This document summarizes a presentation about the relationship between psychological operations (PSYOP) and public information (PI) activities in military information operations, and how this relationship is impacted by the information revolution. It discusses how PSYOP and PI have traditionally operated separately but now need better integration. It proposes integrating PSYOP and PI more like the US model of international public information coordination. It also suggests better integrating PSYOP and PI with other information operations like information assurance and defense of networks. This may require adjustments to Australian national security arrangements to allow for more coordination across agencies and portfolios.

1. Equity Dilemmas for Psychological
Operations and Public Information in
Military Information Operations
Captain Jeff Malone
Future Land Warfare Branch – Army Headquarters
Department of Defence
Information and Technology: The Double Edged Sword Conference
Canberra – 19 February 2001

2. This presentation is
UNCLASSIFIED

3. Caveats
 The views contained herein are those of the author
and should not be construed as representing the
official position of the Department of Defence or
the Australian Defence Force
 The presentation represents AN Australian view,
not THE Australian view

4. Scope of Presentation
 ADF Approach to Information Operations
 Psychological Operations and Public Information
 Implications of the Information Revolution
 The Way Forward?
 Conclusion

5. ADF Approach to Information
Operations

6. Information Operations
 The coordination of information related
activities to produce a tailored effect in
those factors which influence the decision
making and actions of a target audience and
to protect and enhance our own decision
making and action capability

7. INFORMATION
OPERATIONS
Offensive Defensive Information
Information Information Operations
Operations Operations Support
Computer Network Attack Counterintelligence Civil Affairs
Deception Electronic Protection Intelligence Support
Destruction Information Assurance PUBLIC
Electronic Attack OPERATIONS AFFAIRS
PSYCHOLOGICAL SECURITY
OPERATIONS

8. IO and Warfare
Decision Superiority
Knowledge Edge
Offensive
Information Superiority
IO
C2 Structures and C2 Structures and
decision processes decision processes Offensive
IO
Human and C4ISREW Offensive Human and C4ISREW
Intellectual Capital Capabilities Intellectual Capital Capabilities
IO
Defensive IO Defensive IO
Offensive
Offensive Offensive
IO
IO Our “System” Opponent “System” IO

9. Key Characteristics of
Information Operations (1)
 IO is NOT just about computers
 But computers and computer related activities
ARE becoming increasingly important
• Computer Network Attack (CNA)
• Information Assurance (IA)
• Computer Network Defence (CND)

10. Key Characteristics of
Information Operations (2)
 IO is the INTEGRATED employment of
information-related activities to achieve an effect
 They can be:
 Offensive/Shaping or Defensive
 Active or Passive
 Proactive or Reactive
 This requires centralised COORDINATION and
DECONFLICTION of activities

11. Key Characteristics of
Information Operations (3)
 Effective IO must be a NATIONAL effort
 Activities will cross departmental/agency
boundaries - Whole of Government approach
 Activities will cross public/private boundaries -
Whole of Nation approach

12. PSYOP and Public Information -
The Traditional Relationship

13. Psychological Operations
 “Planned psychological activities in peace
and war directed to enemy, friendly and
neutral audiences to order to influence
attitudes and behaviour affecting the
achievement of political and military
objectives”

14. Public Information
 “Information which is released or published
for the primary purpose of keeping the
public fully informed, thereby gaining their
understanding and support”

15. Functional and Geographical
Responsibilities for PI and PSYOP
Audiences within the
Area of Operations
Psychological Operations
Public Information
(Defence)
International Audiences
Public Information
(DFAT)
Australian Audiences
Public Information
(Defence/Government)

16. PSYOP vs Public Information
Criteria PSYOP Public Information
Source Disclosure True source may not be True source must be disclosed
disclosed
Truthfulness May involve the use of Must not involve the use of
falsehood falsehood
Dissemination Disseminated method chosen Dissemination method largely
Means by sponsor chosen by media outlet

17. Implication of the Information
Revolution for PSYOP and
Public Information activities

18. Outcomes of the Information
Revolution that affect PSYOP and PI
 Pervasiveness of the global electronic media
 Lack of control over communication means
 New methods of media dissemination
 Convergence of dissemination means
 Digital manipulation
 Morphing of Digital Images
 Hacking/Alteration of web pages

19. Implications for PSYOP and PI
 Western audiences are increasingly accessible to
adversary propaganda campaigns
 „Softwar‟ increasingly the tool of choice for
asymmetric adversaries
 The conduct of PSYOP and PI activities in
support of military objectives by Western states
is increasingly complex
 Convergence of media dissemination means
implies convergence of PSYOP/PI with other
elements of IO (in particular, IA)

20. Ways Forward?

21. Better integrate
PSYOP and PI
 Emulate US International Public
Information (IPI) concept
 Standing arrangement between Whitehouse,
State Department and Defense Department
 Detailed in PDD-68 dated early 1999
 Coordinates dissemination of external messages
and counter-propaganda activities
 Problem: where does coordination stop and
spin-doctoring begin?
 Currently under consideration

22. Better Integrate PSYOP/PI
with Other IO Activities
 Need a national approach to IO
 Would integrate IPI type activities with
other national IO activities
 Particularly IA and defence of the NII
 Requires standing arrangements that cross
current portfolio/agency boundaries
 Implies a need for adjustment in Australian
national security arrangements
 Currently under consideration

23. Conclusion

24. Conclusion
 Information Revolution has potential to greatly
enhance the effect of PSYOP and PI activities,
but…
 Makes the conduct of PSYOP/PI more challenging
 Has increased the vulnerability of Western
audiences and states to external influence
 Difficulties can be addressed, but will require
adjustments to Australian national security
architecture

25. Questions?