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EP2300 SNMP Project Report                     Amy Skinner (skinner@kth.se) - Laili Aidi (aidi@kthse)



1. Summary
This project aims to design and implement a system that is able to monitor the network using SNMP and
identify the specific possible attacks (DoS and port scan) using a cluster analysis. In the first task, the
program discovers the topology of the network. After successful discovery phase, it will be able to
monitor the link utilization (network link-states) for a specified period of time, and then detect the
anomaly, using k-means clustering scheme [1]. These anomalies will be analyzed to recognize the attack.
Moreover, this program also provides an advance feature, which is defined as optional task, as it
executes online monitoring and detects the attacks using Davies-Bouldin Index as quality scoring
measurement [2].

2. Software Design and MIB objects
A. The MIB objects which are used in this system are:
i. During network crawling System Group and Interface Group (Interfaces table), as listed below:
      sysName, OID 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.5. This MIB object is used to get the administratively assigned name
          of the router
      ifIndex, OID 1.3.6.1.2.1.2.2.1.1. This MIB object is used to get the interface value of the router
      ifDescr, OID 1.3.6.1.2.1.2.2.1.2. This MIB object is used to get the description of the specific
          interface that is discovered previously from the ifIndex MIB object request.
      ipAdEntIfIndex, OID 1.3.6.1.2.1.4.20.1.2. This MIB object represent the index that identifies the
          interface to which it is applicable in the value ifIndex MIB object. Using this MIB Object, we can
          identify the Interfaces that exist in the IP routing table of the Router.
      ipAdEntAddr, OID 1.3.6.1.2.1.4.20.1.1. This MIB object represents the IP address of the specific
          interface of the Router.
ii. To discover the network topology, we identified the link level neighbor of each of the identified
      Router using MIB Objects in Interface Group (IP Routing tables), which is the ipRouteNextHop, OID
      1.3.6.1.2.1.4.21.1.7. This MIB object represents the next hop IP address of a route in the router.
iii. To identify the attacks, we used two MIB Objects in the Interface Group (Interfaces table) that relate
to interface utilization of a route, thus it able to represent the link-states of the network, as listed
below:
      ifInOctets, OID 1.3.6.1.2.1.2.2.1.10. This MIB object represents the total number of octets
          received on the specific interface of the Router.
      ifInUcastPkts, OID 1.3.6.1.2.1.2.2.1.11. This MIB object represents the amount of unicast packets
          delivered to a higher-layer protocol.

B. Below is the design of the software in this SNMP-based network management system, including the
classes, key data structures and operations. A full-size class diagram is given in Appendix 5A.
  i. Class Start, the starting point to running the program. It contains the constant variables, used as
  default parameters to run the specific task, if user has not specified with command line arguments.
  ii. Class Router, represents the Managed node (Router), which contains:
      hostname, which is String data type containing the hostname of the node
      interfaces, which is Map of Integer (interface index) to RouterInf data structure containing
          the interfaces of a router
      localIps, which is List of Strings containing the local IP addresses of a router
      neighborIps, which is List of Strings containing the neighbor (next-hop) IP addresses of a router


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EP2300 SNMP Project Report                     Amy Skinner (skinner@kth.se) - Laili Aidi (aidi@kthse)

iii. Class RouterInf, represents the network interface of the router, which contains:
       The IP Address, called ip, which is String data type.
       The description, called desc, which is String data type.
   iv. Class SNMPUtils, is static class that provide the SNMP values and operations that are needed to
   accomplish the task, which are:
       OID, which is Map of Strings from the human readable OID names data type to Strings of OID
          numeric values, for the MIB objects of which are requested during the run of this program
       open() and close(), opens and closes the SNMP session
       getVarBind(), returns SNMP getNext MIB variable-value binding (value with its OID)
       getVar(), returns SNMP getNext MIB value
   v. Class SNMPCrawler, responsible for the node and link discovery task of the test-bed network:
       createRouter(), creates a router and add to global list of routers operation
       addInterfaces(), discovers and adds a list of the Interfaces of a router
       addNeigbors(), discovers and adds a list of the link level Neighbors of a router
   vi. Class SNMPPoller, provides polling operation to capture the link-states of routers:
       poll and onlinePoll, operations used in Task 2, respective Task 3, to poll all routers for a
          specified period of time and quit, or to continuously poll and call Clusterer after w polling
          rounds.
       xRounds and yRounds, which is Hashtable of integer data type to List of Long data structure.
          This Integer represent the round number, and the List of Long data structure contains the sum
          of ifInOctets, respective ifInUcastPkts, from every interface of each router in each round
   vii. Class PollingTread
   This class has composition relationship with Class SNMPPoller, which polls the information of the
   routers simultaneously in every round.
   vii. Class Clusterer, is a Thread that provides clustering calculation based on k-means clustering
   method and/or Davies-Bouldin Index and show the result. This class contains 2 data structures which
   represent the global-state of the network in every round, and operations which are:
         deltXt and deltYt, the delta values of MIB object ifInOctets and MIB object ifInUcastPkts from
            all routers in every round, calculated from the average value of the sum of MIB object from all
            interfaces from all routers in round t
         cluster(), the cluster formation operation, which is used to perform clustering until the it is
            convergence or reach the maximum iteration for convergence (10 iterations)
         getNewCentroids(), calculates the centroids from a list of type Cluster
         calcDbi(), DBI value operation, used to get the Davis-Boulman Index of the clusters in each
            calculation for the same dataset.
         findAttacks(), identifies the DoS and port scan attacks.
   vii. Class Cluster
   This class has composition relationship with Class Clusterer, represent the cluster object, containing
         CentroidX and CentroidY, the X, respective Y values of the centroid
         Xs and Ys, holds all the X, respective Y values of all the points in this cluster
         getNumPoints, returns the number of points in this cluster




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EP2300 SNMP Project Report                      Amy Skinner (skinner@kth.se) - Laili Aidi (aidi@kthse)



3. Clustering Algorithm and Anomaly Detection Scheme
/** Anomaly detection **/
delXt = createDeltas(createAverages(xRounds, "X"));
delYt = createDeltas(createAverages(yRounds, "Y"));
numDeltas = delXt.size();

List<Cluster> initClusters = new ArrayList<Cluster>();
while(initCentroids.size() < k) {
       Cluster c = new Cluster(delXt.get(p),delYt.get(p));
       initClusters.add(c);
}      }

List<Cluster> clusters = cluster(initClusters);
List<Cluster> newCentroids = getNewCentroids(clusters);
int numIterations = 0;
while (!haveSameCentroids(clusters, newCentroids)) {
       clusters = cluster(newCentroids);
       newCentroids = getNewCentroids(clusters);
       if (numIterations++ > MAX_CLUSTERING_ITERATIONS)
              break;
}      }
double dbi = computeDbi(clusters);

Our clustering algorithm is based off the instructions in the project description in sections 2.3b and 2.3c
[3]. For all of our calculations we have kept track of the values for the x value (the sum of the ifInOctets
MIB values for every interfaces on a given router) and the y value (the sum of the ifInUcastPkts MIB
values for every interface on a router) as separate variables, to the data structures as simple as possible,
since they both change and are operated on independent of each other. At the end of the polling phase
we have two tables that hold all of the polled values, xRounds and yRounds. These tables have the
polling round number as keys, and the values are lists of the x or y values from all routers that
responded with valid results for the corresponding polling round. This data, along with an integer
interval, specifying how often polling should occur, an integer k, to indicate the number of clusters
that should be created, and repeats, to indicate how many times we should recalculate the clusters for
a different time period, are the inputs to the clustering function.

The clustering algorithm begins by determining the average global state for each round, by summing up
all values the list for that round, and then dividing by the number of responses in the list. This number
can vary, if we have received a timeout when requesting a MIB value from a router. One of the biggest
design choices for this project was to decide how to handle these timeouts. If we receive a timeout
from a router while trying to get information about one of the interfaces, we do not add the information
received from the other interfaces to the list for the round, so there will be one less entry in the list from
this round. We have chosen to do this, because we assume that the null responses from the routers
occur independently of when an attack occurs (only as a result of too many students executing at one
time), so we do not want to bring down the global state average for that round and create something
that may look anomalous, but not because of an attack. Another facet of this decision was if we
received a null during a poll of the x value from a router, but not during a poll of the y value, should we
add the y sum value to the y list, even though we are not adding the x value to the x list? We have
decided that because we are only dealing with global averages in this project, and not with the
information from specific routers, that there is no reason why we cannot return one MIB sum value to
help calculate the average. All of these conditions can be seen in the run() method of the
PollingThread class, in SNMPPoller.java.


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EP2300 SNMP Project Report                       Amy Skinner (skinner@kth.se) - Laili Aidi (aidi@kthse)



After averaging, we determine the changes in global state. This is done by finding the differences
between the averages, stored as deltXt and deltYt. Since we are storing all data for x and y
separately, there is the possibility that this lists could become different lengths. However, this could
only occur if we were to get null responses from all routers for one of the values, but not the other, in a
given round. We consider this to be incredibly unlikely, so we assume the size of x list to be the same as
the size of the y list.

In the next step, we run a loop to pick a new random points in the data set to be initial centroids (x(p),
y(p)). Then we make a loop though all of the rounds, and for each point (x(t),y(t)), we record the
Euclidean distance to all of the initial centroids. After calculating the distances, the point is then added
to a cluster with the centroid which is closest to itself. The clusters are stored as lists of type Cluster.
Then we compute the new centroid for each cluster. This step is repeated until we get the same
centroids after an iteration (convergence), or until a maximum number of iterations (10) is met. After
the clusters are created, the Davies-Bouldin index (DBI) is computed for each clustering round. This
entire clustering process is repeated repeats number of times, to compare values discovered from
clusterings with different random initial centroids.

/** Anomaly detection **/
int largestCentroidCluster = clusters.getClusterWithLargestCentroid();
long largestCentroid = clusters.get(LargestCentroidCluster).getCentroid();

int secondLargestCentroidCluster = clusters.getClusterWithLargestCentroid();
long secondLargestCentroid = clusters.get(LargestCentroidCluster).getCentroid();

if(clusters.get(largestCentroidCluster).getNumPoints() <
       clusters.get(secondLargestCentroidCluster).getNumPoints()) {
    print ("There was a DoS attack in cluster: t" + largestCentroidCluster + 1) -
Rounds: ");
    for(int i: clusters.get(largestCentroidCluster).getRounds()) {
       print(clustersRounds.get(largestCentroidCluster).get(i) + " "); }

     print ("nThere was a port scan attack in cluster: " +
               (secondLargestCentroidCluster + 1) - Rounds: ");
     for(int i=0; i<clustersRounds.get(secondLargestCentroidCluster).size(); i++) {
        print(clustersRounds.get(secondLargestCentroidCluster).get(i) + " "); }
}

The anomaly detection scheme (ADS) works by using the qualities listed in section 2.3d of the project
description. First, the top two clusters are picked by their centroid value, which means the two clusters
whose centroid is furthest from the origin. After that, we determine if attacks have happened, by
testing if the qualities of these two clusters agree with qualities laid out in the project description, that is
to say, that if the largest of the two centroids has a smaller size, we call this a DoS Attack, and can
therefore call the other cluster a port scan attack. If these two clusters do not share these qualities, we
consider that it is indeterminate whether there was an attack or not. This can happen due to poor
choice of random initial centroids which prohibit the clusters from forming in predictable ways. Our
clusterer takes a variable integer repeats, which controls how many times we repeat the calculations
with different initial random centroids, that we are more accurately able to say during which rounds
there may have been an attack. We have decided to run the ADS on all clusterings, rather than just the
clusterings with the lowest DBI, because we have found that the clusterings with the lowest DBI do not
always show the most accurate attack detection (see Section 4A). We do however determine and
output which clustering has the lowest DBI, to conform to the requirements of Task 3.

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EP2300 SNMP Project Report                    Amy Skinner (skinner@kth.se) - Laili Aidi (aidi@kthse)


   4. Analysis of Results
   In this section we present plots of data produced from a run of the program in Task 2. Similar data is
   created from every in Task 3, with the difference that the lowest DBI is identified, and only that data is
   output to a file. For this run of the program , we have selected to do 15 clusterings to ensure a breadth
   of different results, and selected 3 unique clusterings to discuss here. For the plots we output data to
   files from our program and then use GnuPlot to create the images [4].
   In section A, we see clustering round number 12. This round had the lowest DBI. However, we can see
   that the clusters were not very evenly distributed. We can tell that Cluster 1 (only one point, the
   centroid, so the red cross is covered by the light blue square), and Cluster 2 are likely anomalous, but
   maybe shouldn’t be clustered as they are. This is due to poor random initialization of the centroids. As
   the initial centroid became the only member of the Cluster 1 in the first iteration, even after subsequent
   iterations, it remained the only member of the cluster. In section B, we see clustering round number 13,
   with a somewhat higher DBI. In this round we still identify the attacks by the criteria given in section
   2.3d of the project description, however by looking at the points, it appears that most of the anomalous
   points are clustered into Cluster 2, causing the algorithm to identify Cluster 1 as another anomalous
   cluster, even though many of its points appear to be in the normal range. In section C, we see clustering
   round 15, with a moderately low DBI. In this clustering we have identified two anomalous looking
   clusters, but were unable to identify either as a specific attack, because the cluster with the largest
   centroid also had the greatest size (contrary to the criteria).

    A. Output from clustering 12:




Calculation number: 12
Cluster 1: INITIAL CENTROID: (2441728310,207925532)      CENTROID: (2441728310,207925532)
           Distance to origin: 2147483647 size:1
Cluster 2: INITIAL CENTROID: (471870614,60886306)        CENTROID: (214883629,107039622)
           Distance to origin: 240067604   size:44
Cluster 3: INITIAL CENTROID: (1885516800,337995273)      CENTROID: (1789368680,226861600)
           Distance to origin: 1803692451 size:4
Cluster 4: INITIAL CENTROID: (1714528937,12997585)       CENTROID: (749674099,115085316)
           Distance to origin: 758456250   size:24
DBI: 0.51
There was a DoS attack in cluster:      1        -Rounds: 9
There was a port scan attack in cluster: 3       -Rounds: 4 11 17 18


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EP2300 SNMP Project Report                 Amy Skinner (skinner@kth.se) - Laili Aidi (aidi@kthse)

    B. Output from clustering 13:




Calculation number: 13
Cluster 1: INITIAL CENTROID: (374573948,35643439) CENTROID: (805820188,111405014)
           Distance to origin: 813484635   size:19
Cluster 2: INITIAL CENTROID: (660388911,93972355) CENTROID: (1919840606,223074386)
           Distance to origin: 1932757132 size:5
Cluster 3: INITIAL CENTROID: (115915131,16393588) CENTROID: (112389070,105981524)
           Distance to origin: 154477786   size:28
Cluster 4: INITIAL CENTROID: (253233972,55685827) CENTROID: (400624290,113025046)
           Distance to origin: 416262516   size:21
DBI: 0.76
There was a DoS attack in cluster:      2        -Rounds: 4 9 11 17 18
There was a port scan attack in cluster: 1       -Rounds: 0 2 3 5 6 7 8 10 12 14 16 19 20 30 35 36 38 58 72


    C. Output from clustering 15:




Calculation number: 15
Cluster 1: INITIAL CENTROID: (13258747,117923684) CENTROID: (148767001,101947479)
           Distance to origin: 180346635   size:33
Cluster 2: INITIAL CENTROID: (704077379,56711499) CENTROID: (1580738673,176220052)
           Distance to origin: 1590530810 size:9
Cluster 3: INITIAL CENTROID: (203160196,49844066) CENTROID: (580964867,78434420)
           Distance to origin: 586235562   size:29
Cluster 4: INITIAL CENTROID: (171386150,79317073) CENTROID: (531160408,681158721)
           Distance to origin: 863775770   size:2
DBI: 0.6
Unable to positively identify attacks due to cluster sizes and centroid values.

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EP2300 SNMP Project Report                 Amy Skinner (skinner@kth.se) - Laili Aidi (aidi@kthse)


5. Appendix
A. UML Class diagram of the project




                         Figure 1. Class Diagram of the designed software
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EP2300 SNMP Project Report                   Amy Skinner (skinner@kth.se) - Laili Aidi (aidi@kthse)

B. Console Output from the run of the program discussed in Section 4
 [aidl@brooklyn src]$ java Start -t 2 -r 15 –o 1
Starting EP2300 SNMP assignment, Task 2 (Clustering Global States)
Beginning crawl at IP: 192.168.1.10 (default)
Crawled Router: R9
        Interface (1): 192.168.1.10     FastEthernet0/0
        Interface (2): 192.168.4.10     FastEthernet0/1
        Interface (3): null     Null0
        Neighbor:       192.168.4.14
        Neighbor:       192.168.1.15
Crawled Router: R13
        Interface (1): 192.168.4.14     FastEthernet0/0
        Interface (2): 192.168.14.14    FastEthernet0/1
        Interface (3): null     Null0
        Neighbor:       192.168.14.1
        Neighbor:       192.168.4.10
Crawled Router: R14
        Interface (1): 192.168.1.15     FastEthernet0/0
        Interface (2): 192.168.13.15    FastEthernet0/1
        Interface (3): null     Null0
        Neighbor:       192.168.1.10
        Neighbor:       192.168.13.3
com.adventnet.snmp.snmp2.SnmpException: Time Synchronization has failed.
        at com.adventnet.snmp.snmp2.usm.USMUserEntry.timeSynchronize(USMUserEntry.java:1185)
        at com.adventnet.snmp.snmp2.usm.USMUtils.doTimeSync(USMUtils.java:2028)
        at com.adventnet.snmp.snmp2.usm.USMUtils.doTimeSync(USMUtils.java:1927)
        at com.adventnet.snmp.snmp2.usm.USMUtils.init_v3_parameters(USMUtils.java:1414)
        at SNMPUtils.getVarBind(SNMPUtils.java:92)
        at SNMPUtils.getVarBind(SNMPUtils.java:132)
        at SNMPCrawler.addNeighbors(SNMPCrawler.java:112)
        at SNMPCrawler.createRouter(SNMPCrawler.java:68)
        at SNMPCrawler.start(SNMPCrawler.java:44)
        at SNMPCrawler.<init>(SNMPCrawler.java:25)
        at Start.main(Start.java:133)
Crawled Router: R0
        Interface (1): 192.168.8.1      FastEthernet0/0
        Interface (2): 192.168.14.1     FastEthernet0/1
        Interface (3): null     Null0
        Neighbor:       192.168.8.2
        Neighbor:       192.168.14.14
Crawled Router: R2
        Interface (1): 192.168.12.3     FastEthernet0/0
        Interface (2): 192.168.13.3     FastEthernet0/1
        Interface (3): null     Null0
        Neighbor:       192.168.13.15
        Neighbor:       192.168.12.4
Crawled Router: R1
        Interface (1): 192.168.0.2      FastEthernet0/0
        Interface (2): 192.168.8.2      FastEthernet0/1
        Interface (3): null     Null0
        Neighbor:       192.168.8.1
        Neighbor:       192.168.0.11
Crawled Router: R3
        Interface (1): 192.168.9.4      FastEthernet0/0
        Interface (2): 192.168.12.4     FastEthernet0/1
        Interface (3): null     Null0
        Neighbor:       192.168.12.3
        Neighbor:       192.168.9.9
Crawled Router: R10
        Interface (1): 192.168.0.11     FastEthernet0/0
        Interface (2): 192.168.7.11     FastEthernet0/1


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EP2300 SNMP Project Report                   Amy Skinner (skinner@kth.se) - Laili Aidi (aidi@kthse)

        Interface (3):    null    Null0
        Neighbor:         192.168.0.2
        Neighbor:         192.168.7.8
Crawled Router: R8
        Interface (1):    192.168.9.9     FastEthernet0/0
        Interface (2):    192.168.10.9    FastEthernet0/1
        Interface (3):    null    Null0
        Neighbor:         192.168.9.4
        Neighbor:         192.168.10.12
Crawled Router: R7
        Interface (1):    192.168.3.8     FastEthernet0/0
        Interface (2):    192.168.7.8     FastEthernet0/1
        Interface (3):    null    Null0
        Neighbor:         192.168.7.11
        Neighbor:         192.168.3.5
Crawled Router: R11
        Interface (1):    192.168.10.12   FastEthernet0/0
        Interface (2):    192.168.11.12   FastEthernet0/1
        Interface (3):    null    Null0
        Neighbor:         192.168.11.13
        Neighbor:         192.168.10.9
Crawled Router: R4
        Interface (1):    192.168.3.5     FastEthernet0/0
        Interface (2):    192.168.5.5     FastEthernet0/1
        Interface (3):    null    Null0
        Neighbor:         192.168.3.8
        Neighbor:         192.168.5.6
Crawled Router: R12
        Interface (1):    192.168.2.13    FastEthernet0/0
        Interface (2):    192.168.11.13   FastEthernet0/1
        Interface (3):    null    Null0
        Neighbor:         192.168.2.16
        Neighbor:         192.168.11.12
Crawled Router: R5
        Interface (1):    192.168.5.6     FastEthernet0/0
        Interface (2):    192.168.15.6    FastEthernet0/1
        Interface (3):    null    Null0
        Interface (4):    192.168.100.100 Loopback0
        Neighbor:         192.168.5.5
        Neighbor:         192.168.15.7
Crawled Router: R15
        Interface (1):    192.168.2.16    FastEthernet0/0
        Interface (2):    192.168.6.16    FastEthernet0/1
        Interface (3):    null    Null0
        Neighbor:         192.168.6.7
        Neighbor:         192.168.2.13
Crawled Router: R6
        Interface (1):    192.168.6.7     FastEthernet0/0
        Interface (2):    192.168.15.7    FastEthernet0/1
        Interface (3):    null    Null0
        Neighbor:         192.168.15.6
        Neighbor:         192.168.6.16
Crawling completed: 40s


[The network discovery of Task 1 is now completed and moving on to the polling of Task 2…]

Beginning polling...
Using interval                   :        2 seconds (default)
Using timespan                   :        180 seconds (default)
Using K-value                    :        4 (default)
Will repeat calculations         :        15 times


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EP2300 SNMP Project Report                   Amy Skinner (skinner@kth.se) - Laili Aidi (aidi@kthse)

   [During the polling of Task 2 we frequently receive TimeSynchronizationExceptions outputted from the
   SNMP class that we do not control. Also, we output every time we get a null response from a router.
   We handle these nulls as discussed in Section 3. We receive many of these throughout the polling, so
   we have edited away most of this output for simplicity, but here is a sample]

   com.adventnet.snmp.snmp2.SnmpException: Discovery Failed
          at com.adventnet.snmp.snmp2.SnmpEngineEntry.discoverSnmpEngineID(SnmpEngineEntry.java:698)
           at com.adventnet.snmp.snmp2.usm.USMUtils.doDiscovery(USMUtils.java:1871)
           at com.adventnet.snmp.snmp2.usm.USMUtils.init_v3_parameters(USMUtils.java:1413)
           at SNMPUtils.getVarBind(SNMPUtils.java:92)
           at SNMPUtils.getVar(SNMPUtils.java:142)
           at PollingThread.run(SNMPPoller.java:197)
   com.adventnet.snmp.snmp2.SnmpException: Failed to authenticate the SecurityParameters for user
   2G1332_student SnmpEngineEntry not found for address 192.168.10.12 port 161
           at com.adventnet.snmp.snmp2.Snmp3Message.processMessage(Snmp3Message.java:1132)
           at com.adventnet.snmp.snmp2.SnmpSession.processPDUForVersion3(SnmpSession.java:2297)
           at com.adventnet.snmp.snmp2.SnmpSession.setPDUParams(SnmpSession.java:2134)
           at com.adventnet.snmp.snmp2.SnmpSession.send(SnmpSession.java:1974)
           at com.adventnet.snmp.snmp2.SnmpSession.syncSend(SnmpSession.java:2558)
           at SNMPUtils.getVarBind(SNMPUtils.java:109)
           at SNMPUtils.getVar(SNMPUtils.java:142)
           at PollingThread.run(SNMPPoller.java:197)
   SNMP EXCEPTION ON       IP: 192.168.10.12       OID: .1.3.6.1.2.1.2.2.1.10.1
   NPE in Polling Thread.run() - X - Router: R11    round:0
   RESULT IS NULL!!! TIMEOUT!!!    IP: 192.168.0.2 OID: .1.3.6.1.2.1.2.2.1.10.1
   NPE in Polling Thread.run() - X - Router: R1     round:0
   RESULT IS NULL!!! TIMEOUT!!!    IP: 192.168.9.9 OID: .1.3.6.1.2.1.2.2.1.11.2
   NPE in Polling Thread.run() - Y - Router: R8     round:0
   RESULT IS NULL!!! TIMEOUT!!!    IP: 192.168.0.11         OID: .1.3.6.1.2.1.2.2.1.10.2
   NPE in Polling Thread.run() - X - Router: R10    round:1
   RESULT IS NULL!!! TIMEOUT!!!    IP: 192.168.9.9 OID: .1.3.6.1.2.1.2.2.1.11.2
   NPE in Polling Thread.run() - Y - Router: R8     round:3
   RESULT IS NULL!!! TIMEOUT!!!    IP: 192.168.2.16         OID: .1.3.6.1.2.1.2.2.1.11.2
   NPE in Polling Thread.run() - Y - Router: R15    round:3


[End of sample of the errors… We now jump to poll completion, which begins with outputting the delta values
created from the global link-states we discovered during polling]

Done polling (74 rounds):         216s
Round: 1        Delta values   (676248289,25047813)
Round: 2        Delta values   (518732205,69707029)
Round: 3        Delta values   (611057586,38984022)
Round: 4        Delta values   (615854761,10902145)
Round: 5        Delta values   (1714528937,12997585)
Round: 6        Delta values   (1140419653,186713705)
Round: 7        Delta values   (1190290703,59148273)
Round: 8        Delta values   (944308308,182602369)
Round: 9        Delta values   (642704189,9359653)
Round: 10       Delta values   (2441728310,207925532)
Round: 11       Delta values   (631360059,274612228)
Round: 12       Delta values   (1885516800,337995273)
Round: 13       Delta values   (1186561012,203413028)
Round: 14       Delta values   (524948788,288193238)
Round: 15       Delta values   (751719760,157507201)
Round: 16       Delta values   (296589241,75250562)
Round: 17       Delta values   (1110173658,21333530)
Round: 18       Delta values   (1664293503,165717608)


                                                                                                       10
EP2300 SNMP Project Report                     Amy Skinner (skinner@kth.se) - Laili Aidi (aidi@kthse)

Round:   19      Delta   values   (1893135481,390735934)
Round:   20      Delta   values   (716660127,596407796)
Round:   21      Delta   values   (704077379,56711499)
Round:   22      Delta   values   (474301583,5731296)
Round:   23      Delta   values   (345660690,765909647)
Round:   24      Delta   values   (578389504,246972096)
Round:   25      Delta   values   (210776255,228074584)
Round:   26      Delta   values   (249289848,205913351)
Round:   27      Delta   values   (181309216,9536905)
Round:   28      Delta   values   (135747952,199565599)
Round:   29      Delta   values   (197541573,356299210)
Round:   30      Delta   values   (21176490,184948620)
Round:   31      Delta   values   (660388911,93972355)
Round:   32      Delta   values   (471870614,60886306)
Round:   33      Delta   values   (278383522,95271155)
Round:   34      Delta   values   (37420732,161891933)
Round:   35      Delta   values   (56636791,146153476)
Round:   36      Delta   values   (895634506,29575242)
Round:   37      Delta   values   (750450800,470387)
Round:   38      Delta   values   (424665195,31493309)
Round:   39      Delta   values   (636587427,24680096)
Round:   40      Delta   values   (49593959,23426091)
Round:   41      Delta   values   (115915131,16393588)
Round:   42      Delta   values   (265811242,51863374)
Round:   43      Delta   values   (524917957,40233073)
Round:   44      Delta   values   (35145500,46103212)
Round:   45      Delta   values   (467187496,127598320)
Round:   46      Delta   values   (75268897,148930723)
Round:   47      Delta   values   (381931973,67041728)
Round:   48      Delta   values   (95511479,66281343)
Round:   49      Delta   values   (33284764,43275525)
Round:   50      Delta   values   (141795148,92786867)
Round:   51      Delta   values   (339863732,124516950)
Round:   52      Delta   values   (367192701,32836506)
Round:   53      Delta   values   (13258747,117923684)
Round:   54      Delta   values   (171386150,79317073)
Round:   55      Delta   values   (192733861,50423466)
Round:   56      Delta   values   (304023671,245948)
Round:   57      Delta   values   (399287805,162308)
Round:   58      Delta   values   (534606351,246896)
Round:   59      Delta   values   (670542749,28956986)
Round:   60      Delta   values   (380146409,47529811)
Round:   61      Delta   values   (92925075,8801812)
Round:   62      Delta   values   (127443602,56944295)
Round:   63      Delta   values   (202964762,142709252)
Round:   64      Delta   values   (458750223,170643896)
Round:   65      Delta   values   (88486619,7202473)
Round:   66      Delta   values   (169244056,55212656)
Round:   67      Delta   values   (253233972,55685827)
Round:   68      Delta   values   (39243653,103893047)
Round:   69      Delta   values   (203160196,49844066)
Round:   70      Delta   values   (27472574,234937466)
Round:   71      Delta   values   (206672650,124642678)
Round:   72      Delta   values   (374573948,35643439)
Round:   73      Delta   values   (775543695,116296947)


[ After outputting the delta values, the clustering algorithm begins]

Calculation number: 1
Cluster 1:      INITIAL CENTROID: (75268897,148930723)       CENTROID: (531160408,681158721) Distance to
origin: 863775770   size:2


                                                                                                       11
EP2300 SNMP Project Report                 Amy Skinner (skinner@kth.se) - Laili Aidi (aidi@kthse)

Cluster 2:      INITIAL CENTROID: (265811242,51863374) CENTROID: (580964867,78434420) Distance to
origin: 586235562   size:29
Cluster 3:      INITIAL CENTROID: (518732205,69707029) CENTROID: (1580738673,176220052)         Distance
to origin: 1590530810 size:9
Cluster 4:      INITIAL CENTROID: (35145500,46103212)   CENTROID: (148767001,101947479) Distance to
origin: 180346635   size:33
DBI: 0.6
Unable to positively identify attacks due to cluster sizes and centroid values.

Calculation number: 2
Cluster 1:      INITIAL CENTROID: (374573948,35643439) CENTROID: (522807513,76506519) Distance to
origin: 528375759   size:26
Cluster 2:      INITIAL CENTROID: (474301583,5731296)   CENTROID: (946176222,155346847) Distance to
origin: 958844140   size:9
Cluster 3:      INITIAL CENTROID: (1186561012,203413028)        CENTROID: (1919840606,223074386)
Distance to origin: 1932757132 size:5
Cluster 4:      INITIAL CENTROID: (21176490,184948620) CENTROID: (148942667,121383621) Distance to
origin: 192140317   size:33
DBI: 0.71
There was a DoS attack in cluster:      3
-Rounds: 4 9 11 17 18
There was a port scan attack in cluster: 2
-Rounds: 5 6 7 12 14 16 19 35 72

Calculation number: 3
Cluster 1:      INITIAL CENTROID: (21176490,184948620) CENTROID: (531160408,681158721) Distance to
origin: 863775770   size:2
Cluster 2:      INITIAL CENTROID: (181309216,9536905)   CENTROID: (580964867,78434420) Distance to
origin: 586235562   size:29
Cluster 3:      INITIAL CENTROID: (380146409,47529811) CENTROID: (1580738673,176220052)         Distance
to origin: 1590530810 size:9
Cluster 4:      INITIAL CENTROID: (49593959,23426091)   CENTROID: (148767001,101947479) Distance to
origin: 180346635   size:33
DBI: 0.6
Unable to positively identify attacks due to cluster sizes and centroid values.

Calculation number: 4
Cluster 1:      INITIAL CENTROID: (39243653,103893047) CENTROID: (148767001,101947479) Distance to
origin: 180346635   size:33
Cluster 2:      INITIAL CENTROID: (524948788,288193238) CENTROID: (623554579,392449562) Distance to
origin: 736774708   size:6
Cluster 3:      INITIAL CENTROID: (751719760,157507201) CENTROID: (1580738673,176220052)        Distance
to origin: 1590530810 size:9
Cluster 4:      INITIAL CENTROID: (399287805,162308)    CENTROID: (566758980,51288730) Distance to
origin: 569074929   size:25
DBI: 0.88
Unable to positively identify attacks due to cluster sizes and centroid values.

Calculation number: 5
Cluster 1:      INITIAL CENTROID: (135747952,199565599) CENTROID: (531160408,681158721) Distance to
origin: 863775770   size:2
Cluster 2:      INITIAL CENTROID: (471870614,60886306) CENTROID: (642200879,84508717) Distance to
origin: 647737363   size:25
Cluster 3:      INITIAL CENTROID: (141795148,92786867) CENTROID: (179274839,93354752) Distance to
origin: 202125153   size:38
Cluster 4:      INITIAL CENTROID: (1714528937,12997585) CENTROID: (1639559299,195580867)        Distance
to origin: 1651183384 size:8
DBI: 0.59
Unable to positively identify attacks due to cluster sizes and centroid values.

Calculation number: 6



                                                                                                  12
EP2300 SNMP Project Report                 Amy Skinner (skinner@kth.se) - Laili Aidi (aidi@kthse)

Cluster 1:      INITIAL CENTROID: (750450800,470387)    CENTROID: (1639559299,195580867)        Distance
to origin: 1651183384 size:8
Cluster 2:      INITIAL CENTROID: (474301583,5731296)   CENTROID: (642200879,84508717) Distance to
origin: 647737363   size:25
Cluster 3:      INITIAL CENTROID: (181309216,9536905)   CENTROID: (179274839,93354752) Distance to
origin: 202125153   size:38
Cluster 4:      INITIAL CENTROID: (202964762,142709252) CENTROID: (531160408,681158721) Distance to
origin: 863775770   size:2
DBI: 0.59
Unable to positively identify attacks due to cluster sizes and centroid values.

Calculation number: 7
Cluster 1:      INITIAL CENTROID: (35145500,46103212)     CENTROID: (125609513,133119380) Distance to
origin: 183026006   size:29
Cluster 2:      INITIAL CENTROID: (141795148,92786867)    CENTROID: (794448653,118183368) Distance to
origin: 803191117   size:19
Cluster 3:      INITIAL CENTROID: (127443602,56944295)    CENTROID: (402050931,69039048)     Distance to
origin: 407935462   size:20
Cluster 4:      INITIAL CENTROID: (670542749,28956986)    CENTROID: (1919840606,223074386)          Distance
to origin: 1932757132 size:5
DBI: 0.72
There was a DoS attack in cluster:      4
-Rounds: 4 9 11 17 18
There was a port scan attack in cluster: 2
-Rounds: 0 2 3 5 6 7 8 10 12 14 16 19 20 30 35 36 38 58   72

Calculation number: 8
Cluster 1:      INITIAL CENTROID: (1140419653,186713705)        CENTROID: (1580738673,176220052)
Distance to origin: 1590530810 size:9
Cluster 2:      INITIAL CENTROID: (206672650,124642678) CENTROID: (173328543,95873467) Distance to
origin: 198077019   size:37
Cluster 3:      INITIAL CENTROID: (249289848,205913351) CENTROID: (531160408,681158721) Distance to
origin: 863775770   size:2
Cluster 4:      INITIAL CENTROID: (615854761,10902145) CENTROID: (613765445,83661868) Distance to
origin: 619441142   size:25
DBI: 0.59
Unable to positively identify attacks due to cluster sizes and centroid values.

Calculation number: 9
Cluster 1:      INITIAL CENTROID: (704077379,56711499) CENTROID: (967923491,172555343) Distance to
origin: 983184230   size:9
Cluster 2:      INITIAL CENTROID: (27472574,234937466) CENTROID: (154557992,121475778) Distance to
origin: 196582139   size:34
Cluster 3:      INITIAL CENTROID: (381931973,67041728) CENTROID: (539230996,71544657) Distance to
origin: 543956528   size:25
Cluster 4:      INITIAL CENTROID: (1893135481,390735934)       CENTROID: (1919840606,223074386)
Distance to origin: 1932757132 size:5
DBI: 0.69
There was a DoS attack in cluster:      4
-Rounds: 4 9 11 17 18
There was a port scan attack in cluster: 1
-Rounds: 5 6 7 12 14 16 19 35 72

Calculation number: 10
Cluster 1:      INITIAL CENTROID: (202964762,142709252) CENTROID: (117457850,237870111) Distance to
origin: 265289532   size:12
Cluster 2:      INITIAL CENTROID: (206672650,124642678) CENTROID: (220474127,53230079) Distance to
origin: 226808910   size:28
Cluster 3:      INITIAL CENTROID: (1140419653,186713705)        CENTROID: (1919840606,223074386)
Distance to origin: 1932757132 size:5
Cluster 4:      INITIAL CENTROID: (467187496,127598320) CENTROID: (709438867,111675265) Distance to
origin: 718174679   size:28

                                                                                                       13
EP2300 SNMP Project Report                  Amy Skinner (skinner@kth.se) - Laili Aidi (aidi@kthse)

DBI: 0.89
There was a DoS attack in cluster:      3
-Rounds: 4 9 11 17 18
There was a port scan attack in cluster: 4
-Rounds: 0 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 10 12 13 14 16 19 20 21 23 30 31 35 36 38 42 44 57 58 63 72

Calculation number: 11
Cluster 1:      INITIAL CENTROID: (127443602,56944295) CENTROID: (148767001,101947479) Distance to
origin: 180346635   size:33
Cluster 2:      INITIAL CENTROID: (1186561012,203413028)        CENTROID: (1077897973,113797691)
Distance to origin: 1083888349 size:6
Cluster 3:      INITIAL CENTROID: (1714528937,12997585) CENTROID: (1919840606,223074386)         Distance
to origin: 1932757132 size:5
Cluster 4:      INITIAL CENTROID: (524948788,288193238) CENTROID: (554150316,118094414) Distance to
origin: 566594090   size:29
DBI: 0.63
There was a DoS attack in cluster:      3
-Rounds: 4 9 11 17 18
There was a port scan attack in cluster: 2
-Rounds: 5 6 7 12 16 35

Calculation number: 12
Cluster 1:      INITIAL CENTROID: (2441728310,207925532)        CENTROID: (2441728310,207925532)
Distance to origin: 2147483647 size:1
Cluster 2:      INITIAL CENTROID: (471870614,60886306) CENTROID: (214883629,107039622) Distance to
origin: 240067604   size:44
Cluster 3:      INITIAL CENTROID: (1885516800,337995273)        CENTROID: (1789368680,226861600)
Distance to origin: 1803692451 size:4
Cluster 4:      INITIAL CENTROID: (1714528937,12997585) CENTROID: (749674099,115085316) Distance to
origin: 758456250   size:24
DBI: 0.51
There was a DoS attack in cluster:      1
-Rounds: 9
There was a port scan attack in cluster: 3
-Rounds: 4 11 17 18

Calculation number: 13
Cluster 1:      INITIAL CENTROID: (374573948,35643439)    CENTROID: (805820188,111405014) Distance to
origin: 813484635   size:19
Cluster 2:      INITIAL CENTROID: (660388911,93972355)    CENTROID: (1919840606,223074386)        Distance
to origin: 1932757132 size:5
Cluster 3:      INITIAL CENTROID: (115915131,16393588)    CENTROID: (112389070,105981524) Distance to
origin: 154477786   size:28
Cluster 4:      INITIAL CENTROID: (253233972,55685827)    CENTROID: (400624290,113025046) Distance to
origin: 416262516   size:21
DBI: 0.76
There was a DoS attack in cluster:      2
-Rounds: 4 9 11 17 18
There was a port scan attack in cluster: 1
-Rounds: 0 2 3 5 6 7 8 10 12 14 16 19 20 30 35 36 38 58   72

Calculation number: 14
Cluster 1:      INITIAL CENTROID: (534606351,246896)      CENTROID: (1919840606,223074386)       Distance
to origin: 1932757132 size:5
Cluster 2:      INITIAL CENTROID: (399287805,162308)      CENTROID: (805820188,111405014) Distance to
origin: 813484635   size:19
Cluster 3:      INITIAL CENTROID: (253233972,55685827)    CENTROID: (400624290,113025046) Distance to
origin: 416262516   size:21
Cluster 4:      INITIAL CENTROID: (88486619,7202473)      CENTROID: (112389070,105981524) Distance to
origin: 154477786   size:28
DBI: 0.76
There was a DoS attack in cluster:      1

                                                                                                    14
EP2300 SNMP Project Report                      Amy Skinner (skinner@kth.se) - Laili Aidi (aidi@kthse)

-Rounds: 4 9 11 17 18
There was a port scan attack in cluster: 2
-Rounds: 0 2 3 5 6 7 8 10 12 14 16 19 20 30 35 36 38 58 72

Calculation number: 15
Cluster 1:      INITIAL CENTROID: (13258747,117923684) CENTROID: (148767001,101947479) Distance to
origin: 180346635   size:33
Cluster 2:      INITIAL CENTROID: (704077379,56711499) CENTROID: (1580738673,176220052)        Distance
to origin: 1590530810 size:9
Cluster 3:      INITIAL CENTROID: (203160196,49844066) CENTROID: (580964867,78434420) Distance to
origin: 586235562   size:29
Cluster 4:      INITIAL CENTROID: (171386150,79317073) CENTROID: (531160408,681158721) Distance to
origin: 863775770   size:2
DBI: 0.6
Unable to positively identify attacks due to cluster sizes and centroid values.

The calculation with the mininum Davies-Bouldin Index occurred in clustering round: 12 with DBI: 0.51



[As mentioned in Section 4, we ran 15 calculations to ensure that we could find significantly unique clusterings
to discuss – ordinarily this is set to the default of 3 clusterings. In Task 3, we would have already begun the next
round of polling before clustering, and this would repeat every w rounds]


    C. References
    [1] k-means clustering http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/K-means_clustering
    [2] Davies–Bouldin index http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Davies–Bouldin_index
    [3] EP2300 SNMP Project Description
    http://www.s3.kth.se/lcn/courses/EP2300/snmp_project_2011.pdf
    [4] GnuPlot http://www.gnuplot.info/




                                                                                                             15

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SNMP Project: SNMP-based Network Anomaly Detection Using Clustering

  • 1. EP2300 SNMP Project Report Amy Skinner (skinner@kth.se) - Laili Aidi (aidi@kthse) 1. Summary This project aims to design and implement a system that is able to monitor the network using SNMP and identify the specific possible attacks (DoS and port scan) using a cluster analysis. In the first task, the program discovers the topology of the network. After successful discovery phase, it will be able to monitor the link utilization (network link-states) for a specified period of time, and then detect the anomaly, using k-means clustering scheme [1]. These anomalies will be analyzed to recognize the attack. Moreover, this program also provides an advance feature, which is defined as optional task, as it executes online monitoring and detects the attacks using Davies-Bouldin Index as quality scoring measurement [2]. 2. Software Design and MIB objects A. The MIB objects which are used in this system are: i. During network crawling System Group and Interface Group (Interfaces table), as listed below:  sysName, OID 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.5. This MIB object is used to get the administratively assigned name of the router  ifIndex, OID 1.3.6.1.2.1.2.2.1.1. This MIB object is used to get the interface value of the router  ifDescr, OID 1.3.6.1.2.1.2.2.1.2. This MIB object is used to get the description of the specific interface that is discovered previously from the ifIndex MIB object request.  ipAdEntIfIndex, OID 1.3.6.1.2.1.4.20.1.2. This MIB object represent the index that identifies the interface to which it is applicable in the value ifIndex MIB object. Using this MIB Object, we can identify the Interfaces that exist in the IP routing table of the Router.  ipAdEntAddr, OID 1.3.6.1.2.1.4.20.1.1. This MIB object represents the IP address of the specific interface of the Router. ii. To discover the network topology, we identified the link level neighbor of each of the identified Router using MIB Objects in Interface Group (IP Routing tables), which is the ipRouteNextHop, OID 1.3.6.1.2.1.4.21.1.7. This MIB object represents the next hop IP address of a route in the router. iii. To identify the attacks, we used two MIB Objects in the Interface Group (Interfaces table) that relate to interface utilization of a route, thus it able to represent the link-states of the network, as listed below:  ifInOctets, OID 1.3.6.1.2.1.2.2.1.10. This MIB object represents the total number of octets received on the specific interface of the Router.  ifInUcastPkts, OID 1.3.6.1.2.1.2.2.1.11. This MIB object represents the amount of unicast packets delivered to a higher-layer protocol. B. Below is the design of the software in this SNMP-based network management system, including the classes, key data structures and operations. A full-size class diagram is given in Appendix 5A. i. Class Start, the starting point to running the program. It contains the constant variables, used as default parameters to run the specific task, if user has not specified with command line arguments. ii. Class Router, represents the Managed node (Router), which contains:  hostname, which is String data type containing the hostname of the node  interfaces, which is Map of Integer (interface index) to RouterInf data structure containing the interfaces of a router  localIps, which is List of Strings containing the local IP addresses of a router  neighborIps, which is List of Strings containing the neighbor (next-hop) IP addresses of a router 1
  • 2. EP2300 SNMP Project Report Amy Skinner (skinner@kth.se) - Laili Aidi (aidi@kthse) iii. Class RouterInf, represents the network interface of the router, which contains:  The IP Address, called ip, which is String data type.  The description, called desc, which is String data type. iv. Class SNMPUtils, is static class that provide the SNMP values and operations that are needed to accomplish the task, which are:  OID, which is Map of Strings from the human readable OID names data type to Strings of OID numeric values, for the MIB objects of which are requested during the run of this program  open() and close(), opens and closes the SNMP session  getVarBind(), returns SNMP getNext MIB variable-value binding (value with its OID)  getVar(), returns SNMP getNext MIB value v. Class SNMPCrawler, responsible for the node and link discovery task of the test-bed network:  createRouter(), creates a router and add to global list of routers operation  addInterfaces(), discovers and adds a list of the Interfaces of a router  addNeigbors(), discovers and adds a list of the link level Neighbors of a router vi. Class SNMPPoller, provides polling operation to capture the link-states of routers:  poll and onlinePoll, operations used in Task 2, respective Task 3, to poll all routers for a specified period of time and quit, or to continuously poll and call Clusterer after w polling rounds.  xRounds and yRounds, which is Hashtable of integer data type to List of Long data structure. This Integer represent the round number, and the List of Long data structure contains the sum of ifInOctets, respective ifInUcastPkts, from every interface of each router in each round vii. Class PollingTread This class has composition relationship with Class SNMPPoller, which polls the information of the routers simultaneously in every round. vii. Class Clusterer, is a Thread that provides clustering calculation based on k-means clustering method and/or Davies-Bouldin Index and show the result. This class contains 2 data structures which represent the global-state of the network in every round, and operations which are:  deltXt and deltYt, the delta values of MIB object ifInOctets and MIB object ifInUcastPkts from all routers in every round, calculated from the average value of the sum of MIB object from all interfaces from all routers in round t  cluster(), the cluster formation operation, which is used to perform clustering until the it is convergence or reach the maximum iteration for convergence (10 iterations)  getNewCentroids(), calculates the centroids from a list of type Cluster  calcDbi(), DBI value operation, used to get the Davis-Boulman Index of the clusters in each calculation for the same dataset.  findAttacks(), identifies the DoS and port scan attacks. vii. Class Cluster This class has composition relationship with Class Clusterer, represent the cluster object, containing  CentroidX and CentroidY, the X, respective Y values of the centroid  Xs and Ys, holds all the X, respective Y values of all the points in this cluster  getNumPoints, returns the number of points in this cluster 2
  • 3. EP2300 SNMP Project Report Amy Skinner (skinner@kth.se) - Laili Aidi (aidi@kthse) 3. Clustering Algorithm and Anomaly Detection Scheme /** Anomaly detection **/ delXt = createDeltas(createAverages(xRounds, "X")); delYt = createDeltas(createAverages(yRounds, "Y")); numDeltas = delXt.size(); List<Cluster> initClusters = new ArrayList<Cluster>(); while(initCentroids.size() < k) { Cluster c = new Cluster(delXt.get(p),delYt.get(p)); initClusters.add(c); } } List<Cluster> clusters = cluster(initClusters); List<Cluster> newCentroids = getNewCentroids(clusters); int numIterations = 0; while (!haveSameCentroids(clusters, newCentroids)) { clusters = cluster(newCentroids); newCentroids = getNewCentroids(clusters); if (numIterations++ > MAX_CLUSTERING_ITERATIONS) break; } } double dbi = computeDbi(clusters); Our clustering algorithm is based off the instructions in the project description in sections 2.3b and 2.3c [3]. For all of our calculations we have kept track of the values for the x value (the sum of the ifInOctets MIB values for every interfaces on a given router) and the y value (the sum of the ifInUcastPkts MIB values for every interface on a router) as separate variables, to the data structures as simple as possible, since they both change and are operated on independent of each other. At the end of the polling phase we have two tables that hold all of the polled values, xRounds and yRounds. These tables have the polling round number as keys, and the values are lists of the x or y values from all routers that responded with valid results for the corresponding polling round. This data, along with an integer interval, specifying how often polling should occur, an integer k, to indicate the number of clusters that should be created, and repeats, to indicate how many times we should recalculate the clusters for a different time period, are the inputs to the clustering function. The clustering algorithm begins by determining the average global state for each round, by summing up all values the list for that round, and then dividing by the number of responses in the list. This number can vary, if we have received a timeout when requesting a MIB value from a router. One of the biggest design choices for this project was to decide how to handle these timeouts. If we receive a timeout from a router while trying to get information about one of the interfaces, we do not add the information received from the other interfaces to the list for the round, so there will be one less entry in the list from this round. We have chosen to do this, because we assume that the null responses from the routers occur independently of when an attack occurs (only as a result of too many students executing at one time), so we do not want to bring down the global state average for that round and create something that may look anomalous, but not because of an attack. Another facet of this decision was if we received a null during a poll of the x value from a router, but not during a poll of the y value, should we add the y sum value to the y list, even though we are not adding the x value to the x list? We have decided that because we are only dealing with global averages in this project, and not with the information from specific routers, that there is no reason why we cannot return one MIB sum value to help calculate the average. All of these conditions can be seen in the run() method of the PollingThread class, in SNMPPoller.java. 3
  • 4. EP2300 SNMP Project Report Amy Skinner (skinner@kth.se) - Laili Aidi (aidi@kthse) After averaging, we determine the changes in global state. This is done by finding the differences between the averages, stored as deltXt and deltYt. Since we are storing all data for x and y separately, there is the possibility that this lists could become different lengths. However, this could only occur if we were to get null responses from all routers for one of the values, but not the other, in a given round. We consider this to be incredibly unlikely, so we assume the size of x list to be the same as the size of the y list. In the next step, we run a loop to pick a new random points in the data set to be initial centroids (x(p), y(p)). Then we make a loop though all of the rounds, and for each point (x(t),y(t)), we record the Euclidean distance to all of the initial centroids. After calculating the distances, the point is then added to a cluster with the centroid which is closest to itself. The clusters are stored as lists of type Cluster. Then we compute the new centroid for each cluster. This step is repeated until we get the same centroids after an iteration (convergence), or until a maximum number of iterations (10) is met. After the clusters are created, the Davies-Bouldin index (DBI) is computed for each clustering round. This entire clustering process is repeated repeats number of times, to compare values discovered from clusterings with different random initial centroids. /** Anomaly detection **/ int largestCentroidCluster = clusters.getClusterWithLargestCentroid(); long largestCentroid = clusters.get(LargestCentroidCluster).getCentroid(); int secondLargestCentroidCluster = clusters.getClusterWithLargestCentroid(); long secondLargestCentroid = clusters.get(LargestCentroidCluster).getCentroid(); if(clusters.get(largestCentroidCluster).getNumPoints() < clusters.get(secondLargestCentroidCluster).getNumPoints()) { print ("There was a DoS attack in cluster: t" + largestCentroidCluster + 1) - Rounds: "); for(int i: clusters.get(largestCentroidCluster).getRounds()) { print(clustersRounds.get(largestCentroidCluster).get(i) + " "); } print ("nThere was a port scan attack in cluster: " + (secondLargestCentroidCluster + 1) - Rounds: "); for(int i=0; i<clustersRounds.get(secondLargestCentroidCluster).size(); i++) { print(clustersRounds.get(secondLargestCentroidCluster).get(i) + " "); } } The anomaly detection scheme (ADS) works by using the qualities listed in section 2.3d of the project description. First, the top two clusters are picked by their centroid value, which means the two clusters whose centroid is furthest from the origin. After that, we determine if attacks have happened, by testing if the qualities of these two clusters agree with qualities laid out in the project description, that is to say, that if the largest of the two centroids has a smaller size, we call this a DoS Attack, and can therefore call the other cluster a port scan attack. If these two clusters do not share these qualities, we consider that it is indeterminate whether there was an attack or not. This can happen due to poor choice of random initial centroids which prohibit the clusters from forming in predictable ways. Our clusterer takes a variable integer repeats, which controls how many times we repeat the calculations with different initial random centroids, that we are more accurately able to say during which rounds there may have been an attack. We have decided to run the ADS on all clusterings, rather than just the clusterings with the lowest DBI, because we have found that the clusterings with the lowest DBI do not always show the most accurate attack detection (see Section 4A). We do however determine and output which clustering has the lowest DBI, to conform to the requirements of Task 3. 4
  • 5. EP2300 SNMP Project Report Amy Skinner (skinner@kth.se) - Laili Aidi (aidi@kthse) 4. Analysis of Results In this section we present plots of data produced from a run of the program in Task 2. Similar data is created from every in Task 3, with the difference that the lowest DBI is identified, and only that data is output to a file. For this run of the program , we have selected to do 15 clusterings to ensure a breadth of different results, and selected 3 unique clusterings to discuss here. For the plots we output data to files from our program and then use GnuPlot to create the images [4]. In section A, we see clustering round number 12. This round had the lowest DBI. However, we can see that the clusters were not very evenly distributed. We can tell that Cluster 1 (only one point, the centroid, so the red cross is covered by the light blue square), and Cluster 2 are likely anomalous, but maybe shouldn’t be clustered as they are. This is due to poor random initialization of the centroids. As the initial centroid became the only member of the Cluster 1 in the first iteration, even after subsequent iterations, it remained the only member of the cluster. In section B, we see clustering round number 13, with a somewhat higher DBI. In this round we still identify the attacks by the criteria given in section 2.3d of the project description, however by looking at the points, it appears that most of the anomalous points are clustered into Cluster 2, causing the algorithm to identify Cluster 1 as another anomalous cluster, even though many of its points appear to be in the normal range. In section C, we see clustering round 15, with a moderately low DBI. In this clustering we have identified two anomalous looking clusters, but were unable to identify either as a specific attack, because the cluster with the largest centroid also had the greatest size (contrary to the criteria). A. Output from clustering 12: Calculation number: 12 Cluster 1: INITIAL CENTROID: (2441728310,207925532) CENTROID: (2441728310,207925532) Distance to origin: 2147483647 size:1 Cluster 2: INITIAL CENTROID: (471870614,60886306) CENTROID: (214883629,107039622) Distance to origin: 240067604 size:44 Cluster 3: INITIAL CENTROID: (1885516800,337995273) CENTROID: (1789368680,226861600) Distance to origin: 1803692451 size:4 Cluster 4: INITIAL CENTROID: (1714528937,12997585) CENTROID: (749674099,115085316) Distance to origin: 758456250 size:24 DBI: 0.51 There was a DoS attack in cluster: 1 -Rounds: 9 There was a port scan attack in cluster: 3 -Rounds: 4 11 17 18 5
  • 6. EP2300 SNMP Project Report Amy Skinner (skinner@kth.se) - Laili Aidi (aidi@kthse) B. Output from clustering 13: Calculation number: 13 Cluster 1: INITIAL CENTROID: (374573948,35643439) CENTROID: (805820188,111405014) Distance to origin: 813484635 size:19 Cluster 2: INITIAL CENTROID: (660388911,93972355) CENTROID: (1919840606,223074386) Distance to origin: 1932757132 size:5 Cluster 3: INITIAL CENTROID: (115915131,16393588) CENTROID: (112389070,105981524) Distance to origin: 154477786 size:28 Cluster 4: INITIAL CENTROID: (253233972,55685827) CENTROID: (400624290,113025046) Distance to origin: 416262516 size:21 DBI: 0.76 There was a DoS attack in cluster: 2 -Rounds: 4 9 11 17 18 There was a port scan attack in cluster: 1 -Rounds: 0 2 3 5 6 7 8 10 12 14 16 19 20 30 35 36 38 58 72 C. Output from clustering 15: Calculation number: 15 Cluster 1: INITIAL CENTROID: (13258747,117923684) CENTROID: (148767001,101947479) Distance to origin: 180346635 size:33 Cluster 2: INITIAL CENTROID: (704077379,56711499) CENTROID: (1580738673,176220052) Distance to origin: 1590530810 size:9 Cluster 3: INITIAL CENTROID: (203160196,49844066) CENTROID: (580964867,78434420) Distance to origin: 586235562 size:29 Cluster 4: INITIAL CENTROID: (171386150,79317073) CENTROID: (531160408,681158721) Distance to origin: 863775770 size:2 DBI: 0.6 Unable to positively identify attacks due to cluster sizes and centroid values. 6
  • 7. EP2300 SNMP Project Report Amy Skinner (skinner@kth.se) - Laili Aidi (aidi@kthse) 5. Appendix A. UML Class diagram of the project Figure 1. Class Diagram of the designed software 7
  • 8. EP2300 SNMP Project Report Amy Skinner (skinner@kth.se) - Laili Aidi (aidi@kthse) B. Console Output from the run of the program discussed in Section 4 [aidl@brooklyn src]$ java Start -t 2 -r 15 –o 1 Starting EP2300 SNMP assignment, Task 2 (Clustering Global States) Beginning crawl at IP: 192.168.1.10 (default) Crawled Router: R9 Interface (1): 192.168.1.10 FastEthernet0/0 Interface (2): 192.168.4.10 FastEthernet0/1 Interface (3): null Null0 Neighbor: 192.168.4.14 Neighbor: 192.168.1.15 Crawled Router: R13 Interface (1): 192.168.4.14 FastEthernet0/0 Interface (2): 192.168.14.14 FastEthernet0/1 Interface (3): null Null0 Neighbor: 192.168.14.1 Neighbor: 192.168.4.10 Crawled Router: R14 Interface (1): 192.168.1.15 FastEthernet0/0 Interface (2): 192.168.13.15 FastEthernet0/1 Interface (3): null Null0 Neighbor: 192.168.1.10 Neighbor: 192.168.13.3 com.adventnet.snmp.snmp2.SnmpException: Time Synchronization has failed. at com.adventnet.snmp.snmp2.usm.USMUserEntry.timeSynchronize(USMUserEntry.java:1185) at com.adventnet.snmp.snmp2.usm.USMUtils.doTimeSync(USMUtils.java:2028) at com.adventnet.snmp.snmp2.usm.USMUtils.doTimeSync(USMUtils.java:1927) at com.adventnet.snmp.snmp2.usm.USMUtils.init_v3_parameters(USMUtils.java:1414) at SNMPUtils.getVarBind(SNMPUtils.java:92) at SNMPUtils.getVarBind(SNMPUtils.java:132) at SNMPCrawler.addNeighbors(SNMPCrawler.java:112) at SNMPCrawler.createRouter(SNMPCrawler.java:68) at SNMPCrawler.start(SNMPCrawler.java:44) at SNMPCrawler.<init>(SNMPCrawler.java:25) at Start.main(Start.java:133) Crawled Router: R0 Interface (1): 192.168.8.1 FastEthernet0/0 Interface (2): 192.168.14.1 FastEthernet0/1 Interface (3): null Null0 Neighbor: 192.168.8.2 Neighbor: 192.168.14.14 Crawled Router: R2 Interface (1): 192.168.12.3 FastEthernet0/0 Interface (2): 192.168.13.3 FastEthernet0/1 Interface (3): null Null0 Neighbor: 192.168.13.15 Neighbor: 192.168.12.4 Crawled Router: R1 Interface (1): 192.168.0.2 FastEthernet0/0 Interface (2): 192.168.8.2 FastEthernet0/1 Interface (3): null Null0 Neighbor: 192.168.8.1 Neighbor: 192.168.0.11 Crawled Router: R3 Interface (1): 192.168.9.4 FastEthernet0/0 Interface (2): 192.168.12.4 FastEthernet0/1 Interface (3): null Null0 Neighbor: 192.168.12.3 Neighbor: 192.168.9.9 Crawled Router: R10 Interface (1): 192.168.0.11 FastEthernet0/0 Interface (2): 192.168.7.11 FastEthernet0/1 8
  • 9. EP2300 SNMP Project Report Amy Skinner (skinner@kth.se) - Laili Aidi (aidi@kthse) Interface (3): null Null0 Neighbor: 192.168.0.2 Neighbor: 192.168.7.8 Crawled Router: R8 Interface (1): 192.168.9.9 FastEthernet0/0 Interface (2): 192.168.10.9 FastEthernet0/1 Interface (3): null Null0 Neighbor: 192.168.9.4 Neighbor: 192.168.10.12 Crawled Router: R7 Interface (1): 192.168.3.8 FastEthernet0/0 Interface (2): 192.168.7.8 FastEthernet0/1 Interface (3): null Null0 Neighbor: 192.168.7.11 Neighbor: 192.168.3.5 Crawled Router: R11 Interface (1): 192.168.10.12 FastEthernet0/0 Interface (2): 192.168.11.12 FastEthernet0/1 Interface (3): null Null0 Neighbor: 192.168.11.13 Neighbor: 192.168.10.9 Crawled Router: R4 Interface (1): 192.168.3.5 FastEthernet0/0 Interface (2): 192.168.5.5 FastEthernet0/1 Interface (3): null Null0 Neighbor: 192.168.3.8 Neighbor: 192.168.5.6 Crawled Router: R12 Interface (1): 192.168.2.13 FastEthernet0/0 Interface (2): 192.168.11.13 FastEthernet0/1 Interface (3): null Null0 Neighbor: 192.168.2.16 Neighbor: 192.168.11.12 Crawled Router: R5 Interface (1): 192.168.5.6 FastEthernet0/0 Interface (2): 192.168.15.6 FastEthernet0/1 Interface (3): null Null0 Interface (4): 192.168.100.100 Loopback0 Neighbor: 192.168.5.5 Neighbor: 192.168.15.7 Crawled Router: R15 Interface (1): 192.168.2.16 FastEthernet0/0 Interface (2): 192.168.6.16 FastEthernet0/1 Interface (3): null Null0 Neighbor: 192.168.6.7 Neighbor: 192.168.2.13 Crawled Router: R6 Interface (1): 192.168.6.7 FastEthernet0/0 Interface (2): 192.168.15.7 FastEthernet0/1 Interface (3): null Null0 Neighbor: 192.168.15.6 Neighbor: 192.168.6.16 Crawling completed: 40s [The network discovery of Task 1 is now completed and moving on to the polling of Task 2…] Beginning polling... Using interval : 2 seconds (default) Using timespan : 180 seconds (default) Using K-value : 4 (default) Will repeat calculations : 15 times 9
  • 10. EP2300 SNMP Project Report Amy Skinner (skinner@kth.se) - Laili Aidi (aidi@kthse) [During the polling of Task 2 we frequently receive TimeSynchronizationExceptions outputted from the SNMP class that we do not control. Also, we output every time we get a null response from a router. We handle these nulls as discussed in Section 3. We receive many of these throughout the polling, so we have edited away most of this output for simplicity, but here is a sample] com.adventnet.snmp.snmp2.SnmpException: Discovery Failed at com.adventnet.snmp.snmp2.SnmpEngineEntry.discoverSnmpEngineID(SnmpEngineEntry.java:698) at com.adventnet.snmp.snmp2.usm.USMUtils.doDiscovery(USMUtils.java:1871) at com.adventnet.snmp.snmp2.usm.USMUtils.init_v3_parameters(USMUtils.java:1413) at SNMPUtils.getVarBind(SNMPUtils.java:92) at SNMPUtils.getVar(SNMPUtils.java:142) at PollingThread.run(SNMPPoller.java:197) com.adventnet.snmp.snmp2.SnmpException: Failed to authenticate the SecurityParameters for user 2G1332_student SnmpEngineEntry not found for address 192.168.10.12 port 161 at com.adventnet.snmp.snmp2.Snmp3Message.processMessage(Snmp3Message.java:1132) at com.adventnet.snmp.snmp2.SnmpSession.processPDUForVersion3(SnmpSession.java:2297) at com.adventnet.snmp.snmp2.SnmpSession.setPDUParams(SnmpSession.java:2134) at com.adventnet.snmp.snmp2.SnmpSession.send(SnmpSession.java:1974) at com.adventnet.snmp.snmp2.SnmpSession.syncSend(SnmpSession.java:2558) at SNMPUtils.getVarBind(SNMPUtils.java:109) at SNMPUtils.getVar(SNMPUtils.java:142) at PollingThread.run(SNMPPoller.java:197) SNMP EXCEPTION ON IP: 192.168.10.12 OID: .1.3.6.1.2.1.2.2.1.10.1 NPE in Polling Thread.run() - X - Router: R11 round:0 RESULT IS NULL!!! TIMEOUT!!! IP: 192.168.0.2 OID: .1.3.6.1.2.1.2.2.1.10.1 NPE in Polling Thread.run() - X - Router: R1 round:0 RESULT IS NULL!!! TIMEOUT!!! IP: 192.168.9.9 OID: .1.3.6.1.2.1.2.2.1.11.2 NPE in Polling Thread.run() - Y - Router: R8 round:0 RESULT IS NULL!!! TIMEOUT!!! IP: 192.168.0.11 OID: .1.3.6.1.2.1.2.2.1.10.2 NPE in Polling Thread.run() - X - Router: R10 round:1 RESULT IS NULL!!! TIMEOUT!!! IP: 192.168.9.9 OID: .1.3.6.1.2.1.2.2.1.11.2 NPE in Polling Thread.run() - Y - Router: R8 round:3 RESULT IS NULL!!! TIMEOUT!!! IP: 192.168.2.16 OID: .1.3.6.1.2.1.2.2.1.11.2 NPE in Polling Thread.run() - Y - Router: R15 round:3 [End of sample of the errors… We now jump to poll completion, which begins with outputting the delta values created from the global link-states we discovered during polling] Done polling (74 rounds): 216s Round: 1 Delta values (676248289,25047813) Round: 2 Delta values (518732205,69707029) Round: 3 Delta values (611057586,38984022) Round: 4 Delta values (615854761,10902145) Round: 5 Delta values (1714528937,12997585) Round: 6 Delta values (1140419653,186713705) Round: 7 Delta values (1190290703,59148273) Round: 8 Delta values (944308308,182602369) Round: 9 Delta values (642704189,9359653) Round: 10 Delta values (2441728310,207925532) Round: 11 Delta values (631360059,274612228) Round: 12 Delta values (1885516800,337995273) Round: 13 Delta values (1186561012,203413028) Round: 14 Delta values (524948788,288193238) Round: 15 Delta values (751719760,157507201) Round: 16 Delta values (296589241,75250562) Round: 17 Delta values (1110173658,21333530) Round: 18 Delta values (1664293503,165717608) 10
  • 11. EP2300 SNMP Project Report Amy Skinner (skinner@kth.se) - Laili Aidi (aidi@kthse) Round: 19 Delta values (1893135481,390735934) Round: 20 Delta values (716660127,596407796) Round: 21 Delta values (704077379,56711499) Round: 22 Delta values (474301583,5731296) Round: 23 Delta values (345660690,765909647) Round: 24 Delta values (578389504,246972096) Round: 25 Delta values (210776255,228074584) Round: 26 Delta values (249289848,205913351) Round: 27 Delta values (181309216,9536905) Round: 28 Delta values (135747952,199565599) Round: 29 Delta values (197541573,356299210) Round: 30 Delta values (21176490,184948620) Round: 31 Delta values (660388911,93972355) Round: 32 Delta values (471870614,60886306) Round: 33 Delta values (278383522,95271155) Round: 34 Delta values (37420732,161891933) Round: 35 Delta values (56636791,146153476) Round: 36 Delta values (895634506,29575242) Round: 37 Delta values (750450800,470387) Round: 38 Delta values (424665195,31493309) Round: 39 Delta values (636587427,24680096) Round: 40 Delta values (49593959,23426091) Round: 41 Delta values (115915131,16393588) Round: 42 Delta values (265811242,51863374) Round: 43 Delta values (524917957,40233073) Round: 44 Delta values (35145500,46103212) Round: 45 Delta values (467187496,127598320) Round: 46 Delta values (75268897,148930723) Round: 47 Delta values (381931973,67041728) Round: 48 Delta values (95511479,66281343) Round: 49 Delta values (33284764,43275525) Round: 50 Delta values (141795148,92786867) Round: 51 Delta values (339863732,124516950) Round: 52 Delta values (367192701,32836506) Round: 53 Delta values (13258747,117923684) Round: 54 Delta values (171386150,79317073) Round: 55 Delta values (192733861,50423466) Round: 56 Delta values (304023671,245948) Round: 57 Delta values (399287805,162308) Round: 58 Delta values (534606351,246896) Round: 59 Delta values (670542749,28956986) Round: 60 Delta values (380146409,47529811) Round: 61 Delta values (92925075,8801812) Round: 62 Delta values (127443602,56944295) Round: 63 Delta values (202964762,142709252) Round: 64 Delta values (458750223,170643896) Round: 65 Delta values (88486619,7202473) Round: 66 Delta values (169244056,55212656) Round: 67 Delta values (253233972,55685827) Round: 68 Delta values (39243653,103893047) Round: 69 Delta values (203160196,49844066) Round: 70 Delta values (27472574,234937466) Round: 71 Delta values (206672650,124642678) Round: 72 Delta values (374573948,35643439) Round: 73 Delta values (775543695,116296947) [ After outputting the delta values, the clustering algorithm begins] Calculation number: 1 Cluster 1: INITIAL CENTROID: (75268897,148930723) CENTROID: (531160408,681158721) Distance to origin: 863775770 size:2 11
  • 12. EP2300 SNMP Project Report Amy Skinner (skinner@kth.se) - Laili Aidi (aidi@kthse) Cluster 2: INITIAL CENTROID: (265811242,51863374) CENTROID: (580964867,78434420) Distance to origin: 586235562 size:29 Cluster 3: INITIAL CENTROID: (518732205,69707029) CENTROID: (1580738673,176220052) Distance to origin: 1590530810 size:9 Cluster 4: INITIAL CENTROID: (35145500,46103212) CENTROID: (148767001,101947479) Distance to origin: 180346635 size:33 DBI: 0.6 Unable to positively identify attacks due to cluster sizes and centroid values. Calculation number: 2 Cluster 1: INITIAL CENTROID: (374573948,35643439) CENTROID: (522807513,76506519) Distance to origin: 528375759 size:26 Cluster 2: INITIAL CENTROID: (474301583,5731296) CENTROID: (946176222,155346847) Distance to origin: 958844140 size:9 Cluster 3: INITIAL CENTROID: (1186561012,203413028) CENTROID: (1919840606,223074386) Distance to origin: 1932757132 size:5 Cluster 4: INITIAL CENTROID: (21176490,184948620) CENTROID: (148942667,121383621) Distance to origin: 192140317 size:33 DBI: 0.71 There was a DoS attack in cluster: 3 -Rounds: 4 9 11 17 18 There was a port scan attack in cluster: 2 -Rounds: 5 6 7 12 14 16 19 35 72 Calculation number: 3 Cluster 1: INITIAL CENTROID: (21176490,184948620) CENTROID: (531160408,681158721) Distance to origin: 863775770 size:2 Cluster 2: INITIAL CENTROID: (181309216,9536905) CENTROID: (580964867,78434420) Distance to origin: 586235562 size:29 Cluster 3: INITIAL CENTROID: (380146409,47529811) CENTROID: (1580738673,176220052) Distance to origin: 1590530810 size:9 Cluster 4: INITIAL CENTROID: (49593959,23426091) CENTROID: (148767001,101947479) Distance to origin: 180346635 size:33 DBI: 0.6 Unable to positively identify attacks due to cluster sizes and centroid values. Calculation number: 4 Cluster 1: INITIAL CENTROID: (39243653,103893047) CENTROID: (148767001,101947479) Distance to origin: 180346635 size:33 Cluster 2: INITIAL CENTROID: (524948788,288193238) CENTROID: (623554579,392449562) Distance to origin: 736774708 size:6 Cluster 3: INITIAL CENTROID: (751719760,157507201) CENTROID: (1580738673,176220052) Distance to origin: 1590530810 size:9 Cluster 4: INITIAL CENTROID: (399287805,162308) CENTROID: (566758980,51288730) Distance to origin: 569074929 size:25 DBI: 0.88 Unable to positively identify attacks due to cluster sizes and centroid values. Calculation number: 5 Cluster 1: INITIAL CENTROID: (135747952,199565599) CENTROID: (531160408,681158721) Distance to origin: 863775770 size:2 Cluster 2: INITIAL CENTROID: (471870614,60886306) CENTROID: (642200879,84508717) Distance to origin: 647737363 size:25 Cluster 3: INITIAL CENTROID: (141795148,92786867) CENTROID: (179274839,93354752) Distance to origin: 202125153 size:38 Cluster 4: INITIAL CENTROID: (1714528937,12997585) CENTROID: (1639559299,195580867) Distance to origin: 1651183384 size:8 DBI: 0.59 Unable to positively identify attacks due to cluster sizes and centroid values. Calculation number: 6 12
  • 13. EP2300 SNMP Project Report Amy Skinner (skinner@kth.se) - Laili Aidi (aidi@kthse) Cluster 1: INITIAL CENTROID: (750450800,470387) CENTROID: (1639559299,195580867) Distance to origin: 1651183384 size:8 Cluster 2: INITIAL CENTROID: (474301583,5731296) CENTROID: (642200879,84508717) Distance to origin: 647737363 size:25 Cluster 3: INITIAL CENTROID: (181309216,9536905) CENTROID: (179274839,93354752) Distance to origin: 202125153 size:38 Cluster 4: INITIAL CENTROID: (202964762,142709252) CENTROID: (531160408,681158721) Distance to origin: 863775770 size:2 DBI: 0.59 Unable to positively identify attacks due to cluster sizes and centroid values. Calculation number: 7 Cluster 1: INITIAL CENTROID: (35145500,46103212) CENTROID: (125609513,133119380) Distance to origin: 183026006 size:29 Cluster 2: INITIAL CENTROID: (141795148,92786867) CENTROID: (794448653,118183368) Distance to origin: 803191117 size:19 Cluster 3: INITIAL CENTROID: (127443602,56944295) CENTROID: (402050931,69039048) Distance to origin: 407935462 size:20 Cluster 4: INITIAL CENTROID: (670542749,28956986) CENTROID: (1919840606,223074386) Distance to origin: 1932757132 size:5 DBI: 0.72 There was a DoS attack in cluster: 4 -Rounds: 4 9 11 17 18 There was a port scan attack in cluster: 2 -Rounds: 0 2 3 5 6 7 8 10 12 14 16 19 20 30 35 36 38 58 72 Calculation number: 8 Cluster 1: INITIAL CENTROID: (1140419653,186713705) CENTROID: (1580738673,176220052) Distance to origin: 1590530810 size:9 Cluster 2: INITIAL CENTROID: (206672650,124642678) CENTROID: (173328543,95873467) Distance to origin: 198077019 size:37 Cluster 3: INITIAL CENTROID: (249289848,205913351) CENTROID: (531160408,681158721) Distance to origin: 863775770 size:2 Cluster 4: INITIAL CENTROID: (615854761,10902145) CENTROID: (613765445,83661868) Distance to origin: 619441142 size:25 DBI: 0.59 Unable to positively identify attacks due to cluster sizes and centroid values. Calculation number: 9 Cluster 1: INITIAL CENTROID: (704077379,56711499) CENTROID: (967923491,172555343) Distance to origin: 983184230 size:9 Cluster 2: INITIAL CENTROID: (27472574,234937466) CENTROID: (154557992,121475778) Distance to origin: 196582139 size:34 Cluster 3: INITIAL CENTROID: (381931973,67041728) CENTROID: (539230996,71544657) Distance to origin: 543956528 size:25 Cluster 4: INITIAL CENTROID: (1893135481,390735934) CENTROID: (1919840606,223074386) Distance to origin: 1932757132 size:5 DBI: 0.69 There was a DoS attack in cluster: 4 -Rounds: 4 9 11 17 18 There was a port scan attack in cluster: 1 -Rounds: 5 6 7 12 14 16 19 35 72 Calculation number: 10 Cluster 1: INITIAL CENTROID: (202964762,142709252) CENTROID: (117457850,237870111) Distance to origin: 265289532 size:12 Cluster 2: INITIAL CENTROID: (206672650,124642678) CENTROID: (220474127,53230079) Distance to origin: 226808910 size:28 Cluster 3: INITIAL CENTROID: (1140419653,186713705) CENTROID: (1919840606,223074386) Distance to origin: 1932757132 size:5 Cluster 4: INITIAL CENTROID: (467187496,127598320) CENTROID: (709438867,111675265) Distance to origin: 718174679 size:28 13
  • 14. EP2300 SNMP Project Report Amy Skinner (skinner@kth.se) - Laili Aidi (aidi@kthse) DBI: 0.89 There was a DoS attack in cluster: 3 -Rounds: 4 9 11 17 18 There was a port scan attack in cluster: 4 -Rounds: 0 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 10 12 13 14 16 19 20 21 23 30 31 35 36 38 42 44 57 58 63 72 Calculation number: 11 Cluster 1: INITIAL CENTROID: (127443602,56944295) CENTROID: (148767001,101947479) Distance to origin: 180346635 size:33 Cluster 2: INITIAL CENTROID: (1186561012,203413028) CENTROID: (1077897973,113797691) Distance to origin: 1083888349 size:6 Cluster 3: INITIAL CENTROID: (1714528937,12997585) CENTROID: (1919840606,223074386) Distance to origin: 1932757132 size:5 Cluster 4: INITIAL CENTROID: (524948788,288193238) CENTROID: (554150316,118094414) Distance to origin: 566594090 size:29 DBI: 0.63 There was a DoS attack in cluster: 3 -Rounds: 4 9 11 17 18 There was a port scan attack in cluster: 2 -Rounds: 5 6 7 12 16 35 Calculation number: 12 Cluster 1: INITIAL CENTROID: (2441728310,207925532) CENTROID: (2441728310,207925532) Distance to origin: 2147483647 size:1 Cluster 2: INITIAL CENTROID: (471870614,60886306) CENTROID: (214883629,107039622) Distance to origin: 240067604 size:44 Cluster 3: INITIAL CENTROID: (1885516800,337995273) CENTROID: (1789368680,226861600) Distance to origin: 1803692451 size:4 Cluster 4: INITIAL CENTROID: (1714528937,12997585) CENTROID: (749674099,115085316) Distance to origin: 758456250 size:24 DBI: 0.51 There was a DoS attack in cluster: 1 -Rounds: 9 There was a port scan attack in cluster: 3 -Rounds: 4 11 17 18 Calculation number: 13 Cluster 1: INITIAL CENTROID: (374573948,35643439) CENTROID: (805820188,111405014) Distance to origin: 813484635 size:19 Cluster 2: INITIAL CENTROID: (660388911,93972355) CENTROID: (1919840606,223074386) Distance to origin: 1932757132 size:5 Cluster 3: INITIAL CENTROID: (115915131,16393588) CENTROID: (112389070,105981524) Distance to origin: 154477786 size:28 Cluster 4: INITIAL CENTROID: (253233972,55685827) CENTROID: (400624290,113025046) Distance to origin: 416262516 size:21 DBI: 0.76 There was a DoS attack in cluster: 2 -Rounds: 4 9 11 17 18 There was a port scan attack in cluster: 1 -Rounds: 0 2 3 5 6 7 8 10 12 14 16 19 20 30 35 36 38 58 72 Calculation number: 14 Cluster 1: INITIAL CENTROID: (534606351,246896) CENTROID: (1919840606,223074386) Distance to origin: 1932757132 size:5 Cluster 2: INITIAL CENTROID: (399287805,162308) CENTROID: (805820188,111405014) Distance to origin: 813484635 size:19 Cluster 3: INITIAL CENTROID: (253233972,55685827) CENTROID: (400624290,113025046) Distance to origin: 416262516 size:21 Cluster 4: INITIAL CENTROID: (88486619,7202473) CENTROID: (112389070,105981524) Distance to origin: 154477786 size:28 DBI: 0.76 There was a DoS attack in cluster: 1 14
  • 15. EP2300 SNMP Project Report Amy Skinner (skinner@kth.se) - Laili Aidi (aidi@kthse) -Rounds: 4 9 11 17 18 There was a port scan attack in cluster: 2 -Rounds: 0 2 3 5 6 7 8 10 12 14 16 19 20 30 35 36 38 58 72 Calculation number: 15 Cluster 1: INITIAL CENTROID: (13258747,117923684) CENTROID: (148767001,101947479) Distance to origin: 180346635 size:33 Cluster 2: INITIAL CENTROID: (704077379,56711499) CENTROID: (1580738673,176220052) Distance to origin: 1590530810 size:9 Cluster 3: INITIAL CENTROID: (203160196,49844066) CENTROID: (580964867,78434420) Distance to origin: 586235562 size:29 Cluster 4: INITIAL CENTROID: (171386150,79317073) CENTROID: (531160408,681158721) Distance to origin: 863775770 size:2 DBI: 0.6 Unable to positively identify attacks due to cluster sizes and centroid values. The calculation with the mininum Davies-Bouldin Index occurred in clustering round: 12 with DBI: 0.51 [As mentioned in Section 4, we ran 15 calculations to ensure that we could find significantly unique clusterings to discuss – ordinarily this is set to the default of 3 clusterings. In Task 3, we would have already begun the next round of polling before clustering, and this would repeat every w rounds] C. References [1] k-means clustering http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/K-means_clustering [2] Davies–Bouldin index http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Davies–Bouldin_index [3] EP2300 SNMP Project Description http://www.s3.kth.se/lcn/courses/EP2300/snmp_project_2011.pdf [4] GnuPlot http://www.gnuplot.info/ 15