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Resource Certification
Alex Band, Product Manager
UKNOF18
Internet Routing
•   Routing is non-hierarchical, open and free
•   Freedom comes at a price:
     - You can announce any address block on your router
     - Route leaking happens frequently, impact is high

         Entire networks become unavailable
         -

     - Route hijacking is easy, as long as peers don’t filter




•   IPv4 address depletion may intensify issue


                                                               2
Digital Resource Certificates
•   Based on open IETF standards (sidr)
•   Issued by the RIRs
•   States that an Internet number resource has
    been registered by the RIPE NCC
•   Do not list any identity information
     -   All resource information can be found in the registry




                                                                 3
What Certification offers
•   Proof of holdership
•   Secure Inter-Domain Routing
     -   Route Origin Authorisation
•   Resource transfers




•   Validation is the added value!

                                      4
The system

             certificate authority




                                    5
The system (2)
•   Accessible through the LIR Portal
•   Administrator grants access to users




                                           6
Proof of holdership




         •

         •

         •




                      7
Route Origin Authorisation (ROA)




         •      fi
         •

         •




                                   8
ROA Creation Demo




                    9
Software Validation of Certificates and ROAs
•   Validators access publicly accessible repository
•   Three software tools available
     1. RIPE NCC Validator
        - Easy to set-up and use, limited feature set
     2. rcynic
     3. BBN Relying Party Software
        -   Complex set-up, but more options and felixibility


             http://ripe.net/certification/validation

                                                                11
BGPmon ROA validation service
•   Relies heavily on RIPE NCC Validator
     $ whois -h whois.bgpmon.net 200.7.86.0

     Prefix:               195.157.0.0/16
     Prefix description:   Netscalibur UK Ltd
     Country code:         GB
     Origin AS:            8426
     Origin AS Name:       CLARANET-AS ClaraNET
     RPKI status:          ROA validation successful

     $ whois -h whois.bgpmon.net " --roa 8426 195.157.0.0/16"

     0 - Valid
     ------------------------
     ROA Details
     ------------------------
     Origin ASN:       AS8426
     Not valid Before: 2011-01-01 13:56:21
     Not valid After: 2012-07-01 00:00:00
     Trust Anchor:     rpki.ripe.net
     Prefixes:         213.165.128.0/19
                       195.157.0.0/16
                       194.112.32.0/19                          12
Hardware Validation: RPKI-RTR Protocol

                                            BGP
   validated             RPKI RTR
                                          Decision
    cache               PROTOCOL
                                          Process




               route-map validity-0
                 match rpki-invalid
                 drop
               route-map validity-1
                 match rpki-not-found
                 set localpref 50


               // valid defaults to 100


                                                     13
Hardware Validation: RPKI-RTR Protocol

                                              BGP
       validated         RPKI RTR
                                            Decision
        cache           PROTOCOL
                                            Process




•   Cisco roadmap has router validation for
    RLS12 / IOS-XR in 2011
•   Juniper is actively working on validation as well


                                                        14
Where are we now?


           After 17 Days

     175 LIRs have enabled the service
          and created 152 ROAs
           covering 419 prefixes



                                         15
The road ahead
•   Web-based validator
•   Up / Down protocol
     - Run your own Certificate Authority
     - Allow PI holders to manage ROAs

     - Transfers between RIRs

         -   ERX space
•   ROA tools
     - Import using combination of IRR + BGP + Human
     - Receive alert if ROA does not match BGP



                                                       16
More information:
http://ripe.net/certification




                               17
Questions?

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Resource Certification

  • 1. Resource Certification Alex Band, Product Manager UKNOF18
  • 2. Internet Routing • Routing is non-hierarchical, open and free • Freedom comes at a price: - You can announce any address block on your router - Route leaking happens frequently, impact is high Entire networks become unavailable - - Route hijacking is easy, as long as peers don’t filter • IPv4 address depletion may intensify issue 2
  • 3. Digital Resource Certificates • Based on open IETF standards (sidr) • Issued by the RIRs • States that an Internet number resource has been registered by the RIPE NCC • Do not list any identity information - All resource information can be found in the registry 3
  • 4. What Certification offers • Proof of holdership • Secure Inter-Domain Routing - Route Origin Authorisation • Resource transfers • Validation is the added value! 4
  • 5. The system certificate authority 5
  • 6. The system (2) • Accessible through the LIR Portal • Administrator grants access to users 6
  • 7. Proof of holdership • • • 7
  • 8. Route Origin Authorisation (ROA) • fi • • 8
  • 10.
  • 11. Software Validation of Certificates and ROAs • Validators access publicly accessible repository • Three software tools available 1. RIPE NCC Validator - Easy to set-up and use, limited feature set 2. rcynic 3. BBN Relying Party Software - Complex set-up, but more options and felixibility http://ripe.net/certification/validation 11
  • 12. BGPmon ROA validation service • Relies heavily on RIPE NCC Validator $ whois -h whois.bgpmon.net 200.7.86.0 Prefix: 195.157.0.0/16 Prefix description: Netscalibur UK Ltd Country code: GB Origin AS: 8426 Origin AS Name: CLARANET-AS ClaraNET RPKI status: ROA validation successful $ whois -h whois.bgpmon.net " --roa 8426 195.157.0.0/16" 0 - Valid ------------------------ ROA Details ------------------------ Origin ASN: AS8426 Not valid Before: 2011-01-01 13:56:21 Not valid After: 2012-07-01 00:00:00 Trust Anchor: rpki.ripe.net Prefixes: 213.165.128.0/19 195.157.0.0/16 194.112.32.0/19 12
  • 13. Hardware Validation: RPKI-RTR Protocol BGP validated RPKI RTR Decision cache PROTOCOL Process route-map validity-0 match rpki-invalid drop route-map validity-1 match rpki-not-found set localpref 50 // valid defaults to 100 13
  • 14. Hardware Validation: RPKI-RTR Protocol BGP validated RPKI RTR Decision cache PROTOCOL Process • Cisco roadmap has router validation for RLS12 / IOS-XR in 2011 • Juniper is actively working on validation as well 14
  • 15. Where are we now? After 17 Days 175 LIRs have enabled the service and created 152 ROAs covering 419 prefixes 15
  • 16. The road ahead • Web-based validator • Up / Down protocol - Run your own Certificate Authority - Allow PI holders to manage ROAs - Transfers between RIRs - ERX space • ROA tools - Import using combination of IRR + BGP + Human - Receive alert if ROA does not match BGP 16