SKilled Labour Migration can impact a country\'s earning and economy

1. CSD WORKING PAPER SERIES
SKILLS, MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT
Chris Sims
Chris.sims@skillsdevelopment.org
Working Paper No.3
www.skillsdevelopment.org
December 2009
ABSTRACT
The migration of skilled people from developing to developed countries can have significant
implications for the development trajectory of sending countries. For many years analysis of the
phenomenon focused on the so-called ‘brain drain’ effect that was seen to rob developing
countries of skills. Later approaches have focused on the role of migration in spreading
knowledge, boosting incomes and incentivising the acquisition of skills. This paper proposes that
the precise impact of skilled migration from a particular country can only be understood by placing
it in the specific context of that country’s development, particularly patterns of internal migration
and unskilled migration. It argues that skilled migration can boost development if properly
managed, and that developed countries can mitigate the potential harmful effects of skilled
migration by investing in skills development in sending countries and assisting developing
countries in matching their educational systems to domestic and international labour markets.
Finally, it proposes that the existing lack of data in this field, the different definitions and
measurements used by individual countries, and the confusing network of bilateral migration
relationships argue for a more multilateral approach to migration management than exists today.
© 2009 by Chris Sims. All rights reserved. Sections of text may be quoted without explicit
permission provided that full credit is given to the source.
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2. 1. INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of the migration of skilled people from developing to developed countries has
received increasing attention from development researchers in recent years. This has often
tended to focus on the possible negative consequences of such migration: the hypothesis that the
emigration of skilled people constrains the capacity of sending countries to implement economic
growth strategies and to deliver key public services. The term “brain drain”, originally coined in the
1950s to refer to the flow scientists from developed countries such as the UK and Canada to the
USA, has since come to be understood more in the context of flows from developing countries.
It is important to remember that the vast majority of international skilled migrant flows are still
between developed countries, and most international migration takes place between countries of
a similar development level. Evidence also indicates that countries with the lowest levels of human
development also have the lowest rates of emigration. However, skilled migration from developing
to developed countries represents a rising proportion of all international migration (IOM, 2008). As
developed countries’ societies grow older while developing world populations continue to rise,
the resulting imbalance in workforces are likely to increase the pressure for migration from the
developing to the developed world (World Bank, 2009).
“Brain drain” has generally been seen as a challenge for developing countries where stocks of
skilled labour are far smaller and the impact of skilled emigration consequently proportionally
larger. In some sectors – such as health care where the loss of skilled personnel is seen as having a
particularly high social cost for developing countries – this has led to concerted efforts to control
and restrict migration flows, such as the UK’s policy of not recruiting skilled personnel in the health
field from a specified list of “vulnerable” countries (Department of Health, 2004).
Alternative analyses of international skilled migration flows have focussed on the potential positive
contribution such movements can make to development. There is increasing recognition that
skilled emigrants can be considered a potential asset to their home countries, able to act as agents
of development and to strengthen co-operation between their home countries (i.e. the country
from which emigration takes place and where the migrant is assumed to have received most if not
all of their education) and host countries (i.e. the country where the migrant is or seeks to be living
and working). This is seen to operate in four main ways:
• Through the sending of remittances, which boost home country incomes;
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3. • Through return migration, whereby emigrants gain more skills, knowledge and
technological expertise overseas which they are then able to re-apply upon return to their
home country;
• Through network development, whereby emigrants and diaspora communities are able
to further the development of their country through gaining new commercial or strategic
contacts while overseas;
• Through incentivisation, whereby the prospect of being able to emigrate encourages
people in developing countries to raise their skill levels and thereby raises the overall skill
levels in those countries.
It is clear, however, that not all sending countries have been equally able to take advantage of
these potential benefits of skilled migration. This paper will examine why and how benefits accrue
to different developing countries from migration and how these can be maximised and the
potential harm minimised. It will then look at the policy implications of this from the point of view
of both developed and developing countries.
Although the focus of this paper is on the impact of skilled migration, it is important to note that it
is far from clear or agreed what constitutes a “skilled” migrant, and that patterns of unskilled
migration interact with and affect patterns of skilled migration. For instance, while most migrants
who moved to the UK from Eastern Europe following the expansion of the EU in 2004 were
employed in positions viewed as unskilled, many were in fact qualified to a much higher level
(Saleheen & Shadforth, 2006). If soft skills are included in the equation, the picture becomes even
more unclear. Evidence indicates that employers not only see migrant workers as offering soft
skills that are hard to find in the home population (such as punctuality, reliability and courtesy), but
that the very fact of migrating indicates the presence of skills such as financial management and
responsibility (LSC, 2006). While acknowledging these conceptual difficulties, this paper is based
on an understanding of a skilled migrant as an individual with qualifications (academic or
vocational) in a subject area and to a level demanded by employers, who is either working in a
position that utilises those qualifications outside their home country or is seeking to do so.
2. THE DEVELOPMENTAL BENEFITS OF SKILLED MIGRATION
2.1 Remittances
While the exact scale of the value of remittance flows to developing countries is impossible to
ascertain, estimates indicate that it is considerably higher than the amount of official development
assistance (Addison 2005). As private transfers of funds, the extent to which such flows can be
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4. harnessed for developmental purposes is limited, and it has been argued that most are used to
fund “conspicuous consumption” – that is, purchases that are seen to enhance social status by
demonstrating wealth, which may be imported goods (Ang, 2007). This overlooks, however, their
significant role in economic development at the macro level (through their contribution to
developing countries’ balance of payments) and at the micro level (by raising the standards of
living of households), as well as their potential contribution to entrepreneurialism and
improvement of the circulation of capital (Tall, 2005). There is evidence that remittances in India
are invested in agriculture, small enterprise, education, health and housing, all of which contribute
to improved household wellbeing (Deshingkar, Khandelwal & Farrington, 2008).
For policy makers, the main concern around remittances is how to make them work for
development without making the wider economy overly dependent on remittances and while
respecting the status of remittances as private funds. Carling (2008) suggests that policy makers
can legitimately address seven policy goals in this area:
• Increasing the volume of current remittances by, for instance, lowering the barriers to
market entry for money transfer service providers.
• Stimulating the direct investment of remittances including through small-scale credit
schemes.
• Stimulating indirect investment of remittances by promoting transfers through
financial institutions.
• Stimulating development-friendly consumption by promoting local production.
• Encouraging sound management of remittances through, for instance, financial
education programmes.
• Securing future remittances through measures like bilateral labour migration
agreements.
• Promoting the channelling of remittances directly to development purposes by, for
instance, taxing remittance transfers (though it should be noted that this raises questions
about the legitimacy of such taxation and the risk of funds being lost to bureaucratic
procedures and / or corruption, as well as the potential of such a tax acting as a deterrent
to using formal channels to transmit funds).
Currently, formal mechanisms for the transfer of remittances are often highly costly and
incentivise the use of informal channels which can make migrants vulnerable to being defrauded
(Addison 2005). Policy makers should seek to make such transfers cheaper and easier and to
ensure that they are made through reliable formal channels. There is also a need to understand
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5. the link between skill levels and remittance-sending behaviour. Faini (2003), for instance, argues
that evidence indicates that more highly skilled migrants are less likely to remit over time. This may
be related to the tendency for skilled migrants to stay longer in the country of destination and to
bring their dependents with them.
Remittances can, therefore, play a role in promoting development, but evidence shows their effect
is smaller than for traditional growth engines like exports and foreign direct investment
(Jongwanich, 2007). As Portes (2006) points out, the positive effects of remittances are deeply
contingent on other factors: there is no evidence of any country achieving a trajectory of sustained
development based solely on remittances sent by expatriates. In particular, remittances can only
encourage sustained economic growth if the policies are put in place to encourage legal transfers
and productive investment, to reduce corruption and bureaucracy, and to provide an investment-
friendly infrastructure (Castles 2008). In Morocco, for instance, the creation of a network of
consulates, post offices and bank branches overseas in the 1970s and 1980s aimed to facilitate
legal remittance transfers, but the developmental impact of remittance transfers were limited by a
generally unfavourable investment climate, excessive red tape and corruption, and a lack of trust
in government institutions (de Haas 2008).
2.2 Return migration
There is evidence that where migrants can be induced to invest in the economies of their home
countries – either from overseas or by returning – this can have a tremendous impact on
development. A recent example is the burgeoning Indian scientific and technological industries,
where the impact of returning emigrants (mainly from the USA) has been crucial in driving
industrial development and the creation of advanced educational infrastructure in the form of the
Indian Institutes of Technology (Khadria, 2008). The factors affecting this process are diverse, and
include several outside the direct control of policy makers in either sending or host countries – not
least the prevailing global economic conditions that will affect migrants’ choices when it comes to
investment and settlement. In the Indian example cited above, for instance, at least some of the
return migration is likely to have been driven by the “dotcom bust” of the early 2000s, which may
have driven many ICT professionals to reconsider their plans and to look afresh at the
opportunities back in India.
The challenge for policy makers, then, is to find ways to build incentives to return into the
migration process without impinging on migrants’ freedom to choose where they settle. In theory,
a system of migration that facilitates return would benefit all concerned:
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6. • It would allow skilled individuals to benefit from higher wages and professional
development opportunities in a developed country
• It would allow host countries to benefit from the economic contribution of skilled
professionals and subsequently from the network links to the sending country
• It would allow sending countries to benefit from the additional skills and networks
generated by their citizens’ experience overseas.
Where return migration already occurs, policy makers should consider how they can best
influence the extent to which the beneficial impact of return migrants can be maximised. In Egypt,
for instance, a European Training Foundation study found that although most return migrants felt
their experiences abroad had helped them to find work in Egypt, less than one percent had
received any information on returning migrant schemes seeking to make the most of their
potential contribution (ETF, 2007). In the wider sense, skilled migrants will only be enticed to return
– and will only be able to make a significant contribution to development – if the economic and
social conditions in the home country are attractive. For this reason, return migration should only
be seen as one potential element in a wider approach to development.
2.3 Network development
Even if they remain overseas, skilled migrants and diaspora communities can contribute to
development in more ways than through sending remittances. Through their professional
networks and investment decisions they can act as effective advocates and direct supporters of
development-related initiatives in their home countries, and serve as “intermediaries, commercial
ambassadors, role models, mentors, partners, and investors for ventures back home” (Clemens,
2009) as well as facilitators of broader transnational links that can benefit the economies of both
sending and host countries. Studies have found a positive correlation between Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) flows and the number of graduates from the (sender) country receiving FDI
present in the (host) investing country (UNDP, 2009). The effect of skills levels upon development,
therefore, need not depend on keeping the people with those skills in one place, and indeed the
impact of skills development may be multiplied by allowing the diffusion of skilled personnel.
Developments in communications technology have allowed governments in developing countries
to seek active engagement of their diaspora communities as part of development strategies. This
has often been seen as a ‘quick win’ in comparison to encouraging return migration, as it does not
depend on the large scale investment necessary to create an environment that will encourage
return. It does, however, demand a committed approach from sending country governments and
a willingness to reform public and educational institutions at home to ensure they can meet the
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7. standards required to forge partnerships with highly skilled emigrants (Germenji & Gedeshi, 2008).
In Albania, for instance, a UNDP-supported programme for the engagement of the diaspora in
Albania’s socio-economic development seeks not only to develop official links with skilled overseas
Albanians but also to develop local capacity and to encourage return migration through the
opening up of civil service recruitment to overseas graduates (UNDP, 2007). Similarly, the US-
based Nigerian computer scientist Philip Emeagwali has proposed that the investment power of
the African diaspora could be mobilised to bring about the outsourcing of a million high-tech jobs
from the USA to Africa (Emeagwali, 2003).
In contrast to the tendency noted above for more highly skilled migrants to send lower
remittances, there is evidence that higher levels of education and occupational status are
associated with greater participation in economic, political and socio-cultural “transnational
activism” through these networks, and that this may spring from a sense of obligation on the part
of migrant professionals to the country and institutions that educated them. In the case of India,
the growth of a significant educated population overseas created a transnational network of
personnel, resources and ideas that provided fresh developmental impetus to institutions in India
(Portes, 2006).
2.4 Incentivisation
In countries where emigration is seen as a route to improved livelihoods, the prospect of
emigrating may act as an incentive to pursue education and training. On the assumption that not
all those who intend to migrate will actually do so, this incentivisation effect could result in raised
skill levels in the sending country. This has been shown to have occurred in Fiji, for instance,
where, despite very high emigration rates to Australia and an over-representation of skilled
workers among the emigrant population, the absolute number of skilled Fijian workers in Fiji has
increased (Chand & Clemens, 2008). Similarly, Rapoport (2002) examined data from the 1990 US
census and various data from other OECD countries along with reliable indicators of emigration
rates for 50 developing countries, and found a positive and highly significant effect of migration
prospects on human capital formation. However, the strength of such effects will vary with the
context of individual countries.
What is arguably lacking in current understandings of this phenomenon is how it fits into wider
psychological effects that the prospect of migration may have on people in developing countries.
For instance, Khadria argues that the possibility of migration may have “created a sense of
desperation amongst the low-income Indian populace to emigrate for the sake of upward socio-
economic mobility” (Khadria, 2008: 103). If incentivisation is a factor, it can only be one part of a
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8. complex set of psychological responses to migration with a still more complex set of behavioural
responses, about which little conclusive research has been conducted.
3. CONTEXTS: WHY SOME COUNTRIES BENEFIT AND SOME SUFFER FROM SKILLED
MIGRATION
The impact that skilled migration has on the country of origin will depend to a great extent on the
characteristics of those who leave and their proclivity to send remittances, develop their networks
and/or eventually return. Other factors, however, will also have a significant impact and these can
help policy makers understand how developmental benefits of skilled migration can be maximised
in specific countries.
3.1 Economic conditions and public sector capacity
The degree to which the potential benefits of migration can be reaped in practice depends to a
large extent on the wider economic structure of the sending country (UNDP, 2009). This will have a
great impact on, for instance, the ability of the economy to absorb skilled workers who return from
overseas or who have been incentivised by the prospect of migration to gain skills but who decide
to remain at home. Similarly, the degree to which new industries can spread to developing
countries through networks of skilled emigrants depends heavily on the openness of the political
and business environment in sending countries. The more open business climates in India, Taiwan
and China has been identified as a factor contributing to the ability of the high tech business
sectors in those countries to benefit more from their skilled emigrant populations than, say, those
in Iran, Vietnam or Russia (Saxenian, 2006).
Where domestic labour markets are unable to absorb high-skilled individuals, emigration can
function as an economic safety-valve. However, this inability to utilise high skill labour may also
reflect education systems that do not tend to produce workers with the skills and knowledge
demanded by employers, either domestically or internationally, as has been argued in the case of
Egypt (ETF, 2007). In this situation, skilled migration cannot operate as an effective safety valve as
many skilled workers will find themselves unable to meet the requirements of employers in
developed countries. This has been reflected in Egypt’s high levels of unemployment for tertiary
graduates. In this case, investment in the capacity and quality of the educational system is
necessary both to absorb skilled labour at home and to facilitate skilled migration.
In terms of public sector capacity, it is worth noting the increasing evidence that emigrants can
spur the improvement of political institutions (and by implication governance) in their home
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9. countries. Moroccan emigrants to France, for instance, have been found to shape basic
infrastructure investments by the government in their home region after returning (UNDP, 2009).
There may be potential for a virtuous circle of skilled migrants who bring knowledge, expertise and
skills back to their home countries which they can use to enhance governance and in turn facilitate
greater utilisation of their fellow citizens’ skills. This may, in turn, have the potential to enhance the
incentivisation effect outlined above.
3.2 Population
Emigration rates tend to have an inverse relationship to population size. The 48 countries around
the world with populations below 1.5 million have an average emigration rate of 18.4%, compared
to the global average of 3%. Three of these – all small Caribbean states – have emigration rates
over 40% (UNDP, 2009). It has been argued that smaller countries are especially vulnerable to
negative repercussions from skilled migration, as the loss of each skilled worker represents a
proportionally larger loss of their total stock of skills – even before these higher emigration rates
are factored in. Adams (2003), for instance, found that Jamaica, El Salvador and Tunisia lost
especially high proportions of their tertiary-educated population, while a large labour exporter like
China did not.
3.3 Proximity
Patterns of migration tend to favour routes between countries that share close proximity –
geographically, culturally, linguistically and in terms of religion (UNDP, 2009). Countries that share
close proximity with a large developed economy where job prospects are good tend to experience
higher levels of emigration, to the extent that serious skills shortages can result. Jamaica is a clear
example of this, where a significant proportion of the skilled population is known to emigrate to
the United States – a country that is geographically and linguistically close to Jamaica, as well as
sharing common elements of culture and religion. A 2009 study found that a third of Jamaican
university graduates were currently living abroad or had previously done so. However, the same
study found that over 16% of returned migrants in Jamaica had possessed a degree before they left
the country, showing that even in small countries with high rates of emigration the skilled do not
necessarily always stay abroad (Lucas & Chappell, 2009).
3.4 Unskilled migration patterns
Migration is a complex phenomenon and movements cannot easily be separated out into different
forms. Patterns of skilled migration – and therefore their impact – interact with and blur with
unskilled migration, and the prevalence of unskilled migration in any one country can affect the
potential of skilled migration to work for development. This particularly applies to the
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10. “incentivisation” effect outlined above in section 2.4. In countries where there are large,
established flows of unskilled migration, any incentivisation effect boosting take-up of education
and training in the sending country is likely to be weak. This has been shown, for instance, in
Mexico, where boys are more likely to drop out of school to pursue low-skilled (often irregular)
migration to the United States rather than pursue longer term high skill migration goals (McKenzie
& Rapoport, 2006).
3.5 Internal migration patterns
It has been argued that the “brain drain” is as much internal within any country affected as it is
international (Skeldon, 2005). The phenomenon of internal migration has received comparatively
little attention, yet it dwarfs international movements: according to UNDP estimates, 740 million
people were internal migrants in 2009, four times as many as those who have moved
internationally (UNDP 2009). This sometimes neglected fact has particular repercussions for
questions of skilled migration and developmental impact, as the majority of those who move
within their own countries go from rural to urban areas. This is particularly true of skilled people,
who frequently move to urban areas where they can expect more in terms of earning potential,
supporting infrastructure and networking opportunities (Clemens, 2009). In countries whose
economies are still largely dependent on rural and agrarian sectors, this has profound implications
for the level and type of skills present in the labour force and the degree to which these skills can
be utilised in the economy, and therefore for our understanding of the impact of international
migration.
The migration of skilled personnel from rural to urban areas has implications, for instance, for
policies that seek to prevent “brain drain” by restricting the international migration of such
individuals. Such restrictions can do nothing to incentivise such skilled people to serve in rural
areas within their countries where need is frequently greatest. It is unclear, for instance, how it
would benefit the development needs of the most deprived areas of Kenya to restrict the
emigration of medical personnel when 65.8% of Kenyan doctors choose to reside in Nairobi,
serving 8.3% of the population (Clemens, 2009).
Internal migration and international migration can also be complementary. In the 1970s and 1980s
in Malaysia, for example, industrialisation led to rapid urbanisation and acute skills shortages in
rural areas. At the same time, population growth and industrial changes led to a surplus of
agricultural labour in neighbouring Indonesia. In this case, international migration from Indonesia
to Malaysia was able to fill the gaps left by internal migration in the host country (UNDP, 2009).
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11. 3.6 Social changes and gender
The impact of migration on gender relations in the home country, and the implications for skill
levels that this has, is not well understood, and evidence is highly mixed as to whether it is largely
beneficial or harmful. This applies regardless of whether those migrating are predominantly male
or predominantly female. Where men migrate, particularly from rural areas, women can be
empowered in their absence and increase participation in community decision making (Deshingkar
& Grimm, 2005), something which is linked in turn to greater participation in training (Collett &
Gale, 2009). Male migration has also been linked to increased labour market participation by
women (Mendola & Carletto, 2009), though this has also been interpreted as working to women’s
detriment by raising their workloads (Dodson 1998). It is also not clear how permanent positive
social changes tend to be after male migrants return to their home communities.
The experience of women who themselves migrate may be more significant, given that emigration
rates for skilled workers are substantially higher for women than men in most developing
countries and that barriers to professional achievement at home seem likely to at least partly
explain this (UNDP, 2009). Where women migrate, norms adopted in host countries – including
greater educational and career expectations for girls – can filter back to the place of origin
(Fargues, 2006). In Miraflores in the Dominican Republic, for instance, large-scale migration to
Boston in the 1990s led to changes in gender roles in their home country, including a more equal
distribution of household tasks and greater empowerment (UNDP, 2009). Again, however, women
who migrate may be particularly vulnerable: a study of female migrant domestic workers in Cairo
found that a third had been called abusive names by their employers, 27% had experience physical
abuse and 10% had suffered sexual harassment (Development Research Centre on Migration,
Globalisation and Poverty, 2009).
4. POLICIES FOR DEVELOPMENT-FRIENDLY SKILLED MIGRATION
While there appear to be good reasons to think that skilled migration can be made to work for
development, more research is needed to better understand these processes, the magnitude of
the effects on development and the conditions under which they operate best. It is also clear that,
when poorly managed, migration can have damaging effects on economic and social prosperity
(Commander, 2003). The policy suggestions outlined below are therefore contingent on the
development of a clearer evidence base and a better understanding of the implications for
developmental processes of the specific contexts in individual countries and regions.
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12. 4.1 Policies in developed countries
As the UN’s 2009 Development Report, Overcoming barriers: human mobility and development
points out, policy responses to migration in developed countries can still be unhelpful. This reflects
the peculiar political sensitivities around migration in host countries: often the issue becomes
focused on domestic fears around jobs and social integration, which can lead to repressive entry
regimes and a failure to prioritise the developmental needs of sending countries. 1 However, in the
context of international migration, it has been pointed out that “countries of destination should
recognise that the demand for migrant workers is a significant driver of migration from poorer
countries, and that they therefore have a responsibility to avoid policies that can lead to adverse
social consequences or negative effects on development” (Castles & Delgado Wise, 2008: 310).
Recent years have seen increasing awareness of this responsibility and arguably some genuine
efforts to mitigate harm. In the health sector, for instance, the UK has developed a list of countries,
viewed as particularly vulnerable to skills shortages in their health systems, from which it will not
actively recruit for medical staff. In practice, however, this approach has been criticised as it is
easily circumvented (Barber, Black & Tenaglia, 2005). While active recruitment is discouraged,
individuals from the countries concerned are still able to come to work in the UK if they apply on
their own behalf rather than through an agency. Even if it were totally successful, the policy would
have little impact on developing countries in terms of raising standards of medical care: in many
African countries, staffing of the health system would be extremely inadequate even if outflows of
health professionals were to stop completely (Kinfu, Dal Poz, Mercer & Evans, 2009). At the time of
writing, the Home Office was consulting on whether this approach can be extended to other
economic sectors, but there is little evidence that it would be any more effective than it is in the
health sector.
Some analysts (e.g. Gent & Skeldon, 2006) have argued that this approach focuses on the wrong
side of the equation, and that rather than trying to prevent brain drains by restricting entry,
developed countries would be better advised to concentrate on boosting capacity in developing
countries to supply the skilled personnel demanded in the developed world. In other words, since
developed countries stand to benefit from the output of developing countries’ education and skills
development systems, they should use their resources to invest in those systems and so boost the
supply of skilled personnel who can be deployed both at home and overseas through migration.
This is a rational argument about boosting supply in response to demand, but it is also a question
1
It should be noted that these sensitivities often apply equally to internal migration, where a powerful, middle
class urban elite can effectively prevent an objective political discussion of migration: see for example Deshingkar
et al., 2008.
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13. of justice and fairness: currently, rich countries can be seen as benefiting from the often meagre
resources developing countries have available for skills development.
Gent and Skeldon (2006) argue that developed countries should seek to build, fund and monitor
providers of advanced training at “key centres” in the developing world, providing occupational
training to developed world standards and helping both to meet demand for skills in other
countries and to raise skills levels at home (since there is an underlying assumption that not all
graduates of such centres would in fact migrate). While this is an attractive idea, it does raise two
crucial questions:
• What are “developed world standards”, and how can quality across different countries be
standardised to meet them? Given the huge diversity in education and training systems
around the world and the different ways of defining and assessing quality in training
provision, how could such training centres be sure of matching their output to the skills
gaps prevalent in the world at any one time?
• Are international skills gaps the same as those at home? If graduates who do not migrate
have been trained with foreign labour markets in mind, will they be able to find jobs at
home? If not, can the centres function both as a supply centre for the international market
and as an opportunity for people to develop skilled and satisfying careers in their home
countries? If they cannot, would such an approach risk the development of a two-tier
system within developing countries? Again, the case of Egypt highlights that a country with
high levels of labour surplus will need to develop its skills systems to meet both domestic
and international demand if it is to make the best use of its available human resources (ETF,
2007).
The case for developed countries (or, indeed, multi-national businesses working in co-operation
with governments) to play a role in building skills development in the developing world hangs on
their interest in promoting prosperity and peace globally as well as on filling their own skills needs.
In the context of domestic concerns around immigration, it has also been argued that helping to
create an enabling economic and political environment in countries of origin is a better way of
controlling immigrant flows and encouraging return than the repressive policies sometimes
pursued (Castles & Delgado Wise, 2008). Capacity building initiatives and skills development
assistance in sending countries are therefore in the interests of both sending and receiving
countries. It is vital that any such projects should be implemented jointly, drawing on local
expertise and leadership to ensure that the needs of the developing country are placed as
centrally as the needs of any potential host countries in the developed world.
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14. Finally, it has been noted that a striking feature of UK schemes to encourage temporary migration,
like the Highly Skilled Migrants Programme and the Sectors Based Scheme, is the apparent lack of
participation by migrant workers themselves, and that addressing this would help improve
transparency and reduce the potential for abuses of the system such as visa overstaying by
temporary migrants. It is also likely that encouraging input by migrants themselves into policy
processes would allow for a more comprehensive basis for analysing the impact on migrants and
on their home communities (Barber et al., 2005).
4.2 Policies in developing countries
Partly because of the lack of reliable data, policy makers in developing countries have also been
seen to neglect migration as a factor affecting their decisions (e.g. Srivastava & Sasikumar, 2003,
Deshingkar et al., 2008). Most national development and poverty reduction strategies do not
recognise the potential of migration or integrate its dynamics into planning. In some developing
countries, however, skilled emigration has been embraced as a policy tool for development, with
governments specifically encouraging citizens to gain skills in order to deploy these abroad. The
Philippines is the best known example of this, and has successfully increased incomes through the
sending of remittances while preventing negative “brain drain” effects. Despite the large numbers
of trained Filipino nurses departing for richer countries, for instance, there are more nurses per
head in the Philippines than in far richer countries such as Austria (WHO, 2005). This seems to
support the theory of incentivisation outlined above, and indicates that through enhancing their
citizens’ freedom to migrate as skilled workers, developing countries can both raise skill levels at
home and raise incomes through remittances. The case of the Philippines, however, raises the
possibility that the effect can work too well: there is a real chance that the country will have a
surplus of nurses in years to come who may well end up unemployed (Asis, 2008).
If the highly skilled cannot be productively employed locally, emigration may be left as their only
rational decision (Skeldon, 2005). Training can therefore only be an effective route to good local
employment if it is designed to meet local needs. In many cases, developing countries have sought
to create professional talent by importing training practices and content from abroad, when the
infrastructure, conditions and capital needed to put the resulting skills into practice are scarce or
entirely absent. In this way, “less developed nations end up spending scarce resources in
educating personnel whose future potential for career development is situated abroad” (Portes,
2006:27). Curricula in developing countries need to reflect this: focusing engineering studies, for
instance, on the development and maintenance of core infrastructure that may be lacking locally,
or adapting medical training to take account of conditions of scarcity (Clemens, 2009). An
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15. alternative to this supply-side approach would be to create the demand for skilled employment
through the creation of public sector positions in those areas most in need. In Senegal, for
instance, access to education has been improved by shifting resources towards the training and
employment of “community teachers” from under-served communities. They receive more limited
training and pay than regular teachers and have succeeded in re-opening hundreds of schools at a
low cost (ibid).
Even where emigration has been shown to have undermined a country’s transition to a developed
economy, there is increasingly recognition that the policy priority should not be to try to prevent it
but to optimise its benefits and tap into the skills of the country’s citizens both at home and
overseas. In the Albanian context, Germenji and Gedeshi (2008) argue precisely this, proposing the
country focus on the three policy objectives of reforming education at home, encouraging return
migration, and mobilising the Albanian diaspora as strategies to turn the “brain drain” of the 1990s
into a tool for development. However, such efforts will have limited success if they are not
accompanied by general political reform and economic progress in sending countries that create
attractive environments to return to and a positive investment climate (de Haas, 2008).
5. THE GLOBAL MANAGEMENT OF SKILLED MIGRATION IN THE FUTURE
It is clear that no individual country can expect to respond to and manage international migration
unilaterally. Apart from the inherent transnational nature of international migration, the
effectiveness of any one country’s policies will depend to a large extent on those of other
countries. As migration routes increase and diversify, and inter-linkages with other global issues
such as trade, development and human rights become clearer, the need for international co-
operation in migration management is increasingly accepted. A number of international
instruments do cover specific aspects of cross-border mobility, but more comprehensive
agreements have been elusive due to widely diverging views on the desirability of restricting or
liberalising migration flows, the proper role for the state in migration management, and a desire on
the part of many states to retain a high degree of flexibility in determining migration policy (IOM,
2008).
A key problem concerns data management. Although data on migration and development is
available from a variety of sources, the international nature of the phenomenon and the diverse
range of actors and parties involved can lead to a confusing picture. In particular, there are no
universally agreed definitions of what constitutes a “migrant”, and individual countries vary
enormously in terms of the quality and extent of their labour market and population surveys.
Information on the basic geography of migration flows is also lacking (Black & Sward, 2008).
15

16. As Laczko (2005) argues, the challenge of making migration work for the benefit of all concerned
militates for the development of multilateral, as well as national and regional, frameworks for the
management of migration. Although the work of organisations such as the International
Organisation for Migration (IOM) has helped greatly to enhance our shared understanding of
migration-related phenomena, the world lacks a body with the capacity to develop multilateral
agreements or establish common definitions and measuring tools in this area. Given the huge
impact of migration patterns on economic development in both sending and receiving countries, it
seems incongruous that a body of this nature exists to regulate and monitor global trade, but not
for migration (with the exception of refugees). This in itself reflects the disproportionately low
priority placed on migration by the development community in general, particularly in comparison
with other phenomena such as international trade or macroeconomic policies (UNDP, 2009).
It has been proposed that such an organisation could be developed through expanding the role of
the International Labour Organisation to include the definition of a multilateral framework for
migration, expanding its surveillance role, and by providing it with additional resources (Faini,
2003). Giving such an organisation greater powers of enforcement and the ability to broker
multilateral agreements would offer a real opportunity to provide global management for an issue
that, by its nature, cannot be managed by individual countries or through bilateral arrangements
only. It would facilitate:
• The development of genuinely global datasets to improve understanding of migration
patterns (migrants’ origins, their destinations, their motivations and their subsequent
trajectories after migration)
• The development of standardised definitions and data collection standards to allow
accurate comparisons across countries
• The identification of countries, regions or sectors where special measures may be justified
to minimise negative impacts of migration
• The development of innovative solutions to address such negative impacts.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Analyses that seek to cast skilled migration simplistically as either a driver of or an obstacle to
development miss the fundamental point that the term “migration” covers a complex set of
individual and collective responses to inexorable processes of globalisation and the restructuring
of relationships in the post-colonial era. As such, the challenge lies not in preventing or
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17. encouraging migration but in understanding those conditions under which it can have the most
beneficial impact and the points at which policy levers are effective at fostering these conditions.
This can only be successfully achieved if the phenomenon is understood within a broader
developmental context that links its potential benefits to wider approaches to economic
infrastructure, political governance and social welfare: that is, if migration is treated as one part of
development strategy rather than as a vehicle for development in and of itself. In an increasingly
mobile world, policy makers in developed and developing countries and on a global scale are
some way from having access to the sophisticated data and resources that would allow the
management of migration to play this kind of role within development strategies.
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