Nkrumah, African awakening and neo-colonialism: how Black America awakened Nkrumah and Nkrumah awakened Black America

From: The Black Scholar Page 1 of 23
(June 22, 2010)

Nkrumah, African awakening
and neo-colonialism: how
Black America awakened
Nkrumah and Nkrumah
awakened Black America.
Source: Nimako, Kwame. (2010, June 22). Nkrumah, African awakening and neo-colonialism: how Black
America awakened Nkrumah and Nkrumah awakened Black America The Free Library. (2010). Retrieved
August 11, 2011 from http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Nkrumah, African awakening and neo-
colonialism: how Black America...-a0233963294

Pan-Africanism has its beginnings in the liberation struggle of African-Americans, expressing
the aspirations of Africans and peoples of African descent. From the first Pan-African
Conference, held in London in 1900, until the fifth and last Pan-African Conference held in
Manchester in 1945, African-Americans provided the main driving power of the movement. Pan-
Africanism then moved to Africa, its true home, with the holding of the First Conference of
Independent African States in Aecra in April 1958, and the All-African Peoples' Conference in
December the same year.

The work of the early pioneers of Pan-Africanism such as H. Sylvester Williams, Dr. W.E.B. Du
Bois, Marcus Garvey, and George Padmore, none of whom were born in Africa, has become a
treasured part of Africa's history. It is significant that two of them, Dr. Du Bois and George
Padmore, came to live in Ghana at my invitation. Dr. Du Bois died, as he wished, on African
soil, while working on the Encyclopaedia Africana. George Padmore became my Adviser on
African Affairs, and spent the last years of his life in Ghana, helping in the revolutionary struggle
for African unity and socialism.--Kwame Nkrumah, Introduction to pamphlet, "The Spectre of
Black Power," 1968

**********

Nkrumah, African awakening and neo-colonialism: how Black America awakened Nkrumah and Nkrumah
awakened Black America

(June 22, 2010)

THIS ESSAY is about how conditions and politics in Black America influenced African politics
and how conditions and politics in Africa influenced Black American politics and culture. A
great number of these influences were transmitted through, and symbolized by, Kwame
Nkrumah (1909-1972), Prime Minister of Ghana from 1957 to 1966. The above quotation
illustrates and sums up Nkrumah's indebtedness to Black America and how he sought to
reciprocate. Consideration of the anniversary of Robert L. Allen's important book--Black
Awakening in Capitalist America--provides us with the opportunity to reflect on the dynamics of
black life in America (much more details of which are provided in the book); it enables us to
highlight many links between Africa and Black America, including the mutual exchanges of Pan-
Africanism, and the central role of cultural and political symbols in the struggle for black
liberation. It also remphasizes the need to locate the struggle for black liberation in a broad
national and international context--the relationship between racial subordination and capitalism
in the US; and between national subordination and independence in the post-colonial state. In
this respect, we can review common aspects of the struggle for black liberation in both nations. I
highlight these issues by providing detailed insights into the political struggles of Nkrumah to
gain and maintain political power in Ghana.

NKRUMAH had left Ghana in his mid-twenties to study in the US at Lincoln University in
Pennsylvania in the 1930s, where he acquired degrees in Education, Sociology, Philosophy,
Political Science, and Theology. Aside from this he had been president of the African Students'
Organization of America and Canada, vice-president of the West African Students Union in
Britain and co-secretary of the Fifth Pan-African Conference held in Manchester, England in
1945. On the invitation of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), he returned to Ghana in
December 1947, after twelve years absence. Nkrumah became the general-secretary of the
UGCC and transformed it into a mass nationalist movement. Three months later Nkrumah found
himself in jail, together with five other members of the leadership of the UGCC; they became
known as the Big Six in Ghana. Their arrest by the colonial authorities was precipitated by riots
and looting in the big cities of European, Syrian and Lebanese shops. In turn, the looting was
triggered by the shooting of an ex-service man, Sergeant Adjetey, and the wounding of several
others by a British police officer on 28 February, 1948 in a protest march to the Governor's
residence by ex-servicemen.

LET US RECALL that Nkrumah's arrival coincided with the decline of the UK as an imperial
power and the continuing ascendancy of the US as a hegemonic power. Nkrumah was a pioneer
in introducing the US to Africa.

The first section of this essay deals with the rise of modern nationalism in Ghana. This is
followed by symbols, concepts and strategies Nkrumah used to awaken Africa in Section Two.
Some of the symbols, concepts and strategies were borrowed from the US in general and Black
America in particular. As will be discussed below Nkrumah used the Red Rooster or Cock to
symbolize the African awakening and the Black Star as the arising and the forward movement of
Africa. A third symbol of Nkrumah's African awakening was the Kente cloth; he elevated the
Kente cloth to the level of national cultural symbol. He also wore Kente for his official portrait
as President of Ghana. Note that in the quotation above, Nkrumah used the concept of African-
American before the term became common usage in Black America. Other concepts that


(June 22, 2010)

Nkrumah used frequently in the anti-colonial struggle between 1949 and 1957 were the concepts
of positive action and freedom. Though Nkrumah did not seem to be conscious of how he had
been shaped by America, he had become Americanized when he arrived back in Ghana. For
those Ghanaians who were formed by local "tribal" culture and schooled in the British education
system and legal tradition, Nkrumah was a strange figure. I argue below that Nkrumah was
aware of these cultural differences but underestimated the resilience of British colonial culture
and sub-nationalism.

The concept most associated with Nkrumah is "neo-colonialism." This is the issue we deal with
in the Third Section. How did he arrive at the concept of neocolonialism? Nkrumah's notion of
neo-colonialism had three components. The first is neocolonialism as a consequence of the status
of an underdeveloped country within the world trade system or in the periphery of the world
system. The second is neocolonialism as military force; the capacity of countries with imperial
ambitions to re-subjugate or overthrow less powerful governments. The third component is
neocolonialism as a form of bribery of local populations such as "politicians"; especially soldiers
and public servants who act as agents or stooges of imperial powers.

In conclusion I pose and answer the question of what went wrong at three levels. What went
wrong with Nkrumah? What went with wrong with Ghana? What went wrong with the Pan-
African project? The first question deals with the overthrow of Nkrumah in a military coup in
1966 and how his overthrow has been explained. Nkrumah himself felt that his overthrow was
the result of an imperialist plot and neo-colonialists in the country. Others have argued that he
was overthrown because he ran a one-party state. Others argue that he was not a true socialist. I
found these explanations too simplistic, so two decades ago I introduced the concepts of holistic
nationalism and sub-nationalism to explain the forces that worked against Nkrumah's project. I
then turn to the implications of Nkrumah's overthrow to Ghana and the Pan-African project.

This paper is only part of a story; the story of how Nkrumah was awakened by Black America
and how he in turn awakened Black America. Let us unfold the story.

Nkrumah and African Awakening: The Dual Struggle

THOSE WHO SEEK to end violent and oppressive systems and regimes have to contemplate
survival, suicide, or genocide. Apparently Nkrumah had contemplated these scenarios when he
noted in 1949 that:

There are two ways to achieve Self-government: either by armed revolution and violent
overthrow of the existing regime, or by constitutional and legitimate non-violent methods. In
other words, either by armed might or by moral pressure. For instance, Britain prevented the two
German attempts to enslave her by armed might, while India liquidated British Imperialism there
by moral pressure. We believe that we can achieve Self-government even now by constitutional
means without resort to any violence. (Nkrumah 1973: 6)


(June 22, 2010)

NKRUMAH'S African awakening was a project with a dual struggle. On the one hand he had to
deal with the internal Ghanaian/African political and cultural configurations to get his message
across; but he needed to succeed in Ghana before he could succeed in Africa. On the other hand,
in the absence of armed insurrection, he had to convey a message that could de-legitimize British
and colonial rule. The dual struggle had to be dealt with simultaneously in the context of
Ghanaian/African nationalism.

With regard to Ghanaian political and cultural configuration it should be noted that modern
Ghanaian nationalism emerged after the collapse of primary resistance in the face of colonial
onslaught. The collapse of primary resistance gave rise to the formal colonization of the coastal
region of Ghana at the end of the nineteenth century. The first modern nationalist "movement,"
the Aborigines Rights Protection Society (ARPS), was formed in 1896 by a group of Ghanaian
intelligentsia in coalition with native rulers in the coastal area of the country. The immediate
objective of the ARPS was to counter attempts by the British to expropriate Fante lands, through
the introduction of a Lands Bill (1897), designed to transmute what the British colonial
authorities considered as "tribal or family holdings into individual ownership" (Nimako 1991:
18).

AFTER successfully preventing the British from expropriating Fante lands, and flowing from
that, Ghanaian lands, the ARPS became conservative. By the 1930s the ARPS had become
dormant and was superseded by the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) in 1947. Like the
formation of the ARPS, the force behind the formation of the UGCC was primarily economic,
but its instruments were political. According to the initiator of the UGCC, George Grant, a
Ghanaian timber merchant, the formation of the UGCC was a consequence of the colonial
politics of exclusion and discrimination. As Grant put it:

We were not being treated right; we were not getting the licenses for import of goods.... At one
time we had the Aborigines Rights Protection Society who were taking care of the country. Later
on, they were pushed out and there was the Provincial Council of Chiefs ... The chiefs go to the
Council and approve loans without submitting them to the merchants and tradesmen in the
country. Thereby we keep on losing. (Watson Commission, Ibid.)

To this effect, Grant gathered forty Ghanaians, mostly British-trained lawyers, who converged
on the coastal town of Saltpond in April 1947 to discuss how Britain could transfer self-
government to them or other Ghanaians. This led to the formation of the UGCC in August 1947.

The United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) pledged itself:

To ensure that by all legitimate and constitutional means the direction and control of government
should pass into the hands of the people and their chiefs in the shortest possible time. (Watson
Commission 1948)

For the record, this UGCC statement was a repudiation of the notion of 'indirect rule'; the essence


(June 22, 2010)

of indirect rule was that the British colonial authorities ruled their colonies through local and
traditional rulers, be they Raj, Sultans, Kings or Chiefs. The problem was how to translate those
wishes into political outcome. The forty Ghanaians, however, realized that they did not possess
adequate skills and strategies. Subsequently, the UGCC executive committee, on the
recommendation of Ako Adjei, a UGCC member who had studied with Nkrumah in the USA,
decided to invite Nkrumah, who had made a name for himself as an anti-colonialist/imperialist
agitator in the US and Britain, to return to Ghana to help shape the social and political forces in
the country that were beyond the control of Ghanaian intelligentsia at that point in history.

RECALL that Marx has made us understand that people make history but they do not do so
simply as they please or under conditions of their own creation. People make history under
conditions they encounter. The conditions Nkrumah encountered in December 1947 were general
discontent in society occasioned by high inflation and post-World War II economic stress and
shortages of commodities. However, whereas Grant, a businessman, viewed the social and
economic conditions in the country in the context of racial discrimination, Nii Bonne, a sub-chief
in Accra (the capital city of Ghana), viewed the same in the context of economic exploitation.

Thus, unlike Grant, who gathered Ghanaian intelligentsia to discuss transfer of power, Bonne
articulated his grievances through protests in the streets and a boycott campaign. Since colonial
rule was also a racialized project, racially discriminatory practices, political and economic
protest also became a form of "racialized protest." This became apparent when Bonne was said
to have told a crowd in one of his boycott campaigns on 26 January 1948:

"... This cloth [wax block print] sold by the white man at eighty-four shillings per piece and sold
at the black market for six pounds per piece cost the white man about forty shillings landed here
in these days. If the white man sells it at fifty shillings he would gain ten shillings he collects a
profit more than the print cost him. Is the white man not cunning taking away your money for
nothing?

"The people will reply, 'yes, the white man is stealing our money by tricks.' Nii Bonne will then
say, 'Don't buy anything from the white man's stores and don't allow your fellow countrymen to
buy. If they do, swear the oath of the Omanhene [i.e., the paramount chief] on them.....'" (Watson
Commission, in Nimako 1991: 44)

Recall that Bonne's boycott campaign took place one month after the arrival of Nkrumah in
Ghana. Though the disorder, disturbances and lootings that followed the boycott campaign were
not the making of the UGCC leadership, they were blamed for it and arrested by the colonial
authorities. The arrest of the UGCC leadership, who became known by Ghanaians as the Big Six
while in jail for two weeks, tested their resolve.

Their arrest by the colonial authorities was precipitated by riots and looting in the big cities of
European, Syrian and Lebanese shops. In turn, the looting was triggered by the shooting of an
ex-service man, Sergeant Adjetey, and the wounding of several others by a British police officer
on 28 February, 1948 in a protest march to the Governor's residence by ex-servicemen.

THE WATSON COMMISSION, which was called into being to investigate the causes of the


(June 22, 2010)

disturbances and recommend reforms in the colonial administration, also took the opportunity to
assess the leadership of the UGCC, especially J.B. Danquah, the chairman, and Nkrumah, the
secretary-general, of UGCC. With regard to the former, the commission reported that:

Dr. Danquah might be described as the doyen of Gold Coast [Ghana] politicians. He has founded
or has been connected with most political movements since his adolescence. He is a member of
the Legislative Council and but for the accident of birth might have been a most notable chief.
He is a man of great intelligence but suffers from a disease not unknown to politicians
throughout the ages and recognized by the generic name of expediency." (Watson Commission,
Ibid.)

With regard to latter, the Watson Commission reported that Nkrumah:

Appears while in Britain to have had Communist affiliations and to have become imbued with a
Communist ideology which only political expediency has blurred. In London he was identified
particularly with the West African National Secretariat, a body which still exists. It appears to be
the precursor of a Union of West African Soviet Socialist Republics. (Watson Commission,
Ibid.)

In plain language this implied that Danquah should not be taken seriously but the colonial
authorities ought to keep a watchful eye on Nkrumah. And they did.

In the final analysis, the majority of the UGCC leadership kept distance from the agitation and
actions of the masses, whereas Nkrumah supported it. Not only did the prison experience drive a
wedge in the UGCC leadership, but also, after their release from jail, Nkrumah transformed the
UGCC into a mass movement and radicalized it. On this score, it is important to note that the
first trade union organization, the Gold Coast Railway Union (GCRU), was registered in 1943
and became active in 1947--the same year that the UGCC was formed. The radicalization of the
UGCC went hand in hand with the radicalization of the trade union.

THESE RADICAL developments contributed to a split in the leadership of the UGCC;
subsequently Nkrumah resigned from the UGCC and formed a new movement or party, the
Convention People's Party (CPP). The formation of the CPP brought Nkrumah's dual struggle
into sharp focus. On the one hand Nkrumah's resignation from the UGCC to form his own
political party, the CPP, laid the foundations for party politics in Ghana. Viewed in this context,
Nkrumah was the first person to form a political party in Ghana, as opposed to a nationalist
movement, and thus introduced democratic politics in the country, and perhaps in Africa.
However by siding with the masses, Nkrumah committed what Amilcar Cabral later referred to
as class suicide. Class suicide constitutes the betrayal of one's class and the embracing of less
comfort and sacrifice in the name of anti-colonial struggle. Of the six members of the UGCC
executive committee, only one, Ako Adjei, joined Nkrumah's party, the CPP.

On the other hand, the formation of the CPP also meant that political and social discontent in
society could be channeled through the CPP. In other words, the masses sought leadership and
found it in Nkrumah. From there on, the rest of the UGCC executive members became


(June 22, 2010)

Nkrumah's political opponents throughout his life; this in turn has clouded Ghanaian political
culture ever since. However, viewed in the context of modern Ghanaian nationalism, the ARPS
was overtaken by the UGCC. When the UGCC became radicalized and was overtaken two years
later by Kwame Nkrumah's CPP in 1949, the labor movement also became radicalized (Nimako
2002).

IT SHOULD BE mentioned that the remaining UGCC leadership viewed Nkrumah's move as
reckless, a betrayal, and opportunistic. Reckless because of the fear and awareness that the
British colonial authorities had the capacity to unleash violence, or even genocide on Ghanaians
in the context of colonial adage; when persuasion fails, force must apply. Thus the UGCC
leadership felt vindicated when Nkrumah was arrested, for the second time, in 1950 and jailed
for nine months for engineering a general strike.

The remaining UGCC leadership alleged betrayal because Nkrumah decided to commit class
suicide and thus disturbed the cohesion of the intelligentsia, which assumed the British colonial
authorities would hand over power to them because they had asked for it. Nkrumah was also
accused of opportunism because their understanding had been that he was invited to help them to
gain political power but not to take political power himself, as later happened.

This was compounded by the fact that though the leadership of the UGCC remained coherent, its
capacity to appeal to voters remained marginal. This was all the more so since Nkrumah won a
landslide election victory in 1951 against the UGCC when he was in jail. To be precise, of the
thirty-eight seats made available by the colonial authorities for political contest, the CPP won
thirty-four seats; the UGCC won two seats and Togoland Congress (TC) two seats. Nkrumah
was subsequently released from jail in to form”self-government," that is, to share the
administration of the country with the British colonial authorities to prepare the grounds for
formal political independence.

AFTER THE DEFEAT of the UGCC in the 1951 election, the UGCC disintegrated, and re-
emerged as the Ghana Congress Party (GCP) under new leadership. Kofi Busia, who had just
earned a doctorate degree in sociology, became the leader of the GCP. Like the old members of
the UGCC, Busia assumed that the GCP was morally and intellectually superior to the CPP.
Thus, in announcing the formation of the GCP, Busia stated:

"Congress [GCP] will show the country the right way. It will meet the CPP squarely and defeat it
... We cannot sit down and allow our country to be so run and ruined by men who think of
themselves only and who compromise principles without the least compunction ... Of course the
Congress means business. We cannot allow this fooling and thieving to go on any longer or else
we are all doomed. The great array of intellectual giants behind the party, the response of the
chiefs and farmers and the joy and support of the thinking man at the birth of Congress give
evidence to the strength of the new party. This Ghana must be saved from a one, arty evil, the
evil of dictatorship." (Emphasis added, quoted from Austin 1964: in Nimako 2002: 54-55)

Not only did Busia imply that there was only one political party (CPP) in Ghana at that point in
time but also in response to the success of the CPP, other political groupings emerged. On this
score the CPP had a demonstration effect on how political parties should be formed in Ghana; by


(June 22, 2010)

the mid-1950s there were five variants of Ghanaian nationalism. The remaining members of the
UGCC became members of the political groupings that emerged to oppose the CPP.

FOR THE RECORD, the process of British colonization shaped and conditioned the pattern of
nationalism(s). In a span of fifty years four areas (i.e., coastal, central, northern, and eastern)
were colonized successively; these regions became administratively known as the Colony
(coastal) Ashanti (central) Northern Territories (northern) and Trans-Volta Togoland (eastern).
This historical process gave rise to regional social formations, which in turn became new
political and cultural configurations. Thus, in response to colonization, five nationalisms
emerged. We have classified Nkrumah's version of nationalism as "holistic," because it was the
only truly national party and the other four regionally-based groupings we classify as "sub-
nationalism" (Nimako 1991). What was the ideological divide between holistic nationalism and
sub-nationalism? For the sake of conserving space, let us present the ideological divide between
holistic nationalism and sub-nationalism in a typology as follows:

Major Structural Features of Holistic Nationalists and
Sub-nationalists

HOLISTIC NATIONALISTS SUB-NATIONALISTS

1. British colonial rule as 1. Holistic nationalist rule as
the object of opposition the object of opposition

2. Strong belief in equal 2. Strong belief in social
opportunity and social stratification and social
transformation and reform
social transformation

3. Strong belief in Pan- 3. Non-belief in Pan-Africanism
Africanism and solidarity and solidarity between
between colonized and colonized and oppressed
oppressed peoples peoples

4. Mass politicization and 4. Primordial relations as
education as the basis the basis of political
of political mobilization mobilization

Sub-nationalism became the internal component of Nkrumah's dual struggle, whereas colonial
rule and domination became the external component. Nkrumah was viewed by both UGCC and
the colonial authorities as someone who was disturbing the tranquillity of colonial society, to
which he replied: "we prefer freedom in danger to servitude in tranquillity."

At the broader level of political culture, sub-nationalism followed the pattern of British


(June 22, 2010)

colonization, and holistic nationalism followed the construction and development of the colonial
state. The colonial state, which was the outcome of complex world trade and political relations as
well as (British) military occupation of the country, became the thread that held the
(geographical) regions together. In a similar vein, holistic nationalism became the thread that
held Ghanaians together by uniting them in their resistance and opposition to British rule,
irrespective of class and ethnic background. Unlike holistic nationalists (whose focus of
opposition was British colonial rule), the primary target for the opposition of the subnationalists
was actually the holistic nationalists. Just as the emergence of holistic nationalism presupposed
the existence of British domination, so did the existence of subnationalism presuppose British
domination and the spectre or even the very existence of holistic nationalism.

THE EXISTENCE of various nationalisms also gave rise to a relative diffusion of political
power in society. Thus, around 1950, the probability that any of the three organized political
forces in question (i.e., the colonial authorities, holistic nationalists and subnationalists) could
carry out its own wishes in isolation was relatively low. The ability of any one of the political
actors to dominate the political arena depended on a conscious and/or unconscious alliance of
two of the forces, in opposition to a third party. The power of the colonial authorities depended
on their control of the colonial state machinery, namely, the civil service, the police service, the
judiciary, and the armed forces. The power of the holistic nationalists was based on their ability
to galvanize the masses (including organized labor) into action, thereby making the country
ungovernable by the colonial authorities.

The power of the holistic nationalists was not only constrained by the colonial state, but also by
sub-nationalism. The power of the sub-nationalists rested on an alliance between a large section
of the intelligentsia and the native rulers, and their subsequent non-cooperation with holistic
nationalists, which in turn undermined the legitimacy of the holistic nationalists' rule. A case in
point is the refusal to accept election results, as the statement of Busia above demonstrates.

But in concrete terms, how did Nkrumah awaken, galvanize and mobilized Ghanaians to end
British colonial rule? Let us answer this question in the following section.

Symbols and Concepts of Nkrumah's African Awakening

POLITICS requires symbols. All political parties use symbols to distinguish themselves from
other political parties. Nkrumah was a man of symbolism and concepts and chose his symbols
and concepts consciously and carefully. Three symbols and three concepts defined Nkrumah's
African awakening in the early period of his political life, especially from the formation of his
political party, the CPP in 1949, and the attainment of Ghana's independence in 1957. The three
symbols were the Red Rooster or Cock, the Black Star, and the Kente cloth. The three concepts
were Positive Action, Freedom, and Self-determination.

It is necessary to place the symbolisms in their proper political context because the first symbol,
a red rooster or cock, which became the symbol of his political party, was meant to signify a
wake-up call. Though Ghanaians knew of red rooster or cock symbolism, Nkrumah gave a new
meaning to it. The red of the cock had a double meaning; one meaning for Ghanaians, another
meaning for international politics and solidarity. For the average Ghanaian red symbolizes


From: The Black Scholar Page 10 of
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(June 22, 2010)
seriousness, a danger, a fire, or hotness. For international solidarity red symbolized leftwing
politics and international socialism and communism.

Nkrumah's message varied, depending on the circumstances, but the element of a wake-up call
remained. A case in point is a speech he gave at a rally in the north of the country on 5 March
1949 in which he stated:

"This country is ours. This land is ours. It belongs to our chiefs and people. It does not belong to
foreigners, but we don't say that all foreigners should pack up and go. They can stay as traders,
and work with us not us masters and rulers.....

"The age of politics of words is gone. This is the age of politics of action. We don't have guns.
We don't have ammunition to fight anybody. We have a great spirit, a great national soul which
is manifest in our unity.

"If we get s.g. [self-government] we'll transform the Gold Coast [Ghana] into a paradise in ten
years. Why should some people in the NTs [Northern Territories] go naked? I can find no reason
for it. We can improve our native looms up here in the NTs in five years under a government of
the people, by the people and for the people....

"Wherefore my advice is 'Seek ye first the political kingdom, and all things will be added unto
you' ..." (Ashanti Pioneer, March, 1949, quoted here from Fitch and Oppenheimer: 25)

This speech has three elements of the holistic nationalist typology presented above, namely,
British colonial rule as object of opposition, strong belief in equal opportunity and social
transformation, and mass education as the basis of political mobilization.

EQUALLY IMPORTANT to note is that Nkrumah informed his followers that "[T]he age of
politics of words is gone. This is the age of politics of action." To this effect Nkrumah introduced
the concept of Positive Action. By Positive Action Nkrumah meant "the adoption of all
legitimate and constitutional means by which we can cripple the forces of imperialism in this
country."

He went on to lay out the strategies of Positive Action in the following terms:

The Weapons of Positive Action are:

1). Legitimate political agitation

2). Newspaper and educational campaigns; and

3). As a last resort, the constitutional application of strikes, boycotts, and non-co-operation based
on the principle of absolute non-violence. (Emphasis added; Nkrumah 1973: 7)

Recall that those who seek to end a violent and oppressive system and regime have to
contemplate survival, suicide or genocide. We have emphasized absolute non-violence to press


23
(June 22, 2010)
this matter home; Nkrumah was aware of the capacity of the colonial authorities to unleash
violence to quell an uprising and use such an incident to prolong colonial rule.

It is also important to mention that the power of the holistic nationalists was not only constrained
by the colonial state, but also by sub-nationalists. The power of the sub-nationalists rested on an
alliance between a large section of the intelligentsia and native rulers, and their subsequent non-
cooperation with holistic nationalists; this in turn undermined the legitimacy of the holistic
nationalists' rule. Whereas the CPP or holistic nationalists challenged the legitimacy of colonial
rule, some of the former UGCC members, now organized around regional groupings as sub-
nationalists and challenged the legitimacy of Nkrumah and CPP-led government. As
independence came close, sub-nationalists became more militant and violent and sought to delay
the process. This brings us to the second symbol, the Black Star.

If the Red Rooster or Cock symbolized a wake-up call, the Black Star symbolized rise-up or
African arising and the forward movement of black people and economic development. It is an
acknowledged fact that the concept of the Black Star and the symbolism around it originates
from Marcus Garvey. Garvey gave a radical twist to a Black American tradition of his time. In
Allen's formulation:

Garvey took [Booker T.] Washington's economic program, clothed it in militant nationalist
rhetoric, and built an organisation which in its heyday enjoyed the active support of millions of
black people. Garvey, a Jamaican by birth, 'identified the problem of American Negroes with the
problem of colonialism in Africa. He believed that until Africa was liberated, there was no hope
for black people anywhere.' He founded his Universal Negro Improvement Association in 1914
in Jamaica with the motto: "One God! One Aim! One Destiny!" But it was not until Garvey
established his group in New York's Harlem in 1917 that it began to assume notable proportions.
(Allen 1970: 100)

LIKE BOOKER T. WASHINGTON, "Garvey believed that economic power through ownership
of business could lay a solid foundation for eventual black salvation" (Allen, Ibid. 101). To this
effect, among other things, he established the Negro Factory Corporation and the Black Star
Steamship Corporation.

Nkrumah used the Black Star in four ways. First he used it in the national flag. The Ghanaian
national flag of red, gold, green strips and a black star in the gold became the official symbol of
Ghana as an independent state and a member of the United Nations. Second, Nkrumah used the
Black Star as part of Ghana's Coat of Arms. There are three black stars, two eagles and an
inscription, "Freedom and Justice" in the coat of arms. Not only was the Black Star borrowed
from Black America but the eagle was also borrowed from America. Thirdly, Nkrumah named
the Ghanaian national shipping line, the Black Star Line; and he used it as the name of the
national football club, the Black Star Football Club/Association. Not only did the Black Star
become prevalent as a symbol for Africa but also many African countries adopted the symbol of
black star in their national flags. The Black Star thus became one of the major symbols of how
Black America awakened Nkrumah.

The Black Star, as a symbol of African arising, also became a symbol of progress, social


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mobility, and economic development. Through self-government, the CPP government was not
only able to improve the physical and social infrastructure of the country but also social mobility
was enhanced. Between 1951 and 1961, primary schools enrolment grew by 212 percent; middle
schools by 142 percent; secondary schools by 438 percent; teacher training by 138 percent and
university enrolment by 479 percent. Similar developments had taken place in the areas of health
care, clean water, sanitation, and employment. However, these developments were dependent on
the prices of primary commodities on the world market; these were in turn dependent on demand
from Europe and North America.

By creating the space to administer the country with the colonial authorities, the CPP formed a
de facto alliance with the colonial authorities against the sub-nationalists. This was not only
viewed by sub-nationalists as compromise of "principles without the least compunction," it also
obliged the subnationalists to swallow contempt for the masses and appeal directly to them.
Thus, in one of its appeals, the anti-CPP Newspaper, the Ashanti Pioneer (of 8 January 1954)
reported that:

[T]he masses should be reminded that the CPP entered the Legislative Assembly [in 1951] as
tramps in [Northern Territories] smocks. Today, within barely three years, they are riding not in
buses, not even in taxis, but in luxurious American saloon cars. A good number of them have
built mansions and go about in tails and toppers. (Quoted in Austin 1964:212 in Nimako 2002:
60)

The political irony should not be overlooked; the "men of substance," who viewed members of
the CPP as "the flotsam and jetsam and the popinjays of the country" started to appeal directly to
the masses. More importantly, they were also reminding the masses that Nkrumah had not only
introduced American style politics in Ghana but also he had introduced American consumption
patterns, including luxurious American saloon cars into the country. Viewed in this context, the
issue of legitimacy became the basis of political instability. Colonial rule was considered
illegitimate by both the colonizer and the colonized, hence the need to transfer power to a
legitimate nationalist government. Sub-nationalists considered the CPP government illegitimate
because they viewed members of the CPP as "the flotsam and jetsam and the popinjays of the
country." In those days this implied that they were not educated in British universities.

THIS BRINGS US to the concept of freedom. During the campaigns for independence, Nkrumah
tended to open and end his speech by shouting the word, Freedom! to which the crowd
responded, Freedom! The concept of freedom was also taken from Black America. For nowhere
is the concept of freedom used more than Black American intellectual and cultural tradition.

The opponents did not use the word freedom. Recall that colonial rule was justified by the
colonizers as a "civilizing mission." Thus in 1954, in arguing his case for Independence in his
motion for constitutional reform in the parliament, Nkrumah argued:

The right of a people to decide their own destiny, to make their way in freedom, is not to be
measured by the yardstick of color or degree of social development. It is an inalienable right of
peoples, which they are powerless to exercise when forces, stronger than they themselves, by
whatever means, for whatever reasons, take this right away from them. If there is to be a criterion


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of a people's preparedness for Self-Government, then I say it is their readiness to assume the
responsibilities of ruling themselves..... never in the history of the world has an alien ruler
granted self-rule to a people on a silver platter. (Emphasis added, quoted from Timothy 1981:
122-123, in Nimako, 1991: 62)

Constitutional reform that followed this motion gave rise to an election based on Universal
Suffrage in 1954 and an expansion of electoral seats to 104, of which the CPP won seventy-two;
the sub-nationalists won only nineteen seats distributed as follows: Northern Peoples Party
(NPP) fifteen, Togoland Congress (TC) three and Ghana Congress Party (GCP) one; the rest of
thirteen seats went to independent candidates (eleven) and one each to two religious parties
(Nimako, Ibid: 65). It should be mentioned that Busia, the leader of the GCP won the one seat
for his party. Just as the 1951 election led to the disintegration of the UGCC, so did the election
of 1954 lead to the disintegration of the GCP. Busia joined a new regional formation, the
National Liberation Movement (NLM), based in the Ashanti region, and became its leader.

DEMANDS from the sub-nationalists groupings, led by Busia, for a federal constitution, as
opposed to the existing unitary constitution, to minimize the power of the CPP, backed by
violence, led the colonial authorities to organize another election in 1956. However, it did not
change the results; the CPP won seventy-two seats out of 104; three sub-nationalists groupings
won in total thirty seats and distributed as follows: Northern Peoples Party (NPP) fifteen,
National Liberation Movement (NLM) twelve, Togoland Congress (TC) three and one seat each
for two religious parties. Thus two years after the above Nkrumah motion, and nine years after
his return to Ghana, Britain decided to end her colonial rule in Ghana and handed over the affairs
of the country to the CPP government. It was this state of affairs that led the then British
Governor, Sir Arden-Clarke, to conclude at a given historical juncture:

Nkrumah and his party had the mass of the people behind them and there was no other party with
appreciable public support to which one could turn. Without Nkrumah, the Constitution would
be stillborn and if nothing came of all the hopes, aspirations and concrete proposals for a greater
measure of self-government, there would no longer be any faith in the good intentions of the
British Government and the Gold Coast [i.e., Ghana] would be plunged into disorders, violence
and bloodshed. (quoted from Austin 1964, 150, in Nimako, 1991: 79)

What the governor's statement implied was that Ghana was a de facto "one-party state" in 1956.
The CPP had won successive elections in 1951, 1954 and 1956 to prepare the grounds for the
country's independence on 6 March 1957.

In response to the observations of the British Governor, at a ceremonial banquet on the eve of the
departure of Sir Arden-Clarke, Nkrumah stated that:

"Much credit has quite properly been accorded to [the Governor] in the press and elsewhere for
the attainment of our independence. I am happy that this is so for without him our struggle would
have been a far more bitter one, a more violent one, and one calling for even greater sacrifices on
the parts of us all. But I know that Sir Charles as an honest man himself will agree
wholeheartedly with me when I say that when honors are handed out, those who should rank first
and foremost are the members of the Convention People's Party, the pioneers and the


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footsloggers of the National Independence Movement. And I say with all emphasis that without
the Convention People's Party there could not have been any independence for this country. For
let it never be imagined for a moment that our independence was given to us for the mere asking.
Every hour, every precious minute of this our glorious freedom was fought for relentlessly and
untiringly by them. We have won independence and founded a modern state. The end we have
reached has been attained at the price of suffering self-denial and patient work." (Emphasis
added, quoted from James 1977: 153, in Nimako, 1991: 80)

LET US give practical meaning to the polemics between Nkrumah and Arden-Clarke. What are
the practical meanings of the following statement by Arden-Clarke? "Nkrumah and his party had
the mass of the people behind them and there was no other party with appreciable public support
to which one could turn." Ghana was a de facto one-party state at the time of independence in
1957. Recall that both the UGCC and the GCP disintegrated after the 1951 and 1954 elections
respectively. In a similar vein the three sub-nationalists groupings, NPP, NLM and TC merged to
form the United Party (UP), with Busia as its leader, after the 1956 election in opposition to the
CPP. But like its predecessors, the UP also suffered from defections. Thus by 1960, seventeen of
the thirty-two opposition members of the parliament had "crossed carpet" to join the ruling party,
the CPP; this brought the majority of the CPP to eighty-nine and the opposition to fifteen
parliamentary seats. It was against this background that in 1958 Busia, now the leader of the
newly formed United Party (UP), abandoned his party and parliamentary seat and went into serf-
imposed exile to seek support to overthrow the Nkrumah government. As we shall see below,
since one-party states were then associated with the Soviet bloc, Nkrumah's regime became a
pawn in the Cold War politics.

Nkrumah, Self-determination and Neo-colonialism

NKRUMAH'S dual struggle was part of a broader Pan-African movement; thus it did not end
with the achievement of Ghana's political independence on 6 March 1957. What it implied,
however, was that he needed to succeed in Ghana before he could succeed in Africa and its
Diaspora. It was against this background that in his inaugural address on Ghana's independence,
he proclaimed in his now famous statement that "the independence of Ghana is meaningless
unless it links with the total liberation of Africa."

We noted in his formulation above that:

[U]ntil the fifth and last Pan-African Conference held in Manchester in 1945, African-Americans
provided the main driving power of the [Pan-African] movement. Pan-Africanism then moved to
Africa, its true home, with the holding of the First Conference of Independent African States in
Accra in April 1958, and the All-African Peoples' Conference in December the same year.
(Nkrumah 1973)

The purpose of these two conferences was to galvanize African states to support nationalist
movements and peoples to achieve political independence. To this effect, the concept of self-
determination, stated in the United Nations Charter, became the equivalent of Positive Action.

The notion of self-determination places emphasis on collective freedom, namely, freedom from


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foreign control. Until Ghana's independence, most African countries had been defined and
represented as property of certain European countries. The new dual struggle thus implied the
creation of new cultural and political configurations in Africa and ensuring that Africans
represent themselves outside Africa. Thus the process of national liberation and solidarity also
required the re-definition of Africa. To this effect Nkrumah noted that:

With true independence regained ... a new harmony needs to be forged, a harmony that will
allow the combined presences of traditional Africa, Islamic Africa and Euro-Christian Africa, so
that this presence is in tune with the original humanist principles underlying African society. Our
society is not the old society, but a new society enlarged by Islamic and Euro-Christian
influences. A new emergent ideology is therefore required, an ideology which can solidify in a
philosophical statement, but at the same time an ideology which will not abandon the original
humanist principle of Africa ... Such a philosophical statement I propose to name philosophical
consciencism. (Nkrumah: 1964)

BY RE-DEFINING Africa and demanding African representation of Africa, it made it possible
to extend solidarity and speak on behalf of those still living under colonial control. A case in
point was Nkrumah's statement on the anti-colonial struggles in Algeria:

The flower of French youth is being wasted in an attempt to maintain an impossible fiction that
Algeria is part of France, while at the same time the youth of Algeria are forced to give up their
lives in a conflict which could be settled tomorrow by the application of the principles of the
United Nations.... France cannot win a military victory in Algeria. If she hopes to do so, then her
hopes are false and unrelated to the realities of the situation.... From whatever angle yon view
this problem you cannot escape from the fact that Algeria is African and will always remain so,
in the same manner that France is French. No accident of history, such as has occurred in Algeria
can ever succeed in turning an inch of African soil into an extension of any other continent.
Colonialism and imperialism cannot change this basic geographical fact..... Let France and the
other colonial powers face this fact and be guided accordingly. (Nkrumah, quoted from Mazrui
1977: 52)

It was certainly true that the Algerian conflict "could be settled tomorrow by the application of
the principles of the United Nations." However, the colonial and imperial powers did not always
adhere to the principles of the United Nations which they constructed themselves. Thus the
galvanization of Africans was matched by solidarity between European states and the US.

Underneath the notions of freedom and self-determination was economic and social
development. On this score one of the major obstacles to the Pan-African project was, and still
is, neo-colonialism. According to Nkrumah:

[T]he essence of neo-colonialism is that the state which is subject to it is, in theory, independent
and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and
its political policy is directed from outside. (Nkrumah 1967: 90)

NKRUMAH'S notion of neo-colonialism had three components. The first is neocolonialism as a
consequence of the status of an underdeveloped country within the world trade system or in the


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periphery of the world system. The second is neocolonialism as military force; the capacity of
countries with imperial ambitions to re-subjugate or overthrow less powerful governments
directly. The third component is neocolonialism as a form of bribery of local populations such as
"politicians"; especially soldiers and public servants, who act as agents or stooges of imperial
powers.

The implications of the first, that is peripheral status in the world system, is that it restrained or
placed limitations on the capacity of a country like Ghana to generate enough resources for its
physical and social infrastructure development; it also restrained the capacity for a country like
Ghana to help other countries in need. The reverse is true for imperial powers. Powerful
countries can place trade sanctions on weak countries; they can also use "development aid" to
blackmail weak countries.

Though major developments in the social sectors had been made, the economy of Ghana
remained fragile. Thus having attempted to attract foreign investment from the West for almost a
decade without success and stimulated local groups to become capitalist without tangible results,
a Ghana Government Minister lamented in 1960 that the CPP government has help "Ghanaian
businessmen over the last few years with loans for their capitalist development. Very large sums
too. And nearly all of it has been wasted" (Nimako 1991: 89). After these experiences the CPP
government embarked on a state-led capital accumulation and industrialization project. In
formulating this project a Government document entitled "Work and Happiness" pronounced:

Imperialism-colonialism left Ghana without the accumulation of capital in private hands which
assisted the Western World to make its industrial revolution. Only Government can therefore
find the means to promote those basic services [i.e. education, health, water and sanitation] and
industries [i.e. employment] which are essential prerequisites to intensive, diversified agriculture,
speedy industrialization and increased economic productivity. (Nimako, 1991: 97)

Coming, as it were, against the background of the Cold War and intensified armed struggle in
Africa, the confrontation between Nkrumah's politics and the interest of the Western world
became stark. The above statement constituted a communist conspiracy in the eyes of Western
powers, especially the US. Which bring us to the second component of neo-colonialism, namely,
the re-subjugation of former colonies by old and new imperial powers.

THE IMPLICATIONS of the second component are that weak countries could be invaded by
powerful countries and reverse the achievement of independence and thus undermine self-
determination and collective freedom. Examples abound to support this position, including
interventions in Egypt on the Suez Canal by Britain, France and Israel; and interventions in Iran,
Guatemala and Vietnam by the US (Chomsky 1993).

Where direct intervention is not an option, a third option is invoked, namely, neo-colonialism as
a form of bribery of local populations such as "politicians"; especially soldiers and public
servants who act as agents or stooges of imperial powers became the most effective instrument
against the Pan-African project. We speak here of a project because a project has a beginning
and an end. We have noted that around 1950, the probability that any of the three organized
political forces in question (i.e. the colonial authorities, holistic nationalists and sub-nationalists)


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could carry out its own wishes in isolation was relatively low. The ability of any one of the
political actors to dominate the political arena depended on a conscious and/or unconscious
alliance of two of the forces, in opposition to a third party.

Not only did Busia advocate against the granting of independence by the British, he also called
on the US government to "impose sanctions" against Ghana in order to bring down the Nkrumah
regime. Thus after wandering through Europe for support in vain, Busia found people to listen to
him in the US. On 3 December 1962 Busia appeared before a Congressional Committee to plead
for the overthrow of Nkrumah.

To this effect Senator Thomas J. Dodd led off by stating that Ghana had become "the mortal
enemy of true freedom and independence for the peoples of Africa and the mortal enemy of
African peace." As Basil Davidson put it:

Dr. Busia could only agree with him. "I should say," he told the Senator, "that politics isn't my
career, but what made me go into politics is the fact that I saw right at the beginning, as far back
as Nkrumah's return, .... That we had there all the makings, all the ingredients of revolutionary
communism." (Davidson 1973: 173)

Here was a crooked logic. The African who was fighting for the freedom and independence of
Africa was being accused by an American of being "the mortal enemy of African peace."

IT WOULD BE FOOLISH to infer that Busia could tell the US government what to do.
Nevertheless, with the support of the US, Nkrumah was overthrown in a bloody military
operation by some Ghanaian soldiers on 24 February 1966 in the name of the restoration of
freedom and democracy. The problem, however, was that the architects of the coup did not seem
to know why they became involved in the coup. According to one of the coup makers, Major
A.A. Afrifa:

"One of the reasons for my bitterness against Kwame Nkrumah's rule was that he paid lip-service
to our membership of the [British] Commonwealth ... African Unity ... is impossible to achieve
within our life-time. Organization of African Unity or no Organization of African Unity, I will
claim my citizenship of Ghana and of the [British] Commonwealth in any part of the world. I
have been trained in the United Kingdom as a soldier, and I am ever prepared to fight alongside
my friends in the United Kingdom in the same way as Canadians and Australians do." (Afrifa in
Nimako, 1991: 112-113)

In other words, Major Afrifa thought he was fighting for the British whereas he was actually
fighting for the Americans. Another planner of the coup, Colonel A.K. Ocran, claimed to resent
the fact that Nkrumah had terminated the appointment of the former British Army Chief of Staff,
Major General Alexander, after the latter had expressed his reservations on Ghana's role in the
Congo crisis and opposed the training of Ghanaian military officers in the Soviet Union. Major
General Alexander also admitted later that he "often found it very difficult to act on Nkrumah's
orders without feeling the [he] might be hurting British interests" (Alexander in Nimako:
119).What about freedom and democracy? In the words of Major Afrifa:


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"The irony of the present situation in Ghana is that it is quite probable that President Nkrumah
and the CPP would command the support of a majority of the electorate, even in genuinely free
elections. It is a pity that it is not possible to test this hypothesis." (Afrifa, in Nimako, 1991:118)

SINCE BUSIA wanted to be the leader of Ghana, let us bring him into the equation. Busia
returned to Ghana and became an advisor to the military junta; he persuaded military rulers to
hand over government to him, but through election. Through the logic of Major Afrifa, the CPP
was banned from participating in the 1969 general election; this made it possible for Busia and
his newly formed Progress Party (PP) the win the election. Busia thus formed or became the
leader of four political parties at various times (GCP-1952, NLM-1954, UP-1958, and PP-1969)
before he could win an election, but this was only possible under the condition that the CPP
would be prevented from contesting the election. However, twenty-seven months after Busia
formed his government, another group of soldiers overthrew the Busia government in January
1972. Busia was not protected by the US.

In justifying the military takeover, Colonel Acheampong, the leader of the coup, made his own
balance of Nkrumah and Busia in his first radio speech to announce the coup as follows:

"The first people Busia put his eye on were the armed forces and police. Some army and police
officers were dismissed under the pretext of retirement. Some officers were put in certain
positions to suit the whim of Busia and his colleagues. Then he started taking from us the few
amenities and facilities which we in the armed forces and the police enjoyed even under the
Nkrumah regime. Having lowered morale in the armed forces and the police to the extent that
officers could not exert any meaningful influence over their men, so that by this strategy coming
together to overthrow his government was to him impossible, he turned his eyes on the
civilians." (quoted from Bennet 1975: 308, in Nimako, 1991: 144)

HERE ARE STRUCTURE and agency at work. Busia focused on the agency of Nkrumah but he
underestimated the structure Nkrumah put in place in his attempt to build a post-colonial state.
Both Nkrumah and Busia spent the rest of the lives in exile; Nkrumah in Guinea, and Busia in
Britain.

The response of the British lawyer, Geoffrey Bing, to these political developments in Ghana at
that point in time was instructive. Bing defended Nkrumah in 1951 against the British colonial
authorities. When Nkrumah became Prime Minister he invited Bing to Ghana and appointed him
Attorney General. Like Nkrumah, Bing became a subject of abuse, insults and ridicule in
sections of the Western media. In that regard Bing summed up the attitudes of Western
governments and media towards Nkrumah and the African and African Diaspora struggles in the
following words:

For NINE years, from its independence in 1957 to 1966, Ghana was illuminated by the glare of
world publicity. Every figure who appeared on its stage magnified and distorted, almost beyond
recognition. Then suddenly in February 1966, as a result of a military rebellion, this little country
was, so it seemed, cut down to size. Overnight it was converted into what in fact it had always
been, a small state on the West Coast of Africa in no way historically, strategically or
economically important to the world. (Bing: 11 in Nimako 1991: 125)


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THIS WAS THE SITUATION Ghana found herself and continued to find herself, after the
overthrow of Nkrumah. Though the institutions which emerged as a result of Nkrumah's
struggle, such as the African Union, and the social cohesion in Ghana remained, the role of
Ghana as an innovator of ideas diminished after the overthrow of Nkrumah.

Here was another irony. Let us recall that Nkrumah's arrival coincided with the decline of the
UK as an imperial power and the rise of the US as a new hegemonic power. Nkrumah was a
pioneer in introducing the US to Africa. Equally ironic, if we can call it ironic, is that Nkrumah
achieved political independence for Ghana through moral pressure but was himself overthrown
through an armed revolt on the instigation of the US and the tacit approval of Britain. However,
just as Nkrumah considered neocolonialism as the last stage of imperialism, so did he consider
his overthrow as part of attempts to reverse the gains of the anti-colonial and anti-racism
struggles in the 1950s by former colonial powers. This is all the more so since the non-violent
struggles by black Americans in the US of America and that of Africans in Africa, from
Alabama to Sharpeville, have been met with state violence. In Nkrumah's words, "The same
power structure which is blocking the efforts of African-Americans in the US is also now
throwing road-blocks in Africa's way. Imperialism, neo-colonialism, settler domination and
racialism seek to bring us down and re-subjugate us" (Nkrumah 1973: 42).

In response, to and in symbiotic relation to these developments, armed struggle intensified in
Africa just as Black Power raged in America. Thus, according to Nkrumah:

Black Power is part of the world rebellion of the oppressed against the oppressor, of the
exploited against the exploiter. It operates throughout the African continent, in North and South
America, the Caribbean, where ever Africans and people of African descent live. It is linked with
the Pan-African struggle for unity on the African continent, and with all those who strive to
establish a socialist society. (Nkrumah 1973: 40)

Viewed in this context, theoretically the time line of organized and co-ordinated African
struggles for liberation is the first Pan-African conference in London in 1900 through Ghana's
independence in 1957 to the end of Apartheid in South Africa in 1994.

LET US CONCLUDE this section by introducing the third symbol that Nkrumah introduced to
Ghanaians and the international stage: the Kente cloth. The achievement of independence
relegated the Red Rooster to the background and brought the Black Star, which we have already
discussed, and the Kente cloth to the fore. Though known and used in Ghana as luxurious
clothing worn on special occasions by sections of the country, Nkrumah used the Kente cloth in
his official portrait and thus elevated it to the level of a national dress code; he also encouraged
parliamentarians to wear the Kente cloth on the opening of parliament. Since then the Kente
cloth has also been adopted by many Ghanaians as a national dress; the Kente cloth has also been
adopted and adapted by many black Americans as an expression of black American Africanity.

Thus, via Nkrumah, not only has the Black Star and Pan-Africanism become a permanent feature
of Black American awakening in Africa, but also the Kente cloth and the concepts of positive
action and neocolonialism entered the lexicon of Black America and the African Diaspora as part


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of African awakening in Black America.

Conclusion: Three Things that Went Wrong

NKRUMAH has played a major role in forging Pan-African identity and solidarity. During his
rule many Africans and people of African descent found refuge in Ghana. For these reasons the
overthrow of Nkrumah should not be taken lightly because anyone who embarked on such a
project, as Nkrumah did, should contemplate survival, suicide and genocide.

Survival in this context refers to strategies to ensure that one can carry one's project through and
live to see the fruits of one's project. Those who planned the overthrow of Nkrumah were aware
that his overthrow would have negative implications for the Pan-African project.

The second, suicide, refers to the sacrifices one has to make to achieve success. Nkrumah's
overthrow constituted suicide because he sacrificed too much to keep Pan-Africanism alive. As a
resistance and de-colonization project, Pan-Africanism is one of the most successful social
movements (awareness raising and mobilization) in the twentieth century.

But as a transformative and state development project (consolidation and development), the
results are mixed, because African states still depend on "development aid" and thus live under
neo-colonialism.

The third, genocide, refers to assassination of the leader or mass murder of the fop lowers by the
dominant group. There were several assassination attempts on the life of Nkrumah within Ghana
during his presidency; strangely the assassination attempts were not resolved. It appeared that
Nkrumah was better protected under British-led police force than under his leadership.

HOWEVER the three problems that Nkrumah failed to resolve are still unresolved in Africa.

This of course poses the problem of what went wrong.

The first problem is that of the transition from nationalist (liberation) movement to political
parties. This is tied to the contradictions between collective freedom and individual freedom or
human fights. Generally the transition from nationalist movement to political party has been
misunderstood and mismanaged in Africa. This is partly because individual freedom has been
subsumed under collective freedom. This has been a fertile ground for foreign intervention in
Africa.

The second problem is related to consolidation of sovereignty and development; this in turn is
tied to security, both food and physical. Most African states have not succeeded in adequately
feeding their populations; this reinforces neocolonialism. With regard to physical security,
Nkrumah himself felt that his overthrow was a result of an imperialist plot and neo-colonialists
in the country. Nkrumah's own reading about his overthrow can be summed up in this statement:

Ghana, on the threshold of economic independence, and in the vanguard of the African
revolutionary struggle to achieve continental liberation and unity, was too dangerous an example


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to the rest of Africa to be allowed to continue under a socialist-directed government. (Nkrumah
1968: 47)

This raises some questions: If imperialism is that strong, why bother to initiate change? One
initiates change out of the recognition that change is possible. But what change is possible?
Others have argued that he was overthrown because he ran a one-party state. This is illogical and
unrelated to the actual political developments that took place. Others argue that he was not a true
socialist, hence his ouster signalled the end of an illusion (Fitch & Oppenheimer 1966; Marable
1987). This is also not based on evidence because the reason Nkrumah's regime did not
nationalize anything was because there was nothing to nationalize. The issues of capitalism and
socialism were secondary to developments of the period. Of course, if by capitalism we mean
European colonization of Africa, then Africa has been capitalist for centuries; this in turn means
that capitalism cannot be defended. With regard to socialism, nobody knows what it is, so it need
not detain us here. In sum I found these explanations too simplistic, so two decades ago I
introduced the concepts of holistic nationalism and sub-nationalism to explain the forces that
worked against Nkrumah's project.

The third problem is the relevance of institutionalized Pan-Africanism for the African Diaspora
beyond memory and belonging. As a social movement and ideological expression of African
identity, Pan-Africanism is one of the most successful movements in modern history because it
achieved its aim of freedom and self-determination of African peoples worldwide. People of
Africa and African descent worldwide now recognize a shared history. However, African states
abandoned the African Diaspora after the overthrow of Nkrumah. Thus, as an institutionalized
project to foster economic development in Africa, Pan-Africanism is less successful.

Besides, the relatively weak status and position of the African Diaspora in the imperial countries
where they are citizens implied that they could not influence their countries or states in relation
to positive developments in Africa. This was compounded by the death of George Padmore
(1903-1959) and W.E.B. Du Bois (1868-1963) and the alienation of C.R.L. James. This was
when Nkrumah realized that Ghana did not have the resources to act as a springboard for African
Liberation, given the counter-revolutionary forces from what he considered as the imperialist
world and led him to coin the term neo-colonialism. This does not imply that colonialism is
better than neocolonialism.

CAN AFRICA, as a continent, do more for its Diaspora? Here we should revisit our previous
work.

The African Union's renewed interest in Pan-Africanism should be applauded, but the
declaration of African Diaspora by the African Union as the latter's sixth region is inadequate,
deficient and contradictory; it is formulated in terms of what the Diaspora can do for Africa but
not what the African Union and the Diaspora can do for each other.

There should be a better way to integrate institutionalized Pan-Africanism, which is what the
African Union is, and African Diaspora as civil society and social movement. As a start, the
more than 100 million strong African Diaspora worldwide can be more useful to the African
Union if the African Union considers the African Diaspora as a market for "Made in Africa"


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products, rather than as a forum to appeal for development aid.

Continental Africa has the land, the natural resources and the international legal framework to
effect the desired changes. Africans in the Diaspora may be separated by citizenship but they are
united by history, memory and "race"; market and cultural forces can transcend citizenship. This
is all the more so since history, memory and culture without production or material base are
empty (Nimako and Small 2009).

WHAT CONSIDERATION of Pan-Africanism n the context of the fortieth anniversary of
Allen's important book--Black Awakening in Capitalist America--tells us is the following. We
are reminded of the complex links beween black subordination and the broader political terrain
on which struggle must be waged, a terrain that is extensive in both its national and international
dimensions. It reminds us of the complex matrix of variables that must be considered in efforts to
attain black liberation. And a central feature of this concerns the power of cultural and political
symbols in the struggle for black liberation; it also remphasizes the importance and
indispensability of international connections, cooperation and collaborations--of the need for a
continued emphasis on Pan-Africanism as social movement. In the twenty-first century, many of
the protagonists have changed, but the struggle and the obstacles to be overcome remain very
similar. By comparing Allen's analysis with an analysis of the dyanmics of Nkrumah's struggles
we extract important lessons for our continuing struggles.

Works Cited

Allen, Robert L. (1970). Black Wakening in Capitalist America: An Analytic History (New
York: Anchor Books).

Arhin, K. (ed.). (1993). The Life and Work of Kwame Nkrumah (Trenton, NJ: Africa World
Press).

Chomsky, Noam. (1993). "World Orders, Old and New," in Facing the Challenge: Responses to
the Report of the South Commission (Geneva: South Centre) pp. 139-151.

Davidson, Basil. (1973). Black Star: A View of the Life and Times of Kwame Nkrumah
(London: Allen Lane).

Fitch, Bob and Oppenheimer, Mary. (1966). Ghana: End of an Illusion (New York: Monthly
Review Press). James, C.L.R. (1977). Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution (London: Allison and
Busby).

Marable, Manning. (1987). African & Caribbean Politics: From Nkrumah to Maurice Bishop
(London: Verso).

Mazrui, Ali A. (1977). Africa's International Relations: The Diplomacy of Dependency and
Change (London: Heinemann).

Nimako, Kwame. (2009). "Theorizing Black Europe and African Diaspora: Implications for


23
(June 22, 2010)
Citizenship, Nativism and Xenophobia" (with Stephen Small), in Black Europe and the African
Diaspora: Blackness in Europe, (eds.) Darlene Clark Hine, Tricia Danielle Keaton and Stephen
Small (Champaign: University of Illinois Press).

--. (2007). "African Regional Groupings and Emerging Chinese Conglomerates," in Big Business
and Economic Development: Conglomerates and Economic Groups in Developing Countries and
Transition Economies under Globalization, (eds.) Barbara Hogenboom and Alex E. Fernandez
Jilberto (London: Routledge).

--. (2002). "Labour and Ghana's Debt Burden: The Democratization of Dependence," in: Labour
Relations in Development, (eds.) Alex E. Fernandez Jilberto et al. (London: Routledge).

--. (1996). "Power Struggle and Liberalisation in Ghana," in Liberalization in the Developing
World: Institutional and Economic Changes in Latin America, Africa and Asia, (eds.) Alex E.
Fernandez Jilberto and Andre Mommen. (London: Routledge).

--. (1991). Economic Change and Political Conflict in Ghana, 1600-1990 (Amsterdam: Thesis
Publishers). Nkrumah, Kwame (1973). The Struggle Continues (Panaf Books: London).

--. (1968). Dark Days in Ghana (New York: International Publishers).

--. (1966). Challenge of the Congo (London: Panaf Books).

--. (1964). Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonization and Development with
Particular Reference to the African Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press).

--. (1963). Africa Must Unite (London: Heinemann).

--. (1962). Towards Colonial Freedom: Africa in the War against Imperialism (London:
Heinemann).

--. (1959). Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah (Edinburgh: Nelson Thomas and
Sons).
COPYRIGHT 2010 The Black Scholar


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