Source: Looking Glass Publications By Linda Lavender, Writer / Robin Barnett, Editor Understanding the past proxies is relevant to the recent unrest in the Middle East, which is often mischaracterized as a purely sectarian conflict. While clearly there is a sectarian component to ongoing unrest in the region, the conflicts, both latent and manifest within Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen are often reported as a struggle between opposing religious sects - Sunnis and Shiites. However, according to F. Gregory Gause of the Brookings Institution, the best way to understand regional politics and the current unrest in the Middle East is through a Cold War framework between Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Iran where the central issue is that of regional hegemony.

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BY LINDA LAVENDER, WRITER 04 OCTOBER 2015
ROBIN BARNETT, EDITOR
The Middle East Cold War
A Cold War is a war with no direct fighting between the countries involved. Often cold wars involve
countries with different ideologies, such as the case of the US and Soviet Union Cold War that spanned
a period of fifty years only ending in December of 1991. It is characterized by intense economic, social,
and political competition to gain advantage over the adversary. While the US and Soviet Union never
directly clashed, many conflicts that occurred from the late 1940’s through 1990’s were supported and
funded by the US and Soviet Union. These
superpowers were shadow actors in numerous proxy
wars worldwide.
Understanding the past proxies is relevant to the
recent unrest in the Middle East, which is often
mischaracterized as a purely sectarian conflict.
While clearly there is a sectarian component to
ongoing unrest in the region, the conflicts, both
latent and manifest within Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and
Yemen are often reported as a struggle between
opposing religious sects - Sunnis and Shiites.
However, according to F. Gregory Gause of the
Brookings Institution, the best way to understand
regional politics and the current unrest in the Middle
East is through a Cold War1 framework between Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Iran where the
central issue is that of regional hegemony.
It is within this context that the Middle East Cold War should be understood specifically by appreciating
the “relationships between domestic conflicts, transnational affinities and regional state ambitions. It is
a Cold War among a number of regional players – both states and non-state actors – but where Iran
and Saudi Arabia have the lead roles”, posits Gause.
Often domestic conflicts for power lead local actors to seek out regional allies that can supply money,
weapons, ideological cover, and diplomatic support. Internal actors actively court regional allies who
share, in some way, their own political and ideological positions, with whom a kinship is shared on
ideological or identity grounds2. At the same time, regional powers such as Iran and Saudi Arabia need
1 A Cold War framework refers to intense economic, political, military, and ideological rivalry between nations, short of
military conflict; sustained hostile political policies and an atmosphere of strain between opposed countries.
2 A perfect example of this can be seen in Hezbollah, a non-state actor, active within Lebanon, seeking support from an
ideological patron – Iran.
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these ideological, or identity, links to consolidate their relations with their local alliances. This is often
why power struggles occurring within the Middle East are mistaken for sectarian conflicts.
While the current geopolitical landscape between these two nations is more complex than simply a
sectarian conflict, one cannot dismiss the important manifested sectarian component - and even the
not so coincidental fault line of alliances where Sunni actors align with Saudi Arabia and Shi’ite actors
align with Iran.
Regardless, Saudi Arabia and Iran are currently locked in a heated contest to gain sway over weaker
regional entities that include both state and non-state actors. The manifest conflicts within Lebanon,
Syria, Iraq, and now Yemen are visible signs of the struggle over the direction of the Middle East’s
domestic politics. The intensity and breath of conflicts within the region underscore the reality that
Riyadh and Tehran are deeply committed to playing a balance of power game.
This paper seeks to explore the powerful regional influences at play within the current instability of
Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and now Yemen.
Saudi Arabia and Iran Relations
It should be noted that it is impossible to fully explore the multifaceted dimensions of the Saudi Arabian
and Iranian relationship. This section seeks to briefly introduce modern day complexities in the bilateral
relations between these actors beginning in 1979 3 .
Additionally, it will be useful to discuss at a very basic level,
cultural differences between the entities in order to better
understand the proxy conflicts occurring in the Middle
East as it is important to have some context of the two
main agitators in the region.
Saudi Arabia and Iran are divided by culture and
societies. Stratfor posits that the countries have relatively
few if any shared interests. Saudi Arabia comprises most
of the Arabian Peninsula and is the “homeland of the
Arab people and of Islam”. Saudi citizens chiefly identify
themselves as Muslim and Arab. Arabic is the language
of the country. Excluding a small minority of Shi’ites, Saudis
are primarily Sunni and practice Wahhabism,4 which is an
extreme form of Sunnism. The country is governed by a
monarchy whose king serves as both head of state and
head of the government.
Unlike Saudi Arabia, Iran is not an Arab country, but rather Persian. The Republic of Iran is a multi-ethnic,
multicultural society as a result of centuries of migration and conquest. Approximately half the
3 While this paper seeks to understand the relationships between these regional powers, it should be acknowledged that
Turkey is also playing an increasingly important role within the region. Some experts see Turkey as attempting to “re-create
a version of the Ottoman Empire” offering a more moderate form of Sunnism than Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabism.
4 Wahhabism is the dominant Saudi faith. It is an austere form of Islam that insists on the literal interpretation of the Holy
Koran. Strict adherents to this faith believe that Muslims that do not practice Wahhabism are heathens and enemies.
Gulf States
Source: WordPress

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population speaks Persian and affiliated dialects. It is one of the oldest continuous civilizations in the
world and although the vast majority of Iranians are Shi’ite Muslim, religious minorities such as
Zoroastrians, Christians and Jews are part of Iranian society. After the fall of the Shah of Iran, and the
advent of the Iranian Revolution, Iran is now a theocratic republic.
The modern day Saudi/Iranian power struggle pre-dates the Arab uprisings in 2011. As a long-time ally
of the United States, Saudi Arabia’s relations with Iran have been strained since the onset of the Iranian
Revolution in 1979, reports IranTracker. Calls for the export of the Iranian ideology and revolution to
neighbouring countries deeply alarmed the Saudi kingdom that saw the republic as a direct threat to
their autocratic rule. Responding to the Ayatollah’s calls for revolution, Saudi Arabia’s minority Shi’ite
began protesting that same year in the country’s eastern province. These protests eventually ended in
conflict and led to a number of deaths5.
In 1980 as the Iran-Iraq war broke out, Saudi Arabia backed and financially supported Iraq, allowing
Iraq to acquire advanced weapons and expertise on a much larger scale than Iran. The war was
devastating to both Iraq and Iran. At least 500,000 Iranian troops were killed, costing Iran USD 228
billion. After the war, Iran, in a more compromised position, became less aggressive in its attempts to
remake the Middle East. However, the groundwork for conflict with Saudi Arabia was already laid.
Saudi Arabia and Iran “[came] to see each other as dangerous threats. Saudi Arabia [saw] Iran as
focused on overturning a Middle Eastern political order that [was] quite friendly to Saudi interests; the
Iranians believe[d] the Saudis [were] actively attempting to keep Iran weak and vulnerable”, writes
VOX.
Other noticeable flashpoints include the 1987 “Mecca incident” where 400 people, including 275
Iranians, died following a riot led by Iranian pilgrims to Mecca6. At the time the Ayatollah called for
the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy. Subsequent bomb attacks on Saudi facilities and the
assassination of Saudi diplomats were linked to Saudi Shiites supported by elements in the Iranian
Republic. In 19897, the Saudi government accused Iran of two retaliation bombings after Saudi officials
imposed quotas on the number of Iranian pilgrims8 that could travel to Mecca for the Hajj9. In 1996
Saudi Hezbollah operatives bombed the Kohbar Towers10 killing 19 American military.
Throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s the Saudi-Iranian rivalry was fairly dormant but the US led
invasion of Iraq in 2003 that ousted Saddam Hussein changed the geopolitical landscape in the region
5 Sometimes referred to as the Qatif Uprising, seven days in late November 1979 resulted in bloody street violence and the
deaths of an unknown number of deaths of protesters, between Saudi security and thousands of frustrated Shi’ites in the
Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. The uprising resulted from the Saudi regime’s “brutal repression of those peacefully
celebrating” the Shi’ite holy day of Ashura.
6 The 1987 Mecca Massacre occurred when Iranian pilgrims in Mecca and Saudi Arabian security forces clashed when
security forces attempted to cordon off the planned path for Iranian Shi’ite demonstrators that led to a bloody
confrontation between the sides.
7 Saudi Arabian officials beheaded 16 Kuwaiti Shi’ites in connection with bombings during the annual Hajji. All were Shi’ite
Muslims of Iranian and Saudi origin. The ring-leader of the group confessed that the acts of violence were ordered by the
Iranian Government.
8 Ongoing tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran, along with the violence and protests Shi’ites held at the Hajj resulted in
Saudi officials decreasing the number of Iranian pilgrims from 150,000 to 45,000.
9 The Hajj is the pilgrimage to the Holy City of Mecca located in Saudi Arabia. It is one of the Five Pillars of Islam to travel to
Mecca at least once in a Muslim’s lifetime.
10 Kohbar Towers housing complex was built in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia in 1979. It was essentially unoccupied
until the Gulf War of 1990 when coalition forces operating in the area occupied the Towers.

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by creating a massive balance of power vacuum in the region. Since 2003, these rivals have supported
opposing political parties, funded opposing armies in conflict, reports VOX. Neither wants the other to
gain regional influence so they intervene and counter intervene. “It’s what the US and the Soviet Union
were involved in” during the Cold War asserts Daniel Serwer, Professor at Johns Hopkins School of
Advanced International Studies. Additionally, Serwer posits that currently Saudis and Iranians see
regional power in “zero-sum terms: the rationale [the Iranians] give themselves is very heavily
defensive”.
The struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran for regional dominance has exacerbated nearly every
conflict across the Middle East for years. In 2014, an advisor to the Saudi government maintained that,
“Iran [was] in a stronger position than Saudi…[Iran] has more cards”. Iran continues to successfully exert
its influence in Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Syrian, and Yemen. The Saudis have gained leverage with Egypt
after they assisted its government with billions of dollars. However, Egypt’s regional influence and
agenda have narrowed as the country continues to stabilize itself after its own Arab Spring events.
Each regional power seeks to outshine the other as the “lodestar of the Muslim world”. This pits the
Sunni-majority kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a US ally, against Shi’ite theocratic Iran whose aim is to rid the
Middle East of Western Influence. The Saudi Arabia and Iran conflict is increasingly driven by a Sunni –
Shi’ite divide as well as the ethnic differences between the countries, according to United States
Institute of Peace (USIP). It would be impossible to engage a study of this protracted conflict without
recognizing the question of US power in the region. Iran seeks to create a Middle East without the
influence of US military influence while Saudi Arabia has benefitted from a long-time US relationship
that assists Saudi Arabia in keeping Iran and Iraq in check.
Lebanon
While in the late 1960s Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the Gulf states built governing
structures that were oppressive and brutal while at the same time effective in controlling their
respective societies, Lebanon and Yemen remained weak and open to outside interference in the
“Arab state consolidation” process of the 1970s and 1980s. According to Gause of the Brookings
Institution, Lebanon was an exception to the process of state building. Lebanon largely absorbed its
Arab neighbours in the 1970s and 1980s. As a result, Lebanon’s political history is marked by foreign
intervention.
Lebanon’s bloody civil war from 1975 to 1990 had Israel and Syria both heavily intervening militarily.
Both Israel and Syria occupied significant portions of Lebanese territory post-civil war. Beyond Israel
and Syria, other regional powers have intervened in Lebanon’s formation, supporting various Lebanese
factions to further benefit their own agendas. Iran has clearly been the most successful in influencing
Lebanon through Hezbollah, but Saudi Arabia and even Saddam Hussein built patronage systems with
The following section briefly discusses the Saudi Arabian/ Iranian proxy element involved in
within Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen, and is by no means exhaustive as the commentary
is meant to highlight the manifesting regional Cold War in select regional conflicts.

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Lebanese political-elites, notes Gause. Given Lebanon’s political system11, factions within Lebanon
were inevitably sectarian in orientation.
Iran’s biggest initial success in exporting its revolution occurred in Lebanon with the creation of Shi’ite
Hezbollah12 in 1985. With its formation, Lebanon has long held the interest of both Saudi Arabia and
Iran. Hezbollah’s ideology is rooted in the Iranian Revolution. Shortly after Hezbollah’s founding, Iran
sent approximately 1,500 of its elite Revolutionary Guards to train the new Hezbollah recruits.
As of mid-2014, Iranian influence in Lebanon seems secure. Although in 2005, Iran appeared to be
dealt a political blow by Saudi Arabia when Lebanon demanded that Iranian-allied Syria remove
troops from Lebanese territory. The victory of the largely Sunni March 14 coalition in parliamentary
elections (2005) bode well for Saudi interests, according to Aspen Institute. However, Hezbollah
demonstrated it was the true political power in Lebanon shortly afterwards as it conducted its own
foreign and military policy in its brief war with Israel in 2006. Then in 2008, during a confrontation with
the Lebanese government over control of domestic security, Hezbollah fighters raided and took over
downtown Beirut.
Subsequently, in the 2009 parliamentary elections, Saudi Arabia’s political allies in the Lebanese
government were unable to subdue the popularity of Hezbollah and by early 2011, Hezbollah’s March
8 coalition for all intents and purposes commanded Lebanon, reports Council on Foreign Relations.
Iraq
Since the creation of Saudi Arabia and Iraq in the wake of World War I, relations between the two have
been problematic, according to USIP. Tensions between the countries were only heightened by the
overthrown of the Iraqi Monarchy in 1958 and subsequent rise of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist Party.
However Iraq’s shift towards a more tempered foreign policy in the 1970s led to improvements in
relations between the countries. They became stronger Arab allies against Iran at the onset of the 1979
revolution since both had interest in containing the spread of revolutionary Shi’ite-doctrine.
In a post-2003 Iraq, Saudi foreign policy toward Iraq has been one of stability, reports USIP. Saudi
Arabia’s concerns were firmly grounded in concrete threats to Saudi national and dynastic interests.
Iraq is Saudi Arabia’s longest international border. In post-Saddam Iraq, Iran saw an opportunity to
strengthen reliable, pro-Iran Shi’ite militant groups and to replace Sunni – Ba’athist with a friendlier
Shi’ite-led regime.
At the time the Saudis greatest concern was the evolving relationships Iraq was exploring with Iran,
Syria, and Turkey. A military agreement announced on 07 July 2005 between Iran and Iraq reinforced
Saudi concerns about Iran’s ongoing attempts to “infiltrate Iraqi society through the Shiite community”
and build long lasting influence over Iraq. By 2007 sectarian violence within Iraq focused on Sunni versus
Shi’ite communities. It was widely understood at the time that Iran was providing lethal support for
Shi’ite groups, according to The New York Times. As the US grappled with next steps in the devolving
11 Lebanon’s constitutional government is divided between 18 sectarian groups – attempting to ensure that all 18
recognized religious groups based on their percentage of the population is represented. It also requires all public service
positions to be divided equally along the same religions lines.
12 Hezbollah, “Party of God”, is an Islamist Shi’ite organization founded in Iran and having a branch in Lebanon. The
organization was formally founded in Lebanon in 1985.

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crisis, Saudi Arabia indicated in the Washington Post that, “as the economic powerhouse of the Middle
East, the birthplace of Islam and the de facto leader of the world's Sunni community, constituting 85
percent of all Muslims, Saudi options are to provide Sunni military leaders (primarily members of the
former Iraqi officer corps, who make up the backbone of the insurgency) with the same types of
assistance -- funding, arms and logistical support -- that Iran has been giving to Shiite armed groups for
years or to help establish new Sunni brigades to combat the Iranian-backed militias."
In 2015, with the threat of the Islamic State (IS) within Iraq, The New York Times asserts that Iran’s powerful
influence in Iraq is on display because of the IS threat. Iran has taken the lead assisting Iraqi forces in
the counteroffensive against Islamic State militants. At every point, the Iranian-backed militias have taken the
lead in the fight against the Islamic State from Tikrit to Baghdad. Senior Iranian leaders have been openly helping
direct the battle, and American officials say Iran’s Revolutionary Guards forces are taking part.in the fight.
Iraqi officials have been unapologetic about the role of the Iranian-backed militias. One Iraqi, a former
teacher, who now heads an artillery unit for the militias, described the new reality in Iraq very directly,
“Iran is the principal supporter of Iraq, for the people and the army,” he said. “Iran is a real, true partner”
Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki accused Saudi Arabia of funding IS militants in Syria. This
strategy he argued backfired and now the Saudis are to blame after IS captured large swaths of
territory across northern and central Iraq, according to The Guardian. The Iraqi government, with close
ties to Tehran, held that Saudi Arabia is responsible for what IS militias are receiving in terms of financial
and moral support”, reports Gulf News. While the Saudis have historically funded terrorist organizations,
a strategy which has boomeranged on them (i.e. Al Qaeda), Saudi Arabia maintains that the state
has not funded the IS group. Although Saudi Arabia may not be supporting IS, the kingdom would
clearly benefit from a geopolitical influence perspective if the Iraq / Iran relationship failed and the
majority Shi’ite in Iraq became governed by a Sunni regime. Unrest in Iraq benefits Saudi Arabia in this
Cold War as a result, Stratfor advances that Saudi Arabia is willing to assist Kurdish13 elements within the
semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan with weapons to protect against IS advances. It would benefit
Saudi Arabia to have closer relations with Kurds as both Turkey and Iran are seeking to influence the
Kurdish region that is rich in oil. How far the Kurd/Saudi relationship develops is unclear but it is likely that
Saudis would seek to embolden Kurdistan autonomy to affect regional economic and security
challenges and hold both Turkey and Iran in check.
Syria
The long-standing Iran-Syrian alliance grew out of a common cause – and common enemies –
according to USIP. Beginning shortly after the 1979 Iranian revolution, these two countries have pooled
political leverage and military resources to attempt to enhance their regional positions, build networks
of surrogate militias and to thwart opponent’s plans. Former Iranian President Ali-Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani stated in December 2012, “We must possess Syria. If the chain from Lebanon to here is cut,
bad things will happen”, reports the Foundation for Defence of Democracies.
Iran came to the assistance of embattled Syrian President Bashar al Assad after the Syrian crisis erupted
in 2011. Iran provided military advisors, equipment and billions of dollars in aid in efforts to protect their
13 The Kurds are the largest ethnic group in the Middle East without their own country. Kurds have long been marginalized by
the Iraqi government. They are largely Sunni Muslim and have a long term goal of having their own country. Currently in
Iraq, Kurds largely populate the semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan in the Northeast region of Iraq.

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interests in Syria. The Council on Foreign Relations reports that Iran has trained and equipped Shi’ite
militants from Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan to aid Assad. Additionally, Iranian-backed Lebanese
Hezbollah were also enlisted to assist Syrian forces repelling rebels. Efforts to secure the country
experienced a setback with the rise of militant Sunni extremist groups such as ISIS and Al Nusra Front,
an Al –Qaeda affiliate, capturing large portions of the Syrian county in the northern and western
regions.
The Saudi monarchy has been a vocal supporter of the overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria, reports
The Guardian. Early in the Syrian uprising, Saudi Arabia sent money and weapons to rebel groups
fighting against Assad. Wealthy individuals and religious foundations within Gulf countries have
channelled millions of dollars to the anti-Assad opposition. Lina Khatib of the Carnegie Foundation
posits that after the rise of jihadist groups, Saudi leaders began to rethink their support of rebels in the
Syrian conflict. Now she says, “There is Saudi money flowing into ISIS but it is not from the Saudi state”14.
Similar to the country of Turkey, Saudi Arabia would like to see the downfall of the Assad government
that would deal a blow to Iranian influence in the region, according France 24. According to the
Foundation for Defence of Democracies, Saudi motivation for intervening is three-fold. First, Saudis
want to be seen as the protectors of Sunni Muslims within the region. Secondly, Saudi Arabia is against
the Muslim Brotherhood’s15 potential spread into Syria. and finally, Saudi Arabia seeks to weaken their
geopolitical adversary Iran.
Yemen
Yemen has long been portrayed as
a country teetering on the brink of
disaster, reports The Guardian.
Yemen faces tremendous
economic, social and political
obstacles in order to achieve the
illusive stability it seeks. Within the
country the cast of non-state
actors along with regional
agitators currently involved in the
civil war is complicated.
For one, ousted President Ali
Abdullah Saleh continues to cause
trouble for the new governing
body and appears to be colluding
14 US Officials report that a small but steady flow of money to IS originates from rich individuals in Gulf States. One expert
refers to these donors as “angel investors”.
15 At the first conference to organize Syria’s political opposition to the Assad regime in May 2011 the Brotherhood attended,
achieving a few key positions. By December 2011 the Brotherhood had expanded its influence. It was a strong member in
the Syrian National Committee but had also won influence ago grassroots organization within Syria.
Source: BBC

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with the Houthis16; officially known as Ansar Allah (the Supporters of God). The Houthis belong to a
branch of Shi’ite Islam and have historically been marginalized in Yemen. Since the seizure of the
capital Sana’a by the Houthis in September 2014, the situation in Yemen has worsened significantly
reports Centre for Security Policy. At the same time, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and
the Islamic State (IS) are actively seeking to continue to disrupt the current government of President
Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. The US has been a staunch supporter of the Hadi government, and has
worked to combat AQAP’s powerful franchise within the country.
Saudi Arabia has a long history of conflict with the Houthi Shi’ites, recently carrying out military
operations again Houthis in 2009, according to New York Times. Iran has long supported the Houthis
with arms, training and financing, reports USA Today.
Most recently in March 2015, responding to the Houthi rebel advances, Saudi Arabia and coalition of
allies launched air strikes to “defend and support the legitimate government of Yemen and prevent
the radical Houthi movement from taking over the country” Adel al Jubair, Saudi ambassador to the
US stated. The bombing was understood by Houthi leadership as a declaration of war on Yemen and
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif demanded an immediate end to the Saudi led military
action.
It has long been suspected that Iran
provides money and training to the
Shi’ite Houthi militia in Yemen. Paul
Sullivan, a Middle East specialist from
Georgetown University stated, “with the
Houthis, Iran now has a growing indirect
foothold in Yemen…Saudi Arabia should
be worried”. Saudi Arabia remains
concerned and has reinforced border
security along the 1,100 mile Yemeni-
Saudi border and clearly views Houthi
aggression as Iran’s interference in the
affairs of Arab countries, reports
Bloomberg. In 2012 and in the early
months of 2013, ships carrying guns and
missiles were intercepted off the coast of Yemen. At the time the Yemeni government accused Iran of
the shipments, although conclusive evidence has not been made available to the public, asserts the
Yemen Times. David Weinberg from the Foundation for the Defence of Democracies said, “Tehran
does not exercise command and control over [the Houthi militia], but credible reports confirm that it
has been providing on –the-ground advising…training overseas, major sums of money and weapons
by the literal ton”.
Considered an important battleground in the larger geopolitical struggle against Iran’s expanding
influence, Saudi Arabia has cooperated with various Yemeni Sunni factions as a means of squashing
16 The Houtis are an insurgent group based in northwestern Yemen. The Houthis have been in conflict with Yemen’s
government since 2004. The group has grown into a broad national political movement that is battling the Yemeni
government and AQAP
Source: Al Arabiya News

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October 2015
Houthi rebels reports Huffington Post. Some of these extremist Sunni groups have been designated as
“terrorist organizations” by other Arab and Western governments. These alliances have some
concerned to what lengths Saudi Arabia will go to ensure that Iran and Houthis do not succeed in
Yemen. Foreign Policy Journal sites the de facto partnership between Riyadh and AQAP evident by
the fact that the Saudi-led military coalition has avoided bombing AQAP targets. While Riyadh
understands that AQAP’s ultimate objective is to overthrow the Saudi monarch, this short-term tacit
alliance helps to accomplish the “immediate task at hand”.
Conclusion
The struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran for regional dominance has aggravated and intensified
nearly every conflict across the Middle East for years. In 2014, an advisor to the Saudi government
maintained that, “Iran [was] in a stronger position than Saudi…[Iran] has more cards”. Iran continues
to successfully exert its influence in Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen.
These two regional powers are clearly engaged in their own Cold War. Saudi Arabia and Iran seek to
outshine the other as the “lodestar of the Muslim world”. This pits the Sunni-majority kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, a US ally, against Shi’ite Theocratic Iran whose aim is to rid the Middle East of Western Influence.
Most recently, Saudi Arabia has expressed concern over the geopolitical implications of a gradual
improvement in the West’s relationship with Iran as manifested in the Iran Nuclear deal.
While the conflicts discussed within this report clearly reveal the handiwork of Saudi Arabia and Iran,
perhaps a more important question to be posed concerns the potential effects of a larger, re-
emergent Cold War between the US and Russia that might play out in the region. It will be imperative
for the international community to closely monitor the recent, increased competition between the US
and Russia which has led both countries to reconsider (albeit remote) the potential for direct conflict.
This renewed competition could skew how the US and Russia view their existing relationships around
the world – including the Middle East. This more distrustful stance between the countries creates the
desire to achieve a more favourable balance of power – thus reducing incentives for self-restraint to
avoid confrontation. “From this perspective, it is worth considering that the Middle East is already more
than sufficiently volatile based strictly on tensions within and among regional states”, according to Al
Monitor. Reigniting major power competition between US and Russia could pose even greater threats
to stability in the Middle East.
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