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CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory
http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/
Anti-Phishing Phil
The Design and Evaluation of a
Game That Teaches People Not to
Fall for Phish
S. Sheng, B. Maginien, P. Kumaraguru,
A. Acquisti, L. Cranor, J. Hong, E. Nunge
• CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/
 Online game
• http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/antiphishing_phil/
 Teaches people how to protect
themselves from phishing attacks
• Identify phishing URLs
• Use web browser cues
• Find legitimate sites with search engines
Anti-Phishing Phil
• CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/
Why a game?
 Security is a secondary task
 Learning by doing
 Fun and engaging
 Better strategies
• CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/
More about the game
 Four rounds
• Increasing difficulty
• Two minutes in each round
 Eight URL “worms” in each round
• Four phishing and four legitimate URLs
• Users must correctly identify 6 out of 8 URLs to
advance
• CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/
User Study
 Test participants’ ability to identify phishing web
sites before and after training
• 10 URLs before training, 10 after, randomized
• Up to 15 minutes of training
 Training conditions:
• Web-based phishing education
• Tutorial
• Game
 14 participants in each condition
• Screened out security experts
• Younger, college students
• CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/
• CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/
• CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/
Falling for Phishing
0.43
0.34
0.12
0.19 0.17
0.38
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Existing training
materials
Tutorial Game
FalseNegativeRate
Pre test
Post test
• CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/
Misidentifying Legitimate Sites
0.30
0.27
0.30
0.41
0.21
0.14
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Existing training
material
Tutorial Game
FalsePositiveRate
Pre test
Post test
• CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/
Results
 Game group had the best performance
overall
 Game group had fewest false positives
 No significant difference in false negatives
among the three groups
• CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/
Field Study
• CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/
Study Set-up
 Test participants’ ability to identify phishing web
sites after training and the ability to retain the
knowledge
• 6 URL quiz
 before training, after training, one week later
 Conditions:
• Control
• Game
 Completed training
• 423 in training group
• 292 in control group
• CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/
Preliminary Results
31%
60%
92%
75%
81%
93%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Novice Intermediate Expert
Pretest
Post test
• CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/
Comments
• CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/
Press
• CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/
Deployment
 We’ve released Phil under a Creative Commons
non-commercial license
 Over the past few weeks we’ve been contacted
by several banks, retailers, other companies, and
government agencies who are interested in using
Phil in their employee training programs
• Can’t get employees to read security memos, but think
they will be willing to play a game and learn something
 We’re working on setting up a commercial
licensing program, customized versions
• CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/
Portuguese Version
• CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/
Future Plans
 Analyze field study results to understand
how game can be further improved
 Continue to update game and use data
from public usage to evaluate and improve
 Consider adding new modules to teach
different skills or reinforce skills through
alternate approaches
 Consider special versions for kids, elderly,
specific brands, etc.
• CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/
Acknowledgements
 Members of Supporting Trust Decision
research group
 Members of CUPS Lab
CMU Usable Privacy and Security
Laboratory
http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/
Play Anti-Phishing Phil:
http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/antiphishing_phil/

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Anti-Phishing Phil: The Design and Evaluation of a Game That Teaches People Not to Fall for Phish

  • 1. CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Anti-Phishing Phil The Design and Evaluation of a Game That Teaches People Not to Fall for Phish S. Sheng, B. Maginien, P. Kumaraguru, A. Acquisti, L. Cranor, J. Hong, E. Nunge
  • 2. • CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/  Online game • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/antiphishing_phil/  Teaches people how to protect themselves from phishing attacks • Identify phishing URLs • Use web browser cues • Find legitimate sites with search engines Anti-Phishing Phil
  • 3. • CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Why a game?  Security is a secondary task  Learning by doing  Fun and engaging  Better strategies
  • 4.
  • 5.
  • 6.
  • 7.
  • 8.
  • 9.
  • 10. • CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ More about the game  Four rounds • Increasing difficulty • Two minutes in each round  Eight URL “worms” in each round • Four phishing and four legitimate URLs • Users must correctly identify 6 out of 8 URLs to advance
  • 11.
  • 12. • CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ User Study  Test participants’ ability to identify phishing web sites before and after training • 10 URLs before training, 10 after, randomized • Up to 15 minutes of training  Training conditions: • Web-based phishing education • Tutorial • Game  14 participants in each condition • Screened out security experts • Younger, college students
  • 13. • CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/
  • 14. • CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/
  • 15. • CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Falling for Phishing 0.43 0.34 0.12 0.19 0.17 0.38 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 Existing training materials Tutorial Game FalseNegativeRate Pre test Post test
  • 16. • CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Misidentifying Legitimate Sites 0.30 0.27 0.30 0.41 0.21 0.14 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 Existing training material Tutorial Game FalsePositiveRate Pre test Post test
  • 17. • CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Results  Game group had the best performance overall  Game group had fewest false positives  No significant difference in false negatives among the three groups
  • 18. • CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Field Study
  • 19.
  • 20. • CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Study Set-up  Test participants’ ability to identify phishing web sites after training and the ability to retain the knowledge • 6 URL quiz  before training, after training, one week later  Conditions: • Control • Game  Completed training • 423 in training group • 292 in control group
  • 21. • CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Preliminary Results 31% 60% 92% 75% 81% 93% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Novice Intermediate Expert Pretest Post test
  • 22. • CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Comments
  • 23. • CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Press
  • 24. • CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Deployment  We’ve released Phil under a Creative Commons non-commercial license  Over the past few weeks we’ve been contacted by several banks, retailers, other companies, and government agencies who are interested in using Phil in their employee training programs • Can’t get employees to read security memos, but think they will be willing to play a game and learn something  We’re working on setting up a commercial licensing program, customized versions
  • 25. • CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Portuguese Version
  • 26. • CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Future Plans  Analyze field study results to understand how game can be further improved  Continue to update game and use data from public usage to evaluate and improve  Consider adding new modules to teach different skills or reinforce skills through alternate approaches  Consider special versions for kids, elderly, specific brands, etc.
  • 27. • CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory • http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Acknowledgements  Members of Supporting Trust Decision research group  Members of CUPS Lab
  • 28. CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Play Anti-Phishing Phil: http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/antiphishing_phil/

Hinweis der Redaktion

  1. Good afternoon everyone, I am Steve Sheng from Carnegie Mellon University, I am part of the CUPS lab at CMU. Today, I will be talking about some of the work that we did at CUPS lab in order to find solutions to train users about phishing attacks. The work that I will be presenting today was jointly done with Bryant Maginien, Ponguru Kumaragu, Alessandro Acquisti, Lorrie Cranor, Jason Hong and Elizabeth Nunge.
  2. Educating user have some constraints, The first constraint is that security is a secondary task, people are not visiting a website to look at its security features, they go to the website to complete transactions. Another constraint is people like learning by doing, they don’t like to sit down and read training materials. Education is more effective when users learn by doing rather than by learning the classroom instructions.
  3. The scene: is sea, we have a small fish called Phil, her job is to eat all the worms.
  4. So today, Phil swim by a worm, the worm is identified by a URL. A good worm is a legitimate URL, whereas a bad worm is a bait dropped by the phishers.
  5. Phil needs to score 6 / 8 to move on to the next rounds, and the end of the round, phil got a chance to reflect what he missed.
  6. In between rounds, we also have short tutorials to teach Phil better strategies to identify phishing. In this example, Phil’s father teaches Phil how to use a search engine.
  7. STUDY WAS A THINK ALOUD STUDY that lasts 45 - 60 MINS.. WE CAREFULLY RECRUITED NON-EXPERTS USING THREE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS - THE DEIFNITION OF NON EXPERT IS THE SAME AS IN PREVIOUS STUDY THAT I SAID. It aimed at testing the participants’ ability to identify phishing websites. We presented them 10 websites before training, followed by a 15 minute break where users perform one of the three tasks: they read webased phishing education, they read the game tutorial, or they played the game. Users are randomly assigned in each of the conditions. There are fourteen non-expert participants in each condition, for a total of 42 participants.
  8. All of them are statistical significant, there is no statistical difference between them in Either pre test or post test.
  9. There are statistically different.
  10. To summarize, there are -- No significant difference in false negatives among the three groups - Game group performed best in false positives - Game condition performed best in total correctness Effect between the tutorial and the game conditions not statistically significant. The next question we want to answer, is that is the increase in performance due to learning or raising awareness.
  11. http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,137868-c,cybercrime/article.html http://www.news.com/8301-10784_3-9787549-7.html?tag=nefd.only http://www.cbc.ca/technology/story/2007/09/26/phil-phish.html http://www.pcpro.co.uk/news/126386/phishers-caught-hook-line-and-sinker.html http://www.businessweek.com/the_thread/blogspotting/archives/2007/09/play_with_anti-.html