4. Genetic Epistemology: A
constructivist theory
• No innate ideas...not a nativist theory.
• Nor is the child a “tabula rasa” with the
“real” world out there waiting to be
discovered.
• Instead, mind is constructed through
interaction with the environment; what is
real depends on how developed one’s
knowledge is
5. How does Piaget describe
developmental change?
• Development occurs in stages, with a
qualitative shift in the organization and
complexity of cognition at each stage.
• Thus, children not simply slower, or less
knowledgeable than adults instead, they
understand the world in a qualitatively
different way.
• Stages form an invariant sequence.
7. What develops? Cognitive
structures
• Cognitive structures are the means by which
experience is interpreted and organized:
reality very much in the eye of the beholder
• Early on, cognitive structures are quite
basic, and consist of reflexes like sucking
and grasping.
• Piaget referred to these structures as
schemes.
8. How do cognitive structures
develop?
• Through assimilation and accomodation.
• Assimilation: The incorporation of new
experiences into existing structures.
• Accommodation: The changing of an old
structures so that new experiences can be
processed.
• Assimilation is conservative, while
accommodation is progressive.
9. Why accommodate?
• Normally, the mind is in a state of
equilibrium: existing structures are stable,
and assimilation is mostly occurring.
• However, a discrepant experience can lead
to disequilibrium or cognitive “instability”
• Child forced to accommodate existing
structures.
10. Active view of development
• Child as scientist
• Mental structures intrinsically active
constantly being applied to experience
• Leads to curiosity and the desire to know
• Development proceeds as the child actively
refines his/her knowledge of the world
through many “small experiments”
11. Instructional learning viewed as
relatively unimportant
• Teachers should not try to transmit
knowledge, but should provide
opportunities for discovery
• Child needs to construct or reinvent
knowledge adult knowledge cannot be
formally communicated to the child
• Limited importance of socio-cultural
context; importance of peer interaction.
12. II: The Sensorimotor Period
(0-2 years)
• Only some basic motor reflexes grasping,
sucking, eye movements, orientation to
sound, etc
• By exercising and coordinating these basic
reflexes, infant develops intentionality and
an understanding of object permanence.
13. II: The Sensorimotor Period
(0-2 years)
• Intentionality refers to the ability to act in a
goal-directed manner in other words, to
do one thing in order that something else
occurs.
• Requires an understanding of cause and
effect
14. II: The Sensorimotor Period
(0-2 years)
• Object permanence refers to the
understanding that objects continue to exist
even when no longer in view.
• Need to distinguish between an action and
the thing acted on.
15. Stage 1 (0-1 month)
• Stage of reflex activity.
• Many reflexes like reaching, grasping
sucking all operating independently.
• Objects like "sensory pictures".
• Subjectivity and objectivity fused.
• Schemes activated by chance: No
intentionality.
16. Stage 2 (1-4 months)
• Stage of Primary Circular Reactions.
• Infant’s behaviour, by chance, leads to an
interesting result & is repeated.
• Circular: repetition.
• Primary: centre on infant's own body.
• Example: thumb-sucking.
17. Object concept at stage 2
• Passive expectation: if object disappears,
infant will continue looking to the location
where it disappeared, but will not search.
• In the infant mind, the existence of the
object still very closely tied to schemes
applied to experience
18. Intentions at stage 2
• Intentionality beginning to emerge: infant
can now self-initiate certain schemes (e.g.,
thumb-sucking)
19. Stage 3 (4-8 months)
• Stage of Secondary Circular Reactions
• Repetition of simple actions on external
objects.
• Example: bang a toy to make a noise.
20. Intentionality at stage 3
• Poor understanding of the connection
between causes and effect limits their
ability to act intentionality.
• “Magical causality” accidentally banging
toy makes many interesting things happen
21. Object concept at stage 3
• Visual anticipation.
• If infant drops an object, and it disappears,
the infant will visually search for it.
• Will also search for partially hidden objects
• But will not search for completely hidden
objects.
22. Stage 4 (8-12 months)
• Co-ordination of secondary circular
reactions.
• Secondary schemes combined to create new
action sequences.
23. Intentionality at Stage 4
• First appearance of intentional or in Piaget’s
terms, means-end behavior.
• Infant learns to use one secondary scheme
(e.g., pulling a towel) in order that another
secondary scheme can be activated (e.g.,
reaching and grasping a toy)
24. Object concept at stage 4
• Infant will search for hidden objects.
• Does infant understand the object as
something that exists separate from the
scheme applied to find the object?
• No. Evidence?
• A not B error.
34. A not B error
• Infant continues to search at the first hiding
location after object is hidden in the new
location.
• Object still subjectively understood.
• Object remains associated with a previously
successful scheme.
35. Stage 5 (12-18 months)
• Stage of Tertiary Circular Reactions.
• Actions varied in an experimental fashion.
• Pursuit of novelty
• New means are discovered.
• Limited to physical actions taken on objects
36. Object concept at stage 5.
• Can solve A not B.
• Cannot solve A not B with invisible
displacement (Example from Piaget).
37. Stage 5 and invisible
displacement
• Can only imagine the object as existing
where it was last hidden.
• Invisible displacement requires the infant to
mentally calculate the new location of the
object.
38. Stage 6 (18-24 months)
• Can solve object search with invisible
displacement.
• Infants now mentally represent physically
absent objects.
• Understands object as something that exists
independently of sensory-motor action.
39. Stage 6 (18-24 months)
• Sensori-motor period culminates with the
emergence of the Symbolic function
• An idea or mental image is used to stand-in
for a perceptually absent object
• Trial-and-error problem solving does not
need to enacted but can undertaken through
mental combination.
40. Summary
• Sensori-motor period culminates in the
emergence of symbolic representation.
• Object permanence understood.
• Basic means-ends skills have emerged.
42. III: The pre-operational period
• Symbolic thought without operations.
• Operations: logical principles that are
applied to symbols rather than objects.
• 3 examples: reversibility, compensation,
and identity
• In the absence of operations, thinking is
governed more by appearance than logical
necessity.
51. Pre-operational thinking and
problems of conservation
• Why do pre-operational children fail
problems of conservation?
• Because their thinking is not governed by
principles of reversibility, compensation
and identity
52. Pre-operational thinking and
problems of conservation
Reversibility: The pouring
of water into the small
container can be reversed.
53. Pre-operational thinking and
problems of conservation
Compensation: A decrease
in the height of the new
container is compensated by
an increase in its width
54. Pre-operational thinking and
problems of conservation
Identity: No amount of
liquid has been added or
taken away.
55. Pre-operational thinking and
problems of conservation
• Why do pre-operational children fail
problems of conservation?
• Because their thinking is not governed by
principles of reversibility, compensation
and identity
• If children applied these principles, they
would conclude liquid is conserved
56. Characteristics of Pre-Operational
Thinking
• Not governed by logical operations
• Consequently, it appears egocentric (e.g., 3
mountains task) and intuitive (e.g.,
conservation tasks)
60. Nature of intuitive reasoning
• No reversibility Cannot mentally undo a
given action.
• Perceptual centration Focus on only one
dimension of a problem.
• States versus transformations
Transformations relating different states
ignored.
61. What makes Pre-operational
thinking stage-like?
• Because it appears to be a general
characteristic of children’s thinking at this
age.
62. What makes Pre-operational
thinking stage-like?
• Because it appears to be a general
characteristic of children’s thinking at this
age.
• Examples:
(3) Other conservation problems.
66. What makes Pre-operational
thinking stage-like?
• Because it appears to be a general
characteristic of children’s thinking at this
age.
• Examples:
(3) Other conservation problems.
67. What makes Pre-operational
thinking stage-like?
• Because it appears to be a general
characteristic of children’s thinking at this
age.
• Examples:
(3) Other conservation problems.
(4) Emotion reasoning.
69. What makes Pre-operational
thinking stage-like?
• Because it appears to be a general
characteristic of children’s thinking at this
age.
• Examples:
(3) Other conservation problems.
(4) Emotion reasoning.
(5) Moral reasoning.
70. What makes Pre-operational
thinking stage-like?
• Because it appears to be a general
characteristic of children’s thinking at this
age.
• Examples:
• Other conservation problems.
• Emotion reasoning.
• Moral reasoning. focus on consequences
71. IV: Concrete operational thinking
(7-12 years)
• Qualitatively different reasoning in
conservation problems.
• Flexible and decentered.
• Co-ordination of multiple dimensions.
• Logical vs. empirical problem solving.
• Reversibility.
• Awareness of transformations.
72. IV: Concrete operational thinking
(7-12 years)
• Physical operations now internalized and
have become cognitive
• Still, logic directed at physical or concrete
problems
73. Horizontal decalage
• Different conservation problems solved at
different ages.
• Some claim it is a threat to Piaget’s domain
general view of cognitive development
• Example: volume vs mass
• But, invariant sequence observed.
74. V: Formal operations
• Thought no longer applied strictly to
concrete problems.
• Directed inward: thought becomes the
object of thought.
• Advances in use of deductive and inductive
logic
75. V: Formal operations
• Deductive thought in period of concrete
operations confined to familiar everyday
experience: “If Sam steals Tim’s toy, then
how will Tim feel?”
• Formal operations: “If we could eliminate
injustice, would the world live in peace?”
• Thinking goes beyond experience, more
abstract
76. Inductive reasoning
• Example: Pendulum problem
• Scientific thinking: from specific
observations to general conclusions through
hypothesis-testing
78. Inductive reasoning
• Formal operational children will
systematically test all possibilities before
arriving at a conclusion
79. VI: Evaluating Piaget
• Difficult.
• An enormous theory.
• Covers many ages and issues in
development.
80. Strengths
• Active rather than passive view of the child.
• Revealed important invariants in cognitive
development.
• Errors informative.
• Perceptual-motor learning rather than
language important for development.
• Tasks.
83. Performance
• Energy level, interest, attention, language
skills, motivation etc.
• Factors that effect the expression of a
competence.
84. Competence-performance
distinction.
• Piaget attributed infants success (or lack of
success) to competence.
• However, he gave no consideration to
performance factors that may have
constrained the expression of knowledge.
• Example: A not B
85. Performance-competence
distinction and A not B
• A not B errors thought to indicate poor
understanding of objects.
• However, motor components of the task
may constrain the expression of infants
knowledge.
• Example: Baillergeon.
• Object permanence observed in 5 month-
olds using a looking time task.
86. Other examples
• Borke (1975) & the 3 mountains task.
• Bruner (1966) & the liquid conservation
task.
• More detailed task analysis required.
87. Stages?
• Stage like progression only observed if one
assumes a bird-eye view.
• Closer inspection reveals more continuous
changes (Siegler, 1988).
88. Summary
• Piaget’s theory is wide-ranging and
influential.
• Source of continued controversy.
• People continue to address many of the
questions he raised, but using different
methods and concepts.