Going Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan - Towards a Better Understanding of the Pashtun

GOING FORWARD IN
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
Towards A Better Understanding Of The Pashtun

Global Reach, Local Approach

GOING FORWARD IN
AFGHANISTAN AND
PAKISTAN
TOWARDS A BETTER
UNDERSTANDING OF
THE PASHTUN
Outreach Strategists, LLC

Introduction
The Pashtun1 people represent the world’s largest ethnic tribal group and are largely indigenous
to the desolate, mountainous region straddling the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan in a
region that is now recognized as the geographical safe haven for the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The
remoteness of parts of this area, as well as the scarcity of modern accoutrements, belies their
significance to current international security. Our purpose in this paper is to offer a significant
first step toward greater insight into the lives of the Pashtun people in the belief that U.S. and
international policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan will benefit significantly from this enhanced
knowledge.

Traditionally, topics of international affairs are understood in light of nationalistic concerns: nations,
states, cities, etc. A better understanding of the cultural and political nuances of the trans-national
Pashtun people is indispensable for formulating more effective policy with increased chances of
successful implementation. Success for this region includes a more secure and peaceful state that
empowers local and federal government entities to work autonomously, that does not require
the present military footprint of international forces, and that does not offer conditions for the
safe haven of organized militant groups.

For short and long-term engagement in Afghanistan and Northwest Pakistan, a background
knowledge and insight into the Pashtun people, the peculiar culture, the geography, the recent
and past history and the current political situation is crucial.

This paper seeks to present an introduction to Pashtun history and identity, explicate the ways in
which Pashtun identity plays a crucial role in current regional problems, and propose a battery of
strategies to achieve U.S. policy objectives in the region.

1. Also known as Pukhtoon, Pakhtun, and Pathan.

TOWARDS A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE PASHTUN 2

Map courtesy of Google Earth

Who Are the Pashtun
The Pashtun people hail from a triangular region, of approximately 250,000 sq. miles, in Central South
Asia which includes large portions of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) a part of Quetta
Division of Baluchistan province in Pakistan and three-fourths of Afghanistan. The triangle runs from
Dir in the north along the river Indus, is bound on the east by Swat, Buner and Swabi, takes a westward
turn a few miles south of Dera Ismail Khan, and includes Loralai, Sharigh, Degari, Harnai, Quetta, Pishin,
Chaman and Qandahar, then extends up to Herat. From here it curves north-east and follows the
foothills of the Hindu Kush mountain range and comes back to Dir.

The entirety of the Pashtun populace is comprised of roughly 60 major tribes and more than 400
sub-clans. Estimations of the Pashtun population range from 40-50 million, with the lack of any official
Afghani census since 1979 complicating the accuracy on this count. There are 3.5 million Pashtuns living
in present-day Karachi. 25.6 million or 15% of Pakistan’s population is Pashtun, and 13.3 million or 42%
of the population in Afghanistan.2 By way of comparison, the Pashtun are generally considered the largest
tribal society in the world.

2. Population Census Organization, Government of Pakistan, http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/pco/.


History and Origin
While the origins of the Pashtun have been researched and debated for centuries, it is sufficient
to suggest that the Pashtun are a heterogeneous ethnicity, owing their makeup to the multitude
of tribes and peoples who have passed through the region over the many centuries of Pashtun
civilization.

Much of their history and customs has been passed down through oral narratives and allegories
rather than through written text. As a result, pre-modern Pashtun history is often the work of
foreign transcription and has been relatively vague. As such, there is still much uncertainty as to
the precise history of the Pashtun people.

The most accepted theory of Pashtun origin suggests that the Pashtun are of Aryan descent
and eastern Iranian origins. Another theory links the Pashtun to the original 12 tribes of Israel
and the Yusufzai tribe. Yet another theory describes their descent from Arabs and some groups
such as the Afridis claim to be direct descendants of Alexander the Great and his army who
swept through the area in the 4th century B.C.

In the 13th century, the brutal Mongol invasion and their rule over what is now Afghanistan gave
rise to animosity between the Pashtun and the descendents of the Mongols, the ethnic minority
Hazara. This animosity, consequently, continues to this day. Other civilizations which inhabited
this region include the Central Asian Timurids in the 14th century and their descendents the
Moghul dynasty of the 16th century. Ahmad Shah Durrani, a Pashtun, is the founder of modern
Afghanistan. He founded the state in 1747 and the Pashtun ruled Afghanistan for the next 200 years.


The Way of the Pashtun – Pashtunwali
“It is said that a Pashtun can be your best friend or your worst enemy.”- Anonymous

Pashtunwali, which literally translates as, “the way of
the Pashtun” serves as the basis for the traditional
Pashtun obligation to protect their lands from
foreign invaders. This strict social code, as ancient
as the tribe itself, is the cultural connectivity that
defines the Pashtun people. It is essentially their
societal philosophy and is therefore central in all
of their actions, customs, and traditions.

Only by adhering to the code of Pashtunwali can
a Pashtun retain his honor or izzat, without which
he would be cast out from the tribe. Pashtunwali
is governed by four main tenants; the concepts of
(1) chivalry (ghayrat or nang), (2) hospitality
(melmastiya) and forgiveness over past
hostility (nanawatey), (3) gender boundaries (purdah or namus) and (4) council (jirga).
These rules are responsible for the survival of the Pashtun tribes for over 2,000 years. It is
important to note that these rules are not necessarily in conformity with Islamic law, but derive
from years of cultural tradition and are thought to trace back to pre-Islamic times

Chivalry (Ghayrat or Nang)
Pashtun chivalry is a two-fold concept. It encompasses the laws of honor in battle and the
defense of honor in civil society. In times of war, the norms of chivalry determine who may
be attacked in battle, the distribution of the spoils of war, and the criteria for honor in war.
In general day to day interactions, ghayrat comprises “the defense of honor against shame
by another person.” 3 The binary concept of honor and shame is paramount in Pashtunwali.

3. Kakar, Palwasha. “Tribal Law of Pashtunwali and Women’s Legislative Authority.”, Afghan Legal History Project, Islamic Legal Studies Program,
Harvard University, p. 4. http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs /ilsp/research/kakar.pdf.


Hospitality (Melmastiya) and Nanawatey – forgiveness or
repentance over past hostility and the granting of asylum
to fugitives
Melmastiya, or an open hearted hospitality
is one of the most sublime and noble
features of Pashtun character. Hospitality
addresses the shelter and defense of
guests. Pashtunwali dictates that a host
provide shelter, food and water for guests,
for as long as the guest chooses to stay.
Pashtuns will invariably go beyond their
means to provide this care. It would be an
act of dishonor to ask a guest to leave, even in cases where acts of hospitality are causing undue
hardship to the host.

For example, in May 2009, approximately three million Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs) fled
from their homes to escape the fighting in Dir, Buner and the Swat Valley. They were greeted with
care and unparalleled generosity from their Pashtun neighbors in surrounding rural areas. Even
though UNHCR, the government of Pakistan and many non-governmental organizations set up
camps to provide assistance to these IDPs, 80% stayed in the private homes of other Pashtuns
who supported them monetarily and otherwise, out of a sense of melmastiya.

These rural Pashtun families took in as many as 20 refugees and supported them for weeks at
a time. In some situations, families sold their own assets-animals and land- to provide income to
continue hosting refugee families.4

An important nuance of melmastiya is nanawatey, or literally “to enter into the security of a
house.” 5 This aspect of hospitality extends beyond traditional shelter and includes the defending
of guests and the offering of protection from all those who would threaten him. Anyone who
gains access to a Pashtun’s house can claim asylum irrespective of caste, creed, status or previous
relations. Once taken in, the asylum seeker is protected by the owner of the house even at the
risk of his own life.

With this concept, a repentant enemy is forgiven and the feuding factions resume peaceful and
amiable relations. Under nanawatey, Pashtuns on several occasions have provided sanctuary to
even their deadliest of enemies.

4. “Pashtun culture aids refugees, ruins hosts.” The Washington Post. 3 June 2009.
5. Akbar Ahmed, Millennium and Charisma among Pathans. A Critical Essay in Social Anthropology (London: Routeledge and Kegal Paul, 1976), 76.


Historically, the obligation of asylum frequently brought the Pashtuns into conflict with the British
during their one hundred year rule. The British government, attempted to enter into various
treaties and agreements with area tribesmen for territorial responsibility. These treaties often
insisted that tribesmen should refrain from harboring outlaws. The Pashtuns considered this
offensive to the principles of Pashtunwali, and refused to agree to this request to hand over their
guests despite threats of severe punishment. Tribesmen remained obstinate, even when faced
with military action and economic blockades by the British.

This strict adherence to melmastiya sheds light on current events in the region and partly
illuminates why otherwise disparate groups of militants such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda have
been able to gain refuge in these tribal villages. In addition, according to the tenants of nanawatey,
not only are these guerillas afforded house and home, but they are also afforded military
protection from their hosts.

Gender Boundaries (Purdah or Namus)
Namus sets the foundation for the rules regarding men and women and the mixing of genders.
Pashtun’s marked fierce independence and acute sensitivity to any perceived personal insult
are often tied to their defense of namus. Lifelong grudges are often created from even slight
deviations of societal gender rules. Defense of namus is obligatory for every Pashtun and is
achieved at any cost.

Gender boundaries are defined by
respecting the gender order, maintaining
gender segregation, and defending
the honor of women. In some ways
this aspect of Pashtunwali is similar to
fundamentalist interpretations of Islamic
mandates. Purdah, or the veil, defines this
physical and conceptual separation of
men and women. Afghan homes include
a hujra, or sitting room for males, usually located just inside the entrance of the house. This room
provides a seating area for outsider males who are forbidden from entering the rest of the home
without permission.

Touching a female who is not an immediate family member is absolutely forbidden and has
dire consequences.


Council (jirga)
Finally, the tenant of council is represented in Pashtun society by jirga. Tribal elders selected for
their honor and practice of Pashtunwali are given the task of making decisions, ruling on disputes
and acting as arbitrators. These decisions are made by consensus and are binding on the parties
involved. The jirga’s decisions maintain the order of the village and inter-tribal relationships
and are final. Councils are entrusted with the sanctity of the tribe’s code. Due to the inherent
magnitude of Pashtunwali’s directives, the Council’s decisions may carry grave and, what by
Western standards, may be considered extreme orders. For example, the Council may determine
that a tribesman no longer has namus, or honor, and, as a result, burn his house and belongings
and banish him from the tribe. Or, in contrast, the Council has the power to grant asylum (lokhay
warakhal) to a visiting group, thus risking the entire village’s fate in the defense of its guests.

Other Relevant Concepts of Pashtunwali Are:

Teega or Kanray: Teega or kanray is defined as a temporary truce to end killings between
parties who are in dispute. Terms of the truce are declared by a jirga. Violation of the truce can
result in punitive measures.

Badal: (Commonly referred to as ‘eye for an eye’) Pashtun’s have a heightened sense of
sensitivity to insult or personal attacks. Dignity and honor are vehemently defended with an act
showing superior force by the insulted party.6 An insult may be avenged at any cost even by
taking the life of the insulting party.

Lokhay Warkawal: Lokhay Warkawal literally translated as the ‘giving of a pot’. It is the
creation of a promise for the protection of an individual or a tribe. Weaker tribes or individuals
will offer lokhay, symbolically delivered in the form of a sacrificial goat or sheep, to a stronger
tribe with the intention of garnering its safety and security. Once accepted, a promise for
protection against enemies is provided in all circumstances.

Pashtunwali is ingrained in every Pashtun. It defines gender roles in society. It
dictates how relationships are formed and conducted, how food and possessions
are shared, how guests are treated, how family and the village is defended, and
how the Pashtun operate in nearly every way.

6. Kakar, p.5


Pashtun Settlement
Having defeated multiple foreign invasions over the past several centuries, including the British
in the nineteenth century and the Russians in the late twentieth century, the Pashtun are well
known throughout the world as fierce protectors of their homeland. Strategically positioned
between Central Asia and the Punjab plain, the land of the Pashtuns has been highly sought after
for centuries by many civilizations including the sixteenth century Mogul emperors of India who
attempted to subjugate the Pashtun tribes of the frontier, the Durrani kings in Kabul, the Sikhs
under Ranjit Singh, and the British Empire.


Federally Administered Tribal Area
The Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) is a tribal region along the Pakistan-Afghanistan
border and constitutes the heart of the Taliban movement’s refuge within Pakistan. The region is
mountainous, lawless, and, like Baluchistan and NWFP, provides advantageous refuge for al-Qaeda
and Taliban militants. Officially, the region is the jurisdiction of the Pakistan government and the
governor of NWFP, but, practically, “the real power in the tribal agencies has historically rested
with each of their political agents, who represent the federal government and maintain control
through the colonial-era Frontier Crimes Regulations.” 7

7. Zissis, Carin. “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas.” Council for Foreign Relations. 26 October 2007, http://www.cfr.org/publication/11973.


FATA is rife with corruption, extremism,
and unrestrained militant activity.
Bribes of money, goods, and
protection are commonplace
between Taliban leaders and tribal
leaders. Additionally, the region is
poorly educated with a literacy rate
of only 17%. 8 Madrassas, or Islamic
religious schools, far out number
secular schools in the tribal lands, but
are still too few in number to serve the student population of the region. Because of the mix
of ideology and teaching, madrassas can be significant recruitment centers for Taliban forces.
Over the years, the Taliban have gained important footholds in the region.

Baluchistan
Baluchistan is the largest province in Pakistan and borders Iran, Afghanistan, and the Arabian
Sea to the west, northwest, and south, respectively. The Baluch, Pashtun, and Brahvi are the
three major tribes comprising the province. Although exact numbers are not known because of
constant migration and movement of displaced persons, the Pashtun compromise roughly one-
third of the population in Baluchistan. The terrain ranges from picturesque farms on snow-clad
hills to arid desert that reaches 120ºF in the summer.

The Taliban and al-Qaeda have long used the virtually uninhabitable Afghanistan-Pakistan border
region, including Baluchistan, as a refuge in wars with the Soviets and the United States. As of June
2009, they continued to consolidate control inside of the region and gained a stronghold around
the capital city of Quetta. The spreading of Taliban philosophy or ‘Talibanization’ has increased in
the region as many Islamic extremist practices, such as the prohibition of male-female socializing
and increased violence against minority Shiites, are on the rise.

Western intelligence sources believe that prominent Taliban members are based in the capital city
of Quetta. “The Taliban leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, to whom bin Laden has pledged loyalty,
has lived in Quetta, Pakistan, for the past several years.”9 Mullah Omar played an integral role in
securing bin Laden’s safe haven in Afghanistan after the 1996 Taliban takeover.

Baluchistan is plagued by inter-tribal fighting, limited but violent rebellions against the Pakistani
government, and a growing secessionist movement. Ethnic Baluchi fear an alliance between the
Taliban (mainly Pashtuns) and Pakistani intelligence services. “ ‘[B]illions of rupees were being

8. Ibid.
9. Riedel, Bruce. “Pakistan: The Critical Battlefield.” Current History. November 2009, p.355.


spent on eliminating the Taliban and their supporters’ in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
and the North West Frontier Province,” Sanaullah Baluch, a spokesman for the Baluchistan
National Party, told a Pakistani newspaper, even as “the government ignores the alarmingly
dangerous moves of the Taliban in Baluchistan.” 10

Northwest Frontier Province
The Northwest Frontier Province, or NWFP, borders Afghanistan, Kashmir, the Federally
Administered Tribal Area, and Punjab to the northwest, east, southwest, and southeast
respectively. NWFP is majority Pashtun and current estimates are that it includes approximately
1.5 million Afghan refugees. The principal language is Pashto, and the capital is Peshawar.

Along with the more southern region of Baluchistan, the Frontier Province constitutes the front
lines of the battle against Taliban militants who continue to evade U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The
Taliban’s strength in the region continues to exceed the authority of the Provincial Government
of NWFP. Taliban militants have “sought to expand [their] strict interpretation of Islam to
neighboring districts.” Pakistani President, Asif Ali Zardari, acknowledged the danger of the Taliban
in the country: “’We are aware of the fact (the Taliban) trying to take over the state of Pakistan…
We are fighting for the survival of Pakistan.” 11

10. Khan, Raza. “Taliban shifts to southwest Pakistan.” Washington Times. 19 March 2009.
11. Ghaus, Ghulam. “Taliban Controls Northwest Frontier Province.” UPI Asia. 26 February 2009.


Pashtun Tribal History
The Pashtun have lived a largely nomadic life amidst the craggy terrain of the Hindu Kush and
Central South Asia. In the 7th century they adopted the religion of the Arab invaders – Islam.
Most embraced the Sunni sect of Islam while a minority adopted the beliefs of the Shia sect.
In addition, to Islam other religious traditions including Zoroastrianism and Buddhism have
flourished in Afghanistan.

Pashtun Tribes
The Pashtun are generally considered to be
the largest tribal society in the world. The
many Pashtun tribes fall into three divisions:
the Western Afghans, the Eastern
Afghans, and the highlanders or
“true” Pashtuns. The Western Afghans
are Persian-speaking and settled mainly in
Afghanistan. They include the Durrani and Ghilzari
tribes. The Eastern Afghans, whose culture is largely
Indian-influenced, settled mainly in the trans-Indus
plains of Pakistan. Finally, occupying the land in
between, the highlanders of the tribal belt,
who are sometimes referred to as the “true” Pashtuns
include the Wazirs, Mahsuds, Afridis, Mohmands,
Bangash, Orakzai and others.

The Pashtun are historically known for demonstrating
a tribal identity decided in the order of tribe, sub-tribe,
and then clan. Today, however, such identities are often
decided by more pragmatic reasons than cultural affiliations and it is not unheard
of for multiple identities to be relied upon by certain tribes. This has a direct influence
on how they organize politically and whether they decide to support their government
or various insurgency movements.


Pashtun Rule
Following the assassination of the Persian ruler Nadir Shah, the state of Afghanistan was founded
by Ahmad Shah Durrani in 1747. His “election” as King was pronounced by a tribal council or
jirga. He soon consolidated the disparate chieftainships and principalities throughout the region
into a single, unified state. Durrani was a Pashtun and, until the 1978 Marxist coup by the Soviet
Union, all of Afghanistan’s rulers have been from Durrani’s Pashtun tribal confederation.

In 1837, Pashtun tribesmen held off an advancing Sikh army, killing the famous General Hari Singh
Nalwa. A decade later, after defeating the Sikhs, the British battled the Russians for control of
the region in an intense conflict commonly known as “The Great Game.” During this period, the
British responded to fierce Pashtun resistance and sent approximately one hundred expeditions
to quell the rebellion. The British were ultimately unsuccessful in gaining control of the region.

In 1893, after years of Pashtun rebellion, the British government and the Emir of Afghanistan
reached an agreement in the demarcation of the border between Afghanistan and British India.
The “Durand Line” effectively split the Pashtun tribe into two separate, sovereign states – one
Afghan, one Indian.

The Durand Line
“Foreigners are advised not to leave the main road.” – Official road sign
outside Peshawar just past the Khyber Gateway.
The Durand Line is the current border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. When established,
it effectively divided the greater Pashtun tribal territory into two separate states. Although
recognized by the national governments of the area, Afghani and many Pakistan tribal Pashtun
do not recognize the Line and see it as an artificial division. A small contingency of Pashtuns in
Afghanistan suggest rever ting to pre-British colonial divisions and establishing a monolithic
tribal territory with no connection to the Durand Line which would be under Afghan rule.

The area bordering the Durand Line is one of the most dangerous places in the world, especially
for foreigners or outsiders.

For all practical purposes, the area is a lawless tribal frontier and the people fierce and warlike.
Since British-colonial times, it has been a refuge for outlaws, murderers and kidnappers for
ransom. This criminal activity has naturally precipitated a market for guns and ammunition and
since the 19th century, the tribal Pashtun have heavily armed themselves in intertribal warfare
and against foreign invaders. Today, Pashtun culture has a veritable love affair with guns and gun
culture. Tribes acquire modern rifles and ammunition, and a cottage industry of home-made



artillery serves as the basis for the local economy. In addition,
tribes practice a tradition of kidnapping for ransom and theft
of food, livestock, money and weapons from the settled areas
as another source of tribal income.

The Pashtun’s ‘gun culture’ revolves around the
manufacturing and exhibition of gun paraphernalia. Gun-toting
Pashtun males are a common sight in the tribal and settled
areas, where rifles and weaponry are as common of an
accessory as a shawl or hat. Village homes are built with rifle
slots in their walls and the sound of rampant gunfire is not
unusual where gunfire is often used to note a family celebration
or event. Because of the area’s un-policed nature and essential immunity to federal law, combined
with the Pashtun’s fierce nature and contempt for foreigners, dire consequences can result for
those who even unintentionally provoke or offend.


Post British Era
In the 1930s, after over a century of British colonial rule, momentum began to build for an
independent Muslim state on the subcontinent. The Pashtun were actively involved in the struggle
for Indian independence, and Pashtun nationalist organizations, such as the Khundai-Kidmatgars
(also known as the Red-Shirts) were on the rise. In 1947, the Indian subcontinent was divided
into Pakistan and India and the majority of Pashtuns rallied behind Pakistan’s founder, Mohammad
Ali Jinnah.

Following the Partition of 1947, Jinnah, also the first Governor General of Pakistan, ordered a
complete and immediate withdrawal of all British troops from tribal areas allowing the Pashtun to
roam their land free of foreign occupation. With the exception of some army outposts, this void
remains to this day. These areas have become a vital refuge for guerilla warriors along the Afghan-
Pakistani border.

Soviet Aggression and the Rise
and Fall of the Mujahedeen
Soviet intervention, beginning in the
early 1970’s, has added to continued
political instability and internal conflict
for the Pashtun region. This section will
attempt to explain the rise and fall of
the Mujahedeen and its subsequent
impact on the Taliban phenomenon.

In 1973, King Zahir Shah was
overthrown and the monarchy
was abolished. His cousin, Sardar
Muhammad Daoud, who previously served as Prime Minister from 1953-1963, seized power
after a military coup. He declared himself the first President and Prime Minister of the new
Republic. Daoud sought to reform Afghanistan by abolishing the monarchy and implementing
modernization programs and progressive policies throughout the country, many of which were
aimed at changing the status of women in Afghanistan. Over the course of his Presidency, he
attempted to distance Afghanistan from Marxist influences and took steps to improve diplomatic


relations with the West. These policies were met with bitter resistance from Marxist supporters
such as the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).

In April of 1978, Daoud and most of his family were killed in a bloody coup initiated by the
PDPA. In his place, Nur Muhammad Taraki, Secretary General of the PDPA, became President of
the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister. His Presidency lasted a short year and a half, and
in September 1979, Hafizullah Amin, seized power from Taraki.

During this time, the Soviets quickly dispatched political and military bureaucrats to Afghanistan
and agreed to an additional $250 million in military aid. By December of 1978, at least 1,000
Soviet military advisors were in Afghanistan, three times the number at the time of the coup.12

The U.S. saw an opportunity to take a stand against the Soviet Union, whom they had long
suspected was using Afghanistan as a gateway into Central South Asia. The insurgency was
“receiving arms and assistance from ethnically-allied guerrilla organizations in Pakistan, and
intelligence reported that the loyalty of the Afghan army was eroding, with a number of
defections from the army to the insurgents.”13

The internal insurgency gained momentum with support from the United States, Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, and others and began mounting further attacks against the Soviets. The Soviets responded
by bolstering their military presence, increasing their deployment of personnel, arms, tanks,
helicopters, and aircraft in the country.

Soon after the Soviet ramp up, a group of Afghan army officers attempted to take control of the
presidential palace. Although the attack was crushed, this mutiny added to Soviet worries about
losing Afghanistan as they were not only combating the insurgency from local civilians, but they
were now battling the Afghan army itself.

Finally, on December 27, 1979, President, Hazibullah Amin was assassinated and Babrak Karmal
took his place. Over the next two days, the Soviets deployed an invasion force of more than
30,000 troops. Russian tanks and planes bombed remote villages and rural areas hoping to force
the country into submission, but popular resistance to the occupation only grew in strength.

The Mujahedeen, which literally translates to “freedom fighters”, were a collection of several
groups dedicated to fighting the Soviets occupation in order to establish an Islamic state in
Afghanistan. They had significant support from the Pashtun and, as history reveals, would
eventually give rise to the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

12. MacEachin, Doug, Janne E. Nolan, Kristine Tockman. “The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in 1979: Failure of Intelligence or the Policy Process?”
Discourse, Dissent, and Strategic Surprise: Formulating American Security in an Age of Uncertainty. No. 111 (26 September 2005): 3.
13. Ibid, pp. 5-8.


The Mujahedeen
In May 1985, the seven principal Peshawar-based guerrilla organizations formed an alliance
to coordinate their political and military operations against the Soviet occupation and the
communist government in Afghanistan.

The United States’ military presence increased and President Reagan instituted a policy of
supporting anti-Communist insurgents worldwide in what later became known as “the Reagan
Doctrine.” This included supporting the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan against the Soviets with
funding, training, and arms. An important sidenote that is now well recorded is that among the
Mujahedeen leaders of this time being supported by the U.S. was Osama bin Laden, future
perpetrator of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. The Mujahedeen efforts
finally prevailed in 1989 when the Soviets pulled out of Afghanistan.

Following the exit of Soviet forces, the Mujahedeen failed to establish a legitimate government.
The groups that had banded together against the Soviets were now fighting amongst each other
for power. This in-fighting eventually slipped into full-scale civil war, and from 1992-1996 groups of
Mujahedeen headed by warlords fought amongst each other for control of the country. Seizing
on the power vacuum and their ability to forcefully institute much desired stability, the Taliban
seized control of the country in 1996.


The Taliban (1994-2001)
The Taliban of Kandahar Pashtun descent came to power during the civil war in Afghanistan,
but their precise origins are uncertain. Some contend “that the rape and murder of boys and
girls from a family traveling to Kandahar” or similar acts by ex-Mujahedeen bandits prompted
the building of vigilante groups who vowed “to rid Afghanistan of these criminals.”14 Among the
vigilantes was a Mujahedeen faction led by Mullah Mohammad Omar who is attributed with
the beginnings of what is now known worldwide as the Taliban. While others maintain that the
Pakistan-based shipping mafia known as the ‘Afghanistan Transit Trade’ and their allies in the
Pakistan government, “trained, armed, and financed the Taliban to clear the southern road across
Afghanistan to the Central South Asian Republics of extortionate bandit gangs.”15 What is fairly
certain is that the corruption and in-fighting among the Afghan warlords produced the civil
unrest which made the Taliban’s rise possible.

The Taliban is overwhelmingly Pashtun and,
therefore, exhibit many values and ideals derived
from the Pashtunwali civil code. The root of the
word Taliban or ‘Talib’ simply means one who is
in search of something. Some others define it as
someone in search of knowledge, or a student.
Supporters were largely young, Pashtun Afghan
students of madrassas located in the refugee camps along the border in Pakistan. These refugee
camps were largely confined and for all practical purposes detached from the rest of the world.
This detachment served as the ideal breeding ground for a philosophy deeply rooted in religious
fundamentalism.

Weary from years of fighting Soviet aggressors, the Taliban were quickly able to launch an aggressive
campaign to take over Afghanistan. In 1994, the Taliban captured Kandahar City and its surrounding
provinces. Eventually, they captured twelve of Afghanistan’s thirty-four provinces from various
warlords. Two years later, the Taliban captured Kabul and declared themselves the rulers
of Afghanistan. The group, largely supported by senior Pakistani officials, dedicated itself to
removing warlords, providing order, and bringing fundamentalist Islam to Afghanistan. Originally,
the Taliban received support from Pashtuns across the country who believed the movement
might solidify the nation and provide for a return to a strong Afghanistan. Even those with
serious moral and political differences expressed support for the movement on purely ethnic
grounds. Yet, the goodwill the Taliban enjoyed by ending civil strife and introducing stability rapidly
dissipated as they implemented their strict laws and rigid world view.

14. Matinuddin, Kamal, The Taliban Phenomenon, Afghanistan 1994-1997, Oxford University Press, 1999. p.25-26.
15. Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban. Yale University Press, 2000. p. 25-29.


The Taliban’s ideology has its influences in Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam’s radical Deobandi (an
ultra-conservative movement), and Wahabism, (the religious movement largely supported by
Saudi financial benefactors and practiced by infamous Wahabi leader, Osama bin Laden). As will
be discussed in more detail later, al-Qaeda largely benefitted from this new ideology and the
hospitality provided to it by the Taliban. Afghanistan made for an ideal location for bin Laden
to reside and lead al-Qaeda operations.

According to some reports, Mullah Omar was not completely allied with bin Laden at the outset
of al-Qaeda’s activity, but relations between the two groups became closer over time. A strong
alliance has since formed between al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

Along the more southern region of Baluchistan, the Taliban forces continued to evade U.S. forces
and Pakistani forces. In early May 2009, the Pakistani Army launched full-scale operations to wrest
back control of the Swat Valley from Taliban extremists in a bold counterinsurgency operation.16
The offensive involved approximately 15,000 troops and generated about 2 million Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs). The region is now under the control of the Pakistani army and 50%
of the IDPs have returned to their homes.

The Pashtun, Taliban, and Al-Qaeda Nexus
Al-Qaeda is a group of Islamic
fundamentalists led by Osama bin Laden
who took refuge in Afghanistan after the
Taliban took control in 1996. Like the
Taliban, al-Qaeda is also thought to have
its origins in the Mujahedeen dating back
to the Soviet-Afghanistan war and has
recruited, trained, and financed thousands
of foreign Mujahedeen from several dozen
countries. Al-Qaeda’s self-stated goal is to rid Islamic states of all Western influence and install
Islamic theocratic regimes, and is the group responsible for the September 11, 2001, attacks.

The relationship between the Pashtun tribe, the Taliban, and al-Qaeda is bound by the code of
Pashtunwali and Islam. (It is worth pointing out that the interpretations of Islam advanced by
Taliban and al-Qaeda are in no way universally shared among either the Pashtuns, or followers
of Islam around the world.)

16. Shah, Saeed. “Pakistani Offensive Targets SWAT Valley.” The Columbus Dispatch: Dispatch Politics. 9 May 2009.


As previously discussed, the Pashtunwali code places a great deal of emphasis on protecting
one’s homeland and giving refuge to visitors at any cost. When a Pashtun tribe grants lokhay to
the Taliban and/or al-Qaeda, they are obligated to fight alongside the Taliban and/or al-Qaeda by
virtue of the Pashtunwali code. However, a Pashtun tribe is under no obligation to grant lokhay to
these groups. The Taliban and al-Qaeda must respect the Pashtuns tribal codes in order to receive
the benefit of lokhay. If either group loses the trust of a Pashtun village, it loses the protection of
lokhay. This is a potential wedge that has been largely under-utilized.

Pashtun Nationalism
As mentioned earlier, the Durand Line, created in 1893 through an agreement between the
British Empire and the Emir of Afghanistan, essentially divided the region of the Pashtuns. This
tribal area which previously had been joined together by culture, history, and a loosely assembled
tribal authority was now split in two: half of the region becoming what is now Pakistan and half
becoming a part of the new Afghan state. This demarcation although well recognized by national
governments has never been fully accepted by the Pashtun of the region. Pashtun tribesman
travel across the border freely, passing in and out of the two countries with little recognition
of this artificial division.

A burgeoning movement within this region has been the idea of an independent nation
constituting the Pashtun dominated areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, known
by some as ‘Pashtunistan’.

The movement has had limited support
as most Pashtuns have resigned to the fact
that an independent Pashtun would only
increase economic and political hardship
for the Pashtuns and that independence
would foster few real benefits.

Although representing a small minority
of the Pashtun populace’s desires, groups
such as the Taliban, have been quick to align themselves with this Pashtun separatist movement
in an effort to create a co-dependent relationship to strengthen Taliban forces in the region. If
successful, the Taliban could lead a movement that would unite the regions estimated 40 to 50
million Pashtuns, harbor political chaos for Pakistan and Afghanistan and result in the creation of a
new political entity based in Islamic militant fundamentalism.


The overlap of geography between Pashtun tribes and the Taliban’s strongest base of support
may create the impression that the Taliban movement mirrors these native Pashtun identity
movements. However, the Taliban and the Pashtuns are two separate entities with differing
political, religious, and cultural motivations.

Thus, the Taliban movement is not a manifestation of Pashtun nationalism, but rather is using
Pashtun nationalism as a recruitment tool. Ultimately, the focus of the Taliban is not to assist the
Pashtun in achieving independence. Rather, it is to maintain an operational base (geographically,
financially, and demographically) in Afghanistan for Taliban troops to continue military operations.

Going Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan:
Towards a Post-Taliban Pashtun
If it is true that the world faces a terrorist threat from the Taliban, then the region encompassing
the Pashtun population of Pakistan and Afghanistan must be better understood by military,
government, and NGO decision-makers. Understanding on an intellectual level and increased
communication with these otherwise isolated communities, can defeat existing physical impasses
that prevent traditional forms of outreach and connection. The Taliban thrives on the remoteness
of residents from their government and the power vacuum such separation produces.
Understanding and better messaging can fill this physical void.

While much is made of the Pashtun tradition of armed defense against invading forces, Pashtun
loyalties are not irrevocably tied to Taliban or al-Qaeda forces. It is entirely feasible to foresee
a future where the Taliban is no longer able to rely on the Pashtun population for their base
of support.

Early signs of this division have been borne out as the Taliban in Northern Afghanistan have
aligned with more Uzbek and Turkmen tribes. By aligning with other ethnic groups, the Taliban
put at risk their ties to the Pashtun. As the Taliban sense a need to geographically spread their
reach beyond Southern Afghanistan and Pakistani FATA, they will eventually increase that risk
and weaken their support amongst the Pashtun.

Another more macro-level indicator of growing unease between the Pashtun population and
the Taliban was witnessed in the 2008 Pakistani elections. The incumbent Islamic party, Muttahida
Majlis-e-Amal (MMA - United Council of Action) was defeated throughout the Pashtun-
dominated Northwest Frontier Province. (The MMA is a coalition between religious-political
parties, created after the United States started bombing Afghanistan to overthrow
the Taliban regime.)


By comparison, the winning party, the Awami National Party (ANP) represents a moderate,
secular Pashtun political philosophy. While the Awami party’s base of support does not extend
to the more tribal regions, it is still an indicator of the beginnings of growing unease among the
Pashtun for the Taliban. Although at present most Taliban are of Pashtun origin, the vast majority
of Pashtuns are not Taliban.

The Taliban have built support within the Pashtun population by emphasizing shared social
grievances and promises of a more efficient governance. Their rhetoric includes eliminating
corruption in the Afghan and Pakistani government, aligning with rural distrust for big cities, and
the under-representation of Afghan Pashtun in government. By addressing the legitimate societal
issues of the Pashtun in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, it is not unimaginable that the two groups
can be separated more easily in the future.

While the U.S. influence within the Pashtun region is challenging, U.S. policymakers would benefit
from recognition of the extreme ethnic and tribal divisions inherent in Pashtun leadership. By
recognizing these differences, the U.S. can develop communications inroads into each of these
separate Pashtun minorities and obtain policy objectives on a smaller and more effective scale.
One of the more notable examples of this that has been put into practice by the military has
been the Tribal Engagement Strategy highlighted by Major Jim Gant.17 Gant’s experience puts
forth several promising ideas that have been successful in small pilot projects in Afghanistan. As
those pilot projects are enhanced, multiple approaches based on the subtle nuances between
tribes will exist.

Developing paths to existing leadership within tribal councils or jirgas will be essential to effective
strategic planning. On a local level, the Pashtun ideological commitment to the Taliban can be
weakened through coordinated native communications efforts. By adding voices to the native
conversation, the Taliban’s influence over local communication channels has been shown to diminish.

The creation of new Afghani transportation networks would appear to be another useful
means of countering Taliban control. Presently, the Taliban control many of the scarce roads that
connect them to sanctuary areas within Pakistan. By continuing to create new roads and improve
infrastructure, international policy makers can weaken Taliban efforts to control means of travel.
In addition, this effort affords obvious military advantages, including generating safer supply lines
for military and civilian use.

The U.S. and international forces may also wish to encourage Pashtun inclusion in the Pakistani
political process. With specific regard to Pakistan, for a Taliban-free Pashtun region to evolve,
the “troubled frontier” of Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province and FATA must be allowed

17. Gant, Mj. Jim. “A Strategy for Success in Afghanistan: One Tribe at a Time.”, 2009. http://blog.stevenpressfield.com.


greater ability to engage in the Pakistani political system. At present, the NWFP and FATA elect
representatives to a National Assembly and Senate that have no substantial impact on the two
regions. While both are allowed to govern their territory according to local traditions, integrating
the regional governments into the national government will provided long-term stability by linking
regional governments to a federal government system. This political effort will necessarily require
more time and effort than a solely military campaign. Better representation will help facilitate
the integration of the region more fully into Pakistan’s political process and ultimately the policy
objectives of Pakistan’s long-standing ally, the U.S.

Additionally, U.S. policymakers should define the scope of combat efforts in the Pashtun region
that minimize existing resentment toward them among the Pashtun. While precise military
strategy is beyond the scope of this report, it is worth pointing out that there exists ample
work by military officers and analysts who enumerate areas where change in strategy can have
a positive impact. In addition to the previously stated example of Major Gant’s work with Tribal
Engagement Strategies, there is also David Killcullen and Andrew Exum’s emphasis on eliminating
drone attacks in the region.18

There are obviously no guaranteed outcomes in a region as volatile as the Pashtun region of
Afghanistan and Pakistan. While defeating militants at gunpoint is the historical standard for
measuring success or failure in combat, detangling and defeating extremist ideas that have latched
onto century old customs and religious traditions is far more challenging.

Historically, governments have utilized the Machiavellian approach of supporting one group
against another. Yet, this approach has contributed to our current condition in Afghanistan
and Pakistan.

There are no short term answers to a long term engagement. In order to cultivate programs
and policies that are sustainable on the ground, it is critical that policy makers see things from
the Pashtun perspective, rather than through our Western lens.The war against the Taliban and
al-Qaeda cannot be won by military action alone. An awareness of the Pashtun history, culture
and traditions is absolutely imperative to future success in the region.

18. Death from above, outrage down below”, New York Times, 16 May 2009.


Team Leadership

As founder and managing director of one of Texas’ leading
public affairs firms, Mustafa Tameez is widely regarded as a
pioneer in ethnic marketing, advertising and political consulting.
With an unparalleled understanding of global challenges and
an ability to tailor and implement effective local solutions, he
has positioned Outreach Strategists as a recognized leader in
global public affairs and strategic communications. At a time
when cross-cultural communications are as crucial as ever,
Mustafa is uniquely qualified to help organizations, individuals
and corporations overcome the barriers standing before them
Mustafa Tameez and their goals.

Mustafa Tameez has advised members of Congress, big city
mayors and federal agencies on how to fight and win political
battles. And in the private sector his bottom-up approach and
keen insights have led to victories for both corporate and
non-profit institutions. He has a track record of skillfully guiding
clients through the most perilous of communications challenges
in a manner that is as quick, effective and efficient as his clients
need.

Mustafa’s numerous successful campaigns in the south have
garnered accolades from both regional and national publications.
Texas Monthly has dubbed him one of the most influential new
political players in Texas. His standing as an expert in the field of
communications and political strategy is based on an extensive
body of knowledge and deep professional experience.

His work as an advisor and senior consultant combines an
in-depth understanding of world affairs with long-range vision.
Mustafa brings his unique perspective to bear on issues ranging
from contemporary South Asian and Middle Eastern policy
to emerging population shifts in the developing world. He also
remains a strongly rooted pillar of the Houston community,
having served on the Board of the Houston Zoo, as current
President of the South Asian Chamber of Commerce, and as a
Senior Fellow at the Institute for Sustainable Peace.


Team Leadership

Randall Butler is a highly trained expert at using peaceful
conflict resolution to avoid potentially violent situations. In
order to ameliorate cultural and societal violence Randall has
dedicated his life’s work to the belief that building a sustainable
peace is possible and that conflicts can be overcome through
collaborative interaction between hostile groups. Randall’s work
has transcended borders, languages, and historic cultural divides
and has led to powerful breakthroughs for the individuals and
groups involved.

Randall’s expertise and accomplishments building
Randall Butler rapprochement and progress stretch from communities in
the Balkans, to the Sudan, to the United States. Under his
careful supervision members of the warring Serbian and Croat
communities have been able to resolve their historical enmity
and emerged stronger for the experience. His efforts to guide
members of the Sudanese Diaspora toward reconciliation
have been a major step in easing hostilities and moving this
group toward stability. Randall has also fostered productive
dialogue between Jewish and Muslim communities in the United
States, creating ripples in the struggle toward peace overseas.
The cumulative effect of Randall’s work is to reorder the way
groups in conflict manage differences so they do not erupt into
violence, bloodshed and chaos.

The process of building and maintaining a lasting peace between
warring peoples requires the unique combination of training,
education, and experience that Randall now brings to his
role overseeing the Conflict Resolution practice at Outreach
Strategists. Randall’s previous work as a partner and litigator at
Fulbright and Jaworski and Cook, Butler, Doyle has given him
the necessary insights into the diplomatic process of arbitration.
While his extensive background as an ambassador for and
master practitioner of peaceful, non-violent dispute mediation
led him to found the Institute for Sustainable Peace.


Team Leadership

Huma comes to Outreach Strategists with over 20 years of
experience in the area of environmental law and policy. As an
environmental attorney, she represented government entities
and corporate clients on environmental regulatory, liability,
and public policy issues. While working in Washington, D.C.,
Huma worked with Congressional members to reform New
Source Review legislation and reforms to the 1996 CERCLA
legislation. In addition to her environmental work, Huma has
logged countless hours in the area of community outreach and
engagement with disenfranchised communities. Her language
Huma Ahmed skills include French, Spanish, Arabic and fluency in Urdu. Huma
Ahmed has a Masters Degree in Public Administration and a
J.D. and is licensed to practice law. She currently serves as the
Director of Program Development and General Counsel for
Outreach Strategists, LLC.

Dan Grant is an expert in post- and continuing-conflict areas
around the globe, particularly in the Islamic world. He has had
extensive experience in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq,
and worked on the stabilization and democratization of each
of those countries. Dan served as an advisor to the John Kerry
Presidential campaign as an Afghanistan policy advisor, and
helped lead the largest Iraqi out-of-country voting program
in 2005. Dan has consulted for the United States Defense
Department on cultural and political training for American
forces en route to Iraq and Afghanistan, and, at the direction
Dan Grant of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, has worked for the Unites
States Department of State as a specialist on the 2009 Afghan
elections. His expertise and deep professional assistance have
aided him in over a dozen international elections. He is a
graduate of the Georgetown School of Foreign Service and
The London School of Economics.


Outreach Strategists, LLC is a global public affairs and strategic communications firm. We specialize in
international public relations, conflict solutions, risk management and global grassroots consulting.
Whether promoting a concept, a candidate, or a public relations campaign, we are known for
high impact strategies. Online, on the ground, or in the airwaves - from local
neighborhoods to the global public square, we know how to move public opinion
and work with divergent, ethnic communities. In a volatile world, this is why our clients
count on us to turn high-risk situations into ones of high reward.

Our Approach
Ethnic and religious minority communities are becoming increasingly important both
to Western governments and to the business sector. They are growing in number,
significance, voice, and impact. At the center of this generation’s most complex and
important challenges are Asian and Muslim communities. As we are seeing, when key
segments of our society are left outside of the mainstream, deep cultural rifts emerge.
We advise public agencies and private enterprises on how to
bridge these divides by connecting critical stakeholders across the
United States, Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Our unique,
effective, winning approach to communications is built on a strong foundation of
cultural understanding, trust and innovation.


Board of Advisors
Mayor Lee Brown Colonel Rick Noriega
A prominent leader in national law enforcement, Colonel Noriega is a graduate of Harvard University
Lee Brown served as the United States Drug Czar and has spent three decades in the U.S. Armed Forces,
in President Bill Clinton’s cabinet. During his long during which he served as Garrison Commander
career as the Chief of Police for New York, Atlanta, of the Kabul Military Training Sector in 2004 and
and Houston, he earned a reputation for being a Commander of the Laredo Border Sector during the
prolific reformer. Brown was elected to 3 terms as summer of 2006. Noriega has served 5 terms in the
the Mayor of Houston where he built on his success Texas House of Representatives where he chaired the
fighting crime and implementing unique community Committee on Defense Affairs and Federal Relations.
policing solutions. A widely published author and He ran for the United States Senate in 2008.
criminal justice expert, Brown also holds a Doctorate
in Criminology. Paula Arnold
Over a distinguished 30-year career, Arnold has been
Congressman Nick Lampson elected as a Houston Independent School District
Nick Lampson served 5 terms in the United States Board Member, serving as President of the Board on
Congress representing the 9th and 22nd Districts of one of the largest school districts in the United States.
Texas (containing the highest percentage of Asian She has a diverse background in advocacy in the
and Muslim-Americans of any Congressional district private sector on behalf of educational issues, family
in Texas). Lampson was the founder of the Missing violence initiatives and telecommunications regulatory
and Exploited Children’s Caucus. As Chairman of reform. Arnold also serves on the board of Center for
the House Science Subcommittee on Energy and the Reform of School Systems.
the Environment, Lampson outlined and pursued
ambitious plans for alternative energy that also took Adnaan Muslim
into account the needs of the energy companies and Adnaan Muslim is an expert in the field of political and
their employees who he represented. cross-cultural communications. He is a partner and
Creative Director at Mission Control, a leading U.S.
political consulting, direct mail advertising agency. He
has worked on successful campaigns at every level of
American government and is an expert in persuasive
political advertising



www.outreachstrategists.com
Outreach Strategists, LLC
909 Texas Avenue #1218
Houston, Texas 77002
713.247.9600 Tel
713.247.9605 Fax

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