SlideShare ist ein Scribd-Unternehmen logo
1 von 20
Downloaden Sie, um offline zu lesen
This	work	is	licensed	under	a	Creative	Commons	Attribution-Non	Commercial	4.0	International	License	
	
DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 1 of 20
Hacking	for	Defense	@	Stanford	
DOD/IC	101	Workshop	
	
Read	this	narrative	along	with	the	slides	at		
http://www.slideshare.net/sblank/h4d-dod-101-workshop-040516	
	
	
Slides	1	-11	Joe	Felter:		
In	the	spirit	of	doing	more	work	than	any	of	your	other	classes,	
it's	7pm	and	its	not	a	scheduled	class	session	and	you're	all	here.	
We	appreciate	all	of	you	attending	and	we’ll	not	waste	your	time.		
I'm	going	to	give	you	a	little	background,	and	a	few	vignettes	and	
context	to	help	frame	and	understand	the	nature	of	the	
contemporary	and	emerging	challenges	we	are	facing.		
	
This	is	a	brave	new	world	and	a	threat	environment	unlike	those	we	have	faced	in	previous	
decades.		I’d	like	to	describe	the	complexities	and	challenges	of	this	environment	to	help	
you	get	you	motivated	to	address	the	problems	your	teams	are	taking	on.	Next,	Pete	Newell	
is	going	to	give	you	some	background	on	where	our	DOD	and	IC	problems	come	from.		And	
our	guest,	Jackie	Space	is	going	to	talk	to	us	about	some	of	the	practical	applications	of	the	
acquisition	process	and	the	challenges	and	opportunities	it	presents.	
	
(Slide	2)			
This	is	a	scene	from	West	Point	in	1963.	You	may	recognize	the	
speaker,	Douglas	MacArthur,	just	before	he	passed	away.	This	is	
his	famous	duty	honor	country	speech.		
	
…the	“big	idea”-	to	use	Steve	Blank’s	vernacular	-	from	this	
speech	was	that,	“the	mission	of	West	Point	cadets	and	the	entire	
DOD	is	to	win	our	nation's	wars”.		How	do	we	do	this?	Think	about	the	types	of	wars	that	
General	MacArthur	was	thinking	of	when	he	said	"Our	mission	is	to	win	our	wars."		
	
(Slide	3)		
Back	in	his	day,	wars	were	not	easy	but	much	simpler	to	
understand	how	to	fight.	When	a	state	was	attacked,	they	knew	
the	source	of	the	attack	and	it	was	usually	another	nation	state	
with	the	capacity	to	project	power.	For	example,	consider	the	
aftermath	of	Pearl	Harbor.	We	knew	who	attacked	us	and	in	
general	terms	how	to	respond.	The	US	mobilized	its	resources	
and	industrial	base,	raised	powerful	military	forces	and	
projected	power	-	directing	it	at	a	defined	enemy	and	the	enemies	industrial	base.	In	
conventional	state-on-state	warfare,	the	operational	and	tactical	level	activities	that	
support	a	strategy	to	win	are	often	clear.	You	mass	fire	power	on	objectives.	You	destroy	
the	enemy’s	military	and	industrial	capabilities	and	seize	terrain.	All	those	things	are	
missions	that	the	military	can	get	their	head	around.	Conventional	wars	against	well	
defined	enemies	are	not	easy	but	are	simple	to	appreciate	what	it	takes	to	win	them.
This	work	is	licensed	under	a	Creative	Commons	Attribution-Non	Commercial	4.0	International	License	
	
DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 2 of 20
	
(Slide	4)		
If	you	fight	these	wars	effectively	you	eventually	win.	In	
MacArthur’s	time	we	actually	defeated	our	enemies,	drove	them	
to	unconditional	surrender.	We	had	victory	parades-	kissed	the	
nurse,	went	home	and	demobilized.	The	US	and	their	allies’	back-
to-back	world	war	champions.	…We're	the	winning	team.	It	was	
good	to	be	king	then,	right?	
	 	
We	used	to	win	our	wars,	and	we	knew	how	do	it.	We	not	only	won	conventional	wars	like	
WWI	and	WWII,	we	were	pretty	good	at	winning	low-intensity	conflicts,	unconventional	
wars,	limited	wars.		There's	no	low-intensity	conflict	when	you're	at	the	other	end	of	an	
AK47,	trust	me,	but	we	were	even	good	at	leveraging	our	technology	and	our	capabilities	to	
win	low-intensity	conflicts	and	small	wars.	We	were	dominant,	but	today's	it's	something	
that's	changed.	
	
(Slide	5)		
This	is	a	picture	at	the	tail	end	of	the	cold	war.	It’s	taken	in	
December	1989	in	Operation	Just	Cause	in	Panama	where	we		
were	conducting	a	night	combat	airborne	assault	into	Panama	
and	ultimately	seized	former	Panamanian	President	Manuel	
Noriega.	Pete	Newell	and	I	were	both	junior	officers,	I	was	
with	the	3d	Ranger	Battalion,	Pete	was	in	the	82nd	Airborne	
division.	We	knew	the	mission	was	dangerous.	We	were	
parachuting	in	in	the	middle	of	the	night	to	hostile	territory	under	fire.	We	were	not	cocky,	
but	we	had	a	certain	level	of	confidence	going	in	to	the	mission.		We	were	the	winning	team	
-	nobody	could	stand	up	to	our	powerful	military.	We	had	aircraft	carriers	and	ICBMs,	but	
we	also	had	a	pretty	good	tech	when	it	comes	down	to	the	small	unit,	the	individual	level	
technology.	
	
Let	me	tell	you	about	some	of	the	technology	we	had	back	then.	(Jokingly)	It's	going	to	just	
blow	you	away	-	nobody	but	the	US	and	other	powerful	states’	militaries	had	access	to	this	
level	of	tech.	We	had	night	vision	goggles	you	could	put	on	your	head	and	you	could	see	in	
the	dark.	No	kidding.	See	at	night!	It	was	phenomenal.	We	landed	on	the	airfield,	people	are	
shooting	at	you,	they	don't	know	where	we	are	but	they're	spraying	trying	to	hit	people,	we	
could	see	them.	We	had	night	vision	scopes	on	some	of	our	rifles.	We	could	put	a	crosshair	
on	the	white	T-shirts	they	were	wearing.	It	is	“good	to	be	the	king”	and	have	access	to	these	
game	changing	technologies.				
	
Before	we	went	in	we	had	overhead	images	from	satellites	taking	pictures	of	the	earth	and	
giving	us	maps	so	we	knew	how	to	plan,	and	knew	where	our	objectives	were.	These	
images	obtained	from	national	assets	were	so	sensitive	that	the	satellite	imagery	was	
classified	material.	I	remember	tying	my	imagery	with	parachute	cord	onto	my	cargo	
pocket	because	if	you	lost	it,	it	was	losing	a	sensitive	item	and	I	would	be	subject	to	an	
investigation.
This	work	is	licensed	under	a	Creative	Commons	Attribution-Non	Commercial	4.0	International	License	
	
DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 3 of 20
I	literally	was	jumping	out	of	a	C-130	at	450	feet	which	was	pretty	low.	Getting	shot	at.	My	
map	rips	out	of	my	pocket.	All	I	can	think	of	is,	“oh	my	God	I'm	in	big	trouble	because	I	just	
lost	my	overhead	imagery,”	which	is	pretty	sensitive	stuff.	At	the	same	time	we	also	had	
satellites	up	in	orbit	triangulating	to	tell	us	within	10	meters	of	accuracy	where	we	were	
standing.	GPS.	It	was	crazy.		
	
We	had	communications,	where	every	individual	soldier	in	my	platoon	could	talk	to	each	
other.	I	mean	little	tiny	radios	that	could	talk	to	each	other.	These	little	pens	that	could	
shoot	a	laser	to	direct	fire	and	maneuver.	Never	before	in	the	history	of	warfare	has	an	
organization	been	able	to	direct	its	operations	and	fire	and	maneuver	with	that	kind	of	
technology.	And	all	of	this	cost	thousands	and	thousands	and	thousands	of	dollars,	really	
expensive	stuff	that	few	other	states	if	any	could	afford	to	deploy.	
	
There’s	a	saying	that,	“the	strong	do	what	they	want	to	do	and	the	weak	do	what	they	have	
to	do.”	We're	one	of	the	strong	states.	What	do	strong	states	like	the	United	States	care	
about?	Who	do	they	worry	about?	Other	strong	states,	right?	So	who	was	bigger	than	the	
U.S.	back	then?	
	
But	this	was	the	end	of	an	era.	This	is	1989,	the	cold	war	was	about	over.	In	some	ways,	
despite	the	nuclear	menace,	those	seem	in	retrospect	like	the	good	old	days.		When	it	was	
good	to	be	king	–	where	power	and	resources	translated	almost	directly	in	to	battlefield	
dominance.		
	
What's	changed?	Who	are	these	folks?		
(slide	6)	
	
I	was	joking	about	the	advanced	technology	we	had	in	
1989.	Today	with	a	credit	card	and	Internet	
connection	and	you	can	get	any	one	of	those	things	
described	as	game	changing	advantages	for	us	when	
Pete	and	I	jumped	in	to	Panama	for	a	$100.	Night	
vision	goggles	are	cheap	and	available,	Google	Maps	
with	images	of	almost	any	part	of	the	planet	are	
online,	you	can	just	get	that	and	download	it.	All	of	this	was	formerly	only	in	the	hands	of	
the	very	strongest	states,	the	very	strongest	super	powers.	
	
The	following	slides	highlight	just	a	few	examples	of	how	the	proliferation	and	diffusion	of	
technology	changes	the	face	of	the	battlefield	today	and	why	this	matters.	Let's	look	at	
some	examples	of	the	asymmetries	that	groups	like	ISIS,	al-Qaeda	and	other	groups	take	
advantage	of	to	do	us	harm.
This	work	is	licensed	under	a	Creative	Commons	Attribution-Non	Commercial	4.0	International	License	
	
DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 4 of 20
	
(Slide	7)		
ISIS	is	able	to	use	overhead	imagery	and	drone	surveillance	
to	plan	and	execute	their	operations.	It's	not	so	hard	to	do,	
they've	got	their	own	drones.	They're	using	this	against	us.	
	
This	is	an	example	of	technology	that's	now	in	the	hands	of	
our	adversaries	that	formerly	was	only	in	the	hands	of	the	
strongest	states	like	the	United	States.		
	
(Slide	8)		
Terrorists	and	other	nation	states	are	using	social	media	
against	us.	I	remember	going	to	SERE	school	as	a	special	forces	
officer	candidate.	We	were	trained	to	develop	a	cover	story	to	
hide	our	identify	if	captured.	This	was	a	whole	convincing	
cover	story	that	you	give	so	you	don't	get	found	out.	Today,	if	
you	Google	me	or	call	up	my	Facebook	page	it	would	be	pretty	
clear	who	I	was	and	my	background.	
	
(Slide	9)		
Imagine	what	our	our	enemies	can	do	with	readily	available	
technology	like	3D	printing?	The	instructions	for	making	the	
semi-automatic	rifle	in	this	photo	are	available	online.	
	
	
	
	
	
(Slide	10)		
Cyber	Threats	to	Critical	Infrastructure.	Think	about	how	the	
internet	and	social	media	have	changed	the	ability	to	recruit,	to	
train,	to	radicalize,	motivate	and	inspire	our	enemies.	It's	just	
unbelievable	what	this	technology	is	doing	to	empower	our	groups	
intent	on	doing	us	harm.	
	
One	of	the	big	advantages	of	being	a	strong	superpower-like	state	was	that	you	got	to	
project	power.	Now	anyone	sitting	anywhere	in	the	world	can	project	power	…	so	now	the	
ability	to	project	power	is	not	only	the	purview	of	strong	states	and	superpowers,	it's	kids	
who	are	just	logging	on	and	they're	able	to	attack	us	from	afar,	with	cyber	threats.	
	
(Slide	11)	
Back	to	MacArthur.	…	when	he	told	the	West	Point	Corps	of	
Cadets	in	1963	that	their	mission	was	to	win	our	he	was	talking	
about	defeating	strong	states	which	were	our	biggest	threats	at	
the	time.	Think	about	what	the	threats	are	now.	International	
relations	theory	states	that	said,	strong	states	need	to	be	most
This	work	is	licensed	under	a	Creative	Commons	Attribution-Non	Commercial	4.0	International	License	
	
DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 5 of 20
concerned	by	threats	posed	by	other	strong	states,	has	been	turned	on	its	head.	Today,	
weak	states,	sub-state	actors,	even	individuals	are	now	empowered	through	increasingly	
available	technology	to	do	us	harm.	Addressing	these	emerging	and	lethal	threats	is	now	
also	required	to	“win	our	wars”,-	this	is	definitely	a	different	kind	of	threat	environment	
that	we're	in.	
	
So	what	do	we	do	about	it?	How	do	we	win	our	wars	going	forward?	At	a	minimum	we	
need	to	stack	the	deck	again	in	our	favor.	We	used	to	be	back-to-back	world	war	champs,		
able	to	mobilize	our	resources	effectively	and	take	it	to	our	enemies.	Well	I	would	argue	
that	in	many	ways	we're	not	doing	well	in	todays	changed	threat	environment.	Not	only	do	
we	need	to	stack	the	deck	in	our	favor,	in	some	cases	we	are	at	a	disadvantage	and	just	
need	to	level	the	playing	field.		Ironically	we	aren't	there	yet.	We've	got	to	continue	to	
defend	against	high-intensity	threats.	This	isn't	just	a	war	against	ISIS	and	terrorism,	we've	
got	a	resurgent	China,	pushing	us	in	the	South	China	Sea.	We	have	to	basically	defend	on	
both	fronts.	
	
ISIS	doesn't	have	federal	acquisition	regulations;	in	Steve	Blank’s	definition	ISIS	is	a	Lean	
Organization.	They	are	pivoting,	learning	and	adapting	and	they	rapidly	react	to	evolving	
threat	environments.	This	is	a	tough	adversary	-	an	adaptive	enemy.	This	is	a	threat	
environment	where	our	adversaries	have	access	to	technologies	and	they're	able	to	adapt,	
to	overcome,	and	improvise	and	pivot	and	deploy	that	technology	in	ways	that	are	way	
ahead	of	us.	
	 	
I’m	trying	to	emphasize	that	this	is	a	different	type	of	threat	environment,	different	type	of	
adversaries.	The	formerly	linear	relationship	between	state	power	and	military	
effectiveness	has	forever	changed.	States	don’t	automatically	generate	the	power	predicted	
by	their	resources	–	choices	matter.	Some	of	the	advantages	that	we	enjoyed	back	in	the	
day	when	we	were	“back-to-back	world	war	champs”	don't	really	apply	today.		
	
The	stakes	are	high	and	we're	losing	ground	on	many	fronts.	We	need	to	do	something	
about	it.	You	can	help.		
	
Pete	Newell	is	going	to	give	you	the	background	of	how	we	develop	our	requirements,	
where	our	missions	come	from	and	then	our	guest	Jackie	Space	is	going	to	talk	about	some	
of	the	challenges	and	opportunity	of	the	acquisition	process.		
	
Slides	12-29	Pete	Newell	
Obviously,	things	have	changed	over	the	years.	The	
environment	has	changed,	our	country	has	changed,	the	
economy	has	changed.		
	
Each	of	your	teams	has	a	problem	that	was	generated	by	a	
government	sponsor	for	a	reason.	The	rest	of	the	discussion	
tonight	is	peeling	back	the	layers	to	figure	out	what	that	reason	is,	where	that	problem	
might	have	come	from	and	who	else	shares	that	problem.
This	work	is	licensed	under	a	Creative	Commons	Attribution-Non	Commercial	4.0	International	License	
	
DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 6 of 20
To	begin	the	search	you	must	understand	how	our	National	Strategies	are	built	and	how	
they	come	together	to	drive	this	massive	organization	called	the	Department	of	Defense.		
What	we're	going	to	try	and	do	here	is	fast	as	we	possibly	can,	is	give	you	a	one	over	the	
world	of	how	strategy	and	funding	effect	how	things	are	bought.	
	
(Slides	13-15)		
On	this	first	slide	is	a	big,	complicated	chart	that	would	take	
me	30	years	to	explain	to	you.	So	we're	not	going	to	do	that.	
We'll	cut	it	down	from	2000	slides	to	about	15.		
	
Here's	the	chart.	This	is	the	defense	acquisition	system.	Way	
up	there	in	the	upper	left	hand	corner,	is	where	the	
requirements	for	military	systems	come	from	and	what	gets	things	started.	To	make	it	
simple	if	you	start	on	the	top	left	you	have	the	Joint	Capabilities	and	Integration	
Development	System,	(JCIDS).	JCIDS	is	how	we	handle	the	collision	between	two	many	
requirements	and	not	enough	money.			
	 	
We're	going	to	split	this	talk.	I'm	going	to	take	care	of	the	tanks	and	airplane	side	of	this	
and	then	we're	going	to	hand	it	off	to	Jackie	Space	and	she's	going	to	talk	through	the	
islands	of	innovation	where	a	lot	of	these	rules	don't	apply,	or	they've	condensed	them	into	
much	tighter	acquisition	cycles.	
	
Looking	at	the	red	boxes	at	the	top	of	the	chart	I’ve	highlighted	the	key	activities	you	need	
to	understand,	beginning	with	how	requirements	are	developed.		Next	we	develop	
prototypes.	Then	we	figure	how	we're	going	to	produce	something.	Then	we	figure	out	how	
we're	going	to	sustain	it.	That's	kind	of	the	life	cycle	of	the	acquisition	system.	It's	not	real	
complicated	until	you	dig	in	to	who	does	what	to	who	and	how	and	when	they	make	
decisions.	For	the	purposes	of	this	class	what	is	in	the	red	boxes	at	top	of	the	slide	are	the	
things	we've	got	to	keep	in	mind.	
	
(Slides	16-17)		
Here's	what	you've	really	got	to	remember,	there	are	
three	key	activities	that	take	place.	In	the	bottom	left	
corner	of	this	slide	is	the	planning,	programming,	and	
budget	execution	work	-	no	different	than	any	major	
corporation	out	there.	You	have	to	figure	out	what	funds	
are	coming	in	and	where	you're	going	to	prioritize	and	
send	those	funds	out	to.	This	is	largely	driven	by	a	process	
of	strategy	documents	that	we'll	talk	through	in	just	a	second.	To	the	right	in	yellow	is	
JCIDS,	the	system	used	to	develop	requirements.			Finally,	in	red	at	the	top	of	the	slide	is	the	
acquisition	process	of	how	we	buy	things	to	fill	the	gaps	that	were	identified	in	original	
documents.	
	
Jackie	Space:	Do	the	people	in	the	audience	know	what	we	mean	by	requirements?	
Basically	requirements	are	what	are	used	to	build	a	system,	it’s	the	technical	parameters	by	
which	the	system	is	being	built.	So	there	is	a	whole	process	of	people	that	develop	the
This	work	is	licensed	under	a	Creative	Commons	Attribution-Non	Commercial	4.0	International	License	
	
DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 7 of 20
requirements	and	the	cost	requirements,	the	technical	requirements	around	what	system	
is	actually	being	built.		
	
Joe	Felter:	For	example,	defending	against	dismounted	IEDs		(roadside	bombs)	in	
Afghanistan	versus	the	IED	threat	in	Iraq,	which	were	against	vehicles.		The	lag	time	that	it	
took	for	the	military	to	address	the	dismounted	IEDs	threat	in	Afghanistan	caused	
thousands	of	casualties.	Pete	made	that	a	very	poignant	point	last	week.	
	
Pete	Newell:			
	
(Slide	18)		
All	right	so	here	we	go.	Let's	start	with	the	strategy	documents.		
	
The	strategy	document	that	starts	it	all	is	the	National	Security	
Strategy	(NSS).		This	is	a	document	that	the	President	of	the	
United	States	produces	that	lays	out	America's	enduring	
interests,	not	just	militarily	but	also	economically,	and	socially.	
The	NSS	lists	four	things	that	are	considered	to	be	our	enduring	interests.		
1. The	security	of	the	United	States,	its	citizens,	and	US	allies	and	partners.		
2. A	strong	innovative	and	growing	US	economy.		
3. An	open	international	economic	system	that	can	produce	opportunity	for	
prosperity,	respect	for	universal	values	at	home	and	around	the	world,	and		
4. An	international	order	advanced	by	US	leadership	that	promotes	peace,	security,	
and	opportunity	through	cooperation	to	meet	global	challenges.	
	
(Slide	19)		
The	Secretary	of	Defense	uses	the	NSS	as	a	basis	for	issuing	
his	strategy.	The	Department	of	Defense	calls	it	the	National	
Defense	Strategy	(NDS).	The	NDS	takes	the	President’s	
National	Security	Strategy,	looks	at	it	from	a	defense	
perspective,	and	says	here	are	the	things	that	we	need	do	
that	meet	those	Presidential	objectives.		The	current	NDS	
includes	things	like	counter-terrorism,	irregular	warfare,	
defer	and	defeat	aggression,	project	power,	counter	weapons	of	mass	destruction,	provide	
a	stabilizing	presence,	conduct	stability,	and	counter	insurgent	operations,	and	
humanitarian	disaster	relief	and	other	operations.	
	 	
There's	a	bunch	more	in	there	but	broadly	it	details	what	the	Department	of	Defense	is	
going	to	do	to	meet	the	President's	National	Security	Strategy.		
	
(Slide	20)		
Then	comes	the	quadrennial	defense	review	(QDR).	It’s	
done	every	four	years.	You	notice	the	dates	of	these	are	out	
of	sync,	because	several	years	goes	between	each	one	of	
them.	So	one	document	may	be	issued	in	2015	but	we're	still	
operating	off	one	from	2012	another	one	from	2013	and	one
This	work	is	licensed	under	a	Creative	Commons	Attribution-Non	Commercial	4.0	International	License	
	
DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 8 of 20
more.	The	quadrennial	defense	review	is	really	the	document	that	starts	to	take	those	
strategies	and	look	at	them	in	terms	of	what	can	we	really	afford.	
	
The	QDR	describes	what	are	we	really	going	to	do	in	order	to	meet	the	President’s	and	the	
Secretary	of	Defense’s	requirements.	The	document	has	some	very	broad	statements	like,	
“Protect	the	homeland”	and	“Deter	and	defeat	attacks	on	the	United	States,”	“Build	security	
globally	to	preserve	regional	stability.”	“Project	power	and	win	decisively	and	defeat	
aggression.”		But	underneath	there's	a	nice	line	that	says	"At	the	President's	budget	level	
the	military	will	be	able	to	defend	the	homeland,	conduct	sustained	distributed	counter	
terrorist	operations,	and	deter	aggression	and	assure	allied	in	multiple	regions	before	
presence	and	engagement."	You	know	what	it	doesn't	say	anymore?	That	we're	going	to	
fight	and	win	two	wars	simultaneously.		
	
Seriously.	At	the	President's	budget	level,	which	means	the	President's	already	told	him	
here's	what	we're	going	to	pay	for	in	terms	of	defense	this	year,	they	determine	that	these	
are	the	best	that	they	can	do	to	meet	the	key	objectives	that	were	set	up	by	the	National	
Defense	Strategy	in	order	to	meet	the	President's	National	Security	Strategy.	
	
I	think	you're	starting	to	see	the	where	the	gaps	might	start	to	appear.	As	we	change	one	
word	in	one	line	in	the	QDR	and	suddenly	the	Strategy	documents	mean	something	
radically	different.	Are	we	buying	tanks	now?	Or	are	we	doing	more	humanitarian	
operations?	More	aircraft	carriers	or	more	airplanes?	Depending	on	where	you	sit	in	that	
big	system	it	can	very	rapidly	change	based	on	how	you	perceive	the	best	answer	to	those	
problems.	
	
What	the	three	documents	end	up	giving	us,	and	what	falls	out	of	it,	is	called	the	Defense	
Planning	Guides.	It	really	is	how	we	develop	the	budgets	that	drive	the	organization	of	the	
military	and	eventually	the	activities	of	these	agencies.		
	
(Slide	21)		
In	the	U.S	we	have	four	Military	Services:	the	Army,	Navy,	Air	
Force,	and	Marines.	(The	Coast	Guard	gets	to	act	like	the	fifth	
service	but	they	actually	belong	to	another	government	
agency.)		
	
The	military	services	are	responsible	for	providing	people	
and	equipment	to	combatant	commanders.	It's	their	job	to	
raise	the	army,	navy,	air	force	and	marines.	It's	their	job	to	train	and	equip	them.	It’s	their	
job	to	provide	trained	equipped	ready	forces	to	combatant	commanders	who	are	the	guys	
out	here	who	actually	fight	the	wars.	
	
In	between	the	Military	Services	we	have	a	number	of	Defense	Agencies.	The	easy	way	to	
know	if	your	talking	about	an	agency	is	the	last	word	in	their	name	says	agency.	It's	things	
like	the	National	Geospatial	Intelligence	Agency,	the	National	Security	Agency.	There's	only	
agency	who	doesn't	have	the	word	agency	is	their	name	is	the	National	Reconnaissance	
Office.	For	some	reason	they	got	to	be	different	than	everybody	else.
This	work	is	licensed	under	a	Creative	Commons	Attribution-Non	Commercial	4.0	International	License	
	
DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 9 of 20
	
The	agencies	out	there	all	have	consolidated	portfolios	of	activities	that	they	do	at	the	
behest	of	the	rest	of	the	government	for	DOD,	but	they're	also	strategic	force	providers	for	
the	combatant	commanders.	I'll	show	you	a	couple	of	slides	that	actually	makes	this	a	little	
easier	to	understand.	
	
Finally,	we	have	a	bunch	of	DOD	field	activities.	It's	interesting	what	shows	up	as	field	
activities.	For	example,	Washington	Headquarters	Services	is	responsible	for	the	military	
installations	of	Washington	DC.		Another	example	of	a	field	activity	is	the	Defense	POW	
mission	personnel	office.	60	some	odd	years	after	the	end	of	the	Korean	war	we	are	still	
looking	for	persons	missing	in	action	or	remains	that	were	never	recovered.	We	still	have	
an	activity	that	actually	goes	to	Vietnam,	Laos	and	some	other	places	looking	for	the	
remains	of	service	members	who	never	came	home.	
	
There	are	lots	of	other	small	activities	that	don't	neatly	fit	anywhere	within	someplace	on	
that	chart	up	there.	
	
Student:	I	noticed	that	the	Central	Intelligence	Agency	is	not	on	there.	Why?	
	
Pete	Newell:	The	Central	Intelligence	Agency	is	not	a	DOD	activity	or	agency.	Although,	I'll	
talk	a	bit	later	about	how	some	of	the	other	government	agencies	actually	have	interest	
that	are	embedded	in	DOD.	As	a	deployed	brigade	commander	in	Iraq	in	southern	Iraq	in	
2010	I	had	members	of	the	CIA,	DIA,	the	NSA,	the	FBI,	the	secret	service,	all	who	were	part	
of	my	organization	or	part	of	my	footprint	that	I	was	responsible	for	ensuring	that	they	
could	do	whatever	the	government	sent	them	there	to	actually	get	done.		
	
Student:	When	there's	a	group	that's	made	up	of	DOD	personnel	and	say	CIA	personnel,	
how	does	that	work	in	terms	of	coordination?			
	
Pete	Newell:	There	are	first	a	series	of	standing	inter-agency	agreements	that	account	for	
cross-agency	activities.	Then	there	are	a	series	of	contingency	plans	that	are	a	reaction	to	
something,	that	automatically	enact.		One	example	is	what	happened	on	9/11.	On	9/11	
little	known	to	anybody	there	was	a	1960’s	agreement	that	allows	the	United	States	Air	
Force	to	take	control	of	all	of	the	air	space	in	the	United	States.	About	30	minutes	after	the	
plane	hit	the	second	tower,	there	was	a	young	watch	officer	at	NORAD,	which	is	in	
Colorado,	who	reads	a	one-line	sentence	over	the	phone	one	line	sentence.	"We	at	NORAD	
are	enacting	...	"	and	what	you	heard	on	the	phone	was	dead	silence	while	people	were	
focused	on	figuring	out	what	he	was	talking	about.	
	
The	first	guy	on	the	phone	is	a	guy	from	the	FAA	who	says	"So	if	I	understand	this	right	you	
want	us	to	turn	off	all	the	navigational	aids	in	the	United	States."	There	was	a	pregnant	
pause	and	this	guy's	flipping	through	the	book,	and	says	"No	I	want	you	to	do	X,	Y,	and	Z."	
In	some	cases	these	are	agreements	and	rules	go	back	years.	In	this	case	there	was	a	staff	
and	decision	makers	who	zeroed	in	on	that	regulation	who	understands	what's	supposed	
to	happen.
This	work	is	licensed	under	a	Creative	Commons	Attribution-Non	Commercial	4.0	International	License	
	
DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 10 of 20
Student:	To	what	extent	is	the	structure	here	embraced	by	personnel	within	DOD?	Like	
how	easy	would	it	work	this	time?	
	
Pete	Newell:	What	you	have	to	understand	is	every	time	an	agency	gets	their	name	up	
here	on	this	chart,	they	have	a	budget	that	comes	with	it	from	Congress.	It	takes	almost	an	
act	of	Congress	to	change	one	of	those	things.	If	you're	a	new	organization	and	you	want	to	
become	an	official	agency,	it	takes	an	act	of	Congress	to	get	your	name	up	here.		From	a	
structural	context	the	last	major	change	that	was	made	was	based	on	the	Goldwater-
Nichols	Act	that	mandated	the	formation	of	combat	commanders	and	a	number	of	other	
things.	It	changes	from	time	to	time,	but	not	frequently.			
	
(Slides	22-24)			
	
As	I	mentioned,	the	services	–	the	Army,	Navy,	Air	Force,	Marines	job	
is	to	provide	people	and	equipment	to	the	combatant	commanders	
who	are	responsible	for	the	world.		
	
On	the	bottom	of	this	chart	are	the	combatant	commands.		The	
African	Command	(AFRICOM)	is	a	command	responsible	for	53	African	countries.	The	
Central	Command	(CENTCOM)	is	responsible	for	the	Middle	East,	North	Africa	and	Central	
Asia.	They	are	also	responsible	for	prosecuting	one	war	in	Iraq,	one	in	Afghanistan,	and	
also	dealing	with	pirates	outside	of	Yemen.	The	combatant	commanders	get	all	the	bad	
stuff	that	goes	on	in	the	world.	To	help	deal	with	the	world	they	get	people,	equipment,	
assets	from	all	of	these	Services,	and	from	all	of	those	agencies	that	listed	on	the	previous	
slide.	
	
Based	on	their	missions	they	have	a	series	of	contingency	plans	that	are	developed	in	
response	to	the	strategies,	that	say,	“if	this	happens	we	apportion	these	kinds	of	forces	to	
you.”	Each	one	of	those	things	also	comes	with	a	budget.	And	the	budget	come	with	specific	
“types	of	money”	called	“titles	of	money.”	Title	X	money	belongs	to	the	services.	For	
instances,	as	the	Director	of	the	Army's	Rapid	Equipping	Force,	I	had	a	$200	million	budget	
which	was	title	X	money.	
	
I'll	give	you	a	scenario.	In	Afghanistan,	if	a	Marine	element	working	as	part	of	an	Army	
organization	came	to	us	and	said	“hey	we're	having	a	problem	and	we	need	to	find	a	
solution	for,”	I	couldn't	do	it.	I	couldn't	give	it	to	them	because	I	couldn't	spend	title	10	
money	directed	to	the	Army	by	Congress	to	provide	equipment	to	the	Marines.	However,	I	
could	provide	that	equipment	to	the	Army	element	that	controlled	them,	who	could	then	
assign	it	down	to	them.		
	
There	are	titles	of	money	directed	at	Reserves	and	National	Guard	forces	strictly	for	their	
use	in	the	United	States.	There	are	titles	of	money	for	combatant	commanders.	There	is	a	
different	title	of	money	that's	directed	to	them	for	their	contingency	operations	to	do	
things	and	then	there's	all	kinds	of	colors	of	money	related	on	what	activities	they	place	in	
the	say	of	things.	We’ll	come	back	to	talk	about	the	“colors	of	money”	in	Slide	27.
This	work	is	licensed	under	a	Creative	Commons	Attribution-Non	Commercial	4.0	International	License	
	
DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 11 of 20
The	key	takeaway	here	is	the	world's	broken	up	into	regions,	that	are	run	by	combatant	
commands.	And	it’s	these	combatant	commands	start	to	identify	gaps	based	on	their	
operations.		
	
For	example,	In	Central	command,	the	Army	and	Department	of	Defense	felt	that	getting	
MRAPS	into	Iraq	would	save	soldiers	in	Humvees	from	getting	blown	up	by	IEDs.	MRAPs	
were	the	best	thing	since	sliced	butter,	but	they	were	as	big	as	an	elephant,	armored	but	
saved	lots	of	lives.	We	moved	to	Afghanistan	and	MRAPS	there	were	like	driving	in	
quicksand.	Very	shortly	afterward	the	CENTCOM	Commander	was	telling	the	Department	
of	Defense	is	the	MRAPs	they	were	providing	in	Afghanistan	were	inadequate	to	meet	the	
conditions	of	the	environment	and	that	created	a	gap.	
	
(Slide	25)		
That	gap	then,	leads	us	back	to	that	JCIDS	process	I	mentioned	
on	the	initial	slide.		In	JCIDs	a	gap	is	assigned	a	priority	for	
somebody	then	to	go	figure	out	how	to	solve	it.	That	solution	
then	turns	into	a	requirement.	The	solution	in	this	case	was	
adifferent	kind	of	armored	vehicle	which	were	a	smaller	version	
of	the	MRAP.		They	were	lighter,	could	handle	the	sand	a	little	
better.	
	
Here	we	go.	Gaps,	not	requirements,	gaps.	Those	top	three	the	competition	with	what	these	
guys	say	they	have	to	do	in	order	to	actually	achieve	something.	So	lets	take	one	of	the	
teams	in	class	here,	distributed	ISR.	Is	it	a	gap	or	a	requirement?		
	
Student:	It	is	a	gap,	
	
Pete	Newell:	Who's	gap	is	it?	
	
Student:	The	gap	is	lack	of	a	capability	to	rapidly,	to	have	eyes	on	most	of	the	domain	the	
7th	Fleet	is	supposed	to	be	keeping	track	of,	and	simultaneously	be	able	to	deploy	
something	quickly	to,	if	they	wanted	to	see	something	rapidly.	
	
Pete	Newell:	Correct.	If	I'm	responsible	for	hunting	Russian	nuclear	submarines	in	the	
Pacific	and	I	can't	find	them	because	the	ocean's	too	big,	it's	a	gap.	If	I	am	responsible	for	
securing	the	high	speed	access	to	the	western	coast	from	drug	and	illegal	people	
immigration,	those	kinds	of	things,	that's	a	gap.	Which	combatant	command	is	it?	
	
It’s	PACOM	where	7th	Fleet	is	assigned	as	a	Navy	component	to	the	command.		We'll	walk	
through	a	little	bit,	but	you	can	see	where	from	multiple	perspectives	the	same	gap	may	
produce	different	requirements.	The	gap	is	still	the	center,	we	can't	manage	to	do	X,	Y,	or	Z.	
	
(Slide	26)		
Obviously	there	is	friction	there.	I'll	tell	you	this	happens	a	lot.	
These	guys	get	a	budget	and	they	plan	on	a	five-year	cycle.	I	
started	building	a	tank	in	year	1,	we're	coming	up	with	a	solution
This	work	is	licensed	under	a	Creative	Commons	Attribution-Non	Commercial	4.0	International	License	
	
DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 12 of 20
that	I'm	still	deploying	in	year	5.	However,	in	Year	2,	the	combatant	commander	comes	in	
and	says	whatever	you	were	building	doesn't	solve	my	problem	any	more.	The	guy	up	at	
the	top	says,	well	if	you	want	me	to	start	over	it's	going	to	be	another	five	years	before	I	get	
your	solution	to	you.	
	
In	some	cases	the	combatant	commands	will	use	their	money	to	actually	procure	material	
solutions	that	fill	immediate	gaps.	When	they're	done	with	the	material,	or	when	it	gets	
really	expensive	to	maintain,	they'll	look	at	the	service,	because	they	have	all	the	
authorities	to	maintain	that	stuff,	and	say	here	you	go	I	need	the	maintenance	package	that	
goes	with	this	stuff.	There's	friction	between	the	two	over	how	they	solve	those	kinds	of	
problems.	When	it	happens	it	can	be	really	ugly.	
	
Student:	8	problems	were	chosen	for	the	teams	in	this	room	to	work	on.	Were	any	of	them	
requirements,	or	were	they	all	gaps?	
	
Pete	Newell:	None	of	them	are	full-fledged	requirements.	A	lot	of	people	misuse	the	
terminology.	I	have	a	“requirement”	to	fix	this	problem.	The	only	way	you	get	a	
requirement	is	to	come	out	the	bottom	end	of	this	massive	chart	up	here.	We	very	
specifically	told	our	sponsors	not	to	give	us	requirements.	Your	gap	came	from	the	part	of	
the	chart	up	here	under	joint	operating	concepts.		
	
Eventually	gaps	turn	into	JCIDS	recommendations	that	say	we're	going	buy	a	tank	that	
requires	three	people	that	has	to	be	trained	and	sustained,	and	a	long	list	of	things	that	
goes	with	it.	Eventually	that	comes	out	a	list	of	requirements.	
Once	it	comes	out	as	a	real	requirement	it's	very,	very	hard	to	change	because	you	have	to	
go	back	through	the	entire	process.	In	our	case,	for	this	class	we	very	specifically	vetted	
some	of	the	problems	to	ensure	that	they	were	more	on	the	gap	side,	that	they	hadn't	
determined	what	the	requirement	was	going	to	be	and	it	wasn't	well	within	that	process.	
	
All	of	the	problems	for	this	class	fall	within	recognized	gaps	that	are	out	there	…	
	
Student:	What's	the	authority	that	certifies	that	a	requirement	has	been	met?	For	instance,	
if	I	have	a	requirement	that's	out	there	and	I'd	like	to	be	a	little	bit	flexible	with	it.	Who	
certifies	that	yes	the	requirement	is	met	and	the	way	that	it's	met?	
	
Pete	Newell:	I'll	give	you	the	book	answer	and	then	I'll	tell	you	the	politics.		
At	one	time	they	set	a	standard	for	measuring	battery	usage:	9	people	operating	for	72	
hours	away	from	the	base.	This	makes	sense.	72	hours	means	we	carry	a	lot	of	weight,	a	lot	
of	water,	food	and	a	lot	of	batteries.	At	the	time	depending	upon	what	mission	we	were	
performing	in	Afghanistan	those	my	guys	had	to	distribute	247	pounds	of	batteries	to	
operate	for	72	hours.	
	
The	first	standard	that	is	set	is	not	really	a	standard	for	the	requirements.	it	used	for	the	
standard	for	the	measurement	of	performing	effectively	for	72	hours.	So	the	first	guy	says	
why	is	it	72	hours	and	not	120	hours.	Nuclear	power	guys	who	have	it	in	their	heads	that	
they	want	to	deploy	small	nuclear	devices	to	power	this.	You	know	what	those	nuke	dudes
This	work	is	licensed	under	a	Creative	Commons	Attribution-Non	Commercial	4.0	International	License	
	
DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 13 of 20
have?	They	have	a	really	good	powerful	lobbyist.	That	caused	a	debate	for	18	months	over	
the	capabilities	manager	and	the	other	guys	who	said	72	hours	is	standard.	They	had	to	go	
back	over	10	years	worth	of	documents	to	articulate	why	the	standard	was	72	not	120	or	
24,	or	something	else.	Because	as	soon	as	you	open	a	can	of	worms	everybody	comes	in	and	
says	well	my	solution	would	be	perfect	if	it	was	24	hours.	But	if	it's	36	then	I'm	useless.	I've	
got	a	lobbyist,	I'm	going	to	attack	the	system	to	try	and	get	the	standard	changed.	
	
People	play	a	lot	of	games	when	it	comes	to	who	determines	the	requirement.	Within	the	
Army,	the	Training	and	Doctrine	Command	is	responsible	for	actually	training	people	and	
determining	how	many	pieces	of	equipment	we	need	to	perform	a	mission	is	responsible	
for	writing	the	initial	requirement	document.	That	document	then	goes	to	the	Pentagon	
where	it	goes	through	a	series	of	boards.	The	boards	then	decide	that	yes	is	it	a	valid	
requirement	written	correctly,	the	parameters	fit	within	our	priorities,	it	doesn't	violate	
the	law,	etc.	I	can't	tell	you	how	many	of	those	boards	there	are.	Eventually	it	comes	out	the	
other	end	and	poof	we	have	a	requirement.		
	
It	depends	on	what	you're	touching	and	how	many	different	complexities	there	are	to	it,	
but	if	you	listen	carefully	you'll	start	to	hear	vendors	and	other	people	who	have	things	to	
sell	starting	to	talk	about	how	their	thing	does	better	than	something	else.	They'll	start	
quoting	numbers.	I've	done	it	with	sensors.	I'm	actually	working	on	a	vehicle	at	one	point	at	
Georgia	Tech	Research	Institute	validating	the	sensors	placed	inside	striker	vehicles	to	
provide	data	logging	against	IED	blasts.	We	wanted	to	know	what	happened	inside	the	
vehicle.	We	came	up	with	a	set	of	parameters	for	that	sensor.	It	was	a	pounds	per	square	
inch	reading	that	it	had	to	withstand.	Literally	I	had	a	vendor	start	a	Congressional	
investigation	over	why	it	was	10	pounds	and	not	8	pounds	-	because	it	meant	his	versus	
another	vendor’s	sensor.	
	
You	run	into	those	things	all	the	time.	Which	is	why	sometimes	somebody	is	willing	to	say	
exactly	what	it	is	because	as	soon	as	you	said	it,	and	you	can't	retract	it.	I	know	that's	a	long	
answer	but	I	just	want	to	tell	you	it's	not	simple.	
	
Student:	for	a	program	like	space-based	radar,	led	by	Air	Force,	do	they	consider	the	needs	
of	other	agencies	and	take	requirements	from	those	people?	
	
Pete	Newell:	If	they're	smart	they	will.	They'll	not	only	consider	what	those	other	people	
need,	they'll	consider	what	those	people	are	already	doing.	If	you	want	to	be	successful	you	
avoid	duplicating	something	else.		
	
Student:	Who	was	the	main	sponsor	of	this	class?	I	was	just	wondering	what's	their	
expectation	from	the	outcome	of	the	class.	…	
	
Pete	Newell:	Do	you	mean,	“What's	the	gap	that	this	class	meets?”	It’s	the	Lack	of	DOD/IC	
innovation.	There	is	a	lack	of	opportunity	for	young	technologist	to	perform	a	national	
public	service.	There	is	a	massive	gap	between	the	military	and	the	civilians	that	they're	
charged	with	protecting.	A	shrinking	military	in	a	very	complex	world	where	technology	is	
blowing	past	them	at	light	speed	who	has	no	access	to	the	intellect	that	you	have	on	a
This	work	is	licensed	under	a	Creative	Commons	Attribution-Non	Commercial	4.0	International	License	
	
DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 14 of 20
recurring	basis.	Those	are	all	gaps.	Nobody's	written	a	requirement,	although	they're	
talking	all	over	the	place	about	how	do	you	deal	with	those	issues.	For	folks	like	us	that	
recognize	that	there's	a	gap	our	hope	is	that	we	can	step	in	and	prototype	something	to	
help	validate	that	the	gap	is	real	and	that	there	maybe	a	potential	pathway	to	solving	it.	
	
This	class	is	exactly	what's	going	to	happen.	We'll	prototype	it.	It's	a	pilot.	It's	going	to	
grow.	Somebody	in	the	government	is	going	to	decide	to	put	a	whole	lot	of	money	in	it,	you	
know	$20-$30	million	a	year	to	ensure	that	it	grows	into	another	30	colleges	across	the	
country.	Somebody	else	from	another	agency	says	that's	really	cool	I	want	to	connect	my	
program	to	it.	And	eventually	we'll	be	at	the	sustainment	mode.	…		
	
Student:	We	spoke	with	some	folks	from	a	big	system	integrator	who	said	said	that	part	of	
the	reason	why	the	sensors	are	so	expensive	and	hard	to	deploy	is	because	we	have	to	
source	everything	through	the	US	facilities	and	assemble	in	secure	facilities,	and	so	on	and	
so	forth.	If	our	solution	goes	down	this	pipeline,	at	what	point	might	we	be	expect	for	
someone	to	say	hey	we	need	to	source	everything	in	the	US.	
	
Jackie	Space:		You	are	too	early	in	the	process	to	judge	where	you	need	to	source	it.		
Because	they	have	to	go	through	the	traditional	defense	industrial	base	for	the	most	part	its	
true.	But	I	think	that	there	are	certainly	sensors	or	other	technologies	potentially	that	are	
being	built	on	the	outside.	Eventually	at	some	point,	if	you're	going	to	continue	
development	on	something	big	you	will	have	to	consider	that.	
	
Student:	…I	guess	you're	saying	in	commercial	sites	their	tolerance	for	sensor	error	are	a	
lot	higher	because	they're	not	used	to	approaching	it	from	the	‘hey	we	can	fix	this	area.’	
They	need	to	have	a	much	lower	error.	…		
	
Pete	Newell:	I	would	say	there's	a	fundamental	difference	when	you	apply	them	with	
public	mind	that	has	to	be	accounted	for	to	the	nth	level.	My	experience	in	dealing	with	
these	folks,	and	it's	not	because	they're	bad	people	but	the	system	creates	bad	behaviors.	It	
dis-incents	people	to	take	risk.		Not	only	are	they	not	rewarded	for	accepting	risk	and	
failing	but	they're	actually	punished	for	not	being	perfect.	So	in	the	goal	of	trying	to	
perfectly	acquire	something	we	tend	to	fail	bigger,	more	frequently	than	we	would	
otherwise.	Part	of	the	beauty	of	what	Steve	Blank	has	done	with	Lean	LaunchPad	is	
essentially	build	a	framework	by	which,	with	a	little	bit	of	translating,	we've	been	able	to	
provide	a	strategy	by	which	we	can	fail	in	this	system	much	earlier	and	much	less	
expensively.		
	
At	least	that's	our	hypothesis.	That's	where	we're	at	today.	…		
	
Jackie	Space:		There	are	places	in	the	government	that	are	always	going	to	remain	military	
grade.	The	billion-dollar	satellite	that	they	launch	that	enables	somebody	to	read	a	license	
plate?	That's	going	to	stay	a	military	grade	system,	but	there's	this	awareness	now	in	the	
military	and	government	that	there's	a	lot	of	other	things	out	there	that	are	good	enough,	
with	a	much	lower	resolution	that	you	can	find	the	private	industry.
This	work	is	licensed	under	a	Creative	Commons	Attribution-Non	Commercial	4.0	International	License	
	
DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 15 of 20
(Slide	27)		
Pete	Newell:	One	of	the	things	that	you	have	to	understand	is	
money	has	different	colors.	There's	different	types	of	money	
to	say	what	it	was	used	for.	Believe	it	or	not	the	Department	
of	Defense	caused	itself	this	problem.	It	doesn't	have	to	be	
this	way.	If	Congress	would	quite	honestly	change	it	if	DOD	
said	“we	want	to	change	it.”	But	here's	what	happens.	
	
Operations	money	is	essentially	one-year	money	that	is	used	
for	everything	from	buying	toilet	paper	in	a	barracks	to	paying	for	gas	for	vehicles	or	for	
buying	things	that	cost	less	than	$250,000	per	item.		I	can	buy	something	for	$200,000,	
even	if	it's	a	piece	of	equipment,	using	operational	dollars.	
	
The	problem	that	you	run	into	with	operational	money	though	is	on	the	30th	of	September	
it	goes	away.	It	doesn't	go	back	into	the	government's	bank,	it	doesn't	go	back	into	some	
magic	bag	to	pull	out	later.	It	is	gone.	Disappeared.	
	
If	you	are	working	on	a	problem	and	a	guy	suddenly	shows	up	in	July	and	says	I've	got	a	
million	dollars	I	can	spend	it	today,	what	can	I	get.	My	guess	is	he's	probably	using	end	of	
year	money	and	he's	in	a	panic	because	he	knows	it	disappears	the	30th	of	September.		
	
Here	is	what	happens.		The	folks	in	the	Pentagon	who	manage	a	massive	budget	say	on	the	
30th	of	August	if	you	have	money	left	in	your	account	subordinate	to	us	we're	taking	it	all	
and	we're	going	to	spend	it	on	our	un-forecasted	requirements.	So	the	next	layer	down,	
they	say	“if	you	have	money	left	in	your	budget	on	the	30th	of	July	we're	taking	it	all	for	our	
use.	On	it	goes	until	you	have	the	poor	guy,	who	on	the	1st	of	April,	is	in	a	panic	because	he	
hasn't	spent	his	money	yet.		
	
Jackie	Space:	If	you	don't	spend	your	money	you	get	your	budget	slashed	the	next	year.	
They	say	oh	you	didn't	spend	your	money.	…	another	point	on	these	colors	of	money	is	that	
if	you	have	a	project	that	you're	working	on	you	should	be	asking	beneficiaries	what	type	of	
money	are	you	working	with.	How	you	end	up	putting	your	proposal	and	projects	together	
can	actually	fit	in	all	three	of	those	depending	on	how	you	write	it.	Really	having	an	
understanding	beforehand	of	what	type	of	money	you're	working	with	is	very	important	
	
Pete	Newell:	Here	are	the	questions	you	start	to	ask	so	you	can	figure	out	where	they	are.	
First,	procurement	dollars.	I	will	tell	you	procurement	is	not	my	expertise.	I	probably	
violated	more	rules	than	not.	Procurement	process	was	designed	to	buy	much	larger	
things.	That's	how	we	buy	tanks.	That's	how	we	buy	sustainment.	The	life	cycle	cost	of	
putting	something	out	there.	Unfortunately,	you	can't	use	procurement	dollars	to	buy	toilet	
paper	or	anything	like	that.	So	it’s	designed	to	buy	major	items.	
	
It	does	last	for	three	years.	Which	means	that	we're	in	the	middle	of	2016	so	at	the	end	of	
September	2016,	2014	procurement	money	is	going	to	expire.	Why	is	that	important	to	
know.	If	somebody's	telling	you	“hey	come	do	this	for	us	we've	got	$3	million,”	You	might	
want	to	ask	what	the	expiration	year	is.	Because	if	something's	dragging	along	and	you're
This	work	is	licensed	under	a	Creative	Commons	Attribution-Non	Commercial	4.0	International	License	
	
DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 16 of 20
about	to	hit	the	30th	of	September,	and	you	don't	know	if	the	contract	is	going	to	be	signed	
yet,	if	it's	expiring	money	you're	not	going	any	further.	
	
Jackie	Space:	The	smart	money	manager	will	have	his	money	spent	by	July	1st	just	to	avoid	
losing	it	or	his	contracts.	A	lot	of	people	don't,	so	another	smart	manager	knows	how	to	go	
around	get	money	to	use	in	their	program	from	people	that	can't	get	their	money	spent.	
One	of	the	questions	when	you're	talking	to	your	program	sponsor,	especially	program	
managers,	is	how	do	you	handle	your	end	of	year	budget.		You	want	to	know	if	they	are	
good	at	planning	money	at	end	of	year	to	support	your	programs.		
	
Pete	Newell:	I'm	going	to	hit	the	last	one,	RDT&E	money,	research,	development,	testing	
and	evaluation	money.	With	this	money	you	can	build	prototypes,	you	can	test,	etc.		Most	of	
you	working	on	your	solutions	would	likely	first	touch	RDT&E	money.		
	
There	are	special	cases	of	money	starting	with	purple	money	which	means	they	can	do	
whatever	they	want	with	it.	In	some	of	these	cases	organizations	have	been	given	special	
authorities	to	allow	them	to	essentially	break	all	the	rules.	The	problem	sometimes	though	
is	when	you're	given	special	authorities	you	also	get	special	oversight.	Those	organizations	
are	probably	the	most	scrutinized	organizations	out	there	in	terms	of	Congressional	
oversight.	Not	that	they're	going	to	do	something	wrong	but	because	Congressmen	want	to	
know	that	that	money's	being	spent	where	they	think	it's	being	spent.	
	
The	Secretary	of	Defense	has	a	Rapid	Acquisition	Authority	(RAA).			When	I	was	with	the	
Rapid	Equipping	Force,	the	Secretary	of	Defense	could	authorize	the	up	to	$200	million	a	
year	in	RAA	that	would	allow	us	to	change	the	way	money	was	used.		To	use	that	authority	
we	would	simply	write	a	memo	that	says	we	are	going	to	use	RDT&E	money	to	buy	gas	or	
something	like	that	and	staff	it	through	the	Secretary.		If	he	approved	the	request	we	were	
able	to	do	what	we	needed	to.	It	wasn’t	easy	but	it	wasn’t	hard	either.	It	was	fairly	quick	but	
it	also	required	Congressional	notification	because	we	were	doing	something	other	than	
what	Congress	directed	with	the	money.	
	
The	following	type	of	money	is	one	you	have	to	pay	attention	to.	Overseas	Contingency	
Operating	money.	This	is	the	thing	they	slap	on	top	of	the	budget	every	year	because	we	
keep	having	conflicts	someplace	that	weren’t	planned	for	as	part	of	the	budget.	What	you	
have	to	know	about	OCO	is	that	if	you're	working	on	something	and	somebody's	offering	
you	OCO	money	to	do	something,	what	you're	doing	has	to	be	focused	on	solving	a	gap	
overseas.	You	can't	use	OCO	dollars	everywhere,	because	right	now	I	think	OCO	is	still	
limited	to	CENTCOM	which	means	that	we	can't	solve	the	distributed	ISR	problem	in	
PACOM	using	these	dollars	-	even	if	that's	all	we	have	at	our	disposal.	
	
The	last	thing	you	ought	to	pay	attention	to,	continual	resolutions	(CR’s).	For	example,	if	
we're	not	going	to	pass	a	defense	budget	in	September	because	Congress	wants	to	see	what	
how	the	election	turns	out	first,	we	will	likely	end	up	with	a	continuing	resulution	to	fund	
the	DoD.	What	happens	with	a	continuing	resolution	is	that	the	budget	folks	will	say	“you	
are	not	allowed	to	program	spending	more	than	65%	of	last	year's	budget.”	That	poor	guy	
who's	supposed	to	spend	all	his	money	by	April	or	if	it’s	already	taken	away,	is	now	told
This	work	is	licensed	under	a	Creative	Commons	Attribution-Non	Commercial	4.0	International	License	
	
DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 17 of 20
you've	got	to	stretch	65%	of	your	budget	to	last	all	year.	When	the	budgets	finally	passed	in	
January,	what	happens?	He	suddenly	has	this	massive	(influx)	of	cash	and	he's	got	how	long	
to	spend	it?	Two	months.	
	
Which	means	he	has	to	figure	out	what	he's	going	to	buy,	he	has	to	contract	it,	he	has	to	do	
everything	in	a	very	short	period	of	time.	
	
Student:	So	they	literally	cannot	spend	35%	of	that	budget	on	anything	over	this	period?	…	
	
Pete	Newell:	No,	in	fact	they	have	to	turn	in	a	budget	that	does	not	exceed	65%	of	the	
previous	year’s	budget	and	show	how	that	will	cover	them	for	the	entire	year.	Once	there	is	
a	Defense	budget	passed,	they	have	to	submit	a	whole	new	budget.	This	means	they're	
always	playing	with	two	budgets.	This	is	sometimes	what	causes	expensive	programs	to	
triple	in	expense.		Failure	of	politicians	to	do	their	job	is	one	of	the	biggest	expenses	we	
have.	
	
(Slide	28)	
	Let’s	go	back	to	the	mission	model	canvas;	Value	
propositions,	buy	in,	advocates	…	according	to	who?	
There	are	a	lot	of	people	out	here	who	will	tell	you	they	
fall	in	all	three	of	these	categories.	On	this	slide	is	a	list	
of	folks	you	should	look	for.		On	it	I've	also	left	you	
some	questions	you	ought	to	be	asking	whoever	you	
are	talking	to.	
	
The	first	one	is:	
• who	are	you?		
• Where	do	you	fall	in	here?	Beneficiary,	advocate,	are	you	both?		
• Are	you	from	a	service?	Are	you	from	a	COCOM?		
• Where	do	you	fit	in	this	massive	list	of	things?		
• What's	your	mission?		
• What	are	you	supposed	to	do?	What	are	you	not	supposed	to	do	and	not	allowed?		
	
Make	sure	you've	got	that	clear	in	your	head,	what	are	they	supposed	to	do,	what	are	they	
not	supposed	to	do.	Where'd	your	funding	come	from?	What	kinds	do	you	have?	What	are	
you	talking	to	me	about?	I	would	ask	about	types	of	contracts	if	it's	appropriate.	Finally,	
who	do	you	work	with?	Then	finally,	who	else	do	you	know	that	has	this	problem	that	
might	be	working	this	area?	
	
This	what	I	call	an	asset	inventory.	Everybody	you	meet	exists	in	an	ecosystem.			You're	
trying	to	figure	out	where	they	belong	and	how	they	connect.	Here	are	8	questions	you	can	
ask	that	will	help	you	clarify	where	they	are.	The	answers	to	those	questions,	or	the	way	
they	answer	them	will	allow	you	to	figure	out	where	they	belong	in	your	ecosystem	of	
things	that	you	might	need	eventually.
This	work	is	licensed	under	a	Creative	Commons	Attribution-Non	Commercial	4.0	International	License	
	
DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 18 of 20
(Slide	29)		
Using	one	of	our	teams	working	on	Distributed	ISR	as	an	
example,	the	sponsor	is	the	7th	Fleet.	The	7th	Fleet	is	part	of	the	
US	Navy,	however	7th	Fleet	is	assigned	to	PACOM	as	the	Navy	
component	of	the	Pacific	command.		
	
So	who	has	the	problem?	Is	it	the	Navy's	problem	or	is	it	
PACOMs	problem?	Or	is	it	both?	Might	they	have	difference	of	
opinion	on	how	to	solve	that	problem	based	on	how	expensive	it	is	to	train	people	and	how	
many	people	it	costs.		Do	you	see	where	the	friction	might	come	from?	You	can	be	given	
conflicting	guidance	when	you're	talking	to	people,	one	side	versus	the	other	side.	
	
All	these	agencies	who	provide	assets	to	PACOM,	probably	have	some	amount	of	equity	in	
that	problem.	By	equity	we	mean	they	have	authority	and	they	have	budgets	to	take	action	
against	parts	of	the	problem.	They	may	also	have	five	different	opinions	on	the	scope	of	the	
problem	that	are	different	than	that	of	PACOM	or	7th	Fleet.		
	
Now,	the	CIA,	the	Coast	Guard,	other	folks.	Don’t	you	think	that	they	might	have	a	vested	
interest	in	how	this	is	solved?	Are	they	a	user?	Are	they	a	capability	provider?	Are	they	an	
advocate?	Are	they	trying	to	kill	the	effort?		
	
Other	services.	If		the	Navy	component	of	PACOM	says	this	is	a	problem	rest	assured	there's	
an	Army	component,	there's	a	Marine	component,	there's	an	Air	Force	component	who	all	
think	it	is	as	well,	but	for	different	reasons.	Do	you	think	they	might	have	a	vested	interest	
in	this?	
	
Finally,	SOCOM	is	a	combatant	command,	but	SOCOM	also	provides	folks	to	PACOM.	So	
SOCOM	has	a	vested	interest	in	this	right?	Slide	28	is	what	you've	got	to	pay	a	lot	of	
attention	to.	Money,	contract,	strategy	and	all	that	other	stuff,	it's	interesting	but	not	
necessarily	going	to	help	you	for	the	next	8	weeks.	Slide	28	will.	
	
Slides	30-36		Jackie	Space:	
So	Pete	just	talked	about	the	acquisition	system	at	large	and	I	want	
to	just	drill	down	really	quickly	into	the	more	practical	aspects	of	
what	it	means	for	your	teams	and	the	program	sponsors	that	you're	
working	with,	the	problem	statements,	and	how	it	fits	into	this.	Also	
for	you're	beneficiaries	and	how	you	should	be	talking	to	them	as	
you're	working	through	their	problems.	
(Slide	31)		
Quickly	about	me,	I'm	a	systems	engineer	by	trade,	I	went	to	the	
Air	Force	Academy.	I	spent	the	majority	of	my	career	doing	
government	acquisitions.	I've	worked	very	large	programs	like	
GPS	and	I've	also	worked	very	small	programs	in	terms	of	getting	
things	rapidly	fielded	into	the	field	from	a	technology	
perspective.
This	work	is	licensed	under	a	Creative	Commons	Attribution-Non	Commercial	4.0	International	License	
	
DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 19 of 20
(Slide	32)		
The	purpose	of	this	slide	is	to	to	convey	to	you	that	even	though	
you're	all	working	with	different	government	organizations	and	
they	all	fall	under	this	big	system	of	acquisitions.	
	
Every	organization	is	quite	different	in	culture	and	so	when	you're	
working	with	them	you	need	to	figure	out,	1)	do	they	move	
rapidly	in	how	they	do	business,	2)	how	they	develop	technology,	3)	how	they	field	them.	
Are	they	focused	on	larger	weapons	systems	and	is	it's	going	to	be	ten	years	before	they	
actual	develop	and	field	capability.	When	I	say	rapid	I	mean	like	less	than	2	years,	versus	
10-year	time	lines.	Part	of	your	work	is	to	figure	out	where	does	your	organization	
program	sponsor	reside	in	that	time	frame.	
	
(Slide	33-34)		
The	whole	acquisition	process	is	designed	to	develop	big	
programs	-	like	the	F35,	ballistic	missile	defense,	helicopters,	-	
that	sort	of	thing.	All	of	this	exists	to	be	able	to	field	big	weapons	
programs.	A	lot	of	the	friction	ends	up	when	we	have	
requirements	or	when	we	have	needs	that	emerge	that	don't	fit	
into	the	time	line.	
	
On	slide	33	we've	got	the	DARPA’s	and	the	Air	Force	Research	Lab	and	the	other	labs	that	
exist	in	the	government	that	are	developing	technology	that	will	probably	never	ever	leave	
the	lab.	Or	in	some	cases	it	will	take	10	years	before	it	actually	does	anything.		On	this	slide		
I	put	some	of	the	organization	that	the	teams	in	the	class	are	working	with	to	show	where	
they	fit	in	technology	maturity	and	how	they're	different	from	both	ends	of	it.	
	
If	you	look	at	two	of	the	sponsors	in	this	class,	the	Asymmetric	Warfare	Group	and	the	Joint	
Improvised	Threat	Defeat	Agency,	they	operate	differently.	They're	not	concerned	about	
weapon	systems	or	developing	things	in	support	of	those	weapon	systems.	These	guys	are	
on	a	rapid	time	line	and	they	want	to	field	capabilities	to	user	requirements	in	less	than	2	
years.	All	of	the	problem	statements	for	teams	in	this	class	fit	within	this	category.	This	is	
where	the	opportunities	reside	to	actually	make	an	impact	because	you	have	a	shorter	time	
line	to	fielding	and	delivery.	
	
Then	you	have	other	organizations	like	SOCOM,	NSA,	CIA,	and	the	service	components	that	
play	in	all	parts	of	the	timeline.	Even	with	the	team	that's	working	with	SOCOM	I	would	bet	
that	they	are	more	on	this	2-year	time	line	for	fielding	a	solution.	But	that's	something	that	
you	should	be	asking	your	program	sponsors	when	you're	working	with	them,	“What	is	
your	traditional	time	line	for	fielding	technologies?”	
	
(Slide	35)		
For	entities	outside	of	the	traditional	defense	industrial	base	
to	engage	(ie.	Startups),	it's	really	in	the	R&D	area	as	well	as	
prototype	development.	One	caution,	when	you	talk	about	
government	R&D,	if	you	bring	a	capability	you	want	the
This	work	is	licensed	under	a	Creative	Commons	Attribution-Non	Commercial	4.0	International	License	
	
DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 20 of 20
government	to	give	you	money	to	help	develop,	you	will	eventually	have	to	deal	with	IP	
issues.	Because	anytime	the	government	gives	you	money	to	develop	something,	they	now	
own	it.	In	other	cases	where	you	have	a	capability	that's	more	developed	that	you	bring	
that	to	the	government	and	demo	it,	that's	when	you	can	actually	maintain	the	majority	of	
your	IP.	
	
(Slide	36)	
I	want	to	talk	more	about	the	questions	that	you	should	be	
talking	to	your	beneficiaries	about.	…Most	of	you	have	
talked	to	the	potential	users	of	your	system	and	you're	
getting	feedback	from	them,	which	is	really	valuable.	
However,	you	need	to	find	the	program	managers	and/or	
the	people	that	are	actually	executing	a	program	that	is	
either	similar	or	has	parts	of	the	problem	that	you're	dealing	with.	That’s	because	the	
program	manager	understands	the	time	line	it	takes	to	field	something,	ie.	What	are	all	the	
things	that	they	have	to	go	through	to	actually	bring	on	a	capability	like	that?	How	do	they	
engage	with	industry?	How	do	they	actually	participate	with	people	outside	of	their	
program?	
	
Finding	that	individual	or	set	of	individuals	is	really	important	will	be	really	important	for	
this	class.	
	
In	terms	of	the	culture,	I	think	it's	incredibly	important	to	as	you're	talking	to	your	
sponsors	to	ask	the	questions	about	the	track	record	of	their	organization	in	actually	
getting	something	like	your	solution	fielded?	How	long	did	it	take?	How	many	times	have	
they	actually	attempted	this	particular	technology	set?	Do	you	know	who	the	mission	
partners	around	you	that	may	be	able	to	contribute	to	that?	
	
To	get	more	information	go	to	FedBizOpps.gov.	FedBizOpps.gov	is	the	main	mechanism	by	
which	the	government	will	post	or	solicit	for	industry	feedback.	They'll	post	their	problems	
saying,	we	want	a	proposal	or	we	want	some	information	around	this	actual	technology	
that	we're	looking	at.	If	you	go	to	FedBizOpps.gov	and	you	type	in	a	keyword	around	your	
particular	problem,	what	comes	up	will	be	really	interesting	because	you	might	find	that	
there's	five	or	six	other	organizations	that	are	actually	soliciting	for	the	same	technology.	
	
Thanks,	
	
Joe	Felter,	Pete	Newell,	Jackie	Space

Weitere ähnliche Inhalte

Andere mochten auch

H4D Lecture 2 Stanford 2016 value proposition canvas
H4D Lecture 2 Stanford 2016 value proposition canvasH4D Lecture 2 Stanford 2016 value proposition canvas
H4D Lecture 2 Stanford 2016 value proposition canvasStanford University
 
Aqualink Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016
Aqualink Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016Aqualink Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016
Aqualink Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016Stanford University
 
Sentinel Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016
Sentinel Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016Sentinel Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016
Sentinel Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016Stanford University
 
Narrative Mind Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016
Narrative Mind Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016Narrative Mind Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016
Narrative Mind Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016Stanford University
 
Guardian Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016
Guardian Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016Guardian Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016
Guardian Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016Stanford University
 

Andere mochten auch (8)

H4D Lecture 2 Stanford 2016 value proposition canvas
H4D Lecture 2 Stanford 2016 value proposition canvasH4D Lecture 2 Stanford 2016 value proposition canvas
H4D Lecture 2 Stanford 2016 value proposition canvas
 
Skynet Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016
Skynet Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016Skynet Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016
Skynet Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016
 
Aqualink Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016
Aqualink Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016Aqualink Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016
Aqualink Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016
 
Sentinel Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016
Sentinel Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016Sentinel Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016
Sentinel Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016
 
Narrative Mind Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016
Narrative Mind Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016Narrative Mind Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016
Narrative Mind Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016
 
Guardian Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016
Guardian Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016Guardian Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016
Guardian Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016
 
H4d DOD 101 workshop 040516
H4d DOD 101 workshop 040516H4d DOD 101 workshop 040516
H4d DOD 101 workshop 040516
 
LTTT Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016
LTTT Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016LTTT Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016
LTTT Week 2 H4D Stanford 2016
 

Mehr von Stanford University

Team Networks - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Networks  - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power CompetitionTeam Networks  - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Networks - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power CompetitionStanford University
 
Team LiOn Batteries - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team LiOn Batteries  - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power CompetitionTeam LiOn Batteries  - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team LiOn Batteries - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power CompetitionStanford University
 
Team Quantum - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Quantum  - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power CompetitionTeam Quantum  - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Quantum - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power CompetitionStanford University
 
Team Disinformation - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Disinformation  - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power CompetitionTeam Disinformation  - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Disinformation - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power CompetitionStanford University
 
Team Wargames - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Wargames  - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power CompetitionTeam Wargames  - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Wargames - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power CompetitionStanford University
 
Team Acquistion - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Acquistion  - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition Team Acquistion  - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Acquistion - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition Stanford University
 
Team Climate Change - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Climate Change - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition Team Climate Change - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Climate Change - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition Stanford University
 
Altuna Engr245 2022 Lessons Learned
Altuna Engr245 2022 Lessons LearnedAltuna Engr245 2022 Lessons Learned
Altuna Engr245 2022 Lessons LearnedStanford University
 
Invisa Engr245 2022 Lessons Learned
Invisa Engr245 2022 Lessons LearnedInvisa Engr245 2022 Lessons Learned
Invisa Engr245 2022 Lessons LearnedStanford University
 
ānanda Engr245 2022 Lessons Learned
ānanda Engr245 2022 Lessons Learnedānanda Engr245 2022 Lessons Learned
ānanda Engr245 2022 Lessons LearnedStanford University
 
Gordian Knot Center Roundtable w/Depty SecDef
Gordian Knot Center Roundtable w/Depty SecDef Gordian Knot Center Roundtable w/Depty SecDef
Gordian Knot Center Roundtable w/Depty SecDef Stanford University
 
Team Army venture capital - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competi...
Team Army venture capital - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competi...Team Army venture capital - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competi...
Team Army venture capital - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competi...Stanford University
 
Team Army venture capital - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competi...
Team Army venture capital - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competi...Team Army venture capital - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competi...
Team Army venture capital - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competi...Stanford University
 
Team Catena - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Catena - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power CompetitionTeam Catena - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Catena - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power CompetitionStanford University
 
Team Apollo - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Apollo - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power CompetitionTeam Apollo - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Apollo - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power CompetitionStanford University
 
Team Drone - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Drone - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power CompetitionTeam Drone - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Drone - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power CompetitionStanford University
 
Team Short Circuit - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Short Circuit - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power CompetitionTeam Short Circuit - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Short Circuit - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power CompetitionStanford University
 
Team Aurora - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Aurora - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power CompetitionTeam Aurora - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Aurora - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power CompetitionStanford University
 
Team Conflicted Capital Team - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Comp...
Team Conflicted Capital Team - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Comp...Team Conflicted Capital Team - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Comp...
Team Conflicted Capital Team - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Comp...Stanford University
 
Lecture 8 - Technology, Innovation and Great Power Competition - Cyber
Lecture 8 - Technology, Innovation and Great Power Competition - CyberLecture 8 - Technology, Innovation and Great Power Competition - Cyber
Lecture 8 - Technology, Innovation and Great Power Competition - CyberStanford University
 

Mehr von Stanford University (20)

Team Networks - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Networks  - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power CompetitionTeam Networks  - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Networks - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
 
Team LiOn Batteries - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team LiOn Batteries  - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power CompetitionTeam LiOn Batteries  - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team LiOn Batteries - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
 
Team Quantum - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Quantum  - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power CompetitionTeam Quantum  - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Quantum - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
 
Team Disinformation - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Disinformation  - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power CompetitionTeam Disinformation  - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Disinformation - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
 
Team Wargames - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Wargames  - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power CompetitionTeam Wargames  - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Wargames - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
 
Team Acquistion - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Acquistion  - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition Team Acquistion  - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Acquistion - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
 
Team Climate Change - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Climate Change - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition Team Climate Change - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Climate Change - 2022 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
 
Altuna Engr245 2022 Lessons Learned
Altuna Engr245 2022 Lessons LearnedAltuna Engr245 2022 Lessons Learned
Altuna Engr245 2022 Lessons Learned
 
Invisa Engr245 2022 Lessons Learned
Invisa Engr245 2022 Lessons LearnedInvisa Engr245 2022 Lessons Learned
Invisa Engr245 2022 Lessons Learned
 
ānanda Engr245 2022 Lessons Learned
ānanda Engr245 2022 Lessons Learnedānanda Engr245 2022 Lessons Learned
ānanda Engr245 2022 Lessons Learned
 
Gordian Knot Center Roundtable w/Depty SecDef
Gordian Knot Center Roundtable w/Depty SecDef Gordian Knot Center Roundtable w/Depty SecDef
Gordian Knot Center Roundtable w/Depty SecDef
 
Team Army venture capital - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competi...
Team Army venture capital - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competi...Team Army venture capital - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competi...
Team Army venture capital - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competi...
 
Team Army venture capital - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competi...
Team Army venture capital - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competi...Team Army venture capital - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competi...
Team Army venture capital - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competi...
 
Team Catena - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Catena - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power CompetitionTeam Catena - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Catena - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
 
Team Apollo - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Apollo - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power CompetitionTeam Apollo - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Apollo - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
 
Team Drone - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Drone - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power CompetitionTeam Drone - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Drone - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
 
Team Short Circuit - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Short Circuit - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power CompetitionTeam Short Circuit - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Short Circuit - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
 
Team Aurora - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Aurora - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power CompetitionTeam Aurora - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
Team Aurora - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
 
Team Conflicted Capital Team - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Comp...
Team Conflicted Capital Team - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Comp...Team Conflicted Capital Team - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Comp...
Team Conflicted Capital Team - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Comp...
 
Lecture 8 - Technology, Innovation and Great Power Competition - Cyber
Lecture 8 - Technology, Innovation and Great Power Competition - CyberLecture 8 - Technology, Innovation and Great Power Competition - Cyber
Lecture 8 - Technology, Innovation and Great Power Competition - Cyber
 

Kürzlich hochgeladen

General views of Histopathology and step
General views of Histopathology and stepGeneral views of Histopathology and step
General views of Histopathology and stepobaje godwin sunday
 
The basics of sentences session 10pptx.pptx
The basics of sentences session 10pptx.pptxThe basics of sentences session 10pptx.pptx
The basics of sentences session 10pptx.pptxheathfieldcps1
 
Practical Research 1: Lesson 8 Writing the Thesis Statement.pptx
Practical Research 1: Lesson 8 Writing the Thesis Statement.pptxPractical Research 1: Lesson 8 Writing the Thesis Statement.pptx
Practical Research 1: Lesson 8 Writing the Thesis Statement.pptxKatherine Villaluna
 
How to Add a many2many Relational Field in Odoo 17
How to Add a many2many Relational Field in Odoo 17How to Add a many2many Relational Field in Odoo 17
How to Add a many2many Relational Field in Odoo 17Celine George
 
CapTechU Doctoral Presentation -March 2024 slides.pptx
CapTechU Doctoral Presentation -March 2024 slides.pptxCapTechU Doctoral Presentation -March 2024 slides.pptx
CapTechU Doctoral Presentation -March 2024 slides.pptxCapitolTechU
 
In - Vivo and In - Vitro Correlation.pptx
In - Vivo and In - Vitro Correlation.pptxIn - Vivo and In - Vitro Correlation.pptx
In - Vivo and In - Vitro Correlation.pptxAditiChauhan701637
 
How to Make a Field read-only in Odoo 17
How to Make a Field read-only in Odoo 17How to Make a Field read-only in Odoo 17
How to Make a Field read-only in Odoo 17Celine George
 
Diploma in Nursing Admission Test Question Solution 2023.pdf
Diploma in Nursing Admission Test Question Solution 2023.pdfDiploma in Nursing Admission Test Question Solution 2023.pdf
Diploma in Nursing Admission Test Question Solution 2023.pdfMohonDas
 
How to Manage Cross-Selling in Odoo 17 Sales
How to Manage Cross-Selling in Odoo 17 SalesHow to Manage Cross-Selling in Odoo 17 Sales
How to Manage Cross-Selling in Odoo 17 SalesCeline George
 
M-2- General Reactions of amino acids.pptx
M-2- General Reactions of amino acids.pptxM-2- General Reactions of amino acids.pptx
M-2- General Reactions of amino acids.pptxDr. Santhosh Kumar. N
 
HED Office Sohayok Exam Question Solution 2023.pdf
HED Office Sohayok Exam Question Solution 2023.pdfHED Office Sohayok Exam Question Solution 2023.pdf
HED Office Sohayok Exam Question Solution 2023.pdfMohonDas
 
5 charts on South Africa as a source country for international student recrui...
5 charts on South Africa as a source country for international student recrui...5 charts on South Africa as a source country for international student recrui...
5 charts on South Africa as a source country for international student recrui...CaraSkikne1
 
Human-AI Co-Creation of Worked Examples for Programming Classes
Human-AI Co-Creation of Worked Examples for Programming ClassesHuman-AI Co-Creation of Worked Examples for Programming Classes
Human-AI Co-Creation of Worked Examples for Programming ClassesMohammad Hassany
 
Practical Research 1 Lesson 9 Scope and delimitation.pptx
Practical Research 1 Lesson 9 Scope and delimitation.pptxPractical Research 1 Lesson 9 Scope and delimitation.pptx
Practical Research 1 Lesson 9 Scope and delimitation.pptxKatherine Villaluna
 
Quality Assurance_GOOD LABORATORY PRACTICE
Quality Assurance_GOOD LABORATORY PRACTICEQuality Assurance_GOOD LABORATORY PRACTICE
Quality Assurance_GOOD LABORATORY PRACTICESayali Powar
 
Education and training program in the hospital APR.pptx
Education and training program in the hospital APR.pptxEducation and training program in the hospital APR.pptx
Education and training program in the hospital APR.pptxraviapr7
 
How to Add a New Field in Existing Kanban View in Odoo 17
How to Add a New Field in Existing Kanban View in Odoo 17How to Add a New Field in Existing Kanban View in Odoo 17
How to Add a New Field in Existing Kanban View in Odoo 17Celine George
 
How to Show Error_Warning Messages in Odoo 17
How to Show Error_Warning Messages in Odoo 17How to Show Error_Warning Messages in Odoo 17
How to Show Error_Warning Messages in Odoo 17Celine George
 
What is the Future of QuickBooks DeskTop?
What is the Future of QuickBooks DeskTop?What is the Future of QuickBooks DeskTop?
What is the Future of QuickBooks DeskTop?TechSoup
 

Kürzlich hochgeladen (20)

General views of Histopathology and step
General views of Histopathology and stepGeneral views of Histopathology and step
General views of Histopathology and step
 
The basics of sentences session 10pptx.pptx
The basics of sentences session 10pptx.pptxThe basics of sentences session 10pptx.pptx
The basics of sentences session 10pptx.pptx
 
Practical Research 1: Lesson 8 Writing the Thesis Statement.pptx
Practical Research 1: Lesson 8 Writing the Thesis Statement.pptxPractical Research 1: Lesson 8 Writing the Thesis Statement.pptx
Practical Research 1: Lesson 8 Writing the Thesis Statement.pptx
 
How to Add a many2many Relational Field in Odoo 17
How to Add a many2many Relational Field in Odoo 17How to Add a many2many Relational Field in Odoo 17
How to Add a many2many Relational Field in Odoo 17
 
CapTechU Doctoral Presentation -March 2024 slides.pptx
CapTechU Doctoral Presentation -March 2024 slides.pptxCapTechU Doctoral Presentation -March 2024 slides.pptx
CapTechU Doctoral Presentation -March 2024 slides.pptx
 
In - Vivo and In - Vitro Correlation.pptx
In - Vivo and In - Vitro Correlation.pptxIn - Vivo and In - Vitro Correlation.pptx
In - Vivo and In - Vitro Correlation.pptx
 
How to Make a Field read-only in Odoo 17
How to Make a Field read-only in Odoo 17How to Make a Field read-only in Odoo 17
How to Make a Field read-only in Odoo 17
 
Diploma in Nursing Admission Test Question Solution 2023.pdf
Diploma in Nursing Admission Test Question Solution 2023.pdfDiploma in Nursing Admission Test Question Solution 2023.pdf
Diploma in Nursing Admission Test Question Solution 2023.pdf
 
How to Manage Cross-Selling in Odoo 17 Sales
How to Manage Cross-Selling in Odoo 17 SalesHow to Manage Cross-Selling in Odoo 17 Sales
How to Manage Cross-Selling in Odoo 17 Sales
 
M-2- General Reactions of amino acids.pptx
M-2- General Reactions of amino acids.pptxM-2- General Reactions of amino acids.pptx
M-2- General Reactions of amino acids.pptx
 
HED Office Sohayok Exam Question Solution 2023.pdf
HED Office Sohayok Exam Question Solution 2023.pdfHED Office Sohayok Exam Question Solution 2023.pdf
HED Office Sohayok Exam Question Solution 2023.pdf
 
5 charts on South Africa as a source country for international student recrui...
5 charts on South Africa as a source country for international student recrui...5 charts on South Africa as a source country for international student recrui...
5 charts on South Africa as a source country for international student recrui...
 
Personal Resilience in Project Management 2 - TV Edit 1a.pdf
Personal Resilience in Project Management 2 - TV Edit 1a.pdfPersonal Resilience in Project Management 2 - TV Edit 1a.pdf
Personal Resilience in Project Management 2 - TV Edit 1a.pdf
 
Human-AI Co-Creation of Worked Examples for Programming Classes
Human-AI Co-Creation of Worked Examples for Programming ClassesHuman-AI Co-Creation of Worked Examples for Programming Classes
Human-AI Co-Creation of Worked Examples for Programming Classes
 
Practical Research 1 Lesson 9 Scope and delimitation.pptx
Practical Research 1 Lesson 9 Scope and delimitation.pptxPractical Research 1 Lesson 9 Scope and delimitation.pptx
Practical Research 1 Lesson 9 Scope and delimitation.pptx
 
Quality Assurance_GOOD LABORATORY PRACTICE
Quality Assurance_GOOD LABORATORY PRACTICEQuality Assurance_GOOD LABORATORY PRACTICE
Quality Assurance_GOOD LABORATORY PRACTICE
 
Education and training program in the hospital APR.pptx
Education and training program in the hospital APR.pptxEducation and training program in the hospital APR.pptx
Education and training program in the hospital APR.pptx
 
How to Add a New Field in Existing Kanban View in Odoo 17
How to Add a New Field in Existing Kanban View in Odoo 17How to Add a New Field in Existing Kanban View in Odoo 17
How to Add a New Field in Existing Kanban View in Odoo 17
 
How to Show Error_Warning Messages in Odoo 17
How to Show Error_Warning Messages in Odoo 17How to Show Error_Warning Messages in Odoo 17
How to Show Error_Warning Messages in Odoo 17
 
What is the Future of QuickBooks DeskTop?
What is the Future of QuickBooks DeskTop?What is the Future of QuickBooks DeskTop?
What is the Future of QuickBooks DeskTop?
 

Introduction to the DOD 101 workshop - narrative H$D Stanford 2016

  • 1. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 1 of 20 Hacking for Defense @ Stanford DOD/IC 101 Workshop Read this narrative along with the slides at http://www.slideshare.net/sblank/h4d-dod-101-workshop-040516 Slides 1 -11 Joe Felter: In the spirit of doing more work than any of your other classes, it's 7pm and its not a scheduled class session and you're all here. We appreciate all of you attending and we’ll not waste your time. I'm going to give you a little background, and a few vignettes and context to help frame and understand the nature of the contemporary and emerging challenges we are facing. This is a brave new world and a threat environment unlike those we have faced in previous decades. I’d like to describe the complexities and challenges of this environment to help you get you motivated to address the problems your teams are taking on. Next, Pete Newell is going to give you some background on where our DOD and IC problems come from. And our guest, Jackie Space is going to talk to us about some of the practical applications of the acquisition process and the challenges and opportunities it presents. (Slide 2) This is a scene from West Point in 1963. You may recognize the speaker, Douglas MacArthur, just before he passed away. This is his famous duty honor country speech. …the “big idea”- to use Steve Blank’s vernacular - from this speech was that, “the mission of West Point cadets and the entire DOD is to win our nation's wars”. How do we do this? Think about the types of wars that General MacArthur was thinking of when he said "Our mission is to win our wars." (Slide 3) Back in his day, wars were not easy but much simpler to understand how to fight. When a state was attacked, they knew the source of the attack and it was usually another nation state with the capacity to project power. For example, consider the aftermath of Pearl Harbor. We knew who attacked us and in general terms how to respond. The US mobilized its resources and industrial base, raised powerful military forces and projected power - directing it at a defined enemy and the enemies industrial base. In conventional state-on-state warfare, the operational and tactical level activities that support a strategy to win are often clear. You mass fire power on objectives. You destroy the enemy’s military and industrial capabilities and seize terrain. All those things are missions that the military can get their head around. Conventional wars against well defined enemies are not easy but are simple to appreciate what it takes to win them.
  • 2. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 2 of 20 (Slide 4) If you fight these wars effectively you eventually win. In MacArthur’s time we actually defeated our enemies, drove them to unconditional surrender. We had victory parades- kissed the nurse, went home and demobilized. The US and their allies’ back- to-back world war champions. …We're the winning team. It was good to be king then, right? We used to win our wars, and we knew how do it. We not only won conventional wars like WWI and WWII, we were pretty good at winning low-intensity conflicts, unconventional wars, limited wars. There's no low-intensity conflict when you're at the other end of an AK47, trust me, but we were even good at leveraging our technology and our capabilities to win low-intensity conflicts and small wars. We were dominant, but today's it's something that's changed. (Slide 5) This is a picture at the tail end of the cold war. It’s taken in December 1989 in Operation Just Cause in Panama where we were conducting a night combat airborne assault into Panama and ultimately seized former Panamanian President Manuel Noriega. Pete Newell and I were both junior officers, I was with the 3d Ranger Battalion, Pete was in the 82nd Airborne division. We knew the mission was dangerous. We were parachuting in in the middle of the night to hostile territory under fire. We were not cocky, but we had a certain level of confidence going in to the mission. We were the winning team - nobody could stand up to our powerful military. We had aircraft carriers and ICBMs, but we also had a pretty good tech when it comes down to the small unit, the individual level technology. Let me tell you about some of the technology we had back then. (Jokingly) It's going to just blow you away - nobody but the US and other powerful states’ militaries had access to this level of tech. We had night vision goggles you could put on your head and you could see in the dark. No kidding. See at night! It was phenomenal. We landed on the airfield, people are shooting at you, they don't know where we are but they're spraying trying to hit people, we could see them. We had night vision scopes on some of our rifles. We could put a crosshair on the white T-shirts they were wearing. It is “good to be the king” and have access to these game changing technologies. Before we went in we had overhead images from satellites taking pictures of the earth and giving us maps so we knew how to plan, and knew where our objectives were. These images obtained from national assets were so sensitive that the satellite imagery was classified material. I remember tying my imagery with parachute cord onto my cargo pocket because if you lost it, it was losing a sensitive item and I would be subject to an investigation.
  • 3. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 3 of 20 I literally was jumping out of a C-130 at 450 feet which was pretty low. Getting shot at. My map rips out of my pocket. All I can think of is, “oh my God I'm in big trouble because I just lost my overhead imagery,” which is pretty sensitive stuff. At the same time we also had satellites up in orbit triangulating to tell us within 10 meters of accuracy where we were standing. GPS. It was crazy. We had communications, where every individual soldier in my platoon could talk to each other. I mean little tiny radios that could talk to each other. These little pens that could shoot a laser to direct fire and maneuver. Never before in the history of warfare has an organization been able to direct its operations and fire and maneuver with that kind of technology. And all of this cost thousands and thousands and thousands of dollars, really expensive stuff that few other states if any could afford to deploy. There’s a saying that, “the strong do what they want to do and the weak do what they have to do.” We're one of the strong states. What do strong states like the United States care about? Who do they worry about? Other strong states, right? So who was bigger than the U.S. back then? But this was the end of an era. This is 1989, the cold war was about over. In some ways, despite the nuclear menace, those seem in retrospect like the good old days. When it was good to be king – where power and resources translated almost directly in to battlefield dominance. What's changed? Who are these folks? (slide 6) I was joking about the advanced technology we had in 1989. Today with a credit card and Internet connection and you can get any one of those things described as game changing advantages for us when Pete and I jumped in to Panama for a $100. Night vision goggles are cheap and available, Google Maps with images of almost any part of the planet are online, you can just get that and download it. All of this was formerly only in the hands of the very strongest states, the very strongest super powers. The following slides highlight just a few examples of how the proliferation and diffusion of technology changes the face of the battlefield today and why this matters. Let's look at some examples of the asymmetries that groups like ISIS, al-Qaeda and other groups take advantage of to do us harm.
  • 4. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 4 of 20 (Slide 7) ISIS is able to use overhead imagery and drone surveillance to plan and execute their operations. It's not so hard to do, they've got their own drones. They're using this against us. This is an example of technology that's now in the hands of our adversaries that formerly was only in the hands of the strongest states like the United States. (Slide 8) Terrorists and other nation states are using social media against us. I remember going to SERE school as a special forces officer candidate. We were trained to develop a cover story to hide our identify if captured. This was a whole convincing cover story that you give so you don't get found out. Today, if you Google me or call up my Facebook page it would be pretty clear who I was and my background. (Slide 9) Imagine what our our enemies can do with readily available technology like 3D printing? The instructions for making the semi-automatic rifle in this photo are available online. (Slide 10) Cyber Threats to Critical Infrastructure. Think about how the internet and social media have changed the ability to recruit, to train, to radicalize, motivate and inspire our enemies. It's just unbelievable what this technology is doing to empower our groups intent on doing us harm. One of the big advantages of being a strong superpower-like state was that you got to project power. Now anyone sitting anywhere in the world can project power … so now the ability to project power is not only the purview of strong states and superpowers, it's kids who are just logging on and they're able to attack us from afar, with cyber threats. (Slide 11) Back to MacArthur. … when he told the West Point Corps of Cadets in 1963 that their mission was to win our he was talking about defeating strong states which were our biggest threats at the time. Think about what the threats are now. International relations theory states that said, strong states need to be most
  • 5. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 5 of 20 concerned by threats posed by other strong states, has been turned on its head. Today, weak states, sub-state actors, even individuals are now empowered through increasingly available technology to do us harm. Addressing these emerging and lethal threats is now also required to “win our wars”,- this is definitely a different kind of threat environment that we're in. So what do we do about it? How do we win our wars going forward? At a minimum we need to stack the deck again in our favor. We used to be back-to-back world war champs, able to mobilize our resources effectively and take it to our enemies. Well I would argue that in many ways we're not doing well in todays changed threat environment. Not only do we need to stack the deck in our favor, in some cases we are at a disadvantage and just need to level the playing field. Ironically we aren't there yet. We've got to continue to defend against high-intensity threats. This isn't just a war against ISIS and terrorism, we've got a resurgent China, pushing us in the South China Sea. We have to basically defend on both fronts. ISIS doesn't have federal acquisition regulations; in Steve Blank’s definition ISIS is a Lean Organization. They are pivoting, learning and adapting and they rapidly react to evolving threat environments. This is a tough adversary - an adaptive enemy. This is a threat environment where our adversaries have access to technologies and they're able to adapt, to overcome, and improvise and pivot and deploy that technology in ways that are way ahead of us. I’m trying to emphasize that this is a different type of threat environment, different type of adversaries. The formerly linear relationship between state power and military effectiveness has forever changed. States don’t automatically generate the power predicted by their resources – choices matter. Some of the advantages that we enjoyed back in the day when we were “back-to-back world war champs” don't really apply today. The stakes are high and we're losing ground on many fronts. We need to do something about it. You can help. Pete Newell is going to give you the background of how we develop our requirements, where our missions come from and then our guest Jackie Space is going to talk about some of the challenges and opportunity of the acquisition process. Slides 12-29 Pete Newell Obviously, things have changed over the years. The environment has changed, our country has changed, the economy has changed. Each of your teams has a problem that was generated by a government sponsor for a reason. The rest of the discussion tonight is peeling back the layers to figure out what that reason is, where that problem might have come from and who else shares that problem.
  • 6. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 6 of 20 To begin the search you must understand how our National Strategies are built and how they come together to drive this massive organization called the Department of Defense. What we're going to try and do here is fast as we possibly can, is give you a one over the world of how strategy and funding effect how things are bought. (Slides 13-15) On this first slide is a big, complicated chart that would take me 30 years to explain to you. So we're not going to do that. We'll cut it down from 2000 slides to about 15. Here's the chart. This is the defense acquisition system. Way up there in the upper left hand corner, is where the requirements for military systems come from and what gets things started. To make it simple if you start on the top left you have the Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System, (JCIDS). JCIDS is how we handle the collision between two many requirements and not enough money. We're going to split this talk. I'm going to take care of the tanks and airplane side of this and then we're going to hand it off to Jackie Space and she's going to talk through the islands of innovation where a lot of these rules don't apply, or they've condensed them into much tighter acquisition cycles. Looking at the red boxes at the top of the chart I’ve highlighted the key activities you need to understand, beginning with how requirements are developed. Next we develop prototypes. Then we figure how we're going to produce something. Then we figure out how we're going to sustain it. That's kind of the life cycle of the acquisition system. It's not real complicated until you dig in to who does what to who and how and when they make decisions. For the purposes of this class what is in the red boxes at top of the slide are the things we've got to keep in mind. (Slides 16-17) Here's what you've really got to remember, there are three key activities that take place. In the bottom left corner of this slide is the planning, programming, and budget execution work - no different than any major corporation out there. You have to figure out what funds are coming in and where you're going to prioritize and send those funds out to. This is largely driven by a process of strategy documents that we'll talk through in just a second. To the right in yellow is JCIDS, the system used to develop requirements. Finally, in red at the top of the slide is the acquisition process of how we buy things to fill the gaps that were identified in original documents. Jackie Space: Do the people in the audience know what we mean by requirements? Basically requirements are what are used to build a system, it’s the technical parameters by which the system is being built. So there is a whole process of people that develop the
  • 7. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 7 of 20 requirements and the cost requirements, the technical requirements around what system is actually being built. Joe Felter: For example, defending against dismounted IEDs (roadside bombs) in Afghanistan versus the IED threat in Iraq, which were against vehicles. The lag time that it took for the military to address the dismounted IEDs threat in Afghanistan caused thousands of casualties. Pete made that a very poignant point last week. Pete Newell: (Slide 18) All right so here we go. Let's start with the strategy documents. The strategy document that starts it all is the National Security Strategy (NSS). This is a document that the President of the United States produces that lays out America's enduring interests, not just militarily but also economically, and socially. The NSS lists four things that are considered to be our enduring interests. 1. The security of the United States, its citizens, and US allies and partners. 2. A strong innovative and growing US economy. 3. An open international economic system that can produce opportunity for prosperity, respect for universal values at home and around the world, and 4. An international order advanced by US leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through cooperation to meet global challenges. (Slide 19) The Secretary of Defense uses the NSS as a basis for issuing his strategy. The Department of Defense calls it the National Defense Strategy (NDS). The NDS takes the President’s National Security Strategy, looks at it from a defense perspective, and says here are the things that we need do that meet those Presidential objectives. The current NDS includes things like counter-terrorism, irregular warfare, defer and defeat aggression, project power, counter weapons of mass destruction, provide a stabilizing presence, conduct stability, and counter insurgent operations, and humanitarian disaster relief and other operations. There's a bunch more in there but broadly it details what the Department of Defense is going to do to meet the President's National Security Strategy. (Slide 20) Then comes the quadrennial defense review (QDR). It’s done every four years. You notice the dates of these are out of sync, because several years goes between each one of them. So one document may be issued in 2015 but we're still operating off one from 2012 another one from 2013 and one
  • 8. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 8 of 20 more. The quadrennial defense review is really the document that starts to take those strategies and look at them in terms of what can we really afford. The QDR describes what are we really going to do in order to meet the President’s and the Secretary of Defense’s requirements. The document has some very broad statements like, “Protect the homeland” and “Deter and defeat attacks on the United States,” “Build security globally to preserve regional stability.” “Project power and win decisively and defeat aggression.” But underneath there's a nice line that says "At the President's budget level the military will be able to defend the homeland, conduct sustained distributed counter terrorist operations, and deter aggression and assure allied in multiple regions before presence and engagement." You know what it doesn't say anymore? That we're going to fight and win two wars simultaneously. Seriously. At the President's budget level, which means the President's already told him here's what we're going to pay for in terms of defense this year, they determine that these are the best that they can do to meet the key objectives that were set up by the National Defense Strategy in order to meet the President's National Security Strategy. I think you're starting to see the where the gaps might start to appear. As we change one word in one line in the QDR and suddenly the Strategy documents mean something radically different. Are we buying tanks now? Or are we doing more humanitarian operations? More aircraft carriers or more airplanes? Depending on where you sit in that big system it can very rapidly change based on how you perceive the best answer to those problems. What the three documents end up giving us, and what falls out of it, is called the Defense Planning Guides. It really is how we develop the budgets that drive the organization of the military and eventually the activities of these agencies. (Slide 21) In the U.S we have four Military Services: the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. (The Coast Guard gets to act like the fifth service but they actually belong to another government agency.) The military services are responsible for providing people and equipment to combatant commanders. It's their job to raise the army, navy, air force and marines. It's their job to train and equip them. It’s their job to provide trained equipped ready forces to combatant commanders who are the guys out here who actually fight the wars. In between the Military Services we have a number of Defense Agencies. The easy way to know if your talking about an agency is the last word in their name says agency. It's things like the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency. There's only agency who doesn't have the word agency is their name is the National Reconnaissance Office. For some reason they got to be different than everybody else.
  • 9. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 9 of 20 The agencies out there all have consolidated portfolios of activities that they do at the behest of the rest of the government for DOD, but they're also strategic force providers for the combatant commanders. I'll show you a couple of slides that actually makes this a little easier to understand. Finally, we have a bunch of DOD field activities. It's interesting what shows up as field activities. For example, Washington Headquarters Services is responsible for the military installations of Washington DC. Another example of a field activity is the Defense POW mission personnel office. 60 some odd years after the end of the Korean war we are still looking for persons missing in action or remains that were never recovered. We still have an activity that actually goes to Vietnam, Laos and some other places looking for the remains of service members who never came home. There are lots of other small activities that don't neatly fit anywhere within someplace on that chart up there. Student: I noticed that the Central Intelligence Agency is not on there. Why? Pete Newell: The Central Intelligence Agency is not a DOD activity or agency. Although, I'll talk a bit later about how some of the other government agencies actually have interest that are embedded in DOD. As a deployed brigade commander in Iraq in southern Iraq in 2010 I had members of the CIA, DIA, the NSA, the FBI, the secret service, all who were part of my organization or part of my footprint that I was responsible for ensuring that they could do whatever the government sent them there to actually get done. Student: When there's a group that's made up of DOD personnel and say CIA personnel, how does that work in terms of coordination? Pete Newell: There are first a series of standing inter-agency agreements that account for cross-agency activities. Then there are a series of contingency plans that are a reaction to something, that automatically enact. One example is what happened on 9/11. On 9/11 little known to anybody there was a 1960’s agreement that allows the United States Air Force to take control of all of the air space in the United States. About 30 minutes after the plane hit the second tower, there was a young watch officer at NORAD, which is in Colorado, who reads a one-line sentence over the phone one line sentence. "We at NORAD are enacting ... " and what you heard on the phone was dead silence while people were focused on figuring out what he was talking about. The first guy on the phone is a guy from the FAA who says "So if I understand this right you want us to turn off all the navigational aids in the United States." There was a pregnant pause and this guy's flipping through the book, and says "No I want you to do X, Y, and Z." In some cases these are agreements and rules go back years. In this case there was a staff and decision makers who zeroed in on that regulation who understands what's supposed to happen.
  • 10. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 10 of 20 Student: To what extent is the structure here embraced by personnel within DOD? Like how easy would it work this time? Pete Newell: What you have to understand is every time an agency gets their name up here on this chart, they have a budget that comes with it from Congress. It takes almost an act of Congress to change one of those things. If you're a new organization and you want to become an official agency, it takes an act of Congress to get your name up here. From a structural context the last major change that was made was based on the Goldwater- Nichols Act that mandated the formation of combat commanders and a number of other things. It changes from time to time, but not frequently. (Slides 22-24) As I mentioned, the services – the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines job is to provide people and equipment to the combatant commanders who are responsible for the world. On the bottom of this chart are the combatant commands. The African Command (AFRICOM) is a command responsible for 53 African countries. The Central Command (CENTCOM) is responsible for the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia. They are also responsible for prosecuting one war in Iraq, one in Afghanistan, and also dealing with pirates outside of Yemen. The combatant commanders get all the bad stuff that goes on in the world. To help deal with the world they get people, equipment, assets from all of these Services, and from all of those agencies that listed on the previous slide. Based on their missions they have a series of contingency plans that are developed in response to the strategies, that say, “if this happens we apportion these kinds of forces to you.” Each one of those things also comes with a budget. And the budget come with specific “types of money” called “titles of money.” Title X money belongs to the services. For instances, as the Director of the Army's Rapid Equipping Force, I had a $200 million budget which was title X money. I'll give you a scenario. In Afghanistan, if a Marine element working as part of an Army organization came to us and said “hey we're having a problem and we need to find a solution for,” I couldn't do it. I couldn't give it to them because I couldn't spend title 10 money directed to the Army by Congress to provide equipment to the Marines. However, I could provide that equipment to the Army element that controlled them, who could then assign it down to them. There are titles of money directed at Reserves and National Guard forces strictly for their use in the United States. There are titles of money for combatant commanders. There is a different title of money that's directed to them for their contingency operations to do things and then there's all kinds of colors of money related on what activities they place in the say of things. We’ll come back to talk about the “colors of money” in Slide 27.
  • 11. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 11 of 20 The key takeaway here is the world's broken up into regions, that are run by combatant commands. And it’s these combatant commands start to identify gaps based on their operations. For example, In Central command, the Army and Department of Defense felt that getting MRAPS into Iraq would save soldiers in Humvees from getting blown up by IEDs. MRAPs were the best thing since sliced butter, but they were as big as an elephant, armored but saved lots of lives. We moved to Afghanistan and MRAPS there were like driving in quicksand. Very shortly afterward the CENTCOM Commander was telling the Department of Defense is the MRAPs they were providing in Afghanistan were inadequate to meet the conditions of the environment and that created a gap. (Slide 25) That gap then, leads us back to that JCIDS process I mentioned on the initial slide. In JCIDs a gap is assigned a priority for somebody then to go figure out how to solve it. That solution then turns into a requirement. The solution in this case was adifferent kind of armored vehicle which were a smaller version of the MRAP. They were lighter, could handle the sand a little better. Here we go. Gaps, not requirements, gaps. Those top three the competition with what these guys say they have to do in order to actually achieve something. So lets take one of the teams in class here, distributed ISR. Is it a gap or a requirement? Student: It is a gap, Pete Newell: Who's gap is it? Student: The gap is lack of a capability to rapidly, to have eyes on most of the domain the 7th Fleet is supposed to be keeping track of, and simultaneously be able to deploy something quickly to, if they wanted to see something rapidly. Pete Newell: Correct. If I'm responsible for hunting Russian nuclear submarines in the Pacific and I can't find them because the ocean's too big, it's a gap. If I am responsible for securing the high speed access to the western coast from drug and illegal people immigration, those kinds of things, that's a gap. Which combatant command is it? It’s PACOM where 7th Fleet is assigned as a Navy component to the command. We'll walk through a little bit, but you can see where from multiple perspectives the same gap may produce different requirements. The gap is still the center, we can't manage to do X, Y, or Z. (Slide 26) Obviously there is friction there. I'll tell you this happens a lot. These guys get a budget and they plan on a five-year cycle. I started building a tank in year 1, we're coming up with a solution
  • 12. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 12 of 20 that I'm still deploying in year 5. However, in Year 2, the combatant commander comes in and says whatever you were building doesn't solve my problem any more. The guy up at the top says, well if you want me to start over it's going to be another five years before I get your solution to you. In some cases the combatant commands will use their money to actually procure material solutions that fill immediate gaps. When they're done with the material, or when it gets really expensive to maintain, they'll look at the service, because they have all the authorities to maintain that stuff, and say here you go I need the maintenance package that goes with this stuff. There's friction between the two over how they solve those kinds of problems. When it happens it can be really ugly. Student: 8 problems were chosen for the teams in this room to work on. Were any of them requirements, or were they all gaps? Pete Newell: None of them are full-fledged requirements. A lot of people misuse the terminology. I have a “requirement” to fix this problem. The only way you get a requirement is to come out the bottom end of this massive chart up here. We very specifically told our sponsors not to give us requirements. Your gap came from the part of the chart up here under joint operating concepts. Eventually gaps turn into JCIDS recommendations that say we're going buy a tank that requires three people that has to be trained and sustained, and a long list of things that goes with it. Eventually that comes out a list of requirements. Once it comes out as a real requirement it's very, very hard to change because you have to go back through the entire process. In our case, for this class we very specifically vetted some of the problems to ensure that they were more on the gap side, that they hadn't determined what the requirement was going to be and it wasn't well within that process. All of the problems for this class fall within recognized gaps that are out there … Student: What's the authority that certifies that a requirement has been met? For instance, if I have a requirement that's out there and I'd like to be a little bit flexible with it. Who certifies that yes the requirement is met and the way that it's met? Pete Newell: I'll give you the book answer and then I'll tell you the politics. At one time they set a standard for measuring battery usage: 9 people operating for 72 hours away from the base. This makes sense. 72 hours means we carry a lot of weight, a lot of water, food and a lot of batteries. At the time depending upon what mission we were performing in Afghanistan those my guys had to distribute 247 pounds of batteries to operate for 72 hours. The first standard that is set is not really a standard for the requirements. it used for the standard for the measurement of performing effectively for 72 hours. So the first guy says why is it 72 hours and not 120 hours. Nuclear power guys who have it in their heads that they want to deploy small nuclear devices to power this. You know what those nuke dudes
  • 13. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 13 of 20 have? They have a really good powerful lobbyist. That caused a debate for 18 months over the capabilities manager and the other guys who said 72 hours is standard. They had to go back over 10 years worth of documents to articulate why the standard was 72 not 120 or 24, or something else. Because as soon as you open a can of worms everybody comes in and says well my solution would be perfect if it was 24 hours. But if it's 36 then I'm useless. I've got a lobbyist, I'm going to attack the system to try and get the standard changed. People play a lot of games when it comes to who determines the requirement. Within the Army, the Training and Doctrine Command is responsible for actually training people and determining how many pieces of equipment we need to perform a mission is responsible for writing the initial requirement document. That document then goes to the Pentagon where it goes through a series of boards. The boards then decide that yes is it a valid requirement written correctly, the parameters fit within our priorities, it doesn't violate the law, etc. I can't tell you how many of those boards there are. Eventually it comes out the other end and poof we have a requirement. It depends on what you're touching and how many different complexities there are to it, but if you listen carefully you'll start to hear vendors and other people who have things to sell starting to talk about how their thing does better than something else. They'll start quoting numbers. I've done it with sensors. I'm actually working on a vehicle at one point at Georgia Tech Research Institute validating the sensors placed inside striker vehicles to provide data logging against IED blasts. We wanted to know what happened inside the vehicle. We came up with a set of parameters for that sensor. It was a pounds per square inch reading that it had to withstand. Literally I had a vendor start a Congressional investigation over why it was 10 pounds and not 8 pounds - because it meant his versus another vendor’s sensor. You run into those things all the time. Which is why sometimes somebody is willing to say exactly what it is because as soon as you said it, and you can't retract it. I know that's a long answer but I just want to tell you it's not simple. Student: for a program like space-based radar, led by Air Force, do they consider the needs of other agencies and take requirements from those people? Pete Newell: If they're smart they will. They'll not only consider what those other people need, they'll consider what those people are already doing. If you want to be successful you avoid duplicating something else. Student: Who was the main sponsor of this class? I was just wondering what's their expectation from the outcome of the class. … Pete Newell: Do you mean, “What's the gap that this class meets?” It’s the Lack of DOD/IC innovation. There is a lack of opportunity for young technologist to perform a national public service. There is a massive gap between the military and the civilians that they're charged with protecting. A shrinking military in a very complex world where technology is blowing past them at light speed who has no access to the intellect that you have on a
  • 14. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 14 of 20 recurring basis. Those are all gaps. Nobody's written a requirement, although they're talking all over the place about how do you deal with those issues. For folks like us that recognize that there's a gap our hope is that we can step in and prototype something to help validate that the gap is real and that there maybe a potential pathway to solving it. This class is exactly what's going to happen. We'll prototype it. It's a pilot. It's going to grow. Somebody in the government is going to decide to put a whole lot of money in it, you know $20-$30 million a year to ensure that it grows into another 30 colleges across the country. Somebody else from another agency says that's really cool I want to connect my program to it. And eventually we'll be at the sustainment mode. … Student: We spoke with some folks from a big system integrator who said said that part of the reason why the sensors are so expensive and hard to deploy is because we have to source everything through the US facilities and assemble in secure facilities, and so on and so forth. If our solution goes down this pipeline, at what point might we be expect for someone to say hey we need to source everything in the US. Jackie Space: You are too early in the process to judge where you need to source it. Because they have to go through the traditional defense industrial base for the most part its true. But I think that there are certainly sensors or other technologies potentially that are being built on the outside. Eventually at some point, if you're going to continue development on something big you will have to consider that. Student: …I guess you're saying in commercial sites their tolerance for sensor error are a lot higher because they're not used to approaching it from the ‘hey we can fix this area.’ They need to have a much lower error. … Pete Newell: I would say there's a fundamental difference when you apply them with public mind that has to be accounted for to the nth level. My experience in dealing with these folks, and it's not because they're bad people but the system creates bad behaviors. It dis-incents people to take risk. Not only are they not rewarded for accepting risk and failing but they're actually punished for not being perfect. So in the goal of trying to perfectly acquire something we tend to fail bigger, more frequently than we would otherwise. Part of the beauty of what Steve Blank has done with Lean LaunchPad is essentially build a framework by which, with a little bit of translating, we've been able to provide a strategy by which we can fail in this system much earlier and much less expensively. At least that's our hypothesis. That's where we're at today. … Jackie Space: There are places in the government that are always going to remain military grade. The billion-dollar satellite that they launch that enables somebody to read a license plate? That's going to stay a military grade system, but there's this awareness now in the military and government that there's a lot of other things out there that are good enough, with a much lower resolution that you can find the private industry.
  • 15. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 15 of 20 (Slide 27) Pete Newell: One of the things that you have to understand is money has different colors. There's different types of money to say what it was used for. Believe it or not the Department of Defense caused itself this problem. It doesn't have to be this way. If Congress would quite honestly change it if DOD said “we want to change it.” But here's what happens. Operations money is essentially one-year money that is used for everything from buying toilet paper in a barracks to paying for gas for vehicles or for buying things that cost less than $250,000 per item. I can buy something for $200,000, even if it's a piece of equipment, using operational dollars. The problem that you run into with operational money though is on the 30th of September it goes away. It doesn't go back into the government's bank, it doesn't go back into some magic bag to pull out later. It is gone. Disappeared. If you are working on a problem and a guy suddenly shows up in July and says I've got a million dollars I can spend it today, what can I get. My guess is he's probably using end of year money and he's in a panic because he knows it disappears the 30th of September. Here is what happens. The folks in the Pentagon who manage a massive budget say on the 30th of August if you have money left in your account subordinate to us we're taking it all and we're going to spend it on our un-forecasted requirements. So the next layer down, they say “if you have money left in your budget on the 30th of July we're taking it all for our use. On it goes until you have the poor guy, who on the 1st of April, is in a panic because he hasn't spent his money yet. Jackie Space: If you don't spend your money you get your budget slashed the next year. They say oh you didn't spend your money. … another point on these colors of money is that if you have a project that you're working on you should be asking beneficiaries what type of money are you working with. How you end up putting your proposal and projects together can actually fit in all three of those depending on how you write it. Really having an understanding beforehand of what type of money you're working with is very important Pete Newell: Here are the questions you start to ask so you can figure out where they are. First, procurement dollars. I will tell you procurement is not my expertise. I probably violated more rules than not. Procurement process was designed to buy much larger things. That's how we buy tanks. That's how we buy sustainment. The life cycle cost of putting something out there. Unfortunately, you can't use procurement dollars to buy toilet paper or anything like that. So it’s designed to buy major items. It does last for three years. Which means that we're in the middle of 2016 so at the end of September 2016, 2014 procurement money is going to expire. Why is that important to know. If somebody's telling you “hey come do this for us we've got $3 million,” You might want to ask what the expiration year is. Because if something's dragging along and you're
  • 16. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 16 of 20 about to hit the 30th of September, and you don't know if the contract is going to be signed yet, if it's expiring money you're not going any further. Jackie Space: The smart money manager will have his money spent by July 1st just to avoid losing it or his contracts. A lot of people don't, so another smart manager knows how to go around get money to use in their program from people that can't get their money spent. One of the questions when you're talking to your program sponsor, especially program managers, is how do you handle your end of year budget. You want to know if they are good at planning money at end of year to support your programs. Pete Newell: I'm going to hit the last one, RDT&E money, research, development, testing and evaluation money. With this money you can build prototypes, you can test, etc. Most of you working on your solutions would likely first touch RDT&E money. There are special cases of money starting with purple money which means they can do whatever they want with it. In some of these cases organizations have been given special authorities to allow them to essentially break all the rules. The problem sometimes though is when you're given special authorities you also get special oversight. Those organizations are probably the most scrutinized organizations out there in terms of Congressional oversight. Not that they're going to do something wrong but because Congressmen want to know that that money's being spent where they think it's being spent. The Secretary of Defense has a Rapid Acquisition Authority (RAA). When I was with the Rapid Equipping Force, the Secretary of Defense could authorize the up to $200 million a year in RAA that would allow us to change the way money was used. To use that authority we would simply write a memo that says we are going to use RDT&E money to buy gas or something like that and staff it through the Secretary. If he approved the request we were able to do what we needed to. It wasn’t easy but it wasn’t hard either. It was fairly quick but it also required Congressional notification because we were doing something other than what Congress directed with the money. The following type of money is one you have to pay attention to. Overseas Contingency Operating money. This is the thing they slap on top of the budget every year because we keep having conflicts someplace that weren’t planned for as part of the budget. What you have to know about OCO is that if you're working on something and somebody's offering you OCO money to do something, what you're doing has to be focused on solving a gap overseas. You can't use OCO dollars everywhere, because right now I think OCO is still limited to CENTCOM which means that we can't solve the distributed ISR problem in PACOM using these dollars - even if that's all we have at our disposal. The last thing you ought to pay attention to, continual resolutions (CR’s). For example, if we're not going to pass a defense budget in September because Congress wants to see what how the election turns out first, we will likely end up with a continuing resulution to fund the DoD. What happens with a continuing resolution is that the budget folks will say “you are not allowed to program spending more than 65% of last year's budget.” That poor guy who's supposed to spend all his money by April or if it’s already taken away, is now told
  • 17. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 17 of 20 you've got to stretch 65% of your budget to last all year. When the budgets finally passed in January, what happens? He suddenly has this massive (influx) of cash and he's got how long to spend it? Two months. Which means he has to figure out what he's going to buy, he has to contract it, he has to do everything in a very short period of time. Student: So they literally cannot spend 35% of that budget on anything over this period? … Pete Newell: No, in fact they have to turn in a budget that does not exceed 65% of the previous year’s budget and show how that will cover them for the entire year. Once there is a Defense budget passed, they have to submit a whole new budget. This means they're always playing with two budgets. This is sometimes what causes expensive programs to triple in expense. Failure of politicians to do their job is one of the biggest expenses we have. (Slide 28) Let’s go back to the mission model canvas; Value propositions, buy in, advocates … according to who? There are a lot of people out here who will tell you they fall in all three of these categories. On this slide is a list of folks you should look for. On it I've also left you some questions you ought to be asking whoever you are talking to. The first one is: • who are you? • Where do you fall in here? Beneficiary, advocate, are you both? • Are you from a service? Are you from a COCOM? • Where do you fit in this massive list of things? • What's your mission? • What are you supposed to do? What are you not supposed to do and not allowed? Make sure you've got that clear in your head, what are they supposed to do, what are they not supposed to do. Where'd your funding come from? What kinds do you have? What are you talking to me about? I would ask about types of contracts if it's appropriate. Finally, who do you work with? Then finally, who else do you know that has this problem that might be working this area? This what I call an asset inventory. Everybody you meet exists in an ecosystem. You're trying to figure out where they belong and how they connect. Here are 8 questions you can ask that will help you clarify where they are. The answers to those questions, or the way they answer them will allow you to figure out where they belong in your ecosystem of things that you might need eventually.
  • 18. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 18 of 20 (Slide 29) Using one of our teams working on Distributed ISR as an example, the sponsor is the 7th Fleet. The 7th Fleet is part of the US Navy, however 7th Fleet is assigned to PACOM as the Navy component of the Pacific command. So who has the problem? Is it the Navy's problem or is it PACOMs problem? Or is it both? Might they have difference of opinion on how to solve that problem based on how expensive it is to train people and how many people it costs. Do you see where the friction might come from? You can be given conflicting guidance when you're talking to people, one side versus the other side. All these agencies who provide assets to PACOM, probably have some amount of equity in that problem. By equity we mean they have authority and they have budgets to take action against parts of the problem. They may also have five different opinions on the scope of the problem that are different than that of PACOM or 7th Fleet. Now, the CIA, the Coast Guard, other folks. Don’t you think that they might have a vested interest in how this is solved? Are they a user? Are they a capability provider? Are they an advocate? Are they trying to kill the effort? Other services. If the Navy component of PACOM says this is a problem rest assured there's an Army component, there's a Marine component, there's an Air Force component who all think it is as well, but for different reasons. Do you think they might have a vested interest in this? Finally, SOCOM is a combatant command, but SOCOM also provides folks to PACOM. So SOCOM has a vested interest in this right? Slide 28 is what you've got to pay a lot of attention to. Money, contract, strategy and all that other stuff, it's interesting but not necessarily going to help you for the next 8 weeks. Slide 28 will. Slides 30-36 Jackie Space: So Pete just talked about the acquisition system at large and I want to just drill down really quickly into the more practical aspects of what it means for your teams and the program sponsors that you're working with, the problem statements, and how it fits into this. Also for you're beneficiaries and how you should be talking to them as you're working through their problems. (Slide 31) Quickly about me, I'm a systems engineer by trade, I went to the Air Force Academy. I spent the majority of my career doing government acquisitions. I've worked very large programs like GPS and I've also worked very small programs in terms of getting things rapidly fielded into the field from a technology perspective.
  • 19. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 19 of 20 (Slide 32) The purpose of this slide is to to convey to you that even though you're all working with different government organizations and they all fall under this big system of acquisitions. Every organization is quite different in culture and so when you're working with them you need to figure out, 1) do they move rapidly in how they do business, 2) how they develop technology, 3) how they field them. Are they focused on larger weapons systems and is it's going to be ten years before they actual develop and field capability. When I say rapid I mean like less than 2 years, versus 10-year time lines. Part of your work is to figure out where does your organization program sponsor reside in that time frame. (Slide 33-34) The whole acquisition process is designed to develop big programs - like the F35, ballistic missile defense, helicopters, - that sort of thing. All of this exists to be able to field big weapons programs. A lot of the friction ends up when we have requirements or when we have needs that emerge that don't fit into the time line. On slide 33 we've got the DARPA’s and the Air Force Research Lab and the other labs that exist in the government that are developing technology that will probably never ever leave the lab. Or in some cases it will take 10 years before it actually does anything. On this slide I put some of the organization that the teams in the class are working with to show where they fit in technology maturity and how they're different from both ends of it. If you look at two of the sponsors in this class, the Asymmetric Warfare Group and the Joint Improvised Threat Defeat Agency, they operate differently. They're not concerned about weapon systems or developing things in support of those weapon systems. These guys are on a rapid time line and they want to field capabilities to user requirements in less than 2 years. All of the problem statements for teams in this class fit within this category. This is where the opportunities reside to actually make an impact because you have a shorter time line to fielding and delivery. Then you have other organizations like SOCOM, NSA, CIA, and the service components that play in all parts of the timeline. Even with the team that's working with SOCOM I would bet that they are more on this 2-year time line for fielding a solution. But that's something that you should be asking your program sponsors when you're working with them, “What is your traditional time line for fielding technologies?” (Slide 35) For entities outside of the traditional defense industrial base to engage (ie. Startups), it's really in the R&D area as well as prototype development. One caution, when you talk about government R&D, if you bring a capability you want the
  • 20. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 20 of 20 government to give you money to help develop, you will eventually have to deal with IP issues. Because anytime the government gives you money to develop something, they now own it. In other cases where you have a capability that's more developed that you bring that to the government and demo it, that's when you can actually maintain the majority of your IP. (Slide 36) I want to talk more about the questions that you should be talking to your beneficiaries about. …Most of you have talked to the potential users of your system and you're getting feedback from them, which is really valuable. However, you need to find the program managers and/or the people that are actually executing a program that is either similar or has parts of the problem that you're dealing with. That’s because the program manager understands the time line it takes to field something, ie. What are all the things that they have to go through to actually bring on a capability like that? How do they engage with industry? How do they actually participate with people outside of their program? Finding that individual or set of individuals is really important will be really important for this class. In terms of the culture, I think it's incredibly important to as you're talking to your sponsors to ask the questions about the track record of their organization in actually getting something like your solution fielded? How long did it take? How many times have they actually attempted this particular technology set? Do you know who the mission partners around you that may be able to contribute to that? To get more information go to FedBizOpps.gov. FedBizOpps.gov is the main mechanism by which the government will post or solicit for industry feedback. They'll post their problems saying, we want a proposal or we want some information around this actual technology that we're looking at. If you go to FedBizOpps.gov and you type in a keyword around your particular problem, what comes up will be really interesting because you might find that there's five or six other organizations that are actually soliciting for the same technology. Thanks, Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space