1. CAN INDIA PROVIDE BALANCED MULTIPOLARITY IN
SOUTHEAST AND EAST ASIA
(Talk delivered at the University of Philippines, Asian Centre on June
18, 2013)
By Vinod Saighal
INTRODUCTION
The Philippines is Asia’s first democracy. India is the world’s
largest democracy. Both are therefore the standard-bearers for
freedom and democracy in the region. The Philippines and India
are natural allies, not only because they have a shared history of
being colonized by two English-speaking nations, and therefore
share that common language with aplomb, but both are Asian
countries that are animated by vibrant democratic traditions based
on republican ideals. Asia’s first democracy and Asia’s largest
democracy are therefore surely headed for closer ties. (The Diplomatist,
New Delhi – April 2013).
*
Were I to be asked to sum up in just one sentence the essence of
my talk, I would state that: “With India finally throwing in its lot
with East and Southeast Asia, the potential inheres within the
region for the setting up of a security architecture that ensures
security and tranquility for all countries”. Evidently the maritime
dimension is the overwhelming dimension that will underpin the
new security architecture. This becomes evident from the fact that
the US and every country in the region that has sought closer
defence cooperation with India first and foremost have been
holding joint naval exercises with it.
2. I intend to leave out the new regional economic groupings
that are taking shape like TPP and so on as these are subjects in
themselves and would require a lot of time to discuss. Similarly, I
will not touch on issues on which this audience would be
exceptionally well-informed, unless these are required to
supplement what I consider to be important inputs. By the same
token I am not going to analyse force levels, acquisitions in the
pipeline and several related issues that have been extensively
debated at practically all for a and can be seen on the concerned
websites. It however needs to be reiterated that the arms
acquisitions and military build up in the region is perhaps the most
massive accretion of arms for any set of adversaries since the end
of the Cold War. History bears witness that more often than not
excessive militarization leads to an irreversible momentum for the
outbreak of hostilities, often triggered by a minor incident, as
nearly happened on India’s border very recently. The thrust of my
presentation today is that the potential inheres to restore and
maintain stability in the region by the coming together of like-
minded countries threatened by Chinese not-so-peaceful designs.
The key to this stability would be the perception of friendly East
and Southeast Asian countries that India is in for the long haul.
For the purposes of our analysis ASEAN can be split, the
better term would be divided in to three blocks or categories: the
first category being those suspicious of China, having disputes
with China or those who feel threatened by China. The second
category would be nations that can be considered to be allied to
China. The third category or the largest are those countries that
would prefer not to take sides as of now or remain neutral in spite
of present disputes or difficulties:
It transpires that before today’s event I would have already
delivered three keynote presentations on South China Sea (SCS) at
international conclaves held in Hanoi in 2009, HCMC (formally
3. Saigon) in 2010, and right here in Manila in July 2011 on the
invitation of the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam and the Foreign
Service Institute of the Philippines government. [It gives me great
pleasure to note that Minister Laura Q Del Rosario who was the
head of the Foreign Service Institute when I was invited to Manila
on the earlier occasion is present today among the audience.
Minister, I am reassured by your presence].
I have divided the presentation into four segments that I have
termed as: The China Factor; ASEAN; India: Balanced Multi-
polarity Catalyst (the emphasis being on the word catalyst or call it
energizer); the Environmental Factor; followed by Concluding
Remarks. There is much else that could have been covered, but the
time constraint necessitated selectivity. Whatever is left out can be
covered in the interactive session that follows.
*
THE CHINA FACTOR
As is well known by now, with each ten-year change of Chinese
top leadership the new leader gives out his vision looking into the
future. President Xi Jinping has called his vision the China Dream.
In earlier days it required seers to interpret the dreams of emperors
and kings. In this case the successor emperor of the Middle
Kingdom has himself started fleshing out his dream for the people
of China and above all for the Party and the PLA. In China’s
immediate neighborhood there are no illusions as to where the
dream is leading. The attention of the audience is invited to the
beginning of the presentation where the projected models for
China’s growth were unveiled. Clearly, the model adopted by
China corresponds to the Dynamic Expansion Model. What does
this tell us?
4. For a long time the core interest of China for which it was
ready to go to war was Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang (T, T & X).
The world took note. Nobody dared question China’s core interest.
Seeing the global acceptance of its T, T & X declaration, a few
years later in 2005, China laid claim to the province of Arunachal
Pradesh in the North East of India by calling it South Tibet. In
2009, China’s then state councilor Dai Bingguo elaborated on the
notion of core interest: “maintenance of the Communist Party-led
system: protection of state sovereignty and territorial integrity; and
development of the economy and society”. The following year, in
2010, China proclaimed to the world that its core interest included
sovereignty over the South China Sea islands and reefs covering
approximately 3.5 million square km. Not pausing for breath, in
the year following in 2011, China announced that the Japan
occupied Senkaku islands too were part of its core interest.
Again without pausing, elements of the Chinese navy sailed
1,800 km away from the mainland to drop anchor at the James
Shoal, an outcrop barely 80 kilometers from Malaysia, claimed by
the latter. More recently China sailed a cruise ship with 300
hundred tourists to the Paracel islands claimed by Vietnam to
reinforce its sovereignty claim.
Across its land borders as well China has been robustly
projecting its dream. Concerned that Myanmar was breaking away
and moving far too rapidly towards the U.S, Japan and India, it
decided to nudge the Myanmar government by supplying arms to
Wa insurgents. Moving further West China decided to give a
bigger nudge to India by sending its patrol across the LAC that had
held since 1962 up to a depth of 19 km in a sub sector of great
strategic sensitivity for the Indian military in Ladakh.
The momentum generated by its outward expansionary push
is going to be maintained for the Dynamic Expansion Model posits
that once set in motion irreversibility is built into it till the final
explosion. In galactic space the expansion phase before the
explosion can take several billion years. On Earth in the 21st
Century, it could be several decades or even longer before the
5. decline sets in or the explosion occurs.. What does it imply for the
relatively smaller countries of ASEAN and at a later stage Japan,
Taiwan, South Korea and Australia? Gradually they will succumb
to Chinese hegemony that for a time will bring greater economic
prosperity, concomitant with the loss of independent decision
making. Lee Kuan Yew, the respected elder statesman of
Singapore has said that Chinese leaders recognize they can’t
confront the U.S. military until they have overtaken it in terms of
development and application of technology. Nonetheless, he says
he is sure they aspire to displace the U.S. as the leading power in
Asia. “The 21st
century will be a contest for supremacy in the
Pacific because that is where the growth will be,” Mr. Lee was
quoted as saying in a recently published book. “If the U.S. does not
hold its ground in the Pacific, it cannot be a world leader.”
Unquote.
*
The Chinese leadership is flexing its muscles in every direction
from the East and South China Seas all the way to the border with
India in the Himalayas. While designed to be a show of strength of
China’s military capabilities, examined closely it hides a
fundamental vulnerability?
Looking into China’s internal situation it can be discerned
that all is not well within the country. The various difficulties that
face the CCP internally have been highlighted by China watchers
around the world. What has not been sufficiently brought into the
public domain – within China and outside China - is the fact that
the top leadership in Beijing is painfully aware that whatever
public face of unity they put out, the government as presently
constituted lacks legitimacy. Perhaps elaboration would be in order
in making a far-reaching assertion of this nature.
Leaving aside tin pot dictatorships there would be no country
in the world whose budget for internal security is higher than its
defence budget. Further, if a tally were to be made of all the
agencies in addition to the PAP the total strength of the internal
6. security apparatus would be seen to be more than the strength of
the PLA; all this when no country threatens China or is in a
position to do so.
It is seen that the number of agitations, demonstrations, and
large-scale protests against the government at various levels have
been growing with each passing year. In the year that has gone by
these protests are said to have reached a figure of 180,000, in spite
of the massive internal security apparatus deployed all over the
country. The figure relates to mainland China and does not include
the occupied (amalgamated) territories of Tibet and Xinjiang. Nor
does it include innumerable individual protestors that the
government incarcerates every year.
While it would be both incorrect and premature to infer that
the hold of the CCP is anyway threatened for the time being, it
does raise the specter of the lack of legitimacy that the Beijing
leadership cannot gloss over.
Coming now to the periphery or the occupied territories of
Tibet and Xinjiang that in geographical spread constitute more
than 60% of China’s area, it becomes apparent that in spite of over
60 years of Chinese rule the unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang continues
to grow. Despite the massive military presence, omniscient state
security apparatus and demographic swamping by Han Chinese
that has taken place the Chinese leadership can hardly claim before
the world that these populations whose lands had been taken over
by force of arms are reconciled to Chinese rule.
This was the external perception relating to Tibet and
Xinjiang after being incorporated over six decades ago into the
People’s Republic of China with constitutional guarantees for their
autonomy. But what about the people of China, the Han
people who constitute over 90% of the population within China?
How has the Chinese government been able to perpetuate the myth
for internal consumption that incorporated minorities are living
happily under Chinese rule?
7. In sum, the emerging super power, the economic and
militarily strong Peoples Republic of China is potentially in deep
trouble on account of lack of governance legitimacy. The
camouflage over the actual conditions obtaining in occupied
territories notwithstanding to what extent the continuing protests
and brutal suppression on the periphery, ostensibly hidden from the
people on the mainland, are subconsciously underpinning internal
unrest is difficult to gauge. Only insiders of the system would
know whether the internal unrest in mainland China gives hope to
the unrest on the periphery. Whatever be the case, this degree of
dissatisfaction does constitute lack of governing legitimacy. In the
years to come it could become the greatest vulnerability of the
CCP governance model in China.
What is more, and now a very important statement is being
made, the suppression of internal dissent within China by the state
security apparatus and in the occupied territories by the state
security apparatus and the PLA is leading to an internal power shift
in favour of the PLA at the cost of the Party leadership in Beijing.
For the world it is an uncomfortable development as in the years
ahead the PLA could have a major say in shaping the
government’s foreign policy. In fact this may already be the case.
*
[The Chinese leadership, physically absolute master of its territory,
not facing any external threat is yet paranoid about the Dalai Lama
who does not have even one soldier under his command. His very
being however has created such paranoia in the highest rungs of
the Chinese leadership since he fled to India over 50 years ago that
it remains in perpetual agitation every time that the Dalai Lama
utters a word or visits any country. The contradiction is evidently
lost on the Chinese leaders who are busy setting up Confucius
Centers all over the world to project China’s soft power and
civilization heritage. It becomes the clearest indication that the
Chinese leaders without realizing it unwittingly acknowledge to
8. the world, and in a manner of speaking to the people of the
occupied territories and their own citizens that they lack
governance legitimacy.
Stabilisation in Tibet remains the centre piece of China’s
policy on its periphery. In spite of massive investments large
numbers of Tibetans remain disaffected. No country in the world
recognises Tibet as being disputed territory. Yet the Chinese
constantly seek reassurance from New Delhi about its intentions.
In spite of the massive growth of Chinese power, their insecurities
remain high. In great measure, they are due to Beijing’s own
heavy-handed policies. Beijing seeks to deflect the blame of its
own shortcomings on outsiders. To round off the small digression
on the vulnerability of China it needs to be made clear to its
leaders that the countries whom they have been threatening have to
date not thought fit to exploit China’s vulnerabilities. This could
change should the Chinese government persist with their
aggressive posture or designs].
*
[Countries around China are wondering what to make of the latest
Chinese white paper on defense that for the first time in many
years omits the promise that China will never be the first to use
nuclear weapons. That explicit pledge had been assumed by the
rest of the world to be the cornerstone of Beijing’s stated nuclear
policy for the last 50 years. The latest white paper introduces
ambiguity when it endorses the use of nuclear weapons in response
to a nuclear attack but does not rule out first use or other uses. The
question then arises as to whether China is changing its position on
nuclear weapons. The doubt so created cannot be dismissed out of
hand because the latest white paper coincides with China’s
assertions in the South China Sea and with India on its borders.
Explanations by Chinese generals cannot remove the doubt that
has been created. What is more the latest Chinese position could
well turn out to be the trigger that induces other regional powers
intimidated by China to fashion or start reassessing their own
9. nuclear type responses. Moreover the nuclear debate has already
been renewed by the latest actions in this field by North Korea].
If the Chinese Dream as it unfolds is read in conjunction with
the latest Chinese White Paper there is no doubt that it would make
China’s neighbours even more wary. Were the Chinese leadership
to change direction and profess peace with their neighbors the
lowering of guard by the latter simply cannot take place. The
White Paper spells out the missions of the PLA in no uncertain
terms. National resurgence in any country that treads on the
aspirations of its neighbors will always remain a matter of concern
for the smaller countries of the region and leave them with no
choice but to form defensive alliances for their own security. China
should take note that Japan besides India has commenced overtures
to Russia realizing that the US commitment or even capabilities
might decline in times to come. Japan and Russia are seriously
exploring the possibility of settling their territorial dispute.
The world is aware of the decline in the US military budget
in the years ahead. However, it needs to be kept in mind that
China’s halcyon days of unprecedented double digit growth are
definitely over. Even high single digit growth might not continue
for long. By extension it will have a corresponding effect on its
defence budget and military spending that cannot be sustained at
the present rate for long.
10. ASEAN
Disturbing Geopolitical Trends for ASEAN
It is generally taken for granted in ASEAN and East Asia that
Australia being equally apprehensive of China’s growing power
shares their concern and will stay the course. Many would say that
Australia is perhaps the lead nation that has been carrying out joint
naval exercises with the U.S, Japan and India for improving inter-
operability among them. Whence the feeling that has begun to
surface in many quarters that something might go wrong in the
coming years? In the case of Australia it can be shown that some
leaders feel that their country’s relations with China should be put
on a more solid footing; a few going so far as to say that Australia
need not put all its eggs in the U.S basket. This trend can no longer
be dismissed out of hand. A few examples will suffice. In the first
case it appears that a decision has been taken by the Australian
government to invest 5% of their foreign exchange reserves in
Chinese bonds. Besides helping to strengthen the renminbi, it
indicates a deeper engagement with China. Another example
concerns security issues. China has become Australia’s top trading
partner, ahead of Japan, the US and South Korea. Many
Australians feel that any policy that aims at containing China’s
military growth would not work. Australia it is felt can balance its
defense ties to the US while backing China’s emerging military
strength.
Evidently, no radical departure from existing alliances or
agreements, expressed or understood to be so, is going to take
place in a hurry; yet it would be prudent for ASEAN and its
potential backers to be alive to the way the wind has started
blowing.
It is not inconceivable that at some point of time the US
either finds it difficult to maintain its current military posture in the
Asia-Pacific or is obliged to arrive at an accommodation with
11. China. The EU would follow suit almost immediately. Hence it
would be in the fitness of things for India, being itself troubled by
China, to take the lead to integrate more closely with ASEAN and
East Asian countries to build up a defensive network that would be
able to take the slack for a subsequent pull back by the US, EU and
Australia, should it ever take place.
INDIA: BALANCED MULTIPOLARITY CATALYST
There appears to be unbelievable convergence or uniformity of
views regarding an enhanced Indian presence in the region.
Excluding China there are around fifteen countries in South and
East Asia, including Australia, Taiwan, and North Korea. Although
technically Australia and New Zealand do not form part of South
East or East Asia; their economic and physical presence allows
their integration in the region. If one were to take free soundings
from the public in every country mentioned, it will be seen that
none of them would be averse to an Indian presence in the region;
not one, not even the few countries that are considered close to
China or under China’s tutelage. Going a step further, not one
government from these countries would be uncomfortable with an
Indian presence if left to itself, or if it were not obliged to look
over its shoulder for China’s lack of approbation. Coming to think
of it, this could indeed be one of the most remarkable
achievements of the soft power of any country in the world as far
the region under discussion is concerned..
To make any meaningful contribution to the security and
tranquility of the region India will have to carve out its space as
part of its ‘look east policy’. In doing so two different avenues
open up for India. The first that beckons temptingly would be to
join the US and Australia in a trilateral naval framework; the other
approach would be to independently link up with the navies of
ASEAN and East Asian countries to maintain freedom of
12. navigation as an international commitment rather than as a defence
pact to counter China. Of course, the two avenues are not mutually
exclusive and the degree to which these become more interactive
would depend on China’s actions.
Going purely by the hesitation of the Indian government in
recent years, to conclude that India can be jostled by its adversary
or adversaries would be a mistake. India has the geographical size,
burgeoning young demographic mass and should it choose to push
in that direction the military might to more than hold its own.
Moreover, the current financial downturn - due largely to fetters
that a democratic system with an exceptionally vibrant media and
independent judiciary can put on government decision-making –
should soon be reversed leading to a continuous annual growth of
between 7 and 8 percent. Whatever the current predicament, the
resilience of India’s democracy remains its essential strength.
Seeing its size and potential it would be evident that although India
has been generally punching below its weight in the region it is no
lightweight. For outsiders and frustratingly even for India’s
strategic community within the country, India is seen to be
tentative and indecisive.
*
Call it Action, reaction. A few weeks ago China overplayed its
hand against India in the Ladakh Region. A beleaguered Indian
government that is facing internal difficulties did not wish to take
on the Chinese in the game of real politic and decided to defuse the
crisis in a manner that the Chinese leadership did not lose face in
pulling back its troops that had come in over 10 miles into Indian
territory. The consequences of that Pyrrhic victory are now being
faced by China. India had been hesitating to enter into full-fledged
defence agreements, notably with Vietnam and Japan. China would
be ruing its misadventure in the Himalayas. What it feared most
has come to pass. The final push to make India shed its hesitation
was given by China.
13. The net result has been the historic multi-faceted India-Japan
agreement entered into between the two countries at the end of
May 2013. The agreement was a warning to Beijing and a signal to
the rest of Asia and the world. While in Tokyo, Dr Manmohan
Singh the Indian Prime Minister spoke of Japan as a natural and
indispensable partner in India’s quest for stability and peace in
Asia. Beijing appears to be worried that Tokyo and New Delhi
could be working towards establishing a new architecture for
Asian security. The coming together of Japan and India could have
regional as well as global impact. Shedding his usual cautionary
approach the Indian Prime Minister warned against continuous
threats in the Indo-Pacific region. Observers feel that in drawing a
link of seamless unity between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the
two countries were sending a signal to neighbours who might be
threatened by China’s aggressive behavior. The signal could be
that Japan and India were in the process of setting themselves up as
the linchpin of a new security system that over a period of time
could attract Vietnam, the Philippines, South Korea and Myanmar.
Australia and Indonesia would also be viewing it with favour. The
US had been pushing India in this direction as part of its
rebalancing strategy. After the US used the term Indo-Pacific,
Australia and Japan have embraced it.
Military ties that have developed between Japan and India
can be termed exceptional because to date India has not developed
strategic relationships to the same extent with any other country
and certainly not in this century. The mutual defence pact that
India entered into with the Soviet Union belongs to another era,
long since consigned to the pages of history. Deepening Japan-
India military relations could have far-reaching import for Asia.
Since the US and Japan already have a mutual defence agreement,
the US would like to support a Japan-India coalition. India would
still shy away from a formal tripartite agreement between the three
countries. Japan sees India as a great balancer against China’s
rising influence and a trustworthy partner in the filling of the
14. strategic vacuum created by declining US military resources,
especially in the Indian Ocean. A Japanese researcher, Dr Satoru
Nagao writing for an Indian journal (USI Journal – January-March
2013) spoke of the need to locate where exactly: the theatre of the
“power game” between the US and China would be. Taking off
from there, it can be reasonably inferred that the South China Sea
and East China Sea can be deemed to be the most important theatre
of power play for not only China and the US but for all the
countries of the region including India, Australia and Russia.
Evidently, in this scenario comprehensive maritime power will be
the decisive factor leading toward research and development of sea
denial and access capabilities amongst the adversaries. While the
US has been playing the role of security provider since long, it
would be in the fitness of things for regional countries to
amalgamate their resources for purely defensive regional security
architecture. Several variations can be worked into the model to
make it flexible and operational. Naturally India will have to be the
prime mover towards this end.
The beginning of the second decade of the 21st
century
overturned long held beliefs of India and the countries of East
Asia, Australia, U.S.A and ASEAN. The twin factors leading to
the turnabout were the increase in China’s naval potential linked to
sea denial capabilities and the floating of an indigenously
developed aircraft carrier. Along with this manifestly rising naval
power China felt that the time had come to test the water –
figuratively and literally - with the declaration that its core interest
besides Tibet and Taiwan included the South China Sea. It seemed
to be willing to force respect for its 9-dash line, irrespective of
whether it impinged on the EEZ or claims of other countries.
Having taken note of China’s emergence as a naval power to
be reckoned with, India decided that its commercial and maritime
interests lay in its becoming a significant maritime player in the
region to its East. Towards this end it too has been making rapid
strides in the augmentation of its naval and missile capabilities that
15. are of far greater interest to its friends in ASEAN and East Asia
than its capabilities along its land frontiers. India is not neglecting
the latter capabilities either. On 28th
March 2013 India
successfully carried out the maiden test firing of the over 290 km
range submarine-launched version of BrahMos supersonic cruise
missile in the Bay of Bengal, becoming the first country in the
world to have this capability. This is the first test firing of an
underwater supersonic cruise missile anywhere in the world.
BrahMos Missile is reportedly fully ready to be fitted in
submarines in vertical launch configuration which will make the
platform one of the most powerful weapon platforms in the world.
There is cautious talk in some strategic circles that were India to
provide the BrahMos missile to Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines
it has the potential to become a game changer.
THE ENVIRONMENTAL FACTOR
Well before 2020 climate change, global warming and
ecological degradation factors, collectively being put under the
heading ‘Environmental Factor’ could overwhelm China and all
countries around the disputed area. China already faces severe
problems posed by rampant desertification, polluted rivers and
depleted ground water reserves. By 2020, China will have 130
million cars; by 2040, even more cars than the United States.
Taking into account that China obtains 70 per cent of its energy
needs from coal and that it typically uses six to seven times more
energy to produce a dollar of output than do developed economies,
the extent of the calamity that may engulf China and, by extension,
the world becomes clear. According to China’s own official
estimates, the effects of chronic pollution, large-scale damming,
and climate change have combined to make for a situation where
70 percent of the country’s rivers and lakes are polluted to some
degree, with 28 percent being too polluted even for irrigation or
industrial use. A recent World Bank report estimates the health
costs related to outdoor air pollution in urban China in 2003 to be
between 157 billion Yuan ($21 billion) and 520 billion Yuan ($69
16. billion) – depending on the method of calculation used. This means
1.2 to 3.8 per cent of GDP. Faced with this critical situation, the
Chinese government has little choice but to start taking serious
measures to counteract and slow down environmental degradation
even if it means putting the brakes on economic growth.
Taking off from there and seeing that Tibet is the water tower
not only for South and Southeast Asian countries as well as for
parts of some Central Asian regions it is likely that after the 2014
elections the government of India might hold a conference in New
Delhi for the affected countries that comprise over 40 percent of
the global population depending on the river systems originating in
Tibet. The conference would call for a multilateral Joint Rivers
Commission that China has not conceded to date bilaterally with
any country. Concomitantly moves are afoot to have Tibet known
as the Roof of the World to be declared as the Third Pole on the
lines of the Arctic and the Antarctic. A few months ago the
President of Iceland a country far removed from the region at a talk
delivered in New Delhi included the Himalayas as part of what he
called the AHA Moment (Arctic, Himalayas, Antarctic) as vital
regions for addressing the global warming and climate change that
is fast overtaking the world. When he made his proposal the carbon
content in the atmosphere had not yet crossed the dreaded 400
PPM mark. Hence the urgency for China to open up Tibet that has
been ecologically devastated in the earlier stages of Chinese
occupation and militarization to world bodies for better
coordination and addressing of pressing planetary concerns.
In India there is great anxiety over the reported diversion of
the Brahmaputra waters by China, which is constructing several
dams over most, if not all rivers flowing into the countries of South
and South East Asia from the Tibetan Plateau. Like the irreversible
damage that has occurred in the Three Gorges dam (now that the
dam is in place, apparently no amount of money can fix the
problem) in the post-Fukushima era, one can hope that
17. governments would far more carefully study the geology around
the mega projects that China seems to be bent upon going ahead
with, unmindful of the consequences for the countries through
which these rivers flow to the sea, seriously affecting the deltaic
regions where population density is the highest. Such has been the
case with the Indus River delta in Pakistan. These 'irreversible'
actions should trigger fresh research into the most seismic region
on the planet, the Tibetan plateau.
From the passing allusions to the environmental imperilment
mentioned above it should become evident that unless China,
ASEAN, India and the other countries on the periphery collectively
come together to save the region from further environmental
decline, seemingly important, but relatively insignificant disputes
like the South China Sea stand off between China and several
ASEAN countries or border disputes could soon become minor
blips against the approaching cataclysms that could soon engulf all
countries.
With the phenomenal militarization of the region, in as little
as 20 years from now the ecological regime of the East and South
China Seas would have been irreversibly destroyed, leaving large
tracts of the seas practically azoic without fish or any other type of
life forms. Therefore, while there is time to do so, it is necessary to
take example from the ecological destruction of large parts of the
Tibetan Plateau, the Himalayas and mainland China itself. Hence
the coming together for resolving the South and East China Sea
disputes becomes the existential imperative of the day. As
mentioned in earlier presentations by the author at South China Sea
conclaves the time may have come to demilitarize the Paracels and
Spratlys and other reefs and atolls. These should be declared as the
common heritage of future generations. A special intraregional
body of experts can be set up at the earliest under the aegis of the
UNEP to prepare a phased blueprint for arriving at the desired goal
by 2020. Meanwhile, even if China were to be reluctant to come on
18. board, remainder countries of the region involved in the disputes
could hold special sessions of their parliaments to approve the
proposal in principle followed by referenda of their populations for
the purpose, thereby creating an irreversible momentum for the
creation of the East and South China Seas Ecological Heritage
Zone for the coming generations. The Philippines government
could take the lead in this matter. It will set a precedent for the
whole world. Naturally, in passing the resolution the Philippines
government does not give up its rights till all disputants including
China come on board.
Within the lifetime of the present generation or probably the next,
sea-level rise will threaten all coastal habitations that from time
immemorial have nurtured the densest human settlements. It used
to be said that time is running out for the inhabitants of the planet.
For those who can look ahead, time has already run out. If the
leaders of countries involved in petty squabbles, when measured
against the major survival threats, are unable to settle their
differences amicably, civil societies in these countries must come
together to enlarge the dialogue to ward off the common dangers in
the borrowed time that might still remain. In sum the
environmental imperative dwarfs all other considerations that
govern relations between countries.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The aim of India’s closer interaction with ASEAN and friendly
nations in East Asia is not to contain China, but to restrain it from
dreaming its new-fangled dream in a manner that conflict breaks
out in the region. The resultant damage to the countries involved
and the region as a whole from a conflict that should it get out of
control would be enormous, actually prohibitive. In worst case
scenarios it could spell the end of the Asian Century whose
principal beneficiary to date has been China. Increased trade that
has spelled prosperity for many countries and raised tens, if not
hundreds of millions out of poverty would be jeopardized. .
19. China and India are both poised for growth that could project
them in the front ranks of the world in as little as twenty years.
This could only happen if the massive outlays on defence budgets
led by China, triggering in turn higher military spending by India
and other countries in the region, are drastically reduced and
instead confidence building measures commenced between China
and ASEAN, China and Japan, China and Vietnam and China and
India. In every case the ‘pivot’ (eschewing the negative
connotation of the term) or central driver for the collective project
of stabilizing and strengthening the Asian Century becomes China.
As the harbinger of peace and prosperity China effortlessly and
seamlessly will come into its own as the Middle Kingdom of yore.
None of its neighbours, once assured that its peaceful rise can
never be transformed into anything other than peaceful, would
begrudge China its role as the brightest star in the Asian
firmament, a prelude to greater glory at the global level by the
mid-21st
century.
**
Statement of Hon. Albert F del Rosario on the occasion of the
unveiling of the Commemorative Stamp on the 30th
Anniversary of the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful
Settlement of International Disputes
General Carlos P Romulo, one of the original signatories to the
United Nations Charter and fourth President of the General
Assembly, once remarked, “Let us make this floor the last
battlefield,” when referring to the United Nations General
Assembly. It was his fervent hope after surviving the carnage of
World War II that disputes would be settled on the floor of the
United Nations with statements and not bombs, through tacit
diplomacy instead of force of arms. His hopes were dashed when
three decades into the existence of the organization, conflicts
continued to rage in various parts of the world.
It is up to us to revive General Romulo’s dream in the second
decade of the new century.