1. NIGERIA:
POSITION PAPER ON THE MILITARY
Draft Report submitted to DfID
By
‘Kayode Fayemi
Centre for Democracy & Development
2, Olabode Close,
Ilupeju Estate,
Lagos,
NIGERIA

2. DRIVERS OF CHANGE INITIATIVE:
COMPONENT 13 - THE MILITARY1
Setting the context
Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country. With an estimated population of 121
million (48% of West Africa) and a GDP of US$41 billion, Nigeria controls a
significant portion of the human and natural resource endowments of the West
African sub-region. Nigeria has the capacity and potential to be the region’s engine
for economic growth with these endowments but has largely failed to accomplish this
potential. One key institution that shares great responsibility for the country’s
inability to realise its potential is the military. The military ruled Nigeria for twenty
nine out of forty three years of its independence and on balance contributed to the
damage done to the State than any other institution. Although purported originally as
possessing modernising qualities and its reasons for intervention in politics always
included halting the drift into corruption and saving the nation from the clutches of
civilian politicians, the military leaders organised the pillaging and plunder of the
Nigerian state, destroyed the civil service which largely became a vehicle for this
corrupt practises, overcentralised power through the creation of weak states and
local governments which became totally dependent on the military for succour and
even hollowed out the military as a professional institution through its involvement in
politics. In the course of perpetrating these dastardly acts, the military destroyed the
credibility it gained from the populace as a nation-builder.
Although the Nigerian populace remains largely despondent about the performance
of the civilians now in power, they still maintain a low level of tolerance for the
military.2 Our attempt in this paper is therefore to examine the military as a key
driver of or impediment to change, examining the historical background and the
contemporary trajectories of the military in Nigeria’s development as well as the link
of the military to the quantitative and qualitative trends in poverty and inequality
over the last three decades. The paper also examines other factors slowing down
the pace of democratic consolidation, looking at the nature and character of the
Nigerian state, questions of structure, ethnicity, religion and regionalism as well as
the legacy of Nigeria’s authoritarian past in the quest for deepening democratic
development. Finally, the paper examines the policy implications of this transitional
phase, proffering policy options and highlighting key agents for pro-poor growth and
development in the country.
After four years of civilian rule, the conventional wisdom today is that the Nigerian
military is in retreat after close to four decades at the centre stage of politics.
Without a doubt, President Obasanjo has surprised many people by the boldness of
the steps he has taken to break the grip of the erstwhile military elite, to expose
corrupt practices in the military and to espouse an agenda for transparency and
accountability in the polity. Nevertheless, a contrary wisdom would contend that
1
Although this study focuses on the military, we deliberately use the term – security sector
as both a theoretical and practical distinction, derived from the conviction that an exclusive
focus on the military privileges the institution, and ignores the wider issues in the security
sector relations, reforms and challenges.
2
According to survey, seventy percent say they still maintain a low level of tolerance for the
military in society. See Peter Lewis, Michael Bratton, Etanibi Alemika & Zeric Smith, “Down to
Earth: Changes in Attitudes toward Democracy and Markets in Nigeria”, Afrobarometer
Survey on Nigeria. (www.afrobarometer.org) May 2002
2

3. there is as yet little evidence of the political institutionalisation of several of these
bold steps and it may be misleading to overemphasise the scale and intensity of the
military retreat in the democratising polity. Indeed, in light of the authoritarian
tendencies still prevalent in the current democratic dispensation, there ought to be a
growing realisation of the need to think less teleologically about consolidating
democratic transitions brought about by a combination of military fracturing and
incoherent civil society agitation. After all, if the experience of post-cold war Africa is
anything to go by, it seems clear enough that while democratic transition may lead
to democratic development in stages or “in parts”, pacted transitions have not
necessarily led to consolidated democracies nor stemmed the tide of democratic
reversals, especially in places where militarism has eaten deep into the fabric, ethos,
language and character of public discourse and action.
Any attempt to accurately assess the role of Nigeria’s military in the democratisation
and development process and its impact on the future of pro-poor reform, therefore,
would benefit more from a nuanced assessment that does not treat the institution as
a monolith. Neither should the military be defined simply by the excesses of its
aberrant officer corps nor seen through the prism of the distinction often made in the
literature between reformers and hard-liners, moderates and radicals.
Consequently, it is important to trace the sociological and institutional underpinnings
of the military’s role in the Nigeria’s chequered history of democratic transition, to
enable us assess: (a) the conditions, ingredients and consequences of military
projects for nation-building (political institutionalisation and economic development
through democratic transition); (b) the impact of the post-civil-war ‘democratic
pressure’ on the political role of the military and their nation-building agenda, the
impact of the post cold war pressure on the military and the State and, (c) the likely
impact of the manifold legacies of Nigeria’s authoritarian past on the consolidation of
civil politics, democratic governance and pro poor growth.
Equally, the military complex could only be addressed within a historical and political
context. Hence, to understand the nature and complexities of the challenges faced
in the security sector and proffer solutions to them, an assessment of Nigeria’s
political environment is critical. To what extent, for example has the question of the
State and national legitimacy been resolved? What do the Constitution and other
laws say about the governance of the security forces; what is the mission, purpose
and nature of the military and other security forces; what is the interaction between
the composition of the military and the composition of society as a whole; Does the
mission derived from the security threat correspond to the size, composition and
equipment of the security forces; Are the resources used to fulfil the identified
mission of the security forces, or are they misused in various ways; what is the role
of non-state security actors – positive and negative and how effectively do the key
oversight agencies – legislature, civilian bureaucracy, civil society – function in
general.
Approached this way, it should be possible to review the political role of the military
and project into the future about the emerging realities of post-military politics in
Nigeria, examining the key challenges in forging a stable civil-military order, which
remain on the one hand that of establishing effective and accountable security
agencies dedicated to addressing triggers of conflict and, on the other that of
establishing effective and democratic governance of the military sector through the
empowerment of civilian oversight mechanisms.
3

4. Historical analysis of the military in Nigeria
Understanding the colonial character of the military is a crucial factor in explaining
the rise of the praetorian instincts in post-colonial militaries in Africa. What emerged
as the Nigerian Armed Forces in 1963 had a long history as a product of British
colonialism. Established as a small constabulary force at the beginning of the
century, it became part of the Royal West African Frontier Force just before the
Second World War, comprising of soldiers from all the satellite states of Nigeria,
Ghana (formerly Gold Coast), Sierra Leone and the Gambia – with a clear mandate to
protect representatives of the metropolitan authority and often at loggerheads with
the nationalist politicians that formed the crop of post-independence leaders.
In the above context, the relationship between the military and the political
leadership of the country became understandably fraught and this multi-layered
colonial hangover was to define the development (or lack of it) of the military
political doctrine – especially as this related to ‘development’ and 'security'. Indeed,
since the post-colonial State inherited, and in most cases expanded the hegemonic
tendencies of the colonial period, the post-independence army remained essentially
colonial in character, and the nationalist leaders thought the most logical way out of
this dependence was an accelerated Nigerianisation policy. Whilst this showed
evidence of direction and purpose on the part of the leadership, the political
coloration of the Nigerianisation policy undermined the professionalism of the military
as loyalty among the fighting men became divided along regional and political lines.
According to Billy Dudley, the 1962 law that sanctioned a quota system in the army
recruitment process created the impression that:
"Whereas before the system was introduced, recruitment and mobility
were thought to be dependent on the individual’s ability, with the
[new] system the suspicion grew that this mattered less than who were
one’s patrons. The ‘unintended consequence’ of the political decision
to introduce a quota system was the politicisation of the military."3
Yet, in spite of the notion that the military had become an extension of the dominant
political elite as Dudley suggested, it is equally arguable that the Nigerianisation
agenda merely reproduced and expanded the colonial armed forces’ recruitment
pattern. Representativeness was never an issue for the colonial army and the bulk of
the recruits came from the ‘martial’ groups mostly from the North, but in the
recruitment of the officer material where the forces needed fairly well educated men,
the bulk of the educated men came from the southern ethnic groups.4 This early
pattern of recruitment was replicated in the post-independence armed forces.
Clearly, the political elite of the immediate post-independence era was very sensitive
to the fact that two-thirds of the officers by 1962 were from the South (and mainly
Ibo), hence the 1962 quota policy was aimed at redressing the imbalance already
dominant in the officer ranks.5
The domestic upheavals in Nigeria’s post independence politics coupled with the
global promotion of the military in development set the stage for military intervention
3
Billy J. Dudley, Political Stability and the Nigerian State (Ibadan: Oxford University Press
1971)
4
Prior to the first military coup in 1966, two thirds of the officers were Ibo in origin.
5
On the issue of recruitment, see J.’Kayode Fayemi, “The Politics of Military Recruitment in
Nigeria: A critical appraisal,” Tempo Magazine, August 27, 1997,pp.4-5.
4

5. in politics and it was no surprise that the military intervened in direct political affairs
by January 1966. From January 1966 to September 1979 (14 years) and January
1984 to May 1999 (15 years), the military took charge of political leadership in the
country. Twenty nine years of this involvement fostered deep seated militarism in the
body politic and left legacies of authoritarianism.
Table 1 A profile of Nigeria’s governments since independence
Dates Type Main Protagonists Control of the Military
Oct '60 – Jan. Elected, civilian Prime Minister Bale- Small military (10,000) Colonial in
'66 with strong wa, Alhaji Ahmadu orientation, but professional in
regional bias Bello (Premier of the character, increasingly drawn into
North), Chief internal security by rising political
Awolowo (Premier of tension
the West), Dr Okpara
((Premier of the
East), President
Azikiwe
Jan – July ’66 Military junta after Major K. C. Nzeogwu, Assassination of prominent political
first coup General A. Ironsi leaders – especially in the north
destroyed military espirit de corps
and threatened professionalism.
Jul ’66 – Jul 75 Collegial Military General Gowon and Broad-based support of all armed
junta, weak at members of the forces for military junta in spite of
inception, but Supreme Military earlier problems, partly due to lack
strengthened by Council of commitment to a political
civil war timetable.
July '75 – Sept Military junta Generals Mohammed, As above, but with more credibility
'79 Obasanjo, Yar'Adua, and more emphasis on
Danjuma, and middle- professionalism and political
level officers who change.
overthrew previous
junta
Oct ’79 – Dec Elected civil rule President Shagari of Limited control of the military;
'83 under 1979 the National Party of creation of alternative base in
constitution Nigeria; multiparty police force as well as patronage to
political structure, ensure loyalty to government.
presidential style of
government
Dec ’83 – Aug Popular military Generals Buhari, Professional-political prerogative;
'85 junta Idiagbon, Babangida, increasing authoritarian tendency
and Abacha in a largely internally oriented
policy agenda.
5

6. Aug ’85 – Aug Transition from General Babangida Co-optation of the military in the
'93 junta to was the main player ruler's personal project via
personalised with 'bit parts' to patronage and deft political
dictatorship in a close civilians and manoeuvrings.
palace coup military 'politicians'
Aug ’93 – Nov Interim Chief E. Shonekan, Clear military control of a
'93 government Head of Interim government that lacked legitimacy
representing Government, and and popular support in a period of
interregnum after General Abacha, high political tension.
the annulled Defence Minister
elections and exit
of Babangida
Nov ’93 – June Full-blown military General Abacha Undermined military
'98 dictatorship professionalism, increased use of
intelligence and security outfits,
especially death squads, against
political and military opponents.
June '98 – May Military General Abubakar Focus on political transition and
'99 dictatorship with a Abdulsalami preparation for withdrawal from
human face - government.
under pressure to
reform politically
and exit gracefully
May '99 – May Elected civilian President Obasanjo, Increasing presidential, rather than
‘03 government civilian government democratic control of military;
with a non- commitment to military
ideological, centrist professionalism, diminished
notion but weak party likelihood of full-blown military
structure and coup but increased spread and
militarily imposed intensity of communal conflicts and
constitution. human rights abuse by sections of
the military.
Legacies of Nigeria’s Military/authoritarian past
When the Nigerian military first intervened in politics in January 1966, their action
was acclaimed as a nation-building/transformation project aimed at eradicating
corruption and reordering the State. Six months after, the Nigerian army had become
the catalyst for national disintegration as it broke up into ethnic and regional factions
and exacerbated existing primordial cleavages, which had earlier undermined its
professionalism, eventually leading to the three year civil war. The civil war was
however significant in helping the military regain a level of legitimacy after the war
ended. Strengthened by the favourable aftermath of the civil war, the ruling military
elite headed by General Yakubu Gowon utilised the legitimacy provided by the
favourable ‘resolution’ of the war to project the military as the vanguard of the
nation-building project. Consequently, the civil war which albeit fragmented the
6

7. military as an institution now provided it with the best opportunity to redeem its
image, but not necessarily on account of any sterling performance in the prosecution
of the war.
Although the civil war is not the focus of Component 13 of the Drivers of Change
initiative6, it is important to use the civil war to illustrate why policy choices taken at
crucial points of transition in a country’s political transition matters. The action and
inaction of the government in the aftermath of the civil war also highlights the
degree to which it influenced the actions of the military regime, especially its claim to
a pride of place in the nation-building project.
To understand the impact of the inability of the post-war military regime to maximise
its post war legitimacy, it would be useful to examine the legacies in greater depth,
especially in areas such as: (i) the politicisation and de-institutionalisation of the
armed forces; (ii) the personalisation of power and quest for the creation of a
military party; (iii) the weakening of accountability and control mechanisms and the
growth of the intelligence agencies; (iv) business-civilian bureaucracy-military links
and corruption; (v) the emergence of the ethnic-regional factor in the armed forces
and (vi) societal militarisation, crime and political violence.
(i) The Legacy of a Politicised and De-institutionalised Military
Most observers of the Nigerian military in its thirty years of involvement in politics
agree that the institution was riven by a variety of corporate, ethnic and personal
grievances developed over time in the prolonged years of the military in
government.(Ihonvbere, 1997; Adejumobi, 1999) Although the negative impact on
professionalism and the operational effectiveness of the military had become
noticeable – especially in the aftermath of the civil war – given the confusion and
lack of direction that attended the professional direction of the post-war military.
Unfortunately, the euphoria of federal victory and the immediate pressures of
rehabilitation, reconciliation and reconstruction of the political terrain fostered the
creeping organisational inertia in which the armed forces had become embroiled.
Military planners and battle commanders were uncertain that the war was won by
effective organisation of the military7, and honest enough to admit that peacetime
deterrence will be harder to achieve if renewed attention was not paid to
professional/organisational issues around mission/role, doctrine, force posture, force
levels, combat operational command, resource allocation and weapon procurement8.
In spite of this recognition, Nigeria's immediate post war defence organisation did not
depart markedly from what existed in pre-war circumstances, mainly because the
preference for incremental, rather than radical change was overwhelming. Indeed, a
wide gap existed between defence organisation and strategic purpose, in terms of the
relationship between the mission derived from threat assessment and force design,
posture, weapons procurement procedures, resource allocation and combat operational
6
For an extensive analysis of the impact of the civil war on the Nigerian military, please see:
J.K.Fayemi, Threats, Military Expenditure and National Security: Trends in Post Civil war
Defence Planning in Nigeria, 1970-1990, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of London,
1993.
7
J.J.Oluleye, Military Leadership in Nigeria, 1966 - 79, (Ibadan: University Press Limited,
1986)
8
O.Obasanjo: Not My Will: An Autobiography of a Former Head of State, (Ibadan: Ibadan
University Press, 1990).
7

8. command. Although a few cosmetic attempts were made in restructuring the defence
organisation (Fayemi, 1994), subordinating the service viewpoint became the main
problem in the promotion of the defence view. Service interests, service needs and
service power continued to dominate the Nigerian military structure, frustrating all
efforts to establish a rational system of strategic planning, force development, resource
allocation and collective military co-ordination throughout the period of military rule.
The limited attempt made towards central coordination during civilian rule from 1979 to
1984 was hobbled by the combination of civilian inexperience and military’s continued
inter-service rivalry.
The implications of military involvement in politics however went beyond defective
defence organisation and management. One aspect that deserves a particular
examination is the impact of military coups on corporate professionalism. By their
very nature, coups are high-risk ventures, which in their success or abortion almost
always result in the loss of perpetrators or their targets, or both. The persistence of
coups and the decimation of the officer corps had a negative impact on the
profession and invariably, national security. For example, the 1966 coups saw the
loss of at least two thirds of the officer corps; the abortive 1976 coups led to the
execution of 116 military men, police officers and civilians; the 1986 abortive coup
resulted in the deaths of some of the country's best pilots, and this in part led to the
near total decimation of the air-force under General Babangida, a situation which
further resulted in the avoidable deaths of 150 military officers in a defective C-130
Transport plane crash in 1991. The April 1990 coup led to the deaths of at least fifty
military officers. Altogether no fewer than 400 officers lost their lives in or as a
result of coup d'etats. In addition to the loss occasioned via executions was the scale
and intensity of premature retirements, unexpected dismissals and rank inflation that
resulted from abortive or successful coups. Ordinarily, retirements and promotions in
the military establishment is a routine thing. Yet despite the surface plausibility of
“routine exercise”, “natural attrition” or “declining productivity”, that accompanied
the dismissals and promotions of this period, the overwhelming consensus was one
of an exercise overtly politically motivated.
By the time General Abacha died in June 1998, the military institution had suffered
seriously from this blatant disregard of its structure and procedures and no fewer
than 300 members of the officer corps had lost their commission in the course of
these haphazard retirements and dismissals. The flip side of the above situation was
the excessively rapid promotions that accompanied them which tended to create
false expectations through rank inflation and this had other implications for the
country's security as commanders kept changing and not enough time was given for
familiarization in command and staff posts, the overall consequences of which was
acute disorientation and organizational dysfunction among the rank and file. At
another level, the political careerism resulting from successful coups also engendered
resentment, rivalry and disunity amongst military officers. Thus, organizational
dysfunction in the Nigerian military organization resulted primarily from this political
involvement. Both played a mutually reinforcing role in their impact on
professionalism and institutional cohesion. In the end, the political military failed to
govern directly and/or effectively without losing its professional attributes and
without ceasing to be an army.
ii) The Personalisation of Power and the Quest for a Military Party
8

9. In the move from the collegial and institutional agenda of the military to the
personalisation of political and military power, a variety of measures were utilised in
turning the erstwhile group project to the personal wishes of the individual ruler. In
the early days of military rule, extensive consultation and regular feedbacks within
the military constituency was the rule rather than the exception and the institutions
established for the decision-making processes did not function as mere rubber
stamps for the whims and caprices of the military junta’s head. Although the sheer
force of personality and charisma of the leader influenced the way his personal
agenda cohered with the institutional project, the institutional agenda prevailed for
much of the period preceding the Babangida regime in 1985. Right from the way he
chose to be addressed as ‘President’ hitherto restricted to elected leaders, rather
than the low key and traditional ‘Head of State’ to the regime’s political economy
project, it became evident early on that the institutional project had lost out.
This breakdown in institutional cohesion and espirit de corps in the context of the
personalised nature of rule, especially under Generals Babangida and Abacha also
had another strategy ingrained in it. Unlike in the past when it was anathema for
serving officers to stake a claim to permanent political participation, many began to
raise the stakes for constitutionalising military involvement in politics in an
institutional sense. Various institutional designs were discussed, implemented and
discarded for furthering this political project, the most prominent being the
establishment of an Armed Forces Consultative Council, comprising of officers from
the rank of Colonels and above as a General Assembly of military officers that fed
into the ruling Armed Forces Ruling Council-the pre-eminent decision making body.
Another design was that of establishing a military party. Military officers and civilian
intellectuals were assigned the task of studying a variety of institutionalised military
political party projects. Prominent models that attracted the regime’s attention
included the Nasserist/Baathist models in Egypt, Syria and Iraq as well as the
foundational regimes in Latin America and South East Asia.7 Although it was General
Babangida who put in motion the idea of constructing a military party, it was his
military successor, General Abacha who eventually implemented the blueprint and
through the brazen creation of artificial political parties. At the time of his death, all
the five parties in his democratic transition project had "unanimously" adopted
General Abacha as the presidential candidate. Although there was strong opposition
to this phoney democratisation project in civil society, it is no exaggeration that
General Abacha had the presidency within sights even if his ascension might have
resulted in a far more pernicious state.
While it is arguable that these personal political projects did not succeed in the
manner envisaged, the legacy of constitutional/institutional engineering from above
bequeathed by the military is partly responsible for the stunted growth of the
political party structure to date. Indeed, the limited success achieved by Generals
Babangida and Abacha in the creation of political parties by military fiat with imposed
but quite pedestrian ideological toga – ‘a little to the left and a little to the right’ as
General Babangida described the two party arrangement he willed into existence -
underscores why the present political parties are still controlled by the praetorian
guard of erstwhile military era in an age of neo-militarism. The fact that very little
differentiates these political parties as platforms for change explains the
disillusionment with mainstream politics and the popularity of ethnic and religious
constituencies as a way of providing security and safety.
9

10. (iii) The Weakening of accountability and the growth of the intelligence agencies
One of the most deleterious consequences of the de-institutionalisation of the
military was its loss of monopoly over the means of coercion and management of
violence in the Nigerian state. One critical factor this loss could be traced to is the
gradual and quite surreptitious disengagement of other security agencies that were
hitherto subsumed within the military hierarchy – especially as the military moved to
a more personalised form of rule. For example, the rise in influence of military
intelligence and associated bodies became directly proportional to the loss of
influence by the ‘constitutional’ military as a corporate institution and the Defence
Ministry as the bureaucratic institution responsible for accountability, leading to the
development of an alternative power-centre around the security/intelligence
networks and used by successive rulers to undermine the military institution in order
to remain in power. What suffered most in the process was the weakening of
accountability and absence of transparent security sector governance. To understand
the depth of the crisis though, it is useful to trace the changes to the security and
intelligence sector of the Nigerian security structure over the last three decades.
Consistent with the position of every post independence sovereign country in
Anglophone Africa, Nigeria’s intelligence activities were largely conducted under the
auspices of the Special Branch of the Nigeria Police Force, except for military related
intelligence work – which was also coordinated with the Special Branch activities. The
Special Branch, which was responsible for domestic security intelligence lost its pre-
eminent role in the collection, collation, evaluation, analysis, integration and
interpretation of information and intelligence after the 1976 abortive coup d'etat in
which the Head of State, General Mohammed was assassinated. The new Head of State
not only set up a new intelligence outfit – named the Nigerian Security Organisation
(NSO), he also chose a military officer to head the body. Hence it took the security of
the individual heading the government for the institution to come to the realisation that
something had to be done about the intelligence aspect of national security. This
became the rule subsequently as every change to the intelligence services reflected
more a concern about regime security rather than any rationally ordered need for
institutional development. With every change however, the intelligence services grew in
influence and relevance to the ruler in particular. Indeed, by the time General
Babangida faced down the bloody military coup that nearly toppled his regime in 1990,
the intelligence service had become the most powerful entity in the institutional
hierarchy of national security policy making – almost an alternative powercentre, with
the military institution consistently playing a second fiddle to it. The growth in influence
of security agencies that are directly accountable to the Head of State also gave the
military leaders more room to manoeuvre and helped seal their distaste for
institutional arrangements that could mediate excesses of the Head of Government
and make the ruler more accountable.
This overwhelming influence however developed a non-institutional side especially
under the Babangida and Abacha regimes, which turned out to be more pernicious.
With the ascendancy of the security/intelligence units, the associational and
corporatist character of the regimes at inception assumed an authoritarian regimen
for power consolidation as the leader’s dependence on the security and intelligence
network grew. Whilst this practice had started with the creation of NSO in 1976, it
was institutionalised under General Babangida when he set up a plethora of security
networks culminating in the creation of the alternative para-military service -
National Guard – to undercut the military institution. By this time, the role of private
10

11. military companies in the activities of the intelligence services and in the overall
management of the regime security had become a source of concern within the
military as an institution.9 Equally, a regime that had come into office espousing
respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights had lost credibility with civil
society and societal violence against the state had increased exponentially by 1989.
Through its responsibility for discovering and nipping ‘forces of destabilization’ in the
bud, the role expansion of the security services guaranteed it an autonomy and
influence not hitherto accorded security and intelligence services in Nigeria. At the
same time, the measure of accountability expected of the service within an
institutional set-up equally disappeared.
This growth in influence however took on more insidious dimensions under the late
General Abacha with the formation of the Libyan and Korean trained Special
BodyGuard Services for the personal protection of the Head of State as well as the
Strike Force and K Squad – responsible for carrying out state sponsored
assassinations of political enemies at a time that the military-controlled Presidential
Brigade of Guards was no longer trust-worthy. That this alternative power bloc
around General Abacha completely made a nonsense of the military institution and
destroyed the hierarchy that is so central to the institution, is evident from recent
revelations at the Human Rights Violations Investigations Commission’s hearings and
in the trials of the junior officers who ran these alternative security outfits.10
(iv) The Business elite-military links and Corruption-fuelled Institutional Designs
The origin of what we have referred to elsewhere as Nigeria's "bureaucratic-
economic militariat" (Fayemi, 1999) could indeed be traced back to the central role
of the military in the control and management of Nigeria's post civil war oil wealth,
especially after the promulgation of the Indigenisation Decrees of 1972 and 1977.11
If one traced the personal, political and financial links of business individuals
associated with the military prior to their exit from government and in the immediate
aftermath of civilian politics in 1979, the emerging trend of a network comprising the
military, the civilian bureaucracy and the business elite became immediately
apparent.12 At this stage though, it would appear that the acquisition by the military
personnel involved was largely in pursuit of personal wealth as an increasing number
of retired senior military officers ... combine chairmanships/directorships of their own
private businesses, with part-time appointments to key governmental posts and
parastatals relating to agriculture, commerce, and industry, in addition to interlocking
9
Ex-Isreali agents were already in charge of training the intelligence outfits and the
presidential guard by then.
10
There is a plethora of primary documents now covering this period. Among many others,
see The News Magazine, “The Trial of Abacha’s Killer gang – We were paid to kill Kudirat -
Excerpts from Sgt.Rogers Mshelia’s Confession Notes”, October 4, 1999; The Week Magazine,
“Gwarzo confesses to Yar’adua’s murder”, October 4, 1999; Tell Magazine, “Bamaiyi’s Plan to
Kill IBB – Exclusive interview with General Oladipo Diya”, October 4, 1999; “I would have
tried Abacha – Exclusive interview with General Obasanjo” Tell Magazine, November 8, 1999
and “Ishaya Bamaiyi: From Grace to Chains”, The Week Magazine, December 6, 1999. Also,
a lot of the petitions submitted to the Human Rights Violation Investigations Commission
covered the state sponsored assassinations that took place under General Abacha.
11
See J.’Kayode Fayemi, “Military Hegemony and the Transition Program in Nigeria”, Issue:
Journal of Opinion, African Studies Association, 1999, New Jersey, USA.
12
See J.’Kayode Fayemi, ‘The Military in Business in Nigeria,’ in The Project on the Military as
an Economic Actor (Bonn: Bonn International Conversion Center, 2000). Also available at
www.bicc.de
11

12. directorships of many foreign companies incorporated in Nigeria.13 In no time
though, this pursuit of individual wealth set the tone for a conscious institutional
programme of wielding political influence.14
With the arrival of General Babangida at the helm of affairs in 1985, the legacy of
militarism had become widespread. One of the first measures that he adopted in a
widely populist move purported to have led to the rejection of the IMF strictures on
Nigeria was the policy of Structural Adjustment. As the country became sucked into
the vortex of structural adjustment programme under General Babangida, the
elevation of finance over industrial capital became the most significant feature of the
period. Short term monetarist policies of exchange rate devaluation, removal of
subsidies, sale of state enterprises, freeing of prices and generalised deflationary
policies took precedence over structural reform of that debilitating economy which
was the favoured national consensus for addressing the problem at the time.
Deregulation ensured that the financial sector became the only growth sector with
interest rates determined by speculators and the military controlling a large share of
finance capital. At the same time, agriculture, manufacturing and industry
experienced severe distress due to low capacity utilisation.
Equally, the extra funds gained from the increased oil sales during the Gulf War in
1990/91 fuelled corruption as this extra income was regarded as discretionary and it
went on a massive spending binge that diverted revenues into corruption funded
patronage, sharply expanded extra-budgetary expenditure and bloated an already
inflation ridden economy. Indeed, an official inquiry into the finances of the Central
Bank of Nigeria, between September 1988 and 30 June 1994 concluded that,
“US$12.2 billion of the $12.4billion (in the dedicated and special accounts) was
liquidated in less than six years... spent on what could neither be adjudged genuine
high priority nor truly regenerative investment; neither the President nor the Central
Bank Governor accounted to anyone for these massive extra-budgetary
expenditures…that these disbursements were clandestinely undertaken while the
country was openly reeling with a crushing external debt overhang.'15
Little wonder then that the economic reform programme started by the military
regime in 1986 (under Genera Babangida) finally collapsed under the weight of the
1993 annulled election and the massive capital flight that followed. By 1993, Nigeria,
according to the World Bank, was among the 20 poorest countries in the world. The
situation has since worsened under the present regime; GNP grew only 2.8 percent
in 1994, inflation ran at over 60 percent just as the country experienced exponential
unemployment growth rate and the Nigerian naira virtually collapsed. As one
commentator of that period noted, "virtually all pretense of professional economic
management was abandoned, and the government cynically allowed the economy to
become completely predatory in nature." As a result, the country stopped servicing
interest payments on much of its $30 billion foreign debt, and the more than $7
billion in arrears on its debt to the Paris Club of Western creditors. Yet, in spite of
this dismal record, a high number of retired military officers or fronts of serving
officers were heavily involved in the finance/banking sectors. Not only did many of
them lack any knowledge of the industry, they possessed little aptitude to apply
themselves to the huge responsibilities their involvement demanded of them.
13
ibid.
14
J.Bayo Adekanye, The Retired Military Phenomenon, (Ibadan: Heinemann, 1999)
15
See address by late Dr Pius Okigbo at the submission of the report of inquiry into the
finances of the Central Bank of Nigeria between September 1988 to June 1994.
12

13. But it was not just the economy that suffered in this ‘private good, public bad’ State
retrenchment legacy of the era. The prospects for democratisation and meaningful
politics also dimmed. Given the diffused level of autonomy exercised by the military
institution that resulted from the parcelling out of the state to private military
interests, the class and group project engendered by previous military rule was
exchanged with the rule of the 'benevolent dictator' since many officers close to
power had become beholden to the personal ruler as direct beneficiaries of the
financial incentives he distributed.
In the larger society, privatisation exacerbated the prebendal politics with its
attendant pressure on ethnic relations as many who lost out in the scheme of things
concluded that the overwhelming power of the centre was responsible for their fate.
But if these tendencies were simply limited to the government, it would be less
disturbing. By institutionalising favouritism and corruption as legitimate instruments
of governance, the military regime headed by Babangida succeeded in breeding a
myriad of anti-democratic practices reproduced regularly in the world view of the
ordinary Nigerian, either in the form of a common belief that everyone had a price,
or in the disappearance of loyalty to the State as militarism became embedded in the
psyche of the average individual.
The restructuring of the economy along monetarist lines could be said to have
represented an ambitious attempt by the 'techno-military' authoritarian state under
General Babangida to generate a new hegemonic bloc and this was carried out on
two broad levels - economic and political. First, as a result of the government's
privatisation agenda, several of the state-owned industrial and commercial ventures
were sold directly to ex-military generals or to conglomerates linked to them.4 In
addition, the new merchant banks that emerged to take advantage of the
liberalisation of the financial sector featured several retired military officers on their
boards. Indeed, many military generals were prominent beneficiaries of the bad
loans allocated by these failed banks.16
Second, General Babangida went beyond the personal pecuniary motives of erstwhile
military rulers by ensuring that the stratification of the military from the rest of
society did not just exist at the level of personal arrangements, but also at an
institutional level. Hence, by adopting a practice common to Latin American and
some South East Asian military institutions, he announced the formation of an Army
Bank (which never took off!), an industrial armament city - (which also did not
happen) and the Nigerian Army Welfare Insurance Scheme (NAWIS). To ensure that
every military officer saw the stratification project as an institutional agenda, the
government spent N550 million ($60 million in 1992) advertised to a hapless public
as loans to purchase cars for military officers of and above the rank of Captains. This
was later extended to the non-commissioned officers in the form of motorcycles and
the rank and file got bicycles. Whilst this provided additional respite to the military
dictatorship, it ultimately failed in providing the platform for the elevation of General
Babangida to the civilian political space.
If the political manipulation under General Abacha was unapologetically blatant; the
Nigerian economy became a personal fiefdom. The diminution of any official
pretence of a collegial facade which military rulers always projected was total by the
16
Fayemi, The Military in Business, op-cit.
13

14. time General Abacha died in June 1997. Unlike General Babangida who parcelled out
the State to friends and mentors within the military and political society with a view
to consolidating his political base, General Abacha kept the spoils of office for himself
and his family, a coterie of his security apparatus – mostly from his ethnic base, thus
leading many to see a link between his economic and political project and that of his
ethnic base amongst Hausa-Fulani-Kanuri political elite. The context of his
plundering of the national wealth in which the presumed winner of the 1993 election
and several other political and civil society leaders were still being held in detention
further fuelled this perception that the agenda was to use a complete control of the
economy to ensure a firm grip on the political terrain. The fact that he made a
conscious effort of ignoring the military institution17, which ordinarily ought to have
provided the cover for his political project, strengthened the notion that he had the
aim of destroying the military as an institution, exacerbate ethnic tensions and shut
out the international community from the country in other to consolidate the state
decomposition project.
(v) The emergence of the ethnic-regional factor in the armed forces
In discussing the emergence of the ethnic-regional factor in the Nigerian security
structure, it is important to start by underscoring the fact that representativeness
was not overly critical in the establishment and recruitment process into the colonial
army as already indicated above. Hence, a division of labour emerged in the colonial
army in which the bulk of the rank and file soldiers came from so-called martial race,
mostly from northern minority ethnic groups, whilst the officer corps in which the
forces needed fairly well educated men, was dominated by southern ethnic groups.18
This early pattern of recruitment was replicated in the post-independence armed
forces. Clearly, the political elite of the immediate post-independence era was very
sensitive to the fact that two-thirds of the officers by 1962 were from the South (and
mainly Ibo), hence the 1962 quota policy was aimed at redressing the imbalance
already dominant in the officer ranks.19 Events surrounding the political crisis that
culminated in the civil war in 1967 exacerbated the ethnic-regional feature of the
Nigerian military, even at a time when it was the best example of a national
institution in the unfinished nation-building project. In particular, the loss of at least
two thirds of the officer corps from the East contributed largely to the secessionist
plans of Lt Colonel Ojukwu, especially after the assassination of General Ironsi, the
Supreme Commander of the Nigerian Armed Forces at the time.
The end of the civil war in 1970 offered the opportunity to redress perceived
imbalance and the subsequent introduction of ‘federal character’ in recruitment that
guaranteed equality of opportunity into military institutions helped in this regard.
However, the involvement of the military in politics continued to strengthen the
unitary characteristics of Nigeria’s federal structure and seriously weakened the very
basis of Nigeria’s federalism. From the creation of twelve states out of the erstwhile
four regions in 1967 as a way strengthening the federal centre in the wake of the
civil war, by the time the military left government in 1999, the country had thirty-six
states – mostly weak and inevitably dependent on the strong centre for its survival –
thus defeating the agenda of autonomy that the states were also meant to serve.
This led to the growing campaign for the deconcentration of power at the centre as
17
Even in the allocation of the Petroleum Task Force funds to the military, there was no
evidence of transparent use of the resources.
18
Prior to the first military coup in 1966, two thirds of the officers were Ibo in origin.
19
See J.’Kayode Fayemi, “The Politics of Military Recruitment in Nigeria, op-cit.
14

15. the politics of identity gained more legitimacy in the wake of a failed citizenship and
nationalist project. The fact that the power-wielders at the Centre also lacked
legitimacy contributed to the perception of the military as a fake national institution
used to promote particular ethnic, religious and political interests. The fact that there
had been no clear resolution of the national question made the perception of
ethnic/regional tension more palpable. Indeed, while the military rulers continued to
project a nationalist outlook, the alliance used in sustaining the military in power
looked increasingly regional or even ethnic to the casual observer.
This failure to resolve the nationality question in an inclusive manner is evident in the
varied responses across country to conflicts over identity, nationality, self-
determination and autonomy. The introduction of Sharia in many of the Northern
states and the attendant violent responses in Kaduna and Jos, the rising tide of
ethno-nationalism (the OPC and Egbesu Boys uprisings), and arguments over the
control of state and federal resources (particularly in the Niger Delta) are all
examples of demands for “genuine federalism.” This increasing privatisation of
violence in the country represents one of the main challenges to the reform of the
military institution and the eventual transformation of the security structure. While
most Nigerians still in favour of a federal nation, it is clear that the nation-state as it
is constituted is a source of violent conflict. The failure of the various institutional
mechanisms adopted to manage diversity and difference – federal character
principle, quota system, rotational presidency and political zoning, to mention just a
few – is an indication of a lack of social contract between the governors and the
people with a view to devising politically legitimate and inclusive mechanisms that
are consensus-driven. Many Nigerians now question the country’s future, especially if
left in the hands of a centralised State. The challenge identified by the variety of
conflicts across the country, especially since the exit of the military, is however not a
negation of the need for institutional processes to address this drift from nationalism
to balkanisation, but a call for the search for that process to be bottom-up, rather
than simply imposed by military fiat..
Yet even as one acknowledges the clear perception that the national question
remains unresolved thus fuelling a regional-ethnic military outlook, it is important to
make a distinction between the character of the military in government and the
military as an institution. While the military in government clearly looked ‘regional’
and ‘ethnic’, the military continued to show evidence of even-handedness in
recruitment as an institution. However, it is the perception that the national military
is not there to serve the interests of all Nigerians that underscores the prevalence of
private armies and militias, mostly formed along ethnic and regional lines in defence
of particular interests. It is to this last legacy of military rule, and perhaps the most
worrying due to the growth in societal and structural violence that we now turn.
(vi) The Legacy of Societal militarisation and Violence.
From the foregoing analysis, years of military rule imposed enormous costs on the
Nigerian people. But perhaps the most enduring of all the legacies bequeathed is
the level of militarism and societal violence that has become rife in civil society. In
spite of the various steps embarked upon by the civilian government since it
assumed power, the intensity of conflict in the country in the last two years
underscore why military restructuring can only take its proper place within the
context of institutionalised national restructuring.
15

16. Without a doubt, military disengagement from politics represents an important first
step towards democratic control, even if it does not equate with or immediately
translate to civilian, democratic control. From the evidence available in Nigeria so far,
formal military disengagement has widened the space within which concrete
democratic reform is possible and sustainable but it has also thrown up various
centrifugal fissures, reopened old wounds hitherto festering under the surface and
generated new forms of conflicts in the country. Some of the conflicts have
antecedents in old native-settler animosities, but many are resource-driven, spurred
by perceptions of unequal distribution of government resources. Equally, incidents of
aggression, impatience, and competition arise in domestic violence and other family
disputes, over petrol queues, in the conduct of motorists, and in the behaviour of the
armed forces and police in dealing with ordinary people.20 While the immediate
causes of increased violence and crime reside in a perception of inequality in society,
at root however is the loss of a culture of compromise and accommodation in the
resolution and management of conflicts. This point cannot be overemphasised:
Nigerians lost their culture of dialogue in a period when militarization and the
primacy of force had become state policy and it will require a return to consensus
based, rather than the current adversarial character of politics, to regain that culture
of dialogue.
Even so, the context within which politics takes place also affect the likelihood of a
dialogue and consensus driven process. In a country where the political leadership
automatically foreclose certain issues as ‘non-negotiable’ or in Nigeria’s local parlance
– as ‘no-go areas’, it becomes difficult for those who want those options to be
discussed, negotiated and bargained for, to regard imposed constitutional principles
as legitimate – especially where these principles are not derived from agreed societal
values and norms, but simply imposed by those who have the means to gain access
to political power at the centre. Having broken free of years of repression and control
under military rule, it is no surprise therefore that constituencies and communities
have taken to heart the lesson of military rule – the use of force as the bargaining
chip for forcing negotiations of foreclosed agenda. Without seeking to justify these
responses, it is important to understand the context within which they occur. Yet for
the country to attain stable civil-military relations, a critical task in consolidating
Nigeria's fragile democracy and rebuilding stable civil-military relations in the polity is
reclaiming the militarised mind, which has been fed by a deep-seated feeling of
social exclusion under military rule. Given the prevailing political culture - bred by
three decades of militarism and authoritarian control, the current political transition
only represents a reconfiguration of the political, economic and military elite, rather
than an opening up of the political system and broadening of participation. Indeed,
what we have witnessed is the creation of "shadow military and security hierarchy”
in a certain sense.
The greatest challenge to addressing the scourge of political militarism therefore is
addressing the psychology of militarism that has become reified in the context of
Nigeria’s politics of exclusion. Herein lie the paradox of democratisation and
demilitarisation not just in Nigeria, but the rest of post-cold war Africa. How
attainable is a complete overhaul of politics from its military roots, especially in a
body politic that has become so atomised and, in which the symbols, values, and
ethos of the military are replicated in large sections of the civil-society.
20
See Biko Agozino & Unyirem Idem, Democratising a Militarised Civil Society in Nigeria, CDD
Occasional Paper 5, (London:CDD, 2000) for a recent survey of the psyche of militarism.
16

17. In themselves, these manifold legacies of military politics constitute major challenges
that need to be grappled with by Nigerians, but it is their impact on the post-military
political reform project, especially its impact on the capacity for governance given
the fact that the country’s escape from the grip of a damaging military rule was more
of a lucky escape than a well ordered exit, that is critical to our understanding. The
capacity of the succeeding administration to address the negative impact of the
legacies highlighted above is key to arresting the drift to violent conflict in the
country.
Dilemmas of Military Reform in a Post-Military Era: Policy Prescriptions
under the Obasanjo administration – 1999 - 2003
The nature of General Abacha's exit and the arrival of General Abubakar on the
scene arguably determined the outcome of the democratisation project in 1999.
However one may view the eventual outcome of the rushed transition programme,
the fact that the military elite was not responding to a full defeat by the population
could hardly be discounted in understanding the pacted nature of the transition and
the push for a graceful exit for the military through a political machine closest and
more sympathetic to its hierarchy. The dominance of the party hierarchy by the
retired military and civilians closely connected to the military elite set the tone for
party formation that set about ensuring a reconfiguration of the political space,
rather than a transformation of politics.
Given the above context of military hangover, the election of an ex-military General
with significant support from the military constituency, was seen in civil society as an
extension of continued military rule of sorts. His initial moves however surprised
many and he was able to turn the limited expectation of change and the perceived
lack of room for manoeuvre to an advantage. His first move - the appointment of
service chiefs the day he came into office - gave a strong impression of a
government committed to military professionalism and determined to ensure civilian
supremacy. It was also a careful balancing act in ethnic and regional juggling by
ensuring that all the senior service chiefs came from minority ethnic groups in the
north and south. Yet, apart from a wish list of what the President wanted to focus on
in restructuring the security sector in his inaugural speech to the nation, there was
no clear articulation of the new administration’s agenda until July1999. The president
articulated the government's stand on civilian supremacy in his first major speech to
the military establishment when he addressed the graduating Course Seven of the
National War College on July 24, 1999. In the speech, he highlighted the following
principles:
• Acceptance of the elected civilian President as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces, and the supremacy of elected officials of state over appointed
officers at all levels;
• Acceptance of civilian headship of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and
other strategic establishments;
• That decisions regarding the goals and conduct of military operations
must serve the political and strategic goals established by the civil
authority;
• Acceptance of the application of the civilised principles to all military
investigations and trials, and
• The right of Civil (Supreme Court) authority to review any actions or
17

18. decisions taken by military judicial officers.
In line with the above, the administration's agenda for military professionalisation
has followed the traditional pattern embraced in countries moving from prolonged
military/authoritarian state structures to civilian, democratic structures. The focus
has been on (i) the De-politicisation and Subordination of the Military to Civil
Authority; (ii) Constitutionalising Security Sector Reform; (iii) Reorientation and Re-
professionalisation Policy; (iv) Demilitarisation of Public Order and Increasing
relevance of Civil Policing; and (v) Balancing the demands of Defence with the needs
for Development. Let us briefly look at what has been done in these areas.
(i) De-politicisation and Subordination of the Military
As indicated above, the incoming administration gained the confidence of sceptics by
tackling the immediate challenge in the choice of military chiefs to lead the military
restructuring/reprofessionalisation project. The next move by the administration was
even more popular when "politicised" military officers were retired on June 10, 1999
- two weeks after the government was sworn in. The retirement exercise saw the
exit of 93 officers in total (53 from the army5 20 from the Navy, 16 from the air-force
and 4 from the police). The third move which also elicited the support of the civil
society was the government's announcement of an anti-corruption crusade that saw
the immediate termination of several contracts awarded by the erstwhile military
administration (many awarded to companies associated with the outgoing military
hierarchy) as well as the setting up of a judicial commission to investigate human
rights violations under the military.
Popular as the measures taken were, the government’s attention still appeared to
have focussed on the dominant model of civil-military relations, which assumes a
level playing field in which ‘autonomous military professionalism’ can be predicated
on ‘objective civilian control’, one that encourages an ‘independent military sphere’
that does not ‘interfere in political matters’. In reality though, this perspective treats
civilian control as an event, a fact of political life, not a process that has to be
negotiated within a continuum, especially in states emerging from prolonged
authoritarian rule. In our view, civilian control should not be seen as a set of
technical and administrative arrangements that automatically flow from every post
military transition, but part of complex political processes, which must address the
root causes of militarism in society, beyond the formal removal of the military from
political power or the retirement of politically tainted officers. There is a need to
redefine our notion of the a-political military - a notion that has been central to the
discourse of the dominant civil military relations literature. In Nigeria where the
military has become entrenched in all facets of civic and economic life and where
politics has just featured a reconfiguration rather than a transformation of power as
argued above, anchoring the need for an objective civilian control to the notion of an
a-political military underestimates the seriousness of the issues at stake. While
formal mechanisms for control are not in themselves wrong, the reality underpinning
Nigeria's crisis of governance underscores the fact that subordination of the armed
forces to civil control can only be achieved when civil control is seen as part of
complex democratic struggle that goes beyond elections and beyond subordination
to the presidency, but also other oversight institutions. (Williams, 1998; Fayemi,
1998). These processes are expressions of institutional relationships that are
inherently political, subjective, and psychological.13 and it is only when the political
and psychological issues arising out of military involvement in politics are grasped
18

19. that we can begin to look at objective control mechanisms. One innovative way of
integrating both objective control mechanisms and subjective political and
psychological issues into a vision of change that is transformatory is the use to which
the constitution is put in the quest for governance in the security sector. The fact
that many of these steps are taken with no discussion as to the precise nature of
security that the citizens desire underscore the need to locate improvements within a
constitutional framework.
(ii) Utilising the Constitution to Clarify and entrench the role of the security sector
If the objective of creating efficient and effective professional armed forces is to be
achieved, particular attention must be paid to the principle of accountability to the
people and their elected representatives. The location of the military in terms of its
accountability to the executive, the legislature and the wider society must be clarified
in constitutional terms. This is important for a number of reasons. First,
accountability, transparency and openness have become fundamental constitutional
tenets and the Obasanjo administration is leading the way in this respect. Second, as
a national institution, the military relies on the public for support and sustenance in
order to fulfil its constitutional mandate. Third, the idea that security matters reside
exclusively in the realm of military constituency is one that is increasingly challenged
by the broadened and inclusive meaning of security to society. Hence, the view that
issues relating to the armed forces and security services must be subjected to public
discourse is becoming acceptable. Therefore, if the state must resolve the problems
of accountability and address the current lacunae arising from the character of the
postcolonial security structures as a result of prolonged military dictatorship, popular
participation and organisational coherence, not exclusivity, are the crucial things
needed to ensure democratic control and widen national security perspectives.21
Unfortunately, previous constitutions have tended to be nearly silent about the
armed forces and its role in Society. Although Section 217(1) of the 1979 constitution
which stipulates the role and broad functions of the Armed Forces: namely,
defending Nigeria from external aggression, maintaining its territorial integrity and
securing its borders from violations on land, sea or air; acting in aid of civil
authorities to help keep public order and internal security as may be prescribed by
an Act of the National Assembly; and performing such other functions as may be
prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly, was repeated verbatim in the 1999
constitution, there was no attempt to even reflect on the problems that arose from
prolonged military rule in the intervening two decades. While it is arguable that this
broad depiction of the roles of the security forces gives the political authority enough
flexibility to define what it seeks, this lack of clarity can also be a problem. This is
more so in circumstances where civilians frequently lack knowledge and
understanding of military affairs, and the apportioning of civilian and military
responsibilities often depend on the military itself, or on a small coterie of elected
civilian officials close to the President. In the case of Nigeria, this has led to a further
lack of accountability and the assumption of an all-knowing President. Given the
burden of its authoritarian past and the loss of credibility by the military, it was
thought that elected civilians will be allowed to play a key role in military
restructuring and redefinition of roles and missions. Yet, there is a conflict between a
21
This view was strongly espoused by the President and the national security team at the
first Presidential retreat on National Security in which a range of stakeholders were invited by
the President to discuss security issues within the context of a democratic society.
19

20. section of the populace who feel that legislative oversight should be central to
democratic control and others who are of the opinion that the President and his
Defence Minister, as ex-military leaders, should have the freedom to restructure the
military without adequate or necessary recourse to other checks and balances within
the system simply because "they know what they are doing".
As a result, the legislature has largely functioned as a rubber-stamp national
assembly as far as military matters are concerned. Not only are they often unaware
of developments, even the role of the legislature in terms of determining policy on
the size and character of the armed forces, overseeing the armed forces' activities
and approving actions taken by the executive branch, have been short-changed by
an overbearing executive branch.' There has been widespread agitation in civil
society about the need to constitutionalise in a comprehensive manner the role of
the military in internal security issues, the use of emergency powers and the limits of
emergency powers vis-à-vis the citizens’ non-derogable rights, the place of
international law in the practice and professionalism of the military as well as the
debate over the composition of the military. It is expected that the current review of
the country's constitution would provide an opportunity to re-examine the
constitutional dimension of military matters and a clarification of the role of the
executive, legislative branch and wider society in ensuring a stable civil-military
relations.
Even on an issue that has become the most contentious with the Nigerian public –
the quest for an anti-coup strategy – the current Nigerian constitution is severely
muted in its content. A clause that is most worrying to many observers on the
constitution is the rather unlimited powers it places on the legality of the security
agency to ovethrow the constitution which is the supreme law of the land. Section
315 (5)c of the 1999 constitution states that the National Security Act (a body of
principles, policies and procedures on the operation of the security agencies) remains
in law and cannot be overridden by the constitution unless the legislature can muster
two-thirds of its members to override it both at the national as well as state
assemblies. Opponents claim that for an Act that came into being via a military
decree to still have this imposed legitimacy makes a mockery of the democratisation
process and exposes the country to the whims and caprices of security agencies
which operate largely in the dark.
As if to complicate matters, the "anti-coup" clause contained in Section 1(2) of the
1999 constitution stipulating that "The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall not be
governed, nor shall any person or group of persons take control of the Government
of Nigeria or any part thereof, except in accordance with the provisions of this
Constitution. Yet, as stated above, the National Security Act can override the same
constitution, in which case an interpretation of the above clause could very well be
that anyone who successfully removes a constitutional government via the provisions
of the National Security Act is acting in a constitutional, or at least in a legal manner.
Compare this section of the Nigerian constitution with Section 3 (1) of the Ghanaian
constitution which states that "Any person who (a) by himself or in concert with
others by any violent or other unlawful means, suspends or overthrows or abrogates
this constitution or any part of it, or attempts to do any such act" or (b) "aids and
abets in any manner any person referred to in paragraph (a) of this clause; commits
the offence of high treason and shall upon conviction be sentenced to suffer death".
In subsection 4 (a), the same constitution states that "All citizens of Ghana have the
20

21. responsibility and duty at all times" to (a)defend this constitution and in particular, to
resist any person or group of persons seeking to commit any of the acts defined to in
Clause 3 of this article". The constitution goes further to declare that any person who
participates in resisting such attempts or acts of suspending or abrogating it commits
"no offence". Subsequent sections award "adequate compensation which shall be
charged to the Consolidated Fund in respect of any suffering incurred as a result of
punishment' in resisting the abrogation of the Constitution. Of course skeptics will
argue that this in itself will not stop the occurrence of illegal intervention, but the
moral force invested in these clauses cannot be compared to the tepid anti-coup
clause in Section 2 (1) of the Nigerian constitution. Similar clauses such as Ghana's
appear in the Ugandan and South African constitutions and the Ethiopian constitution
even goes as far as stipulating that a civilian must be the Defence Minister at all
times. These statements of intent go a long way in revealing the people's concern for
the rule of law.
Finally, beyond the focus on an anti-coup strategy – which is understandable
because of the country’s history, attempts to redefine the role and mission of the
security forces most see security in a wider context and reflect a perspective that
sees security and stability as the flip side of development. There is evidence to
suggest that the current administration understands the link22 but this thinking must
be translated into policy.
(iii) Reorientation and Re-professionalisation of the Military
Although the government has strenuously avoided the use of military restructuring,
preferring the more neutral reorientation and reprofessionalisation of the military,
the thrust of its programme indicates that a reorganisation agenda is on course.
Taking a cue from the speech made at the National War College in July, the Vice
President, Atiku Abubakar also promised a "comprehensive transformation of the
Armed Forces into an institution able to prove its worth" when he addressed the
Inauguration of the Course Eight at the National War College, Abuja in September
10, 1999. This transformation will include:
• Continuation of rationalisation, downsizing, and right-sizing to allow the
military shed its "dead-woods" as well as discard obsolete equipment.
• Re-equipping the services and upgrading soldiers' welfare, albeit within limits
of budgetary allocation;
• Reversing the harm inflicted on military-civilian relations by years of military
rule through measures to subordinate the military to the democratically
constituted authority;
• Building, rehabilitating and strengthening the relationship between the
Nigerian military and the rest of the world, especially African countries,
following years of diplomatic isolation and sanctions.
Although the word "demobilisation" was avoided, it was clear that euphemisms like
22
See Olusegun Obasanjo, Grand Strategy for National Security (2001: The Presidency,
Abuja)
21

22. "down-sizing" and "right-sizing" meant precisely that and there was no doubt that
years of military involvement in politics had impacted negatively on military
professionalism. Indeed - the Defence Minister, Lt.General TY Danjuma was less
diplomatic and actually stated that military be pruned by at least 30,000 men from
current strength.(Daily Times, July 29, 1999), although the President was more
diplomatic when he said the government was yet to make up its mind on questions
of demobilisation and that the military was always shedding "dead wood", hence
there was nothing significant about it. Again, because the desire for demobilisation
and or rationalisation was not based on any informed analysis, the military was able
to argue for maintenance of current force strength. Indeed, by December 2000, the
Defence Minister had turned full circle and acknowledged that the government had
decided against demobilisation because of the ‘multifarious commitments of the
military…the Armed Forces even have commitments for the maintenance of law and
order in this country.’23
It would appear that this shift in the official position has been informed partly by the
perennial concerns over recruitment and representativeness in the armed forces,
hence the wariness in government circles to confront it openly. The strong
perception of a disproportionate recruitment of 'Northerners' into the Nigerian
military in spite of the rigorous operation of the federal quota system in military
recruitment is one that previous regimes had had to deal with. The retirement of
"political" officers by the Obasanjo government was immediately perceived in
affected circles as a response to the demand to "right-size" the ethno-religious
dimension of the military institution.
Yet the question of an appropriate size for the military, especially at a time of
declining national resources, must be seen in an institutionally open and transparent
manner and through a process of confidence building and conflict management
based on objective threat assessment. For example, if the military mission is
primarily coastal and maritime i.e. protection of offshore economic interests, and
external - peacekeeping duties, the question must be asked: is the personnel
currently emphasised in the armed forces order of battle suitable for the types of
missions the military will be called to respond to? Are the manpower levels cost-
effective, and most importantly, does the institutional recruitment process procure
individuals that are wholly dedicated to their military duties, in a reliable and efficient
manner? Put more graphically, if an objective threat assessment reveals that internal
threats are the dominant threats to the country, should the armed forces be the
answer to this or a properly equipped, well trained civil policing arrangement.
If the questions of demobilisation can be resolved along these lines, central to the
issue of military recruitment in terms of military professionalism are then three key
questions: Should the Nigerian armed forces in a democratic dispensation be an
equal opportunities institution? Should it be a combat effective, battle ready force
recruited from the most able in the most rigorous and competitive manner? Should
the manner of recruitment matter - if the training is standardised and geared
towards bringing out the best in every recruit? Although the above are the rational
questions to which answers must be found, there is no evidence to suggest that you
cannot have an equal opportunities military that is professionally competent and up
to the task of defending the territorial integrity of the nation whilst satisfying the
ethno-religious balance necessary in a diverse democratising polity.
23
See Pan African News Agency, ‘Nigeria shelves plans to trim Military’, December 24, 2000.
22

23. Critical to the re-professionalisation of the armed forces as far as the military was
concerned is the ability of the State to provide efficient and well functioning
institutions and infrastructures and an enabling environment for their constitutional
tasks to be accomplished. The former Chief of Army Staff, General Victor Malu aptly
captured the feeling of the military constituency in an interview:
“Having come out of very many years of neglect because of our mismanagement,
we expected that the civilian government was going to address
issues…Unfortunately, from June 1999 to date, we haven’t got anything
meaningful to assist us in the process of professionalisation. Our training
institutions have not improved, the training aids with which we conduct the
training to reprofessionalise have not been provided; the situation in the barracks
has not changed; as a matter of fact, it has deteriorated…we did not get
anything done last year by way of capital projects and we thought these were
the things we were supposed to do if we are going to improve on our well being
to keep busy in the act of re-professionalising…”
While General Malu’s views above reflect the feeling of despondency both within the
military hierarchy and the rank and file, it is hardly fair to blame the civilian
government for the years of neglect in the military; even less so to expect the
President and his team to change this anomaly in two years. What the political
leadership can be blamed for is the lack of shared understanding about the problem
and the lack of ownership of the re-professionalisation process even by the elected
representatives of the people. The feeling is rife within the military as it is in civil
society that the life of the average Nigerian has not improved in the last two years of
civilian governance. Unlike in civil society however, where these things are
expressed daily in the public domain, they have simmered underneath the surface in
the military, partly due to the nature of the institution but mainly due to the military’s
credibility deficit with the Nigerian people who blame all soldiers for the mess the
country is in.
The need to negotiate a process of reconciliation or restitution between the military
and the civil society that takes into account what is in the long term best interests of
human rights and fundamental freedoms in consolidating democracy without
generating new conflicts is more crucial than ever and the government seems to
recognise this. Given the military's chequered history of political intervention and
inherent fears in political circles that some might use the immense economic clout
acquired over the years to undermine the gains of the democratic dispensation, the
government's careful approach to this issue is understandable. Yet in a consolidating
democracy, the government was correct to recognise that a blanket declaration of
amnesty or refusal to revisit past misdeeds posed a serious challenge to the
strengthening of stable civil-military relations. Indeed, revisiting the past misdeeds is
a necessary cathartic exercise, located within the context of sustainable, civil-military
relations. In its establishment of a ‘truth commission’ to investigate past violations
however, the right balance must however be sought between restitution and
reconciliation, between the search for immediate justice and the need for long term
democratic stability. The key therefore is to ensure an institutional strategy that will
streamline and ensure proper accountability and legislative oversight over security
actors. There is no evidence to suggest that this has happened and its remains a key
23

24. priority in the new dispensation.24
(iv) Demilitarising Public Order and the Role of Civilian Policing
Given the threats posed by internal security by the militarised (dis) order since the
new government assumed office, the role of policing has been a subject of
widespread debate in the country, especially against the backdrop of opposition to
the use of military power in “aid of civil authority", the rise of "ethnic militias" in the
country, public perception of police inefficiency and collusion with ‘agents of crime
and insecurity’. On the one hand, the statutory duties and responsibilities of the
Nigeria Police Force are clearly spelt out in Section 4 of the Police Act of 1956 as
follows:” prevention and detection of crime; apprehension of offenders; preservation
of law and order; protection of life and property; due enforcement of all laws and
regulations which they are directly charged; and performance of such military duties
within and without Nigeria as may be required of them under the authority of the
Police Act.” With 37 State Commands, 106 Area Commands, 925 Police Divisions,
2,190 Police Stations throughout the country and 120,000 police officers, the force
clearly an acute manpower shortage. Whilst the UN stipulates a police-citizens ration
of 1:400, the ration is currently 1:1,000 in Nigeria. Added to the gross personnel
shortage is inadequate accommodation and transportation, poor communication
network; poorly funded training institutions; and insufficient crime intelligence
gathering capacity.25
There is no doubt that the Nigerian Police Force has witnessed a serious
deterioration in the quality of the service it provides the average citizens under
military rule. Yet, the only period it enjoyed attention from government and
occupied a pride of place in the scheme of things during the civilian administration of
1979-1983, the police management became embroiled in partisan politics. Aside
from the politicisation of the police in the second republic however, the Nigeria Police
Force’ reputation for brutality, corruption and arbitrariness created poor community
relations. Consequently, while the civil populace is usually opposed to military
involvement in internal security matters, doubts persist about the efficacy of the
police authority in confronting public order issues in the post-military transition
period.
On its part therefore, the new government has shown the determination to:
1. Restructure and 'demilitarise' responsibility for internal security by giving police
sole responsibility for maintaining internal security and public order;
2. Strengthen the efficiency of the police force by reforming its doctrines, codify
procedures, improve training and standards especially to prevent human rights
abuse recurrence, increase the resources available to it, reduce the dead woods in
its rank, expand its role in intelligence and security information gathering and
injecting new blood into the force,
24
Although, President Obasanjo apologised to all Nigerians for the excesses of the past when
receiving the report of the Oputa Commission in May 2002, the government is yet to release
the White Paper on the report and many now wonder whether the government will be able to
address these issues in the aftermath of the elections now that the political leadership is
perceived to have greater space for manoeuvre.
25
Interview with the former Inspector-General of Police, Mr Musiliu Smith, May 11, 2003
24

25. 3. Increasing the size of the police and pay of its operatives thus improving its
estimation in the eyes of the public.
In spite of the government's declared commitment to the above, there is evidence to
suggest that it still has serious doubts about excluding the military completely from
internal security issues - given the recurrence of situations where the police have
found it difficult to cope with incidences of internal dissension. Although the
President announced the withdrawal of the military from joint security patrols with
the police on coming to office - a feature used to intimidate and abuse ordinary
Nigerians in the previous dispensation, public clamour about the inability of the
police to cope with the dramatic increase in crime, especially in the urban areas
encouraged a return to these joint patrols in places like Lagos, Abuja, Kaduna and
Port Harcourt. Even if it were to receive the most appropriate support from the
government, correcting the flaws of the past can only take place within a particular
political, socioeconomic and historical context. The evidence of the first year in office
is that the current ad-hoc reforms have not addressed the post-military internal
security conditions in the country. This is understandable even if not excusable for a
number of reasons:
• First, the serious economic problems that has led to massive unemployment,
including the highest graduate unemployment in the continent requires an
integrated strategy, not an exclusive focus on law and order;
• Second, the nature of the political problems in the country which is directly
linked to the rise of ethnic militias and the campaign for State/regional police
accountable to State Governors;
• Third, the proliferation of arms in the country (sometimes of more superior
quality than the weapons carried by the Police);
• The continuing tension between the military and other security agencies in
terms of role clarification encouraged by the rampant crime rates which has
overwhelmed the capacity of the reforming police force;
• Five, the psyche of militarism that is all-pervasive in society and that has
broken down dialogue and consensus driven resolutions of problems.
The above factors definitely pose immense challenges to any successful reform of
the civilian police sector in the internal security reform agenda. Having said this, the
question of engaging civil policing for democratic governance is central to the issue
of exorcising militarism from the body politic as it is relevant to the issue of returning
security to the community, ensuring democratic accountability and revisiting the
structure of federalism in the country. The question as to whether to decentralise the
police organisation, structure and operations has been particularly central to this
discourse given the problems that have attended the centralised control of the police
force and the use it had been put to under previous regimes. To create a service
culture, and not a regimented force arrangement which the military put in place
when in power, accountability to the ordinary citizens is central to public order and
the police cannot be trusted within the community if it retains a structure that is only
accountable to the President and not the communities. Although concerns have been
expressed about the negative use to which decentralised policing could be put, given
the nature of the inter-ethnic squabbles and community clashes that are prevalent in
25

26. the country today, it is possible to have a focus on community policing whilst
maintaining a level of accountability to federal authorities26.
Emboldened by citizens’ campaign for security, many states are responding to the
citizens' clamour by employing the services of ethnic militias for internal security
duties. In Anambra, Rivers, Enugu, Oyo, Osun, and Lagos States, "Bakassi Boys" and
Odua Peoples Congress' operatives have now taken full charge of traffic
management, confronting armed robbers with the approval of the State executives
and tacit endorsement of the Federal police authorities. As a result of these evident
problems of performance and credibility that the Federal Police now encounters, the
president recently announced his endorsement of a decentralisation package which
ensures accountability to the elected State authority in addition to their
accountability to the Central government, although without the mechanism to
enforce that principle.
Yet the problems of policing cannot be seen in isolation of the criminal justice system
since the police is an implementing agent of the criminal justice system Reforms to
the judicial system have been much slower to be adopted by the current judicial
hierarchy than reforms to the military and the police, but until there is a
comprehensive approach to access to justice and law enforcement, even the
resolution of the resource deficit will not bring change. This will necessarily involve
addressing existing gaps in accountability, oversight, access, due process,
effectiveness, efficiency and representation at the level of the Judicial, prosecutorial
and defence institutions and ensuring the necessary linkages in the justice and
security sector community – the police, correctional services, the judiciary and
prosecution services etc.27
(v) Balancing the demands of defence with the needs of development
The concomittant effect of the reorientation has been the challenge posed on the
sectoral reform by the management of security expenditure "within limits of
budgetary allocation" as the Vice President put it. Yet the process of reform need not
be antagonistic or adversarial to the management of the military expenditure even as
the debate about how much is enough to maintain defence remains a realistic issue
on the agenda. In this regard, it is commendable that the government recognises
that strengthening the military professionally without corresponding provision of
adequate resources and political support may simply lead to frustration and possibly,
unfulfilled and exaggerated expectations. On the other hand, it is important for
government to realise that downsizing, right-sizing and sectoral reform may actually
lead to an increase in military expenditure, not a decrease at least in the interim.28
26
Although there are Police-Community Relations Committees to identify concerns of the
communities, ordinary citizens do not regard this as promoting community policing seriously.
The challenge remains one of producing a system that increases public trust in police
performance and promote people’s involvement in policing their communities. To achieve
this, officers need training in community policing and linkages to the traditional security
systems in the communities for the prevention of crime and promotion of safety and security.
27
The Access to Justice Initiative by DFID has started some work in this regard, but
investigations in the course of this study still suggest need for greater coherence and ‘buy in’
by the key institutions.
28
Lack of funds remains the most vexatious issue raised with this writer in several interviews
conducted with senior military and middle ranking officers. While they all endorse the
direction of professionalism, some even hint at a deliberate attempt to underfund the sector
26

27. This is why planning and the building of mutual confidence and transparency remain
at the heart of organisational effectiveness and security sector transformation.
Hence, adopting a single-minded approach that defence spending must be reduced
from the outset serves as a disincentive, especially for security actors but ignoring
concerns about the need to attend to social and developmental spending is
threatening to the overall goal of stability, security and democratic consolidation.
For this reason, there is a growing clamour for broadening the definition of security
in the military reform agenda. This broader conception seeks to articulate security in
a manner that the individual, the group as well as the state may relate to its
fundamental objectives of promoting and ensuring the right to life and livelihood.
While the government recognises the need to strike the right balance and
understand the dangers that might accompany too broad a conception of security
which altogether dismisses the legitimate need for the military - as is already evident
in the carte blanche demand for the reduction of military expenditure in some civil
society circles - the government is not doing enough in developing a consensus in
society around this broader definition of security.
For example, it ought to be possible for the government both in words and in deed
to demonstrate why post-military Nigeria ought to be equated to a post conflict
situation given the level of damage wreaked on the country by military rule. While
conventional wisdom often ignores it, the security required in the immediate post
conflict environment might also require a higher rather than lower security
expenditure to enable the state and citizens cope with the impact of reconstruction
through the provision of a safe, secure and enabling environment. In situations
where conditions of poverty prevail after post conflict situations, it is reasonable to
predict a correlation between the lack of opportunities in terms of direct income
generation, increase in criminality, and possible re-ignition of conflict.
Nigeria, in the immediate aftermath of transition and over the last four years
demonstrates this view amply. First, the military institution that was the chief victim
of military rule due to extensive deprivation suffered under military rule had hoped
that restoration of civilian rule would correlate to renewal of attention to the
institution’s objective material needs. Equally, the civilian population totally oblivious
of how much suffering the institution experienced under military rule began to
clamour for its disbandment at worst, and reduction in military expenditure at best.
At the end of the first term, as demonstrated below, the government has failed to
satisfy both critical constituencies and the scale, scope and intensity of communal
conflict during this period demonstrated why security sector reform should be
holistic, rather than ad-hoc. It is to the assessment of military in promoting pro-poor
change that we now turn.
Assessing the significance of the military in achieving pro-poor change
Taken at face value, military involvement in politics coincided with the period when
‘money was not Nigeria’s problem, but how to spend it’, to paraphrase the remark of
the then military leader, General Yakubu Gowon. Indeed, Nigeria prosecuted the two
and a half year civil war without running into deficit (Nafziger, 1971) and the post
as a way of decapitating it. While there is no reason to believe that this is the case,
underfunding has certainly been responsible for some of the problems in the sector, such as
delayed barracks development and accommodation problems, the ammunitions dump
disaster in Lagos, the pensions crisis and procurement issues.
27