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Identifying and
Removing
Malwares
FOR BEGINNERS
n|uNullMeetDharamsala
1
July2014
Agenda
 @me
 Light
 Operating System
 User Mode
 Kernel Mode
 Camera
 Malware
 History
 Types
 Properties
 &Action
 Take
n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
2
July 2014
@me
 Malware Analyst
 Can protect my Web Applications.
 Know of: C, C++, Java, Ruby, Python
 I “google” a lot.
 badboy16a@gmail.com
 @_badbot
 *PC Gamer*
n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
3
July 2014
Light, Camera, Action
 Light
 Relevant Information about OS
 Some historical information
 Camera
 Statistics
 Predictions
 Action
 Finding and acting on clues
 Take
 Recommendations
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
4
“Ware”
n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
5
July 2014
Malware
A software that
performs
unintended actions
without user
consent.
n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
6
July 2014
Operating System
n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
7
July 2014
Operating System
Hardware
Operating
System
Application
User
Command
n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
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July 2014
Operating System
Hardware
Device
Driver
Kernel
Programs
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July 2014
Memory Model
Real Memory
 Exact amount of installed
H/W RAM.
 Fixed size.
 Shared among everything
running in system.
 Backed by H/W
 Protected by OS
Virtual Memory
 Amount of RAM perceived
by every process.
 Variable size.
 Owned exclusively.
 Backed by OS Memory
Management.
 Mixed Protection.
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
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Memory Model
User Mode
 Unprotected
 Program code/data
 Un-privileged
 Exclusive for process
 Swappable
 Libraries(.dll, .so, …)
Kernel Mode
 Protected
 Kernel code/data
 Privileged
 Shared in real space
 Mostly not-swappable
 Drivers(.drv, .sys, .ko,…)
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
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0x00000000-0x7FFFFFFF 0X80000000 – 0xFFFFFFFF
Windows Access Levels
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
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•Own Processes
•Other User’s Processes
User
•User Access
•Other User’s Processes
•Unrestricted Access
Administrator
•Administrative Access.
•Unrestricted Access to Local System.
NT_AUTHORITY
SYSTEM
Windows Registry
 Configuration Database.
 Key  [Key] Value[or Default] = [Data]
 Permanent and Transient Keys
 Derived Keys
 Root Keys:
 CLASSES_ROOT
 LOCAL_MACHINE
 USERS
 CURRENT_USER
 CURRENT_CONFIG
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
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Windows Executables
 PE (based on COFF) file format.
 File starts with “MZ”
 Entry point defined in header.
 Typically used extensions
 EXE: Normal Executable
 DLL: Dynamic link library
 LIB: Static Library
 SYS: Driver
 OCX: ActiveX Controls (special purpose DLL)
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
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Malware
 Software programs designed to damage or do
unwanted actions on a computer system. In
Spanish, "mal" is a prefix that means "bad," making
the term "badware“.
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
15
Malware
Malicious Software
Malware Evolution
1948
Self-
Reproducing
Automata
-John Von Neumann
1970Creeper
-PDP-10
-Bob Thomas
-Reaper
1975
The
Shockwave
Rider
-Xerox
- John Shock & John
Hepps
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
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Malware Evolution
1981
Elk-
Cloner
•Apple DOS 3.3
• 15 year old
1986
Brain
•PC-DOS
• Alvi Brothers
1988
Morris
• UNIX Finger
service
• Robert Morris
1995
Concept
• MS Word
• Macro Virus
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
17
Malware Evolution
2000
I LOVE
YOU
•VBScript
• Reomel
Lamores
2004
Cabir
•Symbian OS
2007-2008
Zeus
Conficker
2010
Stuxnet
• SCADA
Systems
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
18
Malware Evolution
2011
Duqu,
Anti
Spyware
2011
2012
Flame
2013
Cyptolocker
BlackPOS
Dexter
vSkimmer
2014
Dragonfly
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
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Malware Statistics
 Categories that Delivered Malicious Code, 2013 : Symantec
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
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Malware Statistics
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
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Malware Statistics
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
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Malware Predictions
 More attack binaries will use stolen or valid code
signature.
 Browser vulnerabilities may be more common.
 Cybercrime gets personal.
 More targeted attacks.
 More stealthier techniques for C&C.
 Expect more malicious code in BIOS and firmware
updates.
 64bit Malwares.
 Malware Diversifies and Specializes.
 Sandbox Evasion.
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
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Malware Classification
 Worm
 Propagates by itself on different machine.
 Virus
 Attaches itself to targets. Infects other systems when target moves.
 Trojan
 Masquerades itself as legitimate/useful software.
 Spyware
 Spies on your data and send it to controller.
 Adware
 Displays unwanted/unsolicited advertisements.
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
24
Malware Classification
 Ransomware
 Locks access to your systems or files and demands ransom for
further access.
 Backdoor(Remote Administration Toolkit):
 Allows unauthorized remote user connect to and control your
system.
 Downloader
 Primary payload for exploits. Download/Installs other malwares.
 Rootkit
 Interferes with kernel to hide itself from user and security tools.
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
25
Malware Lifecycle
 Infection
 It has to infect the target. First run.
 Persistence
 It has to persist. Cannot be downloaded every time.
 Run
 It has to run. Preferably without user action e.g. Boot,
Timed…
 Hide
 Hide itself from naked eye.
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
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&Action
 Almost at every stage malwares leave clues.
 Identify Clues.
 Identify Malware.
 Remove Malware.
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
27
Infection
 Exploitation:
 Using vulnerabilities to achieve code execution.
 Vulnerable program crashes/restarts most of the time.
 External Media
 Carried to the target system using external media e.g. USB
Stick.
 Un-mounting the media usually fails.
 E-mail Attachments
 Sent via email attachment.
 Grammatical/Spelling mistakes. Duplicate e-mail.
Attachments with double extension, wrong extension.
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
28
Persistence
 Files
 Stored as files.
 Cryptic file names.
 Known file names in unexpected locations.
 Misspelled file name.
 Streams
 Data is stored as NTFS alternate stream.
 Pathname containing ‘:’ character.
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
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Run & Hide
 Hiding in plain sight.
 An entry in process list.
 Unknown process name.
 Unexpected Process.
 Process binary at unusual location.
 Process with unexpected user account/privilege.
 Hiding deep inside
 No entry in process list.
 Unexpected library.
 Unusual usage of system resources.
 Re-appearance of some files after deletion.
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
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Detection Difficulty
Hardware
Kernel
Device Driver
User Programs
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
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Sysinternal Tools
 Sysinternal Suite
 Autoruns
 ListDll
 Handle
 Process Explorer
 Process Monitor
 RootkitRevealer
 Strings
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
32
Autoruns
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
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ListDLLs
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
34
Handle
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
35
Process Explorer
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
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Process Monitor
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
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Rootkit Revealer
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
38
Strings
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
39
Other Tools
 GMER
 Redline
 Kaspersky Virus Fighting Utilities
 TDSS Killer
 McAfee Stinger
 Sophos Anti-Rootkit
 Norton Power Eraser
 Trend Micro House Call
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
40
GMER
 By default downloads
with random file name.
 Similar to Rootkit Revealer
 More signature and
parameters to look into.
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
41
Redline
 Separate data
collection and
analysis system.
 Collector can run
from removable
media.
 Verifies against
hashes of known
good modules.
 Reporting
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
42
Take
 Antivirus Not Enough
 Understand
 Be Updated
 Be Paranoid
 Don’t Trust
 Protect
 Backup
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
43
The END
 All the images, statistics, data belong to their respective owners (including me).
July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala
44

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Identifying and Removing Malwares

  • 2. Agenda  @me  Light  Operating System  User Mode  Kernel Mode  Camera  Malware  History  Types  Properties  &Action  Take n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 2 July 2014
  • 3. @me  Malware Analyst  Can protect my Web Applications.  Know of: C, C++, Java, Ruby, Python  I “google” a lot.  badboy16a@gmail.com  @_badbot  *PC Gamer* n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 3 July 2014
  • 4. Light, Camera, Action  Light  Relevant Information about OS  Some historical information  Camera  Statistics  Predictions  Action  Finding and acting on clues  Take  Recommendations July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 4
  • 5. “Ware” n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 5 July 2014
  • 6. Malware A software that performs unintended actions without user consent. n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 6 July 2014
  • 7. Operating System n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 7 July 2014
  • 10. Memory Model Real Memory  Exact amount of installed H/W RAM.  Fixed size.  Shared among everything running in system.  Backed by H/W  Protected by OS Virtual Memory  Amount of RAM perceived by every process.  Variable size.  Owned exclusively.  Backed by OS Memory Management.  Mixed Protection. July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 10
  • 11. Memory Model User Mode  Unprotected  Program code/data  Un-privileged  Exclusive for process  Swappable  Libraries(.dll, .so, …) Kernel Mode  Protected  Kernel code/data  Privileged  Shared in real space  Mostly not-swappable  Drivers(.drv, .sys, .ko,…) July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 11 0x00000000-0x7FFFFFFF 0X80000000 – 0xFFFFFFFF
  • 12. Windows Access Levels July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 12 •Own Processes •Other User’s Processes User •User Access •Other User’s Processes •Unrestricted Access Administrator •Administrative Access. •Unrestricted Access to Local System. NT_AUTHORITY SYSTEM
  • 13. Windows Registry  Configuration Database.  Key  [Key] Value[or Default] = [Data]  Permanent and Transient Keys  Derived Keys  Root Keys:  CLASSES_ROOT  LOCAL_MACHINE  USERS  CURRENT_USER  CURRENT_CONFIG July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 13
  • 14. Windows Executables  PE (based on COFF) file format.  File starts with “MZ”  Entry point defined in header.  Typically used extensions  EXE: Normal Executable  DLL: Dynamic link library  LIB: Static Library  SYS: Driver  OCX: ActiveX Controls (special purpose DLL) July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 14
  • 15. Malware  Software programs designed to damage or do unwanted actions on a computer system. In Spanish, "mal" is a prefix that means "bad," making the term "badware“. July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 15 Malware Malicious Software
  • 16. Malware Evolution 1948 Self- Reproducing Automata -John Von Neumann 1970Creeper -PDP-10 -Bob Thomas -Reaper 1975 The Shockwave Rider -Xerox - John Shock & John Hepps July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 16
  • 17. Malware Evolution 1981 Elk- Cloner •Apple DOS 3.3 • 15 year old 1986 Brain •PC-DOS • Alvi Brothers 1988 Morris • UNIX Finger service • Robert Morris 1995 Concept • MS Word • Macro Virus July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 17
  • 18. Malware Evolution 2000 I LOVE YOU •VBScript • Reomel Lamores 2004 Cabir •Symbian OS 2007-2008 Zeus Conficker 2010 Stuxnet • SCADA Systems July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 18
  • 20. Malware Statistics  Categories that Delivered Malicious Code, 2013 : Symantec July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 20
  • 21. Malware Statistics July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 21
  • 22. Malware Statistics July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 22
  • 23. Malware Predictions  More attack binaries will use stolen or valid code signature.  Browser vulnerabilities may be more common.  Cybercrime gets personal.  More targeted attacks.  More stealthier techniques for C&C.  Expect more malicious code in BIOS and firmware updates.  64bit Malwares.  Malware Diversifies and Specializes.  Sandbox Evasion. July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 23
  • 24. Malware Classification  Worm  Propagates by itself on different machine.  Virus  Attaches itself to targets. Infects other systems when target moves.  Trojan  Masquerades itself as legitimate/useful software.  Spyware  Spies on your data and send it to controller.  Adware  Displays unwanted/unsolicited advertisements. July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 24
  • 25. Malware Classification  Ransomware  Locks access to your systems or files and demands ransom for further access.  Backdoor(Remote Administration Toolkit):  Allows unauthorized remote user connect to and control your system.  Downloader  Primary payload for exploits. Download/Installs other malwares.  Rootkit  Interferes with kernel to hide itself from user and security tools. July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 25
  • 26. Malware Lifecycle  Infection  It has to infect the target. First run.  Persistence  It has to persist. Cannot be downloaded every time.  Run  It has to run. Preferably without user action e.g. Boot, Timed…  Hide  Hide itself from naked eye. July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 26
  • 27. &Action  Almost at every stage malwares leave clues.  Identify Clues.  Identify Malware.  Remove Malware. July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 27
  • 28. Infection  Exploitation:  Using vulnerabilities to achieve code execution.  Vulnerable program crashes/restarts most of the time.  External Media  Carried to the target system using external media e.g. USB Stick.  Un-mounting the media usually fails.  E-mail Attachments  Sent via email attachment.  Grammatical/Spelling mistakes. Duplicate e-mail. Attachments with double extension, wrong extension. July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 28
  • 29. Persistence  Files  Stored as files.  Cryptic file names.  Known file names in unexpected locations.  Misspelled file name.  Streams  Data is stored as NTFS alternate stream.  Pathname containing ‘:’ character. July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 29
  • 30. Run & Hide  Hiding in plain sight.  An entry in process list.  Unknown process name.  Unexpected Process.  Process binary at unusual location.  Process with unexpected user account/privilege.  Hiding deep inside  No entry in process list.  Unexpected library.  Unusual usage of system resources.  Re-appearance of some files after deletion. July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 30
  • 31. Detection Difficulty Hardware Kernel Device Driver User Programs July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 31
  • 32. Sysinternal Tools  Sysinternal Suite  Autoruns  ListDll  Handle  Process Explorer  Process Monitor  RootkitRevealer  Strings July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 32
  • 33. Autoruns July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 33
  • 34. ListDLLs July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 34
  • 35. Handle July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 35
  • 36. Process Explorer July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 36
  • 37. Process Monitor July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 37
  • 38. Rootkit Revealer July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 38
  • 39. Strings July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 39
  • 40. Other Tools  GMER  Redline  Kaspersky Virus Fighting Utilities  TDSS Killer  McAfee Stinger  Sophos Anti-Rootkit  Norton Power Eraser  Trend Micro House Call July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 40
  • 41. GMER  By default downloads with random file name.  Similar to Rootkit Revealer  More signature and parameters to look into. July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 41
  • 42. Redline  Separate data collection and analysis system.  Collector can run from removable media.  Verifies against hashes of known good modules.  Reporting July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 42
  • 43. Take  Antivirus Not Enough  Understand  Be Updated  Be Paranoid  Don’t Trust  Protect  Backup July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 43
  • 44. The END  All the images, statistics, data belong to their respective owners (including me). July 2014n|u Null Meet Dharamsala 44