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Beaconsfield Mine Disaster Initial Media Response
1. MEDIA MANAGEMENT – BEACONSFIELD
MINE COLLAPSE
CASE STUDY BY CONST. PHIL PIKE, TASMANIAN
POLICE
JESSICA TRAN
JADE BAE
2. WHAT IS MEDIA MANAGEMENT?
“The media are the primary conduit to the public
and, during a crisis, are obligated to report
accurately and completely. Rather than viewing
the media as a liability in a crisis situation, risk
and crisis communicators should engage the
media, through open and honest
communication, and use the media as a strategic
resource to aid in managing the crisis.”
- Seeger, 2007
4. SUMMARY OF EVENTS
• Earthquake triggers a rockfall at
Beaconsfield gold mine.
• Fourteen miners escape, three
missing.
• Miner‟s body found.
• Contact and rescue of Brant Webb
and Todd Russell, miners who
survived.
• After ____ days, rescue workers
using mining tools finally break
through to the two trapped men and
the men are finally free on the 9th
May.
5. MEDIA RESPONSE
• Unusually high level of activity from mainland-based media and lcoal media
• Major networks sent crews for news, current affairs programs and morning
shows
• Channel 9, 60 Minutes, News Ltd. publications
6. Who were the key
stakeholders?
What were the needs
that the team needed to
meet?
7. KEY STAKEHOLDERS
The Beaconsfield Mine Joint Venture (management and staff)
Allstate Explorations NL (the managing body of the Beaconsfield Mine)
The West Tamar Council
Tasmania Police and emergency services
Department of Justice (Coroner‟s Office)
Workplace Standards
Chief Inspector of Mines
Australian Worker‟s Union
Tasmanian Minerals Council
Launceston General Hospital
The missing miners and their families
The wider West Tamar community
Responding media
8. SCCT RECOMMENDATIONS
Situational crisis communication
- Viewed as accident, they should have done this and this.
All victims/potential victims should receive instructing information, including recall
information. (This is one-half of the base response to a crisis)
All victims should be provided with an expression of sympathy, any information
about corrective actions, and trauma counselling when needed. This can be
called the “care response”. (This is the second-half of the base response to a
crisis)
9. MEDIA NEEDS
The need to:
a) Protect reputations
b) Engage the media
c) Satisfy the legal needs
of the administration to
limit certain information
10. ISSUE #1: THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE
‘INFORMATION VACUUM’
• BMJV and Allstate
Explorations NL (the
managing body of the
Beaconsfield Mine) were
placed in administration some
years earlier (despite
Beaconsfield containing the
richest gold bearing ore in the
country)
• Imposed restriction by the
mine administrator who was
present at the mine offices left
an „information vacuum‟ for
the media
11. BEACONSFIELD MINE DISASTER
INITIAL MEDIA RESPONSE
• BMVL generated media releases via
Sydney-based communications
specialist via Tasmania Police Media
and Marketing
• Info flowed with reasonable regularity –
but some MRs disseminated after
midnight, outside the news cycle of
Tasmania based media
• PoC for BMJV was the Sydney-based
specialist
• Absence of a spokesperson at the mine
• Initial reluctance by mine
manager, Matthew Gill, to engage
media because of the administrative
needs to limit information
12. RESULT OF THE ‘INFORMATION VACUUM’
• Australian Worker‟s Union (AWU)
gained credibility
• AWU national secretary, Bill
Shorten, and official Paul Howes
always available for engagement with
media.
• Alternative information source not
verified by officials.
• Union officials initially discussed
proposed media interviews with mine
management, agreeing to leave the
issue of blame until rescue.
• Went to media openly blaming mine
management on 60 minutes
13. • Centralized source of information
is often preferred by the media.
• A person with official status and
relevant expertise to convey the
most credible, authoritative EPI
available and to interpret and
clarify complexity for general
reporter.
• Reduce public panic, cut down on
speculation about a disaster from
all quarters, and facilitate
communication among those with
a need to know.
- Sod & Stockdale, 1987
14. AWU VS. GILL
• Limited resources
• Multiple responsibilities: supervise the rescue processes, liase
with mining staff, their families and media contingent.
• Developed media awareness skills through slow rescue
progress
• Regular appearances at media conferences
• However Gill only held a media conference every 24-48
hours, allowing AWU to retain the initiative with the media
contingent by being readily available
16. ISSUE #2: GROWING SENSITIVITY AGAINST THE
MEDIA CONTINGENT FROM MINERS
• Mine staff increasingly resentful
of media contingent.
• Large tarpaulins erected around
boundary fences to limit media
access and vision.
• Miners decided no miners incl.
NSW mine rescue experts and
paramedics would be interviewed
until following the rescue.
17. ISSUE #3: HELICOPTERS
• Limiting media
access led to
media helicopter
traffic
• No-fly
implementation
failed
18. ISSUE #4: POOR PHYSICAL MEDIA MANAGEMENT
• Premises became
camping ground for media
– chaos.
• Small hall became media
centre
• Tight crush of journalists
• Overwhelming for first-
time spokespeople
19. ISSUE #5: COMPETITIVE MEDIA
• Search operation underground
• Limited content for media
• Competition for coverage between
media
• Channel 9 vs. Channel 7
• Bag searches for miners – added
stress
20. MEDIA MANAGEMENT RESPONSES
1. The building of a
professional, experienced crisis
management team
• Support vs. one individual spokesperson•Gill: Original spokesperson
- No media experience, reluctance to engage
with media.
- Experience with Port Arthur Massacre
Shaun Rigby: Department of Premier and
Cabinet
Phil Pyke: Tasmania Police
Tony Scott: Department of Premier and
Cabinet
BMJV‟s Mike Lester: State political reporter
handling media relations for Tasmanian
premier
•At the Launceston General
Hospital:
-Mark Franklin (Tasmania Police)
-Julie Pellas
-Mandy Smith (Premier and
Cabinet)
-Adrian Lacey (Health and Human
Services)
21. MEDIA MANAGEMENT RESPONSES
2. Overcoming the „information
vacuum‟/upkeeping reputation
•Spokespeople who worked underground and been in communication with
the trapped miners.
•Union officials agreement with AWU to leave issue of blame, breached on
60 minutes.
•Barry Easther (mayor of West Tamar) as the face of local community
-Limited media experience
-Strong on-air presence
22. MEDIA MANAGEMENT RESPONSES
3. Providing content for media
outlets/negotiation with mine
management
•Negotiations with mine management regarding
tarpaulins and camera approval.
•Media provided different image and vision
platforms.
•Main television crew and photographer to
obtain pool vision.
•Somewhat limited the helicopter presence
23. MEDIA MANAGEMENT RESPONSES
4. Safe extraction of Webb and Russell
•Initial discussions occurred with
Tasmanian Ambulance Service to prevent
media coverage.
•Negotiations between mine rescue staff
and families of trapped miners approved
pool site
•Restricted but controlled access of media.
• Successful concession achieved – media
networks could broadcast live as gates
opened.
• Spokespeople available immediately
following ambulances
• Police intervention at the bottom of West
St
24. MEDIA MANAGEMENT RESPONSES
5. Organising media
• Media management became a police operation
• Occurred towards the end of mine collapse
• Media marshalling areas
• Each network had own site + pool area for
TV/photographers
• Permission from Government for media
coverage
•At the Launceston General Hospital:
•Government media team was ready and in
place
• Media operations allocated a specific area
•Arrangements made to notify the media once
miners were rescued via SMS
25. “While some journalists might complain
about access restrictions to certain
stories; if they can be explained, and
compromises made, then everyone will
usually be happy with the outcome”
“It‟s important that all journalists get equal
access, and I‟m a big fan of pool coverage
as opposed to NO coverage.”
26. MEDIA MANAGEMENT RESPONSES
6. Dealing with the
competitive nature of media• Media meeting to discuss media
management for extraction
•Making media aware of T&Cs
•Pool vision/images allowed
management of excessive media
intrusion to rescue efforts
•Removal of hidden cameras – News
Limited and Channel 7
• Ambulance doors open – added
coup for media
27. “The plan to have a live TV pool camera (and
photo), a road corridor for ambulances, and
lock-down positions for the news organisations
was crucial to the success of everyone‟s
coverage when the miners finally emerged… If
this hadn‟t been sorted out in advance and…
the journalists hadn‟t agreed to be asked to stay
put.. I think the outcome might have been a lot
different.”
28. REPUTATION REVIEW
BEFORE
• Fine
• Under administration but publicly valued because they
contained richest gold bearing ore
DURING
• Didn‟t wish to engage with media
• Gill eventually provided media conferences
following AWU domination
• Only offered them occasionally – 24-48 hours
• Genuine – fronting media in mine gear.
AFTER
• Pooled media success for media coverage
• Men continued to enjoy fame after crisis – movie deal
• Media reports do not negatively frame BMJV
29. RECOMMENDATIONS (QUESTION TIME)
• What could BMJV have done better to manage the media more
effectively?
• Being transparent from the get-go by providing more frequent releases
and not avoiding press coverage and providing a spokesperson at the
side
• Could have organised for another spokesperson instead of just Gill as
he was busy managing the situation and was not prepared to address
the media
• Could have organised and accommodated the media organisations
better from the beginning with stricter control of the growing media
scrum
• Could have liaised with miners to show they understood the hard time
they were having being stressed from the rescue operations as well as
dealing with the media – as to not reach harsh reactions from the
miners by putting up the blockages to the mines
30. RECOMMENDATIONS
• Clearer spokesperson from the start
“... the earlier a relevant issue can be identified and managed in
terms of a systematic organisational response, the more likely
it is that the organisation can resolve conflict and minimise
cost implications to its advantage.”
- (Hainsworth 1990)
• More frequent media conferences
• Care response towards miners – expression of
sympathy, information about corrective action, counselling
31. MEDIA MANAGEMENT LESSONS
1. The media management approach of facilitation was adopted by all
on-ground media advisers
2. Know your key stakeholders and media people
3. Prevent the information vacuum – in the absence of information
speculation will take over
4. Listen to media requests and create/facilitate opportunities
5. Seek media co-operation and encourage their input
6. Aim to present fresh spokespeople on a regular and planned basis
7. Plan for all media reactions, including competition between
organisations
8. Work closely with other media advisers and operate on a common
plan that supports all stakeholders
32. IN CONCLUSION
• The media management was a
success
• Facilitation approach to media
liason gained media confidence
• Hugh Williams from CNN
applauded overall management
33. REFERENCES
• Matthew W. Seeger (2006): Best Practices in Crisis Communication: An
Expert Panel Process, Journal of Applied Communication
Research, 34:3, 232-244, Accessed Online
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00909880600769944
• Rahul Sod, Geoffrey Stockdale and Everett M. Roger (1987): How the
News Media Operate in Natural Disasters, Communicating Risk: the
Media and the public, Journal of Communication, v37 n3 p27-41 Sum
1987
This imposed restriction proved restrictive throughout the duration of the incident despite strong efforts by Mike Lester of CPR who later became the contracted media adviser to BMJV
Union officials initially discussed their proposed media interviews with mine management, agreeing to leave the issue of blame until the rescue of the trapped minersUnionists later broke these conditions – appeared on Richard Carlton’s last story on 60 Minutes openly blaming mine management for sending miners into “bad ground”
Jade endGill developed better media awareness skills throughout the slow rescue process, making regular appearances at media conferences (even immediately fronting the media after a visit to the rescue site dressed in his overalls, mining vest and belt and holding a miners helmet with a lamp) – his practical involvement adding a level of credibility to his role as a spokesperson
Jess startho were already working long shifts underground in hazardous conditions to find their missing workmates increasingly grew sensitive against the media contingentMine staff erected large tarpaulins around the boundary fences and legs of the mine head, limiting media access to vision and photographsMiners made a decision that no miners – incl. those in charge of the rescue, NSW mine rescue experts and NSW paramedics who were advising Tasmania Ambulance Service Staff – would be interviewed by the media until after the rescue of Webb and Russell
Jess endBMJV’s move to limit media access = consistent flying of media helicopters over the mine site (even drowning out conferences related to the underground rescue at the mine operations room)No-fly zone implementation failed and the sound of helicopters remained constant over the area during the protracted incident
JadestartThe public park around the Museum carpark, mine boundary and West Tamar Council Chambers became a camping ground for the fast growing media contingent with an explosion of hired campervans, broadcast vans and media tents after the discovery of Webb and RussellDuring gale force winds, driving rain and sleet, a small hall became the media centre and a majority of interviews took place amid a tight crush of journalists and cameras (a media scrum), proving daunting for some spokespeople fronting the media for the first time, but this was unavoidable considering the inclement weather
Jade endWith the search operation continuing nearly a km underground, there was very little to fill the news bulletins or newspapers with either vision or imagesCompetitive nature of the media – particularly between Ch. 7 and Ch. 9 gave rise to rumours of cash offers of up to $10,000 for miners on the rescue team to take images and vision of the underground rescue areaLed to bag searches of all miners before their shifts – added stress for an already difficult situation
Port Arthur Massacre – GillSupport- Gill was original spokesperson but had no media experience and was reluctant to engage the media (also was very busy, needing to supervise the rescue processes, liaise with mining staff, their families as well as the media contingent)BMJV’s Mike Lester (previously was a state political reporter handling media relations for former Tasmanian Premier, the late Jim Bacon)Tony Scott (Department of Premier and Cabinet – government media staff)Constable Phil Pyke (Tasmania Police)Shaun Rigby (Department of Premier and Cabinet)
Jess endAs the crisis unfolded Slowly started producing spokespeople who had worked underground and been in communication with the trapped miners (paramedics from Tasmania Ambulance Service proved popular)Presenting Mayor of West Tamar, Barry Easther, as the reassuring face of the local community- Became a much-sought after spokesperson (regular appearances on Sunrise and Today)- Limited media experience but had a strong on-air presence and steered away from speculation or judgement (saving BMJV from negative press)Initially had a deal union officials from AWU agreeing to leave the issue of blame until after the rescue of the trapped miners – although this was later breached by the unionists who appeared on 60 Minutes openly blaming mine management for sending the miners into “bad ground”, this was a good prevention tactic employed by BMJV to actively protect their reputation
About Mike Lester:http://books.google.com.au/books?id=4pSX6c3RavUC&pg=PA134&lpg=PA134&dq=mike+lester+cpr&source=bl&ots=fHiBzeGev2&sig=0vkOOmc0UZRJKFt_DI3BO56AImo&hl=en&sa=X&ei=XMiYUcS3FIqViQf2n4DYBQ&ved=0CFMQ6AEwBQ#v=onepage&q=mike%20lester%20cpr&f=falseJess startNegotiations with mine management to take down some of the tarpaulins on the boundary fences and seek approval for camera crews to film the mine head and yard from a viewing platform at the Museum which overlooked the areaGave the media different image and vision platformsThe idea to position a television camera and a photographer to obtain pool vision on the extraction of Webb and Russell arose (previous requests to mine mgmt for pool vision and images from underground had been refused but the viewing platform was a non-obtrusive and ideal position with the Museum prepared to cut out a section of their fence)Somewhat limited the helicopter presence
Jade startInitial discussions occurred with the Tasmanian Ambulance Service, psychologist and mine staff revolved around decoy ambulances and other methods to prevent the media covering the extractionThese discussions halted and further negotiations between the mine rescue staff and the families of the trapped miners took place, approving the pool site to be opened to the media which proved to be a crucial step in effectively managing the media (so that they would not make rash decisions for the sake of getting coverage) – pool site allowed for restricted but controlled media access as opposed to no media accessA successful concession was achieved (later majorly impacting the coverage of the extraction): the departure of ambulances containing Webb and Russell through the mine gates and down the road through the middle of the media campMedia networks could broadcast live as the gates openedAmbulances could roll out through an honour guard of rescue minersOrganised the extraction so that spokespeople (incl. senior mine rescue staff) would be available for comment immediately as the ambulances departed the mine – this was a deliberate move as part of their media management plan so that they could prevent the media from chasing the ambulances along the highway to the Launceston HospitalPolice officers also stationed at the bottom of West St to use as delay for any pursuing crews – but no crews undertook any pursuit given their access to Webb and Russell after they stepped from the shaft lift
Jade endMedia mgmt in the final stages became a police operationCarpark, media camp and public park were barricaded off as media marshalling areasEach network had their own site + a pool area for TV cameras and photographersPrior permission from Government media advisors required for any camera crew or photographer wishing to step over the barricades during the ambo departure to cover public reactionAt the Launceston General Hospital:Government media team was ready and in place at the hospitalMedia operations were allocated a specific areaArrangements made through BMJV’s Mike Lester to notify the media once miners were rescued via SMSthis can be a point for recommendations – they could have achieved this level of organisation from the beginning – they obviously didn’t have a crisis communication plan in place)
Jade endProducers and senior journalists called to a meeting at the West Tamar Council (5th May) where the media management plan for the extraction was explained to them (including their restrictions regarding the pool site and the strict enforcements against cheating) – made sure media were aware of their T&CsPool vision and images allowed for management of excessive media intrusion to the rescue effortsRemoval of hidden cameras News Ltd: mine staff located a web camera mounted on the façade of Grubb Shaft, overlooking the mine head – BMJV removed the camera and contacted News Ltd, resulting in strong discussions between News Ltd management and Government media staffCh. 7: a remote camera was mounted on a teleboom that the network often raised over the rear fence of the mine yard – mine staff retaliated by raising the tarpaulins higher – affected other photographers out of their ideal positions (ruining the opportunity for other networks who inevitably would have scolded Ch. 7 would have created social pressure to abide to the rules)Leaving ambulance doors open – proved an added coup for media crews
Jess startDuring:Initially didn’t wish to engage the media, providing press releases from a Sydney-based communications company (there was no spokespeople available at the scene despite major media organisations starting to arrive which signalled the need for a greater media provision) AWU took over the media at first with readily available media spokespersons but Gill eventually started to provide press conferenecesHowever he was busy organising the actual rescue mission and only offered press conferences every 24-48 hours – he eventually adapted to media presence adding credibility to his role as a spokesperson by fronting the media straight after coming back from being underground near the miners etc.After: Media got the coverage they wanted through pooled mediaThe men continued to enjoy fame after the crisis even sellign their story into a movieMedia reports years on do not negatively frame the media management of BMJV
Care response – expression of sympathy, information about corrective actions, counsellingA clearer spokesperson from the beginning of the crisis (so the unionists don’t take control of the situation)Gill could have had more frequent media conferences (one every 24-48 hours wasn’t a lot)
Jess end
The facilitation approach to media liaison gained the confidence of the media during the protracted nature of the rescueInternational journalist, Hugh Williams from CNN who also came to report applauded the overall management process