SlideShare ist ein Scribd-Unternehmen logo
1 von 49
Downloaden Sie, um offline zu lesen
Client-side password
Encryption

Pedro Fortuny & Carlos Amieva
(& Rafael Casado “in absentia”)
Client-side password
Encryption

No worries, James, let the sysadmin deal with the problem.
Client-side password
Encryption
Honestly:
Client-side password
Encryption
Honestly:

Can you trust your sysadmin?
Client-side password
Encryption
Honestly:

Can you trust your sysadmin?

I mean
Client-side password
Encryption
Honestly:

Can you trust your sysadmin?
Client-side password
Encryption
Honestly:

Can you trust your sysadmin?

really?
Client-side password
Encryption

I said really
Client-side password
Encryption
We need
Client-side password
Encryption
We need
Ways to minimize data exposure to the
sysadmin
Client-side password
Encryption
We need
Ways to minimize data exposure to the
sysadmin
One step
Client-side password
Encryption
We need
Ways to minimize data exposure to the
sysadmin
One step
Protecting passwords from local access /
MITM
Client-side password
Encryption

The Sibyl v2.0
Client-side password
Encryption
State of affairs 2013 - blind trust

Client
Server
Client-side password
Encryption
State of affairs 2013 - blind trust
TLS/SS
L
Client

, this i

s SAFE

, oooo
hh!

Server
Client-side password
Encryption
State of affairs 2013 - blind trust
TLS/SS
L
Client

, this i

s SAFE

, oooo
hh!

I

se
u

r yp
sc

I’m
t,

Server

no

ol
fo
Client-side password
Encryption
State of affairs 2013 - blind trust
TLS/SS
L
Client

, this i

s SAFE

, oooo
hh!

I

se
u

r yp
sc

I’m
t,

no

ol
fo

Server

zorg:~# a=`pidof mysql`
zorg:~# strace -p $a -e crypt -f
Client-side password
Encryption
State of affairs 2013 - blind trust
TLS/SS
L
Client

, this i

s SAFE

, oooo
hh!

I

se
u

r yp
sc

I’m
t,

no

ol
fo

Server

zorg:~# a=`pidof mysql`
zorg:~# strace -p $a -e crypt -f
[pregnant silence]
Client-side password
Encryption
State of affairs 2013 - blind trust
TLS/SS
L
Client

, this i

s SAFE

, oooo
hh!

I

se
u

r yp
sc

I’m
t,

no

ol
fo

Server

zorg:~# a=`pidof mysql`
zorg:~# strace -p $a -e crypt -f
[pregnant silence]

[pid 9] crypt(“patata”,“$7$21212104040SaLt.$”)
Client-side password
Encryption

?

Do you
really
think
hackers
do NOT
use
strace
Client-side password
Encryption

BUT
Your sysadmin is
good
(tm)

[assumming you have not been rooted]
Client-side password
Encryption

BUT
Your sysadmin is
good
(tm)

[assumming you have not been rooted]

Trust in me...
Client-side password
Encryption

Can do better
Client-side password
Encryption
TLS/SS
L
Client

- but “
trust

in me.

..”

Server
Client-side password
Encryption
TLS/SS
L
Client

- but “
trust

in me.

..”

Store “RSA(scrypt(pwd))”
on the server

Server
Client-side password
Encryption
TLS/SS
L
Client

- but “
trust

in me.

..”

Store “RSA(scrypt(pwd))”
on the server

Server

RSA channel
Sibyl

Use a hardware
module to authenticate
Client-side password
Encryption
TLS/SS
L
Client
[Pub key]

- but “
trust

in me.

..”

Server

Sibyl
Client-side password
Encryption
TLS/SS
L
Client
[Pub key]

- but “
trust

in me.

..”

Server

Sibyl
[Priv, Pub] RSA pair
Client-side password
Encryption
TLS/SS
L
Client
[Pub key]

- but “
trust

in me.

..”

only stores
PUB0(hash)
Server

Sibyl
[Priv, Pub] RSA pair
Client-side password
Encryption
TLS/SS
L
Client
[Pub key]
hash=scrypt(pwd) is run
on the client side

- but “
trust

in me.

..”

only stores
PUB0(hash)
Server

Sibyl
[Priv, Pub] RSA pair
Client-side password
Encryption
TLS/SS
L
Client
[Pub key]
hash=scrypt(pwd) is run
on the client side

- but “
trust

in me.

..”

only stores
PUB0(hash)
Server

msg=PUBi(hash)
Sibyl
[Priv, Pub] RSA pair
Client-side password
Encryption
TLS/SS
L
Client
[Pub key]
hash=scrypt(pwd) is run
on the client side
msg=PUBi(hash)

- but “
trust

in me.

..”

only stores
PUB0(hash)

Server
Priv(PUB0(hash))
==
Login?
Priv(PUBi(hash))
Sibyl
[Priv, Pub] RSA pair
Client-side password
Encryption
TLS/SS
L

- but “
trust

Client
[Pub key]
hash=scrypt(pwd) is run
on the client side
msg=PUBi(hash)

in me.

..”

only stores
PUB0(hash)

Server
Priv(PUB0(hash))
==
Login?
Priv(PUBi(hash))

Only the Sibly can answer this

Sibyl
[Priv, Pub] RSA pair
Client-side password
Encryption

There is no encryption
performed
on the server
Client-side password
Encryption

The Sibyl can be
completely dumb
[not yet implemented]
no access to the priv. key
Client-side password
Encryption

The sysadmin has no
way to MITM or whatever
Trustless pwd management
Client-side password
Encryption
Isn’t it better to trust
people, Charlie Brown?
Client-side password
Encryption
Isn’t it better to trust
people, Charlie Brown?

No, Lucy, no...
Client-side password
Encryption

Details
[...]
skip if necessary
Client-side password
Encryption
client

server

sibyl
Client-side password
Encryption
client

V1=RSAi(pwd)

server

sibyl
Client-side password
Encryption
client

V1=RSAi(pwd)
[login,V1]

server

sibyl
Client-side password
Encryption
client

V1=RSAi(pwd)
[login,V1]

server V2=RSA0(pass)
(stored)

sibyl
Client-side password
Encryption
client

V1=RSAi(pwd)
[login,V1]

server V2=RSA0(pass)
(stored)
[V1,V2]

sibyl
Client-side password
Encryption
client

V1=RSAi(pwd)
[login,V1]

server V2=RSA0(pass)
(stored)

sibyl

[V1,V2]
decrypt(v1)
==?
decrypt(v2)
Client-side password
Encryption
client

V1=RSAi(pwd)
[login,V1]

server V2=RSA0(pass)
(stored)

sibyl

[V1,V2]

yes/no

decrypt(v1)
==?
decrypt(v2)
Client-side password
Encryption
client

V1=RSAi(pwd)
[login,V1]

server V2=RSA0(pass)
(stored)

sibyl

[V1,V2]

yes/no
grant/deny

decrypt(v1)
==?
decrypt(v2)
Client-side password
Encryption
client

V1=RSAi(pwd)
[login,V1]

server V2=RSA0(pass)
(stored)

sibyl

[V1,V2]

yes/no
grant/deny

much gorier
(already
done)

decrypt(v1)
==?
decrypt(v2)
Client-side password
Encryption

Thank you

??

And don’t forget to
have a nice meal

Weitere ähnliche Inhalte

Ähnlich wie The Sibyl: NoConName 2013

Gr I Dsure Enterprise Remote Access (Jc 25 Apr09)
Gr I Dsure Enterprise Remote Access (Jc 25 Apr09)Gr I Dsure Enterprise Remote Access (Jc 25 Apr09)
Gr I Dsure Enterprise Remote Access (Jc 25 Apr09)
JonathanGMCraymer
 
Security and Real-time Communications – a maze of twisty little passages, tha...
Security and Real-time Communications – a maze of twisty little passages, tha...Security and Real-time Communications – a maze of twisty little passages, tha...
Security and Real-time Communications – a maze of twisty little passages, tha...
Alan Quayle
 

Ähnlich wie The Sibyl: NoConName 2013 (20)

SQL Server Security And Encryption
SQL Server Security And EncryptionSQL Server Security And Encryption
SQL Server Security And Encryption
 
ExpertsLiveEurope The New Era Of Endpoint Security
ExpertsLiveEurope The New Era Of Endpoint SecurityExpertsLiveEurope The New Era Of Endpoint Security
ExpertsLiveEurope The New Era Of Endpoint Security
 
Wi-Foo Ninjitsu Exploitation
Wi-Foo Ninjitsu ExploitationWi-Foo Ninjitsu Exploitation
Wi-Foo Ninjitsu Exploitation
 
Insecurity-In-Security version.2 (2011)
Insecurity-In-Security version.2 (2011)Insecurity-In-Security version.2 (2011)
Insecurity-In-Security version.2 (2011)
 
Dirty Little Secrets They Didn't Teach You In Pentest Class v2
Dirty Little Secrets They Didn't Teach You In Pentest Class v2Dirty Little Secrets They Didn't Teach You In Pentest Class v2
Dirty Little Secrets They Didn't Teach You In Pentest Class v2
 
Dirty Little Secrets They Didn't Teach You In Pentest Class v2
Dirty Little Secrets They Didn't Teach You In Pentest Class v2Dirty Little Secrets They Didn't Teach You In Pentest Class v2
Dirty Little Secrets They Didn't Teach You In Pentest Class v2
 
Defending Against Attacks With Rails
Defending Against Attacks With RailsDefending Against Attacks With Rails
Defending Against Attacks With Rails
 
Introduction To Encryption in Lasso 8.5
Introduction To Encryption in Lasso 8.5Introduction To Encryption in Lasso 8.5
Introduction To Encryption in Lasso 8.5
 
Avoiding damage, shame and regrets data protection for mobile client-server a...
Avoiding damage, shame and regrets data protection for mobile client-server a...Avoiding damage, shame and regrets data protection for mobile client-server a...
Avoiding damage, shame and regrets data protection for mobile client-server a...
 
Breaking ssl
Breaking sslBreaking ssl
Breaking ssl
 
Gr I Dsure Enterprise Remote Access (Jc 25 Apr09)
Gr I Dsure Enterprise Remote Access (Jc 25 Apr09)Gr I Dsure Enterprise Remote Access (Jc 25 Apr09)
Gr I Dsure Enterprise Remote Access (Jc 25 Apr09)
 
What is SSL/TLS, 1-way and 2-way SSL?
What is SSL/TLS, 1-way and 2-way SSL?What is SSL/TLS, 1-way and 2-way SSL?
What is SSL/TLS, 1-way and 2-way SSL?
 
Security & Cryptography In Linux
Security & Cryptography In LinuxSecurity & Cryptography In Linux
Security & Cryptography In Linux
 
Secure socket layer
Secure socket layerSecure socket layer
Secure socket layer
 
Security and Real-time Communications – a maze of twisty little passages, tha...
Security and Real-time Communications – a maze of twisty little passages, tha...Security and Real-time Communications – a maze of twisty little passages, tha...
Security and Real-time Communications – a maze of twisty little passages, tha...
 
Threat Detection and Mitigation at Scale on AWS - SID301 - Toronto AWS Summit
Threat Detection and Mitigation at Scale on AWS - SID301 - Toronto AWS SummitThreat Detection and Mitigation at Scale on AWS - SID301 - Toronto AWS Summit
Threat Detection and Mitigation at Scale on AWS - SID301 - Toronto AWS Summit
 
Best Practices of IoT Security in the Cloud
Best Practices of IoT Security in the CloudBest Practices of IoT Security in the Cloud
Best Practices of IoT Security in the Cloud
 
Pre-Quiz Symantec Endpoint Encryption
Pre-Quiz Symantec Endpoint EncryptionPre-Quiz Symantec Endpoint Encryption
Pre-Quiz Symantec Endpoint Encryption
 
In headers / Padlocks / Certificate authorities / site seals we trust
In headers / Padlocks / Certificate authorities / site seals we trustIn headers / Padlocks / Certificate authorities / site seals we trust
In headers / Padlocks / Certificate authorities / site seals we trust
 
Intro to Threat Detection & Remediation on AWS: AWS Security Week at the SF Loft
Intro to Threat Detection & Remediation on AWS: AWS Security Week at the SF LoftIntro to Threat Detection & Remediation on AWS: AWS Security Week at the SF Loft
Intro to Threat Detection & Remediation on AWS: AWS Security Week at the SF Loft
 

Kürzlich hochgeladen

Why Teams call analytics are critical to your entire business
Why Teams call analytics are critical to your entire businessWhy Teams call analytics are critical to your entire business
Why Teams call analytics are critical to your entire business
panagenda
 
Cloud Frontiers: A Deep Dive into Serverless Spatial Data and FME
Cloud Frontiers:  A Deep Dive into Serverless Spatial Data and FMECloud Frontiers:  A Deep Dive into Serverless Spatial Data and FME
Cloud Frontiers: A Deep Dive into Serverless Spatial Data and FME
Safe Software
 

Kürzlich hochgeladen (20)

Repurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost Saving
Repurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost SavingRepurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost Saving
Repurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost Saving
 
Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
 
AWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of Terraform
AWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of TerraformAWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of Terraform
AWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of Terraform
 
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps ScriptAutomating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
 
Apidays New York 2024 - The value of a flexible API Management solution for O...
Apidays New York 2024 - The value of a flexible API Management solution for O...Apidays New York 2024 - The value of a flexible API Management solution for O...
Apidays New York 2024 - The value of a flexible API Management solution for O...
 
TrustArc Webinar - Unlock the Power of AI-Driven Data Discovery
TrustArc Webinar - Unlock the Power of AI-Driven Data DiscoveryTrustArc Webinar - Unlock the Power of AI-Driven Data Discovery
TrustArc Webinar - Unlock the Power of AI-Driven Data Discovery
 
Data Cloud, More than a CDP by Matt Robison
Data Cloud, More than a CDP by Matt RobisonData Cloud, More than a CDP by Matt Robison
Data Cloud, More than a CDP by Matt Robison
 
Why Teams call analytics are critical to your entire business
Why Teams call analytics are critical to your entire businessWhy Teams call analytics are critical to your entire business
Why Teams call analytics are critical to your entire business
 
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivityBoost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
 
ProductAnonymous-April2024-WinProductDiscovery-MelissaKlemke
ProductAnonymous-April2024-WinProductDiscovery-MelissaKlemkeProductAnonymous-April2024-WinProductDiscovery-MelissaKlemke
ProductAnonymous-April2024-WinProductDiscovery-MelissaKlemke
 
Strategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot Takeoff
Strategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot TakeoffStrategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot Takeoff
Strategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot Takeoff
 
Partners Life - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Partners Life - Insurer Innovation Award 2024Partners Life - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Partners Life - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
 
Apidays New York 2024 - Scaling API-first by Ian Reasor and Radu Cotescu, Adobe
Apidays New York 2024 - Scaling API-first by Ian Reasor and Radu Cotescu, AdobeApidays New York 2024 - Scaling API-first by Ian Reasor and Radu Cotescu, Adobe
Apidays New York 2024 - Scaling API-first by Ian Reasor and Radu Cotescu, Adobe
 
Scaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organization
Scaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organizationScaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organization
Scaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organization
 
Top 10 Most Downloaded Games on Play Store in 2024
Top 10 Most Downloaded Games on Play Store in 2024Top 10 Most Downloaded Games on Play Store in 2024
Top 10 Most Downloaded Games on Play Store in 2024
 
Top 5 Benefits OF Using Muvi Live Paywall For Live Streams
Top 5 Benefits OF Using Muvi Live Paywall For Live StreamsTop 5 Benefits OF Using Muvi Live Paywall For Live Streams
Top 5 Benefits OF Using Muvi Live Paywall For Live Streams
 
HTML Injection Attacks: Impact and Mitigation Strategies
HTML Injection Attacks: Impact and Mitigation StrategiesHTML Injection Attacks: Impact and Mitigation Strategies
HTML Injection Attacks: Impact and Mitigation Strategies
 
Cloud Frontiers: A Deep Dive into Serverless Spatial Data and FME
Cloud Frontiers:  A Deep Dive into Serverless Spatial Data and FMECloud Frontiers:  A Deep Dive into Serverless Spatial Data and FME
Cloud Frontiers: A Deep Dive into Serverless Spatial Data and FME
 
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
 
A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?
A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?
A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?
 

The Sibyl: NoConName 2013