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17th March, 2014
1
Fraud Classification Model (FCM)
A New Perspective for the Industry
ZonOptimus, Portugal
AGENDA
1. Project Context
2. Reason for FCM Project
3. Core Concept of FCM
4. Industry Reaction to FCM
5. FCM Register Explained
6. FIINA Fraud Reporting Template
7. An Industry Perspective
FCM (Fraud Classification Model) 2
1. Project Context
ZonOptimus Collaboration with TMForum
3
TM FORUM AND
Fraud Group Overview
TM Forum Fraud Group works to assemble and maintain best
practices from operators around the world relating to Fraud
Management. This information will continue to be updated and
expanded to account for evolving fraud tactics.
TM Forum is a global, non-profit industry association focused on enabling
service provider agility and innovation, through the development of several
projects at key business areas:
 65,000 Member Professionals
 900+ Member Companies
 195 Countries Represented
4
TM FORUM FRAUD GROUP
Fraud Management Guidebooks
GB954 Fraud Classification Guide
Arm operators with fraud information
and offers them a best practice for the
properly Classification of Fraud Cases:
o Fraud Classification Model
o Fraud Enablers Definitions
o Fraud Types Definitions
o Categories and Atributes
ZonOptimus attended TMForum Fraud Group sessions and proposed the development of
a Fraud Classification Model for the benefit of Telecom Industry
- Project started in January, 2012
5
2. Reason for FCM Project
Why the Telecom Industry Requires a Model
6
 TMForum 2012 Fraud Survey results, highlighted the lack
of a common Fraud Classification at Industry level:
o Distinct names for the same Fraud Types
o Distinct interpretations of same fraud incidents
o Multiple Frauds perpetrated in the same case
 There is a clear need for a Multi-Dimensional Analysis
with different levels of abstraction.
Telecommunications
Industry was
presented with many
different and not
synchronized ways of
Fraud Classification
Roaming Fraud
Internal Fraud
Subscription Fraud
PaymentFraud
Credit Card Fraud
Hacking
SIM Cloning
Mobile Malware
Prepaid Fraud
Dealer Fraud
Wangiri
SS7 Tampering
Handset Subsidy Loss
PROBLEM AT INDUSTRY LEVEL
(at the time of project start up, January 2012)
7
Environment
“Example of Distinct Interpretations of Same Fraud Incident”
At 2011 CFCA Fraud Survey
3. Core Concept of FCM
The Baseline for Fraud Classification Model
9
TECHNOLOGYFRAUDSTER OBJECTIVE ENVIRONMENT ATTACK CUSTOMER SERVICE PAYMENT IMPACTS
AAA
ViG
WLAN
Network
UTRAN
CS-CSCS-MS
CS-DS CS-WS
CS-AS
EFWS
SRD
EMA
Portal FOCAMN-OSS
MM
RSS-CSCF
S-CSCFI-CSCF
ENUM/
DNS
MGCF/SG
MG
N-SBGA-SBG
HSS
PSTN
PLMN
HTT
P/H
TTP
S
FTP
H.248
SIP
SIP
DIAMETER
ISC LDAP
DNS
SIP
ISUP
TDM
IMT
LDAP
HTTP/HTTPS
HTTP/HTTPS
BRI
PRI
BRI
POTS
SIP
H.323
SIP RTP
RTP
IP
Backbone
RTP
/SI
P/H
323
RT
P/
SIP
/H
32
3
GGSN
SGSN
PDG
WAG
P-CSCF
PCRF
Gx+
Rx+
Gm
(SIP)
DIAMETER
DIAMETER
PPS
DIAMETER
OSS-RC
Other VoIP
Networks
CORBA
Fraud Classification Attributes
FRAUD CASES CLASSIFICATION
FRAUD
TYPE
ENABLER
TECHNIQUE
 The core concept of the “Fraud Classification Model” is a clear differentiation at the Classification of Fraud Cases between the:
o ENABLER TECHNIQUE
 What was the vulnerability method explored to get access to network, products or services?
versus
o FRAUD TYPE
 What was the fraud committed at network, products or services by exploring the vulnerability above?
FRAUD CLASSIFICATION MODEL
(BASIC PRINCIPLES)
10
 In some circumstances the “Enabler Technique” is not a fraudulent attack but the exploitation of a risk
vulnerability from other Business Assurance areas, such as Revenue Assurance and Security
Management:
o The FCM assumes the relationship of the Fraud Management activity to Security Management; Revenue
Assurance and Risk Management Functions
 The Fraud Classification Model assures CSPs/Operators with data collection to allow the
Understanding of Fraud and the development of Mitigation Strategies at the following levels:
o Revision of Internal Procedures, Processes and Products/Services
o Implementation of Technical Solutions at Network and Service Platforms
o Development, Enhancement and Updated Configuration of Fraud Management Systems (FMS)/Control Solutions
11
FRAUD CLASSIFICATION MODEL
(BASIC PRINCIPLES)
“Fraud Classification Model Brain-Center”
- Revision of Internal Procedures, Processes
and Products/Services
- Implementation of Technical Solutions at
Network and Service Platforms
Development, Enhancement and Reconfiguration of
Fraud Management Systems (FMS)/Control Solutions
Subscription Fraud
Hacking
Customer Account Take-Over
Mobile Malware
FRAUD ENABLER
(fraudulent way to obtain/access service)
FRAUD TYPE
(fraudulent scheme)
TELECOMSSERVICEFRAUD
SIM Card Cloning
Network/Protocol/Signalling
Manipulation
Tariff Rates/Pricing Plan Abuse
Social Engineering
Arbitrage
International Revenue Share Fraud
Service Reselling
Wholesale Fraud
Private Use
Commissions Fraud
Traffic Inflation for Credits/Bonus
Charging Bypass
Interconnect Bypass
SIMBox Gateway
Theft of Company
Handsets/Equipments
OBJECTIVE
(Scope)
 Make Money/Profit
 Obtain Free
Services/Goods
 Obtain Credits/Bonuses
 Obtain Commissions
 Access User Bank
Account
 Access Subscriber
Information
 ……….
BUSINESS
ASSURANCE AREAS
Security
Management
Fraud
Management
Revenue
Assurance
12
FRAUD CLASSIFICATION MODEL (BASIC PRINCIPLES)
The Effective Relation Between “Fraud Enablers” and “Fraud
Types”
Fraud Types
Advance Payment Fraud a a
Charging Bypass a a a a
Commissions Fraud a a a a
Interconnect Bypass / SIMBox Gateway a a a a
International Revenue Share Fraud (IRSF) a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
Toll Free Number Fraud a a a a
Money Laundering a
Online Banking Fraud a a a a a a a
Premium Rate Service Fraud a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
Private Use a a a a a a a a
Service Reselling a a a a a a a a a a a
Spamming a a a a a a a a a
Theft of Company Handsets / Equipment a a a a
Theft of Information a a a a a a
Traffic Inflation for Credits / Bonus a a a a a a
Wholesale Fraud a a a a a
TariffRates/PricingPlansAbuse
ClipOnAbuse
TechnicalFailureatNetwork/ServicePlatforms
SocialEngineering
SubscriptionFraud
FraudEnablers
Network/Protocol/SignalingManipulation
OpenSMS-CAbuse
Operator/Company/Brand/StaffImpersonation
Phishing
CustomerHandset/EquipmentTheft
FalseBaseStationAttack
Hacking
MaliciousApplication/Software
MisconfigurationofNetwork/ServicePlatforms
MobileMalware
AbuseofCompanyProcedures/Processes
Arbitrage
Cloning
CompromisedCreditCards
CustomerAccountTake-Over
Relational Matrix | Fraud Enablers vs Fraud Types
Fraud Classification Model (Basic Principles)
13
GB954 Fraud Classification Guide
4. Industry Reaction to FCM
Model Sharing with Global Fraud Organisations
14
GSMA Fraud Forum | Ireland and Malta Meetings
May and September 2012
 ZonOptimus presented the Core Concept of the Fraud
Classification Model at the GSMA Fraud Forum event held in
Ireland (May 2012).
 Fraud Forum updated its Fraud Incident Reporting
template, readapting it to include FCM Core Concept and
issued a new version at the FF meeting held in Malta
(September 2012).
15
MODEL SHARING WITH GSMA FRAUD FORUM
FF Classification before September, 2012 FF Classification after September, 2012
BEFORE AFTER
16
MODEL SHARING WITH GSMA FRAUD FORUM
CFCA Educational Event | Scottsdale, USA | September 2012
 Presentation of Fraud Classification
Model to CFCA (Communications
Fraud Control Association)
organisation.
 CFCA updated its Fraud Reporting
template, readapting it to include FCM
Core Concept.
CFCA (Communications Fraud Control Association)
17
MODEL SHARING WITH CFCA
Fraud Classification before October, 2012 Fraud Classification after October, 2012
BEFORE AFTER
18
MODEL SHARING WITH CFCA
2013 CFCA Worldwide Communications Industry Fraud Survey
Released at 5th September, 2013 the annual CFCA Fraud Survey, is now reflecting the Core Concept
(Fraud Enablers vs Fraud Types) of the Fraud Classification Model, but still some adjustments need to
be made to the survey in the future.
FRAUD TYPE
(fraudulent abuse)
Wholesale Fraud | USD$ 5.32 B
Premium Rate Service | USD$ 4.73 B
Cable or Satellite Signal | USD$ 3.55 B
Hardware Reselling | USD$ 2.96 B
Hacking | USD$ 8,04 Billion
- PBX (USD$ 4.42B)
- VoIP System (USD$3.62B)
Account Take Over | USD$ 3.62 B
FRAUD ENABLER
(fraudulent way to obtain/access service)
TELECOMSSERVICEFRAUD
(ValuesinUSD$Billions)
Subscription Fraud | USD$ 5.22 B
USD$ 6.11 Billion of the frauds have been committed in Roaming
USD$ 3.35 Billion of the frauds have been perpetrated by Dealers
NOTES
 Estimated Global Fraud Losses
o USD$ 46.3 Billion
 Estimated Global Telecoms Revenues
o USD$ 2.214 Trillion
 Fraud Losses as % of Telecoms Revenues
o 2.09%
19
FIINA Plenary | Port Louis, Mauritius | November 2012
 Presentation of Fraud Classification
Model to the FIINA (Forum for Irregular
Network Access) plenary meeting held
in Mauritius.
 Liaison Agreement signed between
TMForum and FIINA for future
cooperation and joint activities on FCM
(project running).
MODEL SHARING WITH FIINA
20
5. FCM Register Explained
Categories and Attributes
21
GENERAL
DATE:
CUSTOMER TYPE:
CUSTOMER SUB TYPE:
ACQUISITION SALES CHANNEL:
PAYMENT METHOD:
PAYMENT TYPE:
LOSSES QUALITATIVE:
LOSSES QUANTITATIVE:
MAIN IMPACTS:
CASE DESCRIPTION:
OPERATOR:
COUNTRY:
REGION:
FMS STATUS:
ENABLERFRAUDTYPE
FRAUD ENABLER:
 ATTACK TYPE -
 FRAUDSTER TYPE -
 LOCATION -
 ENVIRONMENT -
FRAUD ABUSE/TYPE:
 LOCATION -
 ENVIRONMENT -
 OBJECTIVE -
 TECHNOLOGY -
 SERVICE -
 SUPPLEMENTARY SERVICE -
FRAUD CLASSIFICATION FRAUD MITIGATION
DETECTION:
 DETECTION SYSTEM -
PREVENTION:
 PREVENTION SYSTEM -
MITIGATION DESCRIPTION:
22
Fraud Classification Model RegisterModel Concept Template
Fraud Classification Model Register
ENABLERTECH
FRAUDTYPE
FRAUD ENABLER: …..
 ATTACK TYPE -
 FRAUDSTER TYPE –
 LOCATION –
 ENVIRONMENT –
FRAUD ABUSE/TYPE: …..
 LOCATION –
 ENVIRONMENT –
 OBJECTIVE –
 TECHNOLOGY -
 SERVICE –
 SUPPLEMENTARY SERVICE -
FRAUD CLASSIFICATIONFRAUD ENABLERS
 Abuse of Business Procedures/Processes Weaknesses
 Abuse of Technical Failure at Network/Service Platforms
 Arbitrage
 Cloning
 Compromised Credit Cards
 Customer Account Take-Over
 Customer Handset/Equipment Theft
 Customer Handset/Equipment Configuration Abuse
 False Base Station Attack
 Hacking
 Malicious Application/Software
 Misconfiguration Abuse of Network/Service Platforms
 Mobile Malware
 Network/IT Systems Access Abuse
 Network/Protocol/Signalling Manipulation
 Open SMS-C Abuse
 Operator/Company/Brand/Staff Impersonation
 Phishing
 Social Engineering/Single Ring Solicitation
 Subscription Fraud
 Tariff Rates/Pricing Plans Abuse
 Clip On Abuse
 Abuse of Contract Terms and Conditions
ATTACK TYPE
 External
 Internal
FRAUDSTER TYPE
 Hacker
 Dealer
 Business Partner
 Service User
 Third Party
 Employee
 Service Provider
 …….
LOCATION
 Home Network
 Visited Network
 Home and Visited
Network
 National Network
 International Network
 Customer Offices
 Dealer Offices
 World Wide Web
 …….
ENVIRONMENT
 National Territory
 International Territory
 Roaming IN
 Roaming OUT
 …..
Categories and Attributes Description – Fraud Classification (1)
23
Fraud Classification Model Register
ENABLERTECH
FRAUDTYPE
FRAUD ENABLER: …..
 ATTACK TYPE -
 FRAUDSTER TYPE –
 LOCATION –
 ENVIRONMENT –
FRAUD ABUSE/TYPE: …..
 LOCATION –
 ENVIRONMENT –
 OBJECTIVE –
 TECHNOLOGY -
 SERVICE –
 SUPPLEMENTARY SERVICE -
FRAUD CLASSIFICATION
FRAUD TYPES
 Advanced Payment/Fee Fraud
 Charging Bypass
 Commissions Fraud
 National Revenue Share Fraud
 Interconnect Bypass/SIMBox
Gateway
 IRSF (International Revenue Share
Fraud)
 Money Laundering
 Online Banking Fraud
 Premium Rate Service Fraud
 Private Use
 Service Reselling
 Spamming
 Theft of Company
Handsets/Equipments
 Theft of Information/Content
 Toll Free Number Fraud
 Traffic Inflation for Credits/Bónus
 Wholesale Fraud
LOCATION
 Home
Network
 Visited
Network
 Home and
Visited
Network
 National
Network
 International
Network
 Customer
Offices
 Dealer
Offices
ENVIRONMENT
 National
Territory
 International
Territory
 Roaming IN
 Roaming OUT
 …..
OBJECTIVE
 Make Money/Profit
 Obtain Free
Services/Goods
 Collect
Credits/Bonuses/C
ash
 Obtain
Commissions
 Access/Steal
Information
 Access User Bank
Account
 Operator’s
Impersonation
TECHNOLOGY
 GSM
 GPRS
 3G
 4G/LTE
 IP /IMS
 CDMA
 ADSL
 FTTH
 ……….
SERVICE
 Voice Inbound
 Voice Outbound
 VoIP Inbound
 VoIP Outbound
 SMS Inbound
 SMS Outbound
 MMS Inbound
 MMS Outbound
 Data
 M – Commerce
 M – Payments
SUPPLEMENT
SERVICE
 Call Conference
 Call Forward
 Call Hold
 ……….
Categories and Attributes Description – Fraud Classification (2)
24
GENERAL DATE: June, 2013
CUSTOMER TYPE: Postpaid
CUSTOMER SUB TYPE: Corporate
Business
ACQUISITION CHANNEL: NAp
PAYMENT METHOD: Postpaid Invoice
Payment
PAYMENT TYPE: Various
LOSSES QUALITATIVE: Very High
LOSSES QUANTITATIVE: Financials
NAv (150.000 minutes)
MAIN IMPACTS: Financial
CASE DESCRIPTION: Tests performed at Network/Session Border Gateway (SBG) for new VoIP Services left a backdoor at network level.
This vulnerability was used by an IP Address originating from Palestine who hacked SBG and performed 150.000 minutes of calls to Int. Premium Rate Services.
OPERATOR: Eagle Telecom
COUNTRY: USA
REGION: North America
FMS STATUS: In-House FMS
ENABLERTECHFRAUDTYPE
FRAUD ENABLER: Hacking: Session Border Gateway
 ATTACK TYPE - External
 FRAUDSTER TYPE – Hacker
 LOCATION – Home Network
 ENVIRONMENT – National Territory
FRAUD TYPE: IRSF (Spain; Somalia and Zimbabwe)
 LOCATION – Home Network
 ENVIRONMENT – National Territory
 OBJECTIVE – Make Money/Profit
 TECHNOLOGY – IP IMS
 SERVICE – VoIP Outbound
 SUPPLEMENTARY SERVICE – NAp
FRAUD CLASSIFICATION FRAUD MITIGATION
DETECTION: Traffic Monitoring/Analysis
 DETECTION SYSTEM – Fraud Management System (FMS)
PREVENTION: Network Technical Solution
 PREVENTION SYSTEM – Session Border Gateway (SBG)
MITIGATION DESCRIPTION: Engineering Department secured SBG
and blocked calls to International Premium Rate Services for all future
Network testing programs.
Case 1
25
6. FIINA Fraud Reporting Template
The Summary of the Work Made at FIINA
26
Fraud Classification Model
FIINA Fraud Reporting Template
Fraud Classification Model
FIINA Fraud Reporting Template
Fraud Classification Model
FIINA Fraud Reporting Template
7. An Industry Perspective Through the Model?
The Model Potential
- Graphics hereby presented do not represent an Industry reality
- Fraud varies from region-to-region
30
31
Subscription Fraud
Network/Protocol/Signalling
Manipulation
Hacking
Misconfiguration Abuse of
Network/Service Platforms
Arbitrage
Tariff Rates/Pricing Plans Abuse
Customer Account Take-Over
Customer Handset/Equipment Theft
World-Wide Fraud Enablers
IRSF (International Revenue
Share Fraud)
Interconnect Bypass/SIMBox
GatewayCharging Bypass
Private Use
Wholesale Fraud
Theft of Company
Handsets/Equipments
Commisions Fraud
Theft of Information
Service Reselling
Traffic Inflation for Credits/Bonus
32
World–Wide Fraud Types
IRSF (International
Revenue Share Fraud)
Service Reselling
Theft of Information
Premium Rate Service Fraud
Wholesale Fraud
Spamming
What Are the Main Fraud Types
Committed Through Hacking?
Fraud Types Through Hacking
PABX
VoIP Gateway/Switch
SMS - C
IP Broadband Router
Mobile Voice Mail System
Websites
SIP Switch
Network Elements Victim of Hacking?
33
34
Wholesale Fraud Through Hacking
FRAUD OPERATION SCENARIO | TRAFFIC BROKERING | CASE STUDY
 Negotiating “Traffic Termination Rates” at
the Wholesale Market.
 Traffic Brokers offer the lowest price for call
termination at a specific country.
TRAFFIC BROKERS
(Least Cost Routers)
TELECOM OPERATORS
(Mobile-Fixed-Convergent)
END CUSTOMERS
(Mobile-Fixed-Convergent)
Pays Termination
 Hacking Corporate Customers IP-BX Systems to
terminate traffic for free, forcing the Billing of these
calls upon Telecom Clients.
 Hacked Corporate Customers pay the termination rate.
Traffic Negotiation
Traffic Negotiation
Traffic Negotiation
CORPORATE CUSTOMER
CORPORATE CUSTOMER
CORPORATE CUSTOMER
HACKING
HACKING
HACKING
IRSF (International Revenue Share
Fraud)
Theft of Company
Handsets/Equipments
Commisions Fraud
Traffic Inflation for Credits/Bonus
Premium Rate Service Fraud
Interconnect Bypass/SIMBox
Gateway
Private Use
Fraud Types Through Subscription Fraud
IRSF (International
Revenue Share Fraud)
Wholesale Fraud
Interconnect Bypass/
SIMBox Gateway
Traffic Inflation for
Credits/Bonus
Fraud Types Through Arbitrage
Interconnect Bypass/SIMBox
Gateway
Traffic Inflation for
Credits/Bonus
Spamming
Fraud Types Through Tariff Rates Abuse
Service Reselling
Theft of Company
Handsets/Equipments
Premium Rate Service Fraud
HomeBanking Fraud
Commisions Fraud
IRSF (International Revenue Share
Fraud)
Fraud Types Through Customer Account Take-Over
Revenue Assurance
- Arbitrage
- Open SMS-C Abuse
- Tariff Rates/Pricing Plans Abuse
- Misconfiguration Abuse of Network/Service Platforms
- Abuse of Technical Failure at Network/Service Platforms
Fraud Management
- Customer Account Take-Over
- Operator/Company/Brand/Staff Impersonation
- Phishing
- Social Engineering
- Subscription Fraud
- Customer Handset/Equipment Theft
- Abuse of Business Procedures/Processes Weaknesses
Security Management
- Cloning
- Compromised Credit Cards
- False Base Station Attack
- Hacking
- Malicious Application/Software
- Mobile Malware
- Network/Protocol/Signalling Manipulation
- Misconfiguration Abuse of Network/Service Platforms
Fraud
Management
Security
Management
Revenue
Assurance
Classification of Enablers by Business Assurance Area
Service User
Hacker
Third Party
Dealer
Employee
Main Fraud Perpetrators by Enablers
Make Money/Profit
Obtain Free
Services/Goods
Collect
Credits/Bonuses
Obtain Commissions
Objectives of Fraud Types
Subscription Fraud
Hacking
Arbitrage
Social Engineering
Customer Handset/Equipment Theft
Misconfiguration Abuse of
Network/Service Platforms
Compromised Credit Cards
Customer Account Take-Over
Enablers Contributing to IRSF (International Revenue Share Fraud)
Tariff Rates/
Pricing Plans Abuse
Subscription Fraud
Abuse of Business
Procedures/Processes Weaknesses
Arbitrage
Enablers Contributing to SIMBox Gateway Fraud
IRSF (International
Revenue Share Fraud)
Interconnect
Bypass/SIMBox
Gateway
Private Use
Charging Bypass
Traffic Inflation
for Credits/Bonus
Wholesale Fraud
Credit Balance
Reselling
Commisions Fraud
Fraud Types at Prepaid
Variations of Fraud Types at Prepaid vs Postpaid Customers
IRSF (International Revenue
Share Fraud)
Theft of Company
Handsets/Equipments
Service Reselling
Premium Rate
Service Fraud
Commisions Fraud
Private Use
Interconnect Bypass/SIMBox
Gateway
Wholesale Fraud
Fraud Types at Postpaid
Traffic Monitoring/Analysis
Customer Complains
Security Report/Alert
CDR/Transaction Analysis
Proactive Review
Revenue Assurance Report/Alert
High Usage Report (HUR)
Test Calls Generation
Main Fraud Detection Methods
jose.sobreira@zonoptimus.pt
+ 351 93 101 3018
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME
46

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2014 march falcon business fraud classification model (3attendees)

  • 1. 17th March, 2014 1 Fraud Classification Model (FCM) A New Perspective for the Industry ZonOptimus, Portugal
  • 2. AGENDA 1. Project Context 2. Reason for FCM Project 3. Core Concept of FCM 4. Industry Reaction to FCM 5. FCM Register Explained 6. FIINA Fraud Reporting Template 7. An Industry Perspective FCM (Fraud Classification Model) 2
  • 3. 1. Project Context ZonOptimus Collaboration with TMForum 3
  • 4. TM FORUM AND Fraud Group Overview TM Forum Fraud Group works to assemble and maintain best practices from operators around the world relating to Fraud Management. This information will continue to be updated and expanded to account for evolving fraud tactics. TM Forum is a global, non-profit industry association focused on enabling service provider agility and innovation, through the development of several projects at key business areas:  65,000 Member Professionals  900+ Member Companies  195 Countries Represented 4
  • 5. TM FORUM FRAUD GROUP Fraud Management Guidebooks GB954 Fraud Classification Guide Arm operators with fraud information and offers them a best practice for the properly Classification of Fraud Cases: o Fraud Classification Model o Fraud Enablers Definitions o Fraud Types Definitions o Categories and Atributes ZonOptimus attended TMForum Fraud Group sessions and proposed the development of a Fraud Classification Model for the benefit of Telecom Industry - Project started in January, 2012 5
  • 6. 2. Reason for FCM Project Why the Telecom Industry Requires a Model 6
  • 7.  TMForum 2012 Fraud Survey results, highlighted the lack of a common Fraud Classification at Industry level: o Distinct names for the same Fraud Types o Distinct interpretations of same fraud incidents o Multiple Frauds perpetrated in the same case  There is a clear need for a Multi-Dimensional Analysis with different levels of abstraction. Telecommunications Industry was presented with many different and not synchronized ways of Fraud Classification Roaming Fraud Internal Fraud Subscription Fraud PaymentFraud Credit Card Fraud Hacking SIM Cloning Mobile Malware Prepaid Fraud Dealer Fraud Wangiri SS7 Tampering Handset Subsidy Loss PROBLEM AT INDUSTRY LEVEL (at the time of project start up, January 2012) 7
  • 8. Environment “Example of Distinct Interpretations of Same Fraud Incident” At 2011 CFCA Fraud Survey
  • 9. 3. Core Concept of FCM The Baseline for Fraud Classification Model 9
  • 10. TECHNOLOGYFRAUDSTER OBJECTIVE ENVIRONMENT ATTACK CUSTOMER SERVICE PAYMENT IMPACTS AAA ViG WLAN Network UTRAN CS-CSCS-MS CS-DS CS-WS CS-AS EFWS SRD EMA Portal FOCAMN-OSS MM RSS-CSCF S-CSCFI-CSCF ENUM/ DNS MGCF/SG MG N-SBGA-SBG HSS PSTN PLMN HTT P/H TTP S FTP H.248 SIP SIP DIAMETER ISC LDAP DNS SIP ISUP TDM IMT LDAP HTTP/HTTPS HTTP/HTTPS BRI PRI BRI POTS SIP H.323 SIP RTP RTP IP Backbone RTP /SI P/H 323 RT P/ SIP /H 32 3 GGSN SGSN PDG WAG P-CSCF PCRF Gx+ Rx+ Gm (SIP) DIAMETER DIAMETER PPS DIAMETER OSS-RC Other VoIP Networks CORBA Fraud Classification Attributes FRAUD CASES CLASSIFICATION FRAUD TYPE ENABLER TECHNIQUE  The core concept of the “Fraud Classification Model” is a clear differentiation at the Classification of Fraud Cases between the: o ENABLER TECHNIQUE  What was the vulnerability method explored to get access to network, products or services? versus o FRAUD TYPE  What was the fraud committed at network, products or services by exploring the vulnerability above? FRAUD CLASSIFICATION MODEL (BASIC PRINCIPLES) 10
  • 11.  In some circumstances the “Enabler Technique” is not a fraudulent attack but the exploitation of a risk vulnerability from other Business Assurance areas, such as Revenue Assurance and Security Management: o The FCM assumes the relationship of the Fraud Management activity to Security Management; Revenue Assurance and Risk Management Functions  The Fraud Classification Model assures CSPs/Operators with data collection to allow the Understanding of Fraud and the development of Mitigation Strategies at the following levels: o Revision of Internal Procedures, Processes and Products/Services o Implementation of Technical Solutions at Network and Service Platforms o Development, Enhancement and Updated Configuration of Fraud Management Systems (FMS)/Control Solutions 11 FRAUD CLASSIFICATION MODEL (BASIC PRINCIPLES)
  • 12. “Fraud Classification Model Brain-Center” - Revision of Internal Procedures, Processes and Products/Services - Implementation of Technical Solutions at Network and Service Platforms Development, Enhancement and Reconfiguration of Fraud Management Systems (FMS)/Control Solutions Subscription Fraud Hacking Customer Account Take-Over Mobile Malware FRAUD ENABLER (fraudulent way to obtain/access service) FRAUD TYPE (fraudulent scheme) TELECOMSSERVICEFRAUD SIM Card Cloning Network/Protocol/Signalling Manipulation Tariff Rates/Pricing Plan Abuse Social Engineering Arbitrage International Revenue Share Fraud Service Reselling Wholesale Fraud Private Use Commissions Fraud Traffic Inflation for Credits/Bonus Charging Bypass Interconnect Bypass SIMBox Gateway Theft of Company Handsets/Equipments OBJECTIVE (Scope)  Make Money/Profit  Obtain Free Services/Goods  Obtain Credits/Bonuses  Obtain Commissions  Access User Bank Account  Access Subscriber Information  ………. BUSINESS ASSURANCE AREAS Security Management Fraud Management Revenue Assurance 12 FRAUD CLASSIFICATION MODEL (BASIC PRINCIPLES)
  • 13. The Effective Relation Between “Fraud Enablers” and “Fraud Types” Fraud Types Advance Payment Fraud a a Charging Bypass a a a a Commissions Fraud a a a a Interconnect Bypass / SIMBox Gateway a a a a International Revenue Share Fraud (IRSF) a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a Toll Free Number Fraud a a a a Money Laundering a Online Banking Fraud a a a a a a a Premium Rate Service Fraud a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a Private Use a a a a a a a a Service Reselling a a a a a a a a a a a Spamming a a a a a a a a a Theft of Company Handsets / Equipment a a a a Theft of Information a a a a a a Traffic Inflation for Credits / Bonus a a a a a a Wholesale Fraud a a a a a TariffRates/PricingPlansAbuse ClipOnAbuse TechnicalFailureatNetwork/ServicePlatforms SocialEngineering SubscriptionFraud FraudEnablers Network/Protocol/SignalingManipulation OpenSMS-CAbuse Operator/Company/Brand/StaffImpersonation Phishing CustomerHandset/EquipmentTheft FalseBaseStationAttack Hacking MaliciousApplication/Software MisconfigurationofNetwork/ServicePlatforms MobileMalware AbuseofCompanyProcedures/Processes Arbitrage Cloning CompromisedCreditCards CustomerAccountTake-Over Relational Matrix | Fraud Enablers vs Fraud Types Fraud Classification Model (Basic Principles) 13 GB954 Fraud Classification Guide
  • 14. 4. Industry Reaction to FCM Model Sharing with Global Fraud Organisations 14
  • 15. GSMA Fraud Forum | Ireland and Malta Meetings May and September 2012  ZonOptimus presented the Core Concept of the Fraud Classification Model at the GSMA Fraud Forum event held in Ireland (May 2012).  Fraud Forum updated its Fraud Incident Reporting template, readapting it to include FCM Core Concept and issued a new version at the FF meeting held in Malta (September 2012). 15 MODEL SHARING WITH GSMA FRAUD FORUM
  • 16. FF Classification before September, 2012 FF Classification after September, 2012 BEFORE AFTER 16 MODEL SHARING WITH GSMA FRAUD FORUM
  • 17. CFCA Educational Event | Scottsdale, USA | September 2012  Presentation of Fraud Classification Model to CFCA (Communications Fraud Control Association) organisation.  CFCA updated its Fraud Reporting template, readapting it to include FCM Core Concept. CFCA (Communications Fraud Control Association) 17 MODEL SHARING WITH CFCA
  • 18. Fraud Classification before October, 2012 Fraud Classification after October, 2012 BEFORE AFTER 18 MODEL SHARING WITH CFCA
  • 19. 2013 CFCA Worldwide Communications Industry Fraud Survey Released at 5th September, 2013 the annual CFCA Fraud Survey, is now reflecting the Core Concept (Fraud Enablers vs Fraud Types) of the Fraud Classification Model, but still some adjustments need to be made to the survey in the future. FRAUD TYPE (fraudulent abuse) Wholesale Fraud | USD$ 5.32 B Premium Rate Service | USD$ 4.73 B Cable or Satellite Signal | USD$ 3.55 B Hardware Reselling | USD$ 2.96 B Hacking | USD$ 8,04 Billion - PBX (USD$ 4.42B) - VoIP System (USD$3.62B) Account Take Over | USD$ 3.62 B FRAUD ENABLER (fraudulent way to obtain/access service) TELECOMSSERVICEFRAUD (ValuesinUSD$Billions) Subscription Fraud | USD$ 5.22 B USD$ 6.11 Billion of the frauds have been committed in Roaming USD$ 3.35 Billion of the frauds have been perpetrated by Dealers NOTES  Estimated Global Fraud Losses o USD$ 46.3 Billion  Estimated Global Telecoms Revenues o USD$ 2.214 Trillion  Fraud Losses as % of Telecoms Revenues o 2.09% 19
  • 20. FIINA Plenary | Port Louis, Mauritius | November 2012  Presentation of Fraud Classification Model to the FIINA (Forum for Irregular Network Access) plenary meeting held in Mauritius.  Liaison Agreement signed between TMForum and FIINA for future cooperation and joint activities on FCM (project running). MODEL SHARING WITH FIINA 20
  • 21. 5. FCM Register Explained Categories and Attributes 21
  • 22. GENERAL DATE: CUSTOMER TYPE: CUSTOMER SUB TYPE: ACQUISITION SALES CHANNEL: PAYMENT METHOD: PAYMENT TYPE: LOSSES QUALITATIVE: LOSSES QUANTITATIVE: MAIN IMPACTS: CASE DESCRIPTION: OPERATOR: COUNTRY: REGION: FMS STATUS: ENABLERFRAUDTYPE FRAUD ENABLER:  ATTACK TYPE -  FRAUDSTER TYPE -  LOCATION -  ENVIRONMENT - FRAUD ABUSE/TYPE:  LOCATION -  ENVIRONMENT -  OBJECTIVE -  TECHNOLOGY -  SERVICE -  SUPPLEMENTARY SERVICE - FRAUD CLASSIFICATION FRAUD MITIGATION DETECTION:  DETECTION SYSTEM - PREVENTION:  PREVENTION SYSTEM - MITIGATION DESCRIPTION: 22 Fraud Classification Model RegisterModel Concept Template
  • 23. Fraud Classification Model Register ENABLERTECH FRAUDTYPE FRAUD ENABLER: …..  ATTACK TYPE -  FRAUDSTER TYPE –  LOCATION –  ENVIRONMENT – FRAUD ABUSE/TYPE: …..  LOCATION –  ENVIRONMENT –  OBJECTIVE –  TECHNOLOGY -  SERVICE –  SUPPLEMENTARY SERVICE - FRAUD CLASSIFICATIONFRAUD ENABLERS  Abuse of Business Procedures/Processes Weaknesses  Abuse of Technical Failure at Network/Service Platforms  Arbitrage  Cloning  Compromised Credit Cards  Customer Account Take-Over  Customer Handset/Equipment Theft  Customer Handset/Equipment Configuration Abuse  False Base Station Attack  Hacking  Malicious Application/Software  Misconfiguration Abuse of Network/Service Platforms  Mobile Malware  Network/IT Systems Access Abuse  Network/Protocol/Signalling Manipulation  Open SMS-C Abuse  Operator/Company/Brand/Staff Impersonation  Phishing  Social Engineering/Single Ring Solicitation  Subscription Fraud  Tariff Rates/Pricing Plans Abuse  Clip On Abuse  Abuse of Contract Terms and Conditions ATTACK TYPE  External  Internal FRAUDSTER TYPE  Hacker  Dealer  Business Partner  Service User  Third Party  Employee  Service Provider  ……. LOCATION  Home Network  Visited Network  Home and Visited Network  National Network  International Network  Customer Offices  Dealer Offices  World Wide Web  ……. ENVIRONMENT  National Territory  International Territory  Roaming IN  Roaming OUT  ….. Categories and Attributes Description – Fraud Classification (1) 23
  • 24. Fraud Classification Model Register ENABLERTECH FRAUDTYPE FRAUD ENABLER: …..  ATTACK TYPE -  FRAUDSTER TYPE –  LOCATION –  ENVIRONMENT – FRAUD ABUSE/TYPE: …..  LOCATION –  ENVIRONMENT –  OBJECTIVE –  TECHNOLOGY -  SERVICE –  SUPPLEMENTARY SERVICE - FRAUD CLASSIFICATION FRAUD TYPES  Advanced Payment/Fee Fraud  Charging Bypass  Commissions Fraud  National Revenue Share Fraud  Interconnect Bypass/SIMBox Gateway  IRSF (International Revenue Share Fraud)  Money Laundering  Online Banking Fraud  Premium Rate Service Fraud  Private Use  Service Reselling  Spamming  Theft of Company Handsets/Equipments  Theft of Information/Content  Toll Free Number Fraud  Traffic Inflation for Credits/Bónus  Wholesale Fraud LOCATION  Home Network  Visited Network  Home and Visited Network  National Network  International Network  Customer Offices  Dealer Offices ENVIRONMENT  National Territory  International Territory  Roaming IN  Roaming OUT  ….. OBJECTIVE  Make Money/Profit  Obtain Free Services/Goods  Collect Credits/Bonuses/C ash  Obtain Commissions  Access/Steal Information  Access User Bank Account  Operator’s Impersonation TECHNOLOGY  GSM  GPRS  3G  4G/LTE  IP /IMS  CDMA  ADSL  FTTH  ………. SERVICE  Voice Inbound  Voice Outbound  VoIP Inbound  VoIP Outbound  SMS Inbound  SMS Outbound  MMS Inbound  MMS Outbound  Data  M – Commerce  M – Payments SUPPLEMENT SERVICE  Call Conference  Call Forward  Call Hold  ………. Categories and Attributes Description – Fraud Classification (2) 24
  • 25. GENERAL DATE: June, 2013 CUSTOMER TYPE: Postpaid CUSTOMER SUB TYPE: Corporate Business ACQUISITION CHANNEL: NAp PAYMENT METHOD: Postpaid Invoice Payment PAYMENT TYPE: Various LOSSES QUALITATIVE: Very High LOSSES QUANTITATIVE: Financials NAv (150.000 minutes) MAIN IMPACTS: Financial CASE DESCRIPTION: Tests performed at Network/Session Border Gateway (SBG) for new VoIP Services left a backdoor at network level. This vulnerability was used by an IP Address originating from Palestine who hacked SBG and performed 150.000 minutes of calls to Int. Premium Rate Services. OPERATOR: Eagle Telecom COUNTRY: USA REGION: North America FMS STATUS: In-House FMS ENABLERTECHFRAUDTYPE FRAUD ENABLER: Hacking: Session Border Gateway  ATTACK TYPE - External  FRAUDSTER TYPE – Hacker  LOCATION – Home Network  ENVIRONMENT – National Territory FRAUD TYPE: IRSF (Spain; Somalia and Zimbabwe)  LOCATION – Home Network  ENVIRONMENT – National Territory  OBJECTIVE – Make Money/Profit  TECHNOLOGY – IP IMS  SERVICE – VoIP Outbound  SUPPLEMENTARY SERVICE – NAp FRAUD CLASSIFICATION FRAUD MITIGATION DETECTION: Traffic Monitoring/Analysis  DETECTION SYSTEM – Fraud Management System (FMS) PREVENTION: Network Technical Solution  PREVENTION SYSTEM – Session Border Gateway (SBG) MITIGATION DESCRIPTION: Engineering Department secured SBG and blocked calls to International Premium Rate Services for all future Network testing programs. Case 1 25
  • 26. 6. FIINA Fraud Reporting Template The Summary of the Work Made at FIINA 26
  • 27. Fraud Classification Model FIINA Fraud Reporting Template
  • 28. Fraud Classification Model FIINA Fraud Reporting Template
  • 29. Fraud Classification Model FIINA Fraud Reporting Template
  • 30. 7. An Industry Perspective Through the Model? The Model Potential - Graphics hereby presented do not represent an Industry reality - Fraud varies from region-to-region 30
  • 31. 31 Subscription Fraud Network/Protocol/Signalling Manipulation Hacking Misconfiguration Abuse of Network/Service Platforms Arbitrage Tariff Rates/Pricing Plans Abuse Customer Account Take-Over Customer Handset/Equipment Theft World-Wide Fraud Enablers
  • 32. IRSF (International Revenue Share Fraud) Interconnect Bypass/SIMBox GatewayCharging Bypass Private Use Wholesale Fraud Theft of Company Handsets/Equipments Commisions Fraud Theft of Information Service Reselling Traffic Inflation for Credits/Bonus 32 World–Wide Fraud Types
  • 33. IRSF (International Revenue Share Fraud) Service Reselling Theft of Information Premium Rate Service Fraud Wholesale Fraud Spamming What Are the Main Fraud Types Committed Through Hacking? Fraud Types Through Hacking PABX VoIP Gateway/Switch SMS - C IP Broadband Router Mobile Voice Mail System Websites SIP Switch Network Elements Victim of Hacking? 33
  • 34. 34 Wholesale Fraud Through Hacking FRAUD OPERATION SCENARIO | TRAFFIC BROKERING | CASE STUDY  Negotiating “Traffic Termination Rates” at the Wholesale Market.  Traffic Brokers offer the lowest price for call termination at a specific country. TRAFFIC BROKERS (Least Cost Routers) TELECOM OPERATORS (Mobile-Fixed-Convergent) END CUSTOMERS (Mobile-Fixed-Convergent) Pays Termination  Hacking Corporate Customers IP-BX Systems to terminate traffic for free, forcing the Billing of these calls upon Telecom Clients.  Hacked Corporate Customers pay the termination rate. Traffic Negotiation Traffic Negotiation Traffic Negotiation CORPORATE CUSTOMER CORPORATE CUSTOMER CORPORATE CUSTOMER HACKING HACKING HACKING
  • 35. IRSF (International Revenue Share Fraud) Theft of Company Handsets/Equipments Commisions Fraud Traffic Inflation for Credits/Bonus Premium Rate Service Fraud Interconnect Bypass/SIMBox Gateway Private Use Fraud Types Through Subscription Fraud
  • 36. IRSF (International Revenue Share Fraud) Wholesale Fraud Interconnect Bypass/ SIMBox Gateway Traffic Inflation for Credits/Bonus Fraud Types Through Arbitrage
  • 37. Interconnect Bypass/SIMBox Gateway Traffic Inflation for Credits/Bonus Spamming Fraud Types Through Tariff Rates Abuse
  • 38. Service Reselling Theft of Company Handsets/Equipments Premium Rate Service Fraud HomeBanking Fraud Commisions Fraud IRSF (International Revenue Share Fraud) Fraud Types Through Customer Account Take-Over
  • 39. Revenue Assurance - Arbitrage - Open SMS-C Abuse - Tariff Rates/Pricing Plans Abuse - Misconfiguration Abuse of Network/Service Platforms - Abuse of Technical Failure at Network/Service Platforms Fraud Management - Customer Account Take-Over - Operator/Company/Brand/Staff Impersonation - Phishing - Social Engineering - Subscription Fraud - Customer Handset/Equipment Theft - Abuse of Business Procedures/Processes Weaknesses Security Management - Cloning - Compromised Credit Cards - False Base Station Attack - Hacking - Malicious Application/Software - Mobile Malware - Network/Protocol/Signalling Manipulation - Misconfiguration Abuse of Network/Service Platforms Fraud Management Security Management Revenue Assurance Classification of Enablers by Business Assurance Area
  • 42. Subscription Fraud Hacking Arbitrage Social Engineering Customer Handset/Equipment Theft Misconfiguration Abuse of Network/Service Platforms Compromised Credit Cards Customer Account Take-Over Enablers Contributing to IRSF (International Revenue Share Fraud)
  • 43. Tariff Rates/ Pricing Plans Abuse Subscription Fraud Abuse of Business Procedures/Processes Weaknesses Arbitrage Enablers Contributing to SIMBox Gateway Fraud
  • 44. IRSF (International Revenue Share Fraud) Interconnect Bypass/SIMBox Gateway Private Use Charging Bypass Traffic Inflation for Credits/Bonus Wholesale Fraud Credit Balance Reselling Commisions Fraud Fraud Types at Prepaid Variations of Fraud Types at Prepaid vs Postpaid Customers IRSF (International Revenue Share Fraud) Theft of Company Handsets/Equipments Service Reselling Premium Rate Service Fraud Commisions Fraud Private Use Interconnect Bypass/SIMBox Gateway Wholesale Fraud Fraud Types at Postpaid
  • 45. Traffic Monitoring/Analysis Customer Complains Security Report/Alert CDR/Transaction Analysis Proactive Review Revenue Assurance Report/Alert High Usage Report (HUR) Test Calls Generation Main Fraud Detection Methods
  • 46. jose.sobreira@zonoptimus.pt + 351 93 101 3018 THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME 46