1. CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
In our contemporary world, elections have become the most credible means
of changing leadership. It provides the acceptable platform for aspiration to
political posts in a democratic setting. Representative government, as is known
world-wide, derives from democracy where the authority to govern emanates
solely from the mandate of the people.
Democracy cannot thrive in an atmosphere of insecurity. Therefore,
democracy and security are correlates. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria 1999, section 14 (2b) states that: “the security and welfare of the people
shall be the primary purpose of government...” In other words, “the essence of any
government is the provision of a secured environment and enabling conditions for
the citizens to pursue their legitimate activities (Ita, 2011).
The conduct of general elections require the existence of an election
management body which must be supported by a virile and legally recoganised
security agency. In Nigeria, the Independent National Electoral Commission and
the Nigeria Police Force exist to play these roles.
The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) came into being as
an electoral management body in 1998 via Decree 17. Since the dawn of the Fourth
1

2. Republic, the Decree establishing it has become an Act and INEC is listed in
Section 153 as one of the fourteen Federal Executive bodies under the 1999
constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
INEC has conducted elections at the State and Federal levels in 1999, 2003,
2007 and 2011. In all of these elections the Nigeria Police Force played a
significant role in maintenance of law and order, before, during and after the
elections.Without adequate security, the conduct of free, fair and credible elections
will be impossible.
The electoral process is a whole series of activities involving among others,
political party registration, party conventions, voter education, registration and
electioneering campaigns. Also involved are political party rallies, election of
candidates and eventual inauguration of elected/successful candidates. All through
this process, the Nigeria Police Force working in tandem with other security
agencies had always stood by INEC. The Nigeria Police Force due to its numerical
strength, geographical spread and powers conferred on it by extant legislations had
always acted as the lead agency on security matters in past general elections.
(Nwosu, 2010)
In the exercise of the powers to regulate public/ political assembly and
rallies conferred on the Commissioner of Police of each state, the Resident
Electoral Commissioner (REC) who is the head of INEC in each state of the
2

3. Federation is always carried along. The REC in the exercise of the authority
conferred upon him by section 4(1) (a) and ‘b’ had always had in place a
committee headed by the Commissioner of Police of the state to advise him on
security matters relating to elections. This committee is called the “Inter-Agency
Consultative Committee on Election Security” (ICCES). Other members of the
Committee are heads of the Army/Navy/Air Force formation in the state; the
Director of Department of State Service; heads of Prisons, Immigration, Fed Road
Safety Corps, Nigeria Civil Defence and Security Corps and National Drug law
Enforcement Agency. A similar committee on logistics exists.
Usually, within just a week or so to the commencement of general elections,
an “Operation Order” has always been issued by the Police high command in
Abuja and in each of the 36 states and FCT. This “Operation Order” assigns
specific duties to each officer or group of police officers in relation to geographical
area, polling booth(s) or collation centres. The Police Service Commission (PSC)
and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) as well as INEC would have made input
into this “Operation Order” in course of series of seminars, conferences and other
confidence building measures in preparations for the elections. (PSC, 2007)
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem
In the last fifty two years as a nation, Nigeria has grappled with the
challenges of elections, with each successive exercise presenting a newer and more
3

4. complex challenge. Some of these challenges relate to the relationship between the
INEC and the Nigeria Police Force. They may stem from allegations of aiding and
abetting rigging of elections against serving Police personnel who collude with
politicians to ensure that the later win at all cost. As Nwosu (2010), has observed,
during the 2007 elections there were allegations in the electronic and print media
that Police aided the incumbent government to rig the outcome of elections. He
notes further that “the electoral outcome of 2007 elections were adjudged by both
national and international observers as the worst in Nigeria’s electoral history”
Although it is principally the duty of INEC to conduct elections, it may not
be able to deliver a free, fair and credible election if other key stake holders
especially security agencies of which the Nigeria Police Force is the most visible
do not collaborate with it effectively. Alluding to this, Ralph Ekpu (2011:70)
wrote:
The role of security agencies.... determines to a great
extent how much the election turns out to be free, fair
and transparent. In the past we saw the tendency by the
apparatus to favour, in fact, protect the ruling parties.
And in the current dispensation, we have observed some
incumbents use the state security apparatus to
intimidate opposition by raising false allegations and
closure of their offices.
Any act that dents the integrity of the electoral process by members of the Nigeria
Police Force will obviously impact negatively on its image and that of INEC. No
matter how well – meaning, the intentions of INEC to deliver a credible election,
4

5. any act or omission by the Nigeria Police Force that mars the electoral process,
besides bringing INEC to disrepute, will bring a strain in the relationship between
the two bodies.
1.3 Research Questions
The study seeks to answer the following questions:
i. What is the nature of co-operation between the INEC and the Police
Force in the electoral process?
ii. What are the challenges in the relationship between INEC and the
Nigeria Police Force in the conduct of free and fair elections?
iii. In what ways can these challenges be addressed?
iv. What are the consequences of ineffective co-operation between INEC
and the Nigeria Police Force on the conduct of elections in Nigeria?
v. What are the strategies for enhancing the co-operation between INEC and
the Nigeria Police Force in the electoral process in Nigeria?
1.4 Aim and Objective of the Study
1.4.1 Aim
The aim of the study is to evaluate inter-agency co-operation in the electoral
process in Nigeria as it relates to the Nigeria Police Force and INEC with a view to
making recommendations and preferring implementation strategies
5

6. 1.4.2 Objectives
The objectives of this study are:
i. To examine the nature of co-operation between the Nigeria Police Force
and INEC in the electoral process.
ii. To identify and examine the challenges affecting effective co-operation
between the Nigeria Police Force and INEC in the conduct of general
elections in Nigeria.
iii. To assess the impact of the challenges to effective cooperation between
the Nigeria Police Force and INEC on the electoral process in Nigeria.
iv. To determine ways in which the Nigeria Police and INEC can achieve a
more co-operative framework in the conduct of a free and fair election in
Nigeria.
v. To make recommendations and provide implementation strategies for
enhancing effective co-operative between the INEC and the Nigeria
Police Force in the electoral process in Nigeria.
1.5 Scope
The study covers the period between 1999-2011 general elections into the
state and national assemblies, Governorship and Presidential elections in Nigeria.
The Fourth Republic was ushered in after the successful conduct of the 1999
general elections marking the successful transition of the military to civilian
6

7. government. From then till the last general elections of 2011, Nigeria has
witnessed un-interrupted civil governance for almost 12 years.
1.6 Limitations
It is envisaged that the inability to access classified documents may pose a
limitation to this study. This is because the two institutions directly involved in this
study - the Nigeria Police Force and INEC - are yet to develop a strong and reliable
data base from which information could be sourced. There may also be difficulty
in administering research instruments to personnel of these institutions.
1.7 Significance of Study/Policy Relevance
The outcome of this study may assist the INEC and the NPF in forging
closer and better relationship aimed at delivering to the electorates, free and fair
general elections in future. A closer working relationship from the top echelons to
the ranks and file of these two agencies will act as a buffer to protect the integrity
of the electoral process.
1.8 Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework of this study is the Network Theory. As defined
by Bardach (1994) “network” within the context of inter-agency collaboration is “a
set of self - organizing working relationship among actors such that any
relationship has the potential both to elicit action and to communicate information
in an efficient manner.” This definition aims “to convey the idea that the potency
7

8. of a network lies in its fusion of two capacities, the capacity to organize working
relationships and the capacity to transmit information efficiently.” This author
admits that this definition leaves open the question of exactly what work is to be
done and how exactly the efficient communication is carried out. These questions,
he argues further are best treated as empirical rather than definitional and answers
to them vary. He further emphasizes that his definition of network applies not to
people but roles. This means that more than one “network” could connect the same
set of individuals. This network theory believes that collaborative work among
government agencies is a potential source of productivity improvement. This
improvement comes about through:
i. Eliminating non -optimal duplication thus achieving economy of
scale;
ii. Re - allocating tasks to more effective and efficient specialist,
located in specialized organizational structures.
iii. Enabling specialists work together in individual cases in such a way
as to reconcile conflicting service plans, stimulate more creative
problem - solving and view service recipients in a holistic way.
The essence of the interface between the Nigeria Police Force and INEC is aimed
at mutual understanding with a view at adopting measures necessary for the
conduct of free, fair and transparent elections. The duties of the two agencies have
8

9. already been fully defined by the legal instrument setting them up. Personnel of
these agencies are assigned roles which sometimes amount to duplication of duties.
Through interagency collaboration, tasks are re - allocated through discrete
exchanges resulting in individuals engaging in reciprocal, preferential and
mutually supportive action. Through seminars, workshops, mock exercises and
other confidence building measures, the Police and INEC work toward these
targets.
Therefore, this theoretical framework is most appropriate as shall soon
become obvious in subsequent chapters.
1.9 Methodology
This study utilized both quantitative and qualitative methods of research. All
the data used in the conduct of this study were obtained from both primary and
secondary sources. Questionnaires were administered to sample opinions from
primary sources-policemen and personnel of other security agencies, INEC
personnel as well as persons who from time-to-time act as ad-hoc staff of INEC.
These include primary and secondary school teachers, civil servants and National
Youth Service Corps members. Purposive random sampling technique was
adopted.
For secondary sources, data was obtained from relevant textbooks, research
works, journals, seminars and workshop papers, gazettes, monographs,
9

10. memoranda, government circulars and policy papers. Also information was
obtained from internet websites.
The primary data collected from field work were coded and analysed by an
inferential statistics through use of graphs, charts and tables. Thereafter inferences
were drawn regarding the phenomenon under enquiry.
1.10 Conceptual Clarifications
1.10.1 Independent National Electoral Commission
A statutory body charged with the responsibility of conducting general
elections in Nigeria, especially with specific reference to its management and
conduct. It derives its powers from the 1999 constitution, particularly Sec 153(1)
while the Electoral Act No2 of 2010 (as amended) is an act of the National
Assembly giving further bite to this electoral body.
1.10.2 Elections
This is a means through which eligible voters choose their leaders in a free,
fair and transparent manner in accordance with laid-down principles. An election is
one of the means of establishing legitimate government and exercising control over
the nation’s leaders. Girei (2009:9).
1.10.3 The Police Force
10

11. As defined by Webster’s dictionary (2003:1496) defines Police Force as an
organized civil force for maintaining order, preventing and detecting crime and
enforcing law and order”
1.10.4 Inter-Agency Co-operation
A process in which two or more organization come together to solve a
specific problem or meet a specific need. It carries with it assumption that by
working together, agencies will increase their effectiveness, resource availability
and decision- making capabilities - and thereby more effectively assist in the
resolution of a problem. (Canham, 1967).
1.11 Organisation of the Study
This study is arranged into five chapters. Chapter one focuses on
introduction, statement of research problem, research questions, aim and objective
of the study, significance of the study as well as scope and limitations. It also
covers methodology and organisation of study. Chapter two examines current and
related literature. Chapter three examines the roles of the two agencies in the
electoral process. Chapter four analyses major findings from primary data sources.
Chapter five dwells on conclusion, recommendation and implementation strategies.
11

12. REFERENCES
Alemika, E.O. et al (2010), Police Security and Democratic Governance in
Nigeria, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited.
Canhan, R.R. (1979), “Inter-agency Coordination and Rapid Community Growth”,
(A paper presented at a Regional Centre for Applied Social Science and
Community Development, in Alaska, Arizona)
Ita, E.E. (2011), “Crime, Safety and Security and April 2011 Elections”, in
Asiegbu, L.N., Critical issues in the 2011 General Elections in Nigeria,
Ibadan: John publishers Ltd.
Girei, A.H. (2009), “Credible Elections as Pre-Requisite for Good Governance in
Nigeria: Challenges and Prospect”, (Individual Research Project Submitted to
the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru, in Partial
Fulfillment for the Award of the Member of the National Institute, mni)
Federal Republic of Nigeria (2006), Independent National Electoral Commission,
Electoral Act
The Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999), as Amended, Lagos:
Federal Government Printer.
Laws of the Federal of Nigerian (1999), The Police Act (cap359)
Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (1990), The Public Order Act (cap382)
Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary, (2003), Barnes and Woble
Publishing Inc
12

13. Internet
INEC (2012), “About INEC” from http://www.inecnigeria.org/political/index/html
Retrieved 20/03/12.
Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia
http://www.ng.total.com/o1aboutNigeria/1030history.htm, Retrieved
24/03/12.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Preamble
The literature reviewed in this work focuses on these key variables namely:
inter-agency co-operation (or collaboration) and the electoral process; the Nigeria
Police and the Independent National Electoral Commission; and the relationship
between two agencies.
The process of democratization is more than just casting of votes. To
guarantee a free and fair election requires the collaboration of relevant stakeholders
of which the election management body, the security agency, the political parties,
civil society groups and the voting public play their respective roles.
2.2 General Review
2.2.1 Inter-Agency Co-operation
Mattersich and Monsey (as cited in Townsend and Shelly, 2008: 102) states
that inter-agency co-operation is a “mutually beneficial and well defined
relationship entered into by two or more organizations to achieve a common goal.
13

14. This relationship includes a commitment to mutual relationships and goals, a
jointly developed structure and shared responsibility.” They assert that, Inter-
agency co-operation also entails exercise of mutual authority and accountability for
success and sharing of resources and reward.
Neyla et al (2005) while viewing inter-agency from a military perspective
with regard to the United States of America defence policy, believed that it has
evolved pain-stakingly, beginning with the first Army Navy Board of 1903 during
the Spanish-American War. They conclude however, that it remains “a work in
progress” as issues of span of control and authority are being redefined.
Some scholars are of the view that Inter-agency co-operation is a cross
agency collaboration that identifies record and disseminates information on related
sources and services, identifies gaps and overlaps in services as well as areas of
agency expertise, and leads to strategic decision making that broadens the
collective capacities of participating agencies (Timmons et al 2005: 4)
Best (2006) while identifying the various advantages accruable to inter-
agency collaboration, explained that it affords parties to work together on their
own, to resolve problem through constructive dialogue and other activities like
joint projects. Collaboration enables parties to build trust, confidence and mutual
respect. It provides a platform for conflict parties-potential or actual-working
together on a number of identified common issues and themes, which intensify
14

15. communication and activities between them. This interaction is consummated at
various levels- from interpersonal; groups; communities; national; regional to
universal levels. The underlying assumption is that those who co-operate are likely
to build bond of friendship and establish mutual respect among themselves.
Inter-agency co-operation is operative when two or more organisations are
willing to act together to address a mutually identified security concerns, in the
belief that this will improve security information and support for effective service
(Dabiprosad Majumdar,2006). It does not just mean putting people together, there
must be commitment because it is about results and has substantial policy
implications. In one sentence- it denotes government agencies working across
sectoral boundaries to achieve goals that are symbiotic.
Gray, (2002) classifies various collaborative projects, using a continuum that
relates to how micro or macro the work or focus of the subject is. He identified
three grouping: overview concept, location related concept and service related
concepts. The Mosaic reports (2003) use the term “regional co-ordination” to
describe the macro or strategic level of cooperation and “integrated service
delivery” describes collaboration at the operational or micro-levels. While this
cannot be faulted, it has suffered the problem of generalization. There are instances
which do not fit into the particular explanations.
15

16. A plethora of terminology has emerged to describe the collaborative
approaches required namely: “inter-agency”, inter-Professional”, inter-sectoral”
and partnership” being prevalent (Lloyd et al 2001). For instance Atkinson et al
(2002) identifies five forms of multi-agency activity; decision-making groups;
consultations and training; centre-based delivery; co-ordinated delivery and team-
operational delivery. Nevertheless, these authors note the failure of many studies to
locate models of interagency collaboration within coherent theories of work
(Atkison et al 2002).
In addition, Daniels (undated) quotes Roger and Whetton’s (1968)
distinction between co-operation (referring to relatively informal process involving
deliberate relations between otherwise autonomous organisations for joint
accomplishment of individual goals) and co-ordination (..the process whereby, two
or more organisation create and use existing decision rules that have been
established to deal collectively with their shared task environment).
Barrow et al, (2002) often treats cross-professional collaborative as a given
element, an un-problematic practice represented in and idealistic fashion resting
upon an implicit ideology of neutral benevolent expertise in the service of the
consensual, self-evident values” (Challis et all 1998:17).
In consideration of the link between the agencies and the public they serve,
Bardach (1998) looks at co-operation as involving, “joint activities by agencies
16

17. that are intended to increase public values by working together.” He however
recognizes that the nature of joint activity is diverse and that for co-operation
process with tensions and identifies as well as insights and innovation (Puonti,
2004: 100).
There are two categories of literature on inter-agency working that focus
upon recommending ‘good practice’ and which, consequently, offer very limited
theoretical or conceptual framing. Firstly, there is policy/strategic literature, which
exhorts professionals to engage in inter-agency initiatives and tends to promote ‘a
teleological discourse that depict all ‘joined up working’ as a progressively linear
solutions’ to social exclusion (Allen, 2003). These include: Audit Commission,
1998; Barrow, 2002, DfES.2002; Frye and Webb, 2002; Wittington,2003.
Secondly, there is a proliferating body of papers that describe or evaluate
individual interagency initiative, tracing development at strategic and/ or
operational levels, e.g. Lloyd et at, Peck et al, 2002; Walker and Hex, 2002; Harker
et al, 2004. Both of these types tend to dissolves into prescriptions of good
practice, recommending particular models, processes or working principles.
Atkinson et al (2002: 3-10) review of literature on inter-agency working
summarises the factors commonly cited as impacting upon the effectiveness of
interagency operation. What is apparent from these themes is that a large
17

18. proportion of the current literature focuses upon systematic concerns, often
equating interagency working with analysis of ‘partnership’ structures.
The default position of the evaluation or analysis contained in this literature
is a non-conflictual model of inter-agency working, in which effective
collaboration is dependent upon damping down conflicts and internal tensions.
This levels of literature is minimally concerned with the forms of professional
learning that takes place within inter-agency working that are located within
coherent theories of work organisations in practice.
2.2.2 The Electoral Process
The integrity of the electoral process is fundamental to any democratic
evolution: the electoral system and process must be robust to guard against a
variety of fraudulent behavior and must be sufficiently transparent that majority of
voters and candidates can accept the result of an election (KOHNO, Stubble field
and Walash 2003). Another author. Kohno et al (2003:1) posits that a good voting
system must satisfy the following criteria: anonymity of a voter’s ballot must be
preserved, both to guaranty the voters safety when voting against a malevolent
candidate, and to guarantee that voters have no evidence to prove which candidate
received their vote.
The concluding seminar report of the senior executive course 31 (2010)
stated in their report that different electoral processes and systems are adopted in
18

19. different countries based on their democratic experience and development. It is
preferable that a country choses the model that best suits its conditions, history and
political environment, but that will also contribute towards the deepening of
democratic governance.
The electoral process include the establishment of the electoral body, its
functions and responsibilities, voters registration, polling/elections, announcement
of result after collection of results etc.
Maduagwu and Mohammed (2004), observes that elections in Nigeria are
marred by poor administration and organization of the electoral process, poor
communication of election result, control of voter registration, poor funding of
elections and institution in charge of elections, rigging as well as the manipulation
of ethnicity and religion to influence the electoral outcomes.
As Roberts (2011) states in his article, Election Administration in
Democratic Transitions, “the failure to conduct an election that is adjudged fair by
all sides can pre-empt a democratic transition. Repeated failures can lead to
violence and chronic instability. Where such failure have been a risk, international
technical assistance in election administration has served to tutor and support so
that conflict is not engendered by administrative or other technical deficiencies.
While Robert may have been right to have indicated the need to secure elections in
order that votes and the process becomes free, he is looking for an exogenous
19

20. problem to endogenous problem. His view is largely an Eurocentric approach to
peace and security. In discussing the electoral process in Nigeria, the
Commonwealth, IFES and United Nations (2007) report states:
The deepening of democracy in any country is
always a work in progress. International
experience shows that existence of a peaceful
electoral management body with effective
control over all aspects of the electoral process
and commanding the respect of the society as a
whole, especially political parties, is a best
guarantee of the integrity of a country’s
democratic system.
Unfortunately for us in Nigeria, our democratic institutions are still very weak and
easily get manipulated by strong public figures through the use of economic power,
religion, ethnic sentiments etc, making a mockery of the peoples universal adult
suffrage.
Universal adult suffrage is a voting system in which all qualified adults are
allowed to vote irrespective of their wealth, education and affiliation (Adative
1979)
Yet Barry (1996:280) asserts that many sociological studies on voting
behavior have revealed evidence of ignorance on the part of the electorate.
Schumpeter (in Igweonu 2004) argued that democratic citizenship that is necessary
for democracy must meet certain minimum conditions. He concludes that most
democracies failed because of independence granted to individual voters to
participate in elections.
20

21. 2.2.3 A Brief on the Role of the Police
In its report on the 2003 general elections, a group of international observer
group state as follows:
Political parties, whatever their hue, are tempted
to manipulate the electoral system to their
advantage; if they can get away with it. It is
essential therefore that the electoral process is
effectively insulated from undue interference by
the executive and the ruling party
(Commonwealth Sec, IFES and UN, 2003).
All political parties whether in power or in opposition if given the
opportunity will try to bend the rules in other to win at all cost. Therefore, it is not
only the ruling party that is guilty of this malaise.
Besides the Police Act (cap 359)Laws of the Federation 1990 other legal
instrument which provide for Police roles in the election include the Electoral
Act(2010) as amended, the Criminal Code (1990) as amended and the Police
Service Commission (PSC) guidelines (2003). The PSC guidelines offer the most
elaborate scope for police involvement in the electoral process and particularly
hinge the success of elections in the country on the conduct of police officers on
election duty. It specifies it’s key functions as
(i) Safeguarding the security of persons and their property during campaign
period and voting.
(ii) Ensuring the safety of electoral officers, before, during and after
elections.
21

22. (iii) Providing security for candidates during campaigns and elections.
(iv) Ensuring and preserving a free, fair, safe and lawful atmosphere for
campaigning by all parties and candidates, without discrimination.
(v) Maintaining peaceful conditions, law and order around the polling and
counting centers
(vi) Providing security for electoral officials at voting and counting
(vii) Ensuring the security of election materials at the voting and counting
centers and during transportation thereto (PSC 2003:9 - 11).
The Electoral Act defines what constitute electoral offences and assigns the
role of security during the electoral process to the Police. Noteworthy is the fact
that the Act deals with offences before and after actual voting. As observed by
IMG(2010:2) the building up to 2003 and 2007 elections were characterized by the
political violence, including assassination of prominent political figures, attempted
murder of political opponents and disruption of campaigns events.
As part of its duties, the INEC publishes periodic guidelines for every
election. These guidelines, though not directed at the Police, vests the
responsibilities of ensuring order at the polling station on the presiding officer and
compel police personnel serving at the polling station to take orders from the
presiding officer. Though well attended, it does not permit the police to take
initiative in the face of security challenges.
22

23. According to Chukwuma (2010:61), these guidelines as published by INEC
is a potential area of conflict between the police personnel and INEC officials.
Consequently, it could mar the electoral process when the two main stakeholders
disagree openly in the event of a security challenge. Nevertheless, the Police
authority briefed their personnel to accordingly take instructions from the presiding
INEC official, but to act proactively in the event of a clear breach of the law.
Subsuming the police officers under the control of the presiding officers is not a
negation of their powers, but a necessary human rights safeguard to avoid abuse of
their powers.
Igbinovia (2011:0) has distilled duties of the Nigeria Police Force during
elections into four broad areas as:
(a) Order and Internal Security Management
(b) Law Enforcement
(c) Service Delivery and
(d) Electoral Mandate Implementation and Enforcement
For the Police to perform these duties credibly before, during and after elections, it
must partner INEC through the following
I. Pre - Election Activities
A series of conferences, seminars and meeting must be held between the Police
INEC and Civil Society Organizations, the Media, other Security agencies, the
23

24. Political Parties and the Government at various levels. The main objective of this
action is to achieve an appreciable level of understanding of all issues involved in
the electoral process and thus reduce areas of possible discord.
II. Registration of Voters
The police must be familiar with all aspects of the electoral laws, rules and
guidelines relating to the registration and review of voters registers. Lack of such
knowledge or non - involvement of the Police in this exercise could lead to
multiple registration, registration by proxy and registration of under- aged youths
as well as deceased persons.
The ad-hoc staffs of INEC to be engaged in this exercise need to themselves
be screened before employment, otherwise, loyal party agents will be deployed by
the party in power to compromise the exercise. Nwosu (2010) submits that during
his tenure as INEC chairman he was able to, through vigilance reduce the bloated
register of 75million to 39 million eligible voters.
III. Regulation of political campaigns
The police have a duty to regulate political campaigns and rallies by political
parties, otherwise political thugs will unleash a reign of terror on political
opponents and communities that deny support to dominant political parties. To
ensure orderly conduct of campaign and rallies as well as equity in use of venues,
the police issue permits, on application, authorizing the campaigns/rallies at venues
24

25. and times specified in such a permit. Commissioners of Police derive power to
issue such a permit from Public Order Decree5 of (1979) as amended (now an
Act). Through the issuance of such permits, orderly conducts as well as avoidance
of carrying offensive weapons and use of obscene languages at such events are
checked, through strict monitoring. A level playing ground is ensured for all
parties.
2.2.4 A Brief on the Role of Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)
Section 153 of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria lists
INEC as one of the fourteen Federal Bodies while section 15 of the third schedule
to the same constitution spells out the functions of the Commission.
In an article, “INEC and the Management of Elections: Lessons from
Nigeria” Kwaja (2008) maintained that management of elections by bodies such as
the INEC in Nigeria occupies a significant and strategic position in the election
process, and, by implication, the consolidation of electoral democracy. He insisted
that since such institutions are responsible for organising democratic elections,
their actions and inactions could make or mar elections. The primary goal of any
elections management body is to organise free, fair and credible elections with an
outcome that is considered acceptable by all stakeholders.While there are good
provisions in the Nigerian 1999 Constitution for the Commission, there are also
bad provisions in the same legal document. For example, Section 156 (1) (a) of the
25

26. Constitution provides that those to be appointed as electoral commissioners must
be qualified to be members of the House of Representatives, implying that the
person must be a member of a political party. Adejuumobi, (2007) addressed this
instance and describe it as institutional error. Such a provision does not in any way
insulate INEC from being an institution that is partisan in its dealings, which also
has serious implications for its functions as an independent and impartial umpire
(Adejumobi, 2007). In other words, the outcome and results of its exercise must
reflect the wishes of the electorate. This is to say, their votes must count in the
final analysis. For this to happen, the following are the requisite qualifications that
such body must possess. It must be independent, impartial, transparent and
accountable; that is, it must not act under the influence of any government,
political party or organised group. The work by Chris captured the responsibility of
INEC. In the 2007 elections, INEC’s leadership concluded that its role in the
elections made the entire exercise a huge success (Ezeani, 2007). This scholar
reported the speeches of election managers and neglected the reality on ground. On
the contrary, majority of the national and international election observer groups in
their reports on Nigeria 2007 elections concluded that INEC failed to deliver free,
fair and credible elections (Yusuf, 2007; Human Rights Watch, 2007).
The sections below examine INEC as an institution in the context of the
extent of its independence, impartiality, transparency and accountability. In the run
26

27. up to the April 2007 elections, Yusuf clearly illustrated the rigging structure of the
government in power and concluded there was total violation of electoral
guidelines and therefore there was no free and fair election. Human Rights Watch
report mapped out the various reports of the opposition parties. While some of the
queries are true, most of the conclusions by these observers can be faulted since
there where many instances where elections took place under free and fair
conditions and both the winners and losers agreed with outcomes.
The proper guidelines for the observation of elections are published by INEC.
In this document INEC spelled out clearly the mandate of the observer groups and
their limitations. The document states that election observation should ideally
focus on the whole electoral processes. However, such an approach has immense
cost implications and most Observers focus on the Election Day seeing it as a
reflection of how the electoral process has evolved. To that extent, it represents a
reasonable point of engagement and this guideline focuses mainly on observing the
voting and result collation process. However, Observers would be well advised to
pool resources in order to enable them to follow those activities that precede and
follow balloting which may affect their overall assessment of the elections.
Furthermore, a primary focus of election observation is whether the elections are
carried out substantially in accordance with the rules and regulations that are
prescribed by law in the country in which they take place. However, election
27

28. observation is not limited to this, as it also seeks to compare these national laws
against international standards to ensure that they conform to basic thresholds of
democratic elections as accepted by the international community. Such observation
will also take into account the performance of the election managers, the level of
independence given to them by law and also the attitude of the government in
enforcing the election law and maintaining law and order. All these will offer an
Observer a clear picture of the quality of the election process.
2.3 Case Study Review
There is no gainsaying, the fact that in the past series of elections held in
Nigeria between 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011,activities of thugs have taken a centre
stage thereby breeding a feeling of resentment among members of the public. The
activities of thugs are not noticeable in only one party; all political parties are
guilty of this. Each political party in trying to wrestle power from the other or
remain in power ahead of the others engages in this condemnable act. Thuggery is
not known or experienced in only one part of the country, it is everywhere in the
country. Indeed, hardly will one pick a national daily in a week without finding a
headline about thuggery. Within the nation, different groups exist,formed and
maintained by politicians before, during and after elections with the aim to
intimidate, harass, distort and to perpetrate whatever activities that would give
28

29. political advantage to party candidate over their opponents. (EU Election
Observation mission 2011 report)
It is reported that in the Northern part of Nigeria, Karare a brand of Hausa
word referring to a group of people,mostly youth between the ages of 8 – 35 years,
some of whom are in secondary schools or school drop-outs. These youths are used
by politicians during campaigns and elections in some sections of Northern Nigeria
to intimidate voters and political opponents into accepting the position of their
sponsors. They are violent, unemployed and mostly drug addicts. Similar group
exist in Kano known as “yandaba”. In Kaduna, they are called Kawaye or yan
mage while in Borno, they are known as ecomog, in Bauchi, they are called sara
suka. In Lagos, they are called area boys.( Kabiru, 2010). History has it that the
yan akusa also known as yan dabaor banga in Kano were used in the First
Republic by theNorthern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) to check the winning streak of
NEPU Kabiru, (2010). The same phenomenon today repeats itself as most of these
groups are formed as “ foot soldiers” to fight in the struggle for political power.
Writing on political thuggery and violence in Nigeria a political scientist captured
the wave of thuggery (Lawal, 2010), thus:
Without doubt, Nigerian politics has since
independence,been characterized by thuggery
and violence. Little wonder,politics is conceived
as a dirty game and exclusive right of thugs and
hooligans in Nigeria. Consequently, Nigeria
politics manifest in acrimony, assault,
assassination,intimidation, harassment, maiming
29

30. and killing. This trend is not a phenomenon of
decency; thuggery, brutality and violence (sic)
political behaviour have been with us for the
past four decades. Immediately after
independence, the politicians, in an attempt to
capture, exercise, and retain power within their
regional settings involved themselves in various
acts that were politically immature, unwise and
distratrous (sic)”.
Styles that are antithetical to democratic tenents and good governance are
adopted. In this regard they recruite, train and empower thugs to harass, intimidate
and victimize perceived political opponents and opposing views against their
political ambition. This culture of thuggery has not only been imbibed and
sustained as part of the country’s political behaviour since independence to the
present moment, it has been one of the potent causes of the low participation of
women in politics.
Findings in available data in the conduct of the 2007general elections
equally show the prevalence of the activities of thugs and how in some cases either
clearly overpowered the security operatives who were on duty on election days or
simply, got the cooperation of these same security operatives to perpetrate their
activities.In the 2007 general elections held in April, the National Human Rights
Commission (NHRC) CLEEN and TMG monitored the conduct of security
personnel in each of the six (6) geopolitical zones involving eighteen States of the
Federation and the Federal Capital Territory. In the main, the report (UNDP,
2007), indicate that in a number of States security personnel were over powered by
30

31. thugs who snatched ballot boxes in some polling stations.While in some States,
some security personnel were indifferent to various electoral offences like multiple
voting,under aged voting, impersonation and snatching of ballotboxes.
Detailed part of the report relevant to this work for present purpose shows
that in the North-Central zone comprising Plateau, Benue and Niger, it was
observed that there was disruption of voting by militant armed youths. At Unity
Gate polling station Gindiri V ward in Plateau State and in Benue State, thugs
overpowered security agents and electoral officials at the Government House
polling station and snatched away ballot boxes. Violence resulted and a free-for-all
fight ensued, which made voters run away (NHRC, 2007).
In North West Zone covering Kano, Katsina and Sokoto monitored, cases of
ballot box snatching amongst other offences were noticed (NHRC, 2007),South-
South Zone monitors covered Edo, Bayelsa and Rivers State. Some of the electoral
offence noticed involved snatching of ballot boxes. At Okada in Ovia North East
Local Government Area of Edo State; thumb printing of ballot papers by electoral
officers and party thugs were observed. In Rivers State as well, intimidation of
voters by stern looking party thugs took place. Also a police officer (female)
watched helplessly while ballot boxes were being stuffed by party agents.
The story is not different from what was observed in the South West Zone
where Lagos, Ogun and Oyo were monitored. Cases of snatching of ballot boxes at
31

32. gun point were noticed as well as ballot box stuffing and intimidation of voters.
Indeed, in Ibadan, Oyo States, men and women of the Nigeria Police Force were
reported to collude with party agents and electoral officers to rig election and
intimidate voters.In the South East Zone where Anambra, Enugu and Abia were
monitored, it was observed that cases of snatching of ballot boxes and alteration of
election result abound. It was reported that in one of the polling stations in
Anambra State,one Festus Eze of the Nigerian Police Force was seen thumb
printing ballot papers in favour of one of the political parties.
This phenomenon of political thuggery is therefore commonplace and
presently represents a common feature in political elections in the country. While
Nigerians variously cried and shouted foul in the 1999 general election because of
acts of thuggery, little did anyone know that 2003 was going to be worse. As it
remained the worry and concern of Nigerians for good governance, it is remarkable
that the electoral system improved in the 20011 general elections.
2.4 Nigeria Police Force/Independent National Electoral Commisssion
Relations
In actual performance, the examination of existing literature shows that the
security agencies, particularly the police, have not only failed to provide adequate
security for the electoral process but have themselves become a central element of
the security problems associated with the history of elections in the country. Most
of the organisations which monitored previous elections generally indict the
32

33. security forces and report that security agents were out to collaborate with and
protect the ruling party. The 2003 election in particular witnessed the complicit
role of the security forces, as captured in the report of the Justice Development and
Peace Commission ( JDPC):
In most of the polling stations the security forces
did nothing to prevent hijacking of ballot papers
by political thugs … Rigging was peacefully done
in the form of ballot box stuffing by mainly PDP
party agents collaborating with polling officials
… the ruling party … with the connivance of
some INEC officials and the security officers,
unleashed fearsome intimidation against its
opponents and succeeded in carrying out
massive rigging of elections… (JDPC 2003: 20-
37).
Even though the work is highly limited to selected areas, it gives us a clue of what
transpired in the 2003 elections. The writers claimed that under such conditions,
both opposition parties and election observers agreed that security agents have
aided the victory of the ruling PDP in all the elections. It will be absolutely wrong
to assume that there were not instances in which security agencies resisted the
assault on the electoral process. Unfortunately some of them had to pay the
supreme price as they were killed. Till date they remain unsung heroes of
democracy. One documented instance was the killing of police officers in Ofu and
Idah local government areas of Kogi State (Vanguard, 15 April 2007). As
documented by Egwu (2007: 289), there was an overall balance of terror across the
state between the two main contending political parties, the People’s Democratic
33

34. Party (PDP) and the All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP), both of which resorted to
the use of armed party militias. Again it was the particular case of Kogi state that
Sam Egwu had concerntrated his work on. However, most of the experiences seem
to replicate in other places with similar characteristics.
The detrimental implications of this institutional failure are colossal for good
governance in the country. The inability of the police to contain rampant political
violence during elections exacerbates the disenfranchisement of women and
vulnerable groups in the process, for instance, and consequently reduces the scope
for participatory democracy. In yet another widely-read work, Nwankwo (2007:
63) highlights this point by showing that the use of violence (armed thugs and
youths) to intimidate opponents scared women out of competitive politics.
Interestingly, among the police, female officers are most vulnerable in the face of
armed thugs. During voting in the 2003 election in Borno State, it was noted that
Governor Ali Modu Sheriff employed violent gangs (the so-called ECOMOG or
SAS Super Youths) to wrestle power from the former governor, Mr Kachalla. In the
process of this campaign of violence, female police officers were assaulted
(Mu’azu 2007: 223-230) and the police did not have the capacity to take measures
against such incidents. Both Nwankwo (2007) and Mu’azu (2007) analysed the
employment of brutal force in the race to win elections and the implication on the
female officers of the Force. While many observers find the literatures very
34

35. exciting and insightful, the role of election umpire (INEC) in the event of violent
eruptions was left out completely. The authors concluded that such a situation
guarantee mass rigging of elections. They are both right since there is no guarantee
that under such security vacuum, free and fair elections is to be expected.
The literature also highlights the twin factors of police corruption and
political influence on the police which serve to undermine their effectiveness in the
provision of security for elections. It is argued that corruption within the police
organisation makes the police highly susceptible to compromise and bribe-taking
from wealthy politicians to influence the outcomes of voting in favour of pre-
determined candidates. A particular case was noted in Borno State where the police
colluded with the ruling party and supervised electoral fraud by agents of the party
in the 2007 elections (Mu’azu 2007: 232). In Edo State, Abutudu and Obakhedo
(2007: 252) observe that electoral violence was carried out by ‘big men’ (state
officials) with their police escort and hired thugs in Etsako East, Benin, Ikpoba-
Okha and Akoko Edo, leading to loss of lives and properties. Evidence from other
states reveal similar trends: the politicisation of the police and how that
compromised security and the credibility of elections. Reports from Kogi State
(Egwu 2007: 289) show that the police, with support from some military
personnel, helped the current ruling party to victory in the state. The relationship
between the police and military on election security was even more complex in
35

36. some turbulent states. (Naagbanton 2007: 378). Naagbanton further confirms the
fear earlier expressed by Nwankwo (2007) and Mu’azu (2007). These literatures
share one blind spot, the implications of INEC’s silence and continuous defence of
such results in the electoral tribunals.
The areas in which the police have been considered to have failed in election
security are diverse and many. The report of the Electoral Reform Committee
(ERC) set up by the Yar’adua Administration in August 2009 captures the sum of
popular complaints against the police in relation to elections. The most frequently
cited allegations of police electoral misconduct include partisanship and
discrimination against the opposition party; functional ineffectiveness to prevent
and contain electoral crime; and complicity in fraud through brutality, intimidation,
vote snatching, among others (ERC Report 2008: 174). The report further
compounds the crisis of legitimacy by both INEC and NPF. However, the various
recommendations pay less attention to inter-agency collaboration between INEC
and NPF. It concluded that NPF should be reformed which is not out of point but
less emphasis was made on the need for a better interface between the institutions.
There have also been documented allegations of specific instructions from Police
Headquarters to all State Commands that its officers and men should ensure the
success of the PDP in recent elections (Ayoola, 2004: 1-2). The report of the
European Commission and Election Observation Mission (ECEOM, 2007) also
36

37. emphasizes the various dimensions of police partisanship: arbitrary arrest and
detention of opposition supporters before and during elections by the police,
without charges; banning of rallies and campaigns mounted by the opposition; and
flagrant impunity of violations committed by the members of the ruling party
(PDP).
Yet, in spite of this general failure of the police to guarantee security for
elections across the country, the literature suggests a few instances where the
police performed effectively in relation to electoral security. During the 2007
election, Ighorodje (2007: 317) notes that the police displayed a high level of
professionalism during actual voting across Lagos State, and were so voter friendly
that they did not have to carry fire arms. This is a very interesting observation
which suggests that the Nigeria police (or elements of them) could actually
guarantee security for elections under certain conditions. It is therefore crucial to
explore the conditions under which the police have performed their statutory
mandates effectively and to identify what factors facilitate or obstruct police
performance with regards to election security.
2.5 Gap in Literature
Scholars and commentators on the theme of this research concentrate on the
observable discontent of the Nigeria Police Force and not her contribution to
electoral success. The emphasis of most published works lies on the structural role
37

38. of the police and not much is done on the functional aspect of the police in
elections. Some scholars gloss over the fact that at the end of the day it is INEC
and its officials that collate and announce results through designated Returning
Officers. Besides, the Presiding Officer at the polling booth vicinity is the boss and
issues instructions to the Police personnel and not the other way round, yet the
Policemen are meant to take blame for INEC’s inefficiency.
Apart from the general observations as stated above, there has not been
much work done on the theme of inter-agency cooperation in Nigeria. Where they
exist, the framework and theoretical approaches limits there extent. Therefore this
paper intends to document the peculiar case of inter-agency co-operation between
INEC and the Nigerian Police.
38

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43

44. CHAPTER THREE
CHALLENGES OF INTER AGENCY CO - OPERATION BETWEEN THE
NIGERIA POLICE FORCE AND THE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL
COMMISSION
3.1 Preamble
A review of the history of election in Nigeria shows that a strong
relationship exists between election management bodies (EMBs), in this case
INEC and security agencies (as represented by the Police) and legal provisions that
guide the conduct of elections. Conducting free, fair and credible elections is of
crucial significance in the sustenance of a viable democratic system. The task of
ensuring the conduct of credible elections is the collective responsibility of
numerous stakeholders, which are the pillars upon which democracy stands. They
include, but are not limited to INEC, Political Parties, the Candidates, Civil Society
Groups, the Law Enforcement Agencies and the Media, etc. They are all critical to
the electoral process. A most important pillar that is often neglected, but which is
of very crucial importance is the depth of the nexus between INEC and the Police
in bringing about a peaceful election by protecting the integrity of elections.
Therefore this chapter will explore the nature of inter agency cooperation between
the Police and INEC.
44

45. 3.2 Elections in Nigeria: A Journey through History
3.2.1 First Republic (1960 - 1966)
Electoral malpractice manifested itself between 1964 - 1966 when two
highly respected politicians from the south west of Nigeria engaged themselves
fiercely in a political battle for the control of that region. These politicians were
Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Chief S.L Akintola.
The first indigenous Inspector - General of police Mr. Louis Edet, in a report
broadcast on the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation Network in December 1965
compared the pre - independence election of 1959 and the post-independence of
1965 this:
The general election of 1959 and the general
election of 1964 have two very notable and
striking dissimilates. In 1959, the battle was of
words; in 1964 the battle was one of deeds,
sometimes felonies deeds. It is not to the credit of
this great country that violence has been
introduced into our politics to the extent of
shedding blood.(Tammuno, 1991).
3.2.2 Second Republic (1979 - 1984)
Electoral malpractice during the 1979 elections that returned the country to
civil rule was minimal, though political violence occurred in isolated places. This
was principally because the election was conducted under a military regime. The
1983 election witnessed massive electoral malpractices.
45

46. 3.2.3 Third and Fourth Republic (1992 - 2004)
During the aborted republic, electoral malpractices were not quite
noticeable. The elections were anchored by Prof. Humphery Nwosu - led NECON,
acclaimed nationally and internationally as the best so far in the electoral history of
Nigeria.
The 1999 transition to civil rule was relatively smooth. However, the Fourth
republic witnessed a lot of electoral fraud resulting in political violence in several
parts of the country. In the 2003 general elections, electoral fraud was taken to a
new and frightening level. Political assassination became rife claiming in 2001 the
lives of such notable political figure as Chief Bola Ige, the then Minister of Justice
and Attorney General of the Federation. A violent political culture took centre -
stage (IRG 2,2004)
3.3 The 2007 General Elections
Incumbent political office holders bent on retaining political godsons
undermined the electoral process. President Olusegun Obasanjo, set the stage by
scheming on running for a third term in breach of the constitution instead of
playing the role of a statesman. (Omotosho, 2007)
3.4 The 2011 General Elections
The coming of Prof. Attahiru Jega as the new chairman of INEC gave hope
that 2011 general election will not be manipulated, on account of his professional
46

47. antecedents. Besides the assurances he gave that votes of the electorate will count,
positive amendments to the Electoral Act further raised the hope of the electorate
for a free, fair and transparent process.
All stakeholders were carried along in the preparations for the elections,
resulting in massive mobilization. Following the creation of an atmosphere of
sincerity and visible efforts to create a level playing ground for the political parties,
a massive voter’s registration ensued.
A very close partnership between the Nigeria Police Force and INEC was
forged from the onset, resulting in better organized elections than previously held
(Leadership April 16, 2011:4).
Nevertheless, some enemies of democracy made desperate effort to derail
the electoral process by resort to violence. Fatal assaults to persons and property,
bombings and assassinations were recorded across the country before, during and
after elections. The orgy of violence that trailed the campaign train of opposing
political parties culminated in deaths and loss of property from Jos to Calabar and
from Lagos to Maiduguri. The most remarkable of these pre - election violence
occurred on 17th April 2011 in Uyo, Akwa Ibom State. Clashes between party
supporters of the PDP and ACN during a campaign rally of the ACN gubernatorial
candidate resulted in eight deaths. Property lost included 25 houses and about 600
brand new cars and tricycles burnt. (Leadership April 19,3011:1)
47

48. There was massive post-election violence soon after the presidential election
of April 16, 2011, which spread like a wild fire across the northern parts of Nigeria,
starting from Gombe. As reported by Newswatch magazine:
Post-election violence broke out in many
Northern States, but it was particularly bad in
Kano and Kaduna. It was spread to other parts
of the northern states of Bauchi, Gombe,
Adamawa, Borno, Niger etc. in Kaduna, youths
erected road blocks and set up bonfires, attacked
and burnt PDP offices, houses and properties
including cars belonging to PDP and pro - PDP
politicians in these states. (Newswatch magazine
of May 2, 2011:2)
The Leadership newspaper of April 20,2011:1 reported that no fewer than
121 people died including 10 NYSC members.
In contrast to condemnation of previous elections, especially in 2003 and
2007 accredited local and international observers including the Commonwealth,
the European Union (EU) National Democratic Institute and the International
Democratic Institute unanimously endorsed the elections as credible.
In its final report on the 2011 general elections, the European Union
Election Observation mission stated as follows;
The courts made commendable efforts to timely
adjudicate the volume of petitions filed at the pre
- election period. Nevertheless the lack of
deadline for filling, consideration and
determination of complaints prior to polling
trailed the results of the primaries, producing a
large number of judgments delivered by courts
only a few days before the polls or even after.
The high number of pending petitions had
48

49. negative effect to the voters awareness of the
electoral contestants.
3.5 The Role of Electoral Management Body and Security Agencies in the
Electoral Process
3.5.1 The Role of INEC in the Electoral Process
The constitutional powers of INEC arise from Part I of the 3 rd schedule to
the 1999 constitutions, which prescribe that the commission shall have power to:
(a) organize, undertake and supervise all elections to the offices of the
President and Vice President, the Governor and Deputy Governor of a State,
and to the membership of the Senate, the House of Representatives and the
House of Assembly,
(b) register political parties in accordance with the provisions of this
constitution and any act of the National Assembly,
(c) monitor the organization and operation of the political parties including their
finances,
(d) arrange for the annual examination and auditing of the funds and accounts of
political parties and publish a report on such examination and audit for
public information,
(e) arrange and conduct the registration of persons qualified to vote and prepare,
maintain and revise the register of voters for the purpose of any election
under this Constitution,
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50. (f) monitor political campaigns and provide rules and regulations which shall
govern the political parties,
(g) ensure that all Electoral Commissioners, Electoral and Returning Officers
take and subscribe to the oath of office prescribed by law,
(h) delegate any of its powers to any Resident Electoral Commissioner, and
(i) carry out such other functions as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the
National Assembly
Function of INEC under the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended)
(a) Conduct voter and civic education,
(b) Promote knowledge of sound democratic election processes, and
(c) Conduct any referendum required to be conducted pursuant to the provision
of the 1999 Constitution or any other law or Act of the National Assembly
3.5.2 Role of NPF in the Electoral Process
Due to the varied nature of security problems relating to elections, the role
of NPF in the electoral process can have many facets. In other words, it is a
multiple and varied role. The intervention of NPF is necessary at all stages of the
electoral process and concerns all key stakeholders as well as the major actors in
the process. That is why, to ensure the integrity of the electoral process, the Nigeria
Police Force is responsible, at every stage of the process, for the protection of
persons and property, election materials, officials and institutions involved in the
50

51. process (TMG, 2003). The Force, besides ensuring the security of the electoral
process at all stages, can also be involved, if need be, in the resolution of certain
logistic problems.
In spite of their multiple and varied nature, tasks that may be entrusted to the
NPF to ensure the security of the electoral process can be grouped into (03)
categories. These are mainly (i) static functions (for example, protection of
buildings), (ii) dynamic functions (for example, security of transportation of
election materials) and (iii) stand-by functions (i.e. stand-by forces that can be
mobilized at any time, if need be). The tasks of the Police during elections—can
also be analyzed based on each of the three (03) stages of the electoral process.
Under this study and in order to appreciate these roles a chronological approach
will be adopted while assessing the role of NPF at the(a) pre-electoral stage, (b) the
voting day and (c)the post-electoral stage.
3.5.3 Objectives of Electoral Security
i. Physical security of buildings and materials,
ii. Personal security of voters, candidates, representatives of political parties
and that of the body responsible for the management of elections and the
community in general
3.5.4 The Powers of the Police
The Functions and Powers of the Police (Section 4 of the Police Act) include
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52. (i) Prevention and detection of crime,
(ii) Apprehension of offenders,
(iii) Preservation of law and order,
(iv) Protection of life and property,
(v) Enforcement of all laws and regulations with which they are charged.
3.5.5 Role of the Nigeria Police Force in Elections
The role of the Nigerian Police in elections include the following:
(i) Provide security at the polling stations and collation centers to ensure
that the polling, counting of ballots and collation and declaration of
results are conducted without any disturbance.
(ii) Take all necessary measures to prevent violence or any activity that
would threaten to disrupt the elections.
(iii) Comply with any lawful directive issued by or under the authority of
INEC
(iv) Ensure the safety and security of all election materials by escorting and
guarding the materials, as appropriate.
(v) Protect the election officials at the polling stations and collation centers
(vi) Arrest on the instruction of the Presiding Officer or other INEC officials
any person (s) causing any disturbance or preventing the smooth conduct
of proceedings at the polling stations and collation centers.
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53. (vii) At the polling station, inform the Presiding Officer if they believe that
any voter is under age of 18 years or has committed an offence of
impersonation.
(viii) Accompany the Presiding Officer to deliver the election results, ballot
boxes and other election materials safely to the LG (ward) collation
centre.
(ix) Protect the integrity of the electoral process
(x) Safeguard the security of persons and their properties before, during and
after elections
(xi) Secure an orderly atmosphere at polling stations so that people will feel
free to cast their votes unmolested and in secrecy.
(xii) Provide a conducive environment for political parties to carry out their
campaigns
(xiii) Provide security for candidates and political parties before, during and
after elections.
(xiv) Secure the perimeters of polling stations and collation centers
(xv) Retain copies of results announced by the Presiding Officers and
returning Officers.
53

54. 3.6 The Role of International Organisations
The report of the Electoral Reform Committee (2008) states that the
international organizations play the role of watchdog through election observation
in Nigeria. However, the organization play several roles in emerging democracies
like Nigeria. This includes ensuring peaceful conduct of elections in collaboration
with EMBs as earlier mentioned in the preamble. There is a synergy between
international organization in the provision of funds, security and other logistics
towards successful electoral process. Generally, international organizations may be
classified into two broad categories. The first group consists of institutions of
foreign governments, regional and international agencies. Example of these are
Britain, United States of America, Canada, Germany, etc; African Union;
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); European Union; the
Common Wealth Secretariat and Organs of the United Nations e.g. United Nation
Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Electoral Assistance Division
(UNEAD).
In the second category are the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)
like the International Federation of Electoral Studies (IFES), National Democratic
Institute (NDI), International Republican Institute (IRI), The Carter Centre,
International Crisis Group (ICG) and Human Rights Watch (HRW). In emerging
democratic societies like Nigeria and most African, Latin America, Asia and
54

55. Eastern European Nations, the international organizations play diverse roles
including provision of human, financial, technical and material assistance. During
the 1999, 2003 and 2007, 2011 Elections, Nigerian Government and Civil
Societies received significant financial assistance from the UNDP, United States
Agency for International Development (USAID). Assistance to domestic NGOs is
mainly for civil education and domestic observation; the Commonwealth of
Nations, and the European Union (EU) deploy observers during elections to
strengthen the institutional capacity to conduct credible elections.
The roles of international NGOs in the electoral process of emerging
democracies like Nigeria include technical assistance through information sharing
with the electoral commission and civil society organizations, training of electoral
staff and staff of NGOs on election observation. Some of them like the HRW and
the ICG monitor and issue reports on events and conditions before, during and
after election focusing especially on the credibility of the entire process. The
International NGOs have made valuable contributions to the conduct of elections
in Nigeria since 1999.
3.7 Nigeria’s Legal Framework on Elections
The National Legal Framework for the conduct of elections in Nigeria
consists of:
a. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999
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56. b. Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended)
c. Police Act, cap 19 laws of the Federation 2000
d. Guideline for the Conduct of Police Officers on Electoral Duty issued by the
Police Service Commission
e. Guidelines and Regulations for the Conducts of Federal, States and Area
Council elections by INEC
f. Electoral Acts, 2011
g. Other laws and regulations.
3.8 Nigeria’s Election Management Bodies in Historical Perspective
For modern democracies, the holding of periodic and regular elections which
has become part and parcel of the process of expanding and deepening the
democratic space, requires Election management Bodies (EMB) to conduct, and
supervise all elections within the polity. Electoral Management Bodies, when
properly constituted and guaranteed requisite autonomy, promote transparency,
ensure technical efficiency in electoral process, and give legitimacy to the electoral
process in addition to stabilizing the polity. The nature and character of these
bodies as well as the way and manner they are established affect their performance
capacity (Report of the Electoral Reform Committee, 2008:97).
56

57. 3.8.1 The Evolution of Election Management Bodies in Nigeria
Electoral bodies in Nigeria have a chequered history. Between 1958 to date,
the country has had a total of six electoral bodies that have been reconstituted
eleven times as detailed below:
Table 3.1 Election Management Bodies in Nigeria: 1958-Date
NAME OF BODY CHAIRPERSON TENURE
Electoral Commission of Nigeria (ECN Mr. R.E. Wraith 1958-1959
Federal Electoral Commission (FEC) Eyo E. Esua 1964-1966
Federal Electoral Commission Chief Michael O. Ani 1976-1979
(FEDECO)
Federal Electoral Commission Hon. V. Ovie-Whiskey 1980-1983
(FEDECO)
National Electoral Commission (NEC) Prof. Eme E. Awa 1987-1989
National Electoral Commission (NEC) Prof. Humphrey Nwosu 1989-1993
National Electoral Commission (NEC) Prof. Okon Edet Uya 1993
National Electoral Commission of Chief Summer Dagogo-Jack 1994-1998
Nigeria (NECON)
Independent National Electoral Hon. Justice Ephraim O.O. 1998-2000
Commission (INEC) Akpata
Independent National Electoral Dr. Abel I. Guobadia 2000-2005
Commission (INEC)
Independent National Electoral Prof. Maurice Iwu 2005-2009
Commission (INEC)
Independent National Electoral Prof. Attahiru M. Jega 2010- date
Commission (INEC)
Source: Report of Electoral Reform Committee (Uwais Report, 2008)
A cursory look at the history of the nation’s electoral bodies by the Report of
Electoral Reform Committee (2008) suggests a clear pattern that, although Nigeria
was one of the earliest African countries to evolve a centralized electoral
management system, this has not impacted positively on the nation’s political
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58. process and therefore the institutionalization of democratic governance. The
frequent changes in the nation’s electoral management system have not translated
into an anticipated stable electoral process.
3.9 Establishment of the Inter-Agency Committee
A review of the history of election in Nigeria shows that a strong
relationship exists between Election Management Bodies (EMB) and security
agencies. The EMBs and the Nigeria Police Force regarded the conduct of national
election as a major national civil responsibility that required cooperation. As a
result many elections have been successfully prosecuted. This cooperation at
committee level has always had two aspects: (i) Logistics and (ii) Security.
3.9.1 Inter Agency Committees on Logistics for Election
These are established at Federal, State, Local Government and Ward levels.
The memberships of these committees are drawn from the Electoral Commission,
Nigeria Police Force, Department of State Service, National Security and Civil
Defence Corps, National Youth Service Corps, Political parties and Civil Society
Organizations. These committees assisted the Electoral Commission in the
following areas (Nwosu, 2010: 45).
i. Identifying difficult terrains in different parts of Nigeria such as Brass
in Bayelsa State, Mambilla in Taraba State, Ebba in Niger State and
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59. Burutu in Delta State for movement of human resources and materials
for election.
ii. Identifying different modes of transportation of moving materials to
all the 110,000 registration and voting centres in the country.
iii. Assisting in the accurate codification of all polling stations in the
country.
iv. Assisting in the prompt and effective movement of electoral materials.
v. Helping to ensure that all the rules guiding the conduct of elections,
counting the ballots, collation of result are followed to the letter.
vi. The presence of the police and other security agencies during voting
and announcement of the results on the spot helped to make electoral
outcomes credible, transparent, and acceptable to the members of the
public.
3.9.2 Inter-Agency Consultative Committee on Election Security (ICCES)
This second committee, equally as important as that on logistics
concentrates on security matters only. Consequent upon observed inadequacies of
serving the electoral process in the past on account of lack of co- operation, INEC
adopted this new strategy rather than deal with the security agencies on individual
basis with the inherent dangers of inter- service rivalry. This new approach of
bringing them together under one umbrella was adopted. In realization of the fact
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60. that each security agency have different legal roles, professional inclinations and
organizational tendencies, effective security of elections require that agencies
idiosyncrasies be jettisoned in favour of inter - agency synergies.
Mistakes have been made in the past by the national headquarters of INEC
Abuja in assuming that all state and local governments in the country face same
security challenges with regards to elections. On the contrary, peculiarities exist.
Local Governments are uniquely equipped to take care of peculiar problems as
they arise.
This new perspective of allowing ICCES at their level to train, plan, monitor
and evaluate security development together without interference by the national
headquarters of INEC allowed them to cross - fertilize ideas and harvest richly
from such intercourse. Finally by de- centralizing, these agencies come up with
home - grown solutions due to their unique experience and apply them
expeditiously.
The ICCES is not a legal structure but merely a consultative platform,
designed to increase the level of consultation, co- ordination, harmonization and
manage declaration in election security management. As an advisory body, with
the police as the lead agency, all the benefits accruing therefrom as per the network
theory on inter - agency co - operation as outlined were made manifest. Among
these benefits are economy of scale, a large pool of specialist on
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61. firearms/ammunition, reduction in reaction time to distress situation, removal of
undemocratic bottlenecks especially in the areas of communication; elimination of
inter - agency rival and a marked and healthy increase in cordial relationships.
Stated below are functions of ICCES:
1. Coordinate the design of an election security management system for INEC.
2. Develop locally - focused plans for providing security before, during and
after elections.
3. Harmonize the training, deployment and actions of security personnel on
election duties.
4. Asses existing security threats across the country that have implications for
elections and produce a red, amber and green electoral security map for the
country, which will regularly be updated.
5. Advice INEC on rapid response to security threats around elections,
including voter registration.
6. Ensure a reduction in transaction costs to INEC of dealing with individual
security agencies on issues of election.
7. Evaluate the performance of security agencies on election duties and
recommend improvements and sanctions, where necessary.
The structure of the ICCES at the national level and participating agencies are as
follows.
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62. (i) Office of the National Security Adviser (NSA)
(ii) Nigeria Police Force
(iii) Ministry of Police Afairs
(iv) Nigerian Air Force
(v) Nigerian Navy
(vi) Nigerian Army
(vii) State Security Service
(viii) Nigeria Custom Service
(ix) Nigeria Immigration Service
(x) National Drug Law Enforcement Agency
(xi) Federal Road Safety Corps
(xii) Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps
(xiii) Nigerian Prison Service
(xiv) INEC
The structure at the State and local Government levels are same but office of the
NSA, PSC, and Ministry of Police Affairs are not represented. In that regard, the
Commissioner of Police of that State is the Chairman of the States ICCES as
election matters are purely civil in nature.
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63. 3.10 Regulatory Links between INEC and Nigeria Police Force
Nobody disputes the need to involve the NPF in the electoral process and
their usefulness in guaranteeing the quality of the process provided this
involvement is done under the control of the INEC. To be effective and relevant, it
will have to be done within a quite specific and clear regulatory framework.
Indeed, without a relevant legal framework, the involvement of NPF in the
electoral process could compromise the quality of its management. This legal
framework should clarify the terms of cooperation between the election
management body and the NPF. It should also be quite clear about the indicative
time of commencement of preparations by the NPF to participate in the elections
and the role of the INEC during this important phase. Finally, the involvement of
the INEC in determining the necessary material and financial resources for the
effective participation of the Police may also be necessary. Beyond these major
issues, the legal framework should also focus on the chain of command of Police
personnel involved in the electoral process. Given the hierarchical nature of the
NPF and the importance of the principles of discipline and compliance with
instructions, clarification of the all these issues prior to the electoral process is of
paramount importance in the run up to the elections. It is, for example, very
important that the role of the INEC in ensuring the implementation of security
operations be clearly defined and accepted by all. Finally, just to limit ourselves to
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64. these few elements, the legal framework should go beyond regulating the
relationships of cooperation and supervision between the Police and INEC. It could
also take into consideration the relationship between the Police and all the other
key institutions involved in the electoral process (FEF, 2007). These include, for
example, the judge handling electoral disputes, the institution responsible for
regulating the media, Civil Society Organizations, political parties and candidates,
etc. Overseeing the cooperation and collaboration between each one of these
institutions and the Nigerian Police Force can help secure the quality of the
electoral process. Indeed, a broader vision on the content of the electoral process is
easier to achieve within the context of a well developed electoral code than with
different electoral laws and other regulations scattered and sometimes incoherent
from one document to the other. The issue of regulatory framework is very
important in view of the highly political nature of elections which may make it
difficult to carry out security operations. It is generally admitted by all that it is
rare for the best operational solution to be achieved at the political level and an
operational solution cannot be considered to be desirable if it does not deal with
political conditions. This situation requires not only cooperation between the INEC
and the NPF, but also the design of a framework establishing a minimum level of
communication among all key stakeholders in the electoral process in order to
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65. ensure that each stakeholder plays its role in the implementation of the
process( Mu’azu, Abubakar , 2009).
3.11 Role of Nigeria Police Force in the Post-Conflict Electoral Process
Post-conflict situations have specificities which contribute to making the
management of the electoral process more complex. These specificities generate
specific problems which often need to be resolved both before and during the
electoral process depending on the situation. In Nigeria, results have been rejected
in almost all the elections, more especially in 1959, 1964, 1965, 1979, 1983 and
2007.
Quite a number of African countries are also known to be characterized by
institutional weakness. However, in countries emerging from conflicts, depending
on the intensity and duration of the conflict, one observes a deeper institutional
weakness, as the authority of the State is put to a severe test and public
administration can hardly cater for the nation’s needs. At this point in time in the
life of a nation, institutions are more or less in a state of decline, or worst still they
no longer exist. Examples abound: Liberia, Ivory Coast and now Somalia. In this
particular situation, institutions are often called into question or probably
challenged and, in any case, can hardly perform their functions. Republican
legitimacy is given a hard time or is even disputed by the stakeholders in the
conflict. For citizens, they can only observe, in most cases, the State’s inability or
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66. what is left of it to provide a satisfactory response to security needs. With regard to
the Police, they are disorganized, under-staffed, ill-prepared or unprepared, beset
by ethnic, ideological divisions, etc. Ideally, the preparation of NPF with a view to
securing the electoral process should be done well in advance, which is not often
the case in post-conflict election situations due to emergencies and numerous
technical, financial and logistic problems that need to be solved. As regards the
elections management body, its establishment and management attract widespread
attention and are often a recurrent source of conflict between the opposing parties.
Furthermore, once the said body is set up, one can expect difficulties in
successfully achieving its mission due to human resource problems, especially, the
lack or inadequate expertise which is added to financial and logistic problems
stated above.
66