http://kitetoa.com/

1. Daisy’s underwear
A (US) military vision of the networks and the world
The content of this PPT is in English. I wanted to be kind to our American
friends from the NSA and spare them the time needed for a translation from
French into English. The content is CC, you’re free to spread the word if you
like.
DISCLAIMER : Part of this presentation was given before the mass release of
the Edward Snowden files. It was just after the first paper in the Guardian. I
have updated the content.
The “what can we do now ?” part is brand new.
@_reflets_ 2013


2. Meet my friend Daisy
The
Defense
Information
Systems Agency (DISA), is a
United States Department of
Defense (DoD) combat support
agency composed of military,
federal
civilians,
and
contractors. DISA provides
information technology (IT)
and communications support
to
the
president,
vice
president,
secretary
of
defense, the military services,
the combatant commands, and
any individual or system
contributing to the defense of
the United States.
@_reflets_ 2013

3. Daisy and her knowledge database
 A long time ago in a galaxy far, far
away, Daisy had a knowledge database
stored on a Netscape Web server.
DISA’s (her real name) aim was to
secure the US military networks (and
more). However, this Web server was
secured like shit…
@_reflets_ 2013

4. Daisy exposed…
@_reflets_ 2013

5. What was in Daisy’s underwear ?
 All the network projects, all the Army’s/Gov
communication problems, everything was there.
@_reflets_ 2013

6. What was learned from Daisy’s underwear


They created the necessary environment so that Wikileaks
could receive the diplomatic cables and the Reuters video.

The US wanted to know everything about their citizens.

Networks have diplomatic implications.

US military networks are as rotten as private companies’
networks.

@_reflets_ 2013
The neocons had shitty ideas.
They were undersized when “global war on terrorism” started.

7. Shitty ideas
 9/11 : a breakpoint. The NeoCons had an agenda. It
helped. They started a huge Net Centric plan. The
“Warfighter” was going to get all the information
needed to take the good decision.
 And guess what ? A secret, is a secret. A shared
secret isn’t a secret anymore…
@_reflets_ 2013

8. Paul did it, not Manning, not Julian, not
Edward…
 Paul Wolfowitz, deputy Defense secretary in the
Bush administration is one of the key guys for the
Net Centric plan.
 http://www.kitetoa.com/Pages/Textes/Textes/Texte
s12/20101208-wikileaks-cablegate-comment-lafuite-a-ete-rendue-possible-par-les-faucons-dewashington-et-non-par-wikileaks.shtml
@_reflets_ 2013

9. Meet the Global Information Grid !
@_reflets_ 2013

10. Anyone, anywhere, anytime
 The GIG is defined as a global interconnected end-
to-end set of information capabilities, associated
processes and personnel for collecting, processing,
storing, disseminating and managing information
on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and
support personnel.
 The GIG comprises many systems that interoperate
to provide the right info to the right places when
needed. (…) allow vast amounts of information to
be readily accessed by anyone, anywhere,
anytime.
@_reflets_ 2013

11. GIG, connecting people…


Like the Department of Homeland Security (see the MOU
here :
http://www.kitetoa.com/Images6/armeeUS/Wikileaks/hsd.jp
g)

Or NATO… (see the MOU here :
http://www.kitetoa.com/Images6/armeeUS/Wikileaks/natom
ou.jpg)

At this stage of this speech, are you surprised by the PRISM
project ?

@_reflets_ 2013
The GIG had to be connected to any useful information
source.
It is just a small part of the GIG…

12. The Achilles heel

Is PRISM news ?

Not for us.

On May 203, Paul Wolfowitz created Talon
(http://www.kitetoa.com/Images6/armeeUS/us-talon-memo.pdf). This database
would collect the following categories of information :







@_reflets_ 2013
non-specific threats to DoD interests;
Suspected surveillance of DoD facilities and personnel;
elicitation attempts, suspicious questioning, or other suspected intelligence
collection activities focused on DoD interests;
tests of security;
unusual repetitive activity;
bomb threats;
and any other suspicious activity and incidents reasonably believed to be related
to terrorist activity directed against DoD personnel, property, and activities within
the United States.

13. Talon…
 « Non validated » information on strange behavior
of American citizens…
 raw information reported by concerned citizens and
military members regarding suspicious incidents.
Information in TALON reports is non-validated, may
or may not be related to an actual threat, and by its
very nature may be fragmented and incomplete. The
purpose of the TALON report is to document and
immediately disseminate potential threat
information to DoD personnel, facilities, and
resources…
@_reflets_ 2013

14. Talon would have been inserted into…
The GCCS-J
 “GCCS-J is widely used by all
the combatant commands, all
Service GCCS programs, USCG,
DIA, NSA”
@_reflets_ 2013

15. Please meet the GCCS-J

The Global Command & Control System – Joint (GCCS-J) service offers vital connectivity to systems
used to plan, execute and manage military operations for both joint and multinational
operations. GCCS-J fuses select C2 capabilities into a comprehensive, interoperable system by
exchanging imagery, intelligence, status of forces, and planning information. GCCS-J is focused on
meeting emerging operational needs through sustainment and synchronization support to
operational baselines (Global, COP I3 and JOPES) and subject matter experts to assist with critical
operation and the GCCS-J Family of Systems (FoS).

GCCS-J is a Command, Control, Communications, Computer, and Intelligence (C4I) system for
achieving full spectrum dominance, consisting of hardware, software, procedures, standards, and
interfaces that provide a robust, seamless C2 capability to the Commander-in-Chief (CINC), Secretary
of Defense (SECDEF), National Military Command Center (NMCC), Combatant Commanders (CDRs),
Joint Force Commanders, and Service Component Commanders. It is a suite of mission applications
fusing select C2 capabilities into a comprehensive, interoperable system by exchanging imagery,
intelligence, status of forces, and planning information. GCCS-J is the principal foundation for
dominant battlespace awareness, providing an integrated, near real-time picture of the battlespace
necessary to conduct joint and multinational operations. It offers vital connectivity to the systems the
joint warfighter uses to plan, execute, and manage military operations.

The GCCS-J modernization vision is focused on continuing to decompose applicable existing
applications into services, limiting local deployment, and continuing to expose data and scale services
to support an enterprise implementation; reducing overall sustainment cost through use of more cost
effective and appropriate COTS and HW products; and increasing the use of agile development
practices.
@_reflets_ 2013

16. GCCS-J is the real GIG


So that the « warfighter » can make the good move at any
time, based on good intelligence.

GCCS is the tool for C2 (C2 : ”the exercise of authority and
direction by a properly designated commander over assigned
and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.
Command and control functions are performed through an
arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications,
facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in
planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and
operations in the accomplishment of the mission”)

@_reflets_ 2013
Used by the US Army
Ok… But PRISM ?..

17. Fear ! We need PRISM.
Kitties are dangerous
@_reflets_ 2013

18. Where is Waldo PRISM ?
@_reflets_ 2013

19. Hey ! Waldo PRISM spotted here…
@_reflets_ 2013

20. WTF ? OMG… Google & PRISM ?
@_reflets_ 2013

21. What’s that PRISM anyway ?

There are a few PRISM in the Army…


PRISM Portable Resource for the Investigation of Suspected MANPADS [MANPADS
denotes Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems]
Planning Research and Intelligence Scalable Modeling (PRISM)

PRISM Input Tool (© Mitre Corporation)

There is a PRISM in Israel : Global Research
in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center
THE PROJECT FOR THE RESEARCH OF ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS (PRISM)


@_reflets_ 2013
Our PRISM is probably this one :
Planning Tool for Resource, Integration, Synchronization, and
Management (PRISM), a subsystem of collection management mission
application. A Web-based management and synchronization tool used to
maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of theater operations. PRISM
creates a collaborative environment for resource managers, collection
managers, exploitation managers, and customers.

22. Please define : PRISM

Where applicable, requests for SIGINT support should be entered into
approved systems such as PRISM, for approval by the designated signals
intelligence operational tasking authority (SOTA).

Collection Management Mission Application (CMMA). CMMA is accessed
through JWICS and SIPRNET and comprises a tailorable suite of
interoperable automated tools designed to enhance the collection
planning, execution, and ISR battle management capability of CCMDs,
subordinate joint forces, and components. CMMA includes PRISM, which
is used in collection planning, operations, and managing of intelligence
collection assets that are deployed to all CCMDs and USFK.
Source : Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations
05 January 2012
@_reflets_ 2013

23. The Rand Corporation gives some clues
 The Rand Corporation talks about PRISM in 2007:
A Strategies-to-Tasks Framework for Planning and
Executing Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations
This report proposes ideas to improve ISR collection
planning and execution through implementation of a
strategies-to-task framework for collection planning.
@_reflets_ 2013

24. Collect intelligence
 Currently used to integrate collection requests from
the JFC and various components and, with other
tools, generate the daily collection deck.
 Looks like PRISM is a tool you can use ton integrate
demands for intelligence and collect MANY kind of
data. Not only the one from Google, Facebook, etc.
 Remember GCCS-J : there are many networks,
many sources. Not only PRISM.
@_reflets_ 2013

25. Let’s collect intel

JOINT ISR PLANNING SYSTEMS

Two joint ISR planning systems—the collection management mission application and the
Planning Tool for Resource, Integration, Synchronization, and Management (PRISM)—help
facilitate access to joint resources. PRISM, a subsystem of collection management mission
application, is a Web-based management and synchronization tool used to maximize the
efficiency and effectiveness of theater operations. PRISM creates a collaborative environment
for resource managers, collection managers, exploitation managers, and customers. In joint
collection management operations, the collection manager coordinates with the operations
directorate to forward collection requirements to the component commander exercising
tactical control over the theater reconnaissance and surveillance assets. A mission tasking order
goes to the unit responsible for the collection operations. At the selected unit, the mission
manager makes the final choice of platforms, equipment, and personnel required for the
collection operations based on operational considerations such as maintenance, schedules,
training, and experience. The Air Force uses the collection management mission application.
This application is a Web-centric information systems architecture that incorporates existing
programs sponsored by several commands, Services, and agencies. It also provides tools for
recording, gathering, organizing, and tracking intelligence collection requirements for all
disciplines.
http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_55.pdf
@_reflets_ 2013

26. Recap :
 The PRISM you’ve read about in the Media seems
to be a small part of a bigger PRISM which in turn,
is a small part of a huge stuff used by the Army, the
Government and the Intelligence community : the
GCCS-J.
 Let’s have a look at the big picture once again…
@_reflets_ 2013

27. Have a another look :
@_reflets_ 2013

28. PRISM ? There are easier ways to snoop…
 When the Guardian published it’s paper on PRISM,
we knew at Reflets.info that there was an easier
way to check what kind of lolcats you are sharing…
 That is because we had been reporting on Deep
Packet Inspection for 3 years
 We had unveiled what France was doing with
Amesys, Qosmos, Alcatel and others.
 We new this technology existed and was probably
used on a large scale.
@_reflets_ 2013

29. Echelon : so 20th century…
 We don’t want to tap fax machines
 This is the 21th century guys…
 Let’s head for the backbones dudes…
@_reflets_ 2013

30. I iz in yar BackBoNe…
 “We hack network backbones – like huge internet
routers, basically – that give us access to the
communications of hundreds of thousands of
computers without having to hack every single
one”.
Edward Snowden
@_reflets_ 2013

31. How’s PRISM working ?


The journalists who had THE PowerPoint presentation only
released a 5 pages over 41.

Too bad.

But we could guess. Even if the NSA had one, the agency
didn’t need to have an access into the companies databases.
Big routers and backbones are easier to tap.

@_reflets_ 2013
We didn’t know when the Guardian published the initial
story....
A few months after the initial story, we know that this is
exactly what has been going on here…

32. Tools, cables, routers
 Remember… The NSA has Narus and… so many
backbones to tap. Even if the US government said
he was going to drop PRISM (the one your read
about in the Press), they would still have all the
tools to see what’s in your last email.
@_reflets_ 2013

33. What about France ?
 Do we have a PRISM-like system ?
 Well…
 We invented Deep Packet Inspection (Université
Pierre et Marie Curie)
 We « own » many interesting backbones
@_reflets_ 2013

34. Flower Pilgrim : like a virgin

About the initial PRISM release in the Guardian, Fleur Pellerin
said she is awaiting “explanations” from the US Gov. about
this “alarming” news.

Oh Wait… Who said on Jan 1, 2013 :
“The Alcatel Submarine Networks (ASN) expertise is indeed
unique and covers the production, installation and maintenance of
submarine cables. This is a strategic activity to connect overseas
territories and the African continent with broadband. There is also
an issue related to cyber surveillance and homeland security. We
support a solution that maintains the integrity of ASN and its
national roots. Let me remind you that any equity takeover would
in any case be subject to a review of the Treasury under the
decree on foreign investment in France.”
@_reflets_ 2013

35. In France… We spy from abroad
 Le Monde 11/06/2013 :
In France, the DGSE in the heart of a program of
Internet monitoring
“The French authorities argue that the [DGSE spying]
sites are, for the most part, based abroad, which
exonerated the DGSE to respond to French law”.
@_reflets_ 2013

36. can I h4Z a #PrismBurger ?
@_reflets_ 2013

37. Amesys
 Amesys with the help of the French Gov. sold a
countrywide spying system (Eagle) to Kaddafi (In fact, to
Abdallah Senoussi, a convicted terrorist).
 Amesys was rewarded with the “buying” of Bull
 Once the deal with Libya was published in the press
(thank’s to Reflets.info), Bull sold it’s Eagle activity to the
guy in charge of this activity.
 He called the new company Advanced Middle East
Systems (AMESys). Eagle is now called Cerebro, like in
the X-Men…
@_reflets_ 2013

38. The new AMESys
What kind of country wants a
« Nationwide passive interception
solution » ?
1)
2)
3)
4)
A democracy
A police state
A dictatorship
I don’t know
Multiple answers can be provided here…
@_reflets_ 2013

39. Eagles everywhere
 France sold Eagles (we get paid)
 If France (DGSE) can use them (Backdoor) :
 We can spy anyone on Earth.
 While not having to bother with French laws.

We can spy on governments who bought Eagles.
 Eagles are in :
Libya
Morocco
Emirates
Qatar
Gabon
Kazakhstan
Saudi Arabia
@_reflets_ 2013

40. Alcatel cables and Amesys

Alcatel was leader of the consortium who built EIG.

Alcatel owns the routers (remember Flower Pilgrim ?)

The EIG cable lands in Tripoli, Libya (happy Eagle owner)

The EIG cable lands in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (supposed happy Eagle owner)

The EIG cable lands in Fujairah, United Arab Emirates (supposed happy Eagle owner)

Another cable (FLAG Alcatel-Lucent Optical Network) lands in Qatar (happy Eagle owner)

Another cable (Atlas Offshore) lands in Morocco (happy Eagle owner)

The ACE (African Coast to Europe) cable installed by Alcatel lands in Gabon (happy Eagle
owner)

Jan, 2011 : Alcatel-Lucent announced that it has completed the deployment of the first
gigabit passive optical network (GPON) in Astana, the capital city of Kazakhstan (supposed
happy Eagle owner)
@_reflets_ 2013

41. What eslse ?
@_reflets_ 2013

42. Let’s go back to…
 Our good friend Daisy
@_reflets_ 2013

43. Networks… Networks…
 Tell me where is your network going through, I’ll tell
you who’s your friend or foe.
 Do Networks have diplomatic implications ?
 Yes, they do…
 <subliminal>Remember Amesys…</subliminal>
@_reflets_ 2013

44. Bahrain and the cables…


Did you wonder why ?

the U.S. military has a very important military base in this small
country. And of course, in many other neighboring countries
(Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, etc.)…

Defense Information System Network (DISN) South West Asia and
DISN-Pacific : “Network management is performed by the Bahrain
RNOSC on a 7 x 16 basis and transfers to the Europe RNOSC after
hours and anytime the Bahrain RNOSC needs assistance”.

@_reflets_ 2013
Did you notice nobody talks of Bahrain and its demonstrations
repressed in blood ?
But there is more

45. Satelites
@_reflets_ 2013

46. Links…
@_reflets_ 2013

47. Oh-Oh… Wait… France (Istres) is here too
DISN-E :
Defense
Information
System
Network
Europe
@_reflets_ 2013

48. Now I guess I’m an unlawful combatant
 Am I aiding Osama Bin Laden by revealing those
maps ?
 Oh Wait… He’s dead.
 Must be OK then. Let’s see more…
@_reflets_ 2013

49. Good news, the ultimate spying tools are
not perfect
 Army’s networks are unsecure.
 This is good news
 Because what you don’t want is an ultimate tool for
worldwide surveillance that would be perfect.
@_reflets_ 2013

50. How secure are the USA military networks
?
@_reflets_ 2013

51. Shit happens everywhere even @mil
 When presenting the “Unclassified But Sensitive
Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet)
Backbone” at a “Certification Decision Briefing” in
2003, there were a few bugs left pending…
 Let’s have a look !
@_reflets_ 2013

52. @_reflets_ 2013

53. @_reflets_ 2013

54. @_reflets_ 2013

55. Problem ?
@_reflets_ 2013

56. OK… now, let’s go to War !
 The Iraq war began on March 20, 2003 with the
invasion of Iraq (the "Operation Iraqi Freedom") by
the coalition led by the United States.
 Guess what… Seven days before, on March 13, the
Office of the Chairman at the Joint Chiefs of Staff
requested a secured line with the government of
Turkey. They didn’t have one…
 Reason why they asked for this line ? Captain
Obvious probably told them that they needed an
approval to fly over Turkey…
@_reflets_ 2013

57. Press 2 !
@_reflets_ 2013

58. C4n I Haz a PhoN3 L1n3 pleAz ?
@_reflets_ 2013

59. Wait… A war ? Two Wars ? Three wars ?
Stop it ! We don’t have the bandwidth !
 9/11 led to the Afghan
war (OEF), the Iraq
war (OIF) and the
infamous global war
on terrorism (GWOT).
 The USA did not have
the bandwidth for
such a plan. Problem…
@_reflets_ 2013

60. Fucking Bandwidth

Upgrades since 9/11/01 have more than tripled the amount of DISN services
bandwidth pre-positioned to support Warfighter STEP entries. (Jan 2003)

Domain growth from 60 IDNX nodes to 213 nodes in 7 months (From October 2002- April
2003 – in the 2004 report : US DISA GWOT & OIF LESSONS LEARNED).

BANDWIDTH FUELS TRANSFORMATIONAL WARFARE (FOUO) (Jan 2004)
Finding: Strategic C4ISR requires high bandwidth to support today’s net-centric warfare. Deployed
forces are dependent upon bandwidth to disseminate large data and imagery files, conduct VTC’s
and collaborative planning with command personnel around the globe, and receive real-time
intelligence information on the battlefield. Recent OEF/OIF/GWOT operations in the Central Region
that were enabled by exponential increases in conventional bandwidth clearly demonstrated the
value and feasibility of net-centric operations, but greater flexible response in providing bandwidth
across all echelons of the GIG, especially at the tactical level, are needed in support of GWOT’s
current and probable missions.
Context:
Current Military Satellite (MILSAT) constellation does not have the capability to provide sufficient
bandwidth to support strategic C4ISR requirements. MILSAT only provided approximately 20% of the
C4ISR bandwidth required in support of OEF/OIF/GWOT missions. The remaining 80% had to be
acquired from commercial sources.
@_reflets_ 2013

61. @_reflets_ 2013

62. @_reflets_ 2013

63. Iridium and the coalition
From:
Moriarty, Patrick Col
Sent:
Monday, March 31, 2003 6:20 AM
To:
Staton, Charles Col; Depalma, Evelyn; Sabin, Roger; Higgins, Frank COL; Lee, Gary COL; Fiedler,
George Col; Bashore, John; Geist, Michael; 'Miller, Marcus Col (S)'
Cc:
Ponturiero, Augustine J. LCDR; Reilly, Daniel Maj
Subject: FW: PROVISION OF SECURE EMSS (IRIDIUM) TO UK - LESSONS IDENTIFIED
All,
A couple of weeks ago, we (LCDR Ponturiero Wg Cdr Goslin) went through a goat rope trying to get Iridium
handsets to the Brits. As Wg Cdr Ian Goslin points out, the success of making this happen was directly
attributable to personalities and not processes. Ian believes we (DOD and DISA) need to take advantage of
the valuable lessons learned in making this provisioning happen and establish a clear process with clear
delineation of responsibilities so that the next time we need to provision to one of our coalition partners,
we aren't as screwed up as "Hogan's Goat.”
Attached is Cdr Goslin's proposed solution, or starting point for a solution. As he states, "The key features
of the new process need to address the areas that caused greatest difficulty in providing EMSS service to
the UK i.e. a lack of a single US advocate for the request; no timely identification of who could/should
authorize the request; unclear legal authority to provide the service; and difficulty in actually paying for
the service."
@_reflets_ 2013

64. Radars…
SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT IN A GWOT ENVIRONMENT
Findings: The Joint Spectrum Management Element (JSME) was stood up late
in the planning process for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Stand up of the
JSME must take place in the earliest phases of the OPLAN planning process.
Trained spectrum managers are required at the component and JTF levels to
functionally interact with adjacent and higher level spectrum managers.
Radars used by maritime and land forces during OIF were not deconflicted
amongst each other and resulted in unresolved Electromagnetic Interference
(EMI). During OIF CFLCC had to establish a complex numbering scheme in
order to track frequencies as units moved through phase of the operation.
Finally, Multi-emitter platforms: AWACS, JSTARS, and Commando Solo were
not completely cleared to operate in Host Nation (Turkey).
The EMI was so severe that it affected the capability for shipboard radars to
monitor the airspace for self-protection.
(US DISA GWOT & OIF LESSONS LEARNED) 2004 - Booz Allen Hamilton
@_reflets_ 2013

65. Sharing…
 The warfighter (CENTCOM J3 and CENTAF) stated operational need
to have instantaneous information sharing with certain carefully
selected coalition partners. This meant giving these partners physical
access to particular workstations attached to the SIPRNET, and logical
access from these workstations to a small number of key servers that
are also attached to the SIPRNET.
 This type of direct access by coalition partners to machines on U.S.
Secret networks had never been done before.
 Errors were made and some non-releasable data was posted and
shared even with all of the processes in place to prevent it. The real
time policy monitoring capability was helpful in quickly and
thoroughly cleaning up/resolving the spill.
@_reflets_ 2013

66. Shit… We’re shooting at each other,
dude…
 You may not remember, but in the early stage of
OEF, OIF, coalition members used to shoot each
other. They called it “Fratricide” .
 The US Army tried to act :
@_reflets_ 2013

67. 2005…
@_reflets_ 2013

68. Actions : 12 or 24 months
 But the Army was not quick to act. OIF started in
2003.
 The Joint Requirements Oversight Council
Memorandum (JROCM) was issued on April 2005
and the actions would take place 12 or 24 month
later. Like « Analyse contributing causes of OEF and
OIF MCO fratricide events »…
@_reflets_ 2013

69. More problems ?
@_reflets_ 2013

70. Data leaks someone ?
 Data leaks also happen in the most secretive parts
of the US Army.
 Let’s have a look…
@_reflets_ 2013

71. Emails, longins, …
@_reflets_ 2013

72. Telephone numbers, computer names, IP
address…
@_reflets_ 2013

73. Don’t fool yourselves, they know what is
going on
@_reflets_ 2013

74. More personal data…
@_reflets_ 2013

75. Maps… (DISA’s main building)
@_reflets_ 2013

76. OK, OK… But…What can we do (now) to
protect our privacy on the Net ?
 Well…
Nothing.
@_reflets_ 2013

77. Dude, wait… cryptography rules !
 What if we set some hard cryptography everywhere
?
 Cryptography is generally not implemented on the
end points (computers). Hack the computer and get
the info.
 Governments did authorize the use of cryptography
but did pass some laws to force users give the keys
in the case of an investigation.
 Did you hear about the Patriot Act ? Cryptography
may well be a Maskirovka…
@_reflets_ 2013

78. OK. Then let’s all use friendly associative
Internet acess providers !
 Right.
 But… Remember, they tap the backbones. At some
point, your data will flow through the taped
networks.
 Your data is stored on servers you don’t control.
 Even if you did control those servers… : intelligence
community do not bother what our conception of
legality is, it responds to it’s own laws.
@_reflets_ 2013

79. We are screwed…
 Sorry… We can’t help you…
 You can help yourself by telling your government
you did not not put him in charge for that kind of
paranoid activities.
 You can help yourself learning how the network
works and why “context” is important for privacy.
@_reflets_ 2013

80. Why is all this important ?


It’s politics.

It’s a choice about what world we want to live in.

It’s important for our kids’ future (what if Marine Le Pen’s
children get their hands on this tools in an hypothetical future
?).

It’s about fundamental human rights.

@_reflets_ 2013
It’s the work of paranoid people. Do you want a paranoid guy
in charge of your country ?
It’s about you or your friends being accused of something you
guys did not do.

81. Thank you
Questions
someone ?
@_reflets_ 2013