1. 1
Development and
Underdevelopment
Definitions & conceptualization:
Development & Underdevelopment
Development notions
Since its inception in the 1950s and
1960s, the notion of development has
been an equivalent term with “progress”
and “modernization.” Nowadays it has
become an analogue of “economic
growth”.
A few catch-words:
Economic growth
Industrialization and modernization
Progress
Update, up-to-date
Technological advance
Modern man, ”capitalist spirit”, forwardlooking
“Development” denotes a movement away from
something that is considered to be underdeveloped.
The US president Truman was among the first who
used the word “underdeveloped” in his speech on
January 22, 1949 when he took office: “We must
embark on a bold new program for making the
benefits of our scientific advances and industrial
progress available for the improvement and growth
of underdeveloped area.…”
Since the word “underdeveloped” was
invented in comparison with the development
level of the West at the end of World War II,
the majority of the world population had
suddenly degraded into a status of
“underdevelopment.”
Development defined
All non-Western countries have been more or
less in a process to “develop” or to “catch up.”
The Petit Robert dictionary contains the
following text under the general heading of
“development”: “Developing country or region,
whose economy has not yet reached the level of
North America, Western Europe, etc.”
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Development measurements
economic growth and expansion (GDP*,
GNP*) , institutionalized by WB and IMF
International trade (export and import)
wealth accumulation (foreign reserve, etc.)
mass production and consumption.
One is considered as being “developed” if it
can meet these measurements.
Problems of these measures
1) The number-based measures fail to give a
real picture when using them for acrosscountry

2. comparisons due to the wide
differences from country to country in terms
of exchange rate anomalies, differentials in
tariff and tax rates, as well as subsidies to
consumption goods
2) these data put an emphasis on the market value of
economic transaction, that is the rate at which
resources are converted to commodities and
consumptions together with other paid services
and activities. For example, the expansion of
military budgets, expenditures on prisons, wars
and crime including prevention expenditures, as
well as environmental costs (the destroying of
forests and the toxic dumpsites) seem to make
GNP and GDP data impressive;
3) they do not take account of exchange of
goods and services that do not enter the
market, for example, self-sufficiency,
female contribution to households, elders
unpaid tutoring of youth, care for the sick
and elderly, voluntary work of civic
societies, etc, and other social aspects, such
as family and community coherence,
emotional well-being, social stability
New ways of thinking and measure
1) basic well-being (e.g., food, shelter,
clothing, the goods for self-respect)
2) additive well-being (e.g., health, education,
identity expression, culture)
3) freedom from subtractive and divisive
well-being (e.g. environmental degradation,
violence, crime, coercion, deception,
genocide, ethnic-cleansing, lynching,
slavery, psychological torture, forced
displacement and migration, rape and abuse)
3
4) multiplicative well-being (e.g., ease of
mobility, degree of comfort, ease and
participation in creative and public life,
spiritual fulfillment, confidence and
growing self-respect and psychic health)
Three Major Development Theories
Modernization Theory
Critical development theories:
Dependency Theory
World System Theory
Critical Development Theories
The latter two (dependency and world system)
developed as critiques of the modernization
school.
Emerged as theory to find answers to
development problems, but ended up more as
an explanation of underdevelopment in the
Third World.
Modernization theory
Historical origin
1. The rise of the US as a superpower and as a
model to follow.

3. 2. The birth to many new nation-states in the
Third World which were in search of
development model.
3. The US identified the threat of communism
in post-war Europe and in the Third World
believing that economic recovery and
modernization and moved them along the
path of the US, and thus they would move
away from communism. (Marshall, East
Asia)
4. The economic recovery of Europe
strengthened the ideology and policy of
deliberate intervention.
5. American political scientists sought to
identity the conditions that gave rise to
development in the First World and
examine why these were lacking in the
Third World.
6. With the US support, an interdisciplinary
modernization school was in making in
the 1950s.
4
Modernization Assumptions
Development is a spontaneous, irreversible
process inherent in every single society.
Development is regarded as an evolutionary
perspective. Development and
underdevelopment are differences between
rich and poor nations in terms of observable
economic, political, social and cultural gaps.
Social change is progressive, gradual, and
irreversible.
Development thus implies the bridging of
these gaps by means of an imitative process
in which less developed countries gradually
assumed the qualities of the industrialized
nations. It is a phased process. Society begins
with a primitive stage and move to an
advanced stage.
Modernization policies (a rationalization and
effectivization of economic and social
structures) are not only seen as elements of a
development strategy, but as universal
historical forces. It bears a strong resemblance
to the transition from feudalism to capitalism
in Western economic history.
Development implies structural differentiation
and functional specialization.
The process of development can be divided
into distinct stages showing the level of
development achieved by each society.
Development can be stimulated by external
competition or military threat and by
internal measures that support modern
sectors and modernize traditional sectors.
Development is seen as an universal process
as well as a characteristic of human

4. societies rather than a concrete historical
process taking place in specific societies
during specific periods.
Some approaches to modernization
Functional-structural approach to society
and modernization
cultural approach to society and
modernization
The economics of development
5
Functional-structural approach
to society and modernization
A. Emile Durkheim (19th century). Neil
Smelser, Talcott Parsons
1. Social evolution is a process of social
differentiation as a result of societies
becoming structurally more complex.
2. Social change is seen as a basically
endogenous process (in-built).
Modernization is a universal process
characteristic of human societies rather
than a concrete historical process taking
place in specific societies during specific
periods.
3. Systems are in complex exchange with
their environment, which often requires
internal adjustment. (division of labour
and differentiation)
4. Social differentiation is defined to be the
evolution from a multi-functional role
structure to a specialized role structure.
5. For example, during a society’s transition
from family to factory production, the
division of labour increases and economic
activities based on the family move to the
firm. When a formal education system
emerges, education and training functions
provided by the family and church are now
catered for by a specialized unit - the
school.
6. In political sphere, the political roles in a
pre-modern society are closely bound up
with kinship roles, which provides the main
integrative principle in such a society.
When a society becomes increasingly
complex and more specialized structures
emerge: bureaucracies, parties, assemblies
and the like.
1. Appropriate economic conditions for
development, while necessary, were not of
themselves sufficient. (economic
rationality is not enough)
2. In addition, a capitalist spirit, a set of
orientations and values, was required.

5. Cultural approach to society
and modernization
6
3. Weber argues that there is causal connection existed
between the spiritual and the temporal, namely the
effect of religion on the development of capitalism
religious spirituality was secularized when the
dedication to the task of societal regeneration became
linked to the generalization and multiplication of
capital and when profit-making was turned into an
ethos, a moral crusade. This gave birth to a socioeconomic
evolution which began to function in a
manner independent of religion which was
marginalized by the economic logic.
4. These characteristics are depicted as unique
cultural phenomena of Western civilization and as
the elements behind the emergence of capitalism
in Europe:
1) rationalization and creativity of economic
activities.
2) rational organization of free labour (separation of
productive activity from the household).
3) modern book-keeping system.
4) industrial organization.
5) organization of political and social life.
5. Market economy as an entity that combines
norms, values, markets, money, and laws is an
unanticipated consequence of the Protestant
ethic because “people create social structures
but that those structures soon take on a life of
their own, over which the creators have little
or no control.
6. Besides Weber, Hegel and Marx also took
the culturalist perspectives to explain why
occidental (Western) societies were able to
achieve industrialization earlier than the rest
of the world, and why the oriental (Asian)
societies failed to do so. (Chinese
Confucianism vs Protestant ethics)
7. They argue that traditional religions, cultures
(such as Chinese Confucianism) and social
patterns in oriental societies were structural
barriers and were inimical to the development
of capitalism. This also denotes that
modernization is preconditioned by cultural
capital and ideological attitude receptive to
capitalism.
(the decline of the Chinese empire --- the rise of
East Asia since 1960s --- the financial crisis in
1997 --- the rise of China)
8. Weber’s work has generated a tremendous
impact on and strengthened the culturalist
approaches to the studies of Third World
development.
9. Cultural aspects become one of the most
important elements in development studies.
7
Cultural Modern Man

6. 1. “Modern man” is a central concept. Modern
man is adaptable, independent, efficient,
oriented to long-term planning, adaptable to
change. Modern man is confident of the
ability to bring change about and is actively
interested in and eager to participate in
politics.
3. On the contrary, the “traditional man” is
anxious, suspicious, lacking in ambition,
oriented towards immediate needs,
fatalistic, conservative and clings to wellestablished
procedures even when they
are no longer appropriate.
The economics of development
Underdevelopment is a shortage issue:
- Physical conditions
- Capital (saving rate)
- Technology
W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic
Growth, 1960 (non-communist manifesto)
The best known economic contribution
within the tradition of modernization theory
is that of Walt Rostow, who conceived of
development as a number of stages linking a
state of “tradition” to “maturity”. This
development process was believed to be an
endogenous process.
There were five stages through which all developing
societies had to pass:
1. The traditional society
Limited production, absence of modern science and
technology; agricultural based, clan-based polity, and
fatalistic mentality.
2. The pre-take-off society (many traditional
characteristics removed; agricultural productivity
increased; effective infrastructure created; new
mentality and new class appeared.)
3. Take-off (most crucial, economic
development obstacles removed;
national income raised; certain sectors
developed faster;)
4. The road to maturity (modern
technology disseminated from the
leading sector; the whole economy
moves to mass consumption)
5. The mass consumption society (today)
8
Policy implications
Modernization theories are not just
academic theories, they were originally
formulated in response to the new global
leadership role of the United States after
World War II. Therefore they have
important policy implications.
Modernization theories intend to

7. provide an implicit justification for the
asymmetrical power relationship
between "traditional" and "modern"
societies. Since the US is modern and
advanced, and the Third World is
traditional and backward, the latter
should look to the former for guidance.
Modernization theories attempt to
legitimate the US aid and intervention
policies. If what is needed is more
exposure to modern values and more
productive investment, the US can help
by sending advisers, by encouraging
American business to invest abroad, by
making loans and other kinds of aid.
Structural theories:
Dependency and World System
Structuralist thought (economic structuralism)
It has its origin in Marxism
A historical perspective
Holistic perspective
Economic and political analysis
Focus on the structure of the international capitalist
system / mode of production
Structuralism (background)
Unlike European industrialization, one of the
distinctive features of Third World
industrialization is the fact that such a process
was taking place alongside already
industrialized Western countries and was
therefore tied to them by various economic
relations
Critique to the David Recardo’s Comparative
Advantage: each country is endowed with local
resources, material, cultural and geographical
conditions. A country’s economic development
would benefit from specialization on these
strengths connected with international trade.
If everyone does the same, a system of
specialization and trade will work to its
optimum.
9
Structuralist theories: some basic
assumptions
1. It is necessary to understand the global
context within which states and other entities
interact.
2. They stress the importance of historical
analysis in comprehending the international
system.
3. The rise of British (see List’s theory) and
the later-comers (the US, Russia, Germany
and Japan) all favored industrialization
behind protective tariff barriers --
industrialization not under global

8. specialization, but under protection.
4. The global system is not a uniform
marketplace with actors freely making
mutually beneficial contracts, rather, it is
divided into powerful central and relatively
weak peripheral economies with the former
playing an active role and the latter a
passive/reflexive role.
5. It is assumed that particular mechanisms of
domination exist that keep Third World states
from developing and that contribute to
worldwide uneven development.
6. They also assume that economic factors are
absolutely critical in explaining the evolution
and functioning of the world capitalist system
and the relegation of Third World states to a
subordinate position.
Dependency Theory
Definitions of dependency
In a nutshell
Historical Origin
Intellectual Origin
Explanations of underdevelopment
Suggestions of solution
Definition of Dependency
…a situation in which the economy of a
certain group of countries is conditioned by
the development and expansion of another
economy, to which their own is subjected.
(Dos Santos)
(Theotonio Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence," in K.T. Fann
and Donald C. Hodges, eds., Readings in U.S. Imperialism. Boston:
Porter Sargent, 1971, p. 226)
10
An explanation of the economic
development of a state in terms of the
external influences - political, economic,
and cultural - on national development
policies. (Osvaldo Sunkel)
(Osvaldo Sunkel, "National Development Policy and External
Dependence in Latin America," The Journal of Development Studies,
Vol. 6, no. 1, October 1969, p. 23).
a historical condition which shapes a certain
structure of the world economy such that it
favors some countries to the detriment of
others and limits the development
possibilities of the subordinate economics...
In a nutshell
“The underdevelopment of the Third World and the
development of the First World are not isolated and
discrete phenomena. Rather, they are organically and
functionally interrelated. Underdevelopment is not a
primal or original condition, to be outgrown by
following the industrialized course pioneered by
Western nations. The latter are overdeveloped today to
the same degree the peripheral lands are
underdeveloped. The states of developedness and
underdevelopedness are but two sides of the same
coin.”
L.R. Stavrianos, Global Rift
Key points:

9. _Dependency is the source of
underdevelopment
_Dependency is the result of the imposition
of a set of external conditions on Third
World development
Historical and intellectual origin
Dependency Theory developed in the late
1950s under the guidance of the Director of
the United Nations Economic Commission
for Latin America (ECLA).
Economic growth in the advanced
industrialized countries did not necessarily
lead to growth in poorer countries.
A group of Latin American intellectuals
(especially economists and sociologists), in
the early 1960s, began an overall critique to
modernization theory. ECLA's scholars
started a set of theoretical approaches that
was going to be known generically as
Dependency Theory.
11
It is argued that most of the foundations of
the theoretical categories and development
policies rooted in the modernization school
have been exclusively based on the historical
experience of European and North American
advanced capitalist countries. Thus, these
western theoretical categories are not suitable
to guide our understanding of the
underdevelopment problem of the Third
World.
Marxist tradition – combination of several
traditions, Marxism, Leninism, Neo-
Marxism - more sociological in outlook
Associated with Marxist thinking and sets
LDCs within wider socio-historical context,
arguing that lesser developed nations are
dominated economically & politically by,
and dependent upon, outside industrial
powers
Fields of investigation
mechanisms and processes of domination through
which existing structures are maintained regarding
both national and international structures.
forms of dependency creating mechanism of selfperpetuation
and the possibilities of change.
antagonistic and non-antagonistic relations between
social classes and groups.
Basic assumptions
1) Historical dimensions of relations of dependence are
rooted in the internationalization of capitalism.
Gunder Frank:
“All serious study of the problems of developed and
underdeveloped and all serious intent to formulate
policy for the elimination of underdevelopment and for
the promotion of development must take in account,
nay must begin with, the fundamental historical and
structural cause of underdevelopment in capitalism”
2) The international system comprises two

10. sets of states – metropolitan centre vs peripheral
satellites (buffer).
3) External forces are of singular importance
to economic activities of dependent states.
4) Relations between two sets of states are
dynamic because ongoing interactions tend
to reinforce and intensify unequal relations
and patterns.
5) Attempt to explain underdevelopment by
examining patterns of interactions and
argument that inequality and exploitation
are intrinsic parts of those interactions.
12
6) Developing countries could not be able to
follow the suit of the Western path because
they have experienced the history that
western countries have not experienced –
colonialism
7) Third World countries are not “primitive” and
“feudal” or “traditional”. It is the colonialism
and foreign domination have handicapped
their development course.
8. Poor countries exported primary commodities to
the rich countries who then manufactured
products out of those commodities and sold them
back to the poorer countries. (even today)
9. The "Value Added" by manufacturing a usable
product always costs more than the primary
products used to create those products. (raw
material vs finished products; agriculture vs
manufacturing)
10. Domestic elite is in an alliance with
international capital because they share the
same interests.
Today, “transnational elite class”
Underdevelopment formula
Foreign capital and surplus penetrating in
the national economy
Loss of economic control, wealth,
distribution to foreign powers
Underdevelopment and economic
stagnation
Samir Amin: dual sector
1. The centre and the periphery play unequal roles
in the system because of unequal exchange.
2. In the periphery the ruling groups are in alliance
with those of the centre create environments in
the former in which peasants lack access to the
quantity and quality of land needed to maintain
their family's livelihood. As a result, the pool of
labour available is large. (labour creation)
3. Due to the surplus of labour, the reduction in
wages makes the reduction of prices of
commodities produced by the periphery
possible.
4. The production processes in the centre are
articulated whereas those in the periphery are
dis-articulated

11. 13
5. In the centre, demand and supply linkages
connect the production process throughout the
economy. Thus expansion of one sector has
positive impacts on other sectors via these
linkages.
6. In the periphery, there are few links between
various sectors. The expansion of one sector has
little impact via demand or supply linkages to the
rest of the economy. This rules out autonomous
development in the periphery.
Suggestions of solution
Poorer countries should embark on programs of
import substitution so that they need not purchase
the manufactured products from the richer
countries.
The poorer countries would still sell their primary
products on the world market, but their foreign
exchange reserves would not be used to purchase
their manufactures from abroad.
The only possibility of avoiding dependency
is creating an alternative system of
production, a non-capitalist system of
production. Here, the majority of dependentist
intellectuals were proposing "socialism" as
alternative.
Alternative Dependency thinkings
Cardoso: Associated-dependecy
_It is a critique to the classical dependency school’s
assertion that foreign domination/dependency
makes no room for national development.
_It puts a focus on the new development and
particularity of these activities in order to uncover
the dynamics.
Questions to ask and think:
_The historical origin and uniqueness of a
given dependency situation.
_A particular dependency situation different
from previous.
_Can the existing dependency structures
themselves generate possibilities of
transformation?
_What impact will a change in dependency
have on the historical development of a
developing country?
14
Cardoso’s arguments:
1. to some extent, internal prosperity of the
dependent countries becomes compatible with
multinational corporations (they have to sell
products) and they promote development.
2. the basic relationship remains the same
because this relationship between the
developed and underdeveloped country is
based on the extractive exploitation of the
underdeveloped.
3. Cardoso regards the national bourgeoisies of
the dependent societies as potentially powerful
and capable of shaping development.

12. 4. In the case of Brazil, the military regime
(bureaucratic-technocratic) state, the MNCs
and the local bourgeoisie formed a political
alliance to promote associated-development
since 1964.
O’Donnell – bureaucratic-authoritarian
state (vs traditional authoritarianism)
1. Dominance of bureaucrats
High government officials were those who
have successful careers in bureaucratic
organizations such as the arm, the public
bureaucracy and large private firms.
2. Political exclusion
The BA states repressed popular sectors (fx
labour unions) through closing channels of
political access and imposing corporatist
controls.
3. Economic exclusion
The BA states reduced or postpones
aspirations to economic participation by the
popular sectors.
4. Depoliticization
Social issues were reduced to “technical”
ones that can be solved by the rational
planning of state bureaucrats. (China in
the last two decades, economics-in
command. )
5. Capital is oriented towards: stability,
predictability, discipline. (rather than
democracy, human rights)
Post-colonial dependency
It refers to the status of a country that is no
longer colonized and has regained its political
independence (e.g., post-colonial Africa). In this
sense, "post-colonialism" will pertain to the
previous set of features (economic, political,
social, etc)
15
Colonial infrastructures
Conceptual definitions (democracy, rights)*
A legal system (legislation, law-enforcement)
A communication system (ports, roads,
railways, telegraphs, etc.)
An economic system (trade, production,
finance, accounting,
A social system (health, police, recreation)
A cultural system (state and societal)
Post-colonial dependency characterizes the
statehood of these countries and the way they
negotiate their colonial heritage – the long
periods of forced dependency have a
profound impact on the social and cultural
fabric of these societies (the post-colonial
condition), fx. Africa and Latin America.
“African state”
Political and cultural dependency
ideological conviction (brain-wash)

13. culture of governance
culture of management
culture of capitalist spirit (Weber)
culture of understanding society,
economics and politics
Pan-Africanism
common identity (logo)
common history
common problems
historical bloc
leadership
full independence? Revolution?*
World system theory
1. Three major historical social systems:
a) closed local economies
b) World empires ( a core extracts tribute from
peripheries; such as the Chinese empire and the
Roman empire)
c) World economies (a single economy with
division of labour; pattern of specialization and
exchange; multiple cultures; no central political
authority
2. The world systems approach, argues that
the present inequality and poverty is a direct
consequence of the evolution of the
international political economy into a fairly
rigid division of labor which favored the
rich and penalized the poor.
16
3. The modern world-system is a capitalist worldeconomy,
which means that it is governed by
the drive for the endless accumulation of
capital, sometimes called the law of value.
4. This world-system came into existence in the
course of the sixteenth century, and its original
division of labor included in its bounds much of
Europe (but not the Russian or Ottoman
Empires) and parts of the Americas.
5. This world-system has been expanding over
the centuries, successively incorporating
other parts of the world into its division of
labor.
6. The capitalist world-system is constituted
by a world economy dominated by coreperipheral
relations and a political structure
consisting of sovereign states within the
framework of an interstate system.
7. The fundamental contradictions of the
capitalist system have been expressed within
the systemic process by a series of cyclical
rhythms, which have served to contain these
contradictions.
8. The cyclical rhythms included hegemonic
cycles consisting of the rise and decline of
successive guarantors of global order, each
one with its particular pattern of control.
9. The cyclical rhythms resulted in regular slowmoving

14. but significant geographical shifts in
accumulation and power, without changing the
fundamental relations of inequality within the
system.
10. These cycles were never perfectly
symmetrical, but rather each new cycle brought
about small but significant structural shifts in
particular directions that constituted the secular
trends of the system.
11. The modern world-system, like all systems, is
finite in duration, and will come to an end when
its secular trends reach a point* such that the
fluctuations of the system become sufficiently
wide and erratic that they can no longer ensure
the renewed viability of the system's institutions.
When this point is reached, a bifurcation will
occur, and via a period of (chaotic) transition the
system will come to be replaced by one or
several other systems.
World-system in historical perspective
Mini-systems (pre-agricultural era)
Mini homogeneous societies in cultural and
governing structures
World empires (8000 B.C. – 1500 A.D.)
Vast political structure encompassing a wide
range of cultural patterns; the extraction of
tribute or locally self-sufficient.
17
Wallerstein: (vis-s-vis culturalist explanations)
- The Chinese empire
The Chinese were accomplished astronomers;
had invented gunpowder, printing, and paper;
and had developed a sophisticated bureaucracy
to manage their imperial state. The Great Wall
of China is the only clear object that can be
seen from the moon. (The long and durable
feudal system)
- Turko-Arabic empire
The Arabs had pioneered much of modern
mathematics including the use of Arabic
numerals, zero, and algebra (the term itself is
derived from Arabic). They were also
accomplished chemists, having developed
distillation (alcohol is another term derived from
Arabic).
World economies (since 1500)
Uneven chains of integrated production
dissected by multiply political structures; the
basic logic was accumulation of surplus;
wealth was unequally distributed in favour of
those able to achieve monopolies; the capitalist
world economies then expanded to the entire
globe.
(European expansion, the fall of other empires)
From British to American Empire
Neil Ferguson (2003)
Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British
World Order and the Lessons for Global Power

15. British empire
the British Empire was the grand provider of five
institutions for the world:
1. the triumph of capitalism as the optimal system of
economic organization.
2. the Anglicization of North America and Australasia
3. the internationalization of the English language
4. the enduring influence of the Protestant version of
Christianity.
5. "the survival of parliamentary institutions.
Neil: American empire?
that it is the United States, not Britain, that is
"capable of playing an imperial role" in the world
today.
America's own history - freeing itself from the
British Empire - has made it wary of "formal rule
over subject peoples"
America must face up to its imperial duties
because it is "an empire in denial," an empire "that
dare not speak its name."
18
other readings
Chalmers Johnson (2000): Blowback: The Cost and
Consequences of American Empire.
Andrew J. Bacevich (2002) American Empire: The
Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy.
Harry Turtledove (2003) American Empire: The
Victorious Opposition.
The rise of European dominance
As the first to develop a national capitalist economy,
then expanded to the globe, then translated the
economic power the into the military and
technological power necessary to dominate and
eventually subjugate its Islamic and Chinese rivals.
The maturation of a capitalistic society gave the
Europeans an edge over other powers and offered
them advantages that resulted in European
dominance. From these beginnings came European
hegemony.
World system, 1800 - World system, 1900 -
World system, 2000 ? (China and East Asia) Country differentiations
Competition in total production output
(GNP, GDP)
Specialization in particular type of
production (technological level)
Timing and conditions of state formation
Relative successes in warfare and internal
population control
19
World-system methodology
A Marxist approach
The essence of Marx's analysis of history is that
class divisions emerge as a result of the mode of
production within a society. Slavery, feudalism,,
and capitalism all created class divisions, be they
master/slave, noble/serf, or capitalist/worker.
Human history is a history of class struggles
according to Marx.

16. Wallerstein expands it to examine the entire
global economy from a Marxian perspective.
Applying the Marxist approach on the global
level.
The globe also could be arranged not on the
basis of geography but on the Marxian basis of
the mode of production and division of labor.
Global divisions
Core, “developed”
Semiperiphery, “semi-developed”
Periphery, “developing” or underdeveloped
The core
The core was the equivalent of the ruling
class in traditional Marxian perspective
while the periphery was the equivalent of
the lower class. The core, or First World,
had an economy based upon the importation
of raw materials and exportation of finished
goods.
The periphery
The periphery, or Third World, in turn
provided the raw materials and a market for
the finished goods made from them.
The semi-periphery
In between lay the semi-periphery, or
Second World. The economy of the semiperiphery
was a mixture of resource
extraction and manufacturing but was
dominated by neither.
More recent formulations of the theory have
expanded the semi-periphery to include the
semi-core
20
World system discourses
A. It rejects the nation-state as the unit of analysis:
- as long as exchange takes place through a
market (sale for profit), even if it is only on an
international level, it is still capitalism;
- wage labor is not the issue here; production for
profit in a market is the issue;
- agricultural capitalism began with the rise of
the Western world (Marx's stages of history)
B. A world division of labor in which
production is exchanged through a market
and in which the political units are not
conterminous with the division of labor is a
capitalist world-economy; if political unit is
conterminous with division of labor, it is a
world-empire.
(The division of economic and political class;
single vs multi-legitimation)
C. In a world market, actors and producers
attempt to avoid the normal operation of the
market whenever it did not maximize their
profit. They turn to non-market devices in
order to ensure this--this means to the nationstate.;
i.e., mercantilism; note that this can

17. mean protection (usually for those seeking to
catch up) or a more positive hand to capitalists-
-forcing open markets, maintaining a free trade
regime
D. Historically northwest Europe was better situated in
the 16th century to diversify agricultural
specialization and add certain industries (textiles,
shipbuilding, metal wares). It traded these with E.
Europe and W. Hemisphere for grain, bullion,
wood, cotton, sugar. Strong states developed in the
core because there was more surplus to tax and new
producers wanted protection. They did not develop
in the periphery because there were no surpluses to
tax and large agricultural producers did not want
protection (self-sufficient, self-reliance).
E. Once the unequal exchange mechanism is
set up, and the differences between strong
and weak states are established, the
situation is exacerbated. Strong states
defend their markets and force open those
of the periphery.
F. Western liberal values (science, progress,
rationality, liberty, democracy, rights) which are
alleged to have been the basis of imperialism,
domination and exploitation are not considered
as a major cause of exploitation and domination.
Rather, it was the military and economic power
generated by capitalism that made European
colonialism and hegemony possible. (economic
and technological imperatives)
21
Capitalism vs socialism
Christopher Chase-Dunn
The historical development of the communist states can
be explained as part of a long-run spiraling interaction
between expanding capitalism and socialist counterreponses
The history and developmental trajectory of the
communist states can be explained that socialist
movements in the semiperiphery that attempted to
transform the basic logic of capitalism, but ended up
using socialist ideology to mobilize industrialization for
the purpose of catching up with core capitalism
The spiraling interaction between capitalist
development and socialist movements can be seen in
the history of labor movements, socialist parties and
communist states over the last 200 years:
both capitalism and socialism affect one another's
growth and organizational forms. Capitalism spurs
socialist responses by exploiting and dominating
peoples, and socialism spurs capitalism to expand its
scale of production and market integration and to
revolutionize technology (resilience of capitalism).
Socialists were able to gain state power in certain
semiperipheral states and use this power to create
political mechanisms of protection against competition
with core capital. This was not a wholly new
phenomenon because capitalist semiperipheral states
had done and were doing similar things. But, the
communist states claimed a fundamentally oppositional
ideology in which socialism was allegedly a superior
system that would eventually replace capitalism.

18. Therefore, it is both a economic and ideological
struggle.
In response to socialist movement, capitalism
was driven to further revolutionize technology
or to improve living conditions for workers and
peasants because of the demonstration effect of
propinquity to a communist state.
U.S. support for state-led industrialization of
Japan and Korea (in contrast to U.S. policy in
Latin America) was understood as a
geopolitical response to the Chinese revolution.
Dependency vs World-system
Dependency perspective World-system
perspective
Unit of analysis The nation-state The world system
Methodology Structural-historical: boom
and bust of nation-state
Historical dynamics of the
World-system: cyclical
rhythms and secular trends
Theoretical
structure
Bimodal: core-periphery Trimodal: coresemiperiphery-
periphery
Direction of
development
Deterministic: dependency is
generally harmful
Possible upward and
downward mobility in the
world economy
Research focus On the periphery On the periphery as well as
on the core, the semiphery
and the world economy
World-system key position
Nation’s future is shaped solely by its
historical position in the world system.
Strategies for growth and national policy
have limited impact on development
22
The case of East Asia: yes+no
Modernization
East Asia
Dependency
(linkage –core)
World-system
(geopolitics, upward)
Critical questions
What are the conditions that give rise to
East Asian developmental states?
Why did it emerge in East Asia and not in
Africa and Latin America?
What are other factors and explanations
which form the nature of state-market
relations and state-society relations
East Asian: a special case?
The role of geopolitics
- The Cold War
- The role of the US (political, economic and
military.
The role of the state (political economy)
- Authoritarian capitalism, CDS
- The role of culture?
American security umbrella

19. South Korea
- $13 billion or $600 per capita in the period of
1945-79
- US aid accounted for five-sixths of Korean
imports
_ Taiwan some $5.6 billion and $425 per capita.
_ Market access, investment and foreign trade
Limits of East Asian model
Historically specific vs culturally specific
A model to be learned, but historically confined
Unique conjunction with the development of
capitalism (after the Second World War)
Globalization vs high-speed export-oriented
After the Cold War with the fall of Soviet Union
communism, US needs “fair competition”
The 1997 Asian financial crisis.
The East Asian case is the interaction of many
mutually-related external and internal factors. It
is the synergy of external factors, such as the
US security umbrella, favorable international
environment, foreign assistance and direct
investment, correlating with internal factors,
such as the role of state, cheap labor, export-led
development policy, the role of education and
cultural aspects. Ignoring one single factor
would put explanations on a fragile and
uncompleted basis.
…………………………………………….
Center for European Studies
Working Paper Series 129
Unbalanced Growth: Why Is Economic Sociology
Stronger in Theory Than in Policies?*
by
Carlo Trigilia
Professor of Economic Sociology
Faculty of Political Sciences
University of Florence
Via Delle Pandette, 21
50127 Firenze, Italy
E-mail: trigilia@unifi.it
Abstract
The aim of this article is to discuss the relationship between economic sociology and economic
policies. In the last decades, economic sociology has made significant achievements in terms of
theory and research, but that its influence on policies has remained weak. While this was inevitable
in earlier decades, when scholars had to concentrate most of their effort on defining the role
and contribution of economic sociology, it has since become a constraint for the institutionalization
and recognition of the discipline. The return to economic sociology, since the 1980s, has
brought about important theoretical achievements, especially in the analysis of economic organization
at the micro level in terms of social and cultural embeddedness. The role of social relations
in contemporary economy has clearly emerged, but its implications for policies to promote economic
development have remained more latent so far. Although a weaker institutionalization

20. and a poorer connection to policy-making certainly affect the political influence of economic sociology
in comparison to economics, the paper focuses on the research perspective. A shift of the
research focus from the statics to the dynamics of economic organization could be useful. In this
framework, particular attention is drawn to the study of local development and innovation
through a closer relationship of economic sociology with comparative political economy. A separation
between these two approaches does not favor a full exploitation of the potential contribution
of economic sociology to policies.
*Paperprepared for the International Review of Sociology. A first version was presented at the International
Conference on “Economic Sociology: Problems and Prospects,” University of Crete, Rethimno, Crete,
September 8-10 2004.
2
The aim of this article is to discuss the relationship between economic sociology
and economic policies. I would like to show that in the last decades economic sociology
has made significant achievements in terms of theory and research, but that its influence
on policies has remained weak. While this was inevitable in earlier decades, when scholars
had to concentrate most of their effort on defining the role and contribution of economic
sociology, it has since become a constraint for the institutionalization and recognition
of the discipline.
Of course, one could ask why we should care about influencing policy. It could
be argued that the main goal of the discipline should be to improve knowledge of economic
activities and processes from a sociological point of view. My answer is that a social
science should care about its contribution to a reflexive reconstruction of society. As
James Coleman wrote, "social science is not only a search for knowledge for the aesthetic
pleasure of discovery or for the sake of knowing, but a search for knowledge for the reconstruction
of society" (Coleman 1990, 651).
I will begin by recalling that the classics, the founding fathers of economic sociology,
viewed their approach as clearly oriented towards finding solutions for the reconstruction
of a society increasingly destabilized by liberal capitalism. Analytical intentions
and political implications were strictly related. However, after the Second World
War, a process of disciplinary specialization took place. There was a decline of the classical
tradition and a loss of interest in economic policies. The latter were mainly discussed
in the framework provided by mainstream economics. In the ensuing part of the
paper, I will try to show that a revival of economic sociology, since the 1980s, has
brought about important theoretical achievements, especially in the analysis of economic
organization at the micro level in terms of social and cultural embeddedness. The role of
social relations in contemporary economy has clearly emerged, but its implications for
policies to promote economic development have remained more latent so far. In the final
section, I discuss some factors that affected this outcome and point to possible remedies
to strengthen the contribution of economic sociology to policy proposals. I am aware
that a weaker institutionalization and a poorer connection to policy-making certainly
affect the political influence of economic sociology in comparison to economics. However,
this paper concentrates on the role of the research orientation. It suggests that a
shift of the research focus from the statics to the dynamics of economic organization
could strengthen the policy impact of economic sociology. From this perspective, particular
attention is drawn to the study of local development and innovation through a
closer relationship with comparative political economy. The separation between these
two approaches prevents a full exploitation of the potential contribution of economic
sociology to policies.
1. The classics of economic sociology and the political reform of capitalism
The founders of economic sociology did not oppose the market, but were convinced

21. that it should be properly regulated. It was mainly in Germany, with Max Weber
and Werner Sombart, that economic sociology grew as an autonomous discipline. Both
of them respected neoclassical economics. They took Menger's side in the methodological
debate (Methodenstreit), where he opposed the historicists. They believed that analytical
economic theory had a legitimate right to exist, but did not assume its empirical va 3
lidity. Weber repeatedly stated that economic behavior was actually influenced only
very rarely by the motivations that neo-classical economics attributed to self-interested,
atomistic actors. This is why he wanted to begin a theoretical study of the economy in its
socio-cultural context. He aimed to develop a micro-foundation of economic behavior
able not only to improve the understanding of capitalist development, but also to provide
more sophisticated and effective policy tools than the laissez-faire kit of neo-classical
economics.
The worries about liberal capitalism expressed by Weber and Sombart were
shared by other classics, such as Durkheim and Polanyi. For all of them the market
works better when problems of fairness and trust are successfully dealt with, and this
distinguishes the sociological view from neo-classical economics.
Economic sociology is more interested in the problems of fairness in real markets,
while economics focuses on problems of efficiency, taking it for granted that a fully
competitive market will also resolve any problems of equity. If labor relations are particularly
unbalanced, conflicts may emerge in bargaining relations, which risk endangering
productive activities; or alternatively, workers may become less committed to
their tasks, lowering productivity. In these cases, the institutions representing the collective
interest of workers and introducing political regulation into the labor market, become
important. Moreover, state intervention to regulate working conditions and to reduce
social inequalities brought about by the market are also necessary precisely to have
more efficient markets.
In addition, the real operation of the economy is highly dependent on trust. Individuals
are not normally well-informed or fully capable of rational calculation, and not
everyone can be considered equally trustworthy. The lack of perfect information, together
with the risk of moral hazard, makes market exchanges problematic, even where
they have been legitimized. In addition, markets are not always fully competitive. In real
societies, therefore, the market works better insofar as there are institutions that generate
and reproduce trust through personal interactions (for example, those tied to families,
kinship relations, local communities, etc.) or in an impersonal way, through formal institutions
(such as legal sanctions applied to people who violate contracts). Therefore,
what Durkheim called “non-contractual conditions of the contract” are crucial for the
tradition of economic sociology.
These analytical intentions of economic sociology are well known, but it is worth
noticing that they were strictly related to clear political implications. The classics were
convinced that social and political regulation of the market was necessary; and this conviction
was strengthened by the economic and social turmoil brought about by the Great
Depression and the crisis of liberal capitalism, as is very clear in Polanyi's Great Transformation.
However, after the Second World War, this tradition of economic sociology as
macro-sociology of capitalism, oriented towards its political reform, declined. The legacy
of the classics became fragmented and economic sociology moved towards greater thematic
and disciplinary specialization. New fields emerged, such as industrial and labor
sociology, organizational studies and industrial relations. The original political orientations
towards the reform of liberal capitalism dissolved as well.
4

22. Many factors contributed to the process of fragmentation and disciplinary specialization,
but there are two reasons particularly worth mentioning. The first concerns
the consequences of intense economic growth and social and political stabilization. In
other words, many of the worries about the difficult relationship between the economy
and society in liberal capitalism – on which the founders of economic sociology had focused
their attention – seemed less important as a consequence of the “great transformation”
of capitalism. This occurred particularly in the more developed countries,
where Keynesian policies and “Fordist” forms of industrial organization became widespread.
The second reason involves the contemporary redefinition of the boundaries
between economics and sociology. On the one hand, with the “Keynesian revolution”,
economics offered new and effective instruments to interpret and guide this new and
intense phase of economic growth. On the other hand, the institutionalization of sociology
pushed scholars towards fields that were less studied by economists, and encouraged
a greater disciplinary specialization. The work of Talcott Parsons played a crucial
role in the redefinition of the boundaries between economics and sociology.
Parsons (1937) criticized the atomistic individualism of neo-classical economics
because of its assumption that individuals define their ends independently of their mutual
interaction. However, he proposed a definition of the boundaries between the two
disciplines based on what he called “the analytical factor view". Economics must be conceived
as the analytical theory of a factor of action based on the rational pursuit of individual
interest, while sociology should be understood as an abstract analytical theory of
another factor of action, one linked to “ultimate values”. While an important effect of
this influential view was to favor the academic institutionalization of sociology in new
fields not presided over by economics, at the same time it also meant that the interests of
the sociological community shifted away from economic sociology and towards other
themes. Policy implications were loose and indirect, but basically they implied interventions
that could favor the social acceptance of market economy, even through redistributive
policies (as is clear in Parsons and Smelser 1956). Economic organization
was seen as essentially shaped by market incentives, and thus left to mainstream economics.
Summing up, we could say that when the era of the classics came to a close, their
commitment to a political reform of capitalism had been taken over by Keynesian economics
and Fordist re-organization, until the late 1960s. Sociology was oriented towards
the problem of social integration, and distanced itself from the analysis of the economy
and from economic policies (Granovetter 1990).
2. The revival of economic sociology: theoretical achievements distant from policies
As is known, since the 1980s there has been a return to economic sociology with
the "new economic sociology", focusing mainly on the micro level. Two main factors
have influenced this trend. First, there was a theoretical reaction to new economic
neoinstitutionalist's
attempts to analyze the growing variety of productive organization. In
addition to market and hierarchy, a number of new hybrid forms were developing,
based on the more or less formalized collaboration between firms (joint ventures, alli
5
ances, co-operation agreements, etc.). Although transaction-costs theory tried to redefine
the traditional economic theory of action by taking into account aspects such as
"bounded rationality" and "opportunism" (Williamson 1975,1985), this approach still explains
organizational choices in terms of the rational search for efficiency. Thus, it has
not been able to provide a satisfactory explanation for economic action under conditions
of insufficient information and uncertainty.

23. In sociology, the development of neo-institutional economic theories triggered, in
turn, new explanations of organizational variety that underlined the autonomous roles
of social networks, cultural factors and power relations. This led to the second factor
driving new economic sociology. In the 1970s and early 1980s, there was a growing dissatisfaction
in sociology with Talcott Parsons’ theory of action, and the new economic
sociology was particularly influenced by the criticisms developed by ethnomethodology
and phenomenology (DiMaggio 1994). Thus, it shares a theory of action
that is more constructivist, more contingent and more open to direct social interactions.
Different approaches converge in the new economic sociology. It may be worth
mentioning some differences and similarities between the structuralist and the neoinstitutional
approach. In the structuralist approach, the actor’s location in the structure
of social relations is crucial for understanding his actions (Granovetter 1985). It defines a
peculiar “social capital” that can be used in economic transactions to provide information
and trust (Coleman 1990). Important applications of the structural approach can be
found in the study of labor markets, business groups and inter-firm relations, product
differentiation and market competition, new high-tech activities, the stock market.
In contrast, sociological neo-institutionalists take a different position, emphasizing
the autonomous role played by cultural factors in motivating actors and shaping organization
choice. A good example of the analytical consequences resulting from the
neo-institutionalist approach is the work on “isomorphism” by Powell and Di Maggio
(1991). In empirical research, this approach has stimulated numerous contributions, especially
in sectors that are not affected by market competition, such as non-profit and
cultural organizations, as well as financial institutions and large accounting firms. Fligstein’s
work (1990) on the productive diversification of large American firms provided
an interesting application.
Despite these differences, both the structural approach and sociological neoinstitutionalism
provide a view of the market as embedded in social structures, and try
to explain the real action of economic actors in concrete markets. Both also share an explanation
of organizational diversity than cannot be reduced to the mere search for efficiency
by atomistic actors (individuals or firms). Under the same conditions of "asset
specificity" - to use Williamson's language – different actors could rely to different degrees
on the market, hierarchy or relational contracting, thus providing variable organizational
choices. In fact their choice is influenced by their social relations (or social
capital as intended by Coleman) and by their cognitive and normative attitudes. In this
way the new economic sociology reacted to the "imperialism" of economic analysis by
providing alternative explanations for the variety of economic organization. As
Granovetter (1990) pointed out, this is an important difference from the "old" economic
sociology, which did not trespass on the traditional boundaries between economic and
sociology.
6
On the whole, this has been a significant theoretical achievement, which was favored
by interesting research, and is in turn orienting new research on economic organization.
However, there is in an important potential for policy-making in the new economic
sociology that has not been fully exploited so far. While the shortcomings of
mainstream economics, particularly in the micro-foundation of economic behavior, have
been clearly shown, standard economic thought continues to greatly influence policies
to promote economic development. The new economic sociology appears distant from
policy debates. Engaged in reacting to the “economic imperialism” at the analytical
level, it remains extremely weak in challenging the dominance of mainstream economics

24. and economic neo-institutionalism over policies. Why is it so?
3. How to strengthen the influence of economic sociology on policies
Current economic policies may take the form of either laissez-faire measures or
state-centered intervention. Both orientations, however, share the same attitude towards
economic behavior. Economic action is about self-interested and socially isolated actors.
Laissez-faire policies assume that in order to improve economic development, economic
actors have to be freed from social bonds and political constraints. This is still the same
old worry, since Adam Smith, that social relations and networks among economic actors
would bring about collusion, and could result in the loss of efficiency. In contrast, since
the “Keynesian revolution”, state-centered measures recognize that uncertainty, lack of
information and trust may hinder economic activity. However, they usually provide
policy solutions that are based on two main instruments: financial incentives to compensate
the risks and costs coming from the backwardness of local settings, or public investments
to improve infrastructure or human capital. In any case the role of social relations
and social networks is not considered as a possible target for policies. On the contrary,
it is often perceived as a factor that could hinder the efficient operation of markets.
The reasons for the hegemony of mainstream economics over economic policies
are complex. Certainly, economics provides important tools for the macro-management
of contemporary economies, and this adds to a long-lasting tradition of institutionalization.
and reputation. Economic research centers - both within the university system and
in public or non-governmental structures - are well entrenched and tightly connected to
governmental decision-making. They have a long experience in translating economic
ideas into policy proposals. It is obvious that the degree of institutionalization of economic
sociology and its capacity to influence policy proposals are much weaker.
In addition, one should take into account that the policies shaped by mainstream
economics tend to be more easily understood by politicians and representative of interest
groups, although this does not mean that they are always accepted. As a matter of
fact, they are usually formulated in terms of attempts at influencing the behavior of single
actors, through financial incentives or regulatory measures. Policies inspired by economic
sociology would be more complex because they would try to shape the relational
aspects of economic activities, or the building up of social capital as a way of fostering
economic development. The benefits of such policies tend to be more diffuse, rather than
concentrated on specific groups, and their effective implementation usually requires a
longer time than standard economic measures.
7
Therefore, there are various reasons that hinder a stronger influence of economic
sociology over policies. However, in the following remarks I will concentrate on some
aspects that mainly concern the research topics and the analytical perspective of the discipline.
Although these factors do not directly affect the important issues of institutionalization
and connection to the decision-making, my contention is that a shift of the research
focus to the problem of local development and innovation, and to the relevant
policies, could improve the contribution of economic sociology to more effective policies.
This, in turn, would require a more intense collaboration with comparative political
economy.
So far the “new economic sociology” - especially in the United States - has grown
mainly dealing with static problems. Basically, it has tried to provide an alternative explanation
for the varieties of economic organization at the micro level. Research interests
have been strongly concentrated on the attempt to show that efficiency reasons are not
sufficient and can be misleading. Both the structural approach based on networks and

25. the study of isomorphism undertaken by sociological neo-institutionalism reacted to
economic explanations of economic organization. While this research focus was able to
show the role of social and cultural factors in the operation of the economy, it was less
favorable to exploiting the analytical potential of economic sociology in terms of policies.
A shift of focus towards dynamic problems – such as local development and innovation
– could foster a more active contribution to policies New research might involve
dynamic cities, backward areas that experience new growth, or local innovation systems
such as new high tech districts. A systematic assessment of comparable cases of success
and failure would allow a better understanding of the influence of social and cultural
embeddedness on economic performance.
What are the policy implications of the social and cultural embeddedness of
economic organization? We could hypothesize that the local availability of a rich network
of social relations would favor economic activity and development. It might help
to tackle the problems of co-operation that are due to lack of information and trust; and
it might also help to develop favorable relations among the leaders of collective actors,
thus improving the provision of collective goods. If these hypotheses were reasonably
confirmed, we would have important elements for new policies that go beyond the old
dichotomy between state and market, by promoting cooperation among individual actors
(firms, workers and firms) and collective actors (local governments and organized
interests) as a way to support economic development and social quality. This could entail
both technical assistance and financial incentives to cooperative projects aimed at
strengthening external economies and collective goods.
To make progress in this direction would require more collaboration with comparative
political economy in focusing on the role of politics and policies. The themes of
local development and innovation have been more extensively investigated within the
comparative political economy tradition, especially in the literature related to industrial
districts and local innovation systems (Trigilia 2002), but also in work on the “varieties
of capitalism” (Hall and Soskice 2002). However, the social dimension is often the missing
link. A closer relationship with the theoretical framework and research tools of economic
sociology could improve the analysis of local development and innovation by focusing
on the specific role of social networks and on their relationship with governance,
and could also help to propose new and more effective policies.
8
From this perspective, I would like to draw attention to two problems. The first
has to do with the specific role of social networks, which is not sufficiently clear in the
political economy literature. They may favor development, or may hinder the growth of
economic activities. They may lead to collusion, or to closure with regard to external
stimuli (new knowledge of technology or market trends). So we must ask under what
conditions social networks favor local economic development and innovation. The second
problem concerns the origins of “good” networks conducive to local development
and innovation. It is important to clarify whether good social capital is just rooted in the
history of a particular region or city, or can be fostered through appropriate political
measures. The possibility of improving policies for local development and innovation
strongly relies on adequate evidence and convincing comparative accounts. But before
dealing with these problems (in the final section), it is worth pointing to the increased
importance of social relations in contemporary economic organization.
4. Why social relations become more important for economic development
Comparative political economy implicitly suggests that social networks are more
important for economic development, in the post-Fordist era: the economy tend to become

26. more “relational” (Veltz 2000, DiMaggio 2002). Fordist organization made social
networks less important than in liberal capitalism. Large vertically-integrated firms were
more autonomous from their environment. The non-economic factors that most influenced
development were mainly of two types: the organizational capacity of the firm –
the “visible hand” of the organization at the micro-level - and the Keynesian policies at
the macro-level. Policies to attract large external firms by means of incentives and infrastructures
were also important for backward areas. Stability was the key word for the
old model, which guided the “golden age” of post-war development. In the last decades
it has been increasingly substituted by two other catch-words, especially for firms in advanced
countries: flexibility and quality. Flexible specialization changed the landscape
and tended to give social networks a growing role. The search for flexibility and quality
led not only to restructuring to increase the autonomy of the firms’ internal organization,
but even more to a greater need for external co-operation, especially in sectors
where the technological trajectory is uncertain or the demand is very unstable (as in
biotechnologies, or in the media industry or in some parts of ICT).
Networks of firms (or districts) and large networked-firms become the protagonists
of contemporary economy. But they are more dependent than their predecessor of
the past – the vertically-integrated large firm - on the willingness of the workers and
other firms to cooperate effectively to obtain flexibility and quality. This increased the
potential transaction costs and therefore the value of social capital – of the networks of
social relations rooted in a certain territory – in the productive process and for innovation.
However, one could object that increasing globalization of economic activities, and
the improvement in communications, foster a decentralization of manufacturing towards
the newly developing countries with lower costs. Thus, the role of localized social
networks tends to become less important in a global market where contractual relations
are continuously growing.
As a matter of fact, individual firms – above all the multinationals, but also the
smaller firms – can search, more easily now than in the past, for more advantageous
9
conditions by moving from one country to another and by combining in their productive
process inputs from firms and local partners in different areas, through complex organized
structures. The improvement of communications and information technologies help
this process. All this tends to rapidly alter the localized benefits of a particular territory.
Nevertheless, the empirical evidence suggests that the result is not a simple tendency
towards the “de-territorialization” of productive processes, but rather a greater competition
between regions in which the resource of “good” social networks between individual
and collective actors is crucial. Productive growth and localization of external investments
tend in fact to concentrate where the external economies and productive specialization
are stronger. This affects both the newly developing countries as well as the
more advanced ones.
The decentralization of manufacturing to areas with lower costs is not even. It is
much stronger in areas where external economies and collective goods are more widespread.
The availability of “good” social networks among individual firms, and among
employers and workers influence the potential for economic development. No less important
is the role of collective social capital: cooperative and effective relations among
private and public actors which help to increase the production of collective goods (infrastructure,
services, training) for the local economy (Evans 1996). Even within the “developmental
states”, in the Third World, there are strong regional differences in the
ability to attract foreign investments and to sustain local initiatives.

27. In the developed countries, globalization is fueling an overall reshuffling of economic
organization. While manufacturing tends to shrink, there is a shift toward the
new knowledge economy. These countries are forced to pursue a “high road” based on
innovation in high-tech activities more dependent on scientific advances. But this trend
is producing a new “re-territorialization” of the economy around specialized areas and
cities, both in Europe (Crouch et al. 2001, 2004) and in the US (Florida 2002,2005). Innovation
is now more closely tied to processes of co-operation among firms in different
sectors, which imply the sharing of a language, the development of “conversations”
among different actors (Lester and Piore 2004); some forms of tacit knowledge that allow
the better exploitation of standard technologies and codified knowledge to find out new
solutions and new products. Paradoxically enough, in many innovative sectors such us
bio-technologies, software activities or the media industry, the growth of new information
and communication technologies increases the diffusion of codified information,
but at the same time opens up a greater role for tacit knowledge and understanding,
embedded in social networks, as a competitive resource. Again, it is not only the network
of relations between individuals, but that between organizations, or collective actors,
which is also important. A good network of relations between interest organizations,
financial institutions, universities, and local governments can favor the improvement
of infrastructural facilities and the efficient provision of economic and social services,
as well as the influx of capital and investments of both local and external firms,
and the establishment of effective cooperation among economic actors and research and
training institutions.
Therefore, it can be said that globalization has contradictory consequences for local
development. It may weaken some areas not only as a result of higher costs, but also
because these do not manage to keep up with the provision of external economies and
collective goods that are necessary to increase productivity. It may however favor other
10
areas that exploit their social capital to attract external firms and to take advantage of the
greater opportunities in terms of a growing market for exports that open up, as in the
developing countries; or to exploit the new possibilities dependent on knowledge-based
economy for developing more innovative activities, as in advanced countries.
On the whole, it is to be stressed that the importance of social network seems to
increase, in comparison to the past. This trend enhances the possibilities of local actors to
affect the development of their region. This process does not necessarily depend on
lower costs, although they remain important as competitive resource, especially in the
developing countries. Both in the backward and in the advanced countries, the capacity
to use social capital to develop a certain amount of knowledge and of specialization is a
key resource for development.
5. Social networks, local development and policies
While the political economy literature suggests that social networks may play an
important role in local development, it is not sufficiently clear how they actually work,
under what conditions they may favor economic development, and when they instead
lead to collusion or closure to external knowledge. Another crucial problem concerns the
possibility of promoting cooperative social networks that are conducive to economic development
and innovation through intentional actions. A research investment by economic
sociology in these issues, and a closer cooperation with comparative political
economy, could improve the understanding of these processes and could help develop
new policies more fine-tuned to the relational features of contemporary economy.
Some examples can help to clarify these problems. Let us consider first the problem

28. of collusion with particular reference to the backward areas. The role of traditional
social structures (e.g. family, kinship, community, religious, ethnic subcultures), as resources
for development in backward countries has been widely discussed, reversing
one of the classic assumptions of the theory of modernization. In fact, however, their relationship
with economic development is more complex. While traditional resources as
source of social networks are widespread, their activation as resources for development
is quite uneven, as is shown, for instance, by a comparison between Latin-American and
Asian countries. What makes the difference seems the combination of networks based
on traditional institutions and a modernized politics, autonomous from civil society. It is
the “embedded autonomy” (Evans 1995) – the autonomy of political action that is at the
same time socially embedded at the local level – which can contribute in an innovative
way to local development. In Latin America politics seems to have hindered the productive
use of social capital linked to traditional structures, because of its lack of autonomy
from social interests and the weakness of state structures. On the contrary, the
Asian experiences show a polity that not only provided more strategic capabilities (developmental
states), but also oriented social networks towards the economic rather than
the political market.
Following this perspective, one can propose the hypothesis that the composition
of social capital (strong ties vs. weak ties) matters. It seems likely that an appropriate
mix of the two types would favor economic growth. But an important condition has to
do with the role of politics. Political settings that are more autonomous from particular
11
istic pressure seem more able to avoid the collusive use of social networks, more oriented
to the political rather then to the economic market. In addition, this kind of polity
seems more equipped to avoid the closure of local networks to external stimuli, and
therefore more able to prevent the emergence of lock-ins. More systematic comparative
studies could throw light on this crucial issue, which is obviously important for policies.
Another example that shows the importance of clarifying the role of social networks
concerns the sites of innovation in the most advanced countries. There is a clear
link between the production of innovation in the knowledge-based economy and the
cities. Richard Florida (2005) pointed out that the process is mainly influenced by some
social groups with high human capital. They choose to live in cities with high degree of
tolerance, and cultural and social amenities. This, in turn, attracts – or contributes to the
creation of – innovative firms. This explanation raises many questions about the causal
direction. However, it is certainly true that not all the large and well-equipped cities are
able to trigger a virtuous circle between people and innovative activities, including the
crucial contribution of university and research institutions. There is a different “absorptive”
capacity of potential for innovation related to universities and research facilities, in
terms of economic, cultural and social infrastructure. The comparison between Silicon
Valley and route 128 in Boston (Saxenian 1994) suggests that there is an important social
factor in the explanation of why certain regions or cities succeed and others do not.
Again, a closer attention in comparative terms to the role of social networks and to their
relations to governance could help to better understand local development, and could
contribute to work out more effective policies beyond the traditional opposition between
market and state-centered policies.
Let us come to a second problem. It is not yet clear whether the role of social
networks is merely dependent on the history of local contexts - on the way history has
shaped culture and social relations of actors - or if it may also be socially and politically
constructed through reflexive action. In the first case, if path-dependency prevails, there

29. is little space for policies. Local development could be predicted but hardly promoted
through purposive policies in local contexts which lack certain requisites. In the other
case, we could learn important lessons for new policies that work by promoting the appropriate
social capital through financial incentives and technical assistance. These kind
of policies that try to foster economic development by promoting social capital are
growing, especially in Europe, where they are pursued by the EU, and in the developing
countries through programs of international organization such as the World Bank or
UNIDO, and others. Therefore, it would be crucial to select and investigate cases of local
development that are based on planned interventions to improve cooperation among
individual actors, as well as collective actors. These might include cases of strategic
planning for cities, territorial pacts for backward areas, or projects for the growth of high
tech systems. Such an analysis might encourage the creation of a new repertoire of policies
for economic development that build social bridges between state and market, and
take more into account the relational bases of contemporary economic organization.
These examples show that there could be an important role for economic sociology
in the analysis of local development and innovation. This, in turn, could strengthen
the contribution of this approach to more effective policies. But this also requires that
economic sociologists start to pay more attention to political processes and the role of
public policies than the new economic sociology has so far. As Fligstein (2002) has
12
pointed out, this would be important because it would not only contribute to a more integrated
sociology of markets, but would also help to link micro-economic sociology
with macro-comparative political economy (see also Block and Evans 2005).
Actually, in the main accounts of more recent achievements, economic sociology
has been mainly identified with the "new economic sociology" developed in the US. This
trend does not favor a closer relationship with comparative political economy. A wider
conception of economic sociology that includes comparative political economy would be
consistent with the classical tradition of economic sociology, which paid particular attention
to the influence of the state on economic activities (Trigilia 2002). It also would
help to develop the policy implications of theoretical and empirical achievements. In this
way economic sociology could integrate its theoretical framework with the kind of "pluralistic
applied research" that Coleman was demanding, for a richer contribution to the
reflexive reconstruction of society.
13
References
Block, F. and Evans, P. 2005. “The State and the Economy”, Pp.505-526 in The Handbook of Economic
Sociology, edited by N.Smelser and R.Swedberg, 2nd ed.. Princeton: Princeton University
Press
Coleman, J. 1990. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Crouch, C., Le Galès, P., Trigilia, C., and Voelzkow H., 2001. Local production Systems in Europe:
Rise or demise? Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 2004. Changing Governance of Local Economies: Responses of European Local production Systems.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
DiMaggio, P.1994. “Culture and the Economy.” Pp. 27-57 in The Handbook of Economic Sociology,
edited by N.Smelser and R.Swedberg. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- 2001, ed., The Twenty-First-Century Firm: Changing Organization in International Perspective,
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Evans, P. 1995. Embedded Autonomy. States and Industrial Transformation. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.

30. - 1996. “Government Action, Social Capital and Development : Reviewing the evidence on
Synergy.” World Development 24(6): 1033-37.
Florida, R. 2002, The Rise of the Creative Class, New York: Basic Books
- 2005, Cities and the Creative Class, New York: Routledge.
Fligstein, N. 1990. The Transformation of Corporate Control. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge
University Press.
- 2001. The Architecture of Markets. An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First-Century Capitalist Societies,
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Granovetter, M. 1985. “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness.”
American Journal of Sociology 91: 481-510.
- 1990. "The Old and New Economic Sociology: A History and an Agenda." Pp. 89-112 in Beyond
the Marketplace. Rethinking Economy and Society, edited by R. Friedland and A.F. Robertson.
New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
Hall, P. and Soskice, D. 2002. Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative
Advantage, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lester, R, and Piore, M. 2004. Innovation: The Missing Dimension, Cambridge Mass.. Harvard
University Press.
Parsons, T. [1937] 1968. The Structure of Social Action. 2 vols. New York: Free Press.
Parsons, T. and Smelser, N. 1956. Economy and Society: A Study in the Integration of Economic and
Social Theory. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press.
Powell, W. 1996. "Interorganizational Collaboration in the Biotechnology Industry." Journal of
Institutional & Theoretical Economics, 12:197-215.
Powell,W. and DiMaggio, P. 1991. ”Introduction.” Pp.1-38 in The New Institutionalism in
Organizational Analysis, edited by W. Powell and P. DiMaggio. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Saxenian, A. 1994. Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128,
Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Trigilia, C. 2002. Economic Sociology: State, Market and Society in Modern Capitalism, Oxford:
Blackwell.
Veltz, P. 2002. Le noveau monde industriel, Paris: Gallimard.

31. Beyond the 'problem of order': Elias, habit and modern sociology(1)
or
Hobbes was right
ROBERT VAN KRIEKEN
University of Sydney
....social interaction is not simply the substructure of the "crystallisations" which make up Simmel's
society, or an order detached from the social order made up of Goffman's 'solid buildings' in whose
cracks 'the individual self resides'. It is what endows those entities with the only kind of existence
they have. Social interaction turns out to be not only where 'most of the world's work gets done', but
where 'the solid buildings of the social world' are in fact constructed. (Burns 1992: 380)
Norbert Elias is rarely regarded as a significant sociological theorist, partly because he was hardly
ever concerned to comment on, let alone outline or reconstruct other theorists' ideas. When he was
being critical of other sociological approaches, he usually preferred to keep his critique implicit, so
that only a careful 'reading between the lines' reveals the positions he was distancing himself from.
Elias developed and elaborated his theoretical position primarily through his empirical studies,
especially those on the significance of 'court society' (1983) and one particular long-term social
process around which he felt others tended to be organized: the civilizing process (1994). Elias
refrained from making the claim that he was developing a theoretical 'system' because he wanted to
avoid fetishising theory, theorists and theoretical perspectives; his theory was embedded within his
sociological practice rather than being self-consciously presented as such.
This can give the impression that his primary strength as a sociologist lies in his empirical studies in
historical sociology, not his theoretical framework. It may have been Lewis Coser's (1980)
particularly bad-tempered review of the first of Elias's two explicitly theoretical books, What is
Sociology? (1978)(2) which established this assessment of Elias's sociological theory. Coser insisted
on his admiration for The Civilizing Process (1939) and The Court Society (1983), but proclaimed
What is Sociology? a 'failure' (p. 193) , the work of 'an outsider battling what he perceives to be the
establishment of sociology' (p. 192). Elias, we were told, 'tends to ram in open doors', and Coser
dismissed Elias's concept of 'figuration' as adding nothing, because it covers 'a subject matter that
has been the birthright of sociology since the days of Comte or Cooley' (p. 193).
A central purpose of this paper is to correct this cantankerous misunderstanding, both of Elias
himself and of sociological theory more generally. Rather than assume a continuity in sociological
thinking from the days of Comte and Cooley to today, almost every assessment of Talcott Parsons's
The Structure of Social Action (Alexander 1988; Camic 1989; Gould 1991; Levine 1989; Shils
1961: 1406), including by Coser (1977: 562) himself, has indicated Parsons's significance in having
effected a powerful transformation of sociological thought, one which established a clear break with
pre-Structure theory in the very process of claiming to draw out the essential features of (some)
classical social theorists. Edward Shils once remarked that Structure 'precipitated the sociological
outlook' and 'began the slow process of bringing into the open the latent dispositions which had
underlain the growth of sociological curiosity' (1961: 1406), and no later commentator has
formulation a convincing argument against this assessment.
The paper will begin by identifying two persistent obsessions in sociological theory introduced by
Structure - the captivation with dualisms of various types, and the fascination with the so-called
'Hobbesian problem of order' as the fulcrum of all sociology - and establishing the underlying
connection between the two, using Bruno Latour's (1993) conception of the 'Constitution' of modern

32. scientific thought to explain this connection. Then I will outline Elias's sociological theory and 'way
of seeing', indicating the ways in which it moves around sociology's 'Constitution' in a very
particular and, I will argue, more useful way, concluding with some observations about what we
might do with our theoretical 'Constitution' from this point onwards.
THE DOCTRINE OF 'THE TWO SOCIOLOGIES' AND THE 'PROBLEM OF ORDER'
We can begin with two observations, and then see how they are linked. First, all sociologists are by
now familiar with the mode of reasoning which proceeds as follows: hitherto everyone has divided
both the world itself and the way we think about it into two categories; many have tried to bridge,
link, integrate or synthesise these categories, but all have failed. However, we now have a new way
of thinking which truly achieves the bridging, linking, integration or synthesis, and I, dear reader,
am the bearer of this delightful new theory. This is the doctrine of 'the two sociologies'. It was
probably Talcott Parsons who first developed this rhetorical style in The Structure of Social Action
(1937), the book which Jeffrey Alexander argues established the 'base line vocabulary for modern
sociology', the modern sociologist's 'frame of reference' even as she argues against it (1988: 97).
Before that, sociologists saw both themselves and all previous social and political thought as rather
loose collections of competing perspectives, not as organised around any dualism or polarity in need
of linkage (Shils 1961; Camic 1989).
The bridging exercise never actually abolishes the oppositional dualism, indeed it preserves it. As
Parsons wrote concerning his particular bridging endeavour between positivist and idealist theories
of action, he wanted to 'make the best of both worlds' (Parsons 1937: 486) rather than construct a
third. We need only think of what bridges do - they keep things apart as much as they provide a
means of moving from one to the other. The bridge ceases to exist unless the
polarity/opposition/dualism remains in place, the bridge needs the dualism, if we can use such a
functionalist term. The same applies to 'links', and even integration and synthesis are less interesting
once they have been completed and there is nothing left to integrate or synthesise.
The net result is that every new generation of theorists can repeat the argument, organise their
research, their journal articles, their monographs and their textbooks around the dualism(s) of their
choice, although they may choose to rename the dualism a duality - conflict/consensus,
action/structure, micro/macro, homo economicus/homo sociologicus, individualism/holism, and so
on - and set about busily linking them (Holmwood & Stewart 1991; Sztompka 1994: 269-70). It
gives us all something to do, these two things which need to be integrated, synthesised, bridged or
linked, and something to organise our thoughts around.(3) But apparent attempts to transcend or
bridge the agency/structure dualism merely reproduce it and pose it in a different form because of
the continued conceptual opposition of 'action' to 'structure'. As Richard Kilminster has observed in
relation to structuration theory, 'the ghost of the old dualism haunts the theory because his point of
departure is action theory, which carries the dualism at its core' (1991: 98), and this is why Collins
remarks that 'the result looks curiously like the Parsonian scheme that Giddens criticizes' (Collins
1992: 89).
Parsons may have been the first to practice the argument of 'the two sociologies' in 1937, but it was
Pamela Nixon who appears to have first named it as such sometime in the late 1960s,(4) to be
disseminated in Alan Dawe's (1970) article of that title. As Dawe put it, 'there are...two sociologies:
a sociology of social system and a sociology of social action' (p. 214). The first 'asserts the
paramount necessity, for societal and individual well-being, of external constraint,' whereas the

33. second revolves around the concept of 'autonomous man, able to realize his full potential and to
create a truly human social order only when freed from external constraint' (p. 214).(5)
At this point you may be protesting that there are many dualisms in sociology - individual-society,
micro-macro, etc. - and that it has become accepted practice to insist that they are not all the same.
Erving Goffman, for instance, is more properly understood as a 'micro structuralist', rather than
seeing him as emphasising the creativity of human action simply because of his micro focus (Burns
1992; Collins 1992: 80). 'Action' is, in principle, not supposed to be bound up with the concept of
'the individual', agency can be attributed to collective actors such as organisations. However, in
practice we usually find this insistence dissolving back into something which looks remarkably like
the same old individual/society dichotomy; we often begin by talking about micro-macro or agency-
structure, but it rarely takes very long before we are actually talking about individuals and their
relationships to social constraints (Alexander et al 1987). We seem to be unable to resist the
temptation, despite all our best intentions, to mobilize our dualisms as if they were concerned with
the opposition between individual and society, between free will and determinism. To the extent,
then, that any dualism tends to revert back to the individual/society opposition, I will treat all of
them as essentially the same, grouping individuals, agency/action and the micro-level on one side,
and society, structure/social system and the macro-level on the other, gathering them together under
the heading of 'the doctrine of the two sociologies'.
The second observation is that sociological thought is organised around an equally persistent
misinterpretation of Hobbes, the 'Hobbesian problem of order', another central feature of Parsons's
The Structure of Social Action. Before explaining why it is a misinterpretation, we need to look
briefly at how the problem and its centrality to sociology has been defined. The standard
sociological interpretation(6) of Hobbes is the attribution to him of the view that 'in the absence of
external constraint, the pursuit of private interests and desires leads inevitably to both social and
individual disintegration' (Dawe 1970). Without any constraint imposed on the random pursuit of
ends, wrote Parsons, 'the relations of individuals then would tend to be resolved into a struggle for
power - for the means of each to realize his own ends. This would, in the absence of constraining
factors, lead to a war of all against all - Hobbes's state of nature' (1982: 87). It is 'clear enough,'
asserted Nisbet, that 'Hobbes is concerned with what he believes to be the natural character of the
individual - his precultural, presocial, and prepolitical character' (Nisbet 1974: 138-9). Since then,
we have been told with consistency and regularity that 'the thesis that sociology is centrally
concerned with the problem of social order has become one of the discipline's few orthodoxies'
(Dawe 1970: 207). The 'Hobbesian problem of order' is seen as central to sociology because the
question of 'how is social order possible' slides over to the quite different one of 'how is society
possible'. Alexander puts it in precisely this way: 'What Parsons called the Hobbesian problem can
be understood in the following way: What holds society together?' (1988: 97). Parsons told us that
Hobbes felt that only the coercive force of sovereign authority could in fact hold society/social order
together, when in fact it was the internalisation of values which achieved this effect - the normative
solution to the problem of order which retained a voluntaristic element to social action.
The standard sociological interpretation of Hobbes is simply wrong, for two reasons, concerning
both the problem of order itself and its solutions. First, this is not how Hobbes understood the 'state
of nature' and it is not his 'problem of order'. Essentially the standard sociological intepretation rests
on a very simplistic, and incorrect, reading of what Hobbes meant by the 'state of nature', revolving
around a projection of its own concern to see 'nature' as opposed to society onto Hobbes's much
more specific concern with explaining and preventing civil war. C.B. Macpherson remarked as early
as 1962 that Hobbes's state of nature concerns the conduct of entirely socialized individuals in the

34. absence of a central authority. 'To get to the state of nature,' wrote Macpherson, 'Hobbes has set
aside law, but not the socially acquired behaviour and desires of men' (1962: 22). Hobbes's state of
nature 'is a deduction from the appetites and faculties not of man as such but of civilized men' (1962:
29).
Hobbes did not regard human beings as psychological egoists who could only be constrained to act
in a civil manner by some external authority. Like any contemporary sociologist, Hobbes took it for
granted that humans are made - by discipline, education or as we would all it today, socialization -
rather than born (Gert 1967; 1996). The threat to social order - the threat of civil war - came not
from some presocial, egoistic human nature, which Hobbes felt never existed,(7) but from the effects
of passionately held beliefs and opinions with no central authority to decide between them. Rather
than not having a sense of normative order, as Parsons accuses him (1937: [89]), Hobbes's whole
point was that it was precisely unregulated values and beliefs which would drive humans to civil
war (Loyd 1992). We are in a state of nature, argued Hobbes, so long as 'private appetite is the
measure of good and evil' (1962: 167) - in other words, as long as society is not normatively
integrated, something which he felt can only be achieved via a socially-founded (not externally
imposed: Lloyd 1992: 317; Shapin & Schafer 1985: 152-3) sovereign state. In Bernard Gert's words,
'all the premises about human nature....which he uses in arguing for the necessity of an unlimited
sovereign, are in fact statements about the rationally required desires, and not, as most
commentators have taken them, statements about the passions' (1996: 164; c.f. also Ryan 1996:
217-8 and Kraynak 1983: 93-4).
Second, the 'normative' solution to the problem of order which almost everyone from Parsons
onwards has suggested is specific to sociology, having eluded Hobbes, (Levine 1980: x) is actually
present in Hobbes himself. Brian Barry (1970), Charles Camic (1979) and Donald Levine (1980)
have made this point abundantly clear for the utilitarians generally. Barry observes that 'the victory
over the 'utilitarian' schema is an empty one, because Parsons's 'utilitarians' are men of straw' (1970:
77), and Camic comments that,
The ultimate irony of Parsons's discussion of the utilitarians is that they would reject the
egoistic, rationalistic image of humans ...which Parsons suggests was their image for two
centuries. They would in fact reject it in a more general fashion than Parsons himself does in
Structure, where the Hobbesian problem of order remains central (1979: 523).
Levine also remarks that 'none of the writers associated with developing the principle of utility in
moral philosophy held a view of human action as determined solely by the pursuit of selfish
interests through instrumentally rational means. Much of the animus of their work precisely refutes
such a conception' (1980: xiii).
Levine felt that Hobbes and Mandeville might be the only remaining European social philosophers
who did 'reduce the elements of action to narrowly defined gratificational interests', but noted that
even here there were arguments (1980: xix), and in fact all of Barry's and Camic's arguments
concerning the utilitarians apply with equal force to Hobbes. Barry had pointed out that 'Hobbes
held that men might be motivated by a quite refined moral code', but simply felt that this was
insufficient in itself to prevent violence and civil warfare, making the state's monopolization of
violence 'a necessary (though not sufficient) condition of social peace' (1970: 77). Bernard Gert had
pointed out that Hobbes appealed to morality as much as he appealed to self-interest and self-
preservation. Indeed, continued Gert, 'it would be exceedingly odd for Hobbes, holding that
mistaken views about rights and duties were one of the causes of civil war, to come up with a theory