Expocomm 2009 Diez Estrategias De Bi Del 25 Feb 2009
Analyzing Intelligence
1. Ing. PMP Héctor Franco hfrancob@tbii.org.mx INTELLIGENCE AnalizingIntelligence ***** 2010
2. AnalyzingIntelligence Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations is a 2008 book by editors Roger Z. George, James B. Bruce and multiple contributors who are experts in the field of Intelligence Analysis. The book, which is listed on the Central Intelligence Agency's suggested reading list, [1] provides the first full assessment on the state of U.S. intelligence analysis since 9/11, and offers proposals for improved analytical methods, training, and structured approaches, according to Georgetown University Press. [2] The authors argue intelligence analysis should become its own "professional discipline", and should incorporate rigorous analytic methodologies, increase training and education throughout the intelligence enterprise, and embrace collaborative tools like Intellipedia, a wiki used by the United States government.
3. TheIntelligenceCycle The Intelligence Cycle is the process of developing raw information into finished intelligence for policymakers to use in decisionmaking and action. There are five steps which constitute the Intelligence Cycle.
4. 1. Planning and Direction This is management of the entire effort, from identifying the need for data to delivering an intelligence product to a consumer. It is the beginning and the end of the cycle--the beginning because it involves drawing up specific collection requirements and the end because finished intelligence, which supports policy decisions, generates new requirements. The whole process depends on guidance from public officials. Policymakers--the President, his aides, the National Security Council, and other major departments and agencies of government--initiate requests for intelligence.
5. 2. Collection ...is the gathering of the raw information needed to produce finished intelligence. There are many sources of information including open sources such as foreign broadcasts, newspapers, periodicals, and books. Open source reporting is integral to CIA's analytical capabilities. There are also secret sources of information. CIA's operations officers collect such information from agents abroad and from defectors who provide information obtainable in no other way. Finally, technical collection--electronics and satellite photography--plays an indispensable role in modern intelligence, such as monitoring arms control agreements and providing direct support to military forces.
6. 3. Processing ...involves converting the vast amount of information collected to a form usable by analysts through decryption, language translations, and data reduction.
7. 4. Analysis and Production ...is the conversion of basic information into finished intelligence. It includes integrating, evaluating, and analyzing all available data--which is often fragmentary and even contradictory--and preparing intelligence products. Analysts, who are subject-matter specialists, consider the information's reliability, validity, and relevance. They integrate data into a coherent whole, put the evaluated information in context, and produce finished intelligence that includes assessments of events and judgments about the implications of the information for the United States.
8. 4. Analysis and Production The CIA devotes the bulk of its resources to providing strategic intelligence to policymakers. It performs this important function by monitoring events, warning decisionmakers about threats to the United States, and forecasting developments. The subjects involved may concern different regions, problems, or personalities in various contexts--political, geographic, economic, military, scientific, or biographic. Current events, capabilities, and future trends are examined.
9. 4. Analysis and Production The CIA produces numerous written reports, which may be brief--one page or less--or lengthy studies. They may involve current intelligence, which is of immediate importance, or long-range assessments. The Agency presents some finished intelligence in oral briefings. The CIA also participates in the drafting and production of National Intelligence Estimates, which reflect the collective judgments of the Intelligence Community.
10. 5. Dissemination The last step, which logically feeds into the first, is the distribution of the finished intelligence to the consumers, the same policymakers whose needs initiated the intelligence requirements. Finished intelligence is hand-carried daily to the President and key national security advisers. The policymakers, the recipients of finished intelligence, then make decisions based on the information, and these decisions may lead to the levying of more requirements, thus triggering the Intelligence Cycle.
13. Sources of Intelligence OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) is publicly available information appearing in print or electronic forms, including radio, television, newspapers, journals, the Internet, commercial databases, videos, graphics, and drawings. 1 These definitions are intended to be educational in nature and should not be construed as legal definitions.
14. Sources of Intelligence HUMINT (Human Intelligence) is intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. This intelligence includes overt data collected by personnel in diplomatic and consular posts, as well as otherwise unobtainable information collected via clandestine sources of information, debriefings of foreign nationals and U.S. citizens who travel abroad, official contacts with foreign governments, and direct observation. 1 These definitions are intended to be educational in nature and should not be construed as legal definitions.
15. Sources of Intelligence SIGINT (SignalsIntelligence) isinformationgatheredfrom data transmissions, includingcommunicationsintelligence (COMINT), electronicintelligence (ELINT), and foreigninstrumentationsignalsintelligence (FISINT). 1 These definitions are intended to be educational in nature and should not be construed as legal definitions.
16. Sources of Intelligence GEOINT (Geospatial Intelligence) is information describing, visually depicting, and accurately locating physical features and human activities on the Earth. Examples of GEOINT products include imagery, analyses, maps, and navigation charts. Imagery intelligence (IMINT) is a subset of GEOINT. 1 These definitions are intended to be educational in nature and should not be construed as legal definitions.
17. Sources of Intelligence MASINT (Measurement and Signature Intelligence) is information produced by quantitative and qualitative analysis of physical attributes of targets and events in order to characterize and identify them. 1 These definitions are intended to be educational in nature and should not be construed as legal definitions.
19. Denial & Deception: AnalyticalImperatives DENIALreferstoactivities and programsdesignedtoeliminate, impair, degrade, orneutralizetheeffectiveness of intelligencecollectionwithin and acrossanyorallcollection disciplines, human and technical «Negación»
20. Denial & Deception: AnalyticalImperatives DECEPTIONreferstomanipulation of intelligencecollection, analysis, orpublicopinionbyintroducing false, misleading, oreven true, buttailored, informationintointelligencechannelswiththeintent of influencingjudgementsmadebyintelligenceproducers, and theconsumer of theirproducts. «Engaño»
33. Contrainteligencia Entendemos CI como la información recogida sobre las actividades de inteligencia del adversario y la capacidad de desenmascarar y neutralizar es esfuerzos. Esto pude incluir distintas acciones encaminadas a prevenir y neutralizar actividades que atenten contra la seguridad nacional.
34. The Data Challenge Intellipedia es una red de tres wikis internas de las redes estadounidenses de acceso restringido JWICS, SIPRNete Intelink-Uusadas por 16 agencias de inteligencia de los Estados Unidos. Esta red no es de acceso público
35. WhatisPublicInformation? 80-90 % of information in public domain Public: ‘all information you can legally and ethically identify, locate and then access’ (McGonagleJr. and Vella) Informationcosts: 80/10/10 split(Larry Kahaner)
36. CompetitiveIntelligence ‘Strategies to transfer market share profitably’ (Ian Gordon) ‘Fine-tuning your business planning process’ (John McGonagleJr. and Carolyn Vella) ‘Highly specific and timely information about a corporation’(Leonard M. Fuld)
38. TheIntelligenceCycle Developed by Jan Herring from CIA collections and analysis techniques: –NeedsAssessment –Plan research and collection methods/tools –Data collection/evaluation from public sources –Informationanalysis –Actionable intelligence presented to audience (decision-makers and policymakers)
39. IntelligenceCycle I: NeedsAssessment •Scan business and market context •Decide on Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) •Who is your final audience? •Rankings: –Likertscale (1 to 5) –Reliability index (Kirk Tyson) –Information attributes (Brett Breeding) •Shallowness, credibility, timeliness and focus
40. IntelligenceCycle II: PlanningResearch •Plan researchtools & diagnosticscorecards •Identify data requirements and sources •Decide onscanningframe •Pre-test for personal and toolblind-spots •Teamcapabilities and cognitivestyles (MBTI, Spiral Dynamics®, McQuaig, Enneagram, MultipleIntelligences)
41. IntelligenceCycle III: Data Collection & Evaluation Collect data from published and non-published sources •Interview experts •Data sufficiency and evaluation: –Check facts •‘Relevance, truth-value, understandability, sufficiency, significance and timeliness’ (Ben Gilad) –Resolve the inconsistencies –What are the key drivers and factors that will influence the context and situation? (Pareto’s 80/20 principle)
42. IntelligenceCycle IV: InformationAnalysis Filtering data and storage (ChunWeiChoo) •‘Chunk’ data intocategories and hypotheses –Blind-spots, cross-impacts and wild cards –Debate meanings –Questionassumptions –Look for disconfirmingevidence –Allow for dissentingviews •Identify and recognizeemergingpatterns
43. IntelligenceCycle V: Dissemination Intelligence outputs are contextual, time-specific and actionable •‘Timeliness, accuracy and reliable’ (John Prescott and Patrick Gibbons) •Must meet the need of the consumer –Neuro-Linguistic Programming (NLP) for different sensory modalities –Delivered even if ‘bad news’ •Links to ‘swarm intelligence’, emergence and intelligence augmentation (IA).
44. BI and Professional Ethics Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP) is professional body Economic Espionage Act (1996) in US BI often misunderstood as corporate espionage ‘Litany’ of Hollywood film references
47. Bibliography Journalarticles Allison, Graham T.: “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis”. The American Political Science Review 63, No.3 (1969): 689-718. Augustini, Jeff: “From Goldfinger to Butterfinger: The Legal and Policy Issues Surrounding Proposals to Use the CIA for Economic Espionage”, Law and Policy in International Business, 26, No. 2 (1995) 459-495. Bell, J. Bowyer: “Toward a Theory of Deception”, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, No.16 (2003), pp. 244-279. Ben, Zvi Abraham: “A conceptual framework for the analysis of surprise attack”, World Politics, XXVIII (April 1976). Betts, Richard K.: “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable”. World Politics, 31, No.1 (1978), pp. 61-89. —: “Surprise Despite Warning: Why Sudden Attacks Succeed”, Political Science Quarterly, 95, No.4 (1980), pp. 551-572. 65 Random, H. A.: “Intelligence as a Science”, Studies in Intelligence (Spring 1958), p. 76. Declassified. UNISCI DISCUSSION PAPERS Enero de 2005 13 Brady, Christopher: “Intelligencefailures –Plus Ca change”, Intelligence and National Books Bar-Joseph, Uri (1995): Intelligence Intervention in the Politics of Democratic States: The United States, Israel, and Britain. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. Berkoviz, Bruce (1989): “The cycle of Intelligence”, in Strategic Intelligence. Princeton, Princeton UniversityPress. Betts Richard (1982): Surprise attack: Lessons for Defence Planning. Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution. — and Manken, Thomas G. (2001): Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence. Frank Cass. Brecht, Arnold (1959): Political Theory: The Foundations of Twentieth-Century Political Thought. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Dahl, Erik J (2004): Warning of Terror: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence Against Terrorism. The Fletcher School, Tufts University. Davis, James Kirkpatrick (1992): Spying on America: The FBI's Domestic Counterintelligence Program. New York, Praeger. Foerstel, Herbert N (1991): Surveillance in the Stacks: The FBI's Library Awareness Program. New York, GreenwoodPress. Gillespie, Diane (1992): The Mind's We: Contextualism in Cognitive Psychology. Carbondale, IL, Southern Illinois University Press.
![AnalyzingIntelligence Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations is a 2008 book by editors Roger Z. George, James B. Bruce and multiple contributors who are experts in the field of Intelligence Analysis. The book, which is listed on the Central Intelligence Agency's suggested reading list, [1] provides the first full assessment on the state of U.S. intelligence analysis since 9/11, and offers proposals for improved analytical methods, training, and structured approaches, according to Georgetown University Press. [2] The authors argue intelligence analysis should become its own "professional discipline", and should incorporate rigorous analytic methodologies, increase training and education throughout the intelligence enterprise, and embrace collaborative tools like Intellipedia, a wiki used by the United States government.]()