Paper prepared as part of my "Introduction to Classical Indian Philosophy" course at IIT Delhi. It is about the Theory of Error in Classical Indian Philosophy.

1. Theory of Error in
Classical Indian
Philosophy
HUL 252: Introduction to Classical
Indian Philosophy
Submitted By-
Kangkan Boro (2010CS10221)
Raman Kumar (2010CS10237)
Suman Saurabh Lugun (2010CS10258)

2. Theory of Error in Classical Indian Philosophy 2
ABSTRACT
In our study of this course, we have been introduced to the Theory
of Perceptual Error (known as khyātivāda), which has always been an
important part of a system’s Theory of Knowledge. As we started to
read up, we found that, in case of error, Indian philosophies were
preoccupied principally with non-veridical perception. In this term
paper, at first, we focus on the general aspects of the theory of error
in Indian philosophy. As we move on, we shall take up a few
representative schools of Indian philosophy, and shall attempt to
describe their theories of error and point out the shortcomings, if
any. Finally, we shall discuss about the most reasonable among these
theories and argue why it is the most reasonable one.

3. Theory of Error in Classical Indian Philosophy 3
1. Theory of Error and Indian Philosophy
Our knowledge of something, presupposes a subject of that knowledge and the
object corresponding to it. The nature of this knowledge depends upon the mind
and the cognitive organs of the subject, as well as on the conditions in which the
object is situated in relation to the subject .Now, a distant object may be
mistaken for something else, though the organs of perception may be in a
healthy condition; this error may be caused due to a peculiar relation formed
between the perceiver and the position of the object. Our perceptions of things
greatly influence what we infer and decide, which means that our whole life is
judged by us in accordance with the modes of our perception and the knowledge
based on them. As every inference is based on previous perception, erroneous
perception will nullify the value of the inferences built upon it.
khyāti denotes apprehension, in this case erroneous apprehension. vāda means
proposition, discourse, argument. The theories of perceptual error from the
points of view of different schools of Indian philosophy are called khyātivāda.
Every school of philosophy in India developed its own theory of error
(khyātivāda) made to fit its epistemology and metaphysics. For the Indian
theorist, the standard example has been mistaking a rope for a snake. We will
formulate our discussion using this example.

4. Theory of Error in Classical Indian Philosophy 4
Although the various theories of error differed from each other, every school of
philosophy did agree on two very fundamental points:
a) That in both the veridical and non-veridical perceptual cognitions of the
snake, there is no difference on the subjective side. The difference is only in the
object.
b) That the non-veridical perception (illusory experience) of a snake and the
veridical perception (non-illusory experience) of a snake are exactly alike.
From these two points it can be inferred that khyātivāda is primarily a theory of
the nature of the object of illusory perception and not of the subject.
Rest of our discussion will focus on the following five prominent theories of
error analysis: 1. Asat-khyātivāda (Cārvāka), 2. Ātma-khyātivāda (Yogacārā
Buddhism), 3. A-khyātivāda (Prabhākara Mimāmsā), 4. Anyathā-khyātivāda
(Nāiyayikas) , 5. Anirvacanīya-khyātivāda (Advaitins).
2.1. Asat-khyātivāda (Cārvāka)
This theory is simple and direct. sat means existence and asat non-existence. It
says that in illusory perception something non-existent is cognised as existent.
According to Cārvāka, the perceived (illusory) snake is really non-existent. The
other systems question this theory, because there cannot be any cognition of
what does not exist. Cognition/perception is intentional (directed at something).

5. Theory of Error in Classical Indian Philosophy 5
Even during the illusory perception of the snake, „a snake‟ is presented to the
perceiver although the „snake‟ is not real. No kind of relation can be established
between cognition of the snake and the illusory snake, for there can be no
relation between the existent and the non-existent. Without a relation between
cognition and the object cognised, no cognition is possible. Thus the theory that
the illusory object is non-existent cannot be accepted. The Cārvāka, in its
defence, argue that, since it is characterized as a materialistic school of thought,
its theory of a non-existent illusory object is perfectly in coherence with its
beliefs.
2.2. Ātma- khyātivāda (Yogacārā Buddhism)
In the term Atmakhyati, the word ‘Atma‟ means „referring to oneself‟.
According to this theory, the snake is an object of internal cognition and this
inner cognition is apprehended as an external object. The snake is unreal as an
object of external perception. The illusion is actually a mental state that is
projected outside and the illusory snake, a mental image which has subjective
existence but objective non-existence. The error consists in the snake being
perceived as an external object.
But this theory too is rejected on certain grounds. The Yogacārās need to
explain how a mental entity can be perceived to be out there (in this case the
illusory snake). How can „the snake‟ appear outside when it is only an internal

6. Theory of Error in Classical Indian Philosophy 6
idea? There cannot be appearance outside without some reality underlying it.
Even in the case of non-veridical perceptual cognition (illusion), the snake is
presented to the perceiver and this representation is identical to that of the snake
represented in the veridical cognition. This shows that the illusory object is
always presented as a physical object out there and it is not a mere internal
cognition. Moreover, correction of the illusion does not testify to the illusory
object‟s status as a mental entity. As far as representation of the object is
concerned, it cannot be non-existent, nor can it be an inner object. It is
presented vividly as an outer object.
2.3. A-khyātivāda (Prabhākara Mimāmsā)
Literally, akhyāti means non-apprehension. According to this theory, error is
simply the failure of the mind to apprehend one or more aspects of what is
presented. The Prabhākara Mimāmsā have the view that perceptual error is not
unitary, but composite comprising of memory and perception. Therefore,
illusion is not due to wrong apprehension of one thing as another, but due to
lack of apprehension of the distinction between memory and perception and
their respective objects, namely memory-image and percept. In our illustration
of the rope-snake illusion, the mind fails to notice those features which are
peculiar to rope; it notices only such features as the rope has in common with
snake, e.g., their shape. This partial perception revives the memory of real

7. Theory of Error in Classical Indian Philosophy 7
snake, which, through non - discrimination, is identified with the object
presented. In the statement “This is snake”, the rope is perceived as „this‟ but
bereft of its „ropeness‟, and „snake‟ is imported in memory merely as „snake
bereft of ropeness‟. Thus there results the illusion that the object presented is
snake.
One criticism of this theory is that it does not provide an account of why and
how this confusion between the object presented through memory and object
presented through perception occurs. Moreover, the lack of discrimination
between the cognition and the memory cannot turn into the positive experience
of snake as something present „here and now‟.
2.4. Anyathā-khyātivāda (Nāiyayikas)
Anyatha - khyati means apprehending an object in a matter which is different
from what it actually is. It is an error of commission. According to this Nyāya
theory, the snake and rope are both real and the perception of the shape of the
rope is interpreted as the snake that was actually perceived at some other place
and time. The memory of snake is revived and the memory-image of (real)
snake is presented as the percept of a (real) rope. This is said to occur through
some supernormal connection in knowledge (alaukika pratyaksa) – the mind is
somehow connected to the object via the memory. Error consists in relating
snake with rope where it does not exist, but neither of the two is „unreal‟.

8. Theory of Error in Classical Indian Philosophy 8
Advaita dismisses these arguments on the grounds that perception of snake is
taking place now and should be based upon the current sense input through the
organ of vision. Even in the erroneous cognition, snake does not appear as a
distant object, but is identified with something which is existent before the eyes.
Without acknowledging the perception of snake in some form in the object in
front, the knowledge that „this is snake‟ cannot be occurring. Moreover, the
supposed mechanism of „extraordinary‟ perception (alaukika pratyaksa) itself is
in need of credible explanation. Correction of the illusion, in addition, does not
show the snake, now rejected, as being elsewhere.
2.5. Anirvacanīya-khyātivāda (Advaitins)
The realists (Nyāya, Prabhākara Mimāmsā) had a dilemma :
a) If the snake is real, it cannot be contradicted afterwards by the sublating
cognition of the rope.
b) If the snake is unreal, how can it appear to consciousness during illusion?
Therefore, the Advāitas(idealists) concluded that the illusory object is neither
real nor unreal, and hence indescribable. They said that the non-veridical
perception is as much a unified cognition as is the veridical, only its object is
neither existent nor non-existent. According to them, one cannot definitely
describe the nature of the snake perceived in the rope. It is not real, for it is

9. Theory of Error in Classical Indian Philosophy 9
sublated. It is not unreal, for it is perceived. But the theory pays the price by
adding one more ontological category which is not describable. This theory
comes up with an astonishing fact about the ontological space of the „being of
object of cognition‟. Before this, „real‟ and „unreal‟ was considered to be
exhaustive elements of entire set in which the „being of object of cognition‟
could be categorized. But the theory says that the nature of object of cognition
is neither real nor unreal, it is not describable. So an extra-ordinary nature of
object of cognition comes into picture but the nature of cognition is not altered,
which gives strength to this theory.
3. Final Analysis and Conclusion
The first three theories of error (Asat-khyātivāda, Ātma-khyātivāda, A-
khyātivāda) are generally rejected due to the various shortcomings discussed
above. The last two theories (Anyathā-khyātivāda, Anirvacanīya-khyātivāda)
try to give a proper logical conclusion on perceptual error through a criticism of
the various other views on error. Each of these two schools (Nyāyā and Advaita
Vedānta) put forward two astonishing arguments, supporting their theories,
which are:

10. Theory of Error in Classical Indian Philosophy 10
Extraordinary perception of an ordinary object (by Nyāyas).
Extraordinary object of ordinary perception (by Advaita Vedāntas).
The Nyayas are realists and since they believe in the mind-independent
existence and nature of objects of cognition, they have a hard time arguing
about perceptual error because in the theory of error either the existence of the
object of cognition or its nature, or both, are not mind-independent. Hence, in a
desperate attempt to save realism they put forward an astonishing view in which
they conceptualize perception of the illusory object to be extraordinary
(alaukika pratyaksa) and make the illusory object of cognition to exist
elsewhere, which is abrupt. Moreover, they also need to explain how the ability
of alaukika pratyaksa can be a curse causing perceptual error.
The Advaita Vedāntas, on the other hand, are idealists. Theory of error comes
easy in their hands because the object of erroneous cognition looks like being
mind-dependent. Hence, their theory of error (Anirvacanīya-khyātivāda), which
talks of an indescribable illusory object, is in perfect coherence with their
beliefs of mind-dependent objects. They arrive at a logical conclusion to this
problem through a thorough analysis and criticism of the other theories of error
and put forward the most reasonable theory of perceptual error.