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Process Control Cyber
Security
Jim Gilsinn
Senior Investigator
Kenexis Security Consulting
Before we start…
• Who wants a process that they can say is
secure?

2
Before we start…
• Who wants a process that they can say is
secure?
• Who wants a process that does what its
expected to do, when and for who its
expected to do it, and for the purposes it
was designed?

3
Before we start…
• Who wants a process that they can say is
secure?
• Who wants a process that does what its
expected to do, when and for who its
expected to do it, and for the purposes it
was designed?

4
Safety

Performance

Security

5
Safety

RELIABILITY
Performance

Security

6
Selected Aspects of Security
• Risk Management
• Network Segmentation

• Monitoring

7
Risk Management
• Risk management is
nothing new
– Safety, financial,
physical security have
all been around for a
long time

• Cyber security should
not try to reinvent the
wheel

8
Risk Management
• Brown Field
– Probably have some risk
management and
treatment in place
– Security should feed into
existing risk management
process, not be a separate
entity

• Green Field
– Security should be part of
the process from the
beginning

9
Risk Management
• Consequences are generally the same
– Many times they are already identified
– Difference comes about due to root cause

• Expand to include areas where:
– People don’t act as they are supposed
– Devices don’t act as they are designed

• Be wary of statements like “Well, that
could never happen” and “Why would
anyone do that”.
10
Network Segmentation
• Network segmentation as a security
technique:
– Prevents the spread of an incident
– Provides a front-line set of defenses

• Network segmentation is a lot more!

11
Network Segmentation
• Network segmentation is a process to
understand:
– What devices communicate
– How fast/often those devices communicate
– Where information flows
– What form that information takes

• Technology helps, but architecture is more
important

12
Network
Segmentation
• Limit the ingress and
egress points through zone
boundaries
• Protect the connections
between zones
• Zones & conduits are
logical
– For practical purposes,
match zones to network
architecture as much as
possible

13
Network Segmentation

14
Monitoring
• Do any of these sound familiar?
– It used to work.
– Something just seems to have failed.
– Not really sure what happened.
– Don’t do anything to that system over there,
its touchy.
– This system is just so slow.

15
Monitoring
• Monitoring is extremely important
– Firewalls are good, but useless if you aren’t
monitoring the rules and logs
– IDS are useful (if monitored). Not many are industrial
aware, but can be trained.
– Network performance indicators can give early
indications of something failing

16
Performance Monitoring
• Monitoring isn’t just for security
• Performance can be a leading indicator
– Small blips in performance can indicate
unusual activity

• Helps to eliminating false-positives

17
Performance Monitoring
2 ms Mean Measured Packet Interval
~ 0.8 ms Jitter

18
Performance Monitoring

2 ms Mean Measured Packet Interval
-0.8 ms to +2.2 ms Jitter

19
Performance Monitoring
50 ms Mean Measured Packet Interval
Bimodal (25 ms & 75 ms) with Outliers (100 ms)

20
Looking Forward
• Vulnerabilities
• Whitelisting

21
Vulnerabilities
• Vulnerabilities will always exist in the
industrial environment
– Zero-day vulnerabilities are inevitable
– Infinite-day vulnerabilities are not uncommon
– Industrial protocols themselves are vulnerable

• Well-crafted malware can exist for months
or years before detected
• Do vulnerabilities mean bad
things will happen?
22
Whitelisting
• Limits execution on a computer
– Known good set of applications
and libraries
– Monitors applications and memory-space
against changes

• Has been around for a while
• Makes sense for industrial environment
where things remain relatively static
• Not a silver bullet!
23
Contact Information
• Jim Gilsinn
Senior Investigator
Kenexis Security Consulting
• http://www.kenexis.com
• (614) 323-2254
• @JimGilsinn

24

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Process Control Cyber Security

  • 1. Process Control Cyber Security Jim Gilsinn Senior Investigator Kenexis Security Consulting
  • 2. Before we start… • Who wants a process that they can say is secure? 2
  • 3. Before we start… • Who wants a process that they can say is secure? • Who wants a process that does what its expected to do, when and for who its expected to do it, and for the purposes it was designed? 3
  • 4. Before we start… • Who wants a process that they can say is secure? • Who wants a process that does what its expected to do, when and for who its expected to do it, and for the purposes it was designed? 4
  • 7. Selected Aspects of Security • Risk Management • Network Segmentation • Monitoring 7
  • 8. Risk Management • Risk management is nothing new – Safety, financial, physical security have all been around for a long time • Cyber security should not try to reinvent the wheel 8
  • 9. Risk Management • Brown Field – Probably have some risk management and treatment in place – Security should feed into existing risk management process, not be a separate entity • Green Field – Security should be part of the process from the beginning 9
  • 10. Risk Management • Consequences are generally the same – Many times they are already identified – Difference comes about due to root cause • Expand to include areas where: – People don’t act as they are supposed – Devices don’t act as they are designed • Be wary of statements like “Well, that could never happen” and “Why would anyone do that”. 10
  • 11. Network Segmentation • Network segmentation as a security technique: – Prevents the spread of an incident – Provides a front-line set of defenses • Network segmentation is a lot more! 11
  • 12. Network Segmentation • Network segmentation is a process to understand: – What devices communicate – How fast/often those devices communicate – Where information flows – What form that information takes • Technology helps, but architecture is more important 12
  • 13. Network Segmentation • Limit the ingress and egress points through zone boundaries • Protect the connections between zones • Zones & conduits are logical – For practical purposes, match zones to network architecture as much as possible 13
  • 15. Monitoring • Do any of these sound familiar? – It used to work. – Something just seems to have failed. – Not really sure what happened. – Don’t do anything to that system over there, its touchy. – This system is just so slow. 15
  • 16. Monitoring • Monitoring is extremely important – Firewalls are good, but useless if you aren’t monitoring the rules and logs – IDS are useful (if monitored). Not many are industrial aware, but can be trained. – Network performance indicators can give early indications of something failing 16
  • 17. Performance Monitoring • Monitoring isn’t just for security • Performance can be a leading indicator – Small blips in performance can indicate unusual activity • Helps to eliminating false-positives 17
  • 18. Performance Monitoring 2 ms Mean Measured Packet Interval ~ 0.8 ms Jitter 18
  • 19. Performance Monitoring 2 ms Mean Measured Packet Interval -0.8 ms to +2.2 ms Jitter 19
  • 20. Performance Monitoring 50 ms Mean Measured Packet Interval Bimodal (25 ms & 75 ms) with Outliers (100 ms) 20
  • 22. Vulnerabilities • Vulnerabilities will always exist in the industrial environment – Zero-day vulnerabilities are inevitable – Infinite-day vulnerabilities are not uncommon – Industrial protocols themselves are vulnerable • Well-crafted malware can exist for months or years before detected • Do vulnerabilities mean bad things will happen? 22
  • 23. Whitelisting • Limits execution on a computer – Known good set of applications and libraries – Monitors applications and memory-space against changes • Has been around for a while • Makes sense for industrial environment where things remain relatively static • Not a silver bullet! 23
  • 24. Contact Information • Jim Gilsinn Senior Investigator Kenexis Security Consulting • http://www.kenexis.com • (614) 323-2254 • @JimGilsinn 24