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Why Ukraine has not succeeded in democratization under Yushchenko?
1. Why Ukraine has not
succeeded in democratization
under Yushchenko?
Yuriy Matsiyevsky
Presentation prepared for the Center for European
Studies
University of Florida,
Gainesville, January 24, 2012
2. Major questions
ïź Why after the "Orange Revolution" political
process did not go toward the establishment of
democratic rules, but rather accompanied by
unregulated political rivalry that eventually led to
the defeat of the "orange team" in presidential
and local elections in 2010?Â
ïź Why, after the power change in 2004
political agreement were not kept as well
as before 2004.?Â
ïź What impact has the practice of "game without
rules" in the political process in the recent past
and now, and where the causes for the
devolution of constitutionalism in Ukraine?
3. Basic concept
ïź Institutional trap â ineffective, but durable norms,
which all major players are not interested to
change.
ïź Operating code of political culture, following G.
Meyer, is a set of the dominant rules and norms,
attitudes and patterns of behavior that determine
the actual functioning of politics at the level
of elites and masses.
ïź Involution of constitutionalism is a process of
 the systematic violation of the principle of rule of
law that is manifested in selective use of law and
violation of both the laws and procedures for
their approval.
4. Scenarios of elite conflicts
Balance of Coercion cheaper Cooperation cheaper
recourses/ cost than than
of strategies cooperation coercion
Even distribution âWar of all against âStruggle according to
of recourses allâ the rulesâ (institutional
among actors compromise)
One-sided âWinner takes allâ âCartel-like dealâ
prevalence of (co-optation of
resources subordinated
actors by the dominant
5. Factors influencing the playersâ
behavior
ïź High uncertainty (inability to predict he outcome of the action taken)
ïź Shifting balance of recourses (formal and informal influence, public
support) and hidden information determine the cost of strategies
ïź Having limited recourses, players tend to play a zero-sum game.
The deals they have reached were rather tactical calculations in
pursuing âthe winner takes allâ strategies
ïź All of the above cause the commitment problem. A deal, even after
being reached, has low chances to be fulfilled.
ïź By downgrading the Constitution, players deprived themselves of
the mechanism to enforce commitments.
6. The traits of the âBadâ or informal pacts
ïź while good pacts are based upon mutual acceptance of
competition among elites, bad pacts are designed to
avoid elite competition.
ïź while good pacts provide institutional guarantees for
participants that are enforced by formal institutions, bad
pacts are based upon informal institutional arrangements
or uncertain procedures
ïź while "good pact" are public contracts, "bad pact", even
if they become public, contain a significant component of
the informal nature, which rarely becomes known to
public. Therefore, these covenants I call informal pacts.
ïź Finally, while "good pact" promote democratic political
culture of elites that can be considered as
their added social value, "bad pacts" are reached
exclusively for the survival of political players and bear
7. Informal pacts during the
Yushchenkoâs presidency
ïź Dec.8, 2004- changes to Constitution in exchange of revote of the
second round and election of V.Yushchenko a President.
ïź Consequences: Detrimental  for the legitimate procedure of
overcoming the political crisis, this ââDealâ resulted in
systematic escalation of key issues arising in political process.
ïź Constitutional reform, which entered into force on 01/01/2006 has
significantly reduced the power of the newly elected president,
who obviously did not want to bear it and continued to act as if he
had the same prerogatives as before.
ïź Tensions that existed at the personal level between
Yushchenko and Tymoshenko have intensified an unclear division
of power between the president and the prime minister .
ïź After working for eight months, on 09/ 08/2005 the Tymoshenkoâs
government was forsed by Yushchenko to resignation. It was done
due to still existing presidential power, but mostly for preventing the
shift of power in favor of Premiere.
8. The rivalry with Tymoshenko and a
âDealâ with Yanukovuch
ïź Memorandum of Understanding between the
government and opposition was signed two weeks after
Tymoshenkoâs dismissal on Sep.22, 2005
ïź Consequences: Yushchenko received additional
parliamentary support, but bear 50% loss in public
support (from 30% in Aug.2005 to 14% in Nov.2005)
ïź Yanukovych and his PofR were given a lift into a power
play on the eve of parliamentary election
ïź After winning the election with 34 % of the votes and
41% of seats PofR forget about the deal and formed an
âanti-crisis coalitionâ with socialists and communists.
9. A pact (Universal) of National Unity
ïź Loosing parliamentary support Yushchenko suggested a new deal
that was signed by all factionâs leaders, besides Tymoshenko, on
Aug.3, 2005
ïź The President secured 5 ministers in the new government in
exchange for nominating Yanukovych for the post of prime-minister.
ïź PofR has received a dominant position in parliament and
Yanukovych has received access to the sate recourses.
ïź âOrange campâ was disunited and appeared in ambivalent position
in Parliament.
ïź In case of securing a constitutional majority in Parliament a coalition
could effectively overcome the Presidentsâ veto and threaten
Yushchenko by impeachment.
ïź After a new law on the cabinet of ministers (Dec.21, 2006) that
enable a Prime Minister to dismiss the presidential ministers,
Yushchenko had to wage a war on two fronts and situation in
Ukraine became a war of all against all.
10. Political crisis and dismissal of the Rada
ïź Threatened by the growing number of a new coalition,
Yushchenko issued a decree to dismiss the parliament
on Apr.2, 2007.
ïź On Apr.3, Rada adopted a law preventing the national
bank to finance the election.
ïź On Apr.25 Yushchenko issued another decree,
confirming the dismissal of the Rada and established a
parliamentary election for June 24, 2007.
ïź On Apr.26 the faction of PofR announced the readiness
to initiate the procedure of impeachment of the
President.
ïź The crisis was resolved by a new deal on May 4, 2007
between the President, Prime-Minister and the speaker
of parliament O.Moroz
ïź On June 5 Yushechenko issued a new decree that
stopped the former edicts and, finally, on July 31 issued
the fourth decree in which a date of the pre-term
elections was established on Sep. 30, 2007.
11. Tymoshenko â Yakukovych deal on
the new Constitution (2008-2009)
ïź The deal had several objectives:
ïź to lessen uncertainty over the result of
presidential elections
ïź To secure their control over executive and
legislative power by introducing a parliamentary
system.
ïź What prevent the deal?
ïź Lack of credible commitments in both parties
ïź Leak of information to the press
12. Devolution of constitutionalism and
its implications
ïź The former discussion present the case of
devolution of constitutionalism
ïź Political expediency subverted procedural
requirements
ïź High uncertainty, caused by the disrespect for
democratic decision-making procedures pushed
all key players to resolve conflicts by negotiating
informal pacts, which further intensified
uncertainty and complicated the choice of
"playing by the rules."
13. Institutional Trap in Ukraineâs
politics
ïź Devolution of constitutionalism brought
Ukrainian elites to "institutional trap" â they
realised malignancy of informal agreements
but continued to use them in the hope of
winning over the opponents.
ïź Trying to beat one another in a game of
two against one in a triangle of president, prime
minister and speaker with permanent change of
sides, prevented the elites form initiating
structural reforms in Ukraine and distanced it
from the democratic standards of policy making.
14. Final remarks
ïź The first two imply structural and the last two procedural
constrains of Ukraineâs transition that are rarely
discussed in scholarly researches
ïź informal pacts have become an integral part of
the "operational code"of political culture of
Ukrainian elites
ïź In Ukraine, both elites and citizens have substantive
rather than procedural attitude to good governance that
was once called âmomentocracyâ. In other words, if
the end justifies the means, the question of compliance
with the rules is less important.
ïź Inability to predict the consequences of their actions is a
distinct feature of unprofessionalism of Ukrainian elites.
ïź Personal sympathies/antipathies have become a front
line in Ukrainian politics in post-orange period. This led
some observers to conclude that Ukraine belongs to
Byzantine rather than European political tradition.
Source: Gelman V. Out of the frying pan into the fire.Post-Soviet Regime Changes in Comparative Perspective nternational Political Science Review March 2008Â vol. 29Â no. 2Â 157-180 Two variables are important: balance of recourses and the cost of strategies. When the balance shifted for one side or the other, the cost of strategies determined the choice of players.
The main procedural violations consist but are not limited to the  "batch" voting that is not envisaged by the Constitution of Ukraine, as well as chanhes to the draft law of the amendments to Constitution are not assumed in the process of discussion after obtaining the opinion of the Constitutional Court . S trategic aim of the constitutional reform had to consist in radical  change of the format of the political game by reducing the significance of the President's "prize" and shifting the political process in a parliamentary dimension . Tymoshenko, who was app ointed a prime minister on 02 / 04 / 2005 as a result of a n informal agreement on the di vision of posts within the "orange camp "  obtained a role of key figure in the political system .
Memorandum was signed between Yushchenko, acting prime minister Yechanurov and Yanukovych. The deal went beyond âthe orange campâ. One hour after the deal was reached VR voted 289 for Yechnurovâs approval as a Prime-Minister. The whole faction of PofR voted unanimously as well; Yushchenkoâs concern was to prevent BYuT from winning the election as it could lead to even larger limitations of his power and sliding to parliamentary government.
Official aim was to unite East and West, to overcome conflicts for the good of Ukrainian people and to bring together all political forces to form a coalition and a new government. The Yushenkoâs party (NUNS) has not participated in coalition, however two MPs of the NUNS and four of BYuT entered a coalition. Instead of one rival, Yushchenko now received two.
His decision was motivated by the fact that coalition was joined by the individual MPs, what contradicted with the rule that only factions can from coalition, but not single deputies. The parties agreed for a new pre term election, that were planned for Sept. 30, 2007
A systematic violation of the principle of the rule of law ,manifested in selective use of law and violation of both the laws and procedures for their approval .