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Developer Conference 2011 MICROSOFT USER GROUP HYDERABAD
It is this easy to steal your click! (Secure Web Development) Krishna Chaitanya T Security & Privacy Research Lab, Infosys Labs Microsoft MVP - Internet Explorer http://novogeek.com | @novogeek
Agenda! Saw these on Facebook? Your genuine web page can be victim as well! Lets secure!!
Clickjacking Discovered in 2008-Robert Hansen, Jeremiah Grossman Forces a victim to unintentionally click on invisible page Made possible by overlaying transparent layers Basic clickjacking:  Positioning via CSS (JS not required!)  Follow mouse cursor via JS Advanced techniques: Clickjacking + XSS Clickjacking + CSRF Clickjacking + HTML5 Drag/Drop API
The mischievous <iFrame> tag A web page can embed another web page via iframe <iframesrc="http://bing.com"></iframe> CSS opacity attribute: 1 = visible, 0 = invisible
Clickjacking using CSS & JS demo
Frame Busting! Techniques for preventing your site from being framed Common frame busting code: if (top != self) {		   //condition top.location = self.location; 	   //counter action }
Survey Acknowledgement:All survey content from Stanford Web Security Research Lab
What’s wrong? Walmart.com  if (top.location != location) {   if(document.referrer && document.referrer.indexOf("walmart.com") == -1) 	{  top.location.replace(document.location.href); }  } USBank.com if (self != top) { var domain = getDomain(document.referrer); varokDomains = /usbank|localhost|usbnet/; domain.search(okDomains);if (matchDomain == -1) { 		       /* frame bust	*/   }  } Many if(top.location != self.location) { parent.location= self.location;   } ,[object Object]
Error in Referrer checking. Attacker URL can be: http://usbank.attacker.com
‘parent’ refers to the window available one level higher. So Double framing will break this.,[object Object]
Prevents XSS
Prevents Defacement
Facilitates clickjacking!onBeforeUnloadEvent <h1>www.attacker.com</h1> <script> window.onbeforeunload = function() {     return "Do you want to leave your favorite site?"; } </script> <iframesrc="http://www.paypal.com"> XSS Filters ,[object Object],<iframesrc="http://www.example.org/?xyz=%3Cscript%20type=%22text/javascript%22%3 Eif"></iframe> 204-HTTP header varprevent_bust = 0 window.onbeforeunload = function() {kill_bust++ } setInterval(function() { 	if (kill_bust > 0) { kill_bust -= 2; window.top.location = 'http://no-content-204.com' 	} }, 1); <iframesrc="http://www.victim.com"> Mobile sites ,[object Object]
What about their mobile versions?,[object Object]
X-Frame-Options The savior! Innovative idea introduced by Microsoft in IE8 HTTP header sent on response. Possible values- “DENY” and “SAMEORIGIN” Implemented by most of the modern browsers Need not depend on JavaScript! Ex: Response.AddHeader("X-Frame-Options", "DENY"); Limitations: Poor adoption by sites (Coz of developer ignorance!) No whitelisting – Either block all, or allow all. Nevertheless, advantages outweigh disadvantages. Content Security Policy (CSP) introduced by Mozilla
Best JS solution <style>html { visibility: hidden }</style> <script> if (self == top) { document.documentElement.style.visibility = 'visible'; } else { top.location = self.location;	 } </script>
Frame Busting (X - Frame - Options & JavaScript solutions) demo

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Secure your site from clickjacking attacks

  • 1. Developer Conference 2011 MICROSOFT USER GROUP HYDERABAD
  • 2. It is this easy to steal your click! (Secure Web Development) Krishna Chaitanya T Security & Privacy Research Lab, Infosys Labs Microsoft MVP - Internet Explorer http://novogeek.com | @novogeek
  • 3. Agenda! Saw these on Facebook? Your genuine web page can be victim as well! Lets secure!!
  • 4. Clickjacking Discovered in 2008-Robert Hansen, Jeremiah Grossman Forces a victim to unintentionally click on invisible page Made possible by overlaying transparent layers Basic clickjacking: Positioning via CSS (JS not required!) Follow mouse cursor via JS Advanced techniques: Clickjacking + XSS Clickjacking + CSRF Clickjacking + HTML5 Drag/Drop API
  • 5. The mischievous <iFrame> tag A web page can embed another web page via iframe <iframesrc="http://bing.com"></iframe> CSS opacity attribute: 1 = visible, 0 = invisible
  • 7. Frame Busting! Techniques for preventing your site from being framed Common frame busting code: if (top != self) { //condition top.location = self.location; //counter action }
  • 8. Survey Acknowledgement:All survey content from Stanford Web Security Research Lab
  • 9.
  • 10. Error in Referrer checking. Attacker URL can be: http://usbank.attacker.com
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  • 16. X-Frame-Options The savior! Innovative idea introduced by Microsoft in IE8 HTTP header sent on response. Possible values- “DENY” and “SAMEORIGIN” Implemented by most of the modern browsers Need not depend on JavaScript! Ex: Response.AddHeader("X-Frame-Options", "DENY"); Limitations: Poor adoption by sites (Coz of developer ignorance!) No whitelisting – Either block all, or allow all. Nevertheless, advantages outweigh disadvantages. Content Security Policy (CSP) introduced by Mozilla
  • 17. Best JS solution <style>html { visibility: hidden }</style> <script> if (self == top) { document.documentElement.style.visibility = 'visible'; } else { top.location = self.location; } </script>
  • 18. Frame Busting (X - Frame - Options & JavaScript solutions) demo
  • 19. Its your turn now! Are your sites clickjacking proof? Think about a one-click approval button being clickjacked! Go back and add X-Frame-Options header to your web projects at office (and earn goodwill of your boss ) If you are on old browsers, have JS protection in place If a link on Facebook opens a new window, be highly cautious and avoid clicking. Inquisitive? Check for hidden <iframe> ;) Check your social apps and revoke access if not used. We learnt to break things to build better things. Ethics plz!
  • 20. References “Busting frame busting: a study of clickjacking vulnerabilities at popular sites” – Research paper by Stanford Web Security researchers. Birth of a Security Feature: ClickJackingDefense-IE Blog IE8 Security part VII – Clickjacking Defenses – IE Blog
  • 21. I’m Done! Blog: novogeek.com Twitter: @novogeek