5. The NBIC Report Converging Technologies for Improving Human Performance N anotechnology, B iotechnology, I nformation Technology, and C ognitive Science NSF/DOC-sponsored report June 2002 Arlington, Virginia
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26. Property-Personhood Continuum (Proposed Legal Paradigm) Property (Inanimate Objects) Full Personhood (Attendant rights & responsibilities) Quasi-property (Chimeric Humanoids) Fetuses Embryos Ex Utero Cyborgs Androids A/I Negative Liberties Biotechnology at the Margins of Personhood: An Evolving Legal Paradigm, J. of Evolution and Technology Cognitively impaired
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Hinweis der Redaktion
Whatâs the advantage of being a person as opposed to property? Minimum negative liberties
Case scenarios: Car with embedded intelligence for negotiation Should athletes with artificial limbs or organs be considered enhanced/ Personal avatars online â are they creating new identities?
This split speaks directly to the discussion about anthropomorphism â that Cynthia, Zippie, and Dennis were speaking about with Leonardo.
U.S. Court of International Trade, in Toy Biz, Inc. v. United States, Slip Op. 03-2, decided January 03, 2003, a tariff classification case involving action figures of the X-Men, Spider-Man, and the Fantastic Four, struggled to determine the difference between a doll as opposed to a toy â containing human versus extra-human characteristics. U.S. Customs classified the action figures as dolls representing only human beings by virtue of having a head, mouth, eyes, nose, hair, arms, torso, breasts, muscles, and with one exception, legs and feet, noticeably lifelike and possessing such human characteristics as gene, race, physical impediment/handicap, and nationality. Toy Biz argued otherwise - that the action figures were toys representing animals or other non-human creatures (i.e. robots and monsters), and framed the issue as whether the figures represent exclusively a human being, not whether the character had some human features, or resembled a human being. Ultimately, the Court held that the action figures did not represent human beings and were not properly classifiable as dolls and that a number of them exhibited likenesses to robots or monsters because they had robotic features such as artificial eyes or limbs, or monster-like features such as exaggerated muscle tone and large, sharp-looking teeth
'The Jack-O-Lantern was originally a car float of the usual type, something over 200 feet long, with neither motive power nor steering gear, and having two lines of track on her single deck. The claimant bought her and proceeded to convert her into a steamer to be used for amusement purposes. The tracks were removed, the deck relaid to make a dancing floor, a large house, or superstructure, was built, inclosing most of the deck, and containing a dance hall, rooms, balconies, etc. Steering apparatus and a steam plant of the propeller type, for propulsion, were also installed.
"Whenever you see a new technology, there is always a temptation to say, 'We need all new laws to deal with it,'" noted Glenn Reynolds, a law professor at the University of Tennessee who has written about the legal implications of nanotechnology . This kind of reaction, he said, usually turns out to be wrong. "Old laws often work out surprisingly well," he said, adding that when legislators do try to craft new bodies of law to deal with new technologies, "the results are either pointless or disastrous." That is not to say that government should take a hands-off approach. T.S. Twibell, an associate with the Kansas City, Mo., law firm Kurlbaum Stoll Seaman Mustoe & McCrummen, who has also written about nanotechnology's legal implications , says government involvement will help lawmakers and regulators. "Government needs to have a hand in, to know what people are developing and be able to react to it," Twibell said.