIP Security Key Threats • Denial of Service – attacks against availability • Eavesdropping - unauthorised interception of voice packets • Impersonation – masquerading as a handset or a piece of VoIP infrastructure 4 © Sense of Security 2007 www.senseofsecurity.com AusCERT - May 2007
  • 5. VoIP Security Disclaimer The techniques demonstrated are not vendor specific. Our attacks are against an “out of the box” or “default” implementation of VoIP. We are not responsible for what you do with the tools and techniques demonstrated! 5 © Sense of Security 2007 www.senseofsecurity.com AusCERT - May 2007
  • 6. VoIP Security Typical Cisco VoIP Implementation CISCO IP PHONE 7941SERIES 1 2 3 ABC DEF ? 4 5 6 GHI JKL MNO - + 7 8 9 PQRS TUV WXYZ 0 # * OPER IP Phone #1 x 1000 IP Phone #2 x 2000 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 CATALYST 3550 1 2 SYSTEM RPS STAT UTIL DUPLEX SPEED 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 Cisco Call Manager IP Phone #3 v4.X x 3000 Data Voice VLAN 2 VLAN 6 6 © Sense of Security 2007 www.senseofsecurity.com AusCERT - May 2007
  • 7. VoIP Security Anatomy of Attack – Impersonation • Step 1: Determine MAC address of handset • Step 2: Change MAC address on PC • Step 3: Use Softphone to make a call as that extension 7 © Sense of Security 2007 www.senseofsecurity.com AusCERT - May 2007
  • 8. VoIP Security Anatomy of Attack - Eavesdropping • Step 1: Gather initial information • Step 2: Get access to voice VLAN • Step 3: Locate phone targets • Step 4: Execute ARP poisoning attack and record voice call 8 © Sense of Security 2007 www.senseofsecurity.com AusCERT - May 2007
  • 9. VoIP Security Information Gathering • Cisco phone information disclosure • IP addresses: DHCP, Call Manager, TFTP, DNS Servers 9 © Sense of Security 2007 www.senseofsecurity.com AusCERT - May 2007
  • 10. VoIP Security • Plug into the PC port and sniff! 10 © Sense of Security 2007 www.senseofsecurity.com AusCERT - May 2007
  • 11. VoIP Security Get on the Voice Network • Use the info we have gathered to get on the Voice VLAN. • Configure the network adapter to tag all ethernet frames with the voice VLAN. • Voila! We are on the voice VLAN. • Now we can attack any system on the voice network. 11 © Sense of Security 2007 www.senseofsecurity.com AusCERT - May 2007
  • 12. VoIP Security MITM Attack – ARP Theory 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 CATALYST 3550 1 2 SYSTEM RPS STAT UTIL DUPLEX SPEED 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 12 © Sense of Security 2007 www.senseofsecurity.com AusCERT - May 2007
  • 13. VoIP Security MITM Attack - ARP Poisoning Theory Attackers PC IP: 10.6.0.40 MAC: D IP Phone #2 IP: 10.6.0.20 MAC: B 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 CATALYST 3550 1 2 SYSTEM RPS STAT UTIL DUPLEX SPEED 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 IP Phone #3 IP: 10.6.0.30 MAC: C 13 © Sense of Security 2007 www.senseofsecurity.com AusCERT - May 2007
  • 14. VoIP Security MITM Attack – Execution • Start Cain & Abel and configure ARP poisoning. • Cain & Abel also has the capability to record a call. • Sit back and wait! 14 © Sense of Security 2007 www.senseofsecurity.com AusCERT - May 2007
  • 15. VoIP Security Game Over! 15 © Sense of Security 2007 www.senseofsecurity.com AusCERT - May 2007
  • 16. VoIP Security Some Attack Possibilities.. • Telephone banking / Voicemail PIN disclosure • Insertion of audio into conversation • Real-time voicemail capture 16 © Sense of Security 2007 www.senseofsecurity.com AusCERT - May 2007
  • 17. VoIP Security Compromising the PIN • Telephone banking requires a user to enter a customer number and PIN using the touchpad. • Each number pressed sends a unique tone which is interpreted by the end system. 17 © Sense of Security 2007 www.senseofsecurity.com AusCERT - May 2007
  • 18. VoIP Security 18 © Sense of Security 2007 www.senseofsecurity.com AusCERT - May 2007
  • 19. VoIP Security • But which buttons were pressed? 19 © Sense of Security 2007 www.senseofsecurity.com AusCERT - May 2007
  • 20. VoIP Security Countermeasures Cisco Switch: • Enable DHCP Snooping • Enable Dynamic ARP Inspection • Enable IP Sourceguard • Enable Port Security • Implement VLAN ACLs • Implement 802.1x 20 © Sense of Security 2007 www.senseofsecurity.com AusCERT - May 2007
  • 21. VoIP Security Countermeasures (cont.d) Cisco Call Manager: (Not without some side effects!) • Disable Settings button on phone • Disable Span to PC port • Disable Gratuitous ARP • Disable PC Voice VLAN Access • Configure Signaling & Media Encryption! 21 © Sense of Security 2007 www.senseofsecurity.com AusCERT - May 2007
  • 22. VoIP Security How Real is the Threat in Australia? • One Australian organisation suffers a major telephone hack each and every day. • AusCERT Computer Crime and Security Survey 2006 shows average value of loss of over $60,000. • The largest phone hack on record is $1.7M. • 97% not reported due to risk of adverse publicity. • Threat to phone service - how would your business cope without phones for an entire day? • Telstra, Optus and Macquarie Telecom have written to clients warning of the dangers and confirming the customer is liable. 22 © Sense of Security 2007 www.senseofsecurity.com AusCERT - May 2007
  • 23. VoIP Security Conclusion • Most current implementations of VoIP are insecure. • VoIP can be secured with the right know how. • The only way to know if your implementation is secure is to have it audited by independent experts. 23 © Sense of Security 2007 www.senseofsecurity.com AusCERT - May 2007
  • 24. VoIP Security Questions? Contact: Jason Edelstein T: +61 2 9290 4441 E: jasone@senseofsecurity.com.au www.senseofsecurity.com.au 24 © Sense of Security 2007 www.senseofsecurity.com AusCERT - May 2007