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Planning the OWASP Testing
          Guide v4
Matteo Meucci, Giorgio Fedon, Pavol Luptak
AG E N DA   • Few words about the TG
              history and adoption by
              the Companies
            • Why we need the
              Common Numbering
              and Common
              Vulnerability list
            • Update the set of test
            • V4 Roadmap
What is the OWASP Testing Guide?

      Where are we now?
Testing Guide history
• January 2004
   – "The OWASP Testing Guide", Version 1.0
• July 14, 2004
   – "OWASP Web Application Penetration Checklist", Version 1.1
• December 25, 2006
   – "OWASP Testing Guide", Version 2.0
• December 16, 2008
   – "OWASP Testing Guide", Version 3.0 – Released at the OWASP Summit
     08
Project Complexity
                      Pages
400
350
300
250
200
                                        Pages
150
100
 50
  0
      v1       v1.1           v2   v3
OWASP Testing Guide v3




• SANS Top 20 2007
• NIST “Technical Guide to Information Security Testing (Draft)”
• Gary McGraw (CTO Cigital) says: “In my opinion it is the strongest piece of Intellectual Property in the
OWASP portfolio” – OWASP Podcast by Jim Manico
Testing Guide v3: Index


1. Frontispiece
2. Introduction
3. The OWASP Testing Framework
4. Web Application Penetration Testing
5. Writing Reports: value the real risk
Appendix A: Testing Tools
Appendix B: Suggested Reading
Appendix C: Fuzz Vectors
Appendix D: Encoded Injection
What are the difference between the OWASP Testing
Guide and another book about WebApp PenTesting?
Web Application Penetration Testing
•   OWASP Testing Guide is driven by our Community
•   It’s related to the other OWASP guides

•   Our approach in writing this guide
    – Open
    – Collaborative


•   Defined testing methodology
    – Consistent
    – Repeatable
    – Under quality




9
Testing Guide Categories & vulnerability list
What we need now to improve the v3 and plan the
                     v4?
OWASP Common Vulnerability List




      We need a common vulnerability list


                                            12
Looking at the Testing Guide Categories & vulnerability list
The new team
Andrew Muller            Mike Hryekewicz
Aung KhAnt               Nick Freeman
Cecil Su                 Norbert Szetei
Colin Watson             Paolo Perego
Daniel Cuthbert          Pavol Luptak
Giorgio Fedon            Psiinon
Jason Flood              Ray Schippers
Javier Marcos de Prado   Robert Smith
Juan Galiana Lara        Robert Winkel
Kenan Gursoy             Roberto Suggi Liverani
Kevin Horvat             Sebastien Gioria
Lode Vanstechelman       Stefano Di Paola
Marco Morana             Sumit Siddharth
Matt Churchy             Thomas Ryan
Matteo Meucci            Tim Bertels
Michael Boman            Tripurari Rai
                         Wagner Elias
Proposed v4 list: let’s discuss it
Category         Vulnerability name                             Where implemented   Source
Information
Gathering        Information Disclosure                         TG, ecc, --> link   TG
Configuration
and Deploy       Infrastructure Configuration management
Management       weakness                                                           TG
                 Application Configuration management
                 weakness                                                           TG
                 File extensions handling                                           TG
                 Old, backup and unreferenced files                                 TG
                 Access to Admin interfaces                                         TG
                 Bad HTTP Methods enabled, (XST permitted:
                 to eliminate or                                                    TG
                 Informative Error Messages
                 Database credentials/connection strings
                 available

Business logic   Business Logic                                                     TG
                 Credentials transport over an unencrypted
Authentication   channel                                                            TG
                 User enumeration (also Guessable user
                 account)                                                           TG
                 Default passwords                                                  TG
                 Weak lock out mechanism                                            new TG
                 Account lockout DoS
                 Bypassing authentication schema                                    TG
                 Directory traversal/file include                                   TG
                 vulnerable remember password                                       TG
                 Logout function not properly implemented,
                 browser cache weakness                                             TG
                 Weak Password policy                                               New TG
                 Weak username policy                                               New Anurag
                 weak security question answer                                      New
                  Failure to Restrict access to authenticated
                 resource                                                           New Top10
                 Weak password change function                                      New Vishal
Proposed v4 list: let’s discuss it (2)
Authorization     Path Traversal                                TG
                  Bypassing authorization schema                TG
                  Privilege Escalation                          TG
                  Insecure Direct Object References             Top10 2010
                   Failure to Restrict access to authorized
                  resource                                      TG
Session
Managment         Bypassing Session Management Schema           TG
                  Weak Session Token                            TG
                  Cookies are set not ‘HTTP Only’, ‘Secure’,
                  and no time validity                          TG
                  Exposed sensitive session variables           TG
                  CSRF
                  Session passed over http                      Vishal
                  Session token within URL                      Vishal
                  Session Fixation                              Vishal
                  Session token not removed on server after
                  logout                                        Vishal
                  Persistent session token                      Vishal
                  Session token not restrcited properly (such
                  as domain or path not set properly)           Vishal
Data Validation   Reflected XSS                                 TG
                  Stored XSS                                    TG - Vishal
                  HTTP Verb Tampering                           new TG
                  HTTP Parameter pollution                      new TG
                  Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards            T10 2010: new TG
                  SQL Injection                                 TG
                  SQL Fingerprinting
                  LDAP Injection                                TG
                  ORM Injection                                 TG
                  XML Injection                                 TG
                  SSI Injection                                 TG
                  XPath Injection                               TG
                  SOAP Injection
                  IMAP/SMTP Injection                           TG
                  Code Injection                                TG
                  OS Commanding                                 TG
                  Buffer overflow
                  Incubated vulnerability
                  HTTP Splitting/Smuggling
Proposed v4 list: let’s discuss it (3)
Data Encryption? Application did not use encryption
                 Weak SSL/TSL Ciphers, Insufficient
                 Transport Layer Protection
                 Cacheable HTTPS Response
                 Cache directives insecure
                 Insecure Cryptographic Storage               only SCR guide   T10 2010: new TG
                 Sensitive information sent via unencrypted
                 channels
XML interpreter? Weak XML Structure
                 XML content-level
                 WS HTTP GET parameters/REST
                 WS Naughty SOAP attachments
                 WS Replay Testing
Client side?     DOM XSS                                                       TG
                 Cross Site Flashing                                           TG
                 ClickHijacking                                                new TG
Proposed v4 news from Pavol

- add new opensource testing tools that appeared during last 3 years
(and are missing in the OWASP Testing Guide v3)

- add few useful and life-scenarios of possible
vulnerabilities in Bussiness Logic Testing (many testers have no idea what
vulnerabilities in Business Logic exactly mean)

- "Brute force testing" of "session ID" is missing in "Session Management
Testing", describe other tools for Session ID entropy analysis
(e.g. Stompy)

- in "Data Validation Testing" describe some basic obfuscation methods for
malicious code injection including the statements how it is possible to
detect it (web application obfuscation is quite succesfull in bypassing
many data validation controls)

- split the phase Logout and Browser Cache Management" into two sections
Roadmap
•   Review all the control numbers to adhere to
    the OWASP Common numbering,
•   Review all the sections in v3,
•   Create a more readable guide, eliminating some
    sections that are not really useful,
•   Insert new testing techniques: HTTP Verb
    tampering, HTTP Parameter Pollutions, etc.,
•   Rationalize some sections as Session
    Management Testing,
•   Create a new section: Client side security and
    Firefox extensions testing?
Questions?

http://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Testing_Project
              matteo.meucci@owasp.org




                    Thanks!!

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Planning the OWASP Testing Guide v4 Update

  • 1. Planning the OWASP Testing Guide v4 Matteo Meucci, Giorgio Fedon, Pavol Luptak
  • 2. AG E N DA • Few words about the TG history and adoption by the Companies • Why we need the Common Numbering and Common Vulnerability list • Update the set of test • V4 Roadmap
  • 3. What is the OWASP Testing Guide? Where are we now?
  • 4. Testing Guide history • January 2004 – "The OWASP Testing Guide", Version 1.0 • July 14, 2004 – "OWASP Web Application Penetration Checklist", Version 1.1 • December 25, 2006 – "OWASP Testing Guide", Version 2.0 • December 16, 2008 – "OWASP Testing Guide", Version 3.0 – Released at the OWASP Summit 08
  • 5. Project Complexity Pages 400 350 300 250 200 Pages 150 100 50 0 v1 v1.1 v2 v3
  • 6. OWASP Testing Guide v3 • SANS Top 20 2007 • NIST “Technical Guide to Information Security Testing (Draft)” • Gary McGraw (CTO Cigital) says: “In my opinion it is the strongest piece of Intellectual Property in the OWASP portfolio” – OWASP Podcast by Jim Manico
  • 7. Testing Guide v3: Index 1. Frontispiece 2. Introduction 3. The OWASP Testing Framework 4. Web Application Penetration Testing 5. Writing Reports: value the real risk Appendix A: Testing Tools Appendix B: Suggested Reading Appendix C: Fuzz Vectors Appendix D: Encoded Injection
  • 8. What are the difference between the OWASP Testing Guide and another book about WebApp PenTesting?
  • 9. Web Application Penetration Testing • OWASP Testing Guide is driven by our Community • It’s related to the other OWASP guides • Our approach in writing this guide – Open – Collaborative • Defined testing methodology – Consistent – Repeatable – Under quality 9
  • 10. Testing Guide Categories & vulnerability list
  • 11. What we need now to improve the v3 and plan the v4?
  • 12. OWASP Common Vulnerability List We need a common vulnerability list 12
  • 13. Looking at the Testing Guide Categories & vulnerability list
  • 15. Andrew Muller Mike Hryekewicz Aung KhAnt Nick Freeman Cecil Su Norbert Szetei Colin Watson Paolo Perego Daniel Cuthbert Pavol Luptak Giorgio Fedon Psiinon Jason Flood Ray Schippers Javier Marcos de Prado Robert Smith Juan Galiana Lara Robert Winkel Kenan Gursoy Roberto Suggi Liverani Kevin Horvat Sebastien Gioria Lode Vanstechelman Stefano Di Paola Marco Morana Sumit Siddharth Matt Churchy Thomas Ryan Matteo Meucci Tim Bertels Michael Boman Tripurari Rai Wagner Elias
  • 16. Proposed v4 list: let’s discuss it Category Vulnerability name Where implemented Source Information Gathering Information Disclosure TG, ecc, --> link TG Configuration and Deploy Infrastructure Configuration management Management weakness TG Application Configuration management weakness TG File extensions handling TG Old, backup and unreferenced files TG Access to Admin interfaces TG Bad HTTP Methods enabled, (XST permitted: to eliminate or TG Informative Error Messages Database credentials/connection strings available Business logic Business Logic TG Credentials transport over an unencrypted Authentication channel TG User enumeration (also Guessable user account) TG Default passwords TG Weak lock out mechanism new TG Account lockout DoS Bypassing authentication schema TG Directory traversal/file include TG vulnerable remember password TG Logout function not properly implemented, browser cache weakness TG Weak Password policy New TG Weak username policy New Anurag weak security question answer New Failure to Restrict access to authenticated resource New Top10 Weak password change function New Vishal
  • 17. Proposed v4 list: let’s discuss it (2) Authorization Path Traversal TG Bypassing authorization schema TG Privilege Escalation TG Insecure Direct Object References Top10 2010 Failure to Restrict access to authorized resource TG Session Managment Bypassing Session Management Schema TG Weak Session Token TG Cookies are set not ‘HTTP Only’, ‘Secure’, and no time validity TG Exposed sensitive session variables TG CSRF Session passed over http Vishal Session token within URL Vishal Session Fixation Vishal Session token not removed on server after logout Vishal Persistent session token Vishal Session token not restrcited properly (such as domain or path not set properly) Vishal Data Validation Reflected XSS TG Stored XSS TG - Vishal HTTP Verb Tampering new TG HTTP Parameter pollution new TG Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards T10 2010: new TG SQL Injection TG SQL Fingerprinting LDAP Injection TG ORM Injection TG XML Injection TG SSI Injection TG XPath Injection TG SOAP Injection IMAP/SMTP Injection TG Code Injection TG OS Commanding TG Buffer overflow Incubated vulnerability HTTP Splitting/Smuggling
  • 18. Proposed v4 list: let’s discuss it (3) Data Encryption? Application did not use encryption Weak SSL/TSL Ciphers, Insufficient Transport Layer Protection Cacheable HTTPS Response Cache directives insecure Insecure Cryptographic Storage only SCR guide T10 2010: new TG Sensitive information sent via unencrypted channels XML interpreter? Weak XML Structure XML content-level WS HTTP GET parameters/REST WS Naughty SOAP attachments WS Replay Testing Client side? DOM XSS TG Cross Site Flashing TG ClickHijacking new TG
  • 19. Proposed v4 news from Pavol - add new opensource testing tools that appeared during last 3 years (and are missing in the OWASP Testing Guide v3) - add few useful and life-scenarios of possible vulnerabilities in Bussiness Logic Testing (many testers have no idea what vulnerabilities in Business Logic exactly mean) - "Brute force testing" of "session ID" is missing in "Session Management Testing", describe other tools for Session ID entropy analysis (e.g. Stompy) - in "Data Validation Testing" describe some basic obfuscation methods for malicious code injection including the statements how it is possible to detect it (web application obfuscation is quite succesfull in bypassing many data validation controls) - split the phase Logout and Browser Cache Management" into two sections
  • 20. Roadmap • Review all the control numbers to adhere to the OWASP Common numbering, • Review all the sections in v3, • Create a more readable guide, eliminating some sections that are not really useful, • Insert new testing techniques: HTTP Verb tampering, HTTP Parameter Pollutions, etc., • Rationalize some sections as Session Management Testing, • Create a new section: Client side security and Firefox extensions testing?