The document analyzes electoral manipulation that occurred during the 2009 Afghan presidential election. It identifies key actors, including candidates Karzai, Abdullah, and Bashardost, as well as ethnic groups and external bodies. It finds evidence that Karzai rigged the election through ballot stuffing, voter interference, and intimidation, disproportionately benefiting himself in Pashtun districts. Statistical analysis supports findings of manipulation in Karzai's favor. The conclusion offers recommendations to Karzai on how to better rig future elections.

1. How to Rig an Election A Study of Electoral Manipulation in Afghanistan Stephane Amoyel, Alexander Buchvald, Michael Donnelly, Jonathon Flegg, Shakira Mustapha, Alessio Terzi

3. Schedler’s “elections without democracy”* All are necessary but not sufficient for democracy. # Elections can be a means to either democracy or authoritarianism. * Schedler 2002a; # Dahl 1971 Response to citizens’ preferences Opportunities to formulate preferences Signify preferences to each other and to the government Equally weighted preferences in decision-making

4. Defining Electoral Manipulation Clandestine and illegal efforts to shape election results that can occur at different stages of electoral process, from the passage of the favourable electoral legislation to the adjudication of complaints lodged against the election commission. violation of the law to effect electoral outcomes Lehoucq (2003) introduction of bias into the administration of elections Schedler (2002b)

6. Incentives for Electoral Manipulation Office-seeking Minimise uncertainty of outcomes Satisfy international pressures for democratisation Policy-seeking Strong mandate to implement preferred policy

9. Ukraine: 2004 Presidential Election Electoral System: 2 Round Run-off Ukraine characterised by ‘machine politics’ and de facto authoritarianism. Types of Electoral Manipulation: (i) Gain control of the Media through intimidation (ii) Patronage through exchange of public jobs for votes (iii) Selective law enforcement threats of firms (iv) Soldiers bussed to vote in swing districts (v) Presenting dummy candidates to dilute the representation of the real opposition party on the election committee Why it was not successful: The candidate was too unpopular Fraud was carried out in a transparent way moving from ‘machine politics’ to full authoritarianism Emergence of civil society Division among elite Army maintained neutrality

10. Venezuela: 2006 Presidential Election Electoral System: FPTP “ Free, if not entirely fair.” Types of Electoral Manipulation: (i) Biased media coverage. State-owned television awarded 86% of its coverage to Chavez, while Rosales, his main opponent, received only 14%. (ii) Coercion of public officials. (iii) ‘In kind’ resources distributed for electoral patronage in the poorest areas. (iv) Constitutional Amendment. For example, in 1999 extending presidential terms from 5 to 6 years and subject to a limit of two terms. [?] How it was successful: “ Independent” National Electoral Council still under government influence. Public perceptions (that is, disillusionment with traditionally dominant parties and democracy of the past). Widespread poverty in urban areas. Balanced by attempts to make the electoral process appear more transparent. For example, election of polling station staff through a public lottery.

11. Mexico: Presidential Elections 1930-90 Electoral System: FPTP and no reelection PRI, Mexico's preeminent political organization from 1929 until the early 1990s, second only to the President. Types of Electoral Manipulation: Patronage through attempts to: (i) Integrate large sections of the population into the party (middle class, peasants and workers) (ii) Discourage the formation of opposition parties. “ For nearly five decades, there were few episodes of large-scale organized violence and no revolutionary movements that enjoyed widespread support...”* How it was successful: Vote buying is socially-acceptable. Rule of no reelection weakened accountability. Traditional horizontal class- or interest-based political alliances actively discouraged. * Miró 1996

19. 2009 Election Results Maps compiled using data from National Democratic Institute (http://afghanistanelectiondata.org/)

20. 2009 Election Results with Ethnicity Maps compiled using data from National Democratic Institute (http://afghanistanelectiondata.org/)

21. Key Actors: External Bodies United Nations NATO ie. US and allies Ascribed Preferences: 1. Independent, self-administered Afghanistan 2. Democratic government in Afghanistan

22. Key Actors: Bureaucracy Independent Election Commission Karzai US & Allies Electoral Complaints Commission Structure of bureaucracy was determined through negotiation between Karzai and external actors. Green: aligned with Karzai Blue: altruistic, aligned with external actors

25. So How was the August 2009 Afghan Presidential Election Rigged?

28. Election Manipulation: Ballot Box Stuffing SOURCE: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan; Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan | The Washington Post - October 7, 2009

29. 2009 First Round Election Results Karzai 3,093,256 54.6% Abdullah 1,571,581 27.8% Bashardost 520,627 9.2% Others 477,294 8.4% Total 5,662,758 Western Powers heavily pressure the ECC to investigate and overturn these results.

33. Results

38. Lehoucq, F. E. 2003. “Electoral Fraud: Causes, Types and Consequences”. Annual Review of Political Science 6: 233-56. Merrill T. L. & Miró, R. (eds.) 1996 Mexico: A Country Study . Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress. Schedler, A. 2002a. “Elections Without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation” Journal of Democracy 13(2). 2002b. “The Nested Game of Democratization by Elections”. International Political Science Review 23: 103-123. Scott, J. C. 1969. “Corruption, Machine Politics and Political Change”, American Political Science Review , 63: 1142–58. Tisdall, S. 1 Nov 2009, “The Afghan Election: A five-star Debacle.” Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/nov/01/abdullah-withdrawal-afghanistan-election-clinton UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 2009. AIHRC-UNAMA Joint Monitoring of Political Rights Presidential and Provincial Council Elections Third Report. http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2009.nsf/ FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/EGUA-7X3PBQfull_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf . Washington Post 7 Oct 2009. Discrepancies in Afghan Vote. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/graphic/2009/10/07/GR2009100700038.html?sid=ST2009100603839 Wikipedia 2009. ‘Afghan Presidential Election, 2009’ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghan_presidential _election,_2009