1. Translating Transition to Transformation in Nigeria:
Options and Issues for the New Government.
Democracy is a process…Election is just an important event in that
process…Under my leadership, we shall continue the process of
deepening and widening the democratisation process, through
dialogue…
(General Olusegun Obasanjo, March 1, 1999)
Given the grip of the military as described in the preceding paragraphs, there
are two ways of approaching the problems of military control and domination of the
body politic. The first is more cautious and incremental and there are merits in the
arguments of its proponents who have posed the question thus: “how, given the
existing forms of domination, of military occupation and social stratification, can the
military be ignored, if conflict is to be averted and democracy consolidated in a
fractious setting such as Nigeria’s?” The second approach is to tackle the issue more
comprehensively: what transformations and institutional mechanisms in class
structure, power sharing and ethnic relations will be required to assure conditions of
lasting peace in Nigeria? An innovative use of both approaches would certainly work
better than an isolated use of either. Of equal importance is what becomes of the
state-building project itself in an atmosphere where the growing orthodoxy is that
what is the retrenchment of the state and its replacement with the market. Clearly,
this orthodoxy is gaining influence in the current transition with the pressure to
privatise remaining state institutions in a setting where the only people who have the
resources are those lose to the military, and perhaps backed by foreign resources.
While it is arguable that retired military officers have the right as citizens to
contribute their experience and expertise to the vital sectors of the economy given the
fact of their premature retirement from the services, it is difficult to ignore the link
between those clamouring for state privatisation with the current financial
involvement of the military with the explicit agenda to collapse the military and
capitalist classes in society under military hegemony. The seeming hijack and
subsequent control of the leading political party in the current transition programme –
Peoples Democratic Party, certainly raises the spectre of unrestrained domination in
this direction.
There is now no doubt that the military will exercise considerable “behind the
scene” influence after May 1999. The litmus test for General Obasanjo and his new
government will come on three major fronts – (1) Its response to the clamour for
military restructuring and re-professionalisation; (2) Its response to the clamour for an
institutional framework for the management of ethnic, regional and religious
polarisation in the country; (3) The demand for an accountable and transparent state
and the government’s response to the pressure to privatise the State and allow a free
rein of the market.
(1) The Place of the Military and Security Apparatus in the New Dispensation:
In the context of creating a stable civil-military relations, the overriding fact that the
military in Nigeria has now become entrenched in all aspects of civic and economic is
one the elected authorities will ignore at their peril. Finding an appropriate role and
mission therefore for those left behind in the institution who want to maintain their
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2. professional autonomy, developing a civilian, democratic defence policy expertise
and creating the necessary opportunities for networking and dialogue between
military representatives and civil society workers are the areas the government need to
work on. While General Obasanjo may not be in position to get rid of the image of a
military supporter, he must not shirk the determination to assert civilian supremacy
and oversight and the subordination of the military to objective civilian control –
especially in a context – where he is already perceived as a cloak for continued
military rule.
In ensuring civilian supremacy and a democratic pattern of civil-military
relations, the civilian leadership in a post military state must define the role the
Nigerian military must play in a clear and precise manner. A ‘mission-less’ military
poses a serious threat in relation to the military’s primary role of defence of the
nation’s territorial integrity. By overextending its responsibilities beyond defence
duties or redefining its defence duties to include other elements like nation-building
and internal security, the efficiency of the fighting force was severely undermined
under military rule. This political usurpation of military talents has been shown to be
bad in areas where the military is now needed to function like a fighting force such as
their multi-purpose, peace operations. While the Nigerian military has a somewhat
fine reputation in its commitment to and participation in international peacekeeping
duties, the professionalism of its soldiers on peace keeping missions has also left a lot
to be desired. The recent experience of losses suffered by the Nigerian armed forces
in the hands of a rag-tag rebel force in Sierra Leone underscores this point. As much
as possible, this military mission must be restricted to its traditional external combat
role as a means of strengthening civil-military relations. If it must get involved in any
internal security operations like Operation Sweep etc then a proper criteria would
need to be developed for evaluating the involvement of armed forces in non-combat
operations. Without being prescriptive about this, any attempt to redefine the role and
mission for the Nigerian military, given the declining external security threats faced
by the country must consider security in a holistic manner, and pay particular
attention to the protection of offshore interests and promotion of a professional peace-
keeping command given Nigeria’s good record in international peacekeeping
operations. If the primary role of the Nigerian military on the external front is going to
be peace-keeping and peace enforcement, this would no doubt require a
comprehensive strategy that sets out in very clear terms – conditions for involvement
in external missions, extent of commitment, conditions for withdrawal of Nigerian
troops, rotation of soldiers, training and doctrine as well as legislative oversight.
In addition to the task of identifying the military mission, the second issue for
consideration is therefore the separation of operational and policy control over broad
defence matters such as size, shape, organisation, equipment, weapon acquisition and
pay/conditions in the services on the one hand, and administrative control over the
services on the other. The professional military loves a civilian head that understands
their predicament, value unrestricted access to the President as well as autonomy over
their internal organisation and operations. Any redirection of the defence policy
process will inevitably require a different kind of expertise, which must be a mixture
of civilians and military professionals. There has to be a redistribution of knowledge
between the military and civilian political elite and a significant increase in contact
between the military and the larger civil society. The process of agreeing an
appropriate role for the military can only be successfully achieved in a climate of
sustained dialogue and full consultation with the larger population. At the moment,
the level of contact is non-existent, or just on a social and unstructured manner. In
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3. introducing civilian expertise however, care must be taken not to substitute military
incompetence in a political setting as depraved as Nigeria’s with civilian
inexperience. A good bridge might well be a Strategic Cell that may serve as a buffer
between a civilian presidency and the military professionals
Equally, the current leadership must respect the professional autonomy of the
military in spite of the temptation to want to display superior knowledge of the
institution. The immediate challenge is for the civilian, democratic leadership to make
the right choice of military chiefs to lead the military restructuring/re-
professionalisation project. When the military left the scene in 1979, General
Obasanjo and his colleagues showed their commitment with the choice of Lt.General
Alani Akinrinade as Army Chief (the most important post at the time), although he
was not the most senior military officer, was widely applauded as a good one because
of his reputation as a sound, military officer. Barely six months into the job though,
Akinrinade was ‘promoted’ into the newly created office of the Chief of Defence
Staff in a decision perceived in military circles as politically motivated and the reform
programme started by him was largely stalled. Although General Obasanjo has the
advantage of knowledge of the military, often lacking in the civilian political elite,
his detailed knowledge of the current military officers is suspect, (since they were
mostly young officers barely out of the Defence Academy when he retired).
Therefore, recommendations from the current military hierarchy should be handled
with serious scepticism and thoroughly checked in order to avoid the danger of
military politicisation in the ranks of serving officers. Besides, the damage done to the
professional military hierarchy by the inexplicable purges of the 1980s and 1990s and
the preferment given to junior officers over and above their superiors under Generals
Babangida and Abacha, had ensured that the decent arm of the officer corps left
behind is understandably less hopeful about efforts to reform the military.
In any serious quest for military reform, another albatross to address is the
collective damage that has been done to the armed forces by the alternative power-
centre approach that has been used by successive rulers to undermine the institution in
order to remain in power. Military professionalism had been seriously damaged by
the transformation of intelligence gathering networks into gestapo units for regime
security. Although this was institutionalised by the plethora of the security networks
set up under General Babangida, which culminated in the creation of the alternative
para-military service- National Guard, it turned into a pernicious act under General
Abacha with the formation of the Libya and Korean trained Special BodyGuard
Services, which General Abacha used for his own personal protection. Credible
military intelligence sources claim that there are at least 5,000 of such elements within
the syetem and General Abubakar had failed to do anything about them. As a victim
of this gestapo unit himself, there is no reason to believe that General Obasanjo does
not know of its existence. The key however is to ensure an institutional strategy that
will ensure proper accountability and legislative oversight over all security networks
The question of recruitment into the armed forces is also one that will test the
new regime as part of the military reform exercise. This will be tied to the issue of
size of the Nigerian military. This is an issue that will also feature strongly in the
post-election debate on the structure of the nation. There is a strong perception,
rightly or wrongly, that a dominant recruitment of ‘Northerners’ into the Nigerian
military persists in spite of the principle of quota system introduced during
Obasanjo’s first coming. Only recently, the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN),
raised this as a fundamental problem. While this is a political problem that cannot be
resolved on a rational basis, central to the issue of military recruitment pattern in
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4. terms of military professionalism are three central questions: Should the Nigerian
armed forces in a democratic dispensation be an equal opportunities institution?
Should it be a combat effective, battle ready force recruited from the most able in the
most rigorous and competitive manner? Should the manner of recruitment matter – if
the training is standardised and geared towards bringing out the best in every recruit?1
Although the above are the rational questions to which answers must be found, there
is no evidence to suggest that you cannot have an equal opportunities military that is
professionally competent and up to the task of defending the territorial integrity of the
nation.
But in order to resolve the problem of recruitment, especially at a time of
declining national resources, the size of the armed forces itself must come up for
debate. These are political issues that can only be resolved through a process of
confidence building and conflict resolution mechanisms. There is no accurate figure
of the size of the Nigerian armed forces, but most estimate range between 70,000 and
80,000 men, which makes an accurate headcount of Nigerian soldiers an immediate
step in this direction. There is also a consensus that given the level of threats faced by
the nation, Nigeria can make do with a significantly reduced armed forces, although it
must be said that traditional assessment would consider the current size inadequate to
the country’s population and its regional responsibilities. To buttress the demand for
reduction in size, even the much discredited Constitutional Conference that produced
the 1995 constitution agreed that the size of the military should be cut down to
50,000.
Instead of such arbitrary reduction, the new civilian leadership can conduct an
assessment of the force structure in a much more objective manner. For example, if
the military mission is primarily coastal – protection of offshore economic interests,
and external – peacekeeping duties, are the personnel currently emphasised in the
armed forces order of battle suitable for the types of missions the military may be
called upon to perform? Are the manpower levels cost-effective, and most
importantly, does the institutional recruitment process procure individuals that are
wholly dedicated to their military duties, reliable and efficient. Put more graphically,
why is the Nigerian Navy virtually dead and the air force almost non-existent if the
real threats are as explained above. Why does Nigeria need four divisions of over
65,000 men and officers in the army, and why was recruitment up till the late 1980s
process geared towards sophisticated equipment and modern technology, when
officers are not fit enough to withstand pressures not otherwise common in their
previous infantry based experience? Although the Army’s Training and Doctrine
Command of the Army,[TRADOC] has tried to address this confusion by formulating
doctrine centrally, this has only slightly reduced the degree of subjectivity and
prejudice hitherto prominent in policy making because the distortions in the career
build up of officers has been largely compounded by the political encumbrances of
the military, not by lack of ideas as to what is right and proper.
Again, General Obasanjo has a particular advantage here if the discredited
officers involved in his entry into politics do not draw him back. He was one of the
four senior officers who designed the post-civil war demobilisation strategy, which
was ignored by the Gowon administration. His government later implemented this
policy and it is to their credit that they reduced the size of the armed forces by at least
100,000 from the 250,000 men at the end of the civil war in 1970. The lessons that
was learned and experience gained from the demobilisation process the last time
1
See Kayode Fayemi, “The Politics of Military Recruitment: What is to be done?”, Tempo Magazine,
28 August 1997, pp.4-5 for an extensive analysis of the Nigerian Armed Forces’ recruitment.
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5. around can help them in addressing the problem, once again. The challenge here
would come in the form of what to do with the demobilised soldiers – a sort of “jobs”
for “guns” strategy that would ensure that violent crime do not rise exponentially in
the course of the demobilisation effort. The most important point at this stage is to
take a principled stand to address the crisis posed by a huge, bloated army that has
become flat-footed and grossly incompetent.
(2) Restructuring and National Cohesion: Military restructuring can only take its
proper place within the context of national restructuring. Very little has been said by
General Obasanjo and his party on this particular subject, except for the glib reference
to “making every Nigerian have a sense of belonging” in the country. The depth of
alienation to the concept of Nigeria is so overwhelming in certain parts of the country
that this simply would not do. If the government buries the past, rather than revisit it
in the name of “one nation, one destiny” and “peace and stability”, popular mantra
that have no meaning within the context of Nigeria’s damaged structure, the
government will only remind ordinary people of the Shagari days when these words
were in popular use, even as the fabric of the nation was being destroyed by prebendal
politics.
The newly elected authority has an advantage in the fact that no constitution
has been promulgated. As the president of all Nigerians, and not just those who voted
for his party in the elections, he should seriously consider a national forum for
constitutional reform. Whilst using the constitution likely to be promulgated by the
military before its exit as a basis for civilian rule, the three months interregnum
between election and inauguration should be used to prepare a fully worked out
constitutional reform project to which all sections of society can subscribe. The idea
that the constitution promulgated by the military should be the permanent basis of this
democratic dispensation may not necessarily augur well for the consolidation of this
narrow opening.
To promote the idea of an incremental, constitutional framework in the face of
opposition to political reform by conservative elements in the military, bureaucracy,
political parties and the hegemonic class, any constitution promulgated by the military
should be treated as an Interim Constitution. It is probably too late to ask the outgoing
military regime that the process for the Constitution and consultation be written into
the constitution that will be promulgated to ensure an inclusive, participatory
approach in which public input is paramount, at least a new government with an
elected mandate of the people can do this if it is really keen to break away from
Nigeria’s sordid past. A few issues that have been strong in the minds of Nigerians
which should form the general principles used by the incoming government (in case
they are not addressed by the military constitution) include: Devolution of powers
from the Centre to the constituent/federating units; Effective Independent
Commissions with broad invesigative powers and prosecutorial authority to combat
corruption, and promote transparency and accountability; representative institutions
for Citizens participation in democracy and power sharing; Sustainable mechanisms
for Economic Development, Social Justice, Rule of Law, Human Rights and Gender
Equality, Institutional Mechanisms for sustainable military and police reforms.
The idea of an interim constitution leading to a more inclusive constitutional
framework is not a unique one. This was the process adopted in South Africa and it
has been recently used in the formulation of the 1997 Thailand constitution. This is
going to try the resolve of the incoming government, but if the government is to go
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6. beyond “business as usual”, leadership requires that tough measures are taken to get
the country back on track.
(3) Between the State and the Market: The Challenge of Creating an Accountable
and Efficient State: Of all the challenges that the new government in Nigeria is going
to face, the pressure from forces – external and internal – who are eager to have
democracy without the State – will be the most intense. Already, the stage is set for
the privatisation of several State assets under the pretext that they have been
inefficiently run and many foreign interests are angling for the huge divestment
programme as soon soon to be unveiled. General Obasanjo seems to know that the
resolution of the Nigerian economic crisis is not a choice between the State and the
Market as he pointed out in his pre-election dinner at the Lagos Chamber of
Commerce. Many Nigerians also remember his public opposition to the Structural
Adjustment Programme because of its lack of a “human face.”
The trouble that many observers notice is that those who have invested in
General Obasanjo’s election want divested state assets in return for their support.
Equally, Western diplomats have backed him in the hope that he can unleash the
magic of the market in a country that has been bedraggled by the strictures of SAPs
over the last decade.2 None of these constituencies are particularly bothered by the
fact that what they are urging upon the new government in Nigeria is anti-democratic
even as they promote good governance and democracy. To suggest the parcelling out
of the Nigerian State assets as the only option for saving the State without adequate
consultation with the citizenry in order to seek a national consensus in support of such
an action is a travesty of democracy. The idea of privatising the State’s oil assets as
has been suggested in several circles for example, without adequate consultation with
the Niger-Delta people can only result in democratic reversal, rather than democratic
consolidation. Yet, the crisis of governance and economy in Nigeria is a serious one
requiring serious attention but the experience of other African countries whose
democracies have been undermined by this unrestrained market orthodoxy is
particularly apt3 and the challenge is how to carry out economic reform without
undermining democratic governance.4 As Olukoshi argued, “in sticking to the neo-
liberal reform project, several elected governments have presided over the
undermining/dissolution of the coalition of mostly anti-adjustment forces that
propelled them to power in the first place.”5 It is possible that the people might even
be prepared to go farther than the regime is willing to in respect of economic reform if
all the options are put before them and national consensus is sought widely. This is
moreso in an atmosphere where they are convinced that institutional corruption and
personal graft will be stopped and a realistic development plan is in place.
The problem with the current incoming government in Nigeria is that its
campaign was very thin on ideology or issues and little is known in terms of what it
2
In a recently released Survey on Nigeria, Financial Times confidently wrote that “virtually all
Nigerians are now agreed that the sale of state assets, even to foreigners, is the best way to arrest the
tide of inefficiency in the country.” Financial Times Survey on Nigeria, February 23, 1999.
3
In Benin, the democratic government of Nicephore Soglo lost out to his opponents because of the
policiesd adopted by his government. The revolt against President Rawlings by the Ghanaian populace
in 1994 is also a pointer to the opposition that might accompany policies that have not been agreed by
the people.
4
For an extremely persuasive critique of the new market orthodoxy of State privatisation, See Adebayo
Olukoshi, Structural Adjustment and the Crisis of Governance in Africa, Research Report 104,
Nordiska Afrikainstutet, 1998.
5
Ibid., p.51
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7. seeks to do to redress the economic crisis the country has faced. Setting up a
government and an institutional system that is broadly accountable and transparent
may be the best place to start, but even this will not succeed if those involved in past
graft were to escape any punishment for the crimes perpetrated against the state. For
example, it would be necessary to revisit the Okigbo report into the account of the
Central Bank between 1988 and 1994 as well as the set up investigations into the
finances of the Abacha government between 1993 and 1998. It is therefore worrying
when General Obasanjo says his government is not interested in probing previous
regimes for corruption, even though his resolve to “seek, to search, to find internally
and externally” ill-gotten wealth deserves commendation.
Simultaneously, the government can put together a team of independent
experts to review the proper state of the Nigerian economy as part of its transitional
arrangement in the three month period preceding its inauguration which should
seriously consider the economic agenda as one of the issues to put forward before a
National Forum.
(4) The Case for a Truth Commission: It is why the central issue to be resolved is
the need to negotiate a process of reconciliation (Argentina/Chile) or restitution
(South Korea) between the military and the civil society that takes into account what
is in the long term best interests of human rights and fundamental freedoms in
consolidating democracy. In Nigeria where the military has had a long and chequered
history of political intervention and built up immense economic clout, assuaging the
fears of the military in a consolidating democracy by a declaration of amnesty for past
misdeeds poses a serious challenge to the strengthening of a stable civil-military
relations. Already, several people in Nigeria are yearning for the day when the
military would be brought to account for past actions and any attempt to stop that
process happening will be opposed by those important opinion leaders. Yet, the
question must be asked, as others must have asked themselves in Chile, Argentina and
Philippines: While restitution may be a necessary, even cathartic exercise, in terms of
a sustainable, civil-military relations, is it the nest way to promote a stable, civil-
military relations or is there a way to achieve a balance between restitution and
reconciliation. This is one of the areas where the right balance must be reached
between the search for immediate justice and the need for long term stability. Clearly,
any new government that refuses to acknowledge the scale of abuse and injustice in
Nigeria over the last decade would be confronted with the pressure from the civil
society. Equally, any attempt to rush into issues bordering on the role of the military
in the last decade would raise serious concerns in military circles.
Conclusion
It seems obvious from the available evidence that while demilitarisation of politics
may widen the space within which democratic reform takes place, it will not
automatically translate into a complete overhaul of politics from its military roots,
especially in a body politic that has become so atomised and, in which the symbols,
values, and ethos of the military are replicated by large sections of the civil-society.
Even so, it would be wrong to reinforce the impression that everything is
given and pre-determined and that there is nothing that we can do about demilitarising
the state and ridding it of its military excesses. If the new government is not a hostage
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8. to its supporters, and if it understands the civil-military relations dilemma in terms of
the complexity of the state-civil-society relations in Nigeria whilst explaining how the
nature of state power relates to the key forces of production in the economy and
society within a political synthesis, then we will be in a position to address the crisis
of governance that is likely to confront the new and fragile democracy about to be
installed in Nigeria.
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