The applicability of the Doctrine of Responsibility (R2P) in Syria in perspective of Terrorism

LLM International & European Law
Tilburg Law School
Tilburg University
The applicability of the Doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in Syria in perspective
of Terrorism
Syeda Sabita Amin
ANR: 883421
Student Registration Number: U1262761
Supervisor: Mr. Dr. A. Meijknecht
Second Reader: Prof. Willem J.M. van Genugten
31st August 2015

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Acknowledgements
It is without a doubt that I would never have been able to get as far as I am today without the
support I have had from my mentors, peers and close ones.
I would like to personally thank Professor Anna Meijknecht for her guidance and support during
my program as well as during the period of my master’s thesis as my supervisor and for her
thoughtful support with my personal life. Additionally I am thankful to Professor Willem van
Genugten for taking the time to be my second evaluator in such short notice.
Furthermore I would like to personally thank my peers Maxime van Gerven, Maria Jose Recalde
Vela and Christina van Kujick for their support with my thesis.
To my parents, loved ones and closest of friends, I am nothing without you and would not have
made it without you.
This is moreover dedicated in loving memory of my older brother; my tormentor, my mentor, my
friend.

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List of Abbreviations
The Arab League AL
Advisory Council on International Affairs in the Netherlands AIV
Al-Nusra Front ANF
Al Qaeda in Iraq AQI
Syrian Arab Republic CoI
Counter-Terrorism Committee CTC
The Free Syrian Front FSA
Gulf Cooperation Council GCC
International Criminal Court ICC
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ICCPR
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty ICISS
The International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence ICSR
Internally Displaced People IDP
Middle Eastern region and North Africa MENA
Organization of the Islamic Conference OIC
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons OPCW
Syrian National Council SNC
United Nations UN
United Nations General Assembly UNGA
United Nations Commission on Human Rights UNCHR
United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria UNSMIS
United Nations Security Council UNSC
UN Secretary General UNSG

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Table of Contents
Introduction 5
1.1 Research Question 6
1.2 Methodology and Approach 7
1.3 Purpose of the Research 8
Chapter 2: Legal Framework 9
2.1 The Doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, Humanitarian intervention and the Middle East 9
2.1.1 Definition and sources of R2p 9
2.1.2 R2P in connection with Humanitarian and Military Intervention 18
2.1.3 Differences between R2P and Humanitarian Intervention 20
2.2 R2P and the Middle East 22
2.3 Terrorism 22
2.4 Sub-conclusion 27
Chapter 3: The Middle East 28
3.1 The Arab Spring 28
3.2 Libya 28
3.3 Syria 31
Chapter 4: Syria and the up-rise of Terrorist Actors 37
4.1 Terrorist Actors and Organizations in Syria 37
4.2 Definition of crimes under International Criminal Law 40
4.2.1 Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes 40
4.2.2 Genocide 42
4.2.3 Sexual Slavery, Rape and Enslavement 42
4.2.4 Recruitment of Child Soldiers 43
4.3 Other problems caused by Terrorist Operations 44
4.3.1 IDP and Refugee Crisis 44
4.3.2 Instability and Increase in Foreign Fighters 45
4.4 Response towards Terrorism in Syria 45
Chapter 5: Analysis, Applicability of R2P, and the Future of Syria 47
5.1 Applying R2P to Syria 47
5.2 Difference between Libya and Syria 51
5.3 The future of Syria and the Responsibility to Rebuild 52
Conclusion 54
Bibliography 56

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Introduction
The reoccurrence of horror from mass atrocities has been one of the most troubling characteristics
of international law and human rights. Furthermore, the inability to swiftly have a solution to these
crimes has been equally disappointing. The declaration which was made after World War II of
“Never Again” to genocide was codified in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide1
has persistently shown that states have continued breaching the declaration
and failing human rights.
Without a doubt International law has seen numerous developments over the decades. An
increasing consciousness towards grave human rights violations on major scales has brought
attention to the people around the world and has shown the importance to the international
community to have responsibility towards their states as well as keep an eye out on other states
which are in violation. Treaties have made states not only obliged to protect its citizens, but enables
other states to scrutinize for wrong actions. The concept of responsibility to protect has been one
of the most notable recent contributions to the development of international law and the defence
of human rights.
Although nations may be state parties to treaties and agree to protect the fundamental freedoms of
its citizens and to protect it from any threat including ones from itself, this has not been in the case
and if there is anything that history has taught us it is how even states sometimes betray its nationals
and fail by international standards. A vast number of conflicts around the world have been internal
and in recent years, the Arab Spring has caught the attention of the world.
Humanitarian intervention has been a feature of the international system and its theory is based on
the assumption that states with relation to their own citizens have certain obligations which are
fundamental and basic in nature in order to maintain a standard of relationship with other states2
.
There has always been growing concern as to how a crisis in a given state may have regional or
1 United Nation General Assembly (UNGA), Res 260 (III) A (9 December 1948)
2
FK Abiew, The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention (Kluwer Law
International, 1999)

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international consequences and how turning a blind eye towards it could lead to deleterious
outcomes3
.
The events of the Arab Spring brought to attention issues concerning international law concerning
human rights, democracy and fair and electoral processes, the use of force and the operation of
UN Collective security system and sanction and prosecution of international crimes. The theme
that prevails the most from the Arab Spring is the Doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (Hence
forth referred to as R2P).
The concept of R2P has been a lengthy developing process which will be discussed in the coming
sections of this paper. The important issue of this paper is as to how R2P was applied in the case
of Libya where there was the NATO-led UN-mandated intervention to which the UN Secretary
General (henceforth referred to as UNSG) Ban Ki-moon stated that it marked the “coming of age”4
of R2P, however, March 15th
marked four years of the conflict in Syria5
and there has been no
intervention. The casualties from the conflict in the last few years have gone into hundred-thousand
with millions of civilians in the state being displaced with the situation continuing to deteriorate
as days pass. The consequences of not applying R2P will be discussed from terrorism prospective
rather than focusing on the civil war and sectarian violence that has been ongoing in Syria,
although there will be an introduction of the civil war in Syria to understand the complete
framework of the thesis.
1.1 Research Question
My research question concerns the conflict which has been ongoing in Syria for the last four years,
and the applicability of the doctrine of responsibility to the situation. The conflict goes on to
highlight the limitations of the doctrine which is discussed in the thesis. Therefore, more precisely,
the central research question of this thesis reads as follows
3
For example the Rwandan genocide as well as Srebrenica. Delay in intervention led to catastrophic turn of
events in a very short period of time.
4
‘Responsibility to Protect Came of Age in 2011, Secretary General Tells Conference’ (UN Press Release, 18
January 2012) available at <http://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sgsm14068.doc.htm>
5
R Spencer & R Sherlock, ‘Syria’s Four years of Death and Despair: How ordinary lives have change beyond
description’ (The Guardian, 15 March 2015) available at
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11472832/Syrias-four-years-of-death-and-
despair-how-ordinary-lives-have-changed-beyond-description.html> [accessed August 15th
2015]

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“Given the political dynamics since the Arab Spring and in particular the rise of terrorist actors
in Syria, to what extent can the Doctrine of Responsibility (R2P) be perceived as a tool to solve
the conflict in Syria?”
1.2 Methodology and Approach of the thesis
The legal research methodology is the main method to analyse the research question. Primary
sources, such as international legislation and case-law, will be analysed to provide a theoretical
framework. In addition, to give an accurate portrait of reality, secondary sources such as United
Nations Security Council Resolutions, academic literature and news articles will be used to fill the
gaps caused by primary sources.
Furthermore, this topic is indeed difficult and sensitive to analyse as there are multiple factors
which question the chain of events occurring in the Middle East and North Africa. For one, the
doctrine of R2P is still relatively young and the as my paper discusses terrorism, terrorism has
been in the eye mostly since 9/11 which was in 2001, hence it can also be considered a new aspect
of international law although the idea of terrorism has been around for centuries. This thesis
consists of an interdisciplinary research. On the one hand the legal framework will be analysed
and on the other hand it will focus on current status of the war in Syria and as to why there may
be a possibility for R2P not working as well as it did in Libya (in Syria).
This thesis will look at whether R2P is a good tool to use for intervention in Syria and be as
productive as it was in Libya or whether it will not work due to the difference of certain
circumstances (mainly the involvement terrorist actors and organisations in Syria).
I will begin discussing my thesis on a theoretical perspective initially which discusses the doctrine
of R2P as well as a discussion on terrorist actors and conclude with the theoretical problems that
arise from the applicability of R2P to terrorism.
Subsequently, the following chapters proceed with the empirical framework which discusses the
beginning of the Arab Spring with an introduction on the intervention in Libya as it was the first
time R2P was applied,6
following to the current situation in Syria.
6
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Res 1973 (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973

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Subsequently, the following chapter proceeds to talk about the social vacuum which has been
generated and has created a rise in terrorist actors. This section further goes on to discuss the crimes
under international criminal law which have been committed by the terrorist actors and
organizations.
Before concluding the thesis, I aim to discuss the application of R2P in Syria along with the
differences between the interventions in Libya compared to that of Syria. Before the sub-
conclusion of the chapter, I discuss the future of Syria in light of the doctrine of R2P and what
may be terrorist actors supposing the intervention is successful.
1.3 Purpose of the Research
Post the September 2001 attacks, the world has declared a “War on terrorism” and Islamic
fundamentalist groups around the world continue their operations and have been on the rise. The
Middle East has always been one of the most volatile regions of the world and currently with the
with the Syrian civil war entering its fifth year as well as the growth of the Islamic State of Syria
and Levant (ISIL) which marked their one year anniversary recently,7
the situation has been
deteriorating every day in Syria and the question to assist innocent civilians caught in the battle is
presented to the world. This thesis is an attempt to summarise the situation in Syria as well as to
understand the importance intervention in order to uphold the values of universal human rights to
the Syrian people.
7
L Dearden, ‘Isis Expected to carry out ‘more violence, more advances, more attacks’ as one year anniversary
of Islamic State declaration approaches’ (The Independent, 26 May 2015) available at
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-expected-to-carry-out-more-violence-more-
advances-more-attacks-as-one-year-anniversary-of-islamic-state-declaration-approaches-10277072.html>
[accessed August 15th
2015]

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Chapter 2: Legal Framework
The doctrine of R2P is a relatively new concept which is still said to be in its infancy. Similarly,
although humanitarian intervention may not be a new concept, and neither is terrorism, a lack of
legal definition creates a sense of ambiguity which makes it difficult for organisations in relation
to have standard precedence when either humanitarian crisis occur or when there terrorist activities
which are to cause the same . How can these theories be understood without clear legal definitions
and would the problems which arise from it be able to be solved with the lack of it? Furthermore,
what would constitute for the serious of the crime in order to have an intervention? This chapter
goes on to explain the various concepts in order to understand the legality of the theories in light
of recent events concerning the doctrines.
2.1 The Doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, Humanitarian intervention & the Middle East
Although it may seem that the doctrines of humanitarian intervention and R2P have similar roles,
the two doctrines are quite distinct from one and another. The following subsection provides the
sources for the principles and their requirements in the realm of international law.
2.1.1 Definition and Sources of R2P
“…If humanitarian intervention is indeed an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we
respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that
offend every precept of our common humanity.”8
By definition, responsibility denotes to “actions or forbearances that one is deemed bout to perform
or observe”.9
In the first instance, the primary duty bearers of the R2P are states, and in addition
the international community through the United Nations (henceforth referred to as UN)
furthermore have the responsibility to use applicable diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful
methods to protect populations with authorization of the United Nations Security Council
(henceforth referred to as UNSC).10
According to the International Humanitarian Law and the
Responsibility Handbook by the Australian Red Cross, the International Community may refer to
8
K Annan, “We the Peoples”: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st
century: Millennium Report of the
Secretary General, A/54/2000 (2000)
9 WA Knight & F Egerton, The Routledge Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect (Routledge, 2012)
10
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), World Summit Outcome: Resolution Adopted by the General
Assembly, UN GAOR, 60th session, Agenda Items 46 and 120, UN Doc A/Res/60/1 (2005)

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states working together through the UN, however, as there is no agreed definition of what
‘international community’ is, while it is evident that responsibility is born by states, it is also
possible to extend this to implement responsibility to non-state actors, non-governmental
organizations and civil society. 11
This is moreover extended according to Knight, that the
definition is “primarily concerned with moral as opposed to causal responsibility.”12
Which in
other words is about who must face consequences rather than the one who caused them. R2P is
related to the notion that states have not only the duty to protect its people to its ability but are
inclined to do so as a moral duty. Similarly, Becker agrees to the definition of responsibility to a
certain extent as he goes on to state that the term responsibility is occasionally used
interchangeably with the notion of ‘obligation’ and that when a state is held ‘responsible’ for an
unlawful act or omission, it bears the legal consequences that flow from the breach of its legal
duties.13
Since the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 which established ground rules for relations between states
and the fundamental principles of integrity and inviolability of territorial borders, without losing
its essence the definition of sovereignty has been redefined over time14
. Sovereignty demands
amongst others the power to wield authority over all individuals living in a territory as well as the
noninterference of other states in national issues15
. This notion is legally protected under articles
2(4) and 2(7) of the UN Charter:16
the prohibition of the use or threat of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of states, and the obligation of the UN not to intervene in the
domestic jurisdiction of states, with the exception of Chapter VII measures.17
It was after the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 as well as the bombing in Kosovo by the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (henceforth referred to as NATO) was the concept of sovereignty
revisited; does the international community have to rely on the principle of non-interference if a
11
Australian Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law and the Responsibility to Protect (2011)
12
Ibid.
13
T Becker, Terrorism and the State; Rethinking the Rules of State Responsibility (Oxford Hart Publishing, 2006)
14
However, as Genser goes on to state, in light of globalization and a borderless world, in the words of the
former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, the creation of “problems without passports” exist which
demand a paradigm of understanding and response. J Genser, & I Cotler, The Responsibility to Protect: The
Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in Our Time (OUP, 2012)
15 A Cassese, International Law (OUP, 2005)
16
United Nations, Charter of the United Nations (adopted 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI
17
These articles are further analyzed in the subsequent chapters

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state commits atrocities against its own citizens, and is humanitarian intervention legitimate
without the approval of the UN?18
Deng, a former Sudanese diplomat, as well as additional authors pursued to change the
understanding of sovereignty from the classic Westphalian and provided that legitimate
sovereignty requires responsibility for good governance and accountability to the international
community, with a higher authority capable of holding the sovereigns accountable.19
Former UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan continued this line of thought by stating that sovereignty is
redefined by globalization as well as international cooperation, which is composed of human rights
and responsibilities.20
In 1999, The United Nations General Assembly (henceforth referred to as UNGA) revisiting the
tragedies and failures towards protecting Rwanda and Kosovo, and former UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan21
stressed the need for change towards international attitude regarding humanitarian
crises’.22
The Canadian Government reacted inter alia with Annan’s notes and established in
September 2000 The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (henceforth
referred to as ICISS or The Commission), which was challenged to write a report called “The
Responsibility to Protect” in December 2001, that elaborated the concept of R2P and intended to
replace a compromised idea of humanitarian intervention.23
In the Commission’s report it is
marked that states bear the responsibility on key principles of the responsibility to prevent, react,
and rebuild.24
Furthermore, it is elaborated that the concept of R2P was established on the core
18
AJ Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, in PD Williams (ed), Security Studies. An Introduction
(Routledge, 2013)
19
FM Deng, S Kimaro, T Lyons, D Rothchild & I Zartman, Sovereignty as a Responsibility: Conflict
Management in Africa (Brookings Institution Press, 1996)
20
UN Secretary-General, Secretary-General Presents his Annual Report to the General Assembly. Press Release,
20 September 1999, UN Doc. SG/SM/7136 GA/9596.
21
Kofi Annan was Secretary-General for the period 1999 to 2006 and during the 54th
session of the UN General
Assembly in 1999 he was the then Secretary-General.
22
P Heinbecker, ‘Human Security: The Hard Edge’ (2000) Canadian Military Law Journal 11
23
However, the report was written before the atrocious terrorist attacks in of September 2001 and therefore
various issues were not included in the report and a drastic change in America’s foreign policy created problems
in the interpretation of intervention; D Gierycz, ‘From Humanitarian Intervention (HI) to Responsibility to
Protect (R2P)’ (2010) 29(2) CJE 110
24
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), Report of the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, the Responsibility to Protect (IDRC, 2001)

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basics of principle of state sovereignty as well as that of non-interference. The report goes on to
state that the central theme about R2P as
“the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable
catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from starvation – but that when they are unwilling or
unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states.”25
In principle, the definition of sovereignty which was crafted in the report by the Commission did
not derive on the principle of sovereignty as a state prerogative, but on the primary responsibility
of the state to protect its citizens.26
Although the report was received favorably by states such as
Germany, Canada, and the United Kingdom, others such as Russia, China and the India rejected
this report27
. Following the events of 9/11 as well as the proceeding invasion of Iraq in 2003 by
the perversion of R2P’s principles which were used by the Bush Administration for the
justification of the invasion,28
at the 2005 World Summit over 150 accepted a more nuanced form
of R2P.
Even though the 2005 document is not an international treaty or a formal legal instrument29
, but
rather a document which was adopted by the UNGA and is not subject to treaty interpretation
under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties30
, specifically under paragraphs 138 along
with 139 would go on to summarize legal rules which are contained in various instruments and
conventions such as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide31
25
Ibid.
26
J Genser, & I Cotler, The Responsibility to Protect: The Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in Our Time
(OUP, 2012)
27
AJ Bellamy, ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, in A Collins (ed) Contemporary Security Studies (OUP, 2010)
28
RW Murray & A McKay, Into the Eleventh Hour: R2P, Syria and Humanitarianism in Crisis (E-International
Relations, 2014).; Furthermore, Bellamy goes on to state that initially the states which had rejected the report
were sceptical of such interventions as the US-led one in Iraq as they had feared the misuse of humanitarian
intervention and R2P as a potential abuse. AJ Bellamy, ‘Realizing the Responsibility to Protect’ (2009) 10(2)
International Studies Perspectives 111
29
The general principles of law which is recognized by nations by virtue of Article 38 The Statue of the
International Court of Justice
30 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 23 May 1969 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
31
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted 9 December 1948) 78
UNTS 277

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as well as the four Geneva Conventions from 1949 and their additional protocols in 197732
. These
paragraphs in the document go on to state that
“Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such
crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that
responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as
appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United
Nations in establishing an early warning capability. The international community, through the
United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this
context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the
Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis
and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means
be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations.” 33
Subsequently, this was also endorsed by the UNSC under Resolution 1674 which reaffirmed the
summit’s provisions to protect populations from the four grave crimes as well as the council’s
readiness to adopt appropriate steps where necessary.34
This was further elaborated by the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon at the 2009 General
Assembly Debate, who assured that R2P rests on three pillars:35
32
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field (First Geneva Convention) (adopted 12 August 1949) 75 UNTS 31, Convention (II) for the Amelioration
of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (adopted 12 August
1949) 75 UNTS 85, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva
Convention) (adopted 12 August 1949) 75 UNTS 135, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention) (adopted 12 August 1949) 75 UNTS 287; Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (adopted 8 June 1977) 1125 UNTS 3; Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol II) (adopted 8 June 1977) 1125 UNTS 609
33
UN General Assembly (UNGA), ‘2005 World Summit Outcome: resolution/adopted by the General Assembly’
(2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1
34 UN Security Council (UNSC), Res 1674 (2006) UN Doc S/RES/1674
35
UN Secretary-General, Secretary-General defends, clarifies ‘responsibility to protect’ at Berlin Event on
‘Responsible sovereignty: international cooperation for a changed world’, (2008) UN Doc. SG/SM/11701; UN

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I. Protection responsibilities of the state: A state’s individual population must be protected
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
II. Timely and decisive response: The responsibility of the Member States to respond
collectively in a timely and diplomatic manner when the state fails to protect its own
population, through the measures under Chapter VI (peaceful means), Chapter VII
(coercive means with authorization of the UN Security Council) and Chapter VIII (regional
arrangements) of the UN Charter.
III. International assistance and capacity-building: The international community’s
commitment to encourage and assist states in meeting those obligations.
Moreover, according to the Secretary General, “the three pillars are not sequential and are of equal
importance; without all three, the concept would be incomplete.”36
R2P does not enforce duties on
states, but rather “confers powers “of a public or official nature” and that assigns jurisdiction”37
;
it approves but does not command any kind of decision-making action by individual states or the
international community as a whole in situations of mass atrocities, and therefore, it can be said
that it has no normative effect.38
However, R2P has certainly taken its place in the array of
frameworks against which states measure and assess their own as well as other state’s responses
towards humanitarian crisis. This was further demonstrated by the UNGA passing Resolution
63/308 in October 2009 which reaffirms and recalls the 2005 World Summit Outcome and
continues to consider the importance of R2P39
as well as Resolution 1894 which was passed by
the UNSC in November 2009 which goes on to affirm the same Articles 138 and 139 of the Summit
Outcome document.40
The doctrine of R2P has been stressed by the UNSG over the years stressing the importance
towards the international community and its collective responsibility towards the protection of
human rights. The last report from 2014 “Fulfilling our collective responsibility: international
assistance and the responsibility to protect” outlines ways in which national, regional and
General Assembly (UNGA), Implementing the responsibility to protect. Report of the Secretary-General (2009)
A/63/677 UN Doc
36
Ibid.
37
HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1961) as cited in A Orford, International Authority
and the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge UP, 2011)
38 A Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge UP, 2011).
39
UN General Assembly (UNGA), Res 63/308 (2009) UN Doc A/RES/63/308
40
UN Security Council (UNSC), Res 1894 (2009) UN Doc S/RES/1894

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international actors may assist states in fulfilling their responsibility to protect from the four grave
crimes in light of the 2005 Outcome document and builds on previous reports addressing the
implementation of the responsibility to protect, early warning and assessment, the role of regional
and sub-regional arrangements, timely and decisive response and State responsibility and
prevention. 41
While the reports do not resolve various ambiguities as well as omissions, they do
recognize the need for political momentum which may assist in resolving R2P.
The concept of human rights is by far much broader than the four grave crimes contained within
the context of R2P, however, the defense of human rights over the years has chipped away at
traditional notions of sovereignty and has made collective action possible against governments the
grave crimes mentioned above42
. The Commission goes on to report the six requirements which
were set out by the ICISS to elaborate the responsibility to react. As stated in the report
“When preventive measures fail to resolve or contain the situation and when a state is unable or
unwilling to redress the situation, then interventionary measures by other members of the broader
community of states may be required. These coercive measures may include political, economic
or judicial measures, and in extreme cases – but only extreme cases – they may also include
military action. As a matter of first principles, in the case of reaction just as with prevention, less
intrusive and coercive measures should always be considered before more coercive and intrusive
ones are applied.”43
Moreover, The Commission’s report further provides a list for coercive as well as non-coercive
procedures which initially focus on non-military measures which may be taken. Along with the
three requirements which were set out as the pillars of R2P, the ICISS Commission indicated six
41
UN General Assembly (UNGA), Fulfilling our collective responsibility: international assistance and the
responsibility to protect. Report of the Secretary-General (2014) UN Doc A/68/947–S/2014/449; UN General
Assembly (UNGA), Responsibility to protect: State responsibility and prevention. Report of the Secretary-
General (2013) UN Doc A/67/929–S/2013/399; UN General Assembly (UNGA), Responsibility to protect:
timely and decisive response. Report of the Secretary-General (2012) UN Doc A/66/874–S/2012/578; UN
General Assembly (UNGA), The role of regional and sub-regional arrangements in implementing the
responsibility to protect. Report of the Secretary-General (2011) A/65/877–S/2011/393; UN General Assembly
(UNGA), Early warning, assessment and the responsibility to protect. Report of the Secretary-General (2010)
UN Doc A/64/864; UN General Assembly (UNGA), Implementing the responsibility to protect. Report of the
Secretary-General (2009) UN Doc A/63/677
42 WA Knight & F Egerton, The Routledge Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect (Routledge, 2012)
43

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requirements as ‘decision making criteria’ which should be met before military intervention may
be considered. Although the Commission considers that the criteria which they have set out may
not be universally accepted as list for conditions for which military intervention must be met, it
rather proposes that the criteria which they have set may bridge the gap between ‘the rhetoric and
the reality’ when the question of R2P is concerned.44
The first requirement is referred to as the ‘threshold criteria: just cause’ which defines that military
intervention must be limited to circumstances unless “large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended,
with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect
or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or large scale “ethnic cleansing”, actual or apprehended,
whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape’.45
For a war to be justified as a just cause, how serious does the humanitarian crisis have to be in
order to have military intervention? To come to a justification of the seriousness of a conflict, two
kinds of limits may be studied. The first kind of limit of qualitative in which the rights which are
being breached are basic rights such as right to physical safety (including the right not to be subject
to murder, rape, and assault) as well as the right to survival. The second limit of quantitative in
which there should be a substantial number of persons whose basic rights have been breached.
Both these limits ultimately endorse a just cause criterion which was similarly drawn by the
Commission. Therefore this asserts that for humanitarian intervention to be warranted, there has
to be serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings or harm which is imminently likely
to occur as well there has to be circumstances of actual or apprehended large scale loss of life
without or without genocidal intent or not which is the product of deliberate action or negligence
or large scale ethnic cleansing whether carried out by killing, forced, expulsion or acts of terror or
rape.46
The second requirement is ‘right authority’ which questions as to body would authorize any such
intervention. Although the Commission states the right authorities as the UNSC which should be
44
TG Weiss, Military–Civilian Interactions: Humanitarian Crises and the Responsibility to Protect (Rowman
and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2005)
45
E Massingham, ‘Military intervention for humanitarian purposes: does the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine
advance the legality of the use of force for humanitarian ends?’ (2009) 876 IRRC; International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty, the Responsibility to Protect (IDRC, 2001)
46
J Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect; Who should intervene? (OUP, 2010)

17 | P a g e
the first port of call, it goes on to state that the General Assembly and Regional Organizations may
act if there is an inability for the UNSC to decide and thus the other organizations would have a
high degree of legitimacy. 47
The third requirement is ‘right intention’ which means that the primary purpose of the intervention
must be to halt or avert human suffering and that regime overthrow is not a legitimate reason for
invoking the doctrine and that the intervention is to benefit the people for whom it is intended
for.48
The fourth requirement is ‘last resort’ meaning that resort to force should only be used when ‘every
diplomatic and non-military avenue for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the humanitarian
crises’ has been exhausted. Furthermore, the Commission goes on to state that often there may be
a lack of time in order for all the options to be exhausted in which case it should be regarded that
‘that there must be reasonable grounds for believing that, in all the circumstances, if the measure
had been attempted it would not have succeeded’.49
The fifth requirement is ‘proportional means’. Proportionality is a fundamental principle of jus ad
bellum50
and the Commission goes on to state that the scale, duration and intensity of the planned
military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the humanitarian objective in
question. 51
The last requirement is ‘reasonable prospects’. The Commission dictates that military action can
only be justified if it stands a reasonable chance of success. Furthermore, it goes on to state that
47
E Massingham, ‘Military intervention for humanitarian purposes: does the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine
advance the legality of the use of force for humanitarian ends?’ (2009) 876 IRRC; International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty, the Responsibility to Protect (IDRC, 2001)
48
Ibid
49
Ibid
50
The principle of jus ad bellum is the body of rules which governs the lawful use of force. It is distinguished
from the principle of jus in bello which encompasses the rules that apply once force has been applied and a
conflict in underway and applies irrespective of whether the resort to force i.e. jus ad bellum was lawful. H Duffy,
The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law (CUP, 2006)
51
Military intervention for humanitarian purposes: does the Responsibility to Protect doctrine advance the
legality of the E Massingham, ‘Military intervention for humanitarian purposes: does the ‘Responsibility to
Protect’ doctrine advance the legality of the use of force for humanitarian ends?’ (2009) 876 IRRC; International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), Report of the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty, the Responsibility to Protect (IDRC, 2001)

18 | P a g e
‘military intervention is not justified if actual protection cannot be achieved or if the consequences
of embarking upon the intervention are likely to be worse than if there is no action at all’.52
The final responsibility is that of rebuilding which the Commission goes on to state is of paramount
importance and that if military intervention action is taken – because of a breakdown or abdication
of a state’s own capacity and authority in discharging its “responsibility to protect” – there should
be a genuine commitment to helping to build a durable peace, and promoting good governance
and sustainable development.53
2.1.2 R2P in connection with Humanitarian and Military Intervention
Since the Cold War, the Doctrine of humanitarian intervention has been debated upon intensely as
it has also caused tension among states regarding its principle and has impacted millions of peoples
in a number of as well as regions around the world such as in the 1990’s, when humanitarian efforts
were made in various instances such as Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia and Former Yugoslavia among
others54
.
Humanitarian intervention is often said to denote a various forms of international actions from the
distribution of humanitarian aid to virtually any form of military intervention regardless to whether
or not it was in response to a serious humanitarian crisis55
. However, as there is no legal definition
of humanitarian intervention, the legality as well as efficiency of the doctrine incites the
controversy between the contradicting norms of state sovereignties and that of universal human
rights and non-intervention.
In order to explain humanitarian intervention, Pattison goes on to state four defining conditions in
order to attempt at a definition of humanitarian intervention. To begin with, humanitarian
intervention is military56
. This distinguishes various actions which do not commonly regard as
humanitarian intervention such as economic interventions like trade embargoes, boycotts or
sanctions as well as diplomatic interventions even the use of international criminal prosecutions
by referral to the International Criminal Court (henceforth referred to as ICC). The second
52
Ibid
53
54
A Volsky, ‘Reconciling Human Rights and State Sovereignty, Justice and The Law, In Humanitarian
Interventions’ (2007) 3(1) International Public Policy Review 40
55
56
A Roberts, ‘Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights’ (1993) 69(3) Int Affairs 429

19 | P a g e
condition towards the definition concerns the circumstances of the intervention taking place in
which there is actual or impending grievous suffering or loss of life. The third concerns the body
which may undertake humanitarian intervention i.e. that there is an external agent conducting the
intervention. Finally that the intervention must have a humanitarian intention.57
Thus Pattison concludes the definition of humanitarian intervention as
“Forcible military action by an external agent in the relevant political community with the
predominant purpose of preventing, reducing, or halting an ongoing or impending grievous
suffering or loss of life”58
Concerning the legality of intervention, with regards to the UN Charter, Article 2(1) goes on to
state that the principle of sovereign equality among states which therefore establishes a significant
barrier against interventions of the international community. Additionally, non-intervention is
included in the UN Charter under Article 2(4) which prohibits the threat or use of force against
territorial integrity or political dependence of any state as well as while under Article 2(7) which
explicitly prohibits the UN from unsolicited involvement in the domestic affairs of its member
states.59
Furthermore there have been various UN Resolutions, treaties as well as statements which
validate those principles. Resolution 2625 (XXV) validates the articles by stressing that
“No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention
and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or
against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international law.”60
However, the UNSC expanded its interpretation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter and goes on to
explain in its articles the circumstances under which the UNSC may grant authorization for the
use of force. In virtue of Article 39, the UNSC shall determine the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and will decide what measures shall be need to be
57
58
Ibid
59 A Hehir, The Responsibility to Protect: Rhetoric, Reality and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2012)
60

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taken. If, however, peaceful measures taken by the UNSC fail, then the UNSC may sanction more
robust measures. 61
2.1.3 Differences between R2P and Humanitarian Intervention
The aspect of R2P can be said to be both broader as well as narrower to than of humanitarian
intervention. To consider how R2P may be broader than humanitarian intervention, as mentioned
above are its three central responsibilities i.e. responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react
and the responsibility to rebuild, however, it should be noted that the doctrine of R2P is a doctrine
of prevention.62
The international community has first the responsibility to prevent the crisis as to
deter the need for tough action. Actions which fall under these include mediation or preventive
deployment of peacekeeping forces. When these efforts fail and a humanitarian crises is created,
then the international community has the responsibility to react. However, even then humanitarian
intervention is only a part of the equation. In this instance, military intervention falls under
responsibility to react. Still, the international community may pursue other measures short of the
military intervention. Subsequently, in the post-conflict phase, the responsibility to rebuild arises
which ensures that the conditions which arose from military intervention are not repeated.63
Moreover, the R2P doctrine can said to be narrower than humanitarian intervention in the sense
that humanitarian intervention may be undertaken in a response to various humanitarian crisis.
Additionally, humanitarian intervention is set on legally binding treaties, customary law as well as
conventions whereas R2P principle is not legally binding even though as mentioned earlier its
aspects may be found in conventions.64
Moreover, if the concept of intervention is further analyzed, the ICISS report had a few notable
differences from that of the 2005 World Summit which changes the question of who should
intervene when the issue of R2P arises. These differences changes the authority and conditions of
R2P
I. Whilst in the Commission’s report, R2P transfers to the international community when the
state involved is unable to or unwilling to look after the human rights of its citizens, in the
61
United Nations, Charter of the United Nations (adopted 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI
62
SP Rosenberg, ‘Responsibility to Protect: A Framework for Prevention’ (2009) 1(4) Global Responsibility to
Protect 442
63
64
Australian Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law and the Responsibility to Protect (2011)

21 | P a g e
Summit it is stated that R2P only when national authorities are manifestly failing to protect
its citizens.
II. Military intervention will meet the just cause threshold in circumstances of ‘serious and
irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur’ or ‘large scale
ethnic cleansing’ whilst in the Summit it was stated that military intervention will meet the
just cause threshold only in more limited circumstances of ‘genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity’.
III. When the state primarily responsible for its peoples fails to act, reacting robustly to the
crisis is a fallback responsibility of the international community in general whereas in the
Summit outcome reacting to a crisis is not a fallback responsibility of the international
community but instead states are only prepared to take collective action on a case-by-case
basis.
IV. The UNSC should be the first port of call for humanitarian intervention, but under the
authority of Resolution 377 if there is a lack of unanimity of the permanent member for
which the UNSC fails to act as required for international peace and security, the UNGA
would consider other recommendations deemed as necessary in order to restore
international peace65
but on the other hand the Summit goes on to state any action must be
taken through the UNSC.
V. Intervention must meet four additional precautionary principles as such right intention, last
resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects in contrast to the Summit’s where no
reference is made to the criteria for intervention.66
Moreover, the Advisory Council on International Affairs in the Netherlands (henceforth referred
to as AIV) goes on to state that R2p differs significantly from and perhaps may even be
incompatible with humanitarian intervention and considers that the two doctrines should not be
confused with one another and affirms the differences which have been mentioned above in its
report.67
65
UN General Assembly (UNGA), Res 377 (V) (1950) UN Doc A/RES/377 (V) A
66 J Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect; Who should intervene? (OUP, 2010)
67
Advisory Council on International Affairs, The Netherlands and the Responsibility to Protect: The
Responsibility to Protect people from mass atrocities (2010)

22 | P a g e
2.2 R2P & the Middle East
As my thesis is concerned with the application of R2P in Syria and Libya, it is important to
understand the view point of the perception of R2P in the region. The Middle East has been a
region of multiple and a times competing, identities and allegiances, all of which have had a vast
impact on foreign policies as well as approaches towards R2P. The foreign policies in the region
has been influenced by memberships of the states in various regional organizations. Other than
Israel, all the states are members of The Organization of the Islamic Conference (henceforth
referred to as OIC) Furthermore, simultaneously the states are also members of The Arab League
(henceforth referred to as AL) as well as Gulf Cooperation Council (henceforth referred to as GCC)
other than Iraq in the latter organization.
As the states of the Middle East are pro-Palestine and go against the views of Israel and Western
states, Thakur goes on to explain that the doctrines of R2P and humanitarian intervention are
perceived as facades of Western powers going back to the imperial and neo-colonial oppressive
ways against weaker states.68
Additionally, since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, this perception has been unchanged. With
the Arab Spring which will be discussed further, along with the deterioration of the region, the
application of R2P in light of recent events can perhaps shed some light for its application.
2.3 Terrorism
“The purpose of terrorism lies not just in the violent act itself. It is in producing terror. It sets out
to inflame, to divide, to produce consequences which they then use to justify further terror.”69
It is universally accepted that every state around the world have an international obligation to
respect human dignity as well as abstain from committing grave human rights violations such as
genocide, slavery, torture, racial and ethnic discrimination and deprivations of rights and freedoms
of people. Ever since the conflict, the Syrian population has been victim to various gross human
rights violations by the terrorist organizations.
68
R Thakur, The United Nations, Peace, and Security; From Collective Security to Responsibility to Protect
(CUP, 2006)
69 ‘Former Prime Minister tony Blair’s in his speech concerning the debate on Iraq to the House of Commons
The Guardian 18 March 2003’ (The Guardian, 2003) available at
<http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/mar/18/foreignpolicy.iraq1> accessed august 12th
2015

23 | P a g e
From the September 2001 attacks in the United States, it has become evident more than before of
how terrorism and the Bush administrations and world’s declaration of the war on terrorism would
affect state laws but also international law. This was followed by terrorist attacks in London,
Madrid, Bali and Mumbai to name a few. It has become a volatile and rising threat that has taken
the world by storm to which the international community began changing their domestic and
foreign policies regarding to terrorism.
To understand as to which legislature may apply, it is necessary to have a legal definition of
terrorism.70
The working binding definition as to what terrorism is, is still incomplete in a way that
only acts which have been described by virtue of international conventions can be categorized as
terrorism71
Nevertheless, simultaneously this leaves the definition of terrorism within the domestic
laws of the member states of conventions, so long as it fulfils the standards of international
conventions regarding to terrorism.
70 S Setty, ‘What's in a Name? How Nations Define Terrorism Ten Years after 9/11’ (2011) 33 U Pa J Int'l L Ins
1
71
Those Conventions are the following: UN Convention on offences and certain other acts committed on board
aircraft (Tokyo Convention) (adopted 14 September 1963) UNTS 704 (No 10106); UN Convention for the
suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft (Unlawful Seizure Convention) (adopted 16 December 1970) UNTS
867 (No 12325), replaced by the Beijing Convention; UN Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts
against the safety of civil aviation (Civil Aviation Convention), (adopted 23 September 1971) UNTS 974 (No
14118), including Montreal Protocol 1990; UN Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against
internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents (Diplomatic Agents Convention), (adopted 14
December 1973) UNTS 1035 (No 15410); UN International Convention against the taking of hostages (Hostages
Convention), (adopted 17 December 1979) UNTS 1316 (No 21931); N Convention on the physical protection
of nuclear material (Nuclear Materials Convention) (adopted 3 March 1980) UNTS 1456 (No 24631); UN
Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation (Maritime Convention),
UNTS 1678 (No 29004), including Protocol 2005; UN Protocol for the suppression of unlawful acts against the
safety of fixed platforms located on the continental shelf (Fixed Platform Protocol) (adopted 14 October 2005)
UNTS 1678; UN Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (Plastic
Explosives Convention) (adopted 1 March 1991) ICAO Doc S/22393; UN International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (Terrorist Bombing Convention) (adopted 15 December 1997) UN Doc
A/RES/52/164; UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (Terrorist
Financing Convention) (adopted 9 December 1999) UN Doc A/RES/54/109; UN International Convention for
the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention) (adopted 14 September 2005)
UN Doc A/RES/59/290; UN Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil
Aviation (Beijing Convention) (adopted 10 September 2010), ICAO Doc 9960. D O’Donnell, ‘International
Treaties against Terrorism and the Use of Terrorism During Armed Conflict and by Armed Forces’ (2006)
88(864) IRRC

24 | P a g e
Although the earliest efforts were made when the definition was stated under the 1939 Convention
of the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, the convention was never adopted and thus never
came into effect.72
The UN finally addressed international terrorism under Resolution 3034 (XXVII) of 18 December
1972, in which it stated the necessity of member states cooperate against forms of terrorism and
“Acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance, and despair, and which cause some
people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes.”
A decade later the UNGA acknowledged that effective actions against terrorism could be improved
by having an internationally suitable definition of international terrorism. 73
The need for
cooperation was reaffirmed in Resolution 46/51, unfortunately there was still a lack of agreement
on a definition.74
The Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism was one of
the first documents that contained elements of terrorism. This document stated that
“Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group
of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable,
whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or
any other nature that may be invoked to justify them”.75
Furthermore, the GA declared terrorism as a threat to, amongst others, international peace and
security, and human rights.76
The importance for a detailed framework covering the prevention,
repression and the elimination of terrorism provided the GA with the decision to establish an Ad
Hoc Committee for the draft of an international convention that would cover these characteristics,
especially in the context of terrorist bombings.77
The Ad Hoc Committee stated that several
delegations stressed the need for a definition on terrorism and the formation of an effective
72
H Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law (CUP, 2006)
73
UN General Assembly (UNGA), Res 42/159 (1987) UN Doc A/RES/42/159.
74
UN General Assembly (UNGA), Res 46/51 Measures to eliminate international terrorism, (1991) UN Doc
A/RES/46/51
75
UN General Assembly (UNGA), Res 49/60 Annex: Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International
Terrorism, (1994) UN Doc A/RES/49/60 (1994)
76
Ibid,
77

25 | P a g e
international legal regime for counterterrorism, as well as differentiating between terrorism and
the right to resist foreign occupation.78
After the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center, the UNSC issued Resolution 1373 authorizing
its members to take proactive steps against terrorism, which included measures such as
criminalization of the provision of funds to terrorists cells, bring wrongdoers to justice and
preventing the movement of terrorists through border controls and made it binding to all UN
member states under virtue of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.79
Furthermore, it established the
Counter-Terrorism Committee (henceforth referred to as CTC) which would oversee the
implementation of the Resolution, but it would not monitor performance against human rights or
safeguard the rule of law.80
Although the CTC did not impose sanctions on non-compliant states,
it had bestowed a certain degree of legitimacy on their counter-terrorism efforts. 81
Though, this
was altered later on when the UNSC issued new resolutions ‘reminding’ states to comply with
their human rights obligations.82
In 2004 the UNSC adopted Resolution 1566, which contained elements of what is to be considered
terrorism.83
According to paragraph 3 of the Resolution, these elements are
“Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious
bodily injury, or taking of hostages; With the purpose to Provoke a state of terror in the general
public or in a group of persons or particular persons; Intimidate a population; Or compel a
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act; Which
constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and
protocols relating to terrorism; Based on political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic,
religious or other considerations.”
78
UN General Assembly (UNGA), Report of the Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly
resolution 51/210 (1996) UN Doc A/55/37
79
80
EJ Flynn, ‘The Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee and Human Rights’ (2007) 7(2) Hum Rts L
Rev 371
81
K Roach, The 9/11 Effect: Comparative Counter-Terrorism (CUP, 2011)
82
See for example UN Security Council (UNSC), Res 1456 (2003) UN Doc S/RES/1456 paras 4(ii), 6; UN
Security Council (UNSC), Resolution 1566 (2004) UN Doc S/RES/1566; UN Security Council (UNSC), Res
1624 (2005), UN Doc S/RES/1624
83

26 | P a g e
The UNGA took a significant step in September 2006 by adopting the United Nations Global
Counter-Terrorism Strategy by virtue of Resolution 60/288.84
This thorough document covers a
strategy of action involving of four measures, specifically to address the conditions encouraging
the spread of terrorism, to prevent and combat terrorism, to build States’ capacity to prevent and
combat terrorism and to support the role of the United Nations system in this concern, and to
safeguard respect for human rights and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against
terrorism, with reference to UNGA resolution 60/158 as the fundamental outline85
. Furthermore,
another significant stand from the GA Resolution is reference to the non-refoulement obligation
under international refugee and human rights law.86
Additionally, the Resolution also highlights the role of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion
and protection of human rights as well as fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, whose
mandate was established by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (henceforth
referred to as UNCHR).87
The Special Rapporteur noted that the lack of a definition on terrorism
could perhaps lead to breaches of article 15(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (henceforth referred to as ICCPR)88
as well as the principle of non-discrimination and
equality before the law. However, the Special Rapporteur concluded that an act is a terrorist
offence if the act was committed with the intention of causing death or serious bodily injury; for
the purpose of provoking a state of terror, intimidating a population, or compelling a Government
84
UN General Assembly (UNGA), Res 60/288 ‘The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy’ (2006)
UN Doc A/RES/60/288
85 Ibid
86
UN General Assembly (UNGA), Res 60/158 ‘Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while
countering terrorism’ (2006) UN Doc A/RES/60/158)
87
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR), Res 2005/80 ‘Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism’ (2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2005/80. See also UN
Human Rights Council (UNHRC), Res 15/15 ‘Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while
countering terrorism: mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism’ (2010) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/15/15; United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR), Res 22/8 ‘Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while
countering terrorism: mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism’ (2013) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/22/8
88
Article 12 (1) states that Article 15. 1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any
act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when
it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the
criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for
the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby. International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, (adopted 16 December 1966) UNTS 999 (No. 14668)

27 | P a g e
or international organization to do or abstain from doing any act; and constituting offences under
international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.89
Furthermore, terrorism is not explicitly addressed under R2P, however, it could be covered as the
acts of terrorism do qualify as crimes against humanity, war crimes, or genocide. As Genser states,
that in theory R2P could be understood to encompass state responsibility to repress transnational
terrorism operating within its territory and conventions which concern terrorism could be
applied.90
Moreover, one of the biggest development in the field of international criminal law, was the
establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), however, The Rome Statute establishing
the ICC and its governing document does not include terrorism within its jurisdiction. Although,
the preamble to the statue identifies the link between peace and justice, declaring that “grave
crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world”.91 92
Analysis of this will be made
in the subsequent chapters which discuss the current situation in Syria.
2.4 Sub-conclusion
The release of the report by the ICISS was at an unfortunate timing as the world’s attention shifted
from a positive change towards humanitarian intervention and air to terrorism and the war that was
raging towards it. It can be concluded that a legal definition of the concepts mentioned above is
vital in order to have a unified understanding of the notions of R2P, humanitarian intervention as
well as terrorism. With all the concepts still being in in its early stages, it is also difficult to fix the
problems immediately. The lack of legal definitions are essential in order to tackle human rights
violations and safeguard the rule of law.
89
UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. Report of the
Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while
countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin, (2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/98, paras 26-50
90
J Genser, & I Cotler, The Responsibility to Protect: The Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in Our Time
(OUP, 2012)
91 JK. Kleffner Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions 2008
92
A Cohen, Prosecuting Terrorists at the International Criminal Court: Reevaluating an Unused Legal Tool to
Combat Terrorism’ (2012) Mich St L Rev

28 | P a g e
Chapter 3: The Middle East
The shift in major politics and corruption from governments triggered various events which has
made the region one of the world’s most volatile region.93
What is the history behind the
revolutions and how has the world as well as UNSC reacted towards it in order to tackle the
volatility? How was the UNSC able to approve the doctrine of R2P for the first time? The
following chapter aims to provide an account of the past which has shaped the current instability
and provides insight as to the social vacuum that has been created which caused an up-rise of
terrorist actors and activities which is discussed in the subsequent chapter.
3.1 The Arab Spring
The Arab Spring was a series of anti-government protests by nationals around the Middle Eastern
region and North Africa (henceforth referred to as MENA). The demonstrations were a way of the
people protesting the democratization of the affected states and greater liberalizations. On 17th
December 2010, a 26 year old fruit vendor set himself a blaze and died in a desperate attempt
against the bureaucratic indifference and corruption in Tunisia. His death triggered intense
antigovernment protests which led the then President of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali to flee to Saudi
Arabia in exile. This led to demonstrations which were comparably peaceful to what was ahead in
the latter months in Egypt, Yemen, Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, and civil wars which were to follow
in Libya and Syria94
.
3.2 Libya
“Our consensus was strong, and our resolve is clear. The people of Libya must be protected and
in the absence of an immediate end to the violence against civilians, our coalition is prepared to
act and act with urgency.”95
93
FL Jenista, ‘The Volatile Middle East’ (2006) 27(3) Torch
94
G Blight, S Pulham & P Torpey, ‘Arab spring: an interactive timeline of Middle East protests’ (The Guardian,
5 January 2012) available at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-protest-
interactive-timeline> accessed July 31st
, 2015
95
D Jackson, ‘Obama: 'The people of Libya must be protected'’ President Barack Obama giving a press
conference on enforcement of United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1973 (2011) 17 March 2011
S/RES/1973 (USA Today, 2011) available at
<http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2011/03/obama-the-people-of-libya-must-be-
protected/1#.VZb6fvmqpBc> accessed July 27th
2015

29 | P a g e
Muammar Gaddafi became the political dictator of Libya since he overthrew the then monarchy
in 1969. Since then, he ruled Libya with an iron fist under his military regime. The first protests
in Libya began on 15 February 2011 in Benghazi which then lead to more Anti-Gaddafi
demonstrations to spread across other cities in the country. These protests led to the establishment
of a provisional government based in Benghazi known as the National Transitional Council with
the defined goals to overthrow the government in Tripoli 96
. Witnessing the Arab Spring
revolutions that were in Tunisia and Egypt, Gaddafi massacred at least several hundred of his own
people97
even though at the same time he tried to calm the demonstrations by announcing the
release of political prisoners. However, the situation escalated when he referred to the population
as “cockroaches” “rats” as well as “cowards and traitors” and threatened to make them extinct by
“cleansing Libya house by house”. This reminded the world of how the Tutsi’s during the Rwandan
genocide were described in 1994.98
Till this date there is no verified number on the death toll of
Libyans. According to the ICC, prior to the outbreak of the civil war, an estimated 500-700
civilians were killed in February 2011.99
By the end of February, as violence escalated, regional organizations AL, OIC and GCC had
condemned the acts of the Libyan government. The organizations suspended Libya’s membership
from the organizations which was seen as a surprise as the regional organizations have always
supported the regime in Libya.100
The international community reacted too to the atrocities, which
led to the United Nations Security Council to pass Resolution 1970 which explicitly appealed for
the Libyan authorities the responsibility to protect its population, adopting an arms embargo, travel
bands and freezing of assets and most importantly the threat of prosecution by the International
Criminal Court.101
However, the response from the Libyan government was them stating that the
Resolution was premature and requested suspension of operation until the inquisitions were
verified, however, continued the mass atrocities towards its citizens such as random detentions,
96
Cornell University Library, ‘Arab Spring: A research & Study Guide’ available at
<http://guides.library.cornell.edu/c.php?g=31688&p=200751> accessed July 28th
2015
97
I Black and O Bowcott, ‘Libya protests: Massacres reported as Gaddafi imposes news blackout’ (The Guardian,
18 February 2011) available at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/18/libya-protests-massacres-
reported>
98
G Evans, ‘Libya and its aftermath: the limits of intervention? Implementing Resolution 1973: A case of
overreach’ in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook (OPU, 2012)
99 Ibid
100
T Dune & J Gifkins, ‘Libya and the State of Intervention’ (2011) 65(5) AJ Int’l Affairs 515
101
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Res 1970 (2011) S/RES/1970

30 | P a g e
torturing civilians and killing them102
. Upon verifications of the grave human rights violations and
the violence which was surrounding it, the regional organizations the requested the United Nations
Security Council to take measures which would protect the civilians in Libya103
.
As Libyan authorities had failed to abhor to Resolution 1970, the UNSC had no choice but to order
Resolution 1973 which was the first time that the UNSC had mandated military intervention as a
solution to protecting civilians against a de jure functioning government104
and authorized member
states to “Take all measures” to protect the civilians as well as establishing a No Fly Zone.105
One of the greatest obstacles was the lack of consensus over the necessity to use force, which was
the reason five states chose to abstain against the Resolution.106
Although all the members of the
UNSC condemned Gaddafi’s actions, Brazil and Germany questioned the worth of the long term
effects such as worsening matters instead of an act of conflict resolution. Additionally, India
questioned as to the ambiguities of authorization while China stated its foreign policy of the nonuse
of force whereas Russia contemplated that it could potentially lead to a large-scale military
intervention.107
Two operations were set out. The first one on 19 March 2011 called Operation Odyssey Dawn,
was led by a US-military coalition that levelled Gaddafi’s air-defense systems, established a no-
fly zone over most of the country and forced his army to retreat from the cities where they were
attacking.108
The second operation, Operation Unified Protector, started on 31 March 2011 in order
to implement the three objectives of Resolution 1973, namely the weapons embargo, the no-fly
zone and the protection of civilians.109
Deadlock emerged due to the lack of training of the rebels,
no clear strategic end state and the limited objective of protecting civilians.110
In order to break the
102
PD Williams, ‘Briefing: The Road to Humanitarian War in Libya’ (2011) 3(2) Global Responsibility to
Protect; B Berti, ‘Forcible Intervention in Libya: revamping the ‘political of human protection’?’ (2014) Global
Change, Peace & Security
103
S Zifcak, ‘The Responsibility to Protect after Libya and Syria’ (2012) 13(1) Melb J Int'l L
104
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Res 1973 (2011) S/RES/1973.
105
Ibid
106
J Morris, ‘Libya and Syria: R2P and the spectre of the swinging pendulum’ (2013) 89(5) Int Affairs
107
PD Williams & AJ Bellamy, ‘Principles, politics, and prudence: Libya, the Responsibility to Protect, and the
use of military force’ (2012) 18(3) Global Governance 278; BD Jones, ‘Libya and the responsibilities of power’
(2011) 3(53) Survival: Global Politics and Strategy
108
CS Chivvis, ‘Libya and the Future of Liberal Intervention’ (2012) 6(54) Survival: Global Politics and Strategy
109 F Gaub, ‘The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Libya: Reviewing Operation Unified Protector’ (2013)
Letort Paper Series
110
CS Chivvis, ‘Libya and the Future of Liberal Intervention’ (2012) 6(54) Survival: Global Politics and Strategy

31 | P a g e
deadlock, more military aircraft was provided and the rebels were trained, equipped and well-
supplied.111
Eventually Gaddafi was found by the rebels and killed in October 2011. It was
reported this year that that the Libyan conflict had produced over 434,000 Internally Displaced
People (henceforth referred to as IDP) and around close to 30,000 refugees from Libya.112
The use of military force approved by the UNSC in Libya marked the first time that intervention
in a sovereign state took place against the expressed will of the intervened state’s government. To
some, this intervention was seen as a new dawn to the doctrine of R2P.113
According to Gareth
Evans “the international military intervention in Libya is not about bombing for democracy or
Muammar Gaddafi’s head. Legally, morally, politically and militarily, it has only one justification:
protecting the country’s people”114
. However, as Wilson would go on to state, that there were
indications that the states which made the efforts of intervention in Libya were actually very much
committed towards a regime change, even though stopping short of making it the base objective
of NATO rather than commitment towards the objects of R2P.115
3.3 Syria
‘It’s absolutely sickening… I watched a little baby die today. Absolutely horrific … No one here
can understand how the international community can let this happen. … There is just shells,
rockets and tank fire pouring into civilian areas of this city, and it is just unrelenting.’116
The Syrian conflict has triggered one of the worst humanitarian crisis since World War II117
.
Entering its fifth year of war, the conflict has had over an estimated 220,000 people killed and over
11 million people which is more than half of Syria’s population, displaced by the civil war and
111
Ibid
112
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ‘Numbers of internally displaced in Libya double since
September’ (UNHCR, 30 June 2015) available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5594f8264.html>
113
RW Murray & A McKay, Into the Eleventh Hour: R2P, Syria and Humanitarianism in Crisis (E-International
Relations, 2014)
114
115
G Wilson, ‘The United Nations Security Council, Libya and Resolution 1973: Protection of Civilians or Tool
for Regime Change?’ (2013)
116
‘Journalist Marie Colvin video report from Homs, Syria: “I Saw a Baby Die Today”’ (BBC News, February
2012) available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-17120484> accessed on June 29th
2015
117
J Egeland (Secretary General of the Norwegian Refugee Council), ‘This is the Worst Refugee Crisis since
WWII. It’s Time for Us to Rethink Our Response’ (Huffington Post, 15 September 2014) available at
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jan-egeland/refugee-crisis-wwii-aid-_b_5791776.html> accessed on June 29th
2015

32 | P a g e
sectarian violence118
. Even with the record high figures and more than a thousand days into the
conflict, there shows no end to this conflict in the zone.
Prior to the conflict Syria already had complications with the diverse demographic fabric which
had a varied group of ethnic and religious groups coexisting within artificially contrived borders
drawn following the First World War, however, since the war the precise demographic numbers
are indefinable.119
In the words of the UNSG Ban Ki-moon, Syria has become a “proxy war with
regional and international players arming one side or the other”120
The conflict has escalated faster than any conflict in recent times. This comes from the strong
sectarian component which has been around for decades. The majority of the Syrian population
was composed of Sunni Muslims whereas the government and the heavily armed Shabiha militia
as well as the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad who inherited Syria’s dictatorship from his father
are all of the Alawite Shite minority group. There are many opposition groups against the Assad
regime, with the largest and most significant one being the Syrian National Council (henceforth
referred to as SNC), that stands as an umbrella to the Sunni majority. Combined with SNC is the
main armed group known as The Free Syrian Front (henceforth referred to as FSA).121
While vast
human rights violations have been committed by the Syrian government as well as the Shabiha
militia, it has also been reported that opposition groups have equally breached human rights.122
Syria followed the other countries revolting during the Arab Spring and just like it did in Libya
the situation escalated rapidly, when in February 2011 the protests against the government broke
out by opposition groups questioning poverty, inequality, and the desire for democracy and human
rights obligations.123
Despite international condemnation of the atrocities which have been taking
118
Global Centre For the Responsibility to Protect, ‘4 years, 4 Vetoes, 220,000 dead: Statement on the Fourth
Anniversary of the Syria conflict’ (2015) available at <http://www.globalr2p.org/publications/361> accessed on
June 29th
2015
119
FC Hof & A Simon, ‘Sectarian Violence in Syria’s Civil War: Causes, Consequences, and Recommendations
for Mitigation’ (The Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2013)
120
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, ‘Remarks to the General Assembly on Syria’ (UN News, 3
August 2012) available at: <http://www.un.org/sg/ statements/index.asp?nid=6224> accessed on June 29th
2015
121
J Gifkins, ‘The UN Security Council Divided: Syria in Crisis’ (2012) 3(4) Global Responsibility to Protect
377
122
‘Deadly Reprisals: Deliberate Killings and Other Abuses by Syria's Armed Forces’ (Amnesty USA, 14 June
2012) available at <http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/deadly-reprisals-deliberate-killings-and-other-
abuses-by-syria-s-armed-forces> accessed on June 29th
2015
123

33 | P a g e
place in Syria since war broke out, initially, there appeared to be only very limited keenness
towards some form of military intervention. However, this attitude changed after the aftermath of
chemical weapons and the rise of terrorist actors in the state.124
In Dara’a the peaceful protests began in March after two children were detained and tortured after
allegedly painting anti-government graffiti on public buildings, to which the Syrian armed forces
reacted with violence by attacking protesters and firing at a funeral, causing the spread of protests
to other cities.125
The President Assad, publicly proclaimed that the incident as well as the problem
was a conspiracy of armed gangs, terrorists and imperialist forces.126
Subsequently, in April 2011
the government sent the army to repress the protesters, retorting more violently and intense, to
which the protesters started to demand regime change instead of reforms.127
Numerous efforts were made to address the situation, but all of them were unsuccessful. On 27
April 2011 the matter was discussed within the UNSC.128
In October 2011 the first attempt,
prompted by France, Germany, Portugal and the UK, to permit non-coercive measures
condemning the systematic human rights abuses and the use of force by the Syrian authorities,
with a threat of punitive measures in case of non-compliance.129
Lebanon, Brazil, South Africa as
well as India abstained, whereas China and the Russian Federation vetoed the draft.130
Russia
referred to the Libyan experience and the mission creep of regime change, while China used its
foreign policy to veto the resolution as it did when the Libyan conflict was in question. Brazil
abstained on grounds of obtaining broad support and act as a single voice while India wanted to
give Syria necessary time to stop the violations, and Lebanon as well as South Africa argued that
the principle of sovereignty should not be violated.
124
G Wilson, ‘Applying the Responsibility to Protect to the “Arab Spring”’ (2014) 35(2) Liverpool LR 157
125
UN Human Rights Council (UNHCR), Report of the independent international commission inquiry on the
Syrian Arab Republic, (2011) A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1
126
B Mroue, ‘Syrian President Orders Release of Some Protesters; Cabinet is named’ (The Washington Post, 15
April 2011)
127
N Blanford, ‘Repeal of Hated Emergency Law is “Too Little, Too Late”’ (The Times, 22 April 2011); E
Barry, ‘As Nations Line Up against Syrian Government, Russia Sides Firmly with Assad’, (The New York Times,
28 January 2012)
128
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), The Situation in the Middle East – 6524th meeting (2011)
S/PV.6524
129
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), France, Germany, Portugal and United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland: Draft Resolution (2011) S/2011/61.
130
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), The Situation in the Middle East – 6527th meeting (2011)
S/PV.6627

34 | P a g e
A second attempt was made in February 2012, which called for a political transition, explicitly
ruling out coercive measures.131
There were no abstentions, but Russia and China exercised their
veto on the grounds that the resolution would give opening to regime change.132
Kofi Annan
became a Joint Special Envoy and devised a six-point plan to end the violence133
which was
adopted in April 2012 in Resolution 2042 that authorized the dispatch of 300 unarmed observers
to monitor the ceasefire, followed by Resolution 2043 that established the United Nations
Supervision Mission in Syria (henceforth referred to as UNSMIS) for the same purpose.134
Nevertheless, in May 2012 the violence restarted and an effort was made to extend the mandate of
UNSMIS combined with a threat of sanctions if Syria didn’t comply.135
Accordingly China and
Russia vetoed the draft and Pakistan and South Africa abstained.136
China found the resolution
flawed and would erode international trust and infringe on sovereignty, whereas Russia claimed
that the Resolution was biased. Moreover, Pakistan stated that the coercive approach
counterproductive whereas South Africa emphasized the need for consensus within the UNSC.
It was after the chemical attacks in August 2013, was Resolution 2118 passed in order to destroy
Syria’s chemical arsenal, endorsing the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(henceforth referred to as OPCW).137
A series of reports from within Syria showed how the
chemical attacks had killed a large number of innocent civilian population including a large
number of children amongst the number of causalities, in rebel-held areas of Damascus, for which
the attack was described as one of the world’s most lethal chemical attacks since the 1980’s.138
In
January and February 2014 negotiations were launched between Syrian parties in Geneva, but
131 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Bahrain, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, Jordan, Kuwait,
Libya, Morocco, Oman, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Togo, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: Draft Resolution (2012) S/2012/77
132
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), ‘The Situation in the Middle East – 6711th meeting’ (2012)
S/PV.6711
133
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), ‘The Situation in the Syrian Arab Republic’ (2012)
A/RES/66/253
134
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Res 2042 (2012), S/RES/2042; United Nations Security Council
(UNSC), Res 2043 (2012) S/RES/2043
135
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), France, Germany, Portugal and United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and United States of America: Draft Resolution (2012) S/2012/538.
136
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), The Situation in the Middle East. Report of the Secretary-General
on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2043 (2012) (S/2012/523) (2012) S/PV.6810.
137
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Res 2118 (2013) S/RES/2118).
138 D Evans & K Yacoub Oweis. ‘Syria gas ‘kills hundreds’; Security Council meets’ (Reuters, 21 August 2013)
available at <http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/08/22/syria-crisis-chemicals-idINDEE97K03720130822>
accessed July 24th
2015

35 | P a g e
ended in failure.139
As a response, Resolution 2139 was adopted, where for the first time there was
consensus on the humanitarian dimension by demanding the allowance of humanitarian assistance
and putting an end to all forms of violence.140
As a follow up to Resolution 2139, on 14 July 2014.
Resolution 2165 was passed which authorizes the UN to provide cross border humanitarian aid
without the consent of the Syrian government through Turkey, Jordan as well as Iraq and
establishing a monitoring mechanism for six months to monitor the implementation.141
In May 2014, the UNSC wanted to refer the situation of Syria to the International Criminal Court
(ICC), but China and Russia vetoed.142
Russia, again, argued that the Western powers pursued
regime change and that the whole debate about Syria was damaging the P5 unity, to which China
agreed and once again relied on the principles of sovereignty.143
Finally, the UNSC passed
Resolution 2163 that extends the mandate of UNDOF for six months and condemning the fighting
and military activity around their area of operation.144
Towards the end of 2014, The Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic (henceforth referred to as CoI) had published nine major documents which had
documented grave human rights violations in Syria. 145
The CoI reported of not only pro-
government armed forces but also of opposition and Islamist groups and the widespread of
violations of international humanitarian law.
Subsequently, in March 2015 the UNSC passed Resolution 2209 reaffirming Resolution 2118
which was passed and recalling the protocol for the prohibition of Chemical weapons and to which
139
N Tocci, ‘On Power and Norms. Libya, Syria, and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2014) Transatlantic Paper
Series No 2
140
141
142
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Albania, Andorra, [...] United States of America: Draft Resolution
(2014) S/2014/348
143
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), The Situation in the Middle East (22 May 2014) S/PV.7810.
144
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Res 2163 (2014) S/RES/2163.
145
United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), Report of the Independent International Commission of
Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (2014) A/HRC/25/65. All of the reports of the Commission of Inquiry,
including the ninth report, titled Rule of terror: Living under ISIS in Syria, are available at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/; S Adams, ‘Failure to Protect: Syria and the UN
Security Council’ (2015) 5 Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect Occasional Paper Series

36 | P a g e
threatened the use of force as it had condemned the use of any chemicals as weapons in Syria
during civil war146
.
As the civil war continues, Syria’s problems do not end there. The conflict is further worsened by
the rise of terrorist actors and organizations which have caused an alarming rate of human rights
violations and is threatening to destabilize the region by its rapid expansion. The UNSC has passed
several resolutions against terrorist activities in Syria as well which are discussed in the subsequent
chapters.
3.4 Sub-conclusion
As evidenced from the summary of events, it is astonishing how one man’s self-immolation to
demonstrate the dissatisfaction and corruption to protest a government has caused an escalation of
chain of events in the Arabian region and triggered the Arab Spring. It could be argued that not
since the collapse of the Soviet Union or the fall of the Berlin wall has change and instability swept
across a region as quickly as it can be seen over the last few years. However, even after the UNSC
sanctioned the use of force in accordance with the doctrine of R2P, the lack of consensus over the
necessity to use force among the UNSC states continues to be a problem and leaves the council
paralyzed when R2P is concerned towards Syria. This delay has caused millions of people to suffer
and the creation of a social vacuum which has left an up-rise of terrorist actors which is discussed
in the successive chapter.
146

37 | P a g e
Chapter 4: Syria and the up-rise of Terrorist Actors
In addition to the various human rights violations by the Syrian Government as well as armed
opposition groups147
, the social vacuum which stands has been a scope for an up-rise in terrorist
organizations and their combatant’s activities in Syria. Although the civil war may have acted as
a catalyst of violence and human rights violations, was the country a home to these organizations
already? Under international criminal law, what crimes have these non-state actors committed?
Furthermore, how have other states reacted towards these violations by the terrorists? This chapter
goes on to describe such organizations origin and the crimes under international criminal law.
4.1 Terrorist Actors and Organizations in Syria
One of the most prominent terrorist groups in the world is Al Qaeda. The mere mention of it
generates images of efficient and systematic terror and violence of a network of terrorist actors
around the world. By 2010 it was seen that the network was possibly on a decline as it had lost
militarily in Iraq and seemed as politically irrelevant during the revolts of the Arab Spring. With
the death of Osama bin Laden however in 2011, it was said that the Al Qaeda network became
stronger and began to be on the rise again.148
However, since the Syrian civil war, the network was
seen to have been rebuilt as various affiliate networks and was said to have recovered from its
losses and remerge by taking advantage of political turmoil and western failures. It is said that Al
Qaeda affiliates now occupy more territory in the Arab world than at any time in its history.149
Among the terrorist organisations operating in Syria is Al Qaeda’s affiliate network known as Al-
Nusra Front (henceforth referred to as ANF),150
formed in 2011 when Al Qaeda in Iraq (henceforth
147
See, for example, Human Rights Watch, ‘Syria: Armed opposition groups committing abuses’ (20 March
2012) available at <http://www.hrw. org/news/2012/03/20/syria-armed-opposition-groups-committing-abuses>
accessed on July 23rd
2015; K Fahim, ‘UN official warns Syrian rebels about atrocities’ (New York Times, 10
September 2012) available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/11/ world/middleeast/united-nations-warns-
syrian-rebels-over-atrocities.html> accessed on July 23rd
2015; CJ Chivers, ‘Brutality of Syrian rebels posing
dilemma in West’ (New York Times, 5 September 2013) available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/05/
world/middleeast/brutality-of-syrian-rebels-pose-dilemma-in-west.html> accessed July 23rd
2015;, United
Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on
the Syrian Arab Republic (2014) A/HRC/25/65
148
K Zimmerman, The al Qaeda Network- A New Framework for Defining the Enemy (American Enterprise
Institute, Critical Threats Project, 2013)
149
A Ibrahim, The Resurgence of Al-Qaeda in Syria and Iraq (United States Army War College Press, 2014)
150
Also known as the Nusra or Jabhat-al-Nusra

38 | P a g e
referred to as AQI) sent one of its operatives Abu Muhammad al-Julani to Syria to organise jihadist
cells in the region.151
The organization gained prominence among rebel organisations in Syria for
its consistent supply of arms and funding as well a foreign fighters. AL was the first to claim
responsibility for terrorist attacks which had killed civilians.152
The second Islamist group operating in Syria is the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (henceforth
referred to as ISIL).153
ISIL is a transnational Sunni Islamist insurgent and terrorist group which
has expanded its control over north-western Iraq and north-western Syria since 2013.154
Founded
by the Jordanian extremist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi155
ISIL is composed of fundamentalist Sunni
Muslims, and its roots can be traced back to Iraq, to first being called Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al-
Jihad and then AQI as it pledged its allegiance to Al Qaeda. The group used to target the Iraqi
government and the American forces in Iraq as well as attacked Shia Muslims and Christians.
Although Zarqawi was killed by US and Iraqi Intelligence agencies, the organisation soon has had
multiple leaders who continue the atrocities of the organisation, and currently is led by Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi.156
Al-Baghdadi announced a merger of ISIL to Al Qaeda to AL as an effective
takeover of the group in order to assist the creation of the Islamic State. However, this was rejected
and Al Qaeda stated that only ANF would be its sole Syrian offshoot.157
Primarily, ISIL had limited its operations to attacking the Assad Regime and other resistance
factions within the Syrian territories and took advantage of the ongoing civil war in the country.
However, in early January 2014, ISIL had captured the cities Ramadi and Fallujah but it wasn’t
until the fall of the Iraqi city, Mosul, on 6 June 2014 had ISIL gained momentum and shocked the
151
T Jocelyn, ‘Al Qaeda in Iraq, Al Nusrah Front Emerge as Rebranded Single Entity.’ (2014) Long War Journal
152
‘Profile: Syria’s Al-Nusra Front’ (BBC news, 10 April 2013) Available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
middle-east-18048033> accessed July 29th
2015
153
Also known as Islamic State of Iraq & Syria (ISIS) as well as Islamic State (IS) although not recognized and
Arabic
acronym Daesh)
154
CM Blanchard, CE Humud, K Katzman & MC Weed, ‘The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy’ (2015)
Congressional Research Service
155
H Austin, ‘Global jihadis or al Qaeda wannabes: Who are the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant?’ (NBC
news, January 11 2014) available at <http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/01/11/22243203-global-
jihadis-or-al-qaeda-wannabes-who-are-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-the-levant?lite> accessed July 29th
2015
156 ‘
Syria Iraq: The Islamic State militant group’ (BBC news, 2 August 2014) available at
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24179084> accessed July 29th 2015
157
‘Al-Qaeda disavows ISIS militants in Syria’ (BBC News, 3 February 2014) available at
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26016318> accessed July 29th
2015

39 | P a g e
world by capturing entire districts and provinces.158
ISIL combatants have massacred Syrian and
Iraqi opponents, including civilians, often whom are from minority groups, murdered foreign aid
workers, combatants, and journalists, of whom gruesome videos of their executions were shown
to the world. On 29 June 2014, the organization declared the change of its name to Islamic State
which was denied by the UN, various governments as well as most Muslim Scholars to be void
and null.159
Despite the overt clash between ANF and ISIS, both Islamist groups share common ideologies and
objectives. They have had similar sanctions and violent actions in Syria. Similarly, both groups
have been responsible for the abduction of civilians and single out Christians, Turkmen, Kurds,
Yazidis, Shia as well as Sunni’s who have disputed against their strict interpretation of Islamic
Sharia Law and imposed discriminatory taxes, or forced conversions on such minorities.160
They
have imposed strict and discriminatory rules on women and girls they have abducted and forcibly
married, forcibly conversed into Islam, and enslaved women and girls. Furthermore. They have
said to have been abductions of children such as when ISIL kidnapped 130 Kurdish children in
2014161
. There have been many more instances of kidnapping and forcing children to youth camps
and training them to be military fighters in combat.
Although both groups believe in the establishment of Islamic States, tensions between the groups
and by March 2014, over 3,000 fighters had been killed in battles between ISIS and ANF, as ANF
as well as smaller opposition groups view ISIL to be far too extreme and violent in their
158
K Bouzis, ‘Countering the Islamic State: U.S. Counterterrorism Measures’ (2015) 38(10) Studies in Conflict
& Terrorism 885
159
‘BBC to review use of 'Islamic State' after MPs protest against term, More than 120 MPs, backed by David
Cameron, sign letter saying name gives legitimacy to terrorist group that is neither Islamic nor a state’ (The
Guardian, 29 June 2015) available at <http://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/jun/29/bbc-to-review-use-of-
islamic-state-after-mps-protest-against-term> accessed July 29th
2015; ‘Muslim leaders reject Baghdadi's
caliphate; Prominent Muslim leaders rebuke the Islamic State group's self-proclaimed caliphate, calling it 'void'
and 'deviant'’ (Al Jazeera, 7 July 2014) available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/07/muslim-
leaders-reject-baghdadi-caliphate-20147744058773906.html> accessed July 29th
2015
160
N Rayman, ‘ISIS May Have Committed Genocide Against Iraq Minorities, Report Says (Time.com, 27
February 2015) available at <http://time.com/3726484/isis-isil-iraq-minorities-genocide/> accessed July 29th
2015
161
Syria: ISIS Holds 130 Kurdish Children. Kept hostage for a month. 30 June 2014
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/30/syria-isis-holds-130-kurdish-children

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The applicability of the Doctrine of Responsibility (R2P) in Syria in perspective of Terrorism