"Welfare, immigrati, investimenti in formazione e mercato di lavoro"
1) Schema iniziale di “Coleman boat”
2) Aspetti trasversali
3) Situazione Italiana
4) Dal Macro (M1) al micro (m1)
5) Dal micro (m1) al micro (m2)
6) Dal micro (m2) al Macro (M2)
7) Considerazioni finali – Riformulazione dello schema di “Coleman boat”
2. PresentazionePresentazione
1) Schema iniziale di “Coleman boat”
2) Aspetti trasversali
3) Situazione Italiana
4) Dal Macro (M1) al micro (m1)
5) Dal micro (m1) al micro (m2)
6) Dal micro (m2) al Macro (M2)
7) Considerazioni finali – Riformulazione
dello schema di “Coleman boat”
4. M1 – M2: Diversi regimi di Welfare. Diverse
percentuali destinate alla spesa sociale. Cambiamenti
nel tasso di occupazione dei figli di immigrati (giovani).
M1 – m1: Welfare “generoso” con le famiglie
immigrate. “Stimolo” maggiore per investire nella
formazione universitaria dei figli.
m1 – m2: Con l'investimento delle famiglie, le
seconde generazioni possono ritardare l'entrata nel
mercato del lavoro.
m2 – M2: Ritardando (o meno) l'entrata nel mercato
del lavoro, si possono ottenere differenze significative
riguardo all'offerta di lavoro di queste generazioni
attraverso diversi modelli di Welfare (universalistico,
tradizionale e liberale).
5. 2) Aspetti trasversali2) Aspetti trasversali
● Oggetto di studio: Seconde generazioni di immigrati (figli di
immigrati).
● Contesto: Paesi dell'OECD; diversi modelli di Welfare
● Accesso ai sistemi di protezione sociale da parte degli
immigrati (nei diversi regimi di Welfare) e come questo
possa influenzare l'offerta di lavoro dei figli di immigrati.
● Sostegno alle famiglie, investimento in formazione
scolastica-universitaria e la scelta di lavorare.
● Un Welfare “generoso” con le famiglie immigrate (servizi,
contributo economico) influenza la scelta di investire in
formazione universitaria? E la scelta di entrare nel mercato
del lavoro? E il tipo di lavoro ricercato?
6. ● Paper principale: “Migration and Welfare State solidarity
in Western Europe” (Steffen Mau; Christoph Burkhardt).
Journal of European Social Policy, 2009.
● Regimi di Welfare (Esping-Andersen 1990; Leibfried 1992):
1) Continental – Austria, Belgio, Germania, Francia, Italia,
Lussemburgo, Olanda, Svizzera
2) Mediterranean – Portogallo, Spagna, Grecia
3) Liberal – Inghilterra, Irlanda
4) Social Democ. – Svezia, Norvegia, Finlandia, Danimarca
● Differenze fra variabili indipendenti a livello individuale
(micro) e a livello macro
● Ricerche OECD. Analisi comparato
● Push and Pull Theory
7. – Portes, Alejandro (ed.): “The Economic
Sociology of Immigration. Essays on
Networks, Ethnicity, and Entrepreneurship”.
Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1995.
FATTORI PUSH
(RESPINGERE)
FATTORI PULL
(ATTIRARE)
Disoccupazione Potenziale
occupazione
Mancanza di servizi Migliore prestazione
dei servizi
Scarsa sicurezza Sicurezza
Criminalità Bassa criminalità
Fattori ambientali Terre fertili, clima
migliore, ecc.
Povertà Assistenza
Guerra Pace
Bassa qualità di vita Migliore qualità di vita
Bassa qualità del
sistema sanitario e/o
sistema educativo
Migliore qualità del
sistema sanitario e/o
sistema educativo
– Portes, Alejandro & DeWind, Josh (eds.): “Rethinking migration. New Theoretical
and Empirical Perspectives”. Berghahn Books, New York-Oxford, 2007.
8.
9. 3) Situazione Italiana3) Situazione Italiana
➢ “I diritti non sono un 'costo': Immigrazione, Welfare e Finanza
Pubblica” (a cura di Lunaria). Open Society Foundations, Roma,
2013.
➢ “Immigration in a Mediterranean Welfare State: The Italian
Experience in Comparative Perspective” (Sciortino, Giuseppe).
Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, Vol. 6, No. 2, 111 –129,
August 2004.
➢ “Welfare e immigrazione. Impatto e sostenibilità dei flussi
migratori diretti al settore socio-sanitario e della cura” (Piperno,
Flavia). Cespi, 2009.
19. Fonte: Lunaria (2013), p. 38
Fonte: Lunaria (2013), p. 68
Riduzione delle risorse
del Fondo Nazionale
per le Politiche
Migratorie del -500%
(Periodo: 2009-2012)
come conseguenza
del ridimensionamento
del Fondo Nazionale
per le Politiche Sociali
Nel 2011 i cittadini
stranieri hanno
contribuito per il 12,8%
alla creazione del valore
aggiunto (178,5 miliardi
di euro). Nel 2005
l’incidenza era pari al
7,1% e quindi, 5,7 punti
percentuali in meno
rispetto al 2011
20. ➢ Taglio disposto dall’attuale legge finanziaria riguardo alla spesa sociale, che
riduce anche sul medio termine la possibilità di un lavoro incisivo a favore di
una coerente gestione del lavoro migrante diretto al settore della cura
(Piperno, 2009, p. 18).
Spesa destinata al sociale previste dalle leggi finanziarie (2008-2011)
(milioni di euro)
22. 4) Dal Macro (M1) al micro (m1)4) Dal Macro (M1) al micro (m1)
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28. Fonte: Sciortino,
Giuseppe.
Immigration in a
Mediterranean
Welfare State: The
Italian Experience in
Comparative
Perspective. Journal
of Comparative
Policy Analysis,
Vol. 6, No. 2, 111 –
129, August 2004.
Table 1, p. 114
Fonte: Sainsbury, Diane. Immigrants' social rights in comparative perspective:
welfare regimes, forms in immigration and immigration policy regimes. Journal of
European Social Policy 2006, 16:229. Figure 1, p. 231
29. Fonte: Steffen Mau;
Christoph Burkhardt.
Migration and Welfare
State solidarity in
Western Europe. Journal
of European Social
Policy, 2009. Table 1, p.
218
Fonte: Caponio, Tiziana (a cura di).
Dall'ammissione all'inclusione: Verso
un approccio integrato? Un percorso
di approfondimento comparativo a
partire da alcune recenti esperienze
europee. Rapporto FIERI per CNEL,
Settembre 2013. Figura 1, “Tipologia
delle policy di integrazione civica”, P.
60
30. Descrizione analitica delle politiche di integrazione in diversi paesi
Fonte: Caponio, Tiziana (a cura di). 2013, p. 65.
31. Froy, F. and L. Pyne (2011), “Ensuring Labour Market
Success for Ethnic Minority and Immigrant Youth”,
OECD. Local Economic and Employment Development
(LEED). Working Papers, 2011/09, OECD Publishing.
● Intergenerational factors: “Many parents of migrant youth
did not themselves complete formal education and may not
have the knowledge to assist their children in getting the
most from their schooling (…) Gender is another important
consideration. Among some ethnic minority communities
there is a lower awareness of the significance of good
education for girls” (P. 21).
● Low aspirations: “In some of the case studies young
migrants were resigned to remaining within their socio-
economic status and were looking for a 'job' rather than a
'career'. A possible factor for this is that the children of
immigrants are not as exposed to occupational paths
outside the sectoral specialisation of their parents” (P. 21).
32. ● Financial pressures: “Family poverty can lead to high levels
of young people dropping out of school because of financial
pressure to start earning at an early age. Learning and skills
are sometimes valued in the home only as long as they
immediately allow young people to earn an income. In
Madrid, it was found that many Ecuadorian students opted
to commence short professional training courses rather than
pursue academic study because it was seen as a means to
getting a job faster and helping financially in the home
(CIDALIA, submitted). The economic downturn may now be
dissuading some youngsters from leaving education early”
(P. 21).
● Policy options for improving the educational outcomes of
the children of immigrants (P. 22-23).
● Involving families: “Increasing parents’ involvement in
language learning during early years and school education
can also help children to succeed (Westwood, 2010)” (P.
24).
34. Barriers to labour market integration for migrantBarriers to labour market integration for migrant
youthyouth
● “OECD research has found that the gap in labour market
outcomes between ethnic minorities and non-ethnic
minorities can only be partially explained by their lower
than average educational attainment (2009a)” (P. 35).
● “Employment rates of the second generation increase
with education level, but generally not to the same extent
as for the children of natives. In some countries
differences in employment rates are actually largest for
those with good qualifications” (P. 35).
● “When migrant children have the same average
educational attainment levels as native children, they are
still less successful overall in the labour market which
would suggest additional, persistent barriers present in the
transition from education to work” (P. 35).
35. “In the current fiscal environment most OECD countries are in the
process of reducing public sector spending to counter deficits.
This retrenchment in spending inevitably means that there will be less
state funding available to support new and/or existing
interventions even though the conditions for migrant youth and
ethnic minorities have worsened during the course of the recession”
(P. 63).
36. ➢The initiatives are based in the following pillars:The initiatives are based in the following pillars:
●Importance of early years provision and multi-
generational approaches (P. 70)
●Invest in education (P. 70)
●Additional supports for the school-to-work transition and
financial assistance (P. 70)
●Re-engage youth far removed from the system (P. 71)
●Support job readiness and incentivise youth (P. 71)
●Raise aspirations (P. 71)
●Lobbying for change where necessary at higher
governance levels (P. 73)
37. Georges LemaîtreGeorges Lemaître - The Integration of Immigrants into the- The Integration of Immigrants into the
Labour Market: The Case of Sweden. In: OECD Social,Labour Market: The Case of Sweden. In: OECD Social,
Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 48, 2007Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 48, 2007
Labour market-outcomes by type of migration and time since arrival,
Australia and Canada, p. 41
38. Odds ratios for employment relative to non-employment in 2001 as a
function of Swedish language instruction, public expenditures on training
and employment in 1997-1998 for immigrants having arrived in 1997, p. 43
39. Persons of specific attainment levels by skill level of job held,
selected countries, 2003 data, p. 44
40. ➢ “Welfare pull-factors are more important for asylum seekers than for labour
migrants” (p. 10)
➢ This paper contradicts the common assumption that economic migrants are
more attracted by the welfare state than forced migrants because they have
more time in assessing costs and benefits of their migration, compared to the
persecuted (Böcker/Havinga 1998: 23).
➢ “This paper argues that there is a negative effect of welfare expenditure on
labour migrants because high levels of welfare spending are normally involved with
less market responsiveness and high levels of labour regulations, which keep
economic migrants away. Hence, this paper hypothesises that high levels of
welfare provisions are negatively affecting inflows of labour migration” (p. 10)
➢ Assumption: “the higher a country scores on the de-commodification factor for the
whole population, the higher will be the provisions for forced and economic migrants.
The assumption is based on the argument that egalitarian and liberal values in
Western democracies prevent modern welfare states from completely
excluding certain marginalised groups such as asylum seekers and labour
migrants” (p. 17)
Schulzek, NinaSchulzek, Nina: “The impact of welfare systems on immigration: An: “The impact of welfare systems on immigration: An
analysis of welfare magnets as a pull-factor for asylum seekers and labouranalysis of welfare magnets as a pull-factor for asylum seekers and labour
migrants”. Working Papers, Migration Studies Unit, London School ofmigrants”. Working Papers, Migration Studies Unit, London School of
Economics and Political Science, No.2012/02Economics and Political Science, No.2012/02
45. 5) Dal micro (m1) al micro (m2)5) Dal micro (m1) al micro (m2)
● Hemerijck, A.C.; Palm, T.P. & Van Hooren, F.J.:
“Changing European Welfare States and the Evolution of
Migrant Incorporation Regimes. Background paper
reviewing welfare state structures and reform dynamics in
a comparative perspective”. IMPACIM, May 2013.
● Van Hooren, Franca: “Bringing policies back in: How
social and migration policies affect the employment of
immigrants in domestic care for the elderly in the EU-15”.
Danish National Centre for Social Research (SFI),
Copenhagen, June 2008.
● Kesler, Christel: “Immigrant Wage Disadvantage in
Sweden and the United Kingdom: Wage Structure and
Barriers to Opportunity”. IMR (International Migration
Review), Volume 44, Number 3 (2010): 560–592.
46. ➢ A factor that could affect allocative processes is the
availability of alternatives to work:
“Scholars of comparative political economy, and most
prominently Esping-Andersen (1990), have noted that the
availability of transfer income, particularly in the form of
unemployment insurance or social assistance, has a ‘‘de-
commodifying’’ effect on potential workers. That is, with
the availability of such transfer income, people are less
forced into work to maintain an acceptable standard of
living. De-commodification is relevant for wages, because,
given temporary or longer-term alternatives to work,
immigrants (and other low-skilled or marginalized
groups) need not take poorly remunerated jobs. Some
previous research (Kogan, 2003) suggests that, indeed,
immigrants with generous welfare benefits end up in
better jobs, because they are not forced into immediate
employment” (Kesler 2010, p. 564)
47. “SwedenSweden has a higher level of welfare benefits than
the UKUK for a wide range of family types (OECD, 2005:
Chap. 3), so in Sweden, non-working families are
able to maintain a standard of living that is relatively
close to that of working families. But in terms of
immigrant ⁄ native-born inequalities, it is perhaps more
important that the UK restricts immigrants from
receiving non-contributory benefits such as social
assistance (Groenendijk, Guild, and Barzilay, 2000).
Thus, immigrant and native-born welfare rights are
more similar in Sweden than in the UK. If access to
welfare benefits allows immigrants to avoid jobs at the
bottom of the earnings distribution, then this institutional
difference between the two countries would lead to
smaller wage gaps between immigrants and native-
born workers in Sweden (Kesler 2010, p. 565)
48. “SwedenSweden has been a leader in active labor
market efforts; the UKUK spends much less on such
programs. To illustrate, for each 1% of the total
population that was unemployed in 2001 in
Sweden, spending on active labor market
programs was 0.29% of GDP. This compares to
0.07% in the UK. Sweden also spends a higher
percentage (59.2%) than the UK (40.0%) on
'active' relative to total labor market programs
(OECD, 2003:193). Workers with greater access
to well-funded training programs, as in
Sweden, might possess better skills when they
do enter the labor market, which would increase
wages particularly at the bottom end of the income
distribution” (Kesler 2010, p. 565)
49. “The effects of welfare availability and active labor
market programs might be particularly important for
immigrants, who face specific barriers to desirable
employment, and could have a greater need for time
and resources to invest in human capital (such as
language skills) to seek and find appropriate work.
This is probably particularly true among recent
immigrants. Thus, it could be that immigrants inimmigrants in
Sweden who do enter the labor market are betterSweden who do enter the labor market are better
prepared to maximize their earnings thanprepared to maximize their earnings than
immigrants in the UKimmigrants in the UK, both because they are a more
selective group from among all working-aged
immigrants, and because they have had more state-
subsidized opportunities to improve their host-
country-specific human capital”
(Kesler 2010, p. 566)
52. ● A high level of overall wage inequality in the British labor
market means that wage gaps between immigrant and
native-born workers are larger there than in Sweden (Kesler,
p. 584)
● British institutional context is at least as good as the
Swedish at promoting equal opportunity for immigrants in
terms of wage attainment, but immigrants in the UK cannot
overcome the disadvantage of high wage inequality: UK’s
relatively advanced anti-discrimination laws; role of English as a
world language (newcomers to the UK have an advantage over
their counterparts in Sweden) (Kesler, p. 584)
● The institutional characteristics that would work in favor of
Sweden’s immigrants – such as access to welfare that would
allow them to stay outside the labor force if no desirable jobs are
available as well as the somewhat more top-heavy occupational
structure – do not seem to allow them to reach higher rungs
of the wage structure than their counterparts in the UK
(Kesler, p. 585)
53. ● Institutions and policies that specifically address
immigrant disadvantage are actually relatively
effective in the UK, and at least in the European
context, the UK provides a relatively good model of
ameliorating nativity-based inequalities (Kesler, p.
585).
● But immigrants in the UK cannot overcome high
wage inequality: In terms of the absolute size of
wage gaps, most immigrants are just as well if not
better off in Sweden (Kesler, p. 585).
● Sweden’s immigrants attain wage positions that are
not so different than their counterparts in the UK
suggests that reducing overall wage inequality
does not necessarily put immigrants at a
disadvantage in the process of allocating workers
to jobs (Kesler, p. 586)
54.
55.
56. ● Over the past two decades, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands
and Spain have made efforts to redirect social and economic
policies. This was achieved by passing important social reforms
in social security, labour market policy, employment protection
legislation, pensions and social services, and welfare financing,
which were dependent on the varying starting conditions of the
different regimes: “Welfare recalibration” (Hemerijck et al., p.
42)
● New values of work, family, gender relations, distributive
fairness, and social integration entered the newly-adopted
active welfare edifice, informed critically by the endogenous
forces of ageing populations, deindustrialization, and changing
gender roles in labour markets and households (Hemerijck et
al., p. 42)
● In Germany and the Netherlands: more inclusive strategies of
maximizing employment; new policy priorities aimed at
activation and reintegration of vulnerable groups; support
towards family services meant to stimulate female employment
and help families balance work and care (Hemerijck et al., p. 43)
57. ● The selection of highly-skilled migrants may facilitate a
closing-of-the gap between highly-skilled migrant workers
with strong labour market attachments and citizens. But it
does not prevent continued disparities between
second generation migrant and native youths. This has
become particularly evident when analysing how second
generation migrants fare in Western European welfare
states when it comes to integration (Hemerijck et al., p. 48)
● Education is one widely-accepted marker for the level of
integration of second and third generations, and
indicators such as the Programme for International Student
Assessment (PISA) evidence poor scores for the countries
under review here: Migrant children of both, first and
second generations were outperformed by non-
migrants students in all categories of testing (OECD,
2009), although the gap tends to be closer with children of
the second generation, particularly in the UK (Hemerijck et
al., p. 49)
58. ● Maurice Crul and Han Vermeulen (2006) found that, at least
in Belgium, different levels of integration policies in the
Flemish north compared to the Walloon south seemed to not
have made an impact upon the school achievements of the
second generation Turkish population. Relationship
between different national education systems and the
drop-out rates of second generation (Turkish) migrants,
as well as their successful transition to the labour market
(Crul, 2007)
● Newcomers in Spain tend to have higher average levels of
education than traditional migrant workers. Nevertheless, the
‘1.5 generation’ of migrant children still face significant
obstacles in equal access to the Spanish education
system (Moreno Fuentes and Bruquetas Callejo, 2011)
● Anti-discrimination laws; language and/or cultural
knowledge tests have become common tools of both
immigration policy and integration in especially the
Netherlands, the UK and Germany (Hemerijck et al., p. 49)
59. “High public expenditure on elderly care (Sweden,
Denmark) implies no demand for private migrant
care workers, while low public expenditure (Italy,
Spain, Greece), seems to induce a demand for
migrant domestic care work. The combination of
medium public expenditure with generous and
unregulated cash benefits (Austria, Germany)
seems to also induce migrant domestic care work,
while the lack of an unregulated cash benefit seems
to result in no demand for migrant care work (the
Netherlands, Belgium, France). Still unclear are the
cases of Ireland and the United Kingdom, which
might be related to the fact that these welfare states are
relatively liberal”
(Van Hooren, p. 22)
60. 6) Dal micro (m2) al Macro (M2)6) Dal micro (m2) al Macro (M2)
● Pichler, Florian: “Success on European Labor Markets: A
Cross-national Comparison of Attainment between
Immigrant and Majority Populations”. IMR (International
Migration Review), Volume 45, Number 4 (2011): 938–978.
● Connor, Phillip & Massey, Douglas S.: “Economic
Outcomes among Latino Migrants to Spain and the United
States: Differences by Source Region and Legal Status”.
IMR (International Migration Review), Volume 44, Number
4 (2010): 802–829.
● Euwals, Rob; Dagevos, Jaco; Gijsberts, Mérove &
Roodenburg, Hans: “Citizenship and Labor Market
Position: Turkish Immigrants in Germany and the
Netherlands”. IMR (International Migration Review),
Volume 44, Number 3 (2010): 513–538.
61. ● Heath, Anthony F.; Rothon, Catherine & Kilpi, Elina: “The Second
Generation in Western Europe: Education, Unemployment, and
Occupational Attainment”. Annual Review of Sociology, 2008, 34: 211–
235.
● Österbacka, Eva; Merz, Joachim & Zick, Cathleen D.: “Human
Capital Investments in Children: A Comparative Analysis of the Role of
Parent-Child Shared Time in Selected Countries”. IZA Discussion
Paper, No. 5084, July 2010.
● Papademetriou, Demetrios G.; Somerville, Will & Sumption,
Madeleine: “The Social Mobility of Immigrants and Their Children”.
Migration Policy Institute, June 2009.
● Azzolini, Davide; Schnell, Philipp & Palmer, John R.: “Educational
Achievement Gaps between Immigrant and Native Students in Two
'New' Immigration Countries: Italy and Spain in Comparison”. The
ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
2012, 643: 46.
● Hum, Derek & Simpson, Wayne: “The Legacy of Immigration: The
Labour Market Performance of the Second Generation”. Prairie Centre
of Excellence for Research on Immigration and Integration. PCERII
Working Paper Series, No. WP06-04, June 2004.
62. Source: Papademetriou et al., p. 3
● The Social Mobility of the Second Generation: The number of
native-born children of immigrant parents – the second generation –
has been increasing in many industrialized countries due to increased
immigration flows in the second half of the 20th century and
immigrants’ higher fertility relative to natives. Across Europe and North
America, the size of second-generation populations differs greatly. It
ranges from around two percent in Denmark or Portugal, to over 15
percent in Canada (Papademetriou et al., p. 11)
63. ➢
What Determines the Second Generation’s Success?What Determines the Second Generation’s Success?
“In all industrialized countries, at least some correlation
exists between parents’ labor market performance and
that of their children. The strength of this correlation
varies dramatically. It is low in the Nordic countries,
Canada, and Australia, and high in the United States,
United Kingdom, and Italy. The causes of the persistence
of advantage or disadvantage across generations are
highly complex (…) However, studies of
intergenerational mobility typically emphasize parents’
differing willingness or ability to invest in their
children’s education, as well as family-background
factors such as language or parental education, which
affect the child’s educational development and hence
their labor market success”
(Papademetriou et al., p. 12)
64. ➔
Immigrant-specific factors that are expected to affectImmigrant-specific factors that are expected to affect
the second generation’s labor market prospects:the second generation’s labor market prospects:
● Parental wealth
● Parents’ investment in their children, parental
education, and the transmission of culture
● Language
● Social networks and residential segregation
● Visa restrictions and legal status
● Discrimination
Parents influence their children’s acquisition of human capital in several ways.
Parents could play an important role in shaping the second generation’s
expectations. Parents’ socioeconomic status is an important determinant of
children’s educational attainment (Papademetriou et al., p. 13-14)
65. ➔
What Is the Role of Educational Attainment in the SecondWhat Is the Role of Educational Attainment in the Second
Generation’s Labor Market Success?Generation’s Labor Market Success?
● Second-generation workers are at risk of performing worse than their
non-immigrant peers in both education and the labor market. How are
these two factors – education and labor market performance – connected?
For groups that perform worse in the labor market, is low educational
attainment to blame?
● “OECD data show that when we compare the second generation with
its 'similar' non-immigrant peers (those with the same education level),
the gaps in employment rates decline but remain present”
(Papademetriou et al., p. 18)
● Example: there is nearly a 10 percentage point gap between the
employment rates of native and second-generation French women, but
it drops to less than five percentage points when taking into account
the fact that second-generation French women have lower
educational attainment. Education accounts for nearly half of the gap
between natives and the second generation for men and women in
Denmark, and for women in Germany
● Low levels of schooling can exacerbate shortfalls in the second
generation’s economic integration, but do not fully explain them
67. Pichler, Florian (2011)Pichler, Florian (2011): Typical labor market outcomes vary considerably between
majority and migrant populations. Differential occupational attainment among
immigrant groups across 28 countries. The analyses of occupational attainment
are run separately for first- and second-generation migrants as well as children
of mixed marriage and take into account their wider social and cultural background.
European Social Survey: people with a migration background do not necessarily
achieve a lower labor market success than the majority. However, human capital,
social mobility, and cultural background explain these outcomes to different
degrees, suggesting tailored pathways to labor market success for each group of
migrants. Occupational attainment varies considerably across countries.
Source: Pichler, p. 952
71. 7) Considerazioni Finali7) Considerazioni Finali
● Le diverse percentuali destinate dai Welfare alla Spesa
Sociale possono influenzare le politiche riguardanti
l'immigrazione (programmi e strategie di inserimento nelle
scuole e nel mercato del lavoro, riduzione della
discriminazione, ecc.).
● Le politiche in materia di immigrazione sono diverse a
seconda delle politiche di cittadinanza del paese e delle
diverse percentuali di Spesa Pubblica/Sociale destinate ad
esse. Diverse strategie: reddito a gruppi più vulnerabili
(donne con figli, rifugiati, ecc.); programmi per una migliore
inclusione dei figli di immigrati nel mercato del lavoro
(tramite un investimento in capitale umano);
coinvolgimento delle famiglie nella formazione dei figli, ecc.
72. ● I genitori non solo influenzano l'acquisizione di capitale umano
dei figli ma svolgono un ruolo importante nel plasmare le
aspettative della seconda generazione (“cultura di studiare” o
arrivare ad avere un titolo universitario).
● Status socio-economico della famiglia è una determinante
importante nell'istruzione dei figli (Classe di origine-Classe di
destinazione).
● Le sovvenzioni da parte dello Stato rappresentano una
alternativa ad entrare nel mercato del lavoro: più tempo e più
risorse da investire in capitale umano (esempio: competenze
linguistiche) per puntare ad un'occupazione “desiderabile”.
Politiche indirizzate a questo scopo sono particolarmente
importanti per gli immigrati (principalmente per i figli). Immigrati
in Svezia sono meglio preparati rispetto a quegli del Regno
Unito.
● Ineguaglianze etniche e di genere riguardo al reddito (non
soltanto fra regime di welfare). Importanza di politiche specifiche
per ridurle (esempio: leggi anti-discriminazione in UK).
73. ● Diversi livelli di istruzione possono influenzare differenze di reddito: se gli
immigrati investono in capitale umano, hanno più probabilità di trovare
posti di lavoro meglio pagati.
● Mobilità intergenerazionale: seconda e terza generazione rispetto alla
prima. Differenze di istruzione e di reddito a seconda del paese.
● Questo schema non spiega la discriminazione e la segregazione etnica,
di genere e di status socio-economico degli immigrati quando entrano al
mercato del lavoro.