"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek Schlawack
Presentation 1 Introduction
1. Session 1. An introduction to
preventing corruption
John Butterworth
IRC International Water and Sanitation Centre
Mael Castellan
Water Integrity Network
2. Contents
1. Key definitions and the
importance of this topic:
what do statistics tell us?
2. Frameworks for
understanding corruption
3. Case studies
4. Designing pro-poor
strategies to prevent
corruption
5. Links and further
information
3. 1.1 Some key definitions
Transparency = sharing information and acting in
an open manner
Honesty/ Integrity = working and acting in ways
that reflect known best practices, and following
ethical principles
Accountability = objectively holding people and
agencies responsible for their performance
Corruption = the abuse of entrusted power for
private gain
4. 1.2 Governance, poverty and WASH
indicators in 10 selected countriesTransparency
International CPI
Index (Rank of 163
countries: 1=best,
163=worst)
Population below
national poverty
line, total,
percentage
(Most recent year
with data 1997-
2004)
Water supply
coverage %
(most recent
year e.g. 2004)
Sanitation
coverage %
(most recent
year e.g.
2004)
Children under
five mortality rate
(per 1,000 live
births, 2005)
Ghana 70 39.5 75 18 112
Burkina Faso 79 19.2 61 13 191
Uganda 105 37.7 60 43 136
Ethiopia 130 44.2 22 13 164
South Africa 51 Nd 88 65 68
Mozambique 99 69.4 43 32 145
India 70 24.7 86 33 74
Philippines 121 21.5 85 72 33
Honduras 121 29.5 87 69 40
Colombia 59 55.0 93 86 21
Sources: www.transparency.org; http://mdgs.un.org/; http://www.wssinfo.org/
6. 1.4 Key questions
Are there causal linkages, as well as correlations,
between corruption, WASH sector performance and
poverty?
Will increased WASH sector investment (to meet MDGS)
have the desired impact without better governance?
What are the most important forms of corruption and
levels at which it occurs?
Why might the WASH sector be prone to corruption?
How much leakage should we expect to find?
What could be achieved with existing investments if we
tackled leakage?
Should corruption ever be tolerated?
7. 2.1 Interaction framework
Public to public
Diversion of resources
Appointments and transfers
Embezzlement and fraud in
planning and budgeting
Public to private
Procurement collusion, fraud,
bribery
Construction fraud and bribery
Public to Citizen / consumer
Illegal connections
Falsifying bills and meters
Public
Officials
Public
Actors
ConsumersPrivate
Corruption occurs between
public officials
and 3 different sets of actors
10. PUBLIC to PUBLIC
interactions
Planning and budgeting
• Corruption in planning
and management
• Bribery and kickbacks in
fiscal transfers
Management and
Program Design
• Appointments, transfers
• Preferred candidates
• Selection of projects
Policy-making/Regulating
•Diversion of funds
•Distortions in decision-
making, policy-making
Early warning
indicators
• Monopolies/tariff
abnormalities
• Lack of clarity of
regulator/provider
roles
• Embezzlement in
budgeting, planning,
fiscal transfers
• Speed/complexity of
budget processes
• No. of signatures
• % spending on capital
intensive spending
• Unqualified senior
staff
• Low salaries, high
perks, cf. HH assets
• Increase in price of
Anti-corruption
Measures
• Policy and tariff reform
• Separation
• Transparent minimum
standards
• Independent auditing
• Citizen oversight and
monitoring
• Technical auditing
• Participatory planning
and budgeting
• Performance based staff
reforms
• Transparent, competitive
appointments
11. Early warning
indicators
• Same tender lists
• Bidders drop out
• Higher unit costs
• Variation orders
• Low worker
payments
• Single source
supply
• Change in quality
and coverage
Anti-corruption
Measures
• Simplify tender
documents
• Bidding
transparency
• Independent tender
evaluation
• Integrity pacts
• Citizen oversight
and monitoring
• Technical auditing
• Citizen auditing,
public hearings
• Benchmarking
• SSIP support
mechanisms
PUBLIC to
PRIVATE
interactions
Procurement
• Bribery, fraud,
collusion in tenders
Construction
• Fraud/bribes in
construction
Operations
• Fraud/bribes in
construction
12. PUBLIC to
CONSUMER
interactions
Construction
• Community based WSS –
theft of materials
• Fraudulent documents
Operations
• Admin corruption
(access, service, speed)
Payment systems
• meter, billing and
collection – fraud and
bribery
Early warning
indicators
• Loss of materials
• Infrastructure
• failure
• Low rate of faults
• Lack of interest in
connection
campaigns
• Night time tanking
• Unexplained
variations in
revenues
Anti-corruption
Measures
• Corruption
assessments
• Citizen monitoring
and oversight
• Report cards
• Transparency in
reporting
• Citizen oversight and
monitoring
• Complaints
redressed
• Reform to customer
interface (e.g. women
cashiers)
14. 2.4 Local governance
Specific governance challenges at local level require
different approaches
Decentralisation brings new challenges and
opportunities
Corruption has more immediate and corrosive impact
Improvements may also be more rapid and wide
reaching
In WASH, community management as a key
paradigm
Tackling poverty is a key issue
15. 3.1 Decentralization versus
centralization in India
Davies (2004) identified
high levels of corruption
Petty corruption (falsify meter
reading, speed repairs etc)
Kickbacks from contractors
Transfers within administration
Decentralisation linked to higher
levels of corruption. Why?
Opportunity to plan activities
linked to decentralisation
programmes
16. 3.2 Report cards in India
Public Affairs Centre (PAC) in Bangalore developed report
cards for citizens to rank performance of public service
agencies (including water)
Monitored public satisfaction with staff behaviour, quality
of service, information, and corruption (speed money)
Initially showed lows levels of public satisfaction, agencies
not citizen friendly, lacked customer orientation, corruption
a serious problem
Second survey 5 years later revealed limited
improvements
Third survey 4 years later showed noticeable progress by
all agencies
17. 3.2 Report cards in India
Report cards influenced key
officials in understanding
perceptions of ordinary citizens
Public agencies launched
reforms to improve the
infrastructure and services
Government agencies showed
greater transparency and more
responsiveness
CRCs acted as a catalyst in the
transformation of services in
Bangalore
18. 3.3 Using freedom of
information laws
India adopted a Right to
Information Act in 2001
The citizens group
Parivartan in Delhi has been
active in supporting its use
There have been examples
where an application under
the act has brought
immediate results on a water
issue
Source: Earle & Turton
19. 3.4 Lesotho Highlands Water
Project
Largest international water
transfer was from Lesotho-
South Africa
Construction contracts
awarded fraudulently
Foreign companies paid
bribes
Successful prosecutions
set precedents
Source: Earle & Turton
20. 3.4 Lesotho Highlands Water
Project
Precedents from prosecution
Bribes are still illegal
even if not acted on
after corrupt agreement
Jurisdiction can be taken
where the impact is felt
Crucially, courts can
gain access to
Swiss bank accounts
Source: Earle & Turton
21. 3.5 Pipe manufacturers in
Colombia
Procurement is vulnerable to
price fixing and collusion
Private sector pipe
manufacturers in Colombia
introduced self-regulation
Adopted an integrity pact
not to pay or accept bribes
Support given by professional
association, Transparency
International and government
Half of 167 manufacturers have
signed up
Prices have reduced by 30%
22. 3.6 Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Transformation of a
public utility under
difficult post- conflict
(civil war) conditions
High levels of illegal
connections and
unaccounted for water,
including bribery of
utility officials
Indicators 1993 2006
Staff per 1,000/connections 22 4
Production Capacity 65,000 m3
/day 235,000 m3
/day
Non Revenue Water 72% 8%
Coverage area 25% 90%
Total connections 26,881 147,000
Metered coverage 13% 100%
Supply Duration 10 hours/day 24 hours/day
Collection Ratio 48% 99.9%
Total revenue 0.7 billion riels
(US$180,000)1
34 billion riels
(US$8.7 million)
Financial situation Heavy subsidy Full cost recovery
23. 3.6 Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Corruption was
tackled effectively, due
to
• Leadership
• Culture of change
• External support
Led to reform and new
investment
24. 3.6 Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Human resources
management improved
Revenue collection
improved
Rehabilitation of services
achieved harnessing
local resources
Illegal connections were
tackled, reducing
unaccounted for water
Tariffs were increased
25. 3.7 Sanitation in Kerala
The NGO SEUF targeted
diversion of funds to reduce costs
(by ½ to ⅔) in latrine construction
Mix of strategies to tackle
corruption:
• more information
• extra checks & spot checks
• public postings
• double signatures
• action on complaints at
lowest level
• referral of problems
26. 3.8 Money diverted from
education in Uganda
Public expenditure tracking
(PET) survey in Uganda
Tracked central funds allocated
for school construction
Only 13% of funds arrived at
schools
Transparency campaign
published, information about the
grants
Led to capture being reduced
from 87% to 18%
Schools near newspaper and
communication points did better in
receiving their funds
Source: Reinikka, R. and Smith, N. Undated
27. 3.9 Kecamatan Development
Project (KDP)
Tackling grassroots
corruption in a large rural
development project
KDP – a central
government project focused
on poor villages and highly
dispersed
Very high risk environment
Weak institutions for
control
Mapping is a key step in
tackling this
Source: Guggenheim (2007)
28. 3.9 Kecamatan Development
Project (KDP)
Mapping identified
sources of corruption
• Bribing officials to get
projects
• Cuts taken at high levels
• Illicit fees
• Under-delivery of
materials/ work
• Embezzlement by staff
29. 3.9 Kecamatan Development
Project (KDP)
Solutions identified
• Reducing discretion
• Reducing transactions
• Promoting competition
• Lowering costs of
acquiring information
• Promoting social controls
• Strengthening formal
oversight
• Applying sanctions
Effect of Audits on Percent Missing
Wages
Wages
Materials
Materials
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
Control Audits
PercentMissing
30. 4.1 Pro-poor anti-corruption
strategies
Are all information,
transparency and
accountability initiatives
likely to benefit the poor?
Could they even be
harmful?
Evidence shows that anti-
corruption actions can
harden and shift its forms
Source: Janelle Plummer (2007)
31. 4.2 Diagnose
A key starting point is to
understand what types and level
of corruption exist
Frameworks can be used to
map different types of corruption
and help to identify appropriate
solutions
Severe lack of diagnosis of
corruption and its impacts on the
poor in the WASH sector
Poorly informed anti-corruption
activities risk merely hardening or
shifting it to other forms
Look before you leap
Diagnose
Monitor Target
Mitigate
Connect
solutions
32. 4.3 Target
Focus on water and sanitation
services that reach the poor
May include small-scale
providers and community
managed systems
Local government a key level in
WASH - an opportunity to prevent
corruption before it takes root
Decentralisation to service
providers and agencies that are
closer to communities can
encourage more accountability
Weak local agencies may be
more susceptible to being
corrupted than stronger State
agencies
Diagnose
Target
Connect
solutionsMitigate
Monitor
33. 4.4 Example: Indonesia
15% get water directly from utility networks
20% get water indirectly or illegally
65% rely on community-managed systems,
self-supply and small-scale providers
34. 4.5 Connect solutions
Effective anti-
corruption programmes
combine a mix of
strategies.
Supply side measures
include high level
institutional reforms to
tackle corruption
Demand side
measures strengthen
the ability of poor
people to seek
improvements
Diagnose
Target
Connect
solutionsMitigate
Monitor
35. 4.6 Mitigate
In some places petty
corruption may be a
necessary evil to get access
to services
Anti-corruption measures
take away this coping
strategy
Programmes should do no
harm
put back what is lost
identify alternatives so that
the poor do not need to
engage in petty corruption
Diagnose
Target
Connect
solutionsMitigate
Monitor
36. 4.7 Monitor
WASH sector has little
experience in reducing
levels of corruption
Vital to observe which
strategies are effective
and which aren’t
Implementation
programmes should be
flexible and build on
what works best
Diagnose
Target
Connect
solutionsMitigate
Monitor
37. 4.8 Key messages
Be informed and anticipate
Be inspired by examples
and success stories
Use multiple strategies to
improve access to
information, transparency
and accountability…and
prevent corruption
Act in partnerships
Learn what works
38. 5.1 Links and further information
www.waterintegritynetwork.net is the website of the
Water Integrity Network based at Transparency
International in Berlin
www.irc.nl/transparency includes materials from the IRC
International Water and Sanitation Centre and links to other
useful sources
www.transparency.org is the website of Transparency
International, a global civil society organisation in anti-
corruption
39. 5.2 Links and further information
Astana, A.N. (2004). ´Corruption and decentralization: evidence from India’s water sector´. In proceedings of the 30th WEDC
International Conference, held at Laos, 2004.Loughborough, London, WEDC.
Balcazar, A.R. 2006. The establishment of an anti-corruption agreement with pipe manufacturing companies: a Colombian
experience [online] Available at www.waterintegritynetwork.net/page/238 (A 5 minute video about the Colombian integrity pact
between pipe manufactures can be viewed at www.waterintegritynetwork.net/page/254)
Davis, J. (2004). ´Corruption in Public Service Delivery: Experience from South Asia’s Water and Sanitation Sector´. In: World
Development, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 53–71, UK, Elsevier Ltd. www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev
González de Asís, M., O’Leary, D., Butterworth, J. & Ljung, P. (forthcoming) Training modules for the Programa para mejorar la
transparencia, la rendición de cuentas y el acceso a la información en el sector del agua en Honduras y Nicaragua. World Bank
Institute. Available in English and Spanish (forthcoming)
Gonzalez de Asis, M. (forthcoming) Reducing Corruption at the Local Level. World Bank.
Plummer, J., & Cross, P., 2006 A framework for tackling corruption in the water and sanitation sector in Africa. In proceedings of
the 32nd WEDC International Conference held in Sri Lanka, 2006. Loughborough, London, WEDC.
Plummer, J. 2007. Making Anti-Corruption Approaches Work for the Poor: Issues for consideration in the development of pro-
poor anti-corruption strategies in water services and irrigation. Swedish Water House, SIWI and WIN. [online] Available at
www.swedishwaterhouse.se
Satyanand, P.M. and Malick, B. 2007. Engaging with citizens to improve services: overview and key findings. Water and
Sanitation Program-South Asia, New Delhi, India [online] Available at www.wsp.org
Shordt, K., Stravato, L., & Dietvorst, C. 2007. About Corruption and Transparency in the Water and Sanitation Sector. Thematic
Overview Paper 16. IRC International Water and Sanitation Centre, the Netherlands [online] Available at www.irc.nl
Sijbesma, C., Mathew, S., and Balachandra Kurup, K. (forthcoming) Preventing corruption in sanitation: A case from Kerala,
India. World Bank Institute, Washington.
Sohail, M & Cavill, S. 2007. Accountability arrangements to combat corruption – case study synthesis report and case study
survey reports. Partnering to combat corruption series. [online] Available at www.lboro.ac.uk/wedc/publications/
Stålgren, P. 2006. Corruption in the Water Sector: Causes, Consequences and Potential Reform. Swedish Water House Policy
Brief No. 4, SIWI, Stockholm, Sweden [online] Available at www.swedishwaterhouse.se
TI & UN-Habitat. 2004. Tools to support transparency in local governance. Urban governance toolkit series [online] Available at
www.transparency.org/tools/e_toolkit/
TI. The 2008 Global Corruption Report is focused on the water sector. Forthcoming at www.transparency.org
Woodhouse, A. 2002. Village corruption in Indonesia: Fighting corruption in the World Bank’s Kecamatan Development Program.
World Bank, Washington.
Hinweis der Redaktion
Access to drinking Water vs Corruption Sub-Saharan Africa: This diagram illustrates that there is a correlation between corruption and access to improved drinking water in Sub –Saharan Africa: the more corrupt an country is, the smaller the fraction of its population that has access to improved water (This builds on the corruption perception index in 39 countries developed by TI; data 2005 – clearly a high score on then corruption perception index means you have less corruption – not more !
Amongst the new challenges and opportunities at local level are
greater financial responsibility
increased discretionary powers
increased service delivery responsibilities
The Public Affairs Centre in Bangalore introduced report cards for citizens to comment on public service agencies. Initially the outcome was pessimistic with low levels of public satisfaction and concerns over corruption, particularly in the need to pay speed money to make progress. People paid a heavy cost for inefficiency of the public sector. But in five years there had been some progress and in a further four years, noticeable progress by all agencies.
The introduction of citizen report cards made a difference. Officials better understood what ordinary citizens think; agencies introduced reforms to improve services and Government agencies became more responsive. CRCs were able to act as a catalyst. The key factors in this were 1. use of information by the media and by civil society. 2 there was an active civil society able to take the opportunity, the agencies and particularly their leadership were willing to respond and there was a focused NGO which did what?????
Three days after making an application, a leaking pipe was replaced. Previous, complaints had had no response and the pipe had leaked since it was laid.
Residents asked – under the right to information act - for the status of their earlier complaints, the names of officials, the contract for laying of the pipeline, the completion certificate for the works and names of officials that issued it. Action came within three days.
The NGO SEUF found a number of problems in latrine construction: There were undeserving beneficiaries; There was overcharging for construction; poor materials and construction
In all 20-30% of funds and materials were diverted. It used a mix of strategies to tackle corruption, including providing more information about costs, carried out extra checks and unannounced spot checks, posting information publicly, ensuring that payments could not be authorised without two people signing and acting on complaints at the lowest possible level, with a system of referring problems to the most appropriate place.
In Uganda a tracking survey found that only 13% of the money allocated centrally for building schools arrived where it should at the schools. This meant that 87% had been captured on the way. A transparency campaign was launched enlisting the help of the media. Information about grants was published by posting it up in public places, and by giving to the media. It was printed in newspapers and broadcast on the radio. The ‘capture’ of these precious resources was reduced from 87% to 18%. Interestingly it was most effective at schools near to newspapers and communication points where people were better informed.
The Kecamatan Development Project in Indonesia is a central government project focusing on poor villages and is highly dispersed.
This is a high risk environment where corruption is common in all development projects. There are many opportunities and low risks for corrupt civil servants and a historical legacy of impunity.
There is weak institutional control – with a dysfunctional judiciary, oversight institutions that have degenerated and NGOs that are highly constrained.
Mapping is a key step in combating corruption.
Mapping identified the sources of corruption as shown
The solutions identified were mostly process changes that reduced the temptations and opportunities for corruption and increased levels of oversight with increased sanctions.
The results of an audit show an overall reduction in the hijacking of funds from almost 30% to just over 20%. There was a bigger cut in ‘lost’ materials than in missing wages.
Explain ways in which this hardening and shifting can take place.
Brainstorm what they can do to improve on communication/ publication/information sharing of good and bad practises; merge with IRC list/FAQ 6 and TOP 16 or (http://www.waterintegritynetwork.net !)
The focus should be on cleaning up the water and sanitation services that reach the poor because they are the most effected by failures due to corruption. This might mean focusing on small-scale and community manager services rather than the larger utilities.
Local government is a key level in both WASH services provision and in support and decentralisation offers an opportunity to prevent corruption before it takes root.
While decentralisation can encourage accountability there is also a danger that weak local agencies may be easier to corrupt. Systems of monitoring in local agencies are often lacking or inadequate.
Why the focus on small scale and community-managed systems? Because this is where most people, and especially the poor, get their water.
Connecting up solutions mans a mix of strategies. Supply-side measure include high level institutional reforms such as laws on freedom of information and new institutions like anti-corruption commissions
Demand-side measures include better reporting and complaints systems, with support for civil society and for media reporting.
www.waterintegritynetwork.net includes key sources such as presentations at the Stockholm Water Week 2007 by Janelle Plummer and Scott Guggenhiem, and
Stockholm International. Water Institute (SIWI) papers by Patrik Stalgren and Janelle Plummer