Two faces of radical right wing populism betz

The Two Faces of Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe
Author(s): Hans-Georg Betz
Source: The Review of Politics, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Autumn, 1993), pp. 663-685
Published by: Cambridge University Press for the University of Notre Dame du lac on behalf of Review of
Politics
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1407611 .
Accessed: 19/03/2011 04:54

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup. .

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Cambridge University Press and University of Notre Dame du lac on behalf of Review of Politics are
collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Review of Politics.

http://www.jstor.org

The Two Faces of
Radical Right-Wing Populism
in Western Europe

Hans-Georg Betz

During the past several years, radicalright-wing populist parties have made
impressive electoralgains in a growing number of West Europeancountries. Their
dramatic surge to political prominence has obscured the fact that these parties
hardly form a homogeneous party group. Generally, it is possible to distinguish
between neo-liberal and national populist parties. Both types of parties are a
response to the profound economic, social, and cultural transformation of ad-
vanced societies interpretedas a transitionfromindustrialwelfare to postindustrial
individualized capitalism. National populist parties are primarily working-class
parties which espouse a radically xenophobic and authoritarianprogram. Neo-
liberal parties appeal to a mixed social constituency and tend to stress the market-
oriented, libertarianelements of theirprogram over xenophobic ones. Ratherthan
being mere short-lived protest phenomena, radicalright-wing populist parties are
a reflection and expression of new political conflicts created by the transition to
postindustrial capitalism.

Politics in the advanced democracies of Western Europe is
going through a period of profound transformation, which has
largely been the result of marked changes in the relationship
between parties and voters. Growing access to higher education,
an overabundance of information, and the disintegration of tradi-
tional subcultures have contributed to a progressive dissolution of
traditional party loyalties. Instead of following the lead of political
elites, voters increasingly vote on issues and "shop around" for the
best political deal. In most Western democracies there has been a
considerable increase of floating voters as well as a rising number
of voters dissatisfied with the limited arrayof political choices. The
result has been a significant rise in voter abstention and blank or
invalid votes, and the emergence of new political formations.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the most significant new political
formations were new social movements and Green and other left-
libertarianparties. Since the late 1980s, a growing number of West
European democracies have come under pressure from radical
663

664 THE REVIEWOF POLITICS
I

right-wing populist parties.' Although hardly new to the political
landscape of West European democracies, their recent explosive
growth in a number of countries has made them the most signifi-
cant political challenge to the political establishment and consen-
sus in Western Europe. In recent years radical right-wing populist
parties have made significant political gains in Scandinavia (the
Danish and Norwegian Progress Parties and the Swedish New
Democracy party), Austria (the Freedom party), Germany (the
Republikaner), and Switzerland (the Automobile party and the
Tessin League), in Belgium (the Flemish Block) and France (the
National Front),as well as in Italy(theLombard/Northern League).
Radicalright-wing populist parties tend to distinguish themselves
by their radical rejection of the established socio-cultural and
sociopolitical system, their pronounced advocacy of individual
achievement, a free marketplace,and drasticrestrictionsof the role
of the state; their rejection of individual and social equality, their
opposition to the social integrationof marginalized groups and the
extension of democratic rights to them, and their promotion of
xenophobia, if not overt racism;theirpopulist instrumentalization
of diffuse public sentiments of anxiety, envy, resentment, and
disenchantment, and their appeal to the allegedly superior com-
mon sense of the common people against the dominant cultural
and political consensus. In short, they seek to combine a classical
liberal interpretationof the role of the individual and the economy
with select topoi of the sociopolitical agenda of the traditional
extreme and recent new right and deliver it to those disenchanted
with their life chances and the sociopolitical status quo in general.
At least three developments account for the rapid diffusion
and increasing acceptance of radicalright-wing populism in West-
ern Europe. Western Europe is in the midst of a political revolu-
tion, which appears to have caught the established political parties
largely unprepared. Having provoked voter disenchantment in
large part themselves, the established political parties have lost
much of the public's confidence in their capability and willingness
to execute genuine reforms.Thisvoter disenchantment stems from
the established parties' inability to respond to the consequences of
the profound socio-economic and socio-cultural transformation

1. Hans-Georg Betz, "PoliticalConflictin the Postmodem Age: RadicalRight-
Wing Populist Partiesin Europe,"Current PoliticsandEconomics Europe (1990):
of 1
67-83.

RADICALRIGHT-WINGPOPULISM 665

investing Western Europe. This transformation is perhaps best
characterized as a transition from industrial welfare capitalism to
postindustrial individualized capitalism. The ensuing accelera-
tion of individualizion and social fragmentation has provoked a
wave of individual, regional, and national egoism, reflected in the
political discourse of radical right-wing populist parties. Taking
advantage of a sociopolitical climate of anxiety and resentment,
they present themselves as "catch-all parties of protest."2How-
ever, their political programs show marked differences both in
terms of political objectives and demands and the importance
accorded to them. Whereas some parties pursue a predominantly
neo-liberal-libertarianstrategy, others pursue a primarily nation-
alist-authoritarianone.
A radical right-wing populist party's choice of strategy de-
pends crucially on which social groups it is able to attract.That, in
turn, depends in large part on the response of the established
parties to the challenge posed by the transition to individualized
postindustrial capitalism. In order to demonstrate the usefulness
of this model, the following analysis focuses on four prominent
parties-the Italian Lega Nord, the Belgian Vlaams Blok, the
Austrian FPO, and the German Republikaner.

Evolutionand ElectoralGains

THELEGANORD
"Iam the savior of Italy."With this bold claim Umberto Bossi,
the undisputed leader of the Lega Nord, presented himself before
the 1992 parliamentary elections to the Italian voters. Two weeks
later, his party emerged with almost 9 percent of the popular vote
as the fourth largest political force in Italy, a result which marked
a turning point in postwar Italian politics. Despite the fact that by
now the Lega is closely identified with Umberto Bossi, he had little
to do with the origins of the leagues. The first regionalist leagues
emerged in the Veneto in the late 1970s and scored moderate gains
in the 1983 parliamentary election.3 However, their success was
soon eclipsed by the rapid rise of Bossi's Lega Lombarda.

2. Thomas Childers, "TheSocial Bases of the National Socialist Vote,"Journal
of Contemporary History11 (1976):25.
3. Ilvo Diamanti, "Lamia patriae il Veneto. I valori e la proposta politica delle
leghe," Polis 6 (1992):225-55.

666
THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

Umberto Bossi founded the Lega Lombarda in 1984 in the
richest of the northern regions of Italy.4Promoting Lombardian
regional autonomy, the Lega had its first significant political
success in the national elections of 1987, which started its rise to
political dominance first in Lombardy,then throughout the north.
The Lega received national recognition in the 1990 regional elec-
tions, where it scored 18.9percent of the vote in Lombardy,and the
1991 local elections in the city of Brescia, from which the party
emerged with 24.4 percent as the largest party ahead of the
Christian Democrats. After this success, Bossi united the most
important regional leagues in the north into the Lega Nord, with
the objective of extending the party throughout Italy. However,
the 1992 electoral success was confined almost exclusively to the
rich North. There the party was well on its way to dislodging the
Christian Democrats as the dominant political party as shown by
its electoral successes in the local elections in Varese, Monza and a
number of smaller communities in December 1992. These suc-
cesses paved the way for the Lega's electoral triumph in the local
elections in Milan in June 1993, where it received more than 40
percent of the vote and elected Marco Formentini mayor.

THEFPO
Compared to the Lega Nord, the Austrian Freedom party
(FPO) has been part of the Austrian party system for most of the
post-war period. Founded in 1955 the FPO succeeded the League
of Independents (VdU) which had been formed in 1949. The VdU
was an attempt to challenge the consociational type of democracy
established by the elites representing the Christian-conservative
and socialist subcultures. When the practice of consociationalism
proved too strong for a "third force" to establish itself as a viable
alternative to the two majorparties the VdU quickly fell apart. Its
remnants formed the FPO,whose national program soon attracted
former Nazis and German-nationalists. Central to the FPO's na-

4. Daniele Vimercati, I Lombardi nuova crociata,(Milan: Mursia, 1990);
alla
Vittorio Moioli, IItarlodelleleghe(Trezzo sull'Adda: Comedit2000,1991);Umberto
Bossi with Daniele Vimercati, Ventodal nord(Milan:Sperling and Kupfer, 1992);
Ilvo Diamanti, La Lega:Geografia, storia e sociologiadi un nuovo soggettopolitico
(Rome: Donzelli Editore, 1993).


tional program was the rejection of Austria as a separate nation.
Instead the FPO contended that the Austrians were part of the
German Kulturnationwithout, however, questioning Austria's
status as a separate, but German state.5With growing distance to
the Nazi period the leadership began to strengthen its commitment
to liberalism. Particularlythe coalition with the Austrian Socialists
(1983-1986)"was seen as a success of the emphasis of 'liberalism'
and the deemphasis of 'Germannationalism."'"6 However, by 1986,
growing dissatisfaction with the party leadership and a dramatic
decline in voter appeal led a number of the party's rank and file to
open dissent.
The opposition was led by J6rg Haider, the chairman of the
powerful and strongly German-nationalistCarinthianparty orga-
nization.7A dynamic speaker with strong ties to the party's nation-
alist wing, young and telegenic, Haider successfully challenged
the party's liberal leadership. Elected chairmanin September 1986
just weeks before the general election, Haider orchestrated a
successful election campaign which earned the party 9.7 percent of
the vote. These were followed by a series of successes in state
elections, which gave the FPOseats in state legislatures where they
had been absent for years, and in the general election of 1990, in
which the party gained 16.7 percent of the vote. Its successes
culminated in the electoral triumph in the 1991 regional election in
Vienna. With 22.6 percent of the vote the FPOinflicted substantial
losses both to the conservative Austrian People's party and the
Socialists, who had traditionally dominated the city. Despite the
fact that the liberal wing left the FPO in the spring of 1993 and the
Liberal International started proceedings to expel the party from
its ranks, the FPOsuccessfully maintained its position as Austria's
third strongest party.8

5. Max E. Riedlsperger, "FPO-Liberal or Nazi?" in Conqueringthe Past:
&
AustrianNazismToday Tomorrow, F. Parkinson(Detroit:Wayne StateUniver-
ed.
sity Press, 1989);pp. 259-62; Riedlsperger, "Mit der 'dritten Kraft' in die Dritte
Republik, Manuscript, Department of History, California Politechnic State Uni-
versity, 1993, pp. 7-15.
6. Anton Pelinka,"AlteRechte,neue Rechtein Osterreich," NeueGesellschaft/
Die
Frankfurter Hefte36 (1989):104.
7. Hans-Henning Scharsach, HaidersKampf(Vienna: Orac, 1992); Andreas
Molzer, Jdrg!Der Eisbrecher (Vienna:Suxxes, 1990).
8. Max Riedlsperger, "Heil Haider! The Revitalization of the Austrian Free-

668 66 THE REVIEWOF POLITICS
TEREIE FOITICS

THEVLAAMSBLOK
The year 1991witnessed also the biggest political success so far
of the Belgian Vlaams Blok. The Vlaams Blok was founded in 1978
by former members of the Flemish regionalist party Volksunie to
protest against the Volksunie's support for the Egmontpact, the
first step toward the transformationof Belgium into a federal state.
Accusing the Volksunie of having betrayed the nationalist aspira-
tions of the Flemish population, they decided to launch a genuine
Flemish nationalist party, the Vlaams Blok.9
Although contesting parliamentary elections since 1978, the
political success of the Vlaams Blok remained ratherlimited. In the
1978,1981,1985, and 1987 elections the party never received more
than 2 percent of the vote. Its support came largely from the
nationalist wing of the Volksunie and sympathizers of right-wing
It
extremist Flemish organizations.10 was not until 1988 that the
Vlaams Blok emerged as a majorpolitical force in the Flemish part
of Belgium. In the communal elections the party received almost 18
percent in the city of Antwerp. This was arguably due in large part
to the growing influence in the party of Filip Dewinter, a young
activist in a number of right-wing extremist organizations and
ardent admirer of Jean-MarieLe Pen. Charged with party organi-
zation, Dewinter both rejuvenatedthe party leadership and moved
its political program away from Flemish nationalism toward rac-
ism and right-wing extremism.1
This strategy proved quite attractiveto new voters. Thus in the
European elections of 1989, the Vlaams Blok almost tripled its
support compared to 1984 to 6.6 percent of the vote in Flanders,
and gained more than 21 percent in Antwerp. This was enough to
return Dillen to the European Parliament. Finally in 1991, the

dom Party since 1986," Politicsand Societyin Germany, Austriaand Switzerland 4
(1992):18-58.
9. See Vlaams Blok, Grondbeginselen,
Deume, no date, p. 3; John Fitzmaurice,
"The Extreme Right in Belgium: Recent Developments," Parliamentary Affairs45
(1992):304-305.
10. ChristopherT. Husbands, "Belgium:Flemish Legions on the March,"in
The ExtremeRight in Europe and the USA, ed. Paul Hainsworth (London: Pinter,
1992),pp. 126-50;ChristianVandermottenand JeanVanlaer,"Immigrationet vote
d'extreme-droite en Europe Occidentale et en Belgique," Universite Libre de
Bruxelles, 1991, p. 5.
11. See Philippe Brewaeys, "De Clan Dewinter," Knack, June 1992, p. 80.
3


Vlaams Blok emerged as the undisputed winner of the parliamen-
tary election. With 6.6 percent of the vote overall, and 10.3 percent
in Flanders, the party surpassed the Volksunie and was largely
responsible for the heavy losses of the established political par-
ties.12

THEREPULIKANER
Compared to the dynamic rise of Lega Nord, FPO,and Vlaams
Blok the political evolution of the German Republikanerhas been
characterized by a number of setbacks, which more than once
threatened to destroy the party.'3The Republikanerwere founded
in 1983 by Franz Sch6nhuber together with dissenters of the
Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU). As a popular host of a
Bavariantelevision show Sch6nhuberhad excellent contacts to the
CSU. He was part of the Bavarianestablishment until he published
his memoirs in which he recounted his days as a member of the
Waffen-SSduring World WarII.He was dismissed by the Bavarian
broadcasting service for having presented the Nazi period, and
particularlythe Waffen-SS,in a ratherfavorable light. In response,
Sch6nhuber decided to get actively involved in politics. After
modest electoral successes in Bavarian state elections the party
gained immediate attention in 1989 when it scored 7.5 percent of
the vote in the state elections in West Berlin.This was followed by
7.1 percent in the European elections and the expectation that the
Republikaner might be on their way to become the fifth party to
enter the German Bundestag.l4
However, growing disenchantment among its supporters with
the party's call to welcome Germanresettlersfrom EasternEurope

12. MarcSwyngedouw, "HetVlaams Blokin Antwerpen: Een analyse van de
verkiezingsuitslagen sinds 1985,"in Extreem rechtsin West-Europa, Hugo De
ed.
Schampheleire and Yannis Thanassekos (Brussels:VUB-Press,1991), pp. 93-114;
Xavier Mabille, Evelyne Lentzen, and Pierre Blaise, Leselectionslegislativesdu 24
novembre 1991, Courrier no.
hebdomadaire, 1335-36,1991.
13. Uwe Backes, "The West German Republikaner:Profile of a Nationalist,
Populist Party of Protest," Patternsof Prejudice (1990):3-18; Eike Hennig, Die
24
Republikaner Schatten
im Deutschlands (Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp, 1991).
14. Dieter Roth, "Sind die Republikaner die fiinfte Partei?"Aus Politikund
Zeitgeschichte,B41-42/89, 6 October 1989, pp. 10-20; Franz Urban Pappi, "Die
im
Republikaner ParteiensystemderBundesrepublik," Politikund
Aus Zeitgeschichte,
B21/90, 18 May 1990, pp.37-44.


and the Soviet Union (to which the large majority was opposed)
and above all Sch6nhuber's failure to take political advantage of
the fall of the Wall lost him much support.15Prevented from
participating in the first free elections to the East German
Volkskammer in March 1990 the Republikaner failed to gain a
foothold in the new Linder.In response to these negative trends
Sch6nhuber sought to improve the party's image by drawing a
clear line between the Republikanerand the extreme right, many
of whom had joined the party. Despite strong opposition from the
party's extremist wing and after protracted and vicious internal
struggles Sch6nhuber managed to have his opponents expelled
and fill the top of the party leadership with his followers.
Although Schonhuber had won the internal power struggle,
his and his party's image had been severely tarnished. The result
was a rapid decline at the polls. After failing to enter the Bavarian
Landtag in October1990and with 2.1 percent of the vote remaining
farbehind their own expectations in the December general election
the Republikanerappeared to be politically finished.16 However, in
the 1992 election in the important state of Baden-Wurttembergthe
Republikaner received more than 12 percent of the vote, which
made them the third largest party in one of Germany's most
affluent states. The local elections in Berlin later that year and the
local elections in Hesse in the spring of 1993 confirmed these
results. In both elections the Republikaner received more than 8
percent of the vote. With that the Republikanernot only contrib-
uted considerably to the disastrous losses of the two majorparties,
but also secured their position as the majorparty on the far right in
Germany's changing party system.
Structural Changes and Their Impact on Voting

VOTERDISENCHANTMENT
What explains the dramatic gains of radical right-wing popu-
list parties within a relative short time period in Italy, Austria,

15. Hans-Georg Betz, "Politics of Resentment: Right-Wing Radicalism in
West Germany,"Comparative Politics22 (1990):54-55.
16. Dieter Roth, "Die Republikaner:Schneller Aufstieg und tiefer Fall einer
Protestpartei am rechten Rand," Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte,B37-38/90, 14
September 1990, pp. 27-39.


Belgium, Germany, and elsewhere in Western Europe? The most
immediate explanation is found in the widespread disaffection
with politics, growing cynicism toward the established political
parties, and rapidly dwindling confidence in the political class's
ability to solve society's most urgent problems. Analyses of survey
data provide ample support for this proposition. In Germany, the
proportion of voters who thought parties cared more about votes
than their voters' opinions increased from 63 percent in 1980 to 75
in 1989.At the same time the number of respondents who thought
that politicians were neither interested in what the average person
thought nor knew much about it increased from 58 to 81 percent.
The situation was similar in Austria and in Italy.17
However, can voter cynicism and disenchantment directly
explain the dramatic increase in support for radical right-wing
populist parties? It is certainly the case that their supporters are
particularly disaffected with political parties, politics, and the
political process in general. Thus in 1991, 81 percent of the (West)
German population, but only 57 percent of Republikanersupport-
ers expressed satisfactionwith the state of democracy in Germany;
25 percent of the West German public, but only five percent of
Republikanersupporters expressed trust in political parties. Simi-
lar results were obtained in Italy and Austria.18 However, since
disenchantment and cynicism have become so widespread, radical
right-wing populist supporters differentiate themselves from the
supporters of the established parties primarily by the degree of

17. Fritz Plasser and Peter A. Ulram, "Politisch-kultureller Wandel in
Osterreich,"in StaatsbiirgeroderUntertan? Osterreichs
PolitischeKulturDeutschlands,
und der Schweizim Vergleich, Fritz Plasser and Peter A. Ulram (Frankfurt/
ed.
Bere/New York/Paris: Peter Lang, 1991),pp. 113-15;Renato Mannheimer and
Giacomo Sani, II mercatoelettorale(Bologna: Il Mulino, 1987), p. 16; Renato
Mannheimer, "Gli elettori e simpatizzanti della Lega Lombardadopo le elezioni
politiche del 1992" (Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the American
Political Science Association, Chicago, 1992).
18. H.-J.Veen, N. Lepszy and P. Mnich, Die Republikaner-Partei Beginnder
zu
90er ahre,Intere Studien, no. 14/1991-1992 (SanktAugustin: Forschungsinstitut
der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 1992), p. 48; Mannheimer, "Gli elettori e
simpatizzanti della Lega Lombarda;"Diamanti, La Lega,pp. 88-89; Plasser and
Ulram, "Politisch-kultureller Wandel in Osterreich," 114;FritzPlasserand Peter
p.
A. Ulram, "Uberdehnung, Erosion und rechtspopulistische Reaktion.
Wandlungsfaktoren des osterreichischen Parteiensystems im Vergleich,"
Osterreichische Politikwissenschaft (1992):147-64.
Zeitschriftfiir 21


their disenchantment. What needs explanation is thus why, de-
spite widespread cynicism, only a relative minority of the general
public has yielded to the radical populist right's appeal. Underly-
ing the following analysis is the argument that the established
political parties are increasingly less prepared to respond to the
challenge posed by the economic, social, and cultural transforma-
tion of advanced Western democracies. This transformation has
created winners and losers. When the established political parties
fail to meet their political demands, both groups increasingly turn
to new political formations.

SOCIALBIFURCATION
AND ACCELERATED
INDIVIDUALIZATION
The contemporary political space of advanced Western de-
mocracies is structured by a shift from modern industrial welfare
capitalism to postindustrial individualized capitalism. At least
three developments account for this shift: the rapid spread and
diffusion of new information technologies which have allowed
companies to switch from standardized industrial mass manufac-
turing to flexible specialization; the expansion of the service sector
with the creation of new social, cultural,technical, and managerial
services; finally the maturation of the welfare state which increas-
ingly dispenses public services rather than transfer payments.19
Despite marked differences in the degree and extent to which
postindustrial trends have manifested themselves in advanced
Western societies, the patterns are rather similar. Generally the
postindustrialization of society has entailed a bifurcation of the
labor market into highly demanding and attractivejobs and "junk-
jobs." In manufacturing, the shift toward flexible specialization
has led to a fragmentation of the labor market into core and
periphery sectors. The core includes flexible, mobile employees
with advanced levels of formal education and technical training.
They enjoy full-time, permanent positions with job security, rela-
tively generous benefit packages, and good promotion prospects.

19. Stephen Crook, Jan Pakulski and Malcolm Waters, Postmodernization:
Changein AdvancedSociety (London/Newbury Park/New Delhi: SAGE, 1992);
G0sta Esping-Andersen, "PostindustrialCleavage Structures:A Comparison of
Evolving Patterns of Social Stratificationin Germany, Sweden and the United
States,"in Labor
Partiesin Postindustrial
Societies, FrancesFox Piven (New York:
ed.
Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 147-68.


Opposed to them is a growing periphery including both full- and
part-time labor with little or hardly any formal education and/or
technical training and few prospects for the future.
Similartendencies can also be observed in the service sector. Its
expansion has opened new opportunities for a growing segment of
"symbolic specialists" defined as professionals with higher levels
of education either in human- or culture-oriented public sector or
public sector-dependent services or in business-or finance-ori-
ented private sector services. At the same time there has been a
significant growth of "McDonaldized" services which employ a
new multi-collar service proletariat performing skill-poor
"McJobs."20 Finally, the expansion of the welfare state has led to a
general expansion of the public sector, both in traditional admin-
istrative tasks as well as in the expanding human-oriented ser-
vices, which in some countries have increasingly become a domain
of female employment.
The transformation of the economy and the labor market has
significant social and political implications. As the diffusion of
sophisticated information-driventechnologies progresses,the need
for un- and semiskilled workers rapidly declines. The "technologi-
cal elimination of unskilled and semiskilled jobs means that a great
many people will be caught in a world of despair, lacking market-
able skills or hope for the future."21
Prominent among these groups
are the long-term unemployed, female-headed single households
with children, foreign workers, and unskilled young people.22
It would be tempting to see in the success of radical right-wing
populist parties primarily a protest by marginalized groups which

20. Gosta Esping-Andersen, TheThree Worlds Welfare
of Capitalism (Princeton:
PrincetonUniversity Press, 1990),chap. 8;RobertReich, "Secessionof the Success-
ful," New York Times Magazine, 20 January 1991, p. 42; George Ritzer, The
McDonaldizationof Society (Thousand Oaks/London/New Delhi: Pine Forge
Press, 1993);Douglas Adams, Generation Talesforan Accelerated
X: Culture(New
York:St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 5.
21. JeraldHage and CharlesH. Powers, PostindustrialLives:
RolesandRelation-
shipsin the21st Century(Newbury Park/London/New Delhi:SAGE,1992),pp. 41,
55;see also StaffanMarklund, "Structures Modem Poverty,"ActaSociologica
of 33
(1990): 125-40; Graham J. Room and Bemd Henningsen, Neue Armut in der
Europaischen Gemeinschaft (Frankfurt/New York:Campus, 1990).
22. RainerGeissler, Die Sozialstruktur
Deutschlands
(Opladen:Westdeutscher
Verlag, 1992), pp. 165-93.

674 674THE REVIEWOF POLITICS
POLITICS~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

society can do largely without.3 However, empirical studies pro-
vide little evidence for this view. Thus in 1989, Republikaner
supporters were only slightly more likely (26 percent versus 22
percent for the general public) to place themselves in the bottom
third of West German society. A similar picture emerges from a
1992 survey which tried to find out which groups thought society
no longer needed them. Only 12 percent of Republikanersupport-
ers (compared to 22 percent for the whole population) agreed with
that statement. In fact, with 88 percent, Republikaner supporters
were the most confident of all party supporters that society still
needed them.24 These results suggest that the inclination to vote for
the radical populist parties might not necessarily be a direct
response to experienced social marginalization, which is still rela-
tively limited. It might ratherbe the result of experiences directly
related to changes in the workplace.
It has been argued that the increase in jobs that call for better
education and higher qualificationshas been followed by a marked
increase in the level of professional autonomy and formalegalitari-
anism.25 Autonomy and egalitarianism at the workplace, in turn,
are important determinants of social and potentially also political
values and preferences:"people in jobs characterizedby consider-
able autonomy come to value personal initiative, while people in
jobs that are narrowly constrained or closely supervised come to
In
value conformity and external authority."26 politics, it can be
expected that those better educated and employed in the high
quality sectors of the postindustrial economy are most likely to
eschew the largely elite-directed politics of the traditional parties
and to get attracted to political formations which espouse a liber-
tarian agenda. On the other hand, those performing narrowly
constrained or closely supervised tasks, characteristic of tradi-
tional "fordist" mass production or the new McDonaldized ser-
vices, are most likely to maintain their loyalties to the established
parties or to get attracted to new political formations which es-
pouse an authoritarianagenda.

23.Barbara SchmitterHeisler,"AComparativePerspectiveon theUnderclass,"
Theory Society20 (1991):455-83.
and
24. See EMNID/Spiegel surveys, 1-18March1989and 24-29November 1992.
25. Crook, Pakulski and Waters, Postmodernization, 176.
p.
26. Hage and Powers, PostindustrialLives,p. 65.


THERESPONSE THE ESTABLISHED
OF POLITICAL
PARTIES
Socialbifurcationand fragmentationhave given rise to distinct
social groupings with ratherdivergent politicalexpectations.Those
better educated and employed in the human-oriented sectors of
the public service tend to favor Green and other left-libertarian
parties, representing a commitment to egalitarian redistribution,
participatorydemocracy, and individual autonomy.27 Those better
educated and employed in the private service sector can be ex-
pected to favor the free market, lower taxes and reduced welfare
state outlays over extended state intervention. Finally those lack-
ing human capital and thus most threatened by new moderniza-
tion pressures can be expected to favor state intervention and the
welfare state in general, as long as they themselves are the benefi-
ciaries. Both groups are a potential constituency for the populist
right, depending on the established parties" response to social
change.
During the 1980s, the major established parties in Austria,
Belgium, Germany, and Italy have differed markedly in their
response to postindustrialization.InGermany,the ChristianDemo-
crats began in the early 1980s an open debate on new issues such
as feminism and multiculturalism in order to attractnew middle-
class voters. Although this strategy was likely to alienate conserva-
tive voters, the presence of a populist BavarianCSU was supposed
to ensure that disgruntled voters would remain loyal to the center-
right camp. In Belgium, the election of 1981 saw large gains for the
Flemish liberals, who managed to attractnew voters by adopting
a pronouncedly neo-liberal agenda, largely at the expense of the
Christian Democrats.2 In Austria and Italy, on the other hand, the
dominant center-right parties failed largely to adapt to social
changes and the resulting transformationof electoral competition.

27. Herbert Kitschelt, "New Social Movements and the Decline of Party
Organization,"in Challenging PoliticalOrder, Russell J.Dalton and Manfred
the ed.
Kuechler (New York:Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 179-208.
28. Elmar Wiesendahl, "Volksparteien im Abstieg," Aus Politik und
B34-35/92, 14 August 1992, pp. 9-14; Christan Vandermotten and
Zeitgeschichte,
Jean Vanlaer, "Partis et elections depuis 1946," Pouvoir 54 (1990): 66; Marc
Swyngedouw, Waar voorjewaarden: opkomst Vlaams
De van BlokenAgalevin dejaren
tachtigISPO-schrift1992/1, Leuven, 1992, p. 32.


Instead of actively pursuing emerging social groups, the center-
right parties sought to preserve their traditional clientele.29
Whatever way center-right parties chose to respond to social
modernization, they could expect to alienate some of their tradi-
tional or potential clientele. In those cases where they consciously
sought to attractthe winners of the postindustrialization process,
they could expect to alienate those voters who saw themselves
increasingly left behind on the road to a postindustrial future.
Where they appeared paralyzed when confronted with large-scale
social changes, they could expect to alienate both winners and
losers. Radical right-wing populist parties seeking to exploit voter
alienation thus had to appeal to different social groups. This has
had significant consequences for their political programs.

THESOCIALBASIS RADICAL
OF RIGHT-WING
POPULISM
A number of studies suggest that there are significant differ-
ences between radical right-wing populist parties in terms of the
social background of their supporters and sympathizers. Some
parties appeal primarily to lower-class voters, others to a more
equal distribution of lower and middle-class voters. Generally
male voters predominate among the supporters of all four radical
right-wing populist parties. All four parties also appeal to a signifi-
cant portion of young and first-time voters. Republikaner and
Vlaams Blok voters distinguish themselves by their primarily low
levels of formal education and training, their predominant work-
ing-class status, and their concentration in areas characterizedby
a relatively low level of quality of life.3 For example in Berlin and
Frankfurtin 1989the Republikanerwere particularlysuccessful in

29. Gianni Statera,Come votano Italiani(Milan:Sperling and Kupfer, 1993),
gli
pp. 102-104;generally, Giorgio Galli, MezzoSecoloDC (Milan:Rizzoli, 1993);Fritz
Plasser, "Die Nationalratswahl 1986: Analyse und politische Konsequenzen,
42
Monatshefte (1986)8: 26; FritzPlasser and Peter Ulram, "Abstieg
Osterreichische
oder letzte Chance der OVP?"Osterreichische Monatshefte (1990)7: 14;Gerfried
46
Sperl, "Die Partei unter kraftigen Moderisierungsdruck," Das Parlament,28
August 1992, p. 17.
30. Joachim Hofmann-Gottig, "Die Neue Rechte: Die Mannerpartei,"Aus
PolitikundZeitgeschichteB41-42,6 October1989,p. 26;Ursula Feist, "Rechtsruckin
Baden-Wurttemberg Schleswig-Holstein," Protestwahler Wahlverweigerer:
und in und
Kriseder Demokratie?, Karl Starzacher,Konrad Schacht, Bemd Friedrich and
ed.
Thomas Leif (Cologne: Bund, 1992), p. 74. Roth, "Die Republikaner,"p. 35.

I

areas characterizedby a high percentage of persons with not more
than primary education and predominantly working-class status
and deteriorating living (particularlyhousing) conditions. Similar
developments may also explain the party's significant gains in the
industrial areas of Stuttgart in 1992.31
Like the Republikaner, the Vlaams Blok has increasingly at-
tracted working-class voters with lower levels of education, a
significant number of whom come from areas (e.g., in Antwerp)
characterizedby deteriorating quality of life, even if the party has
increasingly also gained ground in middle-class areas.32These
findings suggest that Republikaner and Vlaams Blok have estab-
lished themselves in new electoral niches, opened up by the
process of social fragmentation and bifurcation. This process is
particularly pronounced in new service centers like Frankfurtor
Antwerp where economic and socio-cultural change has split the
city in two: one dominated by finance, banks, and business ser-
vices, by culture, and the new middle classes, and one character-
ized by confined living spaces, limited life chances and the con-
stant threat of material deprivation.33
The FPO and the Lega Nord appeal to a significantly more
heterogeneous constituency. Particularly the FPO has attracted
better educated voters, with a significant segment coming from the
upwardly mobile middle classes.3 However, the FPOhas increas-
ingly also attracted voters with modest levels of education, re-
flected in a growing support from skilled and unskilled workers.
One study suggests that the FPO gets support from three distinct

31. Hennig, Die Republikaner SchattenDeutschlands, 214-15;Horst W.
im pp.
Schmollinger, "DieWahl zum Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlinam 29. Januar1989,"
20
Zeitschriftfur Parlamentsfragen (1989): 319; Feist, "Rechtsruck in Baden-
Wurttembergund Schleswig-Holstein," p. 73.
32. Marc Swyngedouw, "Het Vlaams Blok in Antwerpen: Een analyse va de
verkiezingsutilagen sinds 1985" in Extreemrechtsin West-Europa, Hugo de
ed.
Schampheleire and Yannis Thanassekos (Brussels:VUB-Press,1991), pp. 93-114;
Swyngedouw, Waarvoorje waarden, 27-28, 36.
pp.
33. Hans-GerdJaschke,"Nicht-demokratischepolitische Partizipationin der
sozial polarisierten Stadt," in Protestwdhler
und Wahlverweigerer, 99; Ronald
p.
Commers, "Antwerpen:Eine europaische Stadt driftet nach rechts,"in Rassismus
in Europa, Christoph Butterwegge and Siegfried Jager (Cologne: Bund, 1993),
ed.
pp. 135-43.
34. Plasser, "Die Nationalratswahl 1986,"p. 8.

678
THE REVIEW POLITICS

social groups: younger, upwardly mobile, white-collar workers
who have an above-average level of education and are welfare
state-oriented;the growing segment of dynamic, younger, market-
oriented white-collar workers and self-employed people with
above average education; and predominantly skilled, blue-collar
protest voters.35
Similarly the Lega Nord has managed to attractsupport both
from blue-collarworkers and the self-employed. Thepercentage of
voters with higher levels of education has increasingly come to
prevail over those with lower levels of education or none at all. At
the same time, the party has managed to attract voters both in
former Christian Democratic areas characterized by a medium-
high level of development, and in former Communist areas char-
acterized by a low level of development.36
These findings suggest that both FPO and Lega Nord have
been significantly more successful than their counterparts in Ger-
many and Flanders to pursue a catch-all strategy. In view of the
Lega's rapid rise to dominance in Northern Italy this is hardly
surprising. By contrast,both Republikanerand Vlaams Blok have
gone through a process of proletarizationwhich has considerably
narrowed the pool of potential supporters, except in regions and
areas with strong working-class presence. What remains to be
analyzed is whether and to what degree the divergent social bases
of radical right-wing populism in Western Europe find reflection
in the political programs these parties espouse.

Political Program:Neo-liberal and Authoritarian Populism

THEPOLITICAL
FIGHTING CLASS
The rise of radical right-wing populism has coincided with a
profound disaffection with established politics. It is hardly sur-

35. Fritz Plasser, Peter A. Ulram and Alfred Grausgruber, "The Decline of
'LagerMentality' and the New Model of ElectoralCompetition in Austria," West
European Politics15 (1992) 1: 40-41.
36. See Mannheimer, "Gli elettori e simpatizzanti dell Lega Lombarda;"
DOXA, "Lanovita delle 'proiezioni DOXA '92':Il sondaggio all' uscita dai seggi,"
Bolletino DOXA46,14 April1992;PaoloNatale,"LegaLombarda insediamento
della e
territoriale:un' analisi ecologica," in La LegaLombarda, Renato Mannheimer
ed.
(Milan:Feltrinelli,1991),p. 108;Diamanti, LaLega,pp. 98-99;Statera,Comevotano
gli Italiani,pp. 62f.


prising that the radical populist right has quickly adopted this
issue. They present themselves as the main advocates of the
concerns of ordinary citizens while promoting a fundamental
renewal of the established order. They owe much of their success
to their skillful translationof popular disaffection with politics into
poignant attacks on the palazzo(Lega Nord), its corruption and
inefficiency, and against the arrogance of the "political mafia"
(Vlaams Blok) who dismiss the views of the common people while
enriching themselves at their expense.37In view of the series of
political scandals which have erupted in Spain, France,Germany,
and particularly Italy, these charges are hardly unfounded. In the
face of a system sustained by clientilism, favoritism, and close ties
between the political class and organized crime, it is hardly sur-
prising that Umberto Bossi's assertion that only with him Italy will
have "honesty, cleanness, transparency, and above all TRUEDE-
MOCRACY"has had growing appeal.3
In addition to charging the established parties with unrespon-
siveness and corruption,particularlythe Republikanerand Vlaams
Blok accuse them of having sold out the national interest: the
betrayal of Flemish separatism or the sellout of Germaninterests in
the lost Eastern territories. In addition, both parties charge the
established parties with seeking to establish a multiculturalsociety
which promotes the extinction of the cultural identity of the
indigenous people and threatens their very survival.39
NEO-LIBERAL
POPULISM
If FPOand Lega Nord differ in their analysis of the causes of the
current sociopolitical impasse from Republikaner and Vlaams
Blok, they also differ from them in terms of the remedies they
propose. For FPO and Lega Nord the remedy lies in a radical neo-
liberal program. This program calls for the reduction of some taxes
and the outright abolition of others; a drastic curtailing of the role
of the state in the national economy together with large-scale
privatization of the public sector and particularly the state-

37. Vlaams Blok, "Zeggen u denkt",
wat Deume, no date, p. 9.
38. Umberto Bossi in LegaNordCentroSud,no. 62-68,1-7 March1992,pp. 1-2.
39. Die Republikaner Baden-Wiirttemberg:
fir Landtagswahlprogramm'92,
Stuttgart,1992, p. 2; Vlaams Blok, Uit Selfverdediging: 1991,
Verkiezingsprogramma
Brussels, 1991.

I I

controlled media; a general deregulation of the private sector;and
a restructurationand professionalization of the public sector. The
main beneficiaries of these measures should be small and medium-
size enterprises. Both parties expect these enterprises to play a
dominant role in the further development of advanced Western
societies, particularly if new technologies allow them to compete
In
effectively with largerenterprises.40 the Italiancase, the Lega has
also proposed to divide the country into three largely autonomous
macro-regions within a loose Italian federation and even threat-
ened with secession. However, with growing success at the polls
and growing charges that the Lega sought separatism rather than
federalism, Bossi increasingly abandoned the notion of a "North-
ern Republic."41

AUTHORITARIAN
POPULISM
Although also Republikanerand Vlaams Blok have cautiously
moved toward espousing neo-liberal economic principles, their
economic ideas are of only peripheral significance for their politi-
cal program.42 Instead they promote an authoritarian,xenophobic
nationalism as a basis for political renewal. This includes a strong
emphasis on law and order, a return to traditional values, and an
end to the confrontation with the past (the Holocaust in the
German, collaboration in the Flemish case). In the case of the
Vlaams Blok this program includes the demand for full indepen-
dence for Flanders with Brussels as the capital, recuperation of all
lost Flemish territories and unification of all Flemings, and a
federation with the Netherlands in a united Europe of regions. In
the case of the Republikanerit includes the continued questioning
of the finality of Germany's territoriallosses in the East.43 most
But
important, authoritarian nationalism means the promotion of
xenophobia, if not racism.

40. Giulio Savelli, Checosavuolela Lega(Milan:Longanesi and Co., 1992).
41. Bossi with Vimercati,Ventodalnord,chap. 13;Umberto Bossi and Daniele
-
Vimercati,Larivoluzione LaLega: storiae idee(Milan:Kupferand Sperling, 1993),
chap. 4.
42. Die Republikaner fir Baden-Wirttemberg, p. 15; Vlaams Blok, Uit
Zelfverdediging, 25.
p.
43. Vlaams Blok,Manifest hetrechtse
van Vlaams-nationalisme:
Grondbeginselen,
Deure, no date, pp. 6-7, 15-16;Die Republikanerifur Baden-Wiirttemberg, 19-20.
p.


"Save the welfare state: expel false refugees! Eliminate unem-
ployment: stop immigration! Fight against crime: deport foreign
criminals!" These slogans promoted by the Republikaner reflect
and express growing concern that the unrestricted influx of East-
ern European and especially non-Europeanpolitical and economic
refugees is adding to an already overburdened welfare state,
creating unemployment, and augmenting crime rates.44 Both the
Republikaner and the Vlaams Blokhave been quick to exploit these
concerns to mobilize voters against an alleged "invasion" of eco-
nomic refugees. At the same time they have started to appeal to
latent fears that as a result of the growing influx of foreigners,
Western Europe will lose its ethnic and national identity. Particu-
larly in response to the growing visibility and assertiveness of
Muslims in Western Europeboth parties call on WesternEuropean
societies to "meet the Muslim challenge" in order to prevent Islam
from achieving "religiousworld domination."45 order to contain
In
and reduce the number of immigrantsboth parties demand drastic
administrative and executive measures including hermetically
closing the borders, ports and airports to illegal immigrants, the
immediate eviction of refugees not recognized as political refu-
gees, and the eventual return of all immigrants and refugees to
At
their home country.46 the same time they promote pro-family
policies (e.g.,a strictban on abortion)in order to arrestand reverse
Western Europe's demographic decline.

BETWEEN
THEPOLES:
LEGANORDAND FPO
Xenophobia and a return to authoritarianvalues play a subor-
dinate role in the programmatic conceptions of FPO and Lega
Nord. In line with their generally libertarian convictions neither
party has been prepared to endorse restrictinga woman's right to
have an abortion.47 situation is different in regard to immigra-
The

44. For the Vlaams Blok see Annemans and Dewinter, DossierGasdarbeid; for
the Republikanersee especially Republikanerfiir Baden-Wirttemberg, 4-14.
pp.
45. Die Republikaner, "Deutsche Biirger wehrt Euch!" leaflet, 1992; Die
Republikanerfiir Baden-Wirttemberg, 19;for the Vlaams Blok see Filip Dewinter,
p.
De
Immigratie: Opplossingen, Merksem, no date, pp. 8-9.
46. See Fr6deric Larsen, "En Belgique, l'extreme droite s'installe dans les
coulisses de pouvoir," LeMondeDiplomatique, 455,8 February1992, p. 8.
no.
47. FPO, Osterreichpolitisch erneuern:Programmder FreiheitlichenPartei
Osterreichs,FBWInformationen,6/89, paragraph 195.


tion. In fact, the Lega's initial success stemmed in part from the
party's open hostility toward immigrants from southern Italy.
However, Bossi's attempt to extend the Lega throughout Italy, led
the party to drop their anti-Southerndiatribesand focus instead on
the "invasion of blacks and Arabs" which by the late 1980s was
gaining growing attention in Italian society. The Lega called for a
"rigorouscontrol of immigration"by allowing only those to immi-
grate into Italy who had prove of a job and of housing. However,
by 1992, the Lega relegated the question of immigration to the
margins of its political program.48 There is, however, a notable
exception: like other populist parties the Lega has shown growing
hostility to Muslim immigrants, going so far as to brand Islam the
main threat to Western civilization.49
In the case of the FPO the development has been reverse.
Originally the FPOjustified their opposition to immigration with
arguments which resembled those of the Lega. Although Austria
had a duty to show solidarity with the rest of the world, solidarity
could only be guaranteed if immigration remained within reason-
able limits. While the FPO recognized the right to asylum, it
demanded strict measures against abuse by economic refugees
and, at least in the case of Vienna, home to a large immigrant
population, a complete immigration stop. At the same time, na-
tionalists in the party attacked the notion of a multicultural society
in Austria, "theresults of which are not cultural cross-fertilization,
but tremendous human misery and large economic damage."50 By
1992, the FPO sharpened its tone. The party presented a compre-
hensive anti-immigrant program which, in addition to the usual
anti-immigrant measures, called for completely halting immigra-
tion until a solution had not been found for the growing problem
of illegal immigration, lack of housing, and unemployment.51 With
these demands the FPO was seeking to exploit growing hostility

48. VittorioMoioli, I nuovirazzismi:
MiserieefortunedellaLegalombarda(Rome:
Edizioni Associate, 1990);"Programmadella Lega Nord," Lombardia Autonomista,
5 March 1992, p. 9; Bossi with Vimercati, Ventodal nord,pp. 143-50.
49. See the interview with Umberto Bossi "Meglio gli Usa che i barbari,"II
Sabato, July 1993,p. 34;and the position of the mayor of Monza, quoted in M. G.
24
Cutuli, "Monza:I cento giori che sconvolsero la citta,"Epoca, June 1993,p. 19.
29
50. FPO, Heimatsuche; Andreas Molzer, "Tragodie der Multikultur," Neue
FreieZeitung,no. 20, 13 May 1992, p. 7.
51. FPO, Osterreich zuerst,Vienna, 1992.


toward foreigners in Austria, even if that meant moving closer to
the extremist end of the political spectrum.

EXPLAINING
PROGRAMMATIC
SHIFTS
Surveys suggest that the programmatic shifts of the Lega and
the FPOon immigration came in response to shifts in their electoral
basis. With growing success in northern Italy the Lega Nord
experienced a growing influx of better educated middle-class
voters less likely to support an outrightly xenophobic party. This
is reflected in polls which indicate the low importance immigra-
tion had for Lega supporters. Thus in 1990, 81 percent of Lega
voters in Milan said they voted for the Lega out of opposition to
inefficiency and bureaucracy in Rome, but only 26 percent to
defend Lombardy against an excessive number of immigrants and
foreigners. Similarly in 1992, two-thirds of Lega Nord voters said
that taxes paid in the north should be spent in the region, but only
19 percent said they thought non-European immigrants could not
integrate easily because they were different from Italians.52
Whereas the Lega Nord has increasingly appealed to middle-
class voters, the FPO has been attractinga growing portion of the
blue-collar vote. In the Viennese election, 35 percent of skilled
workers voted FPO; 20 percent of its overall support came from
blue-collar voters. This trend continued in the local elections in
Graz in 1993, where the FPO was particularlysuccessful in work-
ing-class neighborhoods. At the same time a growing number of
voters said they voted for the FPO because of its stance on the
immigration question (41 percent in the Viennese election). By the
end of 1992, almost three-quartersof FPO supporters agreed with
the party's proposals to reduce the influx of immigrants into
Austria.53 This suggests that the increase in working-class support-
ers found expression in a considerable hardening of the FPO's
position on immigration. The defection of the FPO'sliberalwing is
likely to diminish the party's appeal to middle-class voters, thus
making it more dependent on working-class support and, with it,
on the immigration issue.

52. RenatoMannheimer,"Chivota Lega e perch6,"in LaLega Lombarda, 144;
p.
RenatoMannheimer,"Glielettori e simpatizzanti della Lega Lombarda,"no page.
53. See Fritz Plasser and Peter A. Ulram, "ExitPoll GRWWien "91,"mimeo,
Fessel + GFK Institut, Vienna, 1991; SWS survey, FB288,November/December
1992.

I

CONFLICT THEPOSTINDUSTRIAL
POLITICAL IN AGE
The recent dramatic rise in support for radical right-wing
populist parties in Western Europe has obscured the fact that these
parties are far from representing a homogeneous phenomenon. In
fact it is possible to differentiate between two party families in
terms of the social basis of their support and their programmatic
focus. National populist parties tend to appeal to voters with lower
level of education, working-class status, from areas characterized
by a lower quality of life. Reflecting the anxieties and resentments
of this clientele, national populist parties tend to emphasize law
and order, traditional moral values, and radical opposition to
immigrantsand refugees. Besides the Republikanerand the Vlaams
Blok the only other significant party which belongs to this group is
the French Front National.
Neo-liberal populist parties tend to appeal to voters with
higher level of education and mixed social status. Reflecting the
aspirations of this clientele these parties tend to stress individual-
ism and a market-orientedliberalism while placing less emphasis
on immigration. The Lega Nord, the Swiss Tessin League, the
Scandinavian Progress parties and the Swedish New Democracy
party belong to this group. Among those parties which place equal
emphasis on both a neo-liberal economic and an anti-immigrant
program are the FPO and the Swiss Automobile party.
The composition of their electoral basis and their program-
matic evolution suggest that these parties reflect and respond to
emerging postindustrial political conflicts. One such conflict is
over the future role of the state. Its main opponents are better
educated public sector employees in the human-oriented services
who support continued state intervention in the economy and
state-sponsored redistributive policies and private sector employ-
ees who privilege private initiative and efficiency and seek to
curtail and restrict the role of the state. Politically this conflict pits
Green and other left-libertarianparties against neo-liberal popu-
list parties. In northern Italy, for example, it finds expression both
in the rise of the Lega Nord and the concomitant gains of its left-
libertarian counterpart, La Rete (the Net).54

54.See Giulio Savelli,"Eadesso serve una Leganel Centro-Sud,L"Independente,
22 June 1993, pp. 1-2.


A second conflict is over the question of what obligation
society has to those sectors of the economy which technological
progress and global competition threaten with obsolescence. Its
main opponents are workers and employees in the "sunshine
sectors" of the economy, primarily interested in wage increases, a
shortening of the work week, and greater autonomy at the work
place and workers threatened by rationalization who seek job
security.55Politically this conflict pits the established political
parties not only against national populist parties, but potentially
also against neo-liberal parties. A third conflict pits advanced
against more backward regions. Both national and neo-liberal
populist parties have emerged in some of the most prosperous and
affluent regions of Western Europe, expressing both a new re-
gional assertiveness and a growing regional egoism. Important
representatives are the Lega Nord and the Vlaams Blok.56In
Germany, the Republikaner's German-nationalist programmatic
has so far prevented them from exploiting growing conflicts be-
tween West and East Germans. Increasing support for political
parties which appeal to these sentiments portends ratherill for the
future of European integration.
The transformationof advanced West European societies thus
creates profound sociopolitical tensions which have given rise to
new political formations. To dismiss these formations as mere
expressions of political protest not only fails to confront the dra-
matic reality of economic, social, and cultural change, but also
dismisses their relevance for political renewal. If their past elec-
toral history is any indication, radical right-wing populist parties
are hardly a flash in the pan. Rather they are a reflection and
expression of the ambiguities that characterizethe postindustrial
age.

55. Wilhelm Heitmeyer, "Gesellschaftliche Desintegrationsprozesse als
Ursachen von fremdenfeindlicher Gewalt und politischer Paralysierung," Aus
Politikund Zeitgeschichte,B2-3/93, 8 January1993, pp. 7-8.
56. Luca Ricolfi, "Politica senza fede: l"estremismo di centro dei piccoli
leghisti," IIMulino 42 (1993):53-69.

Two faces of radical right wing populism betz

Empfohlen

Empfohlen

Weitere ähnliche Inhalte

Was ist angesagt?

Was ist angesagt? (20)

Ähnlich wie Two faces of radical right wing populism betz

Ähnlich wie Two faces of radical right wing populism betz (18)

Kürzlich hochgeladen

Kürzlich hochgeladen (9)

Two faces of radical right wing populism betz