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Hacking iOS GameCenter and Passbook with Proxies
OWASP Boston

November 6, 2013
Who am I?

• Karl Fosaaen
Senior Security Consultant
At NetSPI
Twitter: @kfosaaen
Presentation Overview
• Intercepting iOS Traffic
• Why and How
• Tools
• Certificates
• Identifying Pinning
• Attack Examples
• GameCenter Scores
• GameCenter Hashes
• Passbook files
• Conclusions
Intercepting traffic: Why
• iOS traffic can be interesting
‒ Most apps use web service calls
‒ Most apps are web browsers

• Traffic tampering
‒ Can you name your own price?
‒ Submit a higher score?

• Server responses can be interesting
‒ Modify what the server says to trick your app
‒ Intercepting files (ie: Passbook Passes)

• Same goes for Android
Intercepting traffic: How
• Use an intercepting proxy
‒ Set it up to capture your traffic
‒ Store and forward allows for tampering

• SSL Interception
‒ Requires a trusted certificate
‒ Some apps don’t trust iOS cert stores
•

This is a good thing, just a pain for interception

• Traffic sniffing
‒ Some apps send requests in the clear
‒ Packet sniffing can be useful
Intercepting traffic: Tools
• Burp
• iOS simulator
• Other Proxies
‒ ZAP
‒ Fiddler
‒ WebScarab
Intercepting Traffic: Certs
• Exporting the Burp Root CA
Intercepting Traffic: Certs
• Exporting the Burp Root CA
Intercepting Traffic: Certs
• Exporting the Burp Root CA
• Save the root cert as
PortSwiggerCA.crt
• Send the cert to yourself via email
and add it to your iOS device
• Instructions from Portswigger:
http://portswigger.net/burp/help/proxy_options_installingCAcert.html#iphone
Intercepting Traffic: Certs
• Exporting the Burp Root CA
• Certificate installed on iPhone
Intercepting Traffic: Burp
• Burp Set Up
Intercepting Traffic: Burp
• iOS Proxy Set Up
Intercepting Traffic: Burp
• Intercepted iOS traffic
• HTTPS request to Google from iPhone
Intercepting Traffic: Burp
• A quick warning…
‒ Watch your credentials
•
•

Exchange ActiveSync sends encoded passwords
Your login creds for other apps and sites will get
stored in your proxy

‒ Mostly watch the data getting stored in your
proxy
•

You never know when you will need to send your
Burp session to someone else
Intercepting Traffic: Certs
• Identifying pinned apps
• Able to intercept normal browser SSL
traffic
• Can’t get app specific data
• Pinning might be in use
• The app may also be looking for specific
cert parameters
•

This is not pinning
• It’s cert checking
Intercepting Traffic: Certs
• Avoiding issues with cert pinned apps
•
•
•

•

Open the app without the proxy enabled
Get to a spot where you request an
external resource
Switch over to your preferences
• Turn on the Proxy
Request the resource
•
•

•

Passbook pass
Coupon

Or just use the exclusions in Burp
Attack Examples

Example Time!
Attack Examples

• GameCenter High Scores
• GameCenter Email Hashes
• Passbook files
Attack Examples: GameCenter
Attack Examples: GameCenter
• Attacking High Scores
‒GameCenter scores update with
HTTPS POST requests
‒No input validation on “score-value”
parameter
• Max score of
9,223,372,036,844,775,807
Attack Examples: GameCenter
• Attack Process
‒Set up intercepting proxy
‒Play a game
•

Beat the first level
or

•

Trigger a score update

‒ Intercept the score update
•

Look for “submitScores” page

‒ Replace score value with
9,223,372,036,844,775,807
Attack Examples: GameCenter
Attack Examples: GameCenter
Attack Examples: GameCenter
Attack Examples: GameCenter
‒ Bad News
•
•

This was fixed in iOS 7
There’s a token now

=
Attack Examples: GameCenter
Capturing GameCenter Email Hashes
Attack Examples: GameCenter
• Capturing Email Hashes
• SHA1 email hashes can be leaked by
requesting player information
• This can be done for current friends
and accounts of “friends of friends”
• What can we do with these?
• Why would anyone want those?
Attack Examples: GameCenter
• Next Steps
‒ So you have some hashes, so what…
•

You have their handle, first and last names too

‒ What’s your email address?
•

Common email user names
•
•
•
•

First.last
FirstinitialLast
Handle/username
NameBirthYear (or other “significant” number)

‒ Who’s your email provider?
•

Gmail, yahoo, hotmail, AOL
Attack Examples: GameCenter
• Capturing Email Hashes
• Step One: Add a bunch of friends
•

Current recommendations,
leaderboards, friends of your friends
Attack Examples: GameCenter
• Capturing Email Hashes
• Step Two: Get a list of all of their friends
•
•

So “friends of friends”

Use Burp for this
Attack Examples: GameCenter
• Capturing Email Hashes
• Step Three: Friend request all of them
Attack Examples: GameCenter
• Capturing Email Hashes
• RETURN to Step One multiple times
• Step Four: Query for the email hashes
for all of your friends and all of their
friends too
•
•

This will be done with intruder in Burp
Much like step three – Send the request on the
next slide to intruder
Attack Examples: GameCenter
Attack Examples: GameCenter
• Cracking Email Hashes
‒ PowerShell Script to Guess Email user names
• kfosaaen@example.com
• k.fosaaen@example.com
• karlfosaaen@example.com
• karl.fosaaen@example.com
• karl.f@example.com
• karlf@example.com

‒ Append the top 500 email domains to the
end and SHA1 the whole thing
Attack Examples: GameCenter
• Cracking Email Hashes
‒ PowerShell Script to SHA1 hash the guessed
emails
•

This was basic, but worked well

‒ Use the email guesses as a dictionary for
Hashcat
•

The rule set can be customized to make cracking
easier
Attack Examples: GameCenter
• Final Numbers:
‒225 friends added* (as of 10/16/13)
*Records collection stopped after 45 friends

‒1,635 records gathered
• 1,534 after Unicode removal
• 14,377 available to me currently
‒300 email hashes cracked (19.5%)
Records Example:
SHA1 Email Hash
: username : First Name : last Name
591542B50A99EAA8E41136305075F9FF708F1992:bubblefish:Deb:Morgan
Attack Examples: Passbook

Passbook
Attack Examples: Passbook
• Multiple Apps are now available with Passbook
• Mostly used to store loyalty cards, coupons, and
boarding passes
‒ Gift cards are now getting adopted

• Can actually be pretty convenient to use
Attack Examples: Passbook
• Common Application Issues:
• Failure to securely deliver .pkpass files
• No HTTPs or certificate pinning
• Failure to validate pass information on
backend systems
•

Do you really have $1,000 on that gift
card?
Attack Examples: Passbook
• Passes are sent as .pkpass files
‒.pkpass is just a renamed .zip file
‒Required contents:
• manifest.json
• pass.json
• Signature
•

•

A signature file for integrity
Prevents file replacement and a re-zip
Attack Examples: Passbook
• Creating your own
‒ Join the Apple Developer Program ($99)
‒ Create the pass.json to match your needs
• The teamIdentifier and passTypeIdentifier
fields need to be modified to match your
Apple cert
• Modify the pass details that you want to
‒ Use the signpass application (from Apple) to
generate the new .pkpass file
‒ Can be done in Windows and Linux
•

Apple Developer cert is still needed
Attack Examples: Passbook
• Deployment
‒ Can be done via email or web server
Attack Examples: Passbook
• Attack overview – Proxy method
‒ Set up your intercepting proxy
‒ Request a Passbook pass from the app
•

Look for the “Add to Passbook” button

‒ Intercept the request for the pass
•

Usually to a third party site

‒ Request and save the pass in your browser
‒ Modify your pass
‒ Re-sign and use your new and improved pass
Attack Examples: Passbook
• Delta Boarding Passes
‒ One of many Passbook apps, but it’s the one
that I use the most
‒ Main Delta App does not do certificate
pinning
Attack Examples: Passbook
• Delta Boarding Passes
‒ Request for Passbook pass
Attack Examples: Passbook
• Attack overview – Easier way
‒ Add your pass to Passbook
‒ Send yourself the pass from the Passbook app
‒ Modify your pass
‒ Re-sign and use your new and improved pass

=
Attack Examples: Passbook
• Attack overview – Easier way
Attack Examples: Passbook
• Attack overview – Easier way
Attack Examples: Passbook
• Delta Boarding Passes
‒ Extracted pkpass file

‒ Extracted Sky Priority pkpass file
Attack Examples: Passbook
• Delta Boarding Passes
‒ Modify the pass.json file
‒ And include the footer images in the directory
Attack Examples: Passbook
• Delta Boarding Passes
‒ Run the Signpass utility and email yourself the
pass
Attack Examples: Passbook
• Original/Modified Delta Boarding Pass
Conclusions
•Fixes
•

•
•

Certificate pinning
Better input validation
Limiting data leakage from apps
Hacking iOS Game Center and Passbook
• Questions?
• Karl Fosaaen
‒ Senior Security Consultant at NetSPI
‒ Twitter: @kfosaaen

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Hacking iOS Applications with Proxies

  • 1. Hacking iOS GameCenter and Passbook with Proxies OWASP Boston November 6, 2013
  • 2. Who am I? • Karl Fosaaen Senior Security Consultant At NetSPI Twitter: @kfosaaen
  • 3. Presentation Overview • Intercepting iOS Traffic • Why and How • Tools • Certificates • Identifying Pinning • Attack Examples • GameCenter Scores • GameCenter Hashes • Passbook files • Conclusions
  • 4. Intercepting traffic: Why • iOS traffic can be interesting ‒ Most apps use web service calls ‒ Most apps are web browsers • Traffic tampering ‒ Can you name your own price? ‒ Submit a higher score? • Server responses can be interesting ‒ Modify what the server says to trick your app ‒ Intercepting files (ie: Passbook Passes) • Same goes for Android
  • 5. Intercepting traffic: How • Use an intercepting proxy ‒ Set it up to capture your traffic ‒ Store and forward allows for tampering • SSL Interception ‒ Requires a trusted certificate ‒ Some apps don’t trust iOS cert stores • This is a good thing, just a pain for interception • Traffic sniffing ‒ Some apps send requests in the clear ‒ Packet sniffing can be useful
  • 6. Intercepting traffic: Tools • Burp • iOS simulator • Other Proxies ‒ ZAP ‒ Fiddler ‒ WebScarab
  • 7. Intercepting Traffic: Certs • Exporting the Burp Root CA
  • 8. Intercepting Traffic: Certs • Exporting the Burp Root CA
  • 9. Intercepting Traffic: Certs • Exporting the Burp Root CA • Save the root cert as PortSwiggerCA.crt • Send the cert to yourself via email and add it to your iOS device • Instructions from Portswigger: http://portswigger.net/burp/help/proxy_options_installingCAcert.html#iphone
  • 10. Intercepting Traffic: Certs • Exporting the Burp Root CA • Certificate installed on iPhone
  • 12. Intercepting Traffic: Burp • iOS Proxy Set Up
  • 13. Intercepting Traffic: Burp • Intercepted iOS traffic • HTTPS request to Google from iPhone
  • 14. Intercepting Traffic: Burp • A quick warning… ‒ Watch your credentials • • Exchange ActiveSync sends encoded passwords Your login creds for other apps and sites will get stored in your proxy ‒ Mostly watch the data getting stored in your proxy • You never know when you will need to send your Burp session to someone else
  • 15. Intercepting Traffic: Certs • Identifying pinned apps • Able to intercept normal browser SSL traffic • Can’t get app specific data • Pinning might be in use • The app may also be looking for specific cert parameters • This is not pinning • It’s cert checking
  • 16. Intercepting Traffic: Certs • Avoiding issues with cert pinned apps • • • • Open the app without the proxy enabled Get to a spot where you request an external resource Switch over to your preferences • Turn on the Proxy Request the resource • • • Passbook pass Coupon Or just use the exclusions in Burp
  • 18. Attack Examples • GameCenter High Scores • GameCenter Email Hashes • Passbook files
  • 20. Attack Examples: GameCenter • Attacking High Scores ‒GameCenter scores update with HTTPS POST requests ‒No input validation on “score-value” parameter • Max score of 9,223,372,036,844,775,807
  • 21. Attack Examples: GameCenter • Attack Process ‒Set up intercepting proxy ‒Play a game • Beat the first level or • Trigger a score update ‒ Intercept the score update • Look for “submitScores” page ‒ Replace score value with 9,223,372,036,844,775,807
  • 25. Attack Examples: GameCenter ‒ Bad News • • This was fixed in iOS 7 There’s a token now =
  • 26. Attack Examples: GameCenter Capturing GameCenter Email Hashes
  • 27. Attack Examples: GameCenter • Capturing Email Hashes • SHA1 email hashes can be leaked by requesting player information • This can be done for current friends and accounts of “friends of friends” • What can we do with these? • Why would anyone want those?
  • 28. Attack Examples: GameCenter • Next Steps ‒ So you have some hashes, so what… • You have their handle, first and last names too ‒ What’s your email address? • Common email user names • • • • First.last FirstinitialLast Handle/username NameBirthYear (or other “significant” number) ‒ Who’s your email provider? • Gmail, yahoo, hotmail, AOL
  • 29. Attack Examples: GameCenter • Capturing Email Hashes • Step One: Add a bunch of friends • Current recommendations, leaderboards, friends of your friends
  • 30. Attack Examples: GameCenter • Capturing Email Hashes • Step Two: Get a list of all of their friends • • So “friends of friends” Use Burp for this
  • 31. Attack Examples: GameCenter • Capturing Email Hashes • Step Three: Friend request all of them
  • 32. Attack Examples: GameCenter • Capturing Email Hashes • RETURN to Step One multiple times • Step Four: Query for the email hashes for all of your friends and all of their friends too • • This will be done with intruder in Burp Much like step three – Send the request on the next slide to intruder
  • 34. Attack Examples: GameCenter • Cracking Email Hashes ‒ PowerShell Script to Guess Email user names • kfosaaen@example.com • k.fosaaen@example.com • karlfosaaen@example.com • karl.fosaaen@example.com • karl.f@example.com • karlf@example.com ‒ Append the top 500 email domains to the end and SHA1 the whole thing
  • 35. Attack Examples: GameCenter • Cracking Email Hashes ‒ PowerShell Script to SHA1 hash the guessed emails • This was basic, but worked well ‒ Use the email guesses as a dictionary for Hashcat • The rule set can be customized to make cracking easier
  • 36. Attack Examples: GameCenter • Final Numbers: ‒225 friends added* (as of 10/16/13) *Records collection stopped after 45 friends ‒1,635 records gathered • 1,534 after Unicode removal • 14,377 available to me currently ‒300 email hashes cracked (19.5%) Records Example: SHA1 Email Hash : username : First Name : last Name 591542B50A99EAA8E41136305075F9FF708F1992:bubblefish:Deb:Morgan
  • 38. Attack Examples: Passbook • Multiple Apps are now available with Passbook • Mostly used to store loyalty cards, coupons, and boarding passes ‒ Gift cards are now getting adopted • Can actually be pretty convenient to use
  • 39. Attack Examples: Passbook • Common Application Issues: • Failure to securely deliver .pkpass files • No HTTPs or certificate pinning • Failure to validate pass information on backend systems • Do you really have $1,000 on that gift card?
  • 40. Attack Examples: Passbook • Passes are sent as .pkpass files ‒.pkpass is just a renamed .zip file ‒Required contents: • manifest.json • pass.json • Signature • • A signature file for integrity Prevents file replacement and a re-zip
  • 41. Attack Examples: Passbook • Creating your own ‒ Join the Apple Developer Program ($99) ‒ Create the pass.json to match your needs • The teamIdentifier and passTypeIdentifier fields need to be modified to match your Apple cert • Modify the pass details that you want to ‒ Use the signpass application (from Apple) to generate the new .pkpass file ‒ Can be done in Windows and Linux • Apple Developer cert is still needed
  • 42. Attack Examples: Passbook • Deployment ‒ Can be done via email or web server
  • 43. Attack Examples: Passbook • Attack overview – Proxy method ‒ Set up your intercepting proxy ‒ Request a Passbook pass from the app • Look for the “Add to Passbook” button ‒ Intercept the request for the pass • Usually to a third party site ‒ Request and save the pass in your browser ‒ Modify your pass ‒ Re-sign and use your new and improved pass
  • 44. Attack Examples: Passbook • Delta Boarding Passes ‒ One of many Passbook apps, but it’s the one that I use the most ‒ Main Delta App does not do certificate pinning
  • 45. Attack Examples: Passbook • Delta Boarding Passes ‒ Request for Passbook pass
  • 46. Attack Examples: Passbook • Attack overview – Easier way ‒ Add your pass to Passbook ‒ Send yourself the pass from the Passbook app ‒ Modify your pass ‒ Re-sign and use your new and improved pass =
  • 47. Attack Examples: Passbook • Attack overview – Easier way
  • 48. Attack Examples: Passbook • Attack overview – Easier way
  • 49. Attack Examples: Passbook • Delta Boarding Passes ‒ Extracted pkpass file ‒ Extracted Sky Priority pkpass file
  • 50. Attack Examples: Passbook • Delta Boarding Passes ‒ Modify the pass.json file ‒ And include the footer images in the directory
  • 51. Attack Examples: Passbook • Delta Boarding Passes ‒ Run the Signpass utility and email yourself the pass
  • 52. Attack Examples: Passbook • Original/Modified Delta Boarding Pass
  • 53. Conclusions •Fixes • • • Certificate pinning Better input validation Limiting data leakage from apps
  • 54. Hacking iOS Game Center and Passbook • Questions? • Karl Fosaaen ‒ Senior Security Consultant at NetSPI ‒ Twitter: @kfosaaen