1. Economic Rights
and the
Indian Supreme Court
Colin Gonsalves
Human Rights Law Network
576, Masjid Road, Jangpura, New Delhi – 110014.
Ph.: +91-11-24379854, 24379855, 24379856, 24379857
Fax : +91-11-24374502, Email : colin.gonsalves@hrln.org
2. Two India’s
Population – 1.1 billion
Middle Class & Rich 250 m.
Parliament
‘Free’ press
Independent Judiciary
Poor - 760 m.
Everyday struggle for food,
shelter, healthcare, education
and employment. Treated
with indignity & violence on
a daily basis. Left with no
choice, the poor migrate
towards armed
struggle
groups.
3. Will the largest democracy in the
world move towards…
Increased equality ?
or
Increased poverty and anarchy ?
4. Statistical Jugglery
Artificially Lowered
Poverty Line…
•
According
to
the
Government of India and
the Planning Commission
the poverty line stands at €
8 per person per month. On
this basis the government
recently
declared
that
globalisation was successful
in India and that poverty
had reduced from 36% to
24%.
The Real Poverty Line…
• 74.5% of the population of
India does not consume the
stipulated 2400 calories per
person per day.
(Utsa Patnaik, Economist
and Professor , JNU using
NSS 2004 data)
5. Poverty in India
- 53% of children under four- years-old are
moderately or severely malnourished. (60 million)
- 30% of newborns are significantly underweight.
- 87% of pregnant women and 60% of young
children are anaemic.
(http://www.unicef.org/nutrition.html)
- Studies show lower consumption patterns, stunted
growth, small brains and increasing disability.
The UNDP Human Development Index Report
2004, covering 177 countries ranks India at 127.
6. Expanding the Meaning of the Right to Life
Francis Coralie Mullin Vs. The Administrator
[(1981) 2 SCR 516]
• Now obviously, the right to life enshrined in Article 21
cannot be restricted to mere animal existence. It means
something much more than just physical survival…(it
includes) the right to live with human dignity and all
that goes with it, namely, the bare necessaries of life
such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and
facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in
diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and
commingling with fellow human beings.
7. Broadening Of Locus Standi
S.P. Gupta Vs. Union of India
[(1981) Supp. SCC 87]
• Where a legal wrong…is caused to a person or to a
determinate class of persons by reason of violation of any
constitutional or legal right…and any such person or
determinate class of persons is by reason of poverty,
helplessness or disability or socially or economically
disadvantaged position, unable to approach the Court for
relief, any member of the public can maintain an
application for an appropriate direction, order or writ in
the High Court and, in case of breach of any fundamental
right, in this Court under Article 32 seeking judicial
redress.
8. Contd.
• Where the affected persons are really helpless the
Supreme Court will not insist on a regular writ
petition to be filed…the Court will readily respond
even to a letter addressed by such individual acting
pro bono publico, despite the fact that formal rules
exist with regard to filing of petitions…the Court has
to innovate new methods and devise new strategies for
the purpose of providing access to justice to large
masses of people who are denied their basic human
rights and to whom freedom and liberty have no
meaning….
9. Contd.
• But, the individual who moves the court for judicial redress
in cases of this kind must be acting bona fide with a view of
vindicating the cause of justice and if he is acting for
personal gain or private profit or out of political motivation
or some other oblique consideration, the court should not
allow itself to be activised at the instance of such person and
must reject his application at the threshold.
• The strict rule of standing which insists that only a person
who has suffered a specific legal injury can maintain an
action for judicial redress is relaxed and a broad rule is
evolved which gives standing to any member of the public
who is not a mere busybody or a meddlesome inter-loper
but one who has sufficient interest in the proceeding.
10. Contd.
• It is only by liberalising the rule of locus standi that it
is possible to effectively police the corridor of power
and prevent violations of law. The oppression might be
financial, commercial, corporate or governmental.
• Members of the Bar have a vital stake in the
functioning of the judiciary. Members of the Bar and
even litigants whose cases have remained undisposed
for a long number of years on account of the
Government not appointing sufficient number of
Judges can therefore file a petition demanding
appointment of sufficient number of permanent
Judges in High Courts.
11. PILs and the Gathering of Evidence
Bandhua Mukti Morcha Vs. Union of India
[(1984) 3 SCC 161]
•
We have no more occasions than one said that public interest litigation
is not in the nature of adversary litigation but it is a challenge and an
opportunity to the Government and its officers to make basic human
rights meaningful to the deprived and vulnerable sections of the
community…The Government and its officers must welcome public
interest litigation…This right to live with human dignity enshrined in
Article 21…include protection of the health and strength of workers,
men and women, and of the tender age of children against abuse,
opportunities and facilities for children to develop in a healthy manner
and in conditions of freedom and dignity, educational facilities, just
and humane conditions of work and maternity relief….
12. Contd.
• The provision conferring on the Supreme Court power to enforce the
fundamental rights in the widest possible terms shows the anxiety of
the Constitution makers not to allow any procedural technicalities to
stand in the way of enforcement of fundamental rights…But what
procedure shall be followed by the Supreme Court in exercising the
power to issue such direction, order or writ? That is a matter on
which the Constitution is silent…It is only because we have been
following the adversarial procedure for over a century owing to the
introduction of the Anglo-Saxon system of jurisprudence under the
British Rule that it has become a part of our conscious as well as subconscious thinking that even judicial proceeding must be cast in the
mould of adversarial procedure and that justice cannot be done
unless the adversarial procedure is adapted. But it may be noted that
there is nothing sacrosanct about the adversarial procedure and in
fact it is not followed in many other countries where the civil system
of law prevails….
13. Contd.
• There is a considerable body of juristic opinion in our country also
which believes that strict adherence to the adversarial procedure
can sometimes lead to injustice, particularly where the parties are
not evenly balanced in social or economic strength. Where one of the
parties to a litigation belongs to a poor and deprived section of the
community and does not possess adequate social and material
resources, he is bound to be at a disadvantage as against a strong
and powerful opponent under the adversary system of justice,
because of his difficulty in getting competent legal representation
and more than anything else, his inability to produce relevant
evidence before the Court. Therefore, when the poor come before
the Court, particularly for enforcement of their fundamental rights,
it is necessary to depart from the adversarial procedure and to
evolve a new procedure which will make it possible for the poor and
the weak to bring the necessary material before the court ….
14. Contd.
• Now it is obvious that the poor and the disadvantaged
cannot possibly produce relevant material before the
Court in support of their case and equally where an
action is brought on their behalf by a citizen acting pro
bono publico, it would be almost impossible for him to
gather the relevant material and place it before the
Court. What is the Supreme Court to do in such a
case? Would the Supreme Court not be failing in
discharge of its constitutional duty of enforcing a
fundamental right if it refuses to intervene because the
petitioner belonging to the underprivileged segment of
society or a public spirited citizen espousing his cause
is unable to produce the relevant material before the
Court….
15. Contd.
• If the Supreme Court were to adopt a passive approach and decline
to intervene…fundamental rights would remain merely a teasing
illusion…. It is for this reason that the Supreme Court has evolved
the practice of appointing commissions for the purpose of gathering
facts and data in regard to a complaint of breach of a fundamental
right made on behalf of the weaker sections of the society…. The
report of the commissioner would furnish prima facie evidence of
the facts and data gathered by the commissioner and that is why the
Supreme Court is careful to appoint a responsible person as
commissioner to make an enquiry or investigation into the facts
relating to the complaint. It is interesting to note that in the past the
Supreme Court has appointed sometimes a district magistrate,
sometimes a district judge, sometimes a professor of law, sometimes
a journalist, sometimes an officer of the Court and sometimes an
advocate practising in the Court, for the purpose of carrying out an
enquiry or investigation and making report to the Court because the
commissioner appointed by the Court must be a responsible person
who enjoys the confidence of the Court….
16. Financial Resources
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, RATLAM Vs.
VARDICHAND [(1980) 4 SCC 162]
•
The truth is that a few profound issues of processual
jurisprudence of great strategic significance to our legal
system face us and we must zero in on them as they involve
problems of access to justice for the people beyond the
blinkered rules of ‘standing’ of British-Indian vintage. If the
centre of gravity of justice is to shift, as the Preamble to the
Constitution mandates, from the traditional individualism of
locus standi to the community orientation of public interest
litigation, these issues must be considered. In that sense, the
case before us between the Ratlam Municipality and the
citizens of a ward, is a pathfinder in the field of people’s
involvement.
17. Contd.
•
The key question we have to answer is whether by affirmative
action a court can compel a statutory body to carry out its duty
to the community by constructing sanitation facilities at great
cost and on a time-bound basis. At issue is the coming of age of
that branch of public law bearing on community actions and the
court’s power to force public bodies under public duties to
implement specific plans in response to public grievances.
•
The statutory setting being thus plain, the municipality cannot
extricate itself from its responsibility. Its plea is not that the facts
are wrong but that the law is not right because the municipal
funds being insufficient it cannot carry out the duties under
Section 123 of the Act.
18. Contd.
•
The plea of the municipality that notwithstanding the public
nuisance, financial inability validly exonerates it from statutory
liability has no juridical basis. The criminal procedure code
operates against statutory bodies and others regardless of the
cash in their coffers, even as human rights under Part III of the
Constitution have to be respected by the state regardless of
budgetary provision. Likewise, Section 123 of the Act has no
saving clause when the municipal council is penniless. Otherwise,
a profligate statutory body or pachydermic governmental agency
may legally defy duties under the law by urging in self-defense a
self-created bankruptcy or perverted expenditure budget. That
cannot be.
19. Contd.
•
A responsible municipal council constituted for the precise
purpose of preserving public health and providing better finances
cannot run away from its principal duty by pleading financial
inability. Decency and dignity are non-negotiable facets of human
rights and are a first charge on local self-governing bodies…. The
nature of the judicial process is not purely adjudicatory nor is it
functionally that of an umpire only. Affirmative action to make
the remedy effective is of the essence of the right which otherwise
becomes sterile…. The law will relentlessly be enforced and the
plea of poor finance will be poor alibi when people in misery cry
for justice.
20. International Instruments
and their Enforcement in Indian Courts
Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Vs. Union of India
[(1970) 3 SCC 400]
•
The argument raised at the Bar that power to make treaty or to
implement a treaty, agreement or convention with a foreign State
can only be exercised under authority of law, proceeds upon a
misreading of Article 253….The effect of Article 253 is that if a
treaty, agreement or convention with a foreign State deals with a
subject within the competence of the State Legislature, the
Parliament alone has, notwithstanding Article 246(3), the power to
make laws to implement the treaty, agreement or convention or any
decision made at any international conference, association or other
body….
21. Contd.
• In terms, the Article deals with legislative power :
thereby power is conferred upon the Parliament which
it may not otherwise possess. But it does not seek to
circumscribe the extent of the power conferred by
Article 73. If, in consequence of the exercise of
executive power, rights of the citizens or others are
restricted or infringed, or laws are modified, the
exercise of power must be supported by legislation :
where there is no such restriction, infringement of the
right or modification of the laws, the Executive is
competent to exercise the power.
22. Gramophone Company of India Vs. Birendra Pandey
[(1984 (SC) AIR 677)]
• There can be no question that nations must march with the
international community and the municipal law must
respect rules of international law even as nations respect
international opinion. The comity of nations requires that
the rules of international law may be accommodated in the
municipal law even without express legislative sanction
provided they do not run into conflict with Acts of
Parliament…. But the courts are under an obligation
within legitimate limits, to so interpret the municipal
statute as to avoid confrontation with the comity of nations
or the well established principles of international law.
23. Vishaka Vs. State of Rajasthan
[(1997) 6 SCC 241]
• In the absence of domestic law occupying the field, to
formulate effective measures to check the evil of sexual
harassment of working women at all workplaces, the
contents of international conventions and norms are
significant for the purpose of interpretation of the
guarantee of gender equality, right to work with
human dignity in Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the
Constitution and the safeguards against sexual
harassment implicit therein. Any international
convention not inconsistent with the fundamental
rights and in harmony with its spirit must be read into
these provisions to enlarge the meaning and content
thereof, to promote the object of the constitutional
guarantee….
24. Contd.
• This is implicit from Article 51(c) and the enabling power of
Parliament to enact laws for implementing the international
conventions and norms by virtue of Article 253 read with Entry
14 of the Union List in Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.
Article 73 also is relevant. It provides that the executive power
of the Union shall extend to the matters with respect to which
Parliament has power to make laws. The executive power of the
Union is, therefore, available till Parliament enacts legislation
to expressly provide measures needed to curb the evil. Thus, the
power of this Court under Article 32 for enforcement of the
fundamental rights and the executive power of the Union have
to meet the challenge to protect the working women from
sexual harassment and to make their fundamental rights
meaningful. Governance of the society by the rule of law
mandates this requirement as a logical concomitant of the
constitutional scheme….
25. Contd.
• The exercise performed by the Court in this matter is with
this common perception shared with the learned Solicitor
General and other members of the bar who rendered
valuable assistance in the performance of this difficult task
in public interest.
• Some provisions in the “Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women”, of
significance in the present context are :
Article 11 : “1. States Parties shall take all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the
field of employment in order to ensure, on a basis of
equality of men and women, the same rights…..”
26. Contd
.
Article 24 : “States Parties undertake to adopt all
necessary measures at the national level aimed at
achieving the full realization of the rights
recognised in the present Convention.”
• The Government of India has ratified the above
Resolution on 25.6.1993…. We have, therefore, no
hesitation in placing reliance on the above for the
purpose of construing the nature and ambit of
constitutional guarantee of gender equality in our
Constitution…. The international conventions and
norms are to be read into them in the absence of
enacted domestic law occupying the field when
there is no inconsistency.
27. Apparel Export Promotion Council Vs.
A.K.Chopra
[(1999) 1 (SC) 759]
• These international instruments cast an obligation on
the Indian State to gender-sensitise its laws and the
courts are under an obligation to see that the message
of the international instruments is not allowed to be
drowned. This Court has in numerous cases
emphasised that while discussing constitutional
requirements, court and counsel must never forget the
core principle embodied in the international
conventions and instruments and as far as possible,
give effect to the principles contained in those
international instruments. The courts are under an
obligation to give due regard to international
conventions and norms for construing domestic laws,
more so, when there is no inconsistency between them
and there is a void in domestic law.
28. Contd.
• In cases involving violation of human rights, the
courts must forever remain alive to the
international instruments and conventions and
apply the same to a given case when there is no
inconsistency between the international norms and
the domestic law occupying the field.
29. Labour Rights
• Article 41 of the Constitution provides that “the
State shall within the limits of its economic
capacity and development, make effective
provision for securing the right to work, to
education and to public assistance in cases of
unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement,
and in other cases of undeserved want.”
30. National Textile Workers Union Vs. P. R.
Ramakrishnan
[(1983) 1 SCC 228]
•
The concept of a company has undergone radical transformation in
the last few decades…. The traditional view that the company is the
property of the shareholders is now an exploded myth…. The
ownership of the concern was identified with those who brought in
capital. That was the outcome of the property-minded capitalistic
society in which the concept of company originated. But this view
can no longer be regarded as valid in the light of the changing
social-economic concepts and values…There is another equally, if
not more, important factor of production and that is labour….
31. Contd.
•
In fact, the owners of capital bear only limited financial risk and otherwise
contribute nothing to production while labour contributes a major share of
the product. While the former invest only a part of their moneys, the latter
invest their sweat and toil, in fact their life itself. The workers therefore
have a special place in a socialist pattern of society. They are no more
vendors of toil; they are not a marketable commodity to be purchased by
the owners of capital. They are producers of wealth as much as capital….
Our Constitution has shown profound concern for the workers and given
them a pride of place in the new socio-economic order envisaged in the
Preamble and the Directive Principles of State Policy. The Preamble
contains the profound declaration pregnant with meaning and hope for
millions of peasants and workers that India shall be a socialist democratic
republic where social and economic justice will inform all institutions of
national life and there will be equality of status and opportunity for all and
every endeavour shall be made to promote fraternity ensuring the dignity
of the individual.
32. Right to Housing
Shantistar Builders Vs. Narayan K. Totame
[(1990)1 SCC 520]
•
Basic needs of man have traditionally been accepted to be three-food, clothing and shelter. The right to life is guaranteed in any
civilized society. That would take within its sweep the right to
food, the right to clothing, the right to decent environment and a
reasonable accommodation to live in. The difference between the
need of an animal and a human being for shelter has to be kept in
view. For the animal it is the bare protection of the body; for a
human being it has to be a suitable accommodation which would
allow him to grow in every aspect – physical, mental and
intellectual…. Millions of people today live on the pavements of
different cities of India and a greater number live animal-like
existence in jhuggis.
33. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation Vs. Nawab
Khan Gulab Khan
[(1997) 11 SCC 121]
• All civil, political, social and cultural rights enshrined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Convention or under the
Constitution of India cannot be exercised without these basic human
rights. Shelter for a human being, therefore, is not a mere protection
of his life and limb. It is home where he has opportunities to grow
physically, mentally, intellectually and spiritually. Right to shelter,
therefore, includes adequate living space, safe and decent structure,
clean and decent surroundings, sufficient light, pure air and water,
electricity, sanitation and other civic amenities like roads etc. so as to
have easy access to his daily avocation. The right to shelter,
therefore, does not mean a mere right to a roof over one’s head but
right to all the infrastructure necessary to enable them to live and
develop as a human being. Right to shelter when used as an essential
requisite to the right to live should be deemed to have been
guaranteed as fundamental right….
34. Contd.
•
Want of decent residence, therefore, frustrates the very object of the
constitutional animation of right to equality, economic justice,
fundamental right to residence, dignity of person and right to live
itself….
•
The annual budget including for housing accommodation is being
prepared and passed by Parliament…. When the State…annually
[provides] housing accommodation to them within the allocation
budget and effectively and sincerely implement them using the
allocations for the respective schemes so that the right to residence to
them would become a reality and meaningful and the budget
allocation should not either be diverted or used for any other scheme
meant for other weaker sections of the society. Any acts in violation
thereof or diversion of allocation funds, misuse or misutilisation,
would be in negation of constitutional objectives defeating and
deflecting the goal envisioned in the Preamble of the Constitution….
•
It would, therefore, be the duty of the Corporation to evolve the
Schemes.
35. Right to Healthcare
Paschim Banga Khet Majdoor Samity Vs. State of
West Bengal
[(1996) 4 SCC 37]
• The Constitution envisages the establishment of a welfare
State at the federal level as well as at the State level. In a
welfare State the Primary duty of the Government is to
secure the welfare of the people. Providing adequate
medical facilities for the people is an essential part of the
obligations undertaken by the Government in a welfare
State. The Government discharges this obligation by
running hospitals and health centres…. The government
hospitals run by the State and the medical officers
employed therein are duty-bound to extend medical
assistance for preserving human life. Failure on the part of
a government hospital to provide timely medical
treatment… results in violation… of…right to life
guaranteed under Article 21.
36. Contd.
• It is no doubt true that financial resources are needed
for providing these facilities. But at the same time it
cannot be ignored that it is the constitutional
obligation of the State to provide adequate medical
services to the people. Whatever is necessary for this
purpose has to be done. In the context of the
constitutional obligation to provide free legal aid to a
poor accused this Court has held that the State cannot
avoid its constitutional obligation in that regard on
account of financial constraints. [See : Khatri (II) v.
State of Bihar, SCC at p. 631.] The said observations
would apply with equal, if not greater, force in the
matter of discharge of constitutional obligation of the
State to provide medical aid to preserve human life. In
the matter of allocation of funds for medical services
the said constitutional obligation of the State has to be
kept in view.
37. Consumer Education and Research Centre Vs.
Union of India
[(1995) 3 SCC 42]
• Provision for medical test and treatment invigorates the health
of the worker for higher production or efficient service.
Continued treatment, while in service or after retirement is a
moral, legal and constitutional concomitant duty of the
employer and the State. Therefore, it must be held that the
right to health and medical care is a fundamental right under
Article 21 read with Article 39(e), 41 and 43 of the Constitution
and make the life of the workman meaningful and purposeful
with dignity of person. Right to life includes protection of the
health and strength of the worker and is a minimum
requirement to enable a person to live with human dignity.
38. Vincent Pannikulangura Vs. Union of India
[(1987) 2 SCC 165]
• Maintenance and improvement of public health have to
rank high as these are indispensable to the very physical
existence of the community and on the betterment of these
depends the building of the society of which the
Constitution makers envisaged. Attending to public health,
in our opinion, therefore, is of high priority – perhaps the
one at the top.
• Such drugs as are found necessary should be manufactured
in abundance and availability to satisfy every demand
should be ensured…. The State’s obligation to enforce
production of qualitative drugs and elimination of the
injurious ones from the market must take within its sweep
an obligation to make useful drugs available at reasonable
price so as to be within the common man’s reach. That
would involve regulating the price….
39. Contd.
• It may be that there may be an improved quality of a
particular medicine which on account of its cost of
production will have to sell at a higher price but for
every illness which can be cured by treatment, the
patient must be in a position to get its medicine.
• There must be due emphasis on indigenous production
so that in due course, what the government
contemplated in 1979 in its then drug policy may be
effectuated by India.
• The drug policy of the government should emphasise
upon a time-bound switch over to indigenous
production.
40. Right to Education
• Article 45 of the Directive Principles of State
Policy, which corresponds to article 13(1) of the
ICESCR, states, “The State shall endeavor to
provide, within a period of ten years from the
commencement of this Constitution, for free and
compulsory education for all children until they
complete the age of fourteen years.”
41. Unnikrishnan J.P. Vs. State of Andra Pradesh
[(1993) 1 SCC 645]
• Right to education is not stated expressly as a fundamental
right in Part III. This Court has, however, not followed the
rule that unless a right is expressly stated as a fundamental
right, it cannot be treated as one. Freedom of Press is not
expressly mentioned in Part III, yet it has been read into
and inferred from the freedom of speech and expression
[Express Newspapers v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 463 :
(1998) 1 SCR 279].
• Right to free education for all children until they complete
the age of fourteen years (Art. 45). It is noteworthy that
among the several articles in Part IV, only Article 45 speaks
of a time-limit; no other article does. Has it no significance?
Is it a mere pious wish, even after 44 years of the
Constitution? Can the State flout the said direction even
after 44 years…
42. Contd.
…on the ground that the article merely calls upon it to
“endeavour to provide” the same and on the further
ground that the said article is not enforceable by virtue of
the declaration in Article 37. Does not the passage of 44
years – more than four times the period stipulated in
Article 45 – convert the obligation created by the article
into an enforceable right? In this context, we feel
constrained to say that allocation of available funds to
different sectors of education in India discloses an
inversion of priorities indicated by the Constitution. The
Constitution contemplated a crash programme being
undertaken by the State to achieve the goal set out in
Article 45. It is relevant to notice that Article 45 does not
speak of the “limits of its economic capacity and
development” as does Article 41, which inter alia speaks
of right to education.
43. Contd.
• We must say that at least now the State should
honour the command of Article 45….
• We hold that a child (citizen) has a fundamental
right to free education up to the age of 14 years.
44. Right to Food
PUCL vs. Union of India
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 of 2001
• Order dated 23.07.2001 : In our opinion, what is of
utmost importance is to see that food is provided to the
aged, infirm, disabled, destitute women, destitute men
who are in danger of starvation, pregnant and
lactating women and destitute children, especially in
cases where they or members of their family do not
have sufficient funds to provide food for them. In case
of famine, there may be shortage of food, but here the
situation is that amongst plenty there is scarcity.
Plenty of food is available, but distribution of the same
amongst the very poor and the destitute is scarce and
non-existent leading to mal-nourishment, starvation
and other related problems.
45. Contd.
• Mid Day Meal Scheme (MDMS)
We direct the State Governments/Union Territories to
implement the Mid-Day Meal Scheme by providing
every child in every Government and Government
assisted Primary Schools with a prepared mid day
meal with a minimum content of 300 calories and 8 –
12 grams of protein each day of school for a minimum
of 200 days. Those Governments providing dry rations
instead of cooked meals must within three months
start providing cooked meals in all Govt. and Govt.
aided Primary Schools in all half the Districts of the
State (in order of poverty) and must within a further
period of three months extend the provision of cooked
meals to the remaining parts of the State.
46. Contd.
•
Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS)
(i) We direct the State Govts./Union Territories to implement
the Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) in full and to
ensure that every ICDS disbursing centre in the country shall
provide as under :
(a) Each child up to 6 years of age to get 300 calories and 8-10
grams of protein;
(b) Each adolescent girl to get 500 calories and 20-25 grams of
protein;
(c) Each pregnant woman and each nursing mother to get 500
calories and 20-25 grams of protein;
47. Contd.
(d) Each malnourished child to get 600 calories
and 16-20 grams of protein;
(e) Have a disbursement centre in every
settlement.
• National Maternity Benefit Scheme (NMBS) :
(i) We direct the State Govts./ Union Territories
to implement the National Maternity Benefit
Scheme (NMBS) by paying all BPL pregnant
women Rs. 500/- through the Sarpanch 8-12 weeks
prior to delivery for each of the first two births.
48. Contd.
• National Family Benefit Scheme :
(i) We direct the State Govts./ Union Territories to
implement the National Family Benefit Scheme and pay
a BPL family Rs. 10,000/- within four weeks through a
local Sarpanch, whenever the primary bread winner of
the family dies.
• We direct that a copy of this order be translated in
regional languages and in English by the respective
States/ Union Territories and prominently displayed in
all Gram Panchayats, Govt. School Buildings and Fair
Price Shops.
49. Contd.
• In order to ensure to ensure transparency in
selection of beneficiaries and their access to these
Schemes, the Gram Panchayats will also display a
list of all beneficiaries under the various Schemes.
Copies of the Schemes and the list of beneficiaries
shall be made available by the Gram Panchayats
to members of public for inspection.
• We direct Doordarshan and AIR to adequately
publicise various Scheme and this order.
50. Contd.
• It is the duty of each States/Union Territories to prevent
deaths due to starvation or malnutrition. If the Commissioner
reports and it is established to the satisfaction of the Court
that starvation death has taken place, the Court may be
justified in presuming that its orders have not been
implemented and the Chief Secretaries/Administrators of the
States/Union Territories may be held responsible for the
same.
• Licensees, who :
a) do not keep their shops open throughout the month during
stipulated period,
b) fail to provide grain to BPL families strictly at BPL rates
and no higher,
51. Contd.
(c) keep the cards of BPL households with them,
(d) make false entries in the BPL cards,
(e) engage in black-marketing or siphoning away
of grains to the open market and hand over such
ration shops to such other person/organisations,
shall make themselves liable for cancellation of
their
licenses.
The
concerned
authorities/functionaries would not show any
laxity on the subject.
52. Contd.
• We direct the Government of India to place on
AAY category the following groups of persons :(1) Aged, infirm, disabled, destitute men and
women, pregnant and lactating women, destitute
women;
(2) widows and other single women with no
regular support;
(3) old persons (aged 60 or above) with no regular
support and no assured means of subsistence;
53. Contd.
(4) households with a disabled adult and assured
means of subsistence;
(5) households where due to old age, lack of
physical or mental fitness, social customs, need to
care for a disabled, or other reasons, no adult
member is available to engage in gainful
employment outside the house;
(6) primitive tribes.
54. Contd.
• After having heard learned counsel for the parties,
we find that there is practically no monitoring
over the sums allotted for the Public Distribution
System (in short PDS) by the Central
Government, and its utilisation. The amount
involved, we are told, is in the neighborhood of
Rupees Thirty Thousand Crores annually. …At
the present stage, we feel it would be necessary to
constitute a Central Vigilance Committee, headed
by a retired Judge of this Court to be assisted by
Dr. M.C. Saxena, the Commissioner earlier
appointed by this Court. We request Mr.
Justice .P. Wadhwa to head the Committee. The
Committee shall look into the maladies which are
affecting the proper functioning of the system and
also suggest remedial measures.
55. Union of India Vs. Sushil Kumar Modi
[(1997) 4 SCC 770]
• It has to be borne in mind that the purpose of
these proceedings is essentially to ensure
performance of the statutory duty by the CBI and
the other government agencies in accordance with
law for the proper implementation of the rule of
law. …The duty of the Court in such proceedings
is, therefore, to ensure that the CBI and other
government agencies do their duty and do so
strictly in conformity with law. …The nature of
these proceedings may be described as that of
“continuing mandamus” to require performance
of its duty….
56. Right to a Clean and Sustainable
Environment
M.C. Mehta Vs. Union of India
[(1987) 1 SCC 395]
• We are of the view that an enterprise which is
engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous
industry which poses a potential threat to the
health and safety of the persons working in the
factory and residing in the surrounding areas
owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the
community to ensure that no harm results to
anyone on account of hazardous or inherently
dangerous nature of the activity which it has
undertaken.
57. Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action Vs.
Union of India
[(1996) 3 SCC 212]
• The Polluter Pays principle demands that the
financial costs of preventing or remedying damage
caused by pollution should lie with the
undertakings which cause the pollution, or
produce the goods which cause the pollution.
58. State of H.P. Vs. Ganesh Wood Products
[(1995 6 SCC 363]
• [Digression] was necessary to put in proper
perspective the obligation of the State and the
significance of of the concept of “sustainable
development” and “inter-generational equity” visa vis the legal submissions made on the basis of
principles of natural justice, estoppel and so on.
• Inter-generational equity means the concern for
the generations to come. The present generation
has no right to imperil the safety and well-being of
the next generation or the generations to come
thereafter.
59. M.C. Mehta Vs. Kamal Nath
[(1997 1 SCC 388]
• The Public Trust Doctrine primarily rests on the
principle that certain resources like air, sea,
waters and the forests have such a great
importance to the people as a whole that it would
be wholly unjustified to make them a subject of
private ownership. The said resources being a gift
of nature, they should be made freely available to
everyone irrespective of the status in life. The
doctrine enjoins upon the Government to protect
the resources for the enjoyment of the general
public rather than to permit their use for private
ownership or commercial purposes.
60. Contd.
• Our legal system – based on English common law
– includes the public trust doctrine as part of its
jurisprudence. The State is the trustee of all
natural resources which are by nature meant for
public use and enjoyment. Public at large is the
beneficiary of the sea-shore, running waters, airs,
forests and ecologically fragile lands. The State as
a trustee is under a legal duty to protect the
natural resources. These resources meant for
public use cannot be converted into private
ownership. …But in the absence of any legislation,
the executive acting under the doctrine of public
trust cannot abdicate the natural resources and
convert them into private ownership, or for
commercial use.
61. Contd.
• The aesthetic use and the pristine glory of the
natural resources, the environment and the
ecosystems of our country cannot be permitted to
be eroded for private, commercial or any other
use unless the courts find it necessary, in good
faith, for the public good and in public interest to
encroach upon the said resources.