Persistent Surveillance is more than a stare from space or Full Motion Video. Added to a COmmon Operating Picture, it can transform how we operate in the 21st Century.

1. TRANSFORMATION
Persistent
Surveillance
and Its Implications for the
Common Operating Picture
Major David W. Pendall, U.S. Army
T HE IDEA of persistent surveillance as a trans-
formational capability has circulated within the
national intelligence community and the Department
against the adversary within the battlespace. Whether
or not nearly perfect knowledge is possible across
multidimensional battlespaces with multivariant
of Defense (DOD) for at least 3 years.1 Persistent actors is a contextual and situational question. Even
surveillance, also known as persistent intelligence, so, persistent surveillance will increase knowledge
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); persistent and the speed with which the knowledge is shared
stare; and pervasive knowledge of the adversary, and understood at all levels of command, provided
is an often-used term to describe the need for and the system is developed in a holistic manner that
application of future ISR capabilities to qualitatively addresses human, organizational, and technological
transform intelligence support to operational and tac- aspects of the strategy.
tical commands.2 The idea surfaces in many forms,
including defense program reviews and congressional l Will Persistent Surveillance
testimony.3 Each expression envisions a system Change Battle Command?
achieving near-perfect knowledge and removing Integrating persistent surveillance with an Infor-
uncertainty in war. mation Age common operating picture (COP) will
Persistence means that when global, theater, or dramatically increase the potential to transform
local reconnaissance finds something of intelligence warfighting and peace management. Continuous
or actionable interest, ISR systems, including pro- sensing of the battlespace; a fundamental reordering
cessing and analytic systems, maintain constant, of information distribution; and advanced, integrated
enduring contact with the target. This increases sensemaking will create asymmetric advantages for
understanding about the target, which enables a the United States. Recognizing the global nature
faster decision cycle at all levels of command and of the protracted challenges we face, a coherent
supports the application of precision force to achieve national defense system must embrace a new means
desired effects. of control, one that can reorder information flow and
Persistent surveillance integrates the human com- move actionable intelligence and analysis directly to
ponent and various technologies and processes across the individual level.
formerly stovepiped domains; it is not a permanent Persistent surveillance represents a qualitative
stare from space or from airborne imagery platforms. change in the content and delivery of intelligence to
In essence, the targeted entity will be unable to move, those at the operational and tactical levels of war, a
hide, disperse, deceive, or otherwise break contact change that increases the speed of decisionmaking
with the focused intelligence system. Once achieved, across all battlespace domains and at all levels of
persistent ISR coverage will, in theory, deny the conflict, thus multiplying the options for applying
adversary sanctuary, enabling coherent decisionmak- both kinetic and nonkinetic force.4 The qualitative
ing and action with reduced risk. change will evolve with and leverage a revolution
Persistent surveillance in its objective form does in intelligence affairs.5
not exist today; it is still a concept, albeit a promis- With persistent surveillance, sequential analytic
ing one. The promise of a persistent ISR system and distribution rules become obsolete. Higher
is to create transformational conditions for acting echelon analysts will no longer get the data first,
MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2005 41

2. but in parallel with users, includ-
ing those at the lowest levels of
organizations. Analysts will not
simply send reports to those they
believe require the information;
rather, the end user will define the
information required, demand it,
and be able to create the knowl-
edge directly. Users will define
information requirements based
on specific decisionmaking needs
and planning horizons. Serialized
reports will become secondary;
collaboration and a focus on user
real-time support will become
primary. Networking tools will
connect analysts with other ana-
lysts, analysts with end users, and
end users with other end users. A
Figure 1. An integrated concept of the core components of persistent surveillance.
“smart” pull system will support Processing occurs within Knowledge Advantage Centers. Virtual or actual collabora-
all entities on the network, and tion with analysts or automated processors or preprocessors supports edge users
lower level users will access rel- with real-time intelligence and allows users to access raw data at the earliest point of
consumability. (Concept slide adapted from MG John F. Kimmons, U.S. Army Intel-
evant data as it is generated in real ligence and Security Command, presentation at the Global Intelligence, Surveillance,
time.6 Advanced preprocessing and Reconnaisance Conference, sponsored by the U.S. Strategic Command, Denver,
Colorado, 29 September 2004.)
tools will support the user imme-
diately in a variety of user-defined,
immediately usable formats—all done in parallel to virtual private networks, and industry intranets.7
other networked users. These concepts allow simultaneous access and use of
enterprise data generated from internal and external
The Essence of Persistent organizational environments, enabling a friendly
Surveillance networked element to leverage knowledge rapidly
The essence of persistent surveillance is to use at the point of competition.
enterprise systems to detect, collect, disseminate, Examples of enterprise systems include mobile,
and characterize activity in the battlespace. The networked sales representatives leveraging dynamic
recognition of anomalies or change measured against sales and inventory data to make pricing decisions
an established baseline will prompt action from when negotiating with current or future customers;
decisionmakers. Persistent surveillance has three air traffic controllers collaboratively assessing severe
core components: weather effects on regional airports, then making
• Multimode and multidimensional continu- rerouting decisions and impact assessments in near-
ous collection across all battlespace environments real time; and point-of-sale transaction systems with
(sensing). above-normal sales levels generating a supply-chain
• Near-real-time data and knowledge distribution response to restock shelves quickly at local stores
via enterprise systems with tailored, user-defined without requiring unnecessary human intervention,
presentation formats (delivery). thus reducing system latency.
• Horizontal integration of data and advanced, The new rules firmly acknowledge the need to
distributed analytics (sensemaking and understand- maintain persistent coverage capability against all
ing). (See figure 1.) threats, whether they are nation-state, non-nation-
Persistent surveillance will create enterprise state, or transnational. This capabilities-based
(intelligence) data and understanding to support an approach, unlike the Cold War threat-based approach
extended operational enterprise. “Enterprise data,” to designing defense systems, recognizes the require-
“enterprise systems,” and “extended enterprise” are ment to wage war and peace at the individual human
information-management concepts emerging from or “entity” level, a re-conception that transforms the
the increased capacity of digitized information and reconnaissance paradigm of snapshot views and peri-
distribution networks, namely the World Wide Web, odic samplings. Persistent surveillance means longer
42 November-December 2005  MILITARY REVIEW

3. TRANSFORMATION
term collection on a target to completely understand to 48 hours ahead of the adversary’s decision cycles.
a problem. This change will provide more data and Brigades and divisions might live in the 48- to 96-
continuity to analysts and warfighters.8 hour future. Joint task forces and national decision-
ISR logic co-evolved with that of our enemies makers must create advantageous conditions beyond
during the Cold War. The new logic evolved after 9/11 the 96-hour mark.13 With a coherent, COP-enabled
as a “new rule set” for success against a massively view of the planning horizon and persistent surveil-
distributed, decentralized global adversary. lance of adversary systemic changes, tempo control
and effects-sequencing will provide the desired shap-
Implications for the COP ing and battlespace depth that units need to conduct
The integrating mechanism to create a complete operations. Enterprise planning systems help produce
capability is the COP, “a single identical display of competitive advantage.
relevant information shared by more than one com- Examples of enterprise planning systems inte-
mand.”9 The COP is also an enterprise information grated with real-time data and anticipated change
system, supporting an extended operational enterprise include the National Weather Service, which uses
beyond DOD. real-time weather data and advanced simulations
In a highly distributed information environment, a to anticipate hurricane effects so local officials can
single COP display might remain appropriate if the issue alerts, conduct highway traffic flow analysis,
information distribution moved hierarchically and and establish evacuation priorities. The U.S. Forest
the information remained static for periods of time. Service uses real-time weather data and forest fire
However, the single identical display creates its own simulation models to dynamically adjust its assets
problems when the future COP becomes a real-time and plan with far greater insight about the scope and
enterprise information system supported by a con- emerging conditions of a problem. Wal-Mart uses
tinuous-data environment. Single identical displays environmental, social, and cultural data to forecast
are less useful than displays created dynamically and adjust inventories.14 By identifying and generat-
for specific missions and domain views of the bat- ing options, anticipatory planning can streamline the
tlespace. As the Joint Forces Command study on the decision cycle.
collaborative information environment (CIE) finds, Developing and supporting proactive, option-seek-
collaboration capabilities allow users to tailor COP ing behaviors and exploitation-capable frameworks
displays yet maintain common, relevant aspects of the is difficult under current ordered, linear, deliber-
operational picture.10 The study also finds that a real- ate planning constructs. In today’s process- and
time environment significantly increases the COP’s plan-centric execution models, commanders often
value if the user can define and dynamically tailor the become prescriptive in intent, creating reactive
views.11 The key word is “if.” We must transition to a tactical plans because of the perceived need to plan
COP with a dynamic tailoring capability to support in detail for anticipated conditions. Rapidly shifting
real-time operating requirements and future planning enablers across dispersed battlefields is problematic
requirements. and adaptation is slow, especially at the operational
The COP must enable adaptive planning across level. Ordered, mechanistic, linear thinking limits the
planning horizons to achieve coherent, systemic ability to capitalize on options and exploit new condi-
effects. Complex systems survive by anticipating tions created at the tactical level. Deviations from the
the future.12 A transparent, tailored, integrated COP anticipated, and an appreciation of new, unpredicted,
supports this anticipatory function. Each domain and continually emerging circumstances, led Prus-
and level of war has echelons and suborganizations sian General Helmuth Von Moltke the Elder, to view
regardless of how flat a networked force becomes. strategy as a system of expedients (options) and to
Each level must operate within the appropriate time caution that plans should only go as far as the first
horizon. Parallel levels of war and parallel domains encounter with the enemy.15
must remain nested in purpose, and enterprise Commander’s critical information requirements
behaviors are driven by intent. Effects can transit (CCIR) filter information and allow humans to
multiple domains and levels of war instantaneously, better synthesize it to support decisionmaking.
so purposeful adaptations through effects-planning Decisions are forecast in advance, often based on
must be thoroughly integrated. assumptions. Where information systems find and
Platoons, squads, and individual actors focus on report the required elements to support CCIR, other
real-time execution. Higher, more complex orga- information, which could lead to new, improved deci-
nizations focus on setting conditions for the future. sions and superior execution, often falls outside the
Companies and battalions live in the near future, 12 scope of “the plan” and is not seized on. For all the
MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2005 43

4. commander’s admonishments to “fight the enemy, not information fusion across all levels of command and
the plan,” staffs often present only information that in presentation formats accessible to all, including
supports or denies the plan’s key elements. Brigadier multiagency, civil, and coalition partners.
General Huba Wass de Czege writes: “Anticipa-
tory planning and adaptive execution can address Reordering Information
the unpredictable will of the enemy and the chance Distribution
factors which make forecasting the future difficult With persistent surveillance, information pathways
regardless of how much information we possess. . . . will move information directly to collaborative users
The object is to achieve sound, adaptable, simple and (rather than through successive headquarters) and
decisive plans based on the best available informa- empower all echelons, given the right tailoring of
tion, understood and coordinated . . . so that vigorous the COP. Real-time data distribution will transform
teamwork can produce the desired results. . . . Shared all previous information-control mechanisms across
understanding and anticipatory planning combine to the joint force and its partners.19 An enterprise COP
produce adaptive execution, which is the systemic means “exclusivity of data is not the defining attribute
ability to adapt plans to emerging situations in time of decision.”20 An extended operational enterprise
to ensure continuous deliberate operations. . . . New relies on multiple, decentralized, and distributed
planning and execution systems will be needed to actors to achieve its purpose.
implement this process.16 The agent or actor is any individual, individual
An execution-centric model with real-time intel- element, or entity that can interact with its environ-
ligence to identify and predict changes in enemy sys- ment to create effects against other actors and the
tems will create new information, reduce operational environment.21 From a single rifleman to a Tomahawk
risk, and enable bold option exploitation. U.S. Army missile, from a policeman to a Computer Emerging
Field Manual 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Response Team, agents exist throughout the domains
Control of Army Forces, which calls such informa- of conflict and levels of war, all interacting to create
tion exceptional information, states: “Exceptional effects across each domain and level of war.22
information is specific and immediately vital infor- Under current information dissemination archi-
mation that directly affects the success of the current tectures, the means of control coexists with levels of
operation. It would have been one of the CCIR if it command. To synchronize action at the various levels
had been foreseen; it is therefore treated as one of of war, information is rationalized and integrated
the CCIR. Exceptional information usually results with direct, centralized command guidance. With an
[from] discovering something unanticipated about an enterprise data-generation system, including direct
enemy. It allows the commander to take advantage dissemination capabilities, COP control parameters
of an unexpected opportunity. . . .”17 must change. Control mechanisms remain the means
Exceptional information increases when persistent of regulating behavior, as they always will, but in the
surveillance capabilities integrate into the COP, par- 21st-century COP, they will move from centralized
ticularly as near-real-time effects-sensing generates command nodes to distributed processing nodes,
feedback. Enemy system adaptations become more which become Knowledge Advantage Centers
clearly identified. An operational paradox emerges, (KACs).23
however, because tightly coupled, detailed elements KACs enhance self-organization, self-synchroni-
(the basis for synchronization) often make large shifts zation, and self-empowerment down to the lowest
in execution infeasible. levels. The Army endorses this in the “2003 Trans-
The multiple, simultaneous, distributed, decentral- formation Roadmap”: “A focal point of DOD’s
ized nature of combat operations that joint operating thrust to fully exploit network-centric warfare is
concepts describe requires commander-led, execu- the development of persistent surveillance. In sup-
tion-centric planning. Collaboration tools in a CIE port to this goal, the Army will develop supporting
allow parallel planning to move away from the persistent surveillance capabilities throughout the
ordered, timeline-sequenced actions described in global battlespace. This provides the commander near
Joint Publication 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint continuous access to the priority intelligence targets.
Operations.18 After-action reviews from Operation The objective is to develop network-sensing suites
Iraqi Freedom indicate Force XXI Battle Command that tailor their observations to the adversary’s rate
System Brigade and Below’s collaborative capabili- of activity. The goal is to combine the broad spec-
ties are already supporting moves in this direction. trum of current and future sensors into an effective
Executing multiple, simultaneous, distributed, intelligence tool that is geared to the activity of an
decentralized actions requires relevant operational adversary. The amassed information is input into an
44 November-December 2005  MILITARY REVIEW

5. TRANSFORMATION
Figure 2. A paradigm shift: From reconnaissance to peristence.
Internet protocol where it is universally available to guiding vision—a globally coherent national-security
all warfighters. This approach involves a paradigm system—requires a coherent operational system to
shift in how raw data is entered into the network. exercise all elements of national power.
Instead of analysts processing raw data into infor-
mation for input into the network, the raw data will Distributed Effects Over Time
be placed on the network for empowered users to With decision distribution, operational art becomes
exploit for their own particular requirements. The a fully collaborative exchange, and leaders and plan-
decision on what is important moves from the entity ning staffs primarily focus on operational tempo,
that captures or analyzes the data to the person who set conditions through anticipation, and describe
uses it” [emphasis added].24 desired effects. In the past, effects ran concurrently
Animated and three-dimensional presentation will with battlefield actions, but distributed, decentral-
allow users to understand specific mission sets and ized operations create asynchronous effects. Tempo
effects-generation. Current tools, such as Topscene control and effects-linkages across the levels and
and Falcon View, allow combined domain views, domains of war affect the adversary in time and space.
such as a synthesis of terrain data with the infrastruc- For example, logistics preparation and movement of
ture views of the signal or information environment. actors are often indicators and precursors of action.
Future tools will increase the value of enterprise With persistent surveillance, we identify enemy
data, creating an even greater ability to perceive each precursors and act on them in a greater variety of
domain’s dynamic environment. ways. We might delay or prevent collusion, seize key
Right now, the logic driving most service and assets or finances, or deny commercial transportation
joint ISR is the Cold War reconnaissance paradigm: means. Each action increases friction and reduces the
periodic, linear snapshots and samplings.25 The logic enemy’s operational capacity, which creates an inter-
reflects the adaptations and co-evolutions of the past nal focus that continuously forces him to adjust his
and is increasingly inadequate for the future. (See plans. We achieve a temporal advantage by creating
figure 2 for a summary of the differences between deep, systemic effects. Tempo control becomes the
the reconnaissance paradigm and the persistence most important element of operational art.
paradigm.) An integrated COP environment supported by
We must consider the emergence of persistent persistent surveillance will enable commanders to
surveillance in the context of future combat and create tempo through effects planning. Control will
national-security capabilities, and as such, persistent be indirect. Commanders will direct KACs to alter
surveillance should be nested in the higher opera- mission parameters and effects sequences. Mission
tional capability it serves. Form follows function. The formation will take less time because key players
MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2005 45

6. will collaborate to construct effects elements in each Coherence includes purposeful combinations
domain and level of war. Collaboration begins with of kinetic force, arrests or seizure of material and
a shared understanding of the commander’s effects- funds, nonkinetic efforts through computer-network
based intent.26 The objective must be clearly defined. operations or the initiation of public diplomacy, and
Lack of purpose to provide context to an effects-based messages disseminated through global media to shape
intent results in incoherence. perceptions. Some actions might not be military in
Mission command at lower levels will be estab- nature, but military commanders might coordinate
lished through self-regulating behaviors and self- and develop plans for nonmilitary actors to execute
organization, all related to mission purpose and clear in order to create necessary effects. Such actions
intent. Rule sets will outline a maximum-minimum might include acting through interagency partners and
behavior set to follow.27 A commander then takes in nongovernmental actors, with or without attribution
information, makes judgments, and directs subor- to the military command.32
dinates as situations change. In a distributed-enter- The Major Combat Operations-Joint Operating
prise COP, a commander’s direct intervention will Concept states that joint force commanders will find
be greatly reduced because subordinate actors and themselves increasingly engaged in peer leadership
systems will collaborate to generate desired effects. outside the organizations they command and control.33
Commanders will lead from the center of the network Lower echelon commanders will find themselves in
(rather than from the top as in a hierarchical organi- similar situations as their forces increasingly act in
zational structure), provide umbrellas of enabling complex environments as we prosecute the Global
resources, and ensure freedom of action. The com- War on Terrorism.34 In short, the need to create unity
mander will also fight to extend the view deeper into of purpose and coherence of all effects in the opera-
the battlespace so he can determine how to shape the tional environment has expanded. Each effect adds
environment and create broader options. Self-syn- to the desired outcome, creates continuous pressure,
chronizing actions will occur in parallel, distributed and changes the enemy’s decision cycles. Moreover,
operations in each domain and at each level of war, because of an increased ability to identify key rela-
but even in execution-centric environments, purpose tionships and vulnerabilities across an enemy’s global
remains the most important element.28 operating systems, effects might be initiated in many
operational areas that create desired effects in others,
Achieving Coherence and vice versa.35
Coherence of action and continuous operations A COP supported by distributed persistent surveil-
will require a program-management mindset and lance is also likely to support actions against precur-
a long-term view of decisive operating advantages sor behaviors, adversarial collusion, and physical or
and conditions, not a project-management mindset virtual node associations. Cumulative effects can pre-
focused on producing activities of transitory useful- empt or diffuse conditions requiring lethal force. By
ness that support a single end state. Coherence will denying the enemy opportunities, we also deny him
come from correct effects design (supporting a larger key conditions for success.36 Effects-based operations
purpose) and tailored information distribution, not are outcome-based and do not depend on a particular
direct controls over single actors. organization to generate input. In the past, the focus
Because of a lowering of what constitutes the of intelligence was on named areas of interest, a
operational level of war, lower level actors will face term nearly meaningless in a persistent surveillance
diverse response requirements as they integrate with paradigm. The new term is “named relationships
other actors in the battlefield. Today’s battalion com- of interest.” As the enterprise mind gets stronger,
manders often deal directly with non-DOD elements in we become increasingly able to predict events, our
ways a corps commander might have 15 years ago. As actions become more preventive, and we reduce the
one senior joint force commander emphasized: “There use of lethal force.
are nearly 30 interagency elements operating in Iraq Magnetic resonance imagery (MRI) is a form of
today.”29 A senior Army commander added: “[There persistent surveillance in the medical field. Afford-
is] only [an] illusion of control. Consider the inte- able scanning has produced more frequent imaging
grated operations of SOF [special operations forces], and improved the evidentiary base that, in turn, has
Interagency, Coalition and [nongovernmental opera- allowed case-based reasoning and inference models
tions]; [military commanders] don’t really own it [their with which doctors could compare a single patient’s
battlespace]—this is real.”30 What the contributing results to previous scans as well as anomalies to the
effects are, or should be, must begin with a common base. As the data built a greater understanding of the
understanding of the adversary as a system.31 disease, doctors could identify precursor attributes
46 November-December 2005  MILITARY REVIEW

7. TRANSFORMATION
DOD
Airman preparing to enter a building during an urban warfare exercise. The exercise was conducted to test integration
of a Scan Eagle unmanned aerial surveillance aircraft.
leading to definitive cause and effect linkage. As a Leaders, actors, and agents will adapt through train-
result, preventive medicine and treatment options ing, simulation, and experiential learning to create
grew tremendously. More effective use of medi- new operational values and cultures.
cines and chemotherapy (nonkinetic treatments) Perhaps the most significant noninformation tech-
led to increased survival rates. With image-guided nology-related effect from integrating the emergent
surgery, doctors could operate with more precision, persistent surveillance capability into the COP will
because MRI devices scan in real time during sur- be on human capital and security organization design.
gery (kinetic treatment).37 The COP should allow a Rethinking training models, leadership skills, and
similarly precise and effective use of force across retention requirements, and better leveraging of indi-
the battlespace. vidual experiential factors, will help achieve the broad
Exploitation is an operational term. In the past, cav- security and operational goals JOpsC outlines.
alry created the next battle and exploited success. In Training. We must incorporate collaborative
the Napoleonic era, there was no deep cavalry because problemsolving and simulation to reinforce recog-
there was no next battle. Industrial Age commanders nition-primed decisionmaking at platoon, squad,
formed cavalry when they realized that a single, “deci- and team levels. We must use physical and virtual
sive” battle would not end a war. Now we see continu- scenarios with dynamic mission changes, rule sets,
ous operations and global (small-unit) battles. In the and authority modifications as scenarios unfold and
future, the cavalry might not exist as an organization, distribute changes to the force through individual-
but as a global sensing system of systems; that is, as ized COPs. Physical-skills training for close-combat
persistent surveillance and agents conducting exploita- operations should incorporate real-time COP feeds
tion operations.38 However, just as cavalry reporting is and advanced technologies as soon as spiral inser-
not perfect, neither is persistent surveillance. tions allow, as we practice connecting soldiers and
entities to the network. Training should reinforce
Recommendations adaptation, virtual and physical collaboration, and
Persistent surveillance will enable the Joint Opera- mental agility within the mission set. Operational-
tions Concept’s (JOpsC) attributes and result in new level training should focus on operational design
organization, strategy, and authority distribution.39 and planning for parallel, distributed actions, using
MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2005 47

8. DOD
The TPS 75 Air Surveillance Radar System at Aviano Air Base, Italy, 5 October 2005.
dynamic systems thinking as a basis for a new mili- information-technology-savvy soldiers who are
tary science. comfortable with pervasive communications and
Leadership. Shared persistent surveillance and computing technologies. Junior leaders and sol-
an integrated COP will require leaders who are diers have shown tremendous adaptability during
comfortable with exercising indirect control over Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.
decentralized missions. Leaders must also develop These soldiers are bloggers, on-line gamers, smart
enhanced skills in peer leadership and informal lead- mobsters, and chat-room influencers. Future tactical
ership of non-DOD elements within the battlespace. engagements might primarily be at the platoon and
Battlespace visualization and understanding increas- below levels, with a brigade combat team (BCT)
ingly comes from the COP, not a single commander. headquarters serving as the enabler and integrator
No single commander is likely to understand all the for dispersed companies and platoons. Even SOF
complexities and necessary, tempo-sensitive inter- elements might break into individual and split-team
actions within the battlespace, particularly “on the operations and work ever more closely with inter-
edge” events during tactical operations. Leaders at agency partners. The United States has the most
battalion-level and below should receive enhanced experienced, educated Armed Forces in its history,
training to handle greater authority. Those who and our Nation’s future will require leveraging our
can achieve effects should have the authority to do best in this protracted war.40
so. Organizational leaders should develop around Organizational design. New organizational
dynamic systems and enterprise leadership models. constructs should also emerge, with authorities fol-
Senior leader training should teach how to influence lowing information flows and an expanded capacity
and indirectly control distributed operations through to act. Because strategy is reflected through organi-
adaptive mission planning and effects design com- zational design, force designers should continue to
municated through the commander’s effects-based emphasize empowerment of formations at company
purpose and intent. through team levels and the interaction of conven-
Experience. We must improve retention incen- tional and special operating forces. Future force
tives and nurture operational experience. An enter- designs should continue to emphasize soldier and
prise mind-enabled force having an integrated COP soldier-level empowerment. Enablers for integrating
and persistent surveillance feeds requires enhanced force, whether the force is from interagency, mul-
skill sets and increased levels of maturity. We tinational partners, or the joint force, should be the
also need to leverage the collaborative skills of product of coherent operational design and planning
48 November-December 2005  MILITARY REVIEW

9. TRANSFORMATION
from the joint task force through BCT levels, with enterprise data via the tailored COP with assurance
emphasis on shaping and condition-setting. With in content and reliability.
enhanced COP capabilities and a more direct flow of • Mounted and dismounted support to extend
information resulting from the changed, distributed support to individuals, rather than just platforms or
nature of information enabled by persistent surveil- command posts. We must ensure COPs reach DOD
lance, it is unclear what the role of the division and non-DOD partners. Tailorable COP designs
headquarters G2 might be.41 Theater- and national- should support dismounted operations in remote
level planning must focus on deep, global operations areas just as seamlessly as they support a teammate
and long-term success in protracted war. in a hotel room operating in dial-up-access mode.
Experience levels. Increased complexity will • Robust planning and simulation tools that
require seasoned leaders and mature staff in bat- reside on-line and allow users to integrate real-time
talion and below combat formations. Leader-to-led data with planning products automatically. Tactical
ratios must increase. Companies should have intel- planners should be able to integrate the same enter-
ligence sections to fully leverage persistent intel- prise data into tactical simulation and visualization
ligence distribution and enable tactical planning tools to create dynamic mission-rehearsal and tacti-
beyond immediate engagements. We must track and cal-analysis visualizations.
manage intangible assets across the force; namely, • Layered security and smart distribution, so
specific experience, specialized skill sets, and dem- support users can operate securely within their
onstrated proficiencies. Each of these suggestions mission environment and the appropriate planning
raises the operating capacity of edge organizations horizon.
and empowers the lowest levels of the force to act • Reinvention of display and visualization because
with speed and precision. one size does not fit all. We must allow users to
Force structure. We also must create an inte- design and test new COP presentation displays for
grated force structure that combines special opera- anticipated operating environments. There might
tions elements; rapid, strike-capable conventional never be an end goal to build to, but rather a steady
elements; and deep operations forces, including move to bring understanding to the individual through
interagency teams. These forces should engage continuous advances in technology.
in theater security and cooperation initiatives and Integrating persistent surveillance with the COP
operate with specialized rules of engagement and allows us to reconceive security mechanisms to
authority to create preemptive or preventive effects. meet today’s threat. Today’s threat is not regional
This force would likely have the agility and judg- but global, mobile, and intertwined with civil and
ment to be a shaping force for global operations even commercial infrastructures. We must leverage
that can intervene decisively to prevent larger crises persistent intelligence to meet our requirements
from forming. through a shared COP that supports the police ser-
The COP. The spiral development and integration geant as well as the Army sergeant with relative,
of information technologies can provide the force actionable data. We must also create mechanisms
with an asymmetric capability if technologies are and technologies to allow broader access to non-
integrated correctly with the human component. The DOD and non-U.S. elements based on the mission.
COP must allow— A multinational-capable, tailored COP would foster
• Access to all mission elements and to real-time global agility and coherent actions. MR
NOTES
1. Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Transformation Study Report: Transforming Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance,” Office of the Under Secretary of
Military Operational Capabilities,” Executive Summary, Washington, D.C., 2001, 2, Defense—Intelligence, Washington, D.C., 7 April 2004, 4.
on-line at <www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2001/d20010621transexec.pdf>, accessed 4. The battlespace includes three competitive domains: physical, informational,
31 October 2005. and cognitive. These domains are also distributed among the three levels of war:
2. Terms such as persistent or pervasive denote the same basic operational capa- strategic, operational, and tactical. See David S. Alberts, John Garstka, Richard E.
bility. I Corps Commander LTG James M. Dubik used the term pervasive knowledge Hayes, and David T. Signori, Understanding Information Age Warfare (Washington,
during a lecture at the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), Fort DC: Command and Control Research Program Publication, 2001), 10-15.
Leavenworth, Kansas, on 4 October 2004. The concept is consistent with the concept 5. VADM Lowell Jacoby, “Revolution in Intelligence Affairs,” presentation at the
of persistent surveillance. Armed Forces Communications Association’s Spring Intelligence Symposium, Langley,
3. Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” Office of the Virginia, 22 April 2004.
Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C., 2001, 30, on-line at <www.defenselink. 6. Alberts and others, 120.
mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf>, accessed 31 October 2005. See also Stephen A. Cambone, 7. Kenneth C. Laudon and Jane P. Laudon, Management of Information Sys-
“Statement of Dr. Stephen A. Cambone, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, tems: Managing the Digital Firm, 7th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall,
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, 2002), 50-59.
MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2005 49

10. 8. VADM Jacoby, interview by author, September 2004, the Pentagon. tion-centric, decentralized operations can inhibit initiative and create incoherence.
9. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dic- Creating task lists from centralized planning activities is increasingly too slow and
tionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing too limiting to address emerging conditions and can constrain actors from seeking
Office [GPO], 2003). and exploiting opportunities because finite resources are prioritized and committed to
10. Joint Warfighting Center (JWC) Pamphlet 5, Operational Implications of the fulfilling prespecified tasks from “higher.” These insights are from an address on U.S.
Collaborative Information Environment (CIE) (Fort Monroe, VA: JWC, 4 June 2004), Marine Corps operational planning observations during Operation Iraqi Freedom by
11-12, on-line at <www.stormingmedia.us/48/4893/A489324.html>, accessed 31 the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force to the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort
October 2005. On page GL-2, the pamphlet defines the CIE as “a virtual aggregation Leavenworth, Kansas, 6 December 2004.
of individuals, organizations, systems, infrastructures, and processes to create and Tightly coupled task lists for operations resulted in continuous streams of fragmen-
share the data, information and knowledge needed to plan, execute, and assess tary orders (FRAGOs) when situations changed. Many FRAGOs were irrelevant by
joint force operations and enable a commander to make decisions better and faster the time they reached lower level units. In other cases, units were already engaged
than the adversary.” in the actions the FRAGO specified. Had the units waited for an order (even verbal),
11. Ibid., 11-12. the action might have been too slow to produce the required effect. Because the units
12. Kevin Kelly, Out of Control: The New Biology of Machines, Social Systems, perceived the need to act, and did so without orders, one can question the validity, or
and the Economic World (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 1994), 440. Kelly observes at least the necessity, of the higher headquarters’ order that followed. This places the
that a system stuck in the present is reactive, prone to surprise from change, and will debate about effects and tasks firmly in the “Decision Cycle Battle” forum. Task and
die. A common operating picture (COP) only capable of portraying real-time condi- purpose might be replaced by effect and purpose. To be sure, tasks to subordinate
tions creates digitized, myopic views of reality and cognitively handicaps anticipatory units or elements will not be wholly replaced, but the default behavior of specifying
actions. discreet actions to subordinates vice articulating effect-based intent might require
13. The specific temporal orientation is tied to resource allocation and regeneration more thoughtful investigation and doctrinal discussion.
capacity. Future and associated “times” merely show varied planning, decisionmak- 27. The rule sets for authority to take action should clearly reflect the maximum
ing, and action orientations vis-à-vis adversaries. These will vary. Joint task force latitude an actor has and a minimum level of control logic to accomplish the mission.
commanders and national-level decisionmakers should be future-oriented in terms Thresholds should be identified within the mission set, along with purpose and ef-
of weeks, months, and perhaps years. Moreover, a new field of computer science fects-based intent.
deals with anticipatory computing in dynamic environments. 28. Purpose drives behavior. Commanders describe effects to modify and shape
14. In each example, the ability to maintain disciplined focus at the right level and organizational actions to achieve an overarching purpose. Nested purpose and effects
dynamically integrate relevant information and understanding seamlessly with actors create coherence across the domains and levels of war.
across all levels maintains the competitive advantage. A COP view is possible because 29. Anonymous senior joint force commander, lecture to SAMS, Fort Leavenworth,
of the enterprise information systems. Kansas, 2004.
15. Martin Van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge: Harvard University 30. The illusion of control exists when someone has the perception they can control
Press, 1985), 145. The literal interpretation of this does not convey the intent of the dynamic and complex interactions “from the top.”
statement; rather, recognition of the inability to conduct detailed planning for tactical 31. The effects design (purpose) describes the “what” with the actors creatively
actions from higher headquarters. As Van Creveld relates: “The true essence of the determining the “how” without centralized direct control. Remember, control is main-
Prussian command system was not to try to foresee every move in war as if it were tained through indirect means.
a railway timetable.” 32. JCS, Stability Operations-Joint Operating Concept [Stability Joint Operating
16. BG Huba Wass de Czege and MAJ Jacob D. Biever, “Future Battle Command: Concept (JOC)] (Washington, DC, GPO, 3 October 2003), 19.
Where Information Technology, Doctrine and Organization Meet,” Army Magazine 33. Major Combat Operations (MCO)-Joint Operating Concept (JOC), 7. No other
(August 2001): 10-12. information given.
17. U.S. Army Field Manual 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control 34. COL Leonard Wong, Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience
of Army Forces (Washington, DC: GPO, 2004), 3-13; COL Stefan Banach, of Operation Iraqi Freedom (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic
discussions with author, November 2004, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Properly task- Studies Institute, 2004), 3-6. Wong describes the complex interactions junior officers
organized tactical units (mounted and dismounted maneuver, fires, intelligence, are experiencing in Iraq today. Company-level leaders and soldiers routinely interact
interrogation, and translation capability) with seasoned leadership and support with coalition, multiagency, and non-DOD elements as they transition daily (sometimes
(including pulsed sustainment, casualty evacuation, joint fires, air and ground hourly) from humanitarian and stability support operations, to close combat operations,
quick-reaction forces, and robust secure communications) can conduct one and back again to noncombat-related actions. Junior leaders have demonstrated
tactical engagement after another (roll from target to target) to generate and remarkable adaptability, mental agility, and operational flexibility.
continue generating exceptional information. Further empowering lower tactical 35. The persistent surveillance capability might determine linkages among financial
levels with better organization, including the addition of unique capabilities, cre- transactions in Asia, the transshipment of materials in Africa, and the training of an
ates the ability to roll from target to target under an adaptive execution construct. action cell in South America. This is certain to create new methods of developing and
Special operations forces with interagency support do this now. A transformed executing operational art. We will need new mechanisms to describe, induce, and
conventional force should also be fully resourced to execute operations under an assess coherent effects. If persistent surveillance is a major contributor to generating
adaptive execution construct. this understanding for coherent action, it must include tailored COP as the distribution
18. JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, mechanism for each element taking action. The continuous Complex Adaptive System
1995). (CAS) view of the adversary creates the ability to do this.
19. Partners might be U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), non-DOD, or non-U.S. 36. Sun Tzu observed: “The highest realization of warfare is to attack the enemy’s
coalition elements. This empowerment through decentralized data distribution requires plans” (Ralph D. Sawyer, Sun Tzu: The Art of War [Oxford: Westview Press, 1994],
relinquishing expert control to all stakeholders across the enterprise, to even the lowest 177).
levels, to allow adaptive planning and execution. 37. Ralph J. Begley, Mark Reige, John Rosenblum, and Daniel Tseng, “Adding
20. Louis Andre, Chief of Operations, Defense Intelligence Agency, interview by Intelligence to Medical Devices,” Medical Device and Diagnostic Industry Magazine
author, the Pentagon, September 2004. (March 2000), on-line at <www.devicelink.com/mddi/archive/00/03/014.html>, ac-
21. If agents or actors cannot act, they cease to be agents or actors. cessed 31 October 2005.
22. Even the most “strategic” actor or agent must take action in the tactical realm. 38. A key doctrinal component of the cavalry mission is to “gain and maintain
In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the opening air strike against Saddam Hussein (at his contact” with the enemy.
suspected location) was still bound by the tactical, physical employment of the aircraft 39. For a definition of JOpsC, see on-line at <www.jfcom.mil/about/fact_jopsc.
delivering precision munitions. Newtonian physics dominate the tactical level of war. htm>, accessed 22 November 2005.
A tactical component exists in each domain of war. 40. Wong. We should carefully consider how we can leverage the force that has
23. BG Wayne Michael Hall, Stray Voltage: War in the Information Age (Annapolis, “been through the crucible” to enhance new force and organizational capabilities.
MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003), 158-69. I use Hall’s terminology, but U.S. Joint Forces We should not squander demonstrated mental agility and capacity to handle author-
Command (JFCOM) has similar concepts and varied terminology. JFCOM foresees ity with responsibility well beyond what was considered appropriate for them just a
the creation of distributed knowledge centers for the CIE. Knowledge centers are decade ago.
composed of humans, information technology, and information. 41. The Intelligence and Security Command Overwatch Initiative is already sup-
24. U.S. Army, “2003 Army Transformation Roadmap,” 7-17, on-line at <www.army. porting units in combat in Afghanistan and Iraq. Division G2s and the Analytic Control
mil/2003TransformationRoadmap/>, accessed 31 October 2005. Element will continue to have a purpose, but emphasis might shift from real-time sup-
25.Cambone, 4. port to supporting adaptive planning and effects assessment, allowing the Overwatch
26. Vision is a function of articulating the linkage between the guiding purpose to provide real-time, “Knowledge Advantage Center-like” direct support to tactically
and the effects-based intent. The use of specified tasks in operations orders in execu- engaged elements through Distributed Common Ground Systems-Army.
Major David M. Pendall, U.S. Army, is the G2 at V Corps Headquarters. He received a B.A. from Ohio University, an M.S. from
Central Michigan University, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced
Military Studies (SAMS), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has served in various command and staff positions in the continental
United States, Bosnia, Korea, and Kuwait, and during Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq. This article is adapted from a monograph
produced as a SAMS graduation requirement, and is available on-line at <www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/contendm/home.htm>.
50 November-December 2005  MILITARY REVIEW