1. Overkill
Dec 5th 2002
From The Economist print edition
A controversial law is put to the test
1. WHEN Dmitry Sklyarov, a young Russian computer scientist, got up to deliver a technical
paper at a conference in Las Vegas last year, he little suspected that he was about to become
something of a global celebrity. But soon after delivering the paper he was arrested by the FBI
for breaching the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), a 1998 American law that bans any
efforts to bypass software that protects copyrighted digital files. The arrest sparked a rash of
protests in both America and Europe. The Internet hummed with indignation. Charges against
Mr Sklyarov have since been dropped, in exchange for a promise to testify. But the case
against his employer, Moscow-based ElcomSoft, went ahead this week in San Jose, California.
2. The closely-watched trial is the first criminal prosecution brought under the DMCA, a law
loathed by Internet enthusiasts. The trial will mark a crucial stage in the growing struggle
between industries supplying content and those arguing that overly strict enforcement of
copyright may crush the creativity of cyberspace.
3. ElcomSoft is being prosecuted for selling in America, over the Internet, a program
developed by Mr Sklyarov, which allowed purchasers to bypass the copy-protection features of
Adobe's popular e-book software. ElcomSoft, which sells various software utilities, says that it
never intended to breach the law. It seems eager to fight the case. Mr Sklyarov is, in effect,
testifying for both sides, and proceedings were delayed until special visas were obtained both
for him and for Alex Katalov, ElcomSoft's chief executive, to attend the trial. The firm's lawyers
have echoed the arguments of long-standing opponents of the DMCA. They claim that the law
is so vague as to be unconstitutional, that it breaches the first-amendment free-speech rights
of programmers, and that it brushes aside âfair useâ rights of consumers protected by
mainstream copyright law.
4. The DMCA makes it a criminal offence to circumvent in any way technology used by
copyright holders to limit access to their work. It also outlaws the manufacture or distribution
of any tools or technologies that make getting around such controls easier. Critics complain
that this is overkill, criminalising much perfectly innocent research by computer programmers.
Moreover, they say, even legitimate efforts to copy protected material, such as for quotation,
criticism, or purely private use, are turned into crimes by the DMCA's sweeping provisions.
5. As a matter of fact, Adobe's software allows e-book publishers to set their own level of
protection. Many publishers have chosen to allow users to make copies for private use on
different computers, or for lending copies to friends. But if publishers opt for maximum
protection, then e-book purchasers cannot do many of the things that are perfectly legal with
printed books, such as copying sections.
6. So far, the federal judge conducting the trial has dismissed ElcomSoft's constitutional
arguments as irrelevant to the criminal case. But these are likely to become the key issues if
the case, or another DMCA test case like it, goes all the way to the Supreme Court. Given the
vehement arguments made on both sides of the issue, it is not clear how the Supreme Court
would rule. Meanwhile, content industries, led by the mighty American movie and music
businesses, are squaring off against critics not just in the courts, but also in America's
Congress, where bills both to soften the DMCA's provisions and to make them even more
draconian have been introduced this year.
4. 5. āđāļāļāļ§āļģāļĄāđāļāđāļāļāļĢāļīāļ āđāļāļĢāđāļāļĢāļĄāļāļāļāļāđāļāļāļĩāļāļģāļģāđāļŦāđāļāļđāđāļāļīāļĄāļāđāļŦāļāļąāļāļŠāļ·āļ
āļāļīāđāļĨāđāļāļāļĢāļāļāļīāļāļŠāđāļŠāļģāļĄāļģāļĢāļāļāļģāļģāļŦāļāļāļĢāļ°āļāļąāļāļāļāļāļāļģāļĢāļāļļāđāļĄāļāļĢāļāļāđāļāđāđāļāļ āļāļđāđāļāļīāļĄāļāđ
āļŦāļĨāļģāļĒāļĢāļģāļĒāđāļāđāđāļĨāļ·āļāļāļāļĩāđāļāļ°āļāļāļļāļāļģāļāđāļŦāđāļāļđāđāđāļāđāļŠāļģāļĄāļģāļĢāļāļāļģāļģāļŠāļģāļģāđāļāļģāđāļāļ·āđāļāļāļģāļĢāđāļāđ
āļŠāđāļ§āļāļāļąāļ§āļāļāđāļāļĢāļ·āđāļāļāļāļāļĄāļāļīāļ§āđāļāļāļĢāđāļŦāļĨāļģāļĒāđāļāļĢāļ·āđāļāļāđāļāđ āļŦāļĢāļ·āļāļāļģāļāļāļ°āđāļŦāđāđāļāļ·āđāļāļāļĒāļ·āļĄ
āļŠāļģāļģāđāļāļģāļāđāđāļāđ āđāļāđāļāđāļģāļŦāļģāļāļāļđāđāļāļīāļĄāļāđāđāļĨāļ·āļāļāļāļĩāđāļāļ°āđāļāđāļāļģāļĢāļāļļāđāļĄāļāļĢāļāļāļāļąāđāļāļŠāļđāļāļŠāļļāļ āļāļđāđ
āļāļ·āđāļāļŦāļāļąāļāļŠāļ·āļāļāļīāđāļĨāđāļāļāļĢāļāļāļīāļāļŠāđāļāļ°āđāļĄāđāļŠāļģāļĄāļģāļĢāļāļāļģāļģāļŦāļĨāļģāļĒāđāļŠāļīāđāļāļāļĩāđāļāļģāļĄāļāļāļāļīāđāļāđāļ
āļāļĢāļāļĩāļāļĩāđāļāļāļāļāđāļ§āļĒāļāļāļŦāļĄāļģāļĒāļŦāļģāļāđāļāđāļāļŦāļāļąāļāļŠāļ·āļāļāļĢāļĢāļĄāļāļģ āđāļāđāļāļāļģāļĢāļāļģāļģāļŠāļģāļģāđāļāļģ
āļāļģāļāļŠāđāļ§āļāļāļāļāļŦāļāļąāļāļŠāļ·āļ
6. āļāļāļāļķāļāļāļąāļāļāļĩāđ āļāļđāđāļāļīāļāļģāļāļĐāļģāļāļāļāļĻāļģāļĨāļŠāļŦāļāļąāļāļāļĢāļąāļāļāļĩāđāļāļģāļģāđāļāļīāļāļāļĢāļ°āļāļ§āļ
āļāļīāļāļģāļĢāļāļģāđāļāļāļāļĩāđāļāđāļĒāļāļāđāļāļāđāļāļŠāļđāđāļāļāļāđāļāļĨāļāļāļĄāļāļāļāļāđāđāļāļĩāđāļĒāļ§āļāļąāļāļāļ§āļģāļĄāļāļāļ
āļāđāļ§āļĒāļĢāļąāļāļāļĢāļĢāļĄāļāļđāļāđāļāļ·āđāļāļāļāļģāļāđāļŦāđāļāļ§āđāļģāđāļĄāđāđāļāļĩāđāļĒāļ§āļāđāļāļāļāļąāļāļāļĢāļ°āđāļāđāļāđāļāļāļāļĩāļāļģāļāļģ
āđāļāđāļāļāļāđāļāļŠāļđāđāļāļĩāđāļĄāļĩāđāļāļāļģāļŠāļŠāļđāļāļāļĩāđāļāļ°āļāļĨāļģāļĒāđāļāđāļāļāļĢāļ°āđāļāđāļāļŠāļģāļģāļāļąāļāļŦāļģāļāļāļāļĩāļāļĩāđāļŦāļĢāļ·āļ
āđ
āļāļāļĩāļāļ·āđāļāļāļĩāđāđāļāļĩāđāļĒāļ§āļāļąāļāļāļāļŦāļĄāļģāļĒāļāļĩāđāļāđāļĄāļāļĩāđāļāđāļāđāļāļāļāļĩāļāļĩāđāļāļķāđāļāđāļāļāļāļāļķāļāļĻāļģāļĨāļāļĩāļāļģ
āđāļĄāļ·āđāļāļāļīāļāļģāļĢāļāļģāļāļķāļāļāđāļāļāđāļāļŠāļđāđāļāļąāļāļŦāļāļąāļāđāļāđāļāļāļāļāļāļąāđāļāļŠāļāļāļāđāļģāļĒāđāļāļāļĢāļ°āđāļāđāļāļāļĩāđ āļĄāļąāļ
āđāļĄāđāđāļāđāļāļāļāļ§āđāļģāļĻāļģāļĨāļāļĩāļāļģāļāļ°āļāļīāļāļģāļāļĐāļģāļ§āđāļģāļāļĒāđāļģāļāđāļĢ āđāļāļāđāļ§āļāđāļ§āļĨāļģāļāļĩāđ
āļāļļāļāļŠāļģāļŦāļāļĢāļĢāļĄāđāļāļāļģāļĢāļāļąāļāļŦāļģāđāļāļ·āđāļāļŦāļģāļāļķāđāļāļāļģāļģāđāļāļĒāļāļļāļĢāļāļīāļāļ āļģāļāļĒāļāļāļĢāđāđāļĨāļ°
āļāļāļāļĢāļĩāļāļąāļāļāļĢāļāļāļĨāļąāļāļāļāļāļŠāļŦāļĢāļąāļāļāđāļĄāļĢāļīāļāļģāļāļģāļģāļĨāļąāļāđāļāļāļīāļāļŦāļāđāļģāļāļĒāđāļģāļāļāļĢāļāđāļāļąāļāļāļđāđ
āļāđāļāļāđāļģāļāđāļĄāđāđāļāļĩāļĒāļāđāļāđāđāļāļĻāļģāļĨ
āđāļāđāļĢāļ§āļĄāļāļķāļāđāļāļŠāļ āļģāļāļāļāđāļāļĢāļŠāļāļāļ
āļŠāļŦāļĢāļąāļāļāđāļĄāļĢāļīāļāļģāļāļĩāđāļāļķāđāļāļĢāđāļģāļāļāļāļŦāļĄāļģāļĒāļāļĩāđāļāđāļāļāļāļģāļĢāļāļ°āļĨāļāļāļ§āļģāļĄāđāļāđāļĄāļāļ§āļāļāļāļ
āļāļāļāļąāļāļāļąāļāļīāđāļāļāļāļŦāļĄāļģāļĒāļāļĩāđāļāđāļĄāļāļĩāđāļāđāļĨāļ°āļāļĩāđāļāđāļāļāļāļģāļĢāļāļ°āđāļāļīāđāļĄāļāļ§āļģāļĄāđāļāđāļĄāļāļ§āļ
āļāļāļāļāļāļŦāļĄāļģāļĒāđāļāđāļģāļŠāļđāđāļāļģāļĢāļāļīāļāļģāļĢāļāļģāđāļāļāļĩāļāļĩāđ
Vocab. in the News
(in order of appearance)
Arrest
To deprive a person of his liberty
by legal authority. āļāļģāļĢāļāļąāļāļāļļāļĄāđāļāļĒāļāļđāđāļĄāļĩāļāļģāļģāļāļģāļāļāļģāļĄ
āļāļāļŦāļĄāļģāļĒ
Copyright
The right of literary property as
recognized and sanctioned by positive
law. āļĨāļīāļāļŠāļīāļāļāļīāđ
5. Act
A bill which has been enacted by
legislature into law. āļāļĢāļ°āļĢāļģāļāļāļąāļāļāļąāļāļī
Charge
The specific crime the defendant is
accused of committing. āļāđāļāļŦāļģāļ§āđāļģāļāļĢāļ°āļāļģāļģāļāļīāļ
āļāļāļŦāļĄāļģāļĒāļāļģāļāļģ
Testify
To give evidence as witness. āđāļāļīāļ
āļāļ§āļģāļĄāđāļāđāļāļāļĒāļģāļ
Prosecution
A criminal action. āļāļģāļĢāļāļģāļģāđāļāļīāļāļāļāļĩ
āļāļģāļāļģ
Unconstitutional
That which is contrary to or in
conflict with a constitution. āđāļĄāđāļāļāļāļāđāļ§āļĒ
āļĢāļąāļāļāļĢāļĢāļĄāļāļđāļ
Fair Use
A privilege in others than the
owner of a copyright to use the
copyrighted material in a reasonable
manner without the ownerâs consent,
notwithstanding the monopoly granted to
the owner. āļāļģāļĢāļāļĩāđāļāļāļŦāļĄāļģāļĒāļāļāļļāļāļģāļāđāļŦāđāļāļđāđāļāļĩāđāđāļĄāđāđāļāđ
āđāļāđāļģāļāļāļāļĨāļīāļāļŠāļīāļāļāļīāđāļŠāļģāļĄāļģāļĢāļāđāļāđāļāļģāļāļāļąāļāļĄāļĩāļĨāļīāļāļŠāļīāļāļāļīāđāđāļāđāđāļāļĒāđāļĄāđ
āļāļīāļāļāļāļŦāļĄāļģāļĒ
Offence
A breach of the criminal laws. āļāļģāļĢāļ
āļĢāļ°āļāļģāļģāļāļīāļāļāļāļŦāļĄāļģāļĒāļāļģāļāļģ āļāļģāļāļāļ§āļģāļĄāļāļīāļ
Legitimate
That which is lawful, legal,
recognized by law, or according to law.
āļāļāļāļāđāļ§āļĒāļāļāļŦāļĄāļģāļĒ
Provision
A condition which formally
included in law. āļāļāļāļąāļāļāļąāļāļīāļāļāļāļāļāļŦāļĄāļģāļĒ
Asbestos claims
No way to right a wrong
Oct 24th 2002
From The Economist print edition
Cancerous product, cancerous litigation
1. WHAT should America do about mass torts? The toll from asbestos litigation continues to
mount. ABB, a European engineering firm, is the latest company to face ruin because of work done
6. by a subsidiary that was not only legal at the time, but carried out in the interest of safety. And
asbestos is only one cause of such litigation. Tobacco, lead paint and pharmaceutical products are
all ripe business opportunities for lawyers, who routinely earn 30-50% of settlements.
2. A paper published earlier this year by the Council of Economic Advisers estimates that
America's tort system soaks up 1.8% of GDP, or $180 billion a year. And for little purpose: only
20% of the money goes to claimants for economic damages. In a number of mass tort cases, courts
have begged Congress to intervene. But politicians hesitate. Reform would reduce payments to a
constituency that recycles settlement money into political contributions: the trial lawyers.
3. Certainly, companies must take responsibility for disclosing the known potential hazards of the
products they produce, and for shouldering the consequences when they do not. But asbestos does
harm in a particularly insidious way. Its horrible cancers and respiratory problems may emerge only
long after the statute of limitations has expired, meaning that there may be no redress even for
medical costs. This lag has encouraged lawyers to seek huge settlements for people who are not
harmed and will never be harmed. The result is not only to wreak havoc upon companies forced to
pay the bill, but in effect to limit the compensation for real victims.
4. Two remedies that are being widely discussed for asbestos could be used elsewhere. The more
modest is to create a registry of people who might eventually be able to file a tort claim for
exposure to a toxic substance, to preserve their right to litigate beyond any normal statute of
limitation. Courts in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts have already begun to do this. But it can only
be a partial solution. No one would want to be at the end of the line in cases with huge potential
financial settlements, because there may be nothing left when their turn comes. The registry also
leaves a huge liability hanging over existing businesses.
5. A second idea is to address mass torts by creating a giant administrative compensation system,
along the lines of the fund for victims of the September 11th attacks. The fund could compensate
for economic damageâlost wages and medical costsârather than for the more abstract âpain and
sufferingâ that largely feeds the plaintiff bar. But cutting out the plaintiff bar would undoubtedly
jeopardise passage through Congress.
Think modest
6. The best approach would be twofold. First, as suggested by Victor Schwartz of the Campaign
for Asbestos Justice, limit litigation to where plaintiffs live, or were exposed, or where the
defendant has its principal place of business. That would control the rush to tort havens in
Mississippi, West Virginia, Texas and Illinois, where verdicts are most irresponsibly open-handed.
Defendants complain that, in a handful of jurisdictions, judges allow the introduction of poor
scientific evidence and block depositions by plaintiffs, with devastating consequences. Second, end
the consolidation of claims that have little to do with one another. In a recent case in West Virginia,
more than 8,000 plaintiffs took 250 companies to court. After pre-trial settlements, there were still
5,000 plaintiffs when the trial began. Supreme Court rulings may also
help.
7. Solutions exist. But all have one dire weakness: less money for lawyers. Could Congress ever
swallow thatâeven to benefit true victims of corporate
carelessness?
(āļāļģāļģ āđāļāļĨ )
āļāļģāļĢāđāļĢāļĩāļĒ āļāļĢāđāļ āļāļāđāļģ āđāļŠāļĩāļĒ āļŦāļģāļĒāļāļĢāļāļĩāđ āļĢāđāđ āļĒāļŦāļīāļ
9. āļāļģāļĢāļāđāļģ āļāļ·āļ āļāđāļ āļŦāļāđāļģ āļāļĩāđ
āļāļķāđāļ āļāļģāļģ āļŦāļāļāđāļāļĒāļāļāļŦāļĄāļģāļĒāļŦāļĢāļ·āļ āđāļāļĒāļāļĢāļ°āļāļģāļĢāļāļ·āđāļ
āļŠāļģāļģ āļŦāļĢāļąāļ āļāļļāļ āļāļĨāļāļļāļ āļāļāđāļāļŠāđāļ§ āļāļāļĩāđāđ āļāļĩāđāļĒ āļ§āļāļąāļ āļāļ§āļģāļĄ
āļŠāļąāļĄ āļāļąāļ āļāđāļ āļĩāđāļĄ āļĩāļ āđāļ āļāļąāļ āđāļāļāļīāļ āļāļģāļĢāļāļĒāđāļģ āļāļŦāļāļķāđāļ āļāļĒāđāļģ āļāđāļ .
āļāļģāļĢāļĨāļ°āđāļĄāļīāļ
involved in a given transaction.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (N) Statutes of the federal government and various states
setting maximum time periods during which certain
actions can be brought or rights enforced. After the time
period set out in the applicable statute of limitations has
run, no legal action can be brought regardless of whether
any cause of action ever existed. āļāļāļŦāļĄāļģāļĒāļāļāļ
LIABILITY(N)
āļŠāļŦāļāļąāļ āļāļĢāļąāļ āļŦāļĢāļ·āļ āļĄāļĨāļĢāļąāļ āļāļĩāđāļ āļģāļģ āļŦāļāļāļĢāļ°āļĒāļ°āđāļ§āļĨāļģāļŦāļĢāļ·āļ
āļāļģāļĒāļļāļ āļ§āļģāļĄāļŠāļģāļģ āļŦāļĢāļąāļ āļāļģāļĢāļāđāļ āļāļĢāđāļ āļāļāļāļĩ
An obligation one is bound in law or justice to perform. āļŦāļāļĩāđ
āļŦāļĢāļ·āļ āļāļ§āļģāļĄāļĢāļąāļ āļāļīāļ āļāļĩāđāļ āļđāļ āļāļąāļ āļāļģāļĄāļāļāļŦāļĄāļģāļĒ
DEFENDANT (N)
The person defending or denying; the party against whom relief
or recovery is sought in an action or suit or the accused in
a criminal case. āļāļģāļģ āđāļĨāļĒāđāļāļāļāļĩāđ āļāđāļ āđāļĨāļ°āļāļāļĩāļ āļģāļāļģ
DEPOSITION (N)
The testimony of a witness, taken in writing, under oath or
affirmation, before some judicial officer in answer to
questions or interrogatories. The deposition is conducted
under oath outside of the courtroom, usually in one of
lawyerâs offices. āļāļģāļģ āđāļāļīāļ āļāļ§āļģāļĄāļāļāļāļāļĒāļģāļāđāļāđāļ āļŦāļāļąāļ āļŠāļ·āļ
PLAINTIFF (N)
TRIAL (N)
āļāļģāļĄāļāļĩāđāđ āļāđāđ āļāļīāļ āļāļ§āļģāļĄāļ āļģāļĒāđāļāđāļ āļģāļģ āļŠāļģāļāļģāļāļāļāļāļĻāļģāļĨ
āļāļģāļĄāļāļāļāļīāļĄ āļąāļ āļāļ°āļāļģāļģ āđāļāļŠāļģāļģ āļāļąāļ āļāļģāļāļāļāļģāļĒāļāļ§āļģāļĄ
A person who brings an action. āđāļāļāļāđ
A judicial examination and determination of issues between
parties to action, whether by they be issues of law or fact,
before court that has jurisdiction. āļāļģāļĢāļāļīāļ āļģāļĢāļāļģ
āļāļīāļ āļģāļāļĐāļģāļāļāļĩ (āļāļģāļĄāļāļāļāļīāļ āļ°āļāļģāļģ āđāļāļĒāļĄāļĩāļ āļģāļĢāļŠāļ·āļ āļāļĒāļģāļ
āļāđāļ§ āļĒ )
Just don't say it
Dec 12th 2002
From The Economist print edition
To what extent do companies have the right to free speech?
10. AP
1.
IN THE next few days the Supreme Court will decide
whether to review the case of Nike v Kasky. America's top judges
reject 99% of the briefs that thud into their in-tray, but can they
dare to ignore this one? At stake is the basic principle of the first
amendment to the American constitution: free speech. To what
extent should companies have the same rights as individuals when
they make public statements? Specifically, are their public
pronouncementsâin debates, on websites, or in published letters
or articlesânormal speech, or are they advertising that could
expose them to million-dollar lawsuits?
Nike would like to say it
doesn't
2.
More than 40 bodies, from Microsoft, Pfizer and the US Chamber of Commerce, to CNN,
Bloomberg and the New York Times, have joined Nike in pressing the Supreme Court to take
the case. They hope it will overturn a Californian judgment.
3.
The original suit was brought by an anti-corporate activist named Marc Kasky. His
private action claimed that Nike had violated California's unfair trade practice and advertising
law when it issued press releases, newspaper ads and letters to editors to rebut claims that
workers in its South-East Asian factories laboured in âsweatshopâ conditions. Although two
lower courts found for the sports-goods maker, last spring California's supreme court ruled by
a 4-3 majority that Nike's public defences constituted âcommercial speechâ. Thus they were
aimed at consumers of their products and so, like other advertisements, not protected under
the first amendment.
4.
Admittedly, this is not wholly illogical. A reputation for running sweatshops may damage
a brand, and thus hit sales. So defending the brand from that taint is arguably aimed at
boosting sales.
5.
Unless the ruling is reversed, companies fear they could face lawsuits for anything they
say in good faith on matters relating to their business, from globalisation to the environment
to race relations, if it later turns out to be untrue or misleading. According to Floyd Abrams, a
constitutional lawyer: âthe California ruling is extraordinarily dangerous. It puts corporations at
terrible risk if they speak out on public issues that involve their business.â
6.
Mr Abrams says that the effect would be to muzzle companies, stifle debate and reverse
a welcome trend towards greater transparency. According to Thomas Goldstein, a lawyer
acting for Nike, if the ruling holds, âcompanies will be much more reluctant to speak. Even the
truth will not be a defence, since any statement deemed misleading could be actionable.â Nike
has already decided not to release its annual âcorporate social responsibilityâ report. Talking to
the press could also be risky, as firms cannot control how quotes are used.
7.
If the ruling stays, firms everywhere may be hit, including in Europe. As Mr Abrams
points out âCalifornia's supreme court is rightly taken as a serious court whose rulings could
well be adopted elsewhere.â Since European firms have stricter requirements than American
ones about publishing social responsibility reports, they could less easily withdraw from public
debate. (On the other hand, they already have to operate without a constitutional right of free
speech.) That web content produced in one country may be subject to the laws of a country
where it is read was made clear on December 10th when Australia's High Court ruled that an
article on Dow Jones's American website could be grounds for a defamation lawsuit in Victoria,
where the article was downloaded. With companies already under fire for not communicating
11. honestly and openly enough, how odd to stifle their ability to take part in public-policy debates
in the name of consumer protection.
14. āļāļąāļāļŠāļīāļāđāļāļāļĩāđāļāļ°āđāļĄāđāđāļāļĒāđāļāļĢāđāļĢāļģāļĒāļāļģāļāļāļĢāļ°āļāļģāļģāļāļĩāļ§āđāļģāļāđāļ§āļĒāļāļ§āļģāļĄāļĢāļąāļāļāļīāļāļāļāļāļāļāļ
āļāļĢāļīāļĐāļąāļāļāđāļāļŠāļąāļāļāļĄ āļāļģāļĢāļāļđāļāļāđāļāļāļąāļāļāđāļģāļ§āļāđāđāļāđāļāđāļĢāļ·āđāļāļāļāļĩāđāđāļŠāļĩāđāļĒāļāđāļāđāļāđāļāļĩāļĒāļ§āļāļąāļ
āđāļāļ·āđāļāļāļāļģāļāļāļĢāļīāļĐāļąāļāđāļĄāđāļŠāļģāļĄāļģāļĢāļāļāļ§āļāļāļļāļĄāđāļāđāļ§āđāļģāļāļģāļģāļāļđāļāļāļāļāļāļāļāļ°āļāļđāļāļāļģāļģāđāļ
āļāļĨāđāļģāļ§āļāđāļģāļāđāļāļĨāļąāļāļĐāļāļ°āđāļ
7.
āļŦāļģāļāļāļģāļģāļāļąāļāļŠāļīāļāļāļąāđāļāļĒāļąāļāļāļāļāļĒāļđāđ āļāļĢāļīāļĐāļąāļāļāļļāļāļŦāļāđāļŦāđāļāļāļģāļāđāļāđāļĢāļąāļāļāļĨāļ
āļĢāļ°āļāļāļĢāļ§āļĄāļāļķāļāļāļĢāļīāļĐāļąāļāļāļĩāđāļāļĒāļđāđāđāļāļāļ§āļĩāļāļĒāļļāđāļĢāļ āļāļąāļāļāļĩāđāļāļģāļĒāļāļąāļāļāļĢāļąāļĄāļāļĩāđāđāļŦāđāđāļŦāđāļ
âāļĻāļģāļĨāļŠāļđāļāļŠāļļāļāļāļāļāđāļāļĨāļīāļāļāļĢāđāđāļāļĩāļĒāļāļđāļāļĄāļāļāļāļĒāđāļģāļāļāļđāļāļāđāļāļāļ§āđāļģāđāļāđāļāļĻāļģāļĨāļāļĩāđ
āđāļāļĢāđāļāļāļĢāļąāļ āļāļķāđāļāļāļģāļģāļāļąāļāļŠāļīāļāļāļāļāļĻāļģāļĨāļāļąāļāļāļĨāđāļģāļ§āļāļģāļāļāļđāļāļāļģāļģāđāļāđāļāđāđāļāļĢāļąāļāļāļ·āđāļ
āļāđāđāļāđâ āđāļāļ·āđāļāļāļāļģāļāļāļĢāļīāļĐāļąāļāđāļāļāļ§āļĩāļāļĒāļļāđāļĢāļāļĄāļĩāļāļāđāļāļāļāđāļāļĩāđāđāļāļĢāđāļāļāļĢāļąāļāļāļ§āđāļģāļāļĢāļīāļĐāļąāļ
āļāđāļĄāļĢāļīāļāļģāđāļāļĩāđāļĒāļ§āļāļąāļāļāļģāļĢāđāļāļĒāđāļāļĢāđāļĢāļģāļĒāļāļģāļāļāļ§āļģāļĄāļĢāļąāļāļāļīāļāļāļāļāļāđāļāļŠāļąāļāļāļĄ
āļāļĢāļīāļĐāļąāļāđāļŦāļĨāđāļģāļāļąāđāļāļāļķāļāļĒāļģāļāļāļĩāđāļāļ°āļŦāļĨāļĩāļāđāļĨāļĩāđāļĒāļāļāļģāļāļāļģāļĢāđāļāđāđāļĒāđāļāđāļāļāļĢāļ°āđāļāđāļ
āļŠāļģāļāļģāļĢāļāļ°āļāđāļģāļāđ (āđāļāļāļģāļāļāļĢāļāļāļąāļāļāđāļģāļĄ āļāļĢāļīāļĐāļąāļāļĒāļļāđāļĢāļāļāđāļāļāļāļāļīāļāļąāļāļīāļāļģāļāđāļāļĒ
āļāļĢāļģāļĻāļāļģāļāļŠāļīāļāļāļīāđāļāļāļģāļĢāļāļđāļāļāļĒāđāļģāļāļāļīāļŠāļĢāļ°āļāļģāļĄāļĢāļąāļāļāļĢāļĢāļĄāļāļđāļ) āļāđāļāđāļāđāļāļāļĢāļīāļāļāļĩāđ
āļ§āđāļģāđāļāļ·āđāļāļŦāļģāđāļāđāļ§āđāļāđāļāļāđāļāļĩāđāļāļģāļģāļāļķāđāļāđāļāļāļĢāļ°āđāļāļĻāļŦāļāļķāđāļāļāļģāļāļāļāļāļĒāļđāđāļ āļģāļĒāđāļāđ
āļāļāļŦāļĄāļģāļĒāļāļāļāļāļĢāļ°āđāļāļĻāļāļĩāđāļĄāļĩāļāļģāļĢāđāļāļīāļāđāļāđāļģāđāļāļāļđāđāļāļ·āđāļāļŦāļģāđāļŦāļĨāđāļģāļāļąāđāļāđāļāđāļāļĢāļģāļāļ
āļāļąāļāđāļĄāļ·āđāļāļ§āļąāļāļāļĩāđ 10 āļāļąāļāļ§āļģāļāļĄ āđāļĄāļ·āđāļāļĻāļģāļĨāļŠāļđāļāļāļāļāļāļĢāļ°āđāļāļĻāļāļāļŠāđāļāļĢāđāļĨāļĩāļĒāļāļąāļāļŠāļīāļ
āļ§āđāļģāļāļāļāļ§āļģāļĄāļāļāđāļ§āđāļāđāļāļāđāđāļāļāđāļĄāļĢāļīāļāļģāļāļāļāļāļģāļ§āļāđāđāļāļāļŠāđāļāļģāļāđāļāđāļāļĄāļđāļĨāđāļŦāđāļāđāļāļ
āļĢāđāļāļāļāļāļĩāļŦāļĄāļīāđāļāļāļĢāļ°āļĄāļģāļāđāļāļĢāļąāļāļ§āļīāļāļāļāļĢāđāđāļĢāļĩāļĒāļāļĩāđāļāļķāđāļāļĄāļĩāļāļģāļĢāļāļķāļāđāļāļģāđāļāļ·āđāļāļŦāļģāđāļŦāļĨāđāļģāļāļąāđāļ
āļĄāļģāļāļđ āđāļĄāļ·āđāļāļāļīāļāļģāļĢāļāļģāļāļĢāļ°āļāļāļāļāļąāļāļāđāļāđāļāđāļāļāļĢāļīāļāļāļĩāđāļ§āđāļģāļāļĢāļīāļĐāļąāļāļāđāļģāļāđ āļāļāļāļĒāļđāđāļ āļģāļĒ
āđāļāđāļāļģāļĢāļāļģāļģāļŦāļāļīāļāļĩāđāđāļĄāđāļŠāļ·āđāļāļŠāļģāļĢāļāđāļāļĄāļđāļĨāļāļĒāđāļģāļāļāļ·āđāļāļŠāļąāļāļĒāđāđāļĨāļ°āđāļāļīāļāđāļāļĒāđāļāļĩāļĒāļāļāļ
āļĄāļąāļāļāļđāđāļāđāļāđāļĢāļ·āđāļāļāđāļāļĨāļāļāļĩāđāļāļĨāļąāļāļĄāļĩāļāļģāļĢāļāļĒāļģāļĒāļģāļĄāļāļąāļāļāļ§āļģāļāđāļĄāđāđāļŦāđāļāļĢāļīāļĐāļąāļāđāļŦāļĨāđāļģ
āļāļąāđāļāļŠāļģāļĄāļģāļĢāļāļĄāļĩāļŠāđāļ§āļāļĢāđāļ§āļĄāđāļāļāļģāļĢāđāļāđāđāļĒāđāļāđāļāļāļĢāļ°āđāļāđāļāļāļĩāđāđāļāļĩāđāļĒāļ§āļāļąāļāļāļąāļ
āļāđāļĒāļāļģāļĒāļŠāļģāļāļģāļĢāļāļ°āļ āļģāļĒāđāļāđāļāđāļāļāđāļģāļāļ§āđāļģāđāļāđāļāļāļģāļĢāļāļļāđāļĄāļāļĢāļāļāļāļđāđāļāļĢāļīāđāļ āļ.
VOCAB. IN THE NEWS
Review
To re-examine judicially; A
reconsideration āļāļģāļĢāļāļĢāļ§āļāļŠāļāļāļāļāļāļ§āļāļāļģāļģ
āļāļīāļāļģāļāļĐāļģāļāļāļāļĻāļģāļĨāļĨāđāļģāļāđāļāļĒāļĻāļģāļĨāļŠāļđāļ
Free Speech
Right guaranteed by First
Amendment of U.S. Constitution to
express oneâs thoughts and views without
15. governmental restrictions. āđāļŠāļĢāļĩāļ āļģāļāđāļāļāļģāļĢāļāļđāļ
āđāļĨāļ°āđāļŠāļāļāļāļ§āļģāļĄāļāļīāļāđāļŦāđāļāļāļĩāđāđāļāđāļĢāļąāļāļāļģāļĢāļĢāļąāļāļĢāļāļāļāļģāļĄ
āļĢāļąāļāļāļĢāļĢāļĄāļāļđāļāļāļāļāļŠāļŦāļĢāļąāļāļāđāļĄāļĢāļīāļāļģāļāļāļąāļāđāļāđāđāļāđāļāļīāđāļĄāđāļāļīāļĄāļāļĢāļąāđāļ
āļāļĩāđāļŦāļāļķāđāļ
Lawsuit
An action or proceeding in a civil
court āļāļģāļĢāļāđāļāļāļĢāđāļāļāļāļģāļģāđāļāļīāļāļāļāļĩāđāļāđāļ
Judgment
The official and authentic
decision of a court of justice upon the
respective rights and claims of the parties
to an action or suit therein litigated and
submitted to its determination. āļāļģāļģāļāļīāļāļģāļāļĐāļģ
āļ§āļīāļāļīāļāļāļąāļĒāļāļĢāļ°āđāļāđāļāļāđāļāļāļīāļāļģāļāļāļĩāđāļāļđāđāļāļ§āļģāļĄāļāļĨāđāļģāļ§āļāđāļģāļ
Majority
Vote by more than half of voters.
āđāļŠāļĩāļĒāļāļāđāļģāļāļĄāļģāļ
Ruling
A judicial or administrative
interpretation of a provision of a statute,
order, regulation, or ordinance. āļāļģāļģāļ§āļīāļāļīāļāļāļąāļĒ
āļāļĩāļāļ§āļģāļĄāļāļāļāļąāļāļāļąāļāļīāļāļāļāļāļāļŦāļĄāļģāļĒāļŦāļĢāļ·āļāļĢāļ°āđāļāļĩāļĒāļāļāđāļģāļāđ
Reverse
To overthrow, vacate, set aside
or revoke. āļāļģāļĢāļāļĨāļąāļāļāļģāļģāļāļīāļāļģāļāļĐāļģāļāļāļāļĻāļģāļĨāļĨāđāļģāļ
Good Faith
Honesty of intention, and freedom
from knowledge of circumstances which
ought to put the holder upon inquiry. āđāļāļĒ
āļŠāļļāļāļĢāļīāļ
Actionable
That for which an action will lie,
furnishing legal ground for an action.
āļāļĢāļāļĩāļāļĩāđāļāļģāļāļāļđāļāļāđāļāļāļĢāđāļāļāļāļģāļģāđāļāļīāļāļāļāļĩāđāļāđ
Ground
A foundation or basis for bringing
civil action. āļĄāļđāļĨāļāļāļĩāļāļĩāđāļāļģāļāļāļģāļģāđāļāļāđāļāļāđāļāđāļāļāļāļĩāđāļāđāļāđāļāđ
Defamation
An intentional false
communication, either published or
publicly spoken, that injures anotherâs
reputation or good name. āļāļģāļĢāļŦāļĄāļīāđāļāļāļĢāļ°āļĄāļģāļ
āļāļąāļāđāļāđāļāđāļŦāļāļļāđāļŦāđāļāļļāļāļāļĨāļāļ·āđāļāđāļŠāļ·āđāļāļĄāđāļŠāļĩāļĒāļāļ·āđāļāđāļŠāļĩāļĒāļ
16. CRIMINAL LAW 101
Chapter 1 (1)
(excerpt from Criminal Law in a Nutshell, Prof. Arnold H. Loewy
(1975))
PUNISHMENT
The Distinguishing Feature of the Criminal Law
1
Before an intelligent study of criminal law can be undertaken, it
is necessary to focus on the si
ngle characteristic that differentiates it from civil law. This
characteristic is punishment.
2
Generally, in a civil suit, the basic questions are (1) how much, if
at all, has defendant injured
plaintiff, and (2) what remedy or remedies, if any, are appropriate to
compensate plaintiff for his loss.
In a criminal case, on the other hand, the questions are (1) to what
extent, if at all, has defendant
injured society, and (2) what sentence, if any, is necessary to punish
defendant for his transgressions.
3
Since the criminal law seeks to punish rather than compensate,
there should be something
about each course of conduct defined as criminal that renders mere
compensation to the victim
inadequate. This follows from the truism that no human being should
be made to suffer if such
suffering cannot be justified by a concomitant gain to society.
4
No rational assessment of the kinds of activity that should be
punished can be undertaken
without some analysis of the purposes of punishment. Those
purposes most frequently mentioned
are reformation, restraint, retribution, and deterrence (perhaps
more easily remembered as three
âRâs and a âDâ of punishment).
Purpose of Punishment
A. REFORMATION
5
There is little, if any, dispute to the principle that punishment
ought to reform. Certainly, society
17. gains and nobody loses if any individual who has transgressed against
societyâs standards is
reformed.
6
There is, however, some difference of opinion as to the relative
importance of reformation.
Some believe that since criminals represent the worst in society, it is
unjust to take tax dollars from
those they consider more worthy to finance the rehabilitation of
those they deem less worthy. Others
believe that reformationis a valid purpose, but should be subordinated
to other purposes, such as
deterrence. âĶ.
7
Generally speaking, however, reformationis regarded by
criminologist as the most worthwhile
goal of punishment. The real objection to reformationis simply that it
doesnât work. This observation
can be supported by the high degree of recidivism among those who
have been imprisoned.
Moreover, it can be persuasively argued that the very nature of the
prison system runs counter to the
goal of reformation. ... One might also compare imprisoning a criminal
to requiring one who has
engaged in some Communistic activity to associate only with
Communists. Just as the Communist
would likely increase his Communistic tendencies by such as
association, it can be argued that
prison increases rather than decreases the criminal propensities of its
inmates.
8
Notwithstanding the above analysis, it would be unfair to dismiss
the noble concept of
reformation as a total failure. All of us are familiar with instances in
which unskilled, uneducated and
apparently incorrigible criminals have developed skills in prison which
have transformed them into
highly useful citizens. Perhaps the real tragedy of the penal system is
that this happen so infrequently
that when it does occur, we hear about it.
(To be continued)
* Paragraph numbers are added.
** Numbering of titles and topics have been changed from the original
to simplify the text.
References to other parts in the original book have also been
removed.
21. āļāļāđāļĄāļ·āđāļāđāļāļāđāļāļģāļĄāļāļĩāđ
āļĄāļąāļāđāļāļīāļāļāļķāđāļāđāļĢāļģāđāļāđāļĒāļīāļāđāļāļĩāđāļĒāļ§āļāļąāļāļĄāļąāļ
(āđāļāļĢāļāļāļīāļāļāļģāļĄāļāļāļāļāđāļāđāļ)
āđāļĢāļĩāļĒāļāđāļĢāļĩāļĒāļāđāļāļĒ
āļŠāļĢāļ§āļīāļĻ āļĨāļīāļĄ āļāļĢāļąāļ āļĐāļĩ
āļāļđāđāļāļīāļāļģāļāļĐāļģāļĻāļģāļĨāļāļąāđāļāļāđāļāļāļĢāļ°āļāļģāļģāļŠāļģāļģāļāļąāļāļāļĢāļ°āļāļģāļāļĻāļģāļĨāļāļĩāļāļģ
Law Vocabulary
Punishment
A deprivation of life, liberty, property
or right inflicted upon a
person by judgment of the court, for
some criminal offense
committed by the person, e.g., fine,
imprisonment, exection. āļāļģāļĢ
āļĨāļāđāļāļĐāļāļķāđāļāđāļāļāļĩāđāļāļĩāđāļŦāļĄāļģāļĒāļāļķāļāļāļģāļĢāļĨāļāđāļāļĐāļāļģāļāļāļģāļāļģāđāļāļĒ
āļāļģāļģāļāļīāļāļģāļāļĐāļģ
āļāļāļāļĻāļģāļĨāļāđāļ§āļĒāļāļģāļĢāļāļģāļģāđāļŦāđāļāļļāļāļāļĨāļāļĩāđāļāļĢāļ°āļāļģāļģāļāļ§āļģāļĄāļāļīāļāļāđāļāļ
āļāļĢāļģāļĻāļāļģāļ
āđāļŠāļĢāļĩāļ āļģāļ āļāļĢāļąāļāļĒāđāļŠāļīāļ āļŦāļĢāļ·āļāļāļĩāļ§āļīāļāļāļąāļāđāļāđāļāļāļĨāđāļāļ·āđāļāļāļĄāļģāļāļģāļ
āļāļģāļĢāļāļĩāđāļāļļāļāļāļĨāļāļąāļ
āļāļĨāđāļģāļ§āđāļāđāļāļĢāļ°āļāļģāļģāļāļ§āļģāļĄāļāļīāļāļāļāļŦāļĄāļģāļĒāļāļģāļāļģ āđāļāđāļ āļāļģāļĢ
āļāļĢāļąāļ āļāļģāļģāļāļļāļ
āļāļĢāļ°āļŦāļģāļĢāļāļĩāļ§āļīāļ
Compensate
To indemnify, or pay damages, to an
injured party in order to
restore him to his position as existed at
the time of the incidence.
āļāļģāļĢāđāļŦāđāļāđāļģāļŠāļīāļāđāļŦāļĄāļāļāđāļāļāļāļ§āļģāļĄāđāļŠāļĩāļĒāļŦāļģāļĒāđāļāđāļāļđāđāđāļŠāļĩāļĒāļŦāļģāļĒ
āđāļāļ·āđāļāļāļĩāđāļāļ°āļāļģāļģāđāļŦāđ
22. āļāļđāđāđāļŠāļĩāļĒāļŦāļģāļĒāļāļĨāļąāļāļāļ·āļāļŠāļđāđāļŠāļāļģāļāļ°āđāļāļīāļĄāļāļāļ°āļāļĩāđāđāļāļīāļāđāļŦāļāļļāļāļķāđāļ
Reformation
A process aimed to bring about a
better result, or to rectify a
defendantâs behavior. āđāļāļ§āļāļīāļāļāļĪāļĐāļāļĩāļāļģāļ
āļāļāļŦāļĄāļģāļĒāļāļģāļāļģāļāļĩāđ
āļāļĢāļ°āļŠāļāļāđāļāļ°āļĨāļāđāļāļĐāļāļđāđāļāļĢāļ°āļāļģāļģāļāļ§āļģāļĄāļāļīāļāđāļāļ·āđāļāđāļāđāđāļāļāļ·āđāļāļāļđāļāļđāđ
āļāļĢāļ°āļāļģāļģ
āļāļ§āļģāļĄāļāļīāļāļāļģāļāļģāđāļŦāđāļāļĨāļģāļĒāđāļāđāļāļāļāļāļĩ
Retribution A purpose of criminal punishment aimed
to make a wrongdoer
suffer as a consequence of his crime.
āđāļāļ§āļāļīāļāļāļĪāļĐāļāļĩāļāļģāļāļāļāļŦāļĄāļģāļĒ
āļāļģāļāļģāļāļĩāđāļāļĢāļ°āļŠāļāļāđāļāļ°āļĨāļāđāļāļĐāļāļđāđāļāļĢāļ°āļāļģāļģāļāļ§āļģāļĄāļāļīāļāđāļāļ·āđāļ
āđāļāđāļāļāļģāļĢāđāļāđāđāļāđāļ
āļāļĩāđāļāļđāđāļāļąāđāļāđāļāđāļāļĢāļ°āļāļģāļģāļāļ§āļģāļĄāļāļīāļāļāļģāļāļģāļāļāļāļģāļģāđāļŦāđāļāļĢāļ°āļāļģāļāļ
āđāļĨāļ°āļŠāļąāļāļāļĄāđāļāđ
āļĢāļąāļāļāļ§āļģāļĄāđāļŠāļĩāļĒāļŦāļģāļĒ
Deterrence A purpose of criminal punishment aimed
to discourage others
from committing a crime by showing
consequences that they may incur if they
commit similar crime. āđāļāļ§āļāļīāļāļāļĪāļĐāļāļĩāļāļģāļ
āļāļāļŦāļĄāļģāļĒāļāļģāļāļģāļāļĩāđāļāļĢāļ°āļŠāļāļāđāļāļ°āļĨāļāđāļāļĐāļāļđāđāļāļĢāļ°āļāļģāļģāļāļ§āļģāļĄāļāļīāļ
āđāļāļ·āđāļāļāđāļāļ
āļāļĢāļģāļĄāļāļļāļāļāļĨāļāļ·āđāļāļĄāļīāđāļŦāđāļāļĢāļ°āļāļģāļģāļāļ§āļģāļĄāļāļīāļāđāļāđāļāđāļāļĩāļĒāļ§āļāļąāļāļāļĩāļ
Rehabilitation A process aimed to restore a
wrongdoer to be a good citizen and
dignified member of a society. āđāļāļ§āļāļīāļāļāļĪāļĐāļāļĩ
āļāļģāļāļāļāļŦāļĄāļģāļĒāļāļģāļāļģ
āļāļĩāđāļāļĢāļ°āļŠāļāļāđāļāļ°āļĨāļāđāļāļĐāļāļđāđāļāļĢāļ°āļāļģāļģāļāļ§āļģāļĄāļāļīāļāđāļāļ·āđāļāđāļāđāđāļāļāļ·āđāļāļāļđ
23. āļāļđāđāļāļĢāļ°āļāļģāļģ
āļāļ§āļģāļĄāļāļīāļāđāļŦāđāļāļĨāļģāļĒāđāļāđāļāļŠāļĄāļģāļāļīāļāļāļĩāđāļāļĩāđāļĨāļ°āļĄāļĩāļāļļāļāļāđāļģāļāļāļ
āļŠāļąāļāļāļĄāđāļāđāļāđāļāļĩāļĒāļ§
āļāļąāļāđāļāļ§āļāļīāļ Reformation
Criminologist A person who perform a scientific
study of crime and criminals.
āļāļąāļāļāļģāļāļāļģāļ§āļīāļāļĒāļģ
Engage
To do or involve in doing some activity.
āļĨāļāļĄāļ·āļāļŦāļĢāļ·āļāđāļāļĩāđāļĒāļ§āļāđāļāļāļāļąāļ
āļāļīāļāļāļĢāļĢāļĄāļāļąāļāđāļāļāļąāļāļŦāļāļķāđāļ
Propensity A natural tendency, inclination, or
character to behave in a
particular way. āđāļāļ§āđāļāđāļĄāļŦāļĢāļ·āļāļāļļāļāļĨāļīāļāļĨāļąāļāļĐāļāļ°āļāļģāļĄ
āļāļĢāļĢāļĄāļāļģāļāļīāļāļāļ
āļāļļāļāļāļĨāļāļĩāđāļāļ°āļāļĢāļ°āļāļĪāļāļīāļāļāđāļāđāļāļ§āļāļģāļāđāļāđāļāļ§āļāļģāļāļŦāļāļķāđāļ
Inmate
A person who is punished by means of
imprisonment. āļāļąāļāđāļāļĐāļāļĩāđ
āļāļđāļāļāļģāļģāļāļļāļ
CONSTITUTION 101
Chapter 1 (1)
āđāđ
LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT :
THE BASIC ANALYSIS
24. (excerpt from Constitutional Analysis, Prof. Jerre S. Williams
(1995))
1
To aid in understanding the nature of the distinction between
liberty and the exercise of
governmental power and to give us the foundation for the
constitutional analysis, let us develop a simple
imaginary concept âĶ.
2
Imagine, if you will, that we took all of the power that any
government could have and placed it in
a huge oblong box. Included in this box would be the most
autocratic and despotic powers of
government. Along with other generally acceptable governmental
powers in our box, then would be the
power to execute someone without trial or without charges. So also
would be included the power to
throw a person in jail for criticizing the government, or the power
to take a personâs home and his or her
other property without any excuse and without compensating for
it. Other despotic powers would
include forcing all citizens to wear a uniform, to attend a state
church, to listen to a governmental leader
[s speech. So assume, if you will, in the box are all possible
governmental powers, including the most
despicable and the ugliest exercises of power, such as occurred in
Nazi Germany.
3
In the United States under our Constitution, we saw this long
oblong box into tow parts. We shall
represent this by drawing a vertical line through the box as shown:
4
The reason for cutting the box apart is to take away from the
government those powers which we
do not want our government to have. We take away the powers of
the despot. We protect the individual
citizen against intrusions upon freedom of speech and freedom of
religion. We require fair court
procedures. We insist that the citizen can be fined or imprisoned
25. only on fair charges involving a valid
offense and after a fair and complete trial. So we set aside a large
part of this box of potential
governmental powers. We insist that our government cannot have
the powers which would infringe upon
our liberty.
5
After we have severed these excessive and undesirable
governmental powers out of our total
aggregation of powers, we set them aside. We call governmental
attempts to control in these protected
areas invasions of âfreedomâ or âindividual libertyâ or, as we shall
see later, we often just call them the
protections of âdue process of lawâ as a shorthand expression. We
accomplish this withdrawal of
possible governmental powers by writing into the Constitution a
Bill of Rights and other protections of
individual liberty.
6
So now our box of governmental power looks like this:
Freedom or Individual
Liberty
Governmental Power
7
On the left side, within the dotted lines, we have that part of
the original box of governmental
powers where power has been taken away from our government
under our system. We call that area:
liberty. On the right side are the remaining governmental powers.
Those are the powers which are not
taken away by our constitutional requirement for liberty. It is the
Constitution which has severed our box
by drawing the line which protects our liberties from government
powers.
8
A word of caution here; although our schematic line is drawn
down the middle of our diagram, it
was carefully said that the box was sawed into two parts, not
sawed in half. There is not attempt by the
placement of the line to show how much governmental power has
been taken out of the total potential
amount. At the moment, we are not interested in the quantity of
26. governmental power. We are interested
in the nature of the qualities of the powers involved.
9
To understand the application of this boxlike configuration,
which will more often now be called a
diagram, consider a simple, although very important, constitutional
issue. A person makes a speech
advocating revolutionary overthrow of the government. As most
readers probably already know, this
revolutionary advocacy is not automatically subject to criminal
penalties by the government. If this
advocacy of revolution is advocacy in the abstract, philosophical
sense, we have adequate
constitutional holdings establishing that it is protected free
speech. Only when the advocacy becomes
advocacy for immediate, significantly revolutionary or
antigovernmental action may the speaker be
punished for such statements.
10 In terms of our diagram, the issue in such a case is simply
whether this case falls on the left side
of the dividing line, in the area of individual freedom (the
government may not prohibit the speech) (1),
or falls on the right side in the area of government power (the
government does have the power to
control the speech) (2):
Liberty
Governmental Power
(1) (2)
11 To make this analysis clearer, consider some other examples.
A book is charged with being
obscene. Is it protected free speech, or is it a book which is not
protected free speech and therefore,
can be prohibited from circulation by the government? The issue in
terms of our diagram is whether the
result of the case falls in the area of individual liberty on the left
side â (1), or in the area of governmental
power on the right â (2). The vertical line which cuts apart our boxdiagram is the dividing line between
personal liberty on one side and governmental power to control the
27. activities and conduct of persons on
the other.
(To be continued)
āļ§āļīāļ āļģāļāļāļŦāļĄāļģāļĒāļĢāļąāļ āļāļĢāļĢāļĄāļāļđāļ 101
āļāļāļāļĩāđ 1 (1)
āļāļīāļŠ āļĢāļ āļģāļāļāļģāļāļĢāļąāļ āļāļģāļĨ : āļāļģāļĢāļ§āļīāđ āļāļĢāļģāļ°āļŦāđāļ āļąāđāļ āļāļ·āđāļ
āļāļģāļ
(āļāļąāļāļĒāđāļāļāļģāļāļŦāļāļąāļāļŠāļ·āļ Constitutional Analysis āđāļāļĒ
āļĻāļģāļŠāļāļĢāļģāļāļģāļĢāļĒāđ Jerre S. Williams (1995))
1 āđāļāļ·āđāļāļāđāļ§āļĒāđāļāļāļģāļĢāļāļģāļģāļāļ§āļģāļĄāđāļāđāļģāđāļāļāļĢāļĢāļĄāļāļģāļāļīāļāļāļāļāļ§āļģāļĄāđāļāļāļāđāļģāļ
āļĢāļ°āļŦāļ§āđāļģāļāļāļīāļŠāļĢāļ āļģāļāļāļąāļāļāļģāļĢ
āđāļāđāļāļģāļģāļāļģāļāļĢāļąāļ āđāļĨāļ°āļ§āļģāļāļĢāļģāļāļāļģāļāđāļŦāđāđāļāđāļāļ§āļāđāļĢāļģāđāļāļĩāđāļĒāļ§āļāļąāļāļāļģāļĢāļ§āļīāđāļāļĢāļģāļ°āļŦāđ
āļāļāļŦāļĄāļģāļĒāļĢāļąāļāļāļĢāļĢāļĄāļāļđāļ āļāļ
āđāļŦāđāđāļĢāļīāđāļĄāļāļąāļāļāļģāļāļģāļāđāļāļ§āļāļīāļāļāļ·āđāļāļāļģāļāđāļāļĒāđāļāđāļāļīāļāļāļāļģāļāļģāļĢ âĶ.
2 āļāļāđāļŦāđāļāļīāļāļāļāļģāļāļģāļĢāļ§āđāļģāđāļĢāļģāļāļģāļģāļāļģāļģāļāļģāļāļāļąāđāļāļŦāļĄāļāļāļĩāđāļĢāļąāļāļŠāļģāļĄāļģāļĢāļāļĄāļĩāđāļāđ
āļāļģāļģāđāļāđāļŠāđāđāļ§āđāđāļāļāļĨāđāļāļ
āļŠāļĩāđāđāļŦāļĨāļĩāđāļĒāļĄāļāļ·āļāļāđāļģāļāļāļģāļāđāļŦāļāđ āļāļĨāđāļāļāđāļāļāļĩāđāļāļ°āļĢāļ§āļĄāđāļ§āđāļāđāļ§āļĒāļāļģāļģāļāļģāļāļĢāļąāļāļāļĩāđ
āđāļāđāļāđāļāļāđāļāļāļģāļĢāđāļĨāļ°āđāļŦāļāļĢāđāļģāļĒāļāļĩāđ
āļŠāļļāļ āļāļĢāđāļāļĄāđāļāļąāļāļāļģāļģāļāļģāļāļĢāļąāļāļāļ·āđāļāđāļāļĩāđāđāļāđāļĢāļąāļāļāļģāļĢāļĒāļāļĄāļĢāļąāļāđāļāđāļāļāļģāļĢāļāļąāđāļ§āđāļāđāļ
āļāļĨāđāļāļāđāļāļāļĩāđāļāļ°āļĄāļĩāļāļģāļģāļāļģāļāļĢāļąāļ
āļāļĩāđāļāļ°āļāļĢāļ°āļŦāļģāļĢāđāļāļĢāļāđāđāļāđāđāļāļĒāļāļĢāļģāļĻāļāļģāļāļāļģāļĢāļāļģāļģāđāļāļīāļāļāļāļĩāļŦāļĢāļ·āļāļāļģāļĢāļāļąāđāļāļāđāļ
āļāļĨāđāļģāļ§āļŦāļģ āļāļāļāļāļģāļāļāļąāđāļ āļĒāļąāļāļĄāļĩ
āļāļģāļģāļāļģāļāļāļĩāđāļāļ°āļāļąāļāđāļāļĢāļŠāļąāļāļāļāđāļĒāļāđāļāđāļģāļāļļāļāđāļāļ·āđāļāļāļāļģāļāļ§āļīāļāļģāļāļĐāđāļ§āļīāļāļģāļĢāļāđ
āļĢāļąāļāļāļģāļĨāļŦāļĢāļ·āļāļāļģāļģāļāļģāļāļāļĩāđāļāļ°āļĒāļķāļāļāđāļģāļ
āļāļāļāđāļāļĢāļŠāļąāļāļāļāđāļĨāļ°āļāļĢāļąāļāļĒāđāļŠāļīāļāļāļāļāđāļāļģāļŦāļĢāļ·āļāđāļāļāđāļāļĒāļāļĢāļģāļĻāļāļģāļāđāļŦāļāļļāļāļĨ
āđāļĨāļ°āļāļĢāļģāļĻāļāļģāļāļāļģāļĢāđāļŦāđāļāđāļģ
āļāļāđāļāļ āļāļģāļģāļāļģāļāļāļąāļāđāļŦāļāļĢāđāļģāļĒāļāļ·āđāļāļĢāļ§āļĄāļāļķāļāļāļģāļĢāļāļąāļāļāļąāļāļāļĢāļ°āļāļģāļāļ
āļāļąāđāļāļŦāļĄāļāđāļŦāđāđāļāđāļāđāļāļĢāļ·āđāļāļāđāļāļ āđāļŦāđ
31. Liberty
Governmental Power
(1) (2)
11 āđāļāļ·āđāļāđāļŦāđāļāļģāļĢāļ§āļīāđāļāļĢāļģāļ°āļŦāđāļāļĩāđāļāļąāļāđāļāļāļĄāļģāļāļāļķāđāļ āļāļāđāļŦāđāļāļīāļāļģāļĢāļāļģ
āļāļąāļ§āļāļĒāđāļģāļāļāļ·āđāļāļāļģāļāļāļĢāļ°āļāļģāļĢ
āļŦāļāļąāļāļŠāļ·āļāđāļĨāđāļĄāļŦāļāļķāđāļāļāļđāļāļāļĨāđāļģāļ§āļŦāļģāļ§āđāļģāđāļāđāļāļŦāļāļąāļāļŠāļ·āļāļĨāļģāļĄāļ āļŦāļāļąāļāļŠāļ·āļāđāļĨāđāļĄāļāļĩāđāļāļ°
āļāļ·āļāļ§āđāļģāđāļāđāļāđāļŠāļĢāļĩāļ āļģāļāđāļāļāļģāļĢ
āđāļŠāļāļāļāļ§āļģāļĄāļāļīāļāđāļŦāđāļāļāļĩāđāđāļāđāļĢāļąāļāļāļ§āļģāļĄāļāļļāđāļĄāļāļĢāļāļ āļŦāļĢāļ·āļāđāļāđāļāļŦāļāļąāļāļŠāļ·āļāļāļĩāđāđāļĄāđāđāļāđ
āļĢāļąāļāļāļ§āļģāļĄāļāļļāđāļĄāļāļĢāļāļāđāļāļĒ
āđāļŠāļĢāļĩāļ āļģāļāđāļāļāļģāļĢāđāļŠāļāļāļāļ§āļģāļĄāļāļīāļāđāļŦāđāļ āđāļĨāļ°āļāļģāļāļāļđāļāļĢāļąāļāļāļģāļĨāļŦāđāļģāļĄāđāļāļĒāđāļāļĢāđ
āļāđāļāļāļĢāļ°āļāļģāļāļāđāļāđ?
āļāļĢāļ°āđāļāđāļāļāļĩāđāļŦāļģāļāļāļĨāđāļģāļ§āđāļāđāļāļīāļāļāļāļāđāļāļāļ āļđāļĄāļīāļāļāļāđāļĢāļģāļāđāļāļ·āļāļāļģāļĢāļāļģāļĄāļ§āđāļģāļāļĨ
āļāļāļāļāļāļĩāļāļĩāđāļāļ§āļĢāļāļ°āļāļāļāļĒāļđāđāđāļ
āļāļ·āđāļāļāļĩāđāļāļāļāļāļīāļŠāļĢāļ āļģāļāļāļāļāļāļąāļāđāļāļāļāļāļāļģāļāļāđāļģāļāļāđāļģāļĒāļĄāļ·āļ â (1) āļŦāļĢāļ·āļāđāļ
āļāļ·āđāļāļāļĩāđāļāļāļāļāļģāļģāļāļģāļāļĢāļąāļāļāļģāļāļāđāļģāļ
āļāļ§āļģāļĄāļ·āļ â (2) āđāļŠāđāļāđāļāļ§āļāļąāđāļāļāļĩāđāļāļąāļāđāļĒāļāđāļāļāļ āļđāļĄāļīāļāļĨāđāļāļāļāļāļāđāļĢāļģāļāļ·āļāđāļŠāđāļ
āđāļāđāļāļĢāļ°āļŦāļ§āđāļģāļāļāļīāļŠāļĢāļ āļģāļāļŠāđāļ§āļ
āļāļļāļāļāļĨāđāļāļāđāļģāļāļŦāļāļķāđāļāđāļĨāļ°āļāļģāļģāļāļģāļāļĢāļąāļāļāļĩāđāļāļ°āļāļ§āļāļāļļāļĄāļāļīāļāļāļĢāļĢāļĄāđāļĨāļ°āļāļģāļĢāļāļĢāļ°
āļāļģāļģāļāļāļāļāļļāļāļāļĨāđāļāļāļĩāļāļāđāļģāļ
āļŦāļāļķāđāļ
(āđāļāļĢāļāļāļīāļāļāļģāļĄāļāļāļāļāđāļāđāļ)
āđāļĢāļĩāļĒāļāđāļĢāļĩāļĒāļāđāļāļĒ
āļŠāļĢāļ§āļīāļĻ āļĨāļīāļĄ āļāļĢāļąāļ āļĐāļĩ
āļāļđāđāļāļīāļāļģāļāļĐāļģāļĻāļģāļĨāļāļąāđāļāļāđāļāļāļĢāļ°āļāļģāļģāļŠāļģāļģāļāļąāļāļāļĢāļ°āļāļģāļāļĻāļģāļĨāļāļĩāļāļģ
Law Vocabulary
Liberty
Freedom from restraints except such as
those that are justly imposed
by law and indispensable for the equal
enjoyment of the same right
by others. āļāļīāļŠāļĢāļ āļģāļāļāļģāļāļāļģāļĢāļāļđāļāļāļģāļģāļāļąāļāļāđāļģāļāđ āđāļ§āđāļ
32. āđāļāđāđāļāđāļāļāđāļāļāļģāļģāļāļąāļāļāļĩāđāļāļđāļ
āļāļģāļģāļŦāļāļāđāļāļĒāļāļāļāļāđāļ§āļĒāļāļāļŦāļĄāļģāļĒāđāļĨāļ°āđāļāđāļāļāļĢāļāļĩāļāļĩāđ
āļāļģāļģāđāļāđāļāđāļāļ·āđāļāļāļļāđāļĄāļāļĢāļāļ
āļŠāļīāļāļāļīāđāļŠāļĢāļĩāļ āļģāļāļāļāļāļāļļāļāļāļĨāļāļ·āđāļ
Execute
To kill someone as a punishment for
committing a criminal offense.
āļāļģāļĢāļāļĢāļ°āļŦāļģāļĢāļāļĩāļ§āļīāļ
Compensate
To indemnify, or pay damages, to
an injured party in order to
restore him to his position as existed at
the time of the incidence.
āļāļģāļĢāđāļŦāđāļāđāļģāļŠāļīāļāđāļŦāļĄāļāļāđāļāļāļāļ§āļģāļĄāđāļŠāļĩāļĒāļŦāļģāļĒāđāļāđāļāļđāđāđāļŠāļĩāļĒ
āļŦāļģāļĒāđāļāļ·āđāļāļāļĩāđāļāļ°āļāļģāļģāđāļŦāđ
āļāļđāđāđāļŠāļĩāļĒāļŦāļģāļĒāļāļĨāļąāļāļāļ·āļāļŠāļđāđāļŠāļāļģāļāļ°āđāļāļīāļĄāļāļāļ°āļāļĩāđāđāļāļīāļāđāļŦāļāļļāļāļķāđāļ
Exercise
Use of right or authority. āļāļģāļĢāđāļāđ
āļŠāļīāļāļāļī
Freedom of religion
The freedom of an
individual to believe or practice his or
her belief,
which is protected by the Constitution.
āđāļŠāļĢāļĩāļ āļģāļāļāļāļāļāļļāļāļāļĨāļāļĩāđāļāļ°āđāļāļ·āđāļ
āļŦāļĢāļ·āļāļāļāļīāļāļąāļāļīāļāļīāļāļĩāļāļĢāļĢāļĄāļāļģāļĄāļāļ§āļģāļĄāđāļāļ·āđāļāļāļāļāļāļāļāļķāđāļāđāļāđāļĢāļąāļ
āļāļ§āļģāļĄāļāļļāđāļĄāļāļĢāļāļ
āļāļģāļĄāļĢāļąāļāļāļĢāļĢāļĄāļāļđāļ
Fine
To punish someone for committing an
offense by ordering him to
pay a specific sum of money. āļāļģāļĢāļĨāļāđāļāļĐ
āļāļļāļāļāļĨāļāļĩāđāļāļĢāļ°āļāļģāļģāļāļ§āļģāļĄāļāļīāļ
āļāļģāļāļģāļāđāļ§āļĒāļāļģāļĢāļŠāļąāđāļāđāļŦāđāļāđāļģāļĒāđāļāļīāļāļāļģāļĄāļāļģāļģāļāļ§āļāļāļĩāđāļāļģāļģāļŦāļāļ
Imprison
To restrict oneâs freedom by putting
him into prison. āļāļģāļĢāļāļģāļģ
33. āļāļļāļ
Valid
Having the authority of law and the
binding force as permitting by
law. āļĄāļĩāļāļģāļģāļāļģāļāļāļĢāļ°āļāļģāļģāđāļāđāđāļāļĒāļāļāļāļāđāļ§āļĒ
āļāļāļŦāļĄāļģāļĒ
Infringe
To violate a law, regulation or right, to
break into, or to trespass
upon. āļāļģāļĢāļĨāļ°āđāļĄāļīāļāļŠāļīāļāļāļīāļŦāļĢāļ·āļāļāļāļāļąāļāļāļąāļāļīāđāļŦāđāļ
āļāļāļŦāļĄāļģāļĒ
Due process of law a course of legal proceedings
as prescribed by law or regulation
aimed at protecting individual rights.
āļāļĢāļ°āļāļ§āļāļāļģāļĢāļāļģāļĄāļāļĩāđāļāļāļŦāļĄāļģāļĒ
āđāļāļĒāļĄāļĩāļ§āļąāļāļāļļāļāļĢāļ°āļŠāļāļāđāđāļāļ·āđāļāļāļļāđāļĄāļāļĢāļāļāļŠāļīāļāļāļīāđāļŠāļĢāļĩāļ āļģāļāļāļāļ
āļāļĢāļ°āļāļģāļāļ āļ āļģāļĒāđāļāđ
āļŦāļĨāļąāļāļāļģāļĢāļāļĩāđ āļĢāļąāļāļāļ°āļāļģāļģāđāļŦāđāļāļĢāļ°āļāļģāļāļāļŠāļđāļāđāļŠāļĩāļĒāļŦāļĢāļ·āļāđāļŠāļĩāļĒ
āļŦāļģāļĒāđāļāļŠāļīāļāļāļīāđāļāļāļĩāļ§āļīāļ
āļĢāđāļģāļāļāļģāļĒ āđāļŠāļĢāļĩāļ āļģāļ āđāļĨāļ°āļāļĢāļąāļāļĒāđāļŠāļīāļāđāļĄāđāđāļāđ āđāļ§āđāļāđāļāđāđāļ
āļāļĢāļāļĩāļāļĩāđāđāļāđāļāļģāļģāđāļāļīāļ
āļāļĢāļ°āļāļ§āļāļāļģāļĢāļāļģāļĄāļāļĩāđāļāļāļŦāļĄāļģāļĒāļāļģāļģāļŦāļāļāļāļĢāļāļāđāļ§āļāđāļĨāđāļ§
āļāļāļāļāļģāļāļāļąāđāļ āđāļ
āļāļģāļĢāļāļīāļāļģāļĢāļāļģāļāļīāļāļģāļāļĐāļģāļāļāļĩ āļĻāļģāļĨāļāļ°āļāđāļāļāđāļŦāđāđāļāļāļģāļŠāļāļđāđ
āļāļ§āļģāļĄāđāļāļāļģāļĢāļāļģāļģ
āđāļŠāļāļāļāđāļāļāđāļģāļāļāđāļāđāļāļĩāļĒāļāđāļĨāļ°āļāļĒāļģāļāļŦāļĨāļąāļāļāļģāļāļāļĒāđāļģāļ
āđāļāļĩāļĒāļāļāļāļāļķāļāļāļ°āļāļ·āļāļ§āđāļģāđāļāđ
āļāļģāļģāđāļāļīāļāļāļĢāļ°āļāļ§āļāļāļģāļĢāđāļāļĒāļāļāļāđāļĨāđāļ§
Advocacy
Penalty
Holding
The act of supporting in public. āļāļģāļĢāđāļĢāļĩāļĒāļ
āļĢāđāļāļāđāļŦāđāļŠāļāļąāļāļŠāļāļļāļāļāđāļ
āļŠāļģāļāļģāļĢāļāļ°
A legal punishment. āļāļģāļĢāļĨāļāđāļāļĐāļāļģāļĄ
āļāļāļŦāļĄāļģāļĒ
A legal principle that can be drawn from
the judgment of the court,