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Radio Reconnaissance in
Penetration Testing
By: Matt Neely
Date: October 20, 2010
Location: Rochester Security Summit
About Me
•  Matt Neely (CISSP, CTGA, GCIH, and GCWN)
–  Manager of the Profiling Team at SecureState
–  Areas of expertise: wireless, penetration testing,
physical security, security convergence, and
incident response
–  10 years of security experience
•  Prior Life
–  Formed and ran the TSCM team at a
Fortune 200 company
•  Outside of work:
–  Co-host on the Security Justice podcast
–  Co-founder of the Cleveland Chapter of TOOOL
–  Licensed ham radio operator (Technician) for
almost 20 years
•  First radio I hacked:
–  Fisher-Price Sky Talkers Walkie Talkie
Radio Spectrum
What Most Penetration
Tests Look At
2.4GHz
5GHz
What Are You Missing?
2.4GHz
5GHz
Guards
Headsets
Cordless
Phones
Security
Cameras
Legal Issues
•  I am not a lawyer
•  Know the wiretap laws and do not violate them
–  Some states require that both parties consent to a
phone call being recorded
•  Know the scanner laws for the state in which you are
operating; remember to check this before traveling
out of state
–  Example: Kentucky Law 432.570 - Restrictions on
possession or use of radio capable of sending or
receiving police messages
•  Make sure your activities are authorized in the written
rules of engagement
•  In most states it is legal to monitor any radio
transmission as long as it is not a telephone call
or pager traffic
Illegal Activity to Avoid
•  I am still not a lawyer
•  Additional activities to avoid:
–  Jamming transmissions
–  Decoding pager traffic
–  Illegally transmitting
PROFILING A TARGET
Finding Frequencies to Monitor
Off-Site Profiling
•  Before arriving on site try to determine as much
information as possible such as:
–  In house or contract guard force
–  Frequencies they are licensed to use
–  Make and model of equipment they use
Ask the Oracle
•  Ask the Oracle:
–  “Company name” scanner/frequency/guard frequency/MHz
–  Look for press releases from radio manufactures and
reseller regarding the target
–  Look for press releases from guard outsourcing companies
talking about contracts with the target company
–  Etc…
•  Other online resources:
–  http://www.radioreference.com/apps/db/
•  Free part of the site containing a wealth of information
–  http://www.nationalradiodata.com/
•  FCC database search
•  $29 per year
–  http://www.perconcorp.com/
•  FCC database search
•  Paid site
•  Custom rates
Example: Off Site Profiling -
Church Hill Downs
•  Gave this presentation two weeks ago at the
Louisville Information Security Conference hosted at
Church Hill Downs
•  A quick Google Search for “Church Hill Downs
frequencies” reveals
–  Church Hill Downs used a Motorola Type IIi
Hybrid 800 MHz trunked radio system
–  Voice traffic is analog and not encrypted
–  System ID, fleetmap, frequencies, and talkgroups
Example: Off Site Profiling -
Church Hill Downs Talkgroup
In summary, everything needed
to monitor their radio system
On-Site Profiling -
Frequency Counters
•  Displays the frequency of the strongest “near field”
signal
•  Can quickly identify the transmit frequency of a radio
•  Problems:
–  Can have problems in signal
rich urban areas
–  Only locks on to very strong
signals
•  Recommend: Optoelectronic
Scout
On-Site Profiling -
Visual Recon
•  In the field:
–  Try to identify make and model of radios
–  Note the length and type of antenna used
–  Do all targets use the same radio, or do they use
a mix?
•  Use the information gathered above to determine:
–  Frequency range
–  Features of the radio such as digital, trunk, and
encryption support
•  BatLabs (www.batlabs.com) is a great source of
information on Motorola radios
On Site Profiling -
Common Frequency Ranges
•  Labor intensive process
•  Common frequencies
–  FRS, GMRS and “Dot” frequencies
•  Common ranges
–  Business
•  150 – 174 MHz
•  420 – 425 MHz
•  450 – 470 MHz
•  851 – 866 MHz
–  Cordless telephones and headsets (Make sure this is
in scope and legal!)
•  43.7– 50 MHz
•  902 – 928 MHz
•  2400 – 2483.5 MHz – Most are digital
HARDWARE
Recommended Scanners
AOR 8200 Uniden Bearcat BCD396T Uniden Bearcat SC230
~$620 ~$500 ~$180
Images provided by AOR U.S.A. and Uniden
If You Have Unlimited Budget
•  0.005-3335 MHz coverage
•  Quadruple conversion
•  Very sensitive and selective receiver
•  Spectrum scope
•  Built in video decoding
•  FSK demodulator and decoder
•  ~$14,000
Image provided by Icom of America
Recommended Accessories
•  A good antenna can make the difference
between hearing and missing a signal
•  Recommended antennas
–  Flexible “rubber duck”
–  Telescoping whip
–  Magnetic-mount mobile
–  Frequency specific antennas
•  Max Systems 800 Mhz
discone
•  Scout frequency counter
•  Recording equipment
•  Camera
•  DTMF decoder
•  Video converter
REAL WORLD EXAMPLES
Case Study #1
•  Scenario: Physical penetration test of a casino
•  Off-site profiling:
–  Discovered frequency for the radio link between
casino security and state police from forum
postings
•  Started monitoring the radio link between the casino
and state police the night we arrived in town
–  Casino dispatchers often chatted with the police
–  Learned names of the 2nd and 3rd shift
dispatchers
Case Study #1
•  On-site profiling:
–  Visually identified handheld radios
•  Appeared to be Motorola HT
Pro Series, most likely GP-338
•  Operate in 29.7-42, 35-50,
136-174 and 403-470 MHz
•  Do not support encryption or
trunking
•  Short antenna suggested target
radios operate in 136-174 or
403-470 MHz range
–  Carried the Scout through hotel
and gaming floor
Image provided by BatLabs.com
Case Study #1
•  In the car: pulled frequencies from the Scout and noted
those in the 136-174 and 403-407 MHz range
•  Programmed relevant frequencies into scanner and
listened
•  We heard:
–  General chatter
–  Guards going on and off shift
•  We learned:
–  Lingo
–  Guard names
–  When shift changes occur
–  Schedule and locations of guards on rounds
Case Study #2
•  Scenario: Internal penetration test against insurance
provider
–  While being escorted through the building, noticed a
number of wireless headsets
–  Requested permission to add monitoring
conversations over headsets into scope of
engagement
•  Permission granted: started scanning ranges commonly
used by headsets
–  Found several dozen headsets in use in the 902-928
MHz range
–  Used signal strength and geographic information to
determine which headsets were located inside the
target’s building (!)
•  Started monitoring traffic
Case Study #2
•  We heard:
–  Many phone calls
–  Lots of helpdesk calls
–  Employees checking
voicemail
–  Conversations even when
the phone was hung up
•  We learned:
–  Passwords from helpdesk
calls
–  PII used to reset passwords
–  Voicemail passwords,
recovered using a DTMF
decoder
Case Study #3
•  Scenario: Physical penetration test on a power plant
•  On-site profiling:
–  Noticed video cameras around back perimeter
had antennas
–  Antennas appear to be tuned to 900 MHz range
•  What we did:
–  Scanned frequencies
commonly used by
wireless cameras
Images provided by AOR U.S.A.
Case Study #3
•  What we found:
–  Video feeds from security cameras
•  What we learned:
–  Holes in camera coverage
–  Where the PTZ cameras were looking
–  Personnel movement inside the property
On the Horizon
•  VOIP enabled radio dispatch systems
•  DECT interception
•  Software defined radios
Defenses
•  Test your equipment – Make sure headsets and
cordless phones are secure
•  Check your facility for unencrypted radio traffic
•  Only use encrypted cordless phone and headset
–  DECT may not count as encrypted
•  Consider switching to digital or encrypted radios
•  Train guards to be aware that what is said on the
radio is public
Thank you for your time!
mneely@SecureState.com
@matthewneely
A	

Q&

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Radio Reconnaissance in Penetration Testing

  • 1. Radio Reconnaissance in Penetration Testing By: Matt Neely Date: October 20, 2010 Location: Rochester Security Summit
  • 2. About Me •  Matt Neely (CISSP, CTGA, GCIH, and GCWN) –  Manager of the Profiling Team at SecureState –  Areas of expertise: wireless, penetration testing, physical security, security convergence, and incident response –  10 years of security experience •  Prior Life –  Formed and ran the TSCM team at a Fortune 200 company •  Outside of work: –  Co-host on the Security Justice podcast –  Co-founder of the Cleveland Chapter of TOOOL –  Licensed ham radio operator (Technician) for almost 20 years •  First radio I hacked: –  Fisher-Price Sky Talkers Walkie Talkie
  • 4. What Most Penetration Tests Look At 2.4GHz 5GHz
  • 5. What Are You Missing? 2.4GHz 5GHz Guards Headsets Cordless Phones Security Cameras
  • 6. Legal Issues •  I am not a lawyer •  Know the wiretap laws and do not violate them –  Some states require that both parties consent to a phone call being recorded •  Know the scanner laws for the state in which you are operating; remember to check this before traveling out of state –  Example: Kentucky Law 432.570 - Restrictions on possession or use of radio capable of sending or receiving police messages •  Make sure your activities are authorized in the written rules of engagement •  In most states it is legal to monitor any radio transmission as long as it is not a telephone call or pager traffic
  • 7. Illegal Activity to Avoid •  I am still not a lawyer •  Additional activities to avoid: –  Jamming transmissions –  Decoding pager traffic –  Illegally transmitting
  • 8. PROFILING A TARGET Finding Frequencies to Monitor
  • 9. Off-Site Profiling •  Before arriving on site try to determine as much information as possible such as: –  In house or contract guard force –  Frequencies they are licensed to use –  Make and model of equipment they use
  • 10. Ask the Oracle •  Ask the Oracle: –  “Company name” scanner/frequency/guard frequency/MHz –  Look for press releases from radio manufactures and reseller regarding the target –  Look for press releases from guard outsourcing companies talking about contracts with the target company –  Etc… •  Other online resources: –  http://www.radioreference.com/apps/db/ •  Free part of the site containing a wealth of information –  http://www.nationalradiodata.com/ •  FCC database search •  $29 per year –  http://www.perconcorp.com/ •  FCC database search •  Paid site •  Custom rates
  • 11. Example: Off Site Profiling - Church Hill Downs •  Gave this presentation two weeks ago at the Louisville Information Security Conference hosted at Church Hill Downs •  A quick Google Search for “Church Hill Downs frequencies” reveals –  Church Hill Downs used a Motorola Type IIi Hybrid 800 MHz trunked radio system –  Voice traffic is analog and not encrypted –  System ID, fleetmap, frequencies, and talkgroups
  • 12. Example: Off Site Profiling - Church Hill Downs Talkgroup
  • 13. In summary, everything needed to monitor their radio system
  • 14. On-Site Profiling - Frequency Counters •  Displays the frequency of the strongest “near field” signal •  Can quickly identify the transmit frequency of a radio •  Problems: –  Can have problems in signal rich urban areas –  Only locks on to very strong signals •  Recommend: Optoelectronic Scout
  • 15. On-Site Profiling - Visual Recon •  In the field: –  Try to identify make and model of radios –  Note the length and type of antenna used –  Do all targets use the same radio, or do they use a mix? •  Use the information gathered above to determine: –  Frequency range –  Features of the radio such as digital, trunk, and encryption support •  BatLabs (www.batlabs.com) is a great source of information on Motorola radios
  • 16. On Site Profiling - Common Frequency Ranges •  Labor intensive process •  Common frequencies –  FRS, GMRS and “Dot” frequencies •  Common ranges –  Business •  150 – 174 MHz •  420 – 425 MHz •  450 – 470 MHz •  851 – 866 MHz –  Cordless telephones and headsets (Make sure this is in scope and legal!) •  43.7– 50 MHz •  902 – 928 MHz •  2400 – 2483.5 MHz – Most are digital
  • 18. Recommended Scanners AOR 8200 Uniden Bearcat BCD396T Uniden Bearcat SC230 ~$620 ~$500 ~$180 Images provided by AOR U.S.A. and Uniden
  • 19. If You Have Unlimited Budget •  0.005-3335 MHz coverage •  Quadruple conversion •  Very sensitive and selective receiver •  Spectrum scope •  Built in video decoding •  FSK demodulator and decoder •  ~$14,000 Image provided by Icom of America
  • 20. Recommended Accessories •  A good antenna can make the difference between hearing and missing a signal •  Recommended antennas –  Flexible “rubber duck” –  Telescoping whip –  Magnetic-mount mobile –  Frequency specific antennas •  Max Systems 800 Mhz discone •  Scout frequency counter •  Recording equipment •  Camera •  DTMF decoder •  Video converter
  • 22. Case Study #1 •  Scenario: Physical penetration test of a casino •  Off-site profiling: –  Discovered frequency for the radio link between casino security and state police from forum postings •  Started monitoring the radio link between the casino and state police the night we arrived in town –  Casino dispatchers often chatted with the police –  Learned names of the 2nd and 3rd shift dispatchers
  • 23. Case Study #1 •  On-site profiling: –  Visually identified handheld radios •  Appeared to be Motorola HT Pro Series, most likely GP-338 •  Operate in 29.7-42, 35-50, 136-174 and 403-470 MHz •  Do not support encryption or trunking •  Short antenna suggested target radios operate in 136-174 or 403-470 MHz range –  Carried the Scout through hotel and gaming floor Image provided by BatLabs.com
  • 24. Case Study #1 •  In the car: pulled frequencies from the Scout and noted those in the 136-174 and 403-407 MHz range •  Programmed relevant frequencies into scanner and listened •  We heard: –  General chatter –  Guards going on and off shift •  We learned: –  Lingo –  Guard names –  When shift changes occur –  Schedule and locations of guards on rounds
  • 25. Case Study #2 •  Scenario: Internal penetration test against insurance provider –  While being escorted through the building, noticed a number of wireless headsets –  Requested permission to add monitoring conversations over headsets into scope of engagement •  Permission granted: started scanning ranges commonly used by headsets –  Found several dozen headsets in use in the 902-928 MHz range –  Used signal strength and geographic information to determine which headsets were located inside the target’s building (!) •  Started monitoring traffic
  • 26. Case Study #2 •  We heard: –  Many phone calls –  Lots of helpdesk calls –  Employees checking voicemail –  Conversations even when the phone was hung up •  We learned: –  Passwords from helpdesk calls –  PII used to reset passwords –  Voicemail passwords, recovered using a DTMF decoder
  • 27. Case Study #3 •  Scenario: Physical penetration test on a power plant •  On-site profiling: –  Noticed video cameras around back perimeter had antennas –  Antennas appear to be tuned to 900 MHz range •  What we did: –  Scanned frequencies commonly used by wireless cameras Images provided by AOR U.S.A.
  • 28. Case Study #3 •  What we found: –  Video feeds from security cameras •  What we learned: –  Holes in camera coverage –  Where the PTZ cameras were looking –  Personnel movement inside the property
  • 29. On the Horizon •  VOIP enabled radio dispatch systems •  DECT interception •  Software defined radios
  • 30. Defenses •  Test your equipment – Make sure headsets and cordless phones are secure •  Check your facility for unencrypted radio traffic •  Only use encrypted cordless phone and headset –  DECT may not count as encrypted •  Consider switching to digital or encrypted radios •  Train guards to be aware that what is said on the radio is public
  • 31. Thank you for your time! mneely@SecureState.com @matthewneely A Q&