Weapons Of Mass Destruction

1. Weapons of
Mass
Destruction
Volume I:
Chemical and
Biological Weapons

2. Weapons of
Mass Destruction
An Encyclopedia of Worldwide Policy,
Technology, and History
Eric A. Croddy and James J. Wirtz, Editors
Jeffrey A. Larsen, Managing Editor
Foreword by David Kay
Volume I: Chemical and Biological Weapons
Eric A. Croddy, Editor
Santa Barbara, California Denver, Colorado Oxford, England

3. Copyright 2005 by Eric A. Croddy, James J. Wirtz, and Jeffrey A. Larsen
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any
form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief
quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publishers.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Weapons of mass destruction : an encyclopedia of worldwide policy, technology, and history / Eric A. Croddy and
James J. Wirtz, editors.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 1-85109-490-3 (hardback : alk. paper)—ISBN 1-85109-495-4 (e-book)
1. Weapons of mass destruction—Encyclopedias. I. Croddy, Eric, 1966– II. Wirtz, James J., 1958–
U793.W427 2005
358'.3'03—dc22 2004024651
0807060510987654321
This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook. Visit abc-clio.com for details.
ABC-CLIO, Inc.
130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911
Santa Barbara, California 93116–1911
This book is printed on acid-free paper.
Manufactured in the United States of America

5. Contents
Weapons of Mass Destruction
An Encyclopedia of Worldwide Policy, Technology, and History
Volume I: Chemical and Biological Weapons
Foreword, vii
Preface: Weapons of Mass Destruction, ix
Editors and Contributors, xiii
A-to-Z List of Entries, Volumes I and II, xvii
Introduction: Chemical and Biological Weapons, xxv
Chronology: Chemical and Biological Weapons, xxxi
Chemical and Biological Weapons, Entries A to Y, 1
Key Documents: Chemical and Biological Weapons, 341
Bibliography, 395
Index, 413
v

7. Foreword
David Kay
Senior Research Analyst, Potomac Institute,
The importance of this encyclopedia was under- Washington, D.C., and former Director,
scored by the fact that virtually the only area of Iraq Survey Group (2003–2004)
agreement in the 2004 U.S. presidential campaign
between the two major candidates, President
George W. Bush and Senator John F. Kerry, was that
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
poses the most serious national security threat with made new classes of weapons possible. But scientific
which the next president would have to deal. progress marches at a very fast rate, leaving behind
While the prospect of chemical, biological, radi- old, but still dangerous, knowledge. For example,
ological, or nuclear weapons falling into the hands the secrets regarding methods for enriching ura-
of terrorists or regimes hostile to the United States nium were simply bought by the Iraqis from the
and its friends is indeed a frightening prospect, how U.S. Government Printing Office. That office could
many of us understand exactly what this means? not imagine that there was anything important in a
When were such weapons first developed? Which 40-year-old project from the dawn of the U.S. nu-
states and scientists are leading these developments? clear program.
Have these weapons actually been used in the past? In another remarkable case, uranium enrichment
How often and with what consequence—not only technology was stolen from a commercial company
for the populations they were used against, but for in Holland by A. Q. Khan—a rather ordinary Pak-
those that used them, as well? Do these weapons re- istani who went to Germany to earn an engineering
ally give states a decisive edge over their adversaries? degree. Khan subsequently used this technology to
How easy are they to develop and use? Does the ease develop Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and then sold the
of development or use of such weapons by states, same technology to North Korea, Iran, and Libya.
like North Korea, differ from the obstacles faced by The techniques of gene modification, which less than
terrorist groups, like al-Qaeda? What are the tools 20 years ago were the stuff of Nobel prizes, are now
available to the United States to halt the spread of routinely taught in American high schools and com-
such weapons? Have we had any success in limiting munity colleges and have opened up whole new
the spread of these weapons? Are there any protec- classes of biological weapons. As this study also
tive measures that individuals can take to lessen makes clear, even the safe disposal of weapons of
their vulnerability if such weapons are used? mass destruction following a state’s decision to aban-
These are but a few of the questions that the au- don or limit their programs presents serious chal-
thors of this authoritative two-volume study at- lenges of preventing the weapons and associated
tempt to answer. This encyclopedia will have endur- technology from falling into the hands of terrorists.
ing importance as states and societies attempt to The thousands of Soviet-era nuclear weapons and
come to terms with the consequence of the collision the engineering talent that created them represent a
of scientific progress with the failure to develop a re- clear and present danger with which the world has
liable global security structure. The initial develop- not yet completely dealt. The readers of this work will
ment of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, find numerous examples of the lowering of the bar-
as this study makes clear, often involved scientific riers to the acquisition by states and terrorists of these
and engineering breakthroughs of the highest most terrible of weapons.
order. The paths to enriching uranium and geneti- But this study does not simply present the horrors
cally modifying pathogens are but two examples of of a world filled with weapons of mass destruction. It
such successes, scientific breakthroughs that have also catalogs and illuminates the various methods of
vii

8. viii FOREWORD
attempting to control and constrain these weapons— the few efforts made in this regard, it is hard not to
including treaties and agreements such as the Nuclear come away with a sense of dread for the future. Most
Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons control efforts have been aimed at states, not at ter-
Convention, as well as intrusive inspections, such as rorists operating outside of the control of states.
the efforts of the United Nations to hunt such Hopefully students and policy makers using this
weapons in Iraq after the first Gulf War. As will be book a few years hence will be able to record more
clear to the reader, such endeavors have had both suc- progress toward meeting this new challenge.
cesses and failures. Much remains to be done to en- The authors and editors have done an important
sure that their effectiveness matches the problems service by pulling together such an illuminating
posed by the proliferation of such weapons. The study at exactly the point when there is a broad po-
largest gap in effective mechanisms of control and re- litical consensus of the importance of the problem.
sponse to the acquisition of such weapons is with re- One can only hope that our citizens and our politi-
gard to the efforts of terrorists groups to acquire the cal leaders take the time to explore the depth of in-
means of mass murder. While these volumes identify formation presented here.

9. Preface: Weapons
The term “weapon of mass destruction” (WMD) is
of Mass Destruction
a relatively modern expression. It was probably
first used in print media following the interna-
Eric A. Croddy and James J. Wirtz
tional uproar over Germany’s aerial bombardment
of the Basque city of Guernica in April 1937. (The
latter event was famously depicted in Picasso’s
painting Guernica y Luno.) Only a year before, an- never particularly enamored by chemical or biolog-
other Axis power, Italy, had begun using mustard ical weapons and treated them as a deterrent to be
and other chemical warfare (CW) agents in used in retaliation for the use of chemical or bio-
Abyssinia (modern-day Ethiopia).1 During the logical weapons used by the opponent. By the early
anxious years leading up World War II, WMD re- 1990s, the U.S. military had abandoned offensive
ferred to the indiscriminate killing of civilians by use of these weapons, although it maintained a re-
modern weaponry, especially aircraft. It also search and development program designed to pro-
echoed the fear of chemical weapons that was un- duce effective equipment, procedures, medications,
leashed by World War I, which had come to a con- and inoculations to defend against chemical and bi-
clusion just a few years earlier. ological attack.
Following the development of the atomic bomb Over the last decade, much has been written
in 1945, the term “WMD” came to include nuclear about WMD. The meaning of the term itself is
and eventually biological weapons. WMD was ap- somewhat controversial, although there is a formal,
parently first used to describe nuclear warfare by legalistic definition. According to U.S. Code Title
Soviet strategists. In 1956, during the 20th Commu- 50, “War and National Defense,” per the U.S. Con-
nist Party Congress in Moscow, the Soviet Minister gress, the term “weapon of mass destruction”means
of Defense—and “Hero of Stalingrad”—Marshal “any weapon or device that is intended, or has the
Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov prophesied that capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to
modern warfare “will be characterized by the mas- a significant number of people through the release,
sive use of air forces, various rocket weapons and dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous
various means of mass destruction such as atomic, chemicals or their precursors; a disease organism;
thermonuclear, chemical and bacteriological radiation or radioactivity.”4 For its part, the U.S. De-
weapons.”2 In that same year, the Hungarian Minis- partment of Defense has a similar characterization
ter of Defense echoed Marshal Zhukov, stating that of WMD, although in addition it includes “...the
“Under modern conditions, the decisive aspect of means to deliver [WMD].”5 So, what makes a
operational planning is the use of nuclear and other weapon massively destructive? Is it the type of inju-
weapons of mass destruction.”3 rious agents involved, namely radioactive, chemical,
When the West learned of Zhukov’s speech, na- or biological, or is it that the attack itself produces
tional security strategists in the United States and significant casualties or destruction? Also what
elsewhere became quite concerned. By inference, would “significant” mean in this context: ten, a hun-
they concluded that WMD—nuclear, biological, dred, or a thousand casualties? What if very few
and chemical weapons—were an integral part of people are actually killed or hurt by at attack? In the
Soviet military doctrine. Partly in response to latter respect, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investiga-
Zhukov’s ministrations on WMD, the United States tion has a rather unique and somewhat satisfying
reviewed its offensive chemical and biological interpretation of the term “WMD,” invoked when
weapons program in 1958. The U.S. military was the U.S. government indicted Timothy McVeigh
ix

10. x PREFACE
with using a WMD in his 1995 terrorist attack in ture and that civilized people everywhere reject the
Oklahoma City. In this case, although the device use of chemical and biological weapons. Interna-
used was a conventional bomb (employing ammo- tional law is replete with treaties, agreements, and
nium nitrate-fuel oil explosive), “A weapon crosses regimes whose purpose is to proscribe the use of
the WMD threshold when the consequences of its these weapons, or mitigate the consequences of any
release overwhelm local responders.”6 such use. In particular, the world has successfully
Some analysts, however, have suggested that kept nuclear weapons in reserve for almost sixty
various technical hurdles prevent chemical and years as truly deterrent weapons of last resort.
even biological weapons from causing casualties Our encyclopedia covers a wide range of topics,
on a truly massive scale. Some point to the Aum some historical, some drawn from today’s headlines.
Shinrikyo sarin attack on the Tokyo subway system We describe many of the pathogens, diseases, sub-
on March 20, 1995, which resulted in eleven stances, and machines that can serve as weapons of
deaths, as an example of the limits of WMD. They mass destruction, as well as their associated delivery
note that high-explosives have been used with far systems. We also describe important events and in-
greater lethal effects than sarin in the annals of dividuals that have been influential in the develop-
modern terrorism. Others are increasingly con- ment of weapons of mass destruction and doctrines
cerned about the destructive potential of even for their use (or control). We have encouraged our
rudimentary weapons. Analysts today are worried, contributors to highlight ongoing controversies and
for instance, that terrorists might try to employ ra- contemporary concerns about WMD and current
diological dispersal devices or “dirty bombs.” international arms control and nonproliferation ef-
These weapons do not detonate with a fission re- forts intended to reduce the threat they pose to
action, but rather utilize conventional explosives to world peace and security. Even a work of this length,
distribute radiological materials and contaminate however, cannot completely cover the history, sci-
a given area. Few deaths are likely to result from the ence, and personal stories associated with a topic of
effects of a dirty bomb, but the consequences—in this magnitude, so we have included abundant ref-
terms of anxiety, clean-up, and the recognized abil- erences to help readers take those initial steps for
ity of a terrorist to conduct the very act itself— further study of the topics we survey.
would likely be far reaching.
Acknowledgments
About the Encyclopedia Our deepest debt is to the contributors who made
The very presence of chemical, biological and nu- this volume a reality. Many of them joined the proj-
clear weapons in international arsenals and the po- ect at its inauguration several years ago and have
tential that they might fall into the hands of terror- waited a long time to see their work in print. It is im-
ist organizations guarantees that weapons of mass possible for just three people to be experts on all of
destruction will be of great policy, public, and schol- the subjects covered in this volume, and without the
arly interest for years to come. We cannot resolve the hard work of our contributors, this encyclopedia
debates prompted by WMD, but we hope that we would never have been completed. Thanks to our
and our contributors can provide facts to help the research assistants, Abraham Denmark and Laura
reader sort through the controversies that are likely Fontaine, who uncovered most of the key docu-
to emerge in the years ahead. Much that is contained ments in both volumes and wrote a few entries for
in these volumes is disturbing and even frightening; us, as well. We also want to express our appreciation
it is impossible to write a cheery encyclopedia about to a senior government official who reviewed Vol-
weapons whose primary purpose is to conduct ume II for accuracy and sensitive material. We owe
postindustrial-scale mass murder. The sad truth of a special debt to Jeff Larsen, our managing editor,
the matter is that chemical, biological, radiological, whose help was instrumental in the success of this
and nuclear weapons reflect the willingness of hu- project. Not only did he provide editorial support to
mans to go to great lengths to find increasingly both volumes, but he displayed a keen ability to deal
lethal and destructive instruments of war and vio- with the publisher and our 95 contributors, keep
lence. We are pleased to note, however, that much of track of timelines, requirements, and progress, and
what is reported in these volumes is historical in na- gently push the two of us when we needed encour-

11. PREFACE xi
agement during this multiyear project that involved Frederick R. Sidell, Ernest T. Takafuji, and David
over 500 separate parts. Finally, we also want to ex- R. Franz, eds., Textbook of Military Medicine,
press our appreciation to Alicia Merritt, Martha Part I: Warfare, Weaponry, and the Casualty:
Whitt, Giulia Rossi, and the behind-the-scenes Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological
copyeditors at ABC-CLIO who worked tirelessly to Warfare (Washington, DC: Borden Institute,
help get this manuscript into print. We discovered Walter Reed Army Medical Center, 1997), p. 54.
3. Quoted in the archives, “Report of Colonel-
that nothing is a trivial matter when it comes to a
General István Bata, Hungarian Minister of
manuscript of this size. The commitment of our Defense, to Members of the HWP Central
publisher to this topic, and the dedication of the Committee on the Conduct of the Staff-
production staff at ABC-CLIO, greatly facilitated Command Exercise Held, 17 July 1956,” found at
the completion of these volumes. the International Relations and Security
We hope that this encyclopedia will help inform Network (Switzerland), documents collection,
the public debate about weapons of mass destruc- http://www.isn.ethz.ch/
tion and international security policy, with the goal 4. Title 50, Chapter 40, Sec. 2302.
of never again seeing such weapons used in anger. 5. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation:
Threat and Response (Washington, DC: U.S.
Notes Government Printing Office, 2001), p. 4.
1. Stanley D. Fair, “Mussolini’s Chemical War,” 6. U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), “The
Army, January 1985, p. 52. FBI and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 4
2. Jeffery K. Smart, “History of Chemical and August 1999, http://norfolk.fbi.gov.wmd.htm
Biological Warfare: An American Perspective,” in

13. Editors Editors and
ERIC A. CRODDY (EDITOR, VOLUME I,
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS)
Contributors
Analyst with U.S. Pacific Command, Pearl
Harbor, HI
JAMES J. WIRTZ (EDITOR, VOLUME II, JEFFREY M. BALE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS) Senior Research Associate, Monterey Institute
Professor and Chair, Department of National of International Studies, Monterey, CA
Security Affairs, U.S. Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, CA, and Senior Fellow, ZACH BECKER
Center for International Security and Science Applications International Corporation,
Cooperation, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA Arlington, VA
JEFFREY A. LARSEN (MANAGING EDITOR, ANJALI BHATTACHARJEE
VOLUMES I AND II) Research Associate, WMD Terrorism Project,
Senior Policy Analyst, Science Applications Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey
International Corporation and President, Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA
Larsen Consulting Group, Colorado Springs,
CO JENNIFER BROWER
Science and Technology Policy Analyst, The
Contributors RAND Corporation, Arlington, VA
GARY ACKERMAN
Deputy Director, Chemical and Biological WILLIAM D. CASEBEER
Weapons Nonproliferation Program, Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy,
Monterey Institute of International Studies, U.S. Air Force Academy, CO
Monterey, CA
KALPANA CHITTARANJAN
JEFFREY A. ADAMS Research Fellow, Observer Research
Senior Analyst, Analytic Services, Inc. (ANSER), Foundation, Chennai Chapter, Chennai, India
Arlington, VA
CLAY CHUN
PETER ALMQUIST Chairman, Department of Distance Education,
Bureau of Arms Control, U.S. Department of U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA
State, Washington, DC
WILLIAM S. CLARK
ELIZABETH AYLOTT Defense Policy Analyst, Science Applications
Plans and Policy Analyst, Science Applications International Corporation, Arlington, VA
International Corporation, Ramstein Air Base,
Germany CHRIS CRAIGE
Graduate Student, U.S. Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, CA
xiii

14. xiv EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS
MALCOLM DAVIS ANDREA GABBITAS
Lecturer, Defence Studies Department, King’s Graduate Student, Department of Political
College London, London, UK Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Cambridge, MA
ABE DENMARK
Graduate Student, Graduate School of SCOTT SIGMUND GARTNER
International Studies, University of Denver, Associate Professor, Department of Political
Denver, CO Science, University of California–Davis, Davis, CA
JOHN W. DIETRICH MICHAEL GEORGE
Assistant Professor, Bryant University, Policy Analyst, Science Applications
Smithfield, RI International Corporation, Arlington, VA
ANDREW M. DORMAN DON GILLICH
Lecturer in Defence Studies, King’s College Nuclear Research and Operations Officer, U.S.
London, London, UK Army, Colorado Springs, CO
FRANNIE EDWARDS DAN GOODRICH
Office of Emergency Services, San Jose, CA Public Health Department, Santa Clara, CA
LAWRENCE R. FINK PHIL GRIMLEY
Corporate Export Administration, International Professor of Pathology and Molecular Cell
Legal Department, Science Applications Biology, F. Edward Herbert Medical School,
International Corporation, Arlington, VA Uniformed Services University of Health
Sciences, Bethesda, MD
STEPHANIE FITZPATRICK
Arms Control/Policy Analyst, Independent EUGENIA K. GUILMARTIN
Consultant, Arlington, VA Assistant Professor, Department of Social
Sciences, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY
SCHUYLER FOERSTER
President, World Affairs Council of Pittsburgh, JOHN HART
Pittsburgh, PA Researcher, Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, Solna, Sweden
LAURA FONTAINE
Graduate Student, Graduate School of PETER HAYS
International Studies, University of Denver, Executive Editor, Joint Force Quarterly, National
Denver, CO Defense University, Washington, DC
J. RUSS FORNEY JAMES JOYNER
Associate Professor, Department of Chemistry Managing Editor, Strategic Insights,
and Life Science, U.S. Military Academy, West Washington, DC
Point, NY
AARON KARP
MARTIN FURMANSKI Professor, Old Dominion University, and
Scientists Working Group on Biological and Assistant Professor, U.S. Joint Forces Staff
Chemical Weapons, Center for Arms Control College, Norfolk, VA
and Nonproliferation, Ventura, CA
KERRY KARTCHNER
Senior Advisor for Missile Defense Policy, U.S.
State Department, Washington, DC

15. EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS xv
MIKE KAUFHOLD CLAUDINE MCCARTHY
Senior National Security Policy Analyst, Science National Association of County and City Health
Applications International Corporation, San Officials, Washington, DC
Antonio, TX
JEFFREY D. MCCAUSLAND
BRET KINMAN Director, Leadership in Conflict Initiative,
Graduate Student, Department of National Dickinson College, Carlisle, PA
Security Affairs, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, CA PATRICIA MCFATE
Science Applications International Corporation,
KIMBERLY L. KOSTEFF Santa Fe, NM
Policy Analyst, Science Applications
International Corporation, Arlington, VA ROB MELTON
Assistant Professor of Military Strategic Studies,
AMY E. KRAFFT 34th Education Group, U.S. Air Force Academy,
Research Biologist, Department of Molecular CO
Genetic Pathology, Armed Forces Institute of
Pathology, Rockville, MD BRIAN MORETTI
Assistant Professor, Department of Physics, U.S.
JENNIFER LASECKI Military Academy, West Point, NY
Computer Sciences Corporation, Alexandria, VA
JENNIFER HUNT MORSTEIN
PETER LAVOY Senior Analyst, Science Applications
Director, Center for Contemporary Conflict, International Corporation, McLean, VA
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA
EDWARD P. NAESSENS, JR.
SEAN LAWSON Associate Professor, Nuclear Engineering
Graduate Student, Department of Science and Program Director, Department of Physics, U.S.
Technology Studies, Rensselaer Polytechnic Military Academy, West Point, NY
Institute, Troy, NY
T. V. PAUL
MICHAEL LIPSON James McGill Professor of International
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Relations, McGill University, Montreal, Canada
Science, Concordia University, Montreal,
Canada ROY PETTIS
Science Advisor to the Office of Strategic and
BRIAN L’ITALIEN Theater Defenses, Bureau of Arms Control, U.S.
Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC State Department, Washington, DC
MORTEN BREMER MAERLI RICH PILCH
Researcher, Norwegian Institute of International Scientist in Residence, Chemical and Biological
Affairs, Oslo, Norway Nonproliferation Program, Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of
TOM MAHNKEN International Studies, Monterey, CA
Professor of Strategy, Naval War College,
Newport, RI ELIZABETH PRESCOTT
International Institute for Strategic Studies,
ROBERT MATHEWS Washington, DC
Asia-Pacific Centre for Military Law, University
of Melbourne, Victoria, Australia

16. xvi EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS
BEVERLEY RIDER ROBERT SOBESKI
Senior Scientist, Genencor International, Inc., Assistant Professor, Department of Physics, U.S.
Palo Alto, CA Military Academy, West Point, NY
GUY ROBERTS JOHN SPYKERMAN
Principal Director, Negotiations Policy, Office of Foreign Affairs Officer, U.S. State Department,
the Secretary of Defense, Washington DC Washington, DC
J. SIMON ROFE TROY S. THOMAS
Lecturer, Defence Studies Department, King’s Fellow, Center for Strategic Intelligence
College London, London, UK Research, Defense Intelligence Agency,
Washington, DC
KEN ROGERS
Professor of Political Science, Department of CHARLES L. THORNTON
Social Sciences and Philosophy, Arkansas Tech Research Fellow, Center for International and
University, Russellville, AR Security Studies, School of Public Policy,
University of Maryland, College Park, MD
STEVEN ROSENKRANTZ
Foreign Affairs Officer, Office of Strategic and ROD THORNTON
Theater Defenses, Bureau of Arms Control, U.S. Lecturer, Defence Studies Department, King’s
State Department, Washington, DC College London, London, UK
C. ROSS SCHMIDTLEIN ANTHONY TU
Research Fellow, Department of Medical Department of Biochemistry and Molecular
Physics, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Biology, Colorado State University, Ft Collins, CO
Center, New York, NY
PETER VALE
GLEN M. SEGELL Nelson Mandela Professor of Politics, Rhodes
Director, Institute of Security Policy, London, University, Grahamstown, South Africa
UK
GILLES VAN NEDERVEEN
D. SHANNON SENTELL, JR. Independent Consultant, Fairfax, VA
Assistant Professor, Department of Physics, U.S.
Military Academy, West Point, NY MICHAEL WHEELER
Senior Defense Analyst, Science Applications
JACQUELINE SIMON International Corporation, McLean, VA
Independent Consultant, Ottawa, Canada
JOLIE WOOD
JOSHUA SINAI Graduate Student, Department of Government,
Analytic Services, Inc. (ANSER), Alexandria, VA University of Texas, Austin, TX
STANLEY R. SLOAN JACK WOODALL
Visiting Scholar, Middlebury College, and Visiting Professor, Department of Medical
Director, Atlantic Community Initiative, Biochemistry, Federal University of Rio de
Richmond, VT Janeiro, Brazil
JAMES M. SMITH ROBERT WYMAN
Director, USAF Institute for National Security Arms Control Operations Specialist, Science
Studies, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Applications International Corporation,
Springs, CO Arlington, VA

17. Volume I: Chemical and Biological Weapons A to Z List of Entries,
Aberdeen Proving Ground
Abrin
Volumes I and II
Adamsite (DM, diphenylaminochlorarsine
Aerosol
Agent Orange
Agroterrorism (Agricultural Biological Chemical and Biological Munitions and Military
Warfare) Operations
Al-Qaeda Chemical Warfare
Al Shifa Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
Amiton (VG) Chlamydia Psittaci (Psittacosis)
Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil (ANFO) Chlorine Gas
Anthrax Chloropicrin (PS, Trichloronitromethane)
Aralsk Smallpox Outbreak Choking Agents (Asphyxiants)
Arbusov Reaction Cholera (Vibrio cholerae)
Arsenicals Conotoxin
Atropine Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic Fever
Aum Shinrikyo Crop Dusters (Aerial Applicators)
The Australia Group CS
Cyclosarin (GF)
Bari Incident
Bhopal, India: Union Carbide Accident Decontamination
Bigeye (BLU-80) Demilitarization of Chemical and Biological
Binary Chemical Munitions Agents
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Dianisidine
(BTWC) Difluor (DF, Difluoromethylphosphonate)
Biological Terrorism: Early Warning via the Diisopropyl Fluorophosphate (DFP)
Internet Dioxin
Biological Warfare Diphosgene
Biopreparat Dual-Use
Bioregulators Dugway Proving Ground
Bioterrorism
Bleach EA2192
Blood Agents EMPTA (O-Ethyl Methylphosphonothioic Acid)
Botulism (Botulinum Toxin) Enterovirus 70
Brucellosis (Brucella Bacterium) Equine Encephalitis (VEE, WEE, EEE)
Ethiopia (Abyssinia)
C-4 Explosives
Carbamates
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Fentanyl
(CDC) Fermenter
Chemical Agent Monitor Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus
xvii

18. xviii A TO Z LIST OF ENTRIES
Fort Detrick Oklahoma City Bombing
Fuel-Air Explosive (FAE) Organophosphates
Osama bin Laden
Gas Gangrene Oximes
Geneva Protocol
Glanders (Burkholderia Mallei) Parasites—Fungal
Gruinard Island Parathion (Methyl and Ethyl)
G-Series Nerve Agents Perfluoroisobutylene (PFIB)
Gulf War: Chemical and Biological Weapons Phosgene Gas (Carbonyl Chloride)
Gulf War Syndrome Phosgene Oxime (CX, Dichloroform Oxime)
Pine Bluff, Arkansas
Hague Convention Plague
Halabja Incident Plasticized Explosives
Heartwater (Cowdria Ruminantium) Point Source
Hemorrhagic Fevers Porton Down, United Kingdom
Herbicides Precursors
Protective Measures: Biological Weapons
India: Chemical and Biological Weapons Protective Measures: Chemical Weapons
Programs Psychoincapacitants
Inversion Pyridostigmine Bromide
Iran: Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs
Iran-Iraq War Q-Fever
Iraq: Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs QL
Japan and WMD Ricin
Johnston Atoll Rift Valley Fever
Riot Control Agents
Kaffa, Siege of Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever
Korean War Russia: Chemical and Biological Weapons
Programs
Late Blight of Potato Fungus (Phytophthora
Infestans) Sabotage
Libya and WMD Salmonella
Line Source Sarin
Livens Projector Semtex
Lyophilization Shikhany
Simulants
Marburg Virus Sino-Japanese War
Melioidosis Skatole
Microencapsulation Smallpox
Mustard (Sulfur and Nitrogen) Soman
Mycotoxins South Africa: Chemical and Biological Weapons
Programs
Napalm South Korea: Chemical and Biological Weapons
Nerve Agents Programs
Newcastle Disease Spore
Newport Facility, Indiana Stabilizers
North Korea: Chemical and Biological Weapons Staphylococcal Enterotoxin B
Programs Stepnogorsk
Novichok Sverdlovsk Anthrax Accident

19. A TO Z LIST OF ENTRIES xix
Syria: Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs Acheson-Lililenthal Report
Actinides
Tabun Airborne Alert
Terrorism with CBRN Weapons Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
Thickeners Antinuclear Movement
TNT Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Weapons
Tobacco Mosaic Virus Arms Control
Tooele, Utah Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)
Toxins (Natural) Arms Race
Toxoids and Antitoxins Assured Destruction
Tularemia Atomic Energy Act
Tuberculosis (TB, Mycobacterium Tuberculosis) Atomic Energy Commission
Typhus (Rickettsia Prowazekii) Atomic Mass/Number/Weight
Atoms for Peace
Unit 731
United Kingdom: Chemical and Biological Backpack Nuclear Weapons
Weapons Programs Balance of Terror
United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO)
Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS)
United Nations Special Commission on Iraq Ballistic Missiles
(UNSCOM) Baruch Plan
United States: Chemical and Biological Weapons Bikini Island
Programs Bombers, Russian and Chinese Nuclear-Capable
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Bombers, U.S. Nuclear-Capable
Boost-Phase Intercept
Vaccines Bottom-Up Review
V-Agents Brilliant Eyes
Vector Brinkmanship
VECTOR: State Research Center of Virology and British Nuclear Forces and Doctrine
Biotechnology Broken Arrow, Bent Spear
Vesicants
Vietnam War Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) Reactor
Vincennite (Hydrogen Cyanide) The Catholic Church and Nuclear War
Chelyabinsk-40
Weteye Bomb Chernobyl
World Trade Center Attack (1993) Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado
World War I Chicken, Game of
World War II: Biological Weapons Chinese Nuclear Forces and Doctrine
World War II: Chemical Weapons City Avoidance
Wushe Incident Civil Defense
Cold Launch
Xylyl Bromide Cold War
Collateral Damage
Yellow Rain Command and Control
Yemen Committee on the Present Danger
Ypres Compellence
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
Volume II: Nuclear Weapons Conference on Disarmament
Accidental Nuclear War Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Accuracy Europe (CSCE)

20. xx A TO Z LIST OF ENTRIES
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures Equivalent Megaton
(CSBMs) Escalation
Containment Essential Equivalence
Cooperative Threat Reduction (The Nunn-Lugar European Atomic Energy Community
Program) (EURATOM)
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Extended Deterrence
Controls (COCOM)
Correlation of Forces Failsafe
Counterforce Targeting Fallout
Countermeasures Fast Breeder Reactors
Counterproliferation Fat Man
Countervailing Strategy Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Countervalue Targeting Federation of American Scientists (FAS)
Coupling Firebreaks
Credibility First Strike
Crisis Stability Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)
Critical Nuclear Weapons Design Information Fission Weapons
(CNWDI) Flexible Response
Criticality and Critical Mass The Football
Cruise Missiles Forward-Based Systems
Cuban Missile Crisis Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS)
Fratricide
Damage Limitation French Nuclear Forces and Doctrine
Data Exchanges Fuel Fabrication
The Day After Fusion
Dealerting
Decapitation G8 Global Partnership Program
Declared Facility Gaither Commission Report
Decoys Game Theory
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Gas-Graphite Reactors
Dense Pack Geiger Counter
Department of Defense (DOD) Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS)
Department of Energy (DOE) Graphite
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Gravity Bombs
Depleted Uranium (U-238) Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs)
Deployment Ground Zero
Depressed Trajectory Gun-Type Devices
Détente
Deterrence Half-Life
Deuterium Hanford, Washington
Disarmament Hard and Deeply Buried Targets
Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line Harmel Report
Downloading Heavy Bombers
Dual-Track Decision Heavy ICBMs
Heavy Water
Early Warning Hedge
Emergency Action Message (EAM) Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)
Enola Gay Hiroshima
Enrichment Horizontal Escalation
Entry into Force Hot Line Agreements

21. A TO Z LIST OF ENTRIES xxi
Hydrogen Bomb Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX)
Implementation Mobile ICBMs
Implosion Devices Moratorium
Improvised Nuclear Devices Moscow Antiballistic Missile System
Inadvertent Escalation Multilateral Nuclear Force
Indian Nuclear Weapons Program Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle
Inertial Navigation and Missile Guidance (MIRV)
Institute for Advanced Study Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nagasaki
Iranian Nuclear Weapons Program National Command Authority
Iraqi Nuclear Forces and Doctrine National Emergency Airborne Command Post
Isotopes (NEACP)
Israeli Nuclear Weapons Capabilities and Doctrine National Strategic Target List
National Technical Means
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Negative Security Assurances (NSAs)
Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Neutron Bomb (Enhanced Radiation Weapon)
Korean Peninsula Neutrons
Nevada Test Site
Kiloton New Look
Kwajalein Atoll Nike Zeus
No First Use
Launch on Warning/Launch under Attack Non–Nuclear Weapons States
Launchers Nonproliferation
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory North American Aerospace Defense Command
Light-Water Reactors (NORAD)
Limited Nuclear War North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program
Lithium Nuclear Binding Energy
Little Boy Nuclear Emergency Search Teams (NESTs)
Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Los Alamos National Laboratory Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) Nuclear Planning Group
Nuclear Posture Review
Maneuvering Reentry Vehicle (MARV) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
Manhattan Project Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs)
Massive Retaliation Nuclear Suppliers Group
Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles Nuclear Taboo
Megaton Nuclear Test Ban
Megawatt Nuclear Warhead Storage and Transportation
Midgetman ICBMs Security (Russia)
Military Technical Revolution (Revolution in Nuclear Weapons Effects
Military Affairs) Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZs)
Minimum Deterrence Nuclear Weapons States
Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) Nuclear Winter
Minuteman ICBM
Missile Defense Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Missile Gap On the Beach

22. xxii A TO Z LIST OF ENTRIES
One-Point Detonation/One-Point Safe Research Reactors
On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) Restricted Data (RD)
Open Skies Treaty Reykjavik Summit
Outer Space Treaty Ride Out
Overhead Surveillance Rocky Flats, Colorado
Roentgen Equivalent Man (Rem)
Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Program Rumsfeld Commission
Pantex Facility, Texas Russian Nuclear Forces and Doctrine
Parity
Payload Safeguard Antiballistic Missile (ABM) System
Peaceful Coexistence Safeguards
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Sandia National Laboratories
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) Savannah River Site, South Carolina
Peacekeeper Missile Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs)
Penetration Aids Second Strike
Permissive Action Link (PAL) Selective Options
Pershing II Sentinel Antiballistic Missile System
Phased-Array Antenna Short-Range Attack Missiles (SRAM)
Pit Shrouding
Plutonium Silo Basing
Polaris SLBMs/SSBNs Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)
Portsmouth Enrichment Facility Skybolt
Poseidon SLBMs/SSBNs South African Nuclear Weapons Program
Post-Attack Command and Control System South Korean Nuclear Weapons Program
(PACCS) Space-Based Infrared Radar System (SBIRS)
Preemptive Attack Spartan Missile
Presidential Nuclear Initiatives Sprint Missile
Pressurized-Water Reactors (PWRs) Sputnik
Preventive War Standing Consultative Commission (SCC)
Primary Stage Stealth Bomber (B-2 Spirit)
Proliferation Stockpile Stewardship Program
Proliferation Security Initiative Strategic Air Command (SAC) and Strategic
Pugwash Conferences Command (STRATCOM)
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I and SALT
Quadrennial Defense Review II)
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I)
Radiation Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II)
Radiation Absorbed Dose (Rad) Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
Radiological Dispersal Device Strategic Defenses
The RAND Corporation Strategic Forces
Rapacki Plan Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT)
Ratification Strategic Rocket Forces
Reactor Operations Submarines, Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile
Reasonable Sufficiency (SSBNs)
Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs)
Reconnaissance Satellites Sufficiency
Red Mercury Superiority
Reentry Vehicles Surety
Reliability Surprise Attack Conference
Reprocessing Surveillance

23. A TO Z LIST OF ENTRIES xxiii
Survivability Unilateral Initiative
United Nations Special Commission on Iraq
Tactical Nuclear Weapons (UNSCOM)
Telemetry United States Air Force
Terminal Phase United States Army
Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) United States Navy
Theater Missile Defense United States Nuclear Forces and Doctrine
Thermonuclear Bomb Uranium
Three Mile Island
Three-Plus-Three Program Verification
Threshold States
Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) Warfighting Strategy
Tinian Warhead
Titan ICBMs Warsaw Pact
Tous Asimuts Wassenaar Arrangement
Transporter-Erector-Launcher Weapons-Grade Material
Triad Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Trident
Trinity Site, New Mexico X-Ray Laser
Tritium
Two-Man Rule Yield
U-2 Zangger Committee
Underground Testing Zone of Peace

25. Introduction:
Chemical and
In the United States, there are various legal and Biological Weapons
academic definitions of weapons of mass destruc-
Eric A. Croddy
tion (WMD), although not everyone may agree on
any of them. The U.S. Department of Defense
(DOD) defines WMD as, “Weapons that are capa-
ble of a high order of destruction and/or of being
used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers Army Marshal Georgi Konstantinovich Zhukov. In
of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be fact, it was this speech that highlighted for U.S. pol-
high explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, icy makers the real or perceived threat from the So-
and radiological weapons, but exclude the means viet Union, particularly in terms of the latter’s pre-
of transporting or propelling the weapon where sumed arsenal of chemical and biological
such means is a separable and divisible part of the weaponry. As such, Zhukov’s speech invigorated
weapon.”1 United States Cold War research into WMD, in-
According to the DOD, conventional explosives cluding biological weaponry.4 During the Cold War,
also can be considered WMD. And this is reason- the United States—and, to a much greater extent,
able, especially when one considers the cumulative the Soviet Union—amassed large chemical and bi-
number of deaths caused by gunpowder since its in- ological weapons stockpiles. The threat posed by
vention in the tenth century and by nitroglycerine these stockpiles has diminished greatly since the
since its invention in the nineteenth century.2 But crumbling of the Berlin wall.
the underlying assumption of what makes a Regional threats posed by state-funded mili-
weapon massively destructive is the idea that these taries from chemical and biological weapons also
weapons can cause simultaneous mass casualties. have declined. By the end of 2003, the U.S. govern-
Nuclear weapons (dealt with separately in Volume ment had admitted that there was little evidence
II) are an obvious category of WMD, but radiolog- that Iraq had possessed large chemical or biological
ical weapons (such as so-called dirty bombs are less weapon stockpiles after the mid-1990s. This has
likely to cause mass injury or death (see Radiologi- since led both the United States and British govern-
cal Dispersal Device in volume II).3 ments to begin inquiries into the faulty prewar in-
Highly toxic chemical compounds—the nerve telligence on Iraq that was in large part the basis for
agents being prime candidates—could comprise justifying Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003.5
WMD, for example, if delivered effectively against Other regional threats, however, still remain.
an urban target. Biological agents—that is, Among these, states such as Syria and North Korea
pathogens and toxins derived from plants or ani- are suspected of possessing chemical and biological
mals—might also constitute WMD if delivered effi- weapons. Their bellicose posture regarding their
ciently. When compared to conventional and chem- immediate neighbors and regional rivals, as well as
ical weapons, biological agents have the greatest their possession of long-range delivery systems
potential to cause mass casualties, and, theoretically, (such as Scud missiles), make these threats impossi-
theirs could easily exceed the casualties caused by ble to ignore. By contrast, Libyan leader Mohamar
the largest nuclear weapon. Qaddafi stated in early 2004 that he would re-
In terms of referring to nuclear, chemical—and nounce the possession of WMD, which demon-
by inference, biological—weapons, the term strates how quickly the threat of weapons of mass
“weapons of mass destruction” first came into use destruction seems to rise and fall on the global
in 1956 when it was used in a speech by Soviet Red agenda.
xxv

26. xxvi INTRODUCTION
Individuals and terrorist organizations also are of chemical or biological warfare. In an excellent in-
reportedly interested in using chemical or biological troduction to chemical weapons, a short book pub-
agents in their operations. A salient example was a lished by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army dis-
statement by a self-proclaimed spokesman for the cusses a case of CW (chemical warfare) from
terrorist organization al-Qaeda, who said in June China’s early history: In the Zuochuan, it is written
2002, “We have the right to kill 4 million Ameri- that in the sixth century to about the fifth century
cans—2 million of them children—and to exile B.C.E., “An official of the noble princes of the Xia,
twice as many and wound and cripple hundreds of came from the Jin to attack the [forces of] Qin, and
thousands. Furthermore, it is our right to fight them poisoned the Jing River, killing more than a division
with chemical and biological weapons, so as to af- of men.” Another case is cited: “In the year 1000
flict them with the fatal maladies that have afflicted [C.E.], there was one named Tangfu, who made poi-
the Muslims because of the [Americans’] chemical son fire grenades and gave them to the Chao court
and biological weapons.”6 of the Song dynasty. The poisonous smoke ball,
It is not clear as of this writing whether any indi- containing arsenic oxide (As2O3) and a type of poi-
viduals or groups will be able to carry out an attack son derived from crotonaldehyde (see the Arsenicals
using chemical or biological warfare agents, at least listing), looked a bit like a precursor to a chemical
in a manner that could cause more deaths than the gas grenade. After alighting, this weapon would
September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade issue forth smoke to poison the enemy and thus
Center (2,749 dead) and the Pentagon (184 dead). weaken their ability to fight.”8
In 2001, the biological agent that causes anthrax These same authors also point out that this is a
killed five people when an unknown actor or group far cry from what one expects in modern times, for
mailed Bacillus anthracis spores through the U.S. back then chemical warfare “was just in its infancy,
postal system. On February 3, 2004, envelopes con- and not only were its methods crude but its utility in
taining ricin toxin were discovered at the office of actually killing people was limited. Because of this,
the U.S. Senate majority leader and at a mail sorting chemical weapons were regarded as a method to
facility for the White House. These incidents involv- generally assist in conducting warfare, and at the
ing ricin resulted in no injuries, but justifiably time did not draw any particular attention. Coming
caused much concern. into the recent era, as the developments in technol-
ogy continued, chemical weapons then really began
A Brief History of WMD to demonstrate their real menace.”9
The historical record shows that mass poisonings Another premodern military tactic that is often
and the occasional plot to spread disease among described as a form of BW (biological warfare) is
armies and civilian populations go back many cen- the siege of Kaffa (1346 C.E.), in modern Feodosia,
turies.7 Still, chemical and biological warfare Ukraine. During a campaign by Mongol forces to
(CBW)—sometimes referred to in military parlance defeat a heavily defended city of mostly Genoese
as “bugs and gas”—is essentially a modern phe- merchants, bubonic plague struck the area: “The
nomenon. It is modern in the sense that the science Tartars died as soon as the signs of disease appeared
and industry required to produce these types of on their bodies: swellings in the armpit or groin
WMD have only existed since the early 1900s. How- caused by coagulating humors, followed by a putrid
ever, there may indeed have been designs to use fever. The dying Tartars, stunned and stupefied by
chemical or biological agents as a means of warfare the immensity of the disaster brought about by the
(or possibly terrorism) before the Industrial Revolu- disease, and realizing that they had no hope of es-
tion. Before the late nineteenth century (the time of cape, lost interest in the siege. But they ordered
Louis Pasteur and many developments in chem- corpses to be placed in catapults and lobbed into the
istry), however, the requisite scientific knowledge city in the hope that the intolerable stench would
and engineering capacity were insufficient to bring kill everyone inside. . . .”10 We note here that
any such ideas to fruition. Obviously, this is no “stench” was considered in the pre-germ theory era
longer the case. to be responsible for disease. Thus, miasmas, “nox-
Many books and articles that discuss CBW often ious effluvia,” or “corrupt vapors” (febres pestilen-
introduce the subject by bringing up past examples tiales) were synonymous with the spread of deadly

27. INTRODUCTION xxvii
epidemics—plague (causative organism: Yersinia however, that horrific BW experiments were con-
pestis) being among the most notorious.11 ducted upon Chinese civilians and prisoners of
The suggestion later made by historians that the war.12 It is possible that some Allied soldiers, includ-
Mongols were in fact able to spread bubonic ing American and British personnel, were experi-
plague by hurling disease-ridden corpses over the mented upon by Ishii Shiro (see the Sino-Japanese
fortress walls is an intriguing one. During the four- War listing) and his scientists, but this has not been
teenth century, however, a germ theory of disease confirmed. Apart from the East Asian theater of op-
did not exist. How would the people of that era erations, however, no offensive use of CBW was
have known exactly how the disease could spread? conducted in World War II. Suggestions that the So-
What they could not have known is that bubonic viet Red Army used tularemia (caused by the bac-
plague is spread by fleas, which collect the bacteria terium Francisella tularensis) against invading Nazi
Yersinia pestis (the causative organism of plague) forces at the Stalingrad front are not supported by
through feeding upon infected rats. Fleas do not the available evidence.13 German and Allied military
linger near the body once the temperature of the scientists did pursue the manufacture of CW agents
host (be it rodent or human) cools following in very large quantities, but these never were used in
death, making it rather unlikely that the cadavers conflict.
would have done much to spread the plague. In the In the Korean War (1950–1953), Chinese offi-
end, it was not the use of projectile cadavers, but cials, during armistice negotiations, accused the
more likely the exceptionally large rat population United States of using biological weapons. Although
around the Black Sea that led to a pandemic there is evidence that at least some of the commu-
throughout the region (and indeed much of Eu- nist Chinese leaders truly believed the allegations
rope). One could probably conclude, however, that concerning BW in Korea14, there is no evidence that
the Mongols did have the intent to spread disease the U.S. military used chemical or biological
among their enemy, and at least in this respect they weapons during the conflict.15
conducted an early form of BW. During the Cold War, chemical agents became
even deadlier. The United States and the Soviet
CBW in the Modern Era Union stockpiled the German G-series nerve agents
The stunningly high rate of casualties that occurred (sarin and soman), as well as the newer V-agents.
in World War I had much do with the machine gun Perhaps more dangerous was the development of
and rapid-fire artillery, but it also was caused in weaponized biological agents. The United States
large part by the great number of men that were and its allies during World War II had pursued a
brought to the battlefields. World War I marks the rudimentary offensive and defensive BW program.
emergence of “gas warfare:” the use of chlorine, Later, work continued using a variety of infectious
phosgene, and other toxic chemicals. For the most agents, including the causative organisms of an-
part, these were used in vain attempts to achieve a thrax, tularemia, and less deadly—but highly effi-
breakthrough against well-defended armies in cient—microbes such as Venezuelan equine en-
trenches. Later, chemical warfare agents such as sul- cephalitis.
fur mustard entered the scene when previous com- The controversy over the potential use of CBW
pounds were found to be less effective on the battle- grew increasingly protracted during the Vietnam
field. Unlike chemicals used during the early stages War, particularly when the U.S. military used herbi-
of the conflict, mustard is not gaseous, but an oily cides (such as Agent Orange) against Viet Cong-
liquid. It did not kill large numbers of troops, but it controlled areas. In a variety of instances, riot con-
caused debilitating injury by irritating the skin, eyes, trol agents (RCAs or tear gas) were used against the
and upper airways. First used in 1917, it was re- Viet Cong and Viet Minh regular army. Although
sponsible for the most injuries caused by chemical such forms of weaponry were not intended to cause
weapons during World War I. death, their use in an unpopular war heightened the
Japan conducted CBW against China from 1937 sensitivity of the U.S. government to public percep-
to 1945. It is unknown whether the use of chemicals tions of its CBW policies. As a consequence of Viet-
against Chinese soldiers gave the Japanese army a nam and high-profile incidents involving nerve
significant advantage on the battlefield. It is certain, agents at storage facilities in Utah and Okinawa,

28. xxviii INTRODUCTION
President Richard Nixon ended most U.S. chemical tended level of death and destruction, but it caused
and biological programs in 1969. significant structural damage. Yousef reportedly
When President Nixon renounced offensive BW considered the use of cyanide—a toxic “blood
and the United States stopped the production of bi- agent”—during the 1993 bombing. However, tech-
ological weapons, the Soviet Union was only getting nical difficulties and other unknown factors pre-
started. In 1979, a mysterious outbreak of anthrax in vented Yousef from designing such a device.18
Sverdlovsk, Siberia (now Yekaterinberg) was sus- There was another “wake-up call” to the threat of
pected by Western intelligence to have been caused WMD, this time in Tokyo, Japan, when a guru
by a BW-related accident. (After many years of de- named Shoko Asahara instructed followers to use
nials, Russia admitted in the 1990s that the nerve agents (sarin) against his real or perceived en-
Sverdlovsk outbreak was caused by Soviet military emies. In 1995, Shoko Asahara’s cult (Aum Shin-
work with BW agents.) By the late 1980s, the Soviet rikyo) struck at the Tokyo authorities by releasing a
BW apparatus (Biopreparat) had assembled the nerve agent on the subway system. The death toll
world’s largest infrastructure devoted to the devel- was 12, with thousands injured. The end result of
opment of biological weapons. The Soviet arsenal the Tokyo subway attack was less than many experts
included the standard agents, anthrax, tularemia, expected from a WMD attack. Still, it made a
and a particularly virulent form of plague. But it tremendous impact, not only on Japanese society
had also weaponized smallpox, placing it in a liquid but also on how governments around the world
form to be delivered by intercontinental ballistic reevaluated the CBW terrorist threat.
missiles.16 Boris Yeltsin formally ended the program Improvised devices made by Palestinian terror-
in 1992.17 ists using toxic chemicals have been a particular
Iraq had already used large amounts of chemical concern to Israel. But death and injury caused by
(but not biological) weapons against Iranian troops shrapnel (ball bearings, nails, bolts, etc. made into
and Kurdish populations during its 1980–1988 con- projectiles by an exploding device) comprise the
flict with Iran. After the first Gulf War (1990–1991), largest portion of the casualties inflicted by Palestin-
subsequent inspections conducted by United Na- ian suicide bombers. In 2002, however, it was re-
tions personnel revealed that Iraq had undertaken a ported that Israeli intelligence believed Palestinian
serious effort to develop chemical, biological, nu- homicide bombers to have put rat poison in their
clear, and possibly radiological weapons. In 1995, explosive devices. According to this assessment, ter-
the western world was particularly alarmed by the rorists put an anticoagulant type of rodenticide on
scope of the Iraqi BW program. Suspecting that Iraq shrapnel. Following bombings that occurred in
had maintained at least a remnant of its WMD pro- 2002, Israeli doctors made note of excessive bleeding
grams, including CBW agents and missile delivery in certain bombing victims. This type of poison
systems, the United States led a war against Iraq be- (warfarin) acts very slowly in mammals, making its
ginning in 2003 that toppled the Iraqi regime. No utility and effect somewhat doubtful.19 There is
caches of CBW agents have yet been found in Iraq other evidence that Palestinian terrorists have been
by coalition forces since their occupation of Iraq. attempting to use other types of toxic chemicals in
improvised explosive devices.20
The Chemical and Biological Threat Today Now that Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party has lost
The world after September 11, 2001 has certainly control of Iraq and Libya has offered to abandon its
changed, but even before then experts such as WMD programs, there is a lower risk of seeing
Michael Osterholm, Jessica Stern, and Jonathan CBW on the battlefield among national armies.
Tucker had worried about the prospect that terror- Syria and North Korea still retain a significant
ists might obtain and use WMD. In 1993, Ramzi chemical weapons capability. But even skeptics of
Yousef made the first attempt to destroy the World arms control treaties such as the 1993 Chemical
Trade Center. Yousef and his cohorts might have Weapons Convention (CWC), the 1972 Biological
hoped that the towers would fall over in domino and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), and in-
fashion, killing upwards of 250,000 people. Instead, formal arrangements such as the Australia Group
the bomb they planted killed six people and injured must concede that some progress has recently been
more than 1,000. The attack failed to achieve the in- made on the nonproliferation front. It is increas-

29. INTRODUCTION xxix
ingly apparent that the world community has sus- somewhat justified) fear of “radiation” by the
tained the recent momentum toward the elimina- general public would no doubt cause great
tion of chemical and biological weapons, despite anxiety at the very least, perhaps even panic.
some notable setbacks. Thus, RDDs are sometimes referred to as
Although the United States and other developed “weapons of mass disruption,” as opposed to
countries seem to be headed toward complete (if WMD.
4. William Patrick, “Biological Weapons Historical
slow) chemical and biological disarmament, they
Overview,” Chemical & Biological Warfare
continue to prepare their militaries for CBW de- Proliferation Course (Washington, DC: Central
fense in terms of materials and training. This is pru- Intelligence Agency, Biological Warfare Branch,
dent, but one could make the argument that mod- December 1995).
ern militaries are not likely to encounter chemical or 5. Global Security Newswire, “Powell Says Knowing
biological weapons in organized combat. The more True Iraqi WMD Capability Might Have
likely threat is from terrorists using toxic chemicals Affected War Decision,” 3 February 2004,
or infectious agents. This is unnerving, but terrorists http://www.nti.org.
have thus far made little effective use of these types 6. S. Abu Gheith, In the Shadow of the Lances,
of unconventional weapons. And yet, despite recent Middle East Research Institute, Special Dispatch
gains in the war against international terrorism, Series no. 388, 12 June 2002, http://memri.org/.
WMD will continue to pose a threat to society. It is 7. Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland
Moon, eds., Biological and Toxin Weapons:
difficult to conceive of a worse scenario than the ef-
Research, Development and Use from the Middle
fective use of chemical or biological weapons by ter- Ages to 1945, SIPRI Chemical & Biological
rorists who act with little or no restraint. By foster- Warfare Studies, No. 18 (Oxford, UK: Oxford
ing an understanding of CBW agents, weapons, and University Press, 1999); James S. Ketchum and
their potential role in conflict, it is hoped that this Frederick R. Sidell, “Incapacitating Agents,” in
volume will increase awareness—and vigilance—to Frederick R. Sidell, Ernest T. Takafuji, and
defeat these threats. David R. Franz, Textbook of Military Medicine,
Part I: Warfare, Weaponry, and the Casualty:
Notes: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological
1. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Technical Warfare (Borden Institute, Walter Reed Army
Information Center (DTIC), December 2003, Medical Center: Washington, D.C.: 1997) pp.
http://www.dtic.mil/. 289–290.
2. Joseph Needham, Science and Civilisation in 8. Cheng Shuiting and Shi Zhiyuan, Military
China, vol. 5, pt. 7: Military Technology: The Technology Information Handbook: Chemical
Gunpowder Epic (New York: Cambridge Weapons, second edition (Beijing: People’s
University Press, 1986), p. 9. As a British Liberation Army Press, 1999; second printing
diplomat (and to his death a committed January 2000), p. 7.
Marxist), Needham was among the first to alert 9. Ibid.
the world to Japan’s use of chemical weapons 10. Quoted in Mark Wheelis, “Biological Warfare
against China during World War II. before 1914,” in Erhard Geissler and John Ellis
3. A radiological dispersal device (RDD) or “dirty van Courtland Moon, eds., Biological and Toxin
bomb” employs a high explosive (such as Weapons: Research, Development, and Use from
dynamite) to disperse radiological materials the Middle Ages to 1945, SIPRI Chemical &
(such as cobalt–60, cesium–137, or Biological Warfare Studies no. 18 (Oxford:
strontium–90) across a large area. This would Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 14.
not result in a massive radiological hazard as no 11. Michael R. Gilchrist, “Disease & Infection in the
fission takes place. Rather, the contaminated area American Civil War,” The American Biology
would likely remain off limits to people until it Teacher, vol. 60, no. 4, April 1998, p. 258.
was fully cleared of radiating materials—a time- 12. Hal Gold, Unit 731 Testimony. Tokyo: Yen Books,
consuming and expensive process. The 1996.
immediate effects of the explosion itself might of 13. Eric Croddy and Sarka Krcalova, “Tularemia,
course cause death and injury, but few casualties Biological Warfare (BW), and the Battle for
would be expected from the radiological sources Stalingrad (1942–1943),” Military Medicine, vol.
themselves. Nonetheless, the disproportionate (if 166, no. 10, October 2001, pp. 837–838.

30. xxx INTRODUCTION
14. Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War 18. John J. Parachini, “The World Trade Center
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, Bombers (1993),” in John B. Tucker, ed., Toxic
2001), p. 110. Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and
15. “China’s Role in the Chemical and Biological Biological Weapons (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
Disarmament Regimes,” The Nonproliferation 2000), p. 201.
Review, vol. 9, no. 1, spring 2002, pp. 16–47. 19. Sue Shaw and Jeremy Anderson, “Warfarin
16. Richard Preston, “The Bioweaponeers,” The New Ingestion,” Evidence Centre Report, Monash
Yorker, 9 March 1998, p. 63. Medical Center, Australia, 18 March 1999.
17. Ken Alibek, Biohazard (New York: Random 20. Andrew Chang, “Bombs and Bioterror,” 6 August
House, 1998), p. 133. 2002, http://www.ABCnews.com.

31. Incidents of chemical or biological warfare (CBW)
Chronology: Chemical
in history are of great interest, but they are also
quite problematic—at least until we arrive at mod-
and Biological Weapons
ern times (the post–World War I era). We say prob-
lematic because until the twentieth century, science
had not sufficiently explained the roles of toxic
chemicals or infectious disease in order to effec- vice causing mass casualties, certainly not all events
tively utilize them in warfare. Nor had industry would necessarily qualify.
been developed in like fashion to exploit chemistry This will not stop us from trying to delineate a
or biology for the purpose of waging battle. When it chronology of examples that are relevant to CBW.
comes to chemical weaponry in particular, Augustin Here are listed a selection of historical events, with
Prentiss put it quite well: an effort to describe them by category: either chem-
ical or biological weaponry.
History records numerous earlier but abortive at-
tempts to utilize the powers of chemistry for mili- Sixth Century B.C. Assyrians reportedly used
tary ends . . ..With the exception of Greek fire [use ergot fungus (Claviceps
of petroleum-based incendiaries, ca. 7th century purpurea) to poison their
C.E.], none of them produced important results
enemy’s water wells
and none permanently challenged the supremacy
of existing weapons. They are of interest to us only
as indicating man’s eagerness to experiment with 431–404 B.C. Spartan armies use sulfur
any means that promise to promote his fortunes and toxic arsenic smoke
in battle and his final dependence upon technical during Peloponnesian War
knowledge to produce such means. (Prentiss, p.
xvi) Fourth Century B.C. Chinese engineers use
arsenic against
Quite the same can be said of biological underground sappers.
weaponry. In either case of chemical or biological
weapons, the basic knowledge to understand the Circa 200 B.C. Officers in Hannibal’s army
scientific disciplines behind them was inadequate adulterate the wine of
until the nineteenth century, when significant ad- African rebels with
vances were made in fields such as organic chem- mandrake, which contains
istry and microbiology. Still, it then took the latter belladonna alkaloids
stages of the Industrial Revolution for nations to causing hallucinations.
develop the capacity for mass production of
chemicals that would play a noteworthy—albeit 187 B.C. Ambraciots (Greece)
overall insignificant—role in World War I employ irritating smoke
(1914–1918). against Roman soldiers
Another criterion to consider is the scope of the
purported attack. Was this a poisoning of a few in- 7th Century C.E. The Byzantine architect,
dividuals, or a whole army? Keeping in context with Callinicus (“Kallinikos”),
a weapon of mass destruction (WMD), that is, a de- reportedly invents the first
xxxi

32. xxxii CHRONOLOGY
liquid incendiary—“Greek asphyxiating or deleterious
Fire.” gases.” (Mauroni, p. 81)
Circa 1040 Scottish king poisons wine 1914 French troops use tear gas
using a belladonna-like grenades against German
(“sleepy nightshade”) herb positions in World War I
and gives to Norwegian
enemies as “provisions” 22 April 1915 German military uses
under pretense of barrage of chlorine gas
surrender. Scots then against Allied trenches in
slaughter the incapacitated Ypres, Belgium.
Norwegians.
12 July 1917 Germany uses mustard
1347 Mongolians lay siege to agent against Allied troops
Kaffa (in modern Ukraine) at Ypres, Belgium.
and throw corpses over city
walls to spread bubonic 1916–1918 German agents infect beasts
plague. May have of burden—including
contributed to Black Death, horses bound for use by
which killed approximately Allies in Europe—using
50 million people through glanders and anthrax.
the fourteenth century.
1919 In midst of the Russian civil
1672 Bishop of Münster war, British troops use
attempted the use of adamsite
atropine-like drug in (diphenylaminearsine, DM)
grenades in siege against against Bolsheviks.
city of Groningen. Attack
backfires. 1922 The U.S. delegates at the
Washington Arms
1767 British plot to supply cloths Conference table a proposal
from a smallpox hospital to abolish chemical warfare,
ward to American Indian but France ultimately rejects
tribes in hopes of spreading the treaty because of
disease. Unknown if this stipulations regarding
strategy was ultimately submarines.
successful.
17 June 1925 Geneva Protocol for the
1855 Sir Lyon Playfair suggests Prohibition of the Use in
using cyanide-containing War of Asphyxiating,
chemicals against Russian Poisonous or other gases,
troops during Crimean and of Bacteriological
War, but this tactic never Methods of Warfare is
found approval by the signed by nearly thirty
British High Command. countries.
29 July 1899 First Hague Convention 1936 German chemists synthesize
signed, prohibiting “the use first nerve agents to be
of projectiles the sole object weaponized, including
of which is the diffusion of tabun (GA).

33. CHRONOLOGY xxxiii
1937–1942 During Sino-Japanese War, employs riot control
Japan employs chemical agents—chiefly CS—in
and biological weapons certain military operations,
against Chinese troops and creating controversy,
civilians. especially for war critics at
home and abroad.
1939 Japanese attempt to poison
water with Salmonella 1967 With possible support from
enterica Typhi (causative the Soviet Union, Egyptian
agent in typhoid) in the so- forces use chemical
called Nomonhon Incident weapons, including mustard
in a biological attack on agent and some kind of
Soviet troops, but organophosphate (nerve
apparently is unsuccessful. agent) against Yemeni
royalists.
1935 Italian troops under Benito
Mussolini begin using 25 November 1969 U.S. president Richard M.
chemical weapons (mustard Nixon renounces the
agent) against Ethiopians. offensive use of biological
weapons, ordering that the
1942 United States undertakes U.S. program be
study of biological warfare dismantled.
(BW) agents, including
defensive and offensive 10 April 1972 Great Britain, the Soviet
preparations. Union, and the United
States sign the Biological
December 1943 German Luftwaffe attacks and Toxin Weapons
Allied ships carrying sulfur Convention.
mustard in Bari, Italy,
leading to more than 600 1973 Following the Yom Kippur
casualties. War (fought between
Israel and Arab countries),
1956 Soviet Marshal and Defense U.S. military analysts
Minister Georgy Zhukov discover that Egypt
mentions the use of possessed armored
“various means of mass vehicles equipped with
destruction, such as atomic, protection against nuclear,
thermonuclear, chemical chemical, and biological
and bacteriological (NBC) warfare. This leads
weapons,” stirring great to concern that Warsaw
interest and anxiety in the Pact forces, supported by
West. (Mauroni, p. 85) the Soviet Union, were
prepared to use NBC
1962 The U.S. military begins weapons.
herbicide operations in
Vietnam War, including the 1973–1974 The Soviet Union initiates
use of Agent Orange. and establishes Biopreparat,
a civilian organization
1965 As the war in Vietnam devoted to producing
escalates, the United States biological warfare agents.

34. xxxiv CHRONOLOGY
26 March 1975 The Biological and Toxin suspected links to the
Weapons Convention enters terrorist organization al-
into force. Qaeda detonate 1,500
pounds of explosive in the
1979 Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis) basement of the World
spores are accidentally Trade Center in New York.
released from a biological The attack does not destroy
weapons facility in the buildings, but kills six
Sverdlovsk, Russia; at least people and injures more
64 people died from than one thousand.
inhalation anthrax. Concerns arise over the
possibility that the
1983 Iraq begins using chemical terrorists laced the high
warfare agents, including explosives with chemical
mustard, in the Iran-Iraq weapons in order to
War (1980–1988). increase the number of
casualties.
January–March 1991 A United States–led
coalition invades Iraq in 27 June 1994 Aum Shinrikyo, a new
Operation Desert Storm. religious cult in Japan, uses
The goal is to force Iraqi sarin nerve agent in an
compliance with United assassination attempt on
Nations resolutions calling three judges in Matsumoto,
for its withdrawal from killing seven people and
Kuwait and elimination of injuring over 200.
its weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) 20 March 1995 Aum Shinrikyo releases
programs. A newly formed sarin nerve agent on the
United Nations Special Tokyo subway, killing 12
Commission on Iraq people and injuring about
(UNSCOM) searches for 1,000. Japanese police
WMD and oversees the discover nerve agent
destruction of known precursors at the cult’s
chemical and biological home base near Mt. Fuji
weapons arsenals and and also learn that Aum
production facilities until attempted to produce
1998, when Iraq defies biological weapons.
international mandates and
forces UNSCOM 19 April 1995 Timothy McVeigh detonates
inspectors to leave the a 4,000-pound ammonium
country. nitrate fuel oil (ANFO)
explosive device in a rented
13 January 1993 The Chemical Weapons truck, destroying the Alfred
Convention (CWC) is open P. Murrah Federal Building
for signature. in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma and killing 168
26 February 1993 On 26 February 1993, a people.
small group of men from
the Middle East with 29 April 1997 The CWC enters into force.