1.
Rethinking
the
Peripheral:
A
Study
of
Chinese
Migrants
in
Lesotho
对‘边缘’ 的再思考——中国人在莱索托
Naa
bohole
bo
etsa
phapang?:
Balakolako
ba
kojoana
li
mahetleng
ba
Machaena
matsoatlareng
a
Lesotho.
1

2. Statement
This
is
my
own
unaided
work
and
does
not
exceed
20,000
words.
Acknowledgements
I
am
grateful
to
Wolfson
College
for
their
financial
contribution
to
my
research
costs.
I
would
like
to
thank
Mr.
Lin
for
his
invaluable
assistance
during
my
fieldwork
and
for
helping
me
to
overcome
many
of
the
practical
difficulties
involved
in
my
research.
A
final
thanks
to
Dr.
Xiang
Biao
for
his
input
and
warm
encouragement
at
all
stages
of
the
development
of
this
thesis.
Cover
Image:
A
Chinese-­‐owned
food
wholesaler
in
Maseru.
Source:
Author’s
Own,
2010.
2

3. Contents
List
of
Figures.....................................................................................................................4
Clarification
of
Terms
and
Acronyms..................................................................................4
Preface ..............................................................................................................................5
Chapter
1.
Introduction......................................................................................................8
1.1
Rethinking
the
Peripheral...........................................................................................8
1.2
The
Research
Site ....................................................................................................12
Chapter
2.
A
Review
of
Literature
on
China’s
Engagement
with
Africa..............................17
Chapter
3.
Methodology ..................................................................................................29
3.1
The
Ethnographic
Approach .....................................................................................29
3.2
The
Fieldwork..........................................................................................................30
3.3
Gaining
Access.........................................................................................................31
3.4
The
Interviews.........................................................................................................33
Chapter
4.
Findings
and
Discussion...................................................................................38
4.1
Lesotho’s
Established
Chinese
Communities.............................................................38
4.2
From
Fujian
to
Lesotho:
Periphery-­‐to-­‐Periphery
Migration .......................................47
4.3
Understanding
Fujianese
Modes
of
Mobility.............................................................54
4.4
Making
the
Periphery
Profitable...............................................................................57
4.5
Sino-­‐African
Relations
at
the
Periphery ....................................................................66
4.6
New
Directions? ......................................................................................................70
Chapter
5.
Conclusions.....................................................................................................73
Bibliography.....................................................................................................................79
3

4. List
of
Figures
Figure
1:
Map
of
Lesotho ....................................................................................................... 13
Clarification
of
terms
and
acronyms
Basotho
Plural
demonym
for
the
South
Sotho
people
(sing.
Mosotho).
The
Basotho
live
chiefly
in
Lesotho.
ALAFA
Apparel
Lesotho
Alliance
to
Fight
AIDS
BCP
Basutoland
Congress
Party
EDF
European
Development
Fund
FSB
Fujian
Statistics
Bureau
GDP
Gross
Domestic
Product
PRC
People’s
Republic
of
China
ROC
Republic
of
China
(Taiwan)
4

5. Preface
The
reforms
initiated
in
China
in
1978
have
had
a
monumental
impact
on
the
mobility
of
Chinese
people,
both
nationally
and
internationally.
According
to
Murphy,
the
over
100
million
itinerant
labourers
and
traders
who
have
left
their
native
homes
in
search
of
work
in
China’s
cities
represent
‘the
largest
peacetime
movement
of
people
in
history’
(Murphy,
2002,
p.
1).
In
addition
to
paving
the
way
for
internal
migration,
the
reforms
have
created
unprecedented
opportunities
for
outmigration
from
the
Chinese
mainland,
allowing
a
new
generation
of
Chinese
migrants
to
seek
their
fortunes
overseas.
Even
in
this
new
era
of
frenzied
interest
in
China,
studies
of
the
overseas
Chinese
have
focused
on
the
older
and
better-­‐known
Chinese
migrant
communities
of
North
America,
more
recently
Europe
(see:
Avenarius,
2007;
Beck,
2007;
Pieke
et
al.,
2004,
p.2;
Pieke
&
Xiang,
2009;
Skeldon,
2000;
Thunø
et
al.,
2005).
In
general,
writings
on
Chinese
transnational
migration
have
tended
to
assume
that
the
United
States
and
the
wealthy
countries
of
Western
Europe
are
every
migrant’s
destinations
of
choice.
Other
destinations
are
imagined
to
be
second
best,
or
stepping
stones
on
longer
trajectories
of
mobility
(ibid.,
p.
3).
This
focus
on
migration
to
the
centres
of
the
global
economy
ignores
the
fact
that
most
transnational
movements
of
persons,
including
Chinese
migration
take
people
to
places
‘that
seem,
at
first
glance,
curiously
nonobvious’
(Pieke
et
al.,
2004,
p.
3).
For
instance,
studies
of
Chinese
migration
have
almost
entirely
overlooked
the
5

6. fact
that
in
the
past
decade,
more
than
a
million
Chinese
people,
from
chefs
to
engineers,
are
thought
to
have
moved
to
work
in
Africa
(Rice,
2011).
Far
from
being
limited
to
Africa’s
urban
centres,
the
effects
of
Chinese
migration
have
been
felt
even
in
the
most
remote
corners
of
the
continent.
This
investigation
seeks
to
redress
the
imbalance
in
the
scholarship
around
this
issue
by
focusing
on
migration
between
different
sites
in
the
global
periphery.
Throughout
my
analysis,
I
use
the
term
‘periphery’
to
refer
to
those
real
places
that
are
outside
the
flows
of
goods,
capital
and
persons
that
converge
on
global
centres
such
as
New
York,
London
and
Tokyo.
These
out-­‐of-­‐the-­‐way
places
constitute
sites
of
exclusion
in
the
global
economic
system
and
have
traditionally
been
assumed
to
offer
little
in
the
way
of
opportunities
for
accumulation
and
capital
generation.
Lesotho’s
highland
villages
are
a
textbook
example
of
this
kind
of
periphery,
and
yet
they
have
become
a
popular
destination
for
a
particular
class
of
merchants
from
Fujian
province.
These
traders
have
succeeded
in
establishing
a
retail
stronghold
in
Lesotho,
penetrating
corners
of
the
country
previously
unreached
by
foreign
businesses.
This
paper
is
premised
on
a
desire
to
discover
how
and
why
Lesotho’s
Fujianese
migrant
communities
become
established
at
these
marginalised
sites.
I
was
keen
to
discover
the
aspirations
of
Fujianese
migrants
in
coming
to
Lesotho
and
to
identify
the
specific
factors
that
influenced
their
decision
to
migrate.
Furthermore,
I
wanted
to
understand
how
they
perceive
the
‘remoteness’
and
‘peripherality’
of
Lesotho’s
mountainous
hinterland
and
to
discern
the
strategies
6

7. and
practices
that
allow
them
to
turn
the
periphery
into
a
productive
space.
In
carrying
out
this
research,
I
hoped
to
be
able
to
redress
the
relative
paucity
of
ethnographic
research
on
the
Chinese
diaspora
in
Africa,
particularly
in
small,
resource-­‐poor
nations
such
as
Lesotho.
In
the
first
chapter,
I
seek
to
unpack
the
construction
of
‘marginality’
in
the
context
of
different
theories
of
‘core’
and
‘periphery’
emerging
from
international
political
economy.
I
suggest
that
Fujianese
migrants,
who
are
themselves
a
peripheral
group
in
the
world
system,
may
perceive
the
periphery
in
distinct
ways
.
This
chapter
also
provides
an
overview
of
Lesotho’s
economic
situation
and
its
particular
history
as
a
peripheral
enclave
surrounded
by
South
Africa.
In
the
second
chapter,
I
provide
a
critique
of
the
existing
literature
on
Sino-­‐African
relations,
arguing
that
most
writings
on
Chinese
activity
in
Africa
have
provided
top-­‐down
accounts
of
Beijing’s
dealings,
ignoring
the
important
but
complex
role
played
by
the
Chinese
diaspora
in
transforming
the
continent.
Chapter
three
provides
an
account
of
the
research
methods
and
mode
of
analysis
adopted
for
this
investigation.
The
findings
of
my
investigation
are
discussed
in
chapter
four
and
summarised
in
chapter
five.
7

8. Chapter
1.
Introduction
1.1 Rethinking
the
Periphery
The
notion
of
‘periphery’
provides
us
with
a
structural
orientation
for
understanding
spatialised
patterns
of
inequality
and
exclusion.
Although
peripheral
places
are
geographically
diverse,
they
share
a
number
of
common
characteristics
that
set
them
diametrically
apart
from
those
places
at
the
‘centre’
of
global
systems.
These
places
often
enjoy
limited
access
to
flows
of
goods,
capitals
and
persons
and
are
subsequently
placed
outside
major
transnational
networks
of
trade
and
migration.
Indeed,
many
scholarly
narratives
of
migration
are
underpinned,
explicitly
or
implicitly,
by
an
assumption
about
a
divide
between
‘traditional
peripheries’
and
‘modern
centres’.
Being
located
outside
global
trade
and
knowledge
networks,
peripheral
regions
are
typically
unable
to
develop
the
kinds
of
industry
and
capital
base
required
to
achieve
economic
takeoff
and
‘modernisation’.
By
contrast,
regions
at
the
core
concentrate
transnational
flows
and
typically
allow
for
rapid
rates
of
capital
accumulation
and
technical
innovation.
Modernisation
theorists
have
long
posited
that
migration
from
periphery
to
core
and
return
flows
from
core
to
periphery
play
a
vital
role
in
making
‘traditional’
societies
more
‘modern’,
thus
‘developing’
the
periphery
(Goldscheider,
1987,
pp.
677-­‐80).
By
contrast,
structuralist
theories
have
argued
that
migration
cannot
improve
the
situation
of
the
periphery
because
it
consolidates
an
unequal
8

9. relationship
of
dependence
with
the
core.
Instead,
structuralist
studies
have
suggested
that
migration
has
a
negative
impact
on
peripheral
regions,
locking
traditional
communities
into
poverty
and
cementing
traditional
power
structures
(Colton,
1993,
pp.
870-­‐82).
Dependency
theory
proposes
a
very
different
understanding
of
the
relationship
between
the
core
and
the
periphery,
but
nevertheless
it
holds
the
core-­‐
periphery
divide
to
be
a
central
feature
of
the
world
society.
Dependency
theorists
have
posited
that
societies
are
inextricably
linked,
within
a
global
system,
through
relationships
of
dependence.
They
reject
the
idea
that
developing
countries
lag
behind
the
developing
world,
arguing
instead
that
both
developed
and
developing
countries
are
at
the
same
historical
stage.
They
suggest
that
the
developed
world
is
at
the
core
of
the
world
system
and
the
developing
world
is
at
the
periphery.
Core
and
periphery
thus
constitute
two
sides
of
the
same
coin,
with
the
poverty
of
the
latter
being
a
prerequisite
for
the
prosperity
of
the
former
(Frank,
1967;
Dos
Santos,
1971;
Amin,
1976).
World
systems
theory
has
proposed
a
similar
but
more
nuanced
model
of
‘dependency’
or
‘reliance’
between
the
core
and
the
periphery.
Whereas
‘dependency’
in
Dependency
theory
is
unidirectional,
‘reliance’
in
World
systems
theory
is
bidirectional,
operating
within
a
three-­‐tier
framework.
This
framework
posits
the
existence
of
a
third
category:
semi-­‐peripheral
places,
which
exist
between
the
core
and
the
periphery
proper.
This
sliding
model
differs
significantly
from
the
binary
conception
of
core
dependency
on
the
periphery
in
that
it
suggests
that
a
9

10. circulation
of
powers
is
an
unavoidable
outcome
of
the
system.
In
other
words,
a
semi-­‐peripheral
region
may
displace
a
core
region
in
decline,
thus
moving
from
the
periphery
to
the
core
(Wallerstein,
1976).
In
any
case,
regardless
of
which
notion
of
peripherality
one
subscribes
to,
it
is
clear
that
both
the
core
and
the
periphery
are
increasingly
linked
by
the
processes
of
globalisation.
I
use
this
term
to
refer
not
to
a
unidirectional
tendency,
but
rather
to
a
multitude
of
processes
‘that
transcend
and
redefine
regional
and
national
boundaries’
(Pieke
et
al.,
2004,
p.
9).
These
processes
produce
a
world
that
is
increasingly
interconnected,
rearranging
spaces
of
flows
and
challenging
established
notions
of
marginality
and
periphery.
In
doing
this,
globalisation
produces
a
‘new
reality’,
creating
new
social
forms
and
inflecting
existing
social
forms
‘such
as
the
nation-­‐state,
the
family,
class,
race,
or
ethnicity’
(ibid.).
Crucially,
the
scope
of
globalisation
extends
‘beyond
the
traditional
centres
of
the
capitalist
system’
(Pieke
et
al.
2004,
p.
10).
That
is
to
say,
globalisation
reconfigures
spaces
within
and
beyond
the
established
centres
of
the
world
economy.
In
facilitating
new
flows
of
capital,
technology
and
migration,
globalisation
creates
contingent
and
dynamic
relationships
between
‘multiple
centres
and
peripheries’
(ibid.).
Of
particular
interest
for
this
investigation
is
the
way
in
which
globalisation
creates
connections
between
places
previously
considered
to
be
on
the
fringes
of
hegemonic
geographies
of
flows.
10

11. Notions
of
dependency
and
reliance
have
laid
the
foundation
for
popular
understandings
of
national
and
transnational
mobility.
These
interpretations,
emerging
from
the
field
of
development
studies
and
intended
to
inform
development
policy,
have
been
critiqued
by
Murphy
for
being
too
Manichean
and
simplistic
for
understanding
the
complexities
of
change
in
the
global
economy
(Murphy,
2002,
p.
18).
They
certainly
fall
short
in
terms
of
explaining
the
numerous
contingent
and
context-­‐specific
factors
that
may
influence
an
individual’s
decision
to
migrate.
Indeed,
macroeconomic
models
such
as
these
leave
little
room
for
an
appreciation
of
the
agency
of
the
individual
and
an
understanding
of
the
interactions
of
social
and
economic
pressures,
which
inflect
that
agency.
It
became
clear
to
me,
while
reading
around
this
topic,
that
the
changing
nature
of
Chinese
migration
required
in-­‐situ
investigation
of
Chinese
communities
outside
China.
How
and
why
these
communities
become
established
in
developing
countries
are
important
and
relatively
unexplored
questions
within
contemporary
social
anthropology
and
migration
studies.
This
is
a
particularly
interesting
area
of
study
given
that,
contrary
to
the
narratives
promulgated
in
Western
media
accounts
of
international
migration,
most
mobility
of
people
takes
place
‘between
peripheral
areas
rather
than
from
a
periphery
to
a
centre’
(Pieke
et
al.,
2004,
p.198).
Indeed,
Xiang
states
that,
within
the
destination
countries,
most
Chinese
migrants
work
in
remote
areas
instead
of
major
cities
(Xiang,
2009,
p.
421).
According
to
Pieke
and
his
team,
the
nature
of
this
mobility
cannot
be
truly
appreciated
from
the
centre,
hence
the
conspicuous
lack
of
writings
produced
on
11

12. this
subject
by
Western
scholars
(ibid.).
This
is
because
the
enduring
influence
of
the
centre-­‐periphery
dichotomy
is
part
of
a
paradigm
that
tends
to
view
migration
and
return
flows
as
phenomena
that
are
external
to
peripheries
(Murphy,
2002,
p.
17).
Pieke
et
al.
go
on
to
explain
that,
for
Chinese
migrants,
‘the
map
of
the
world
looks
distinctly
different
from
what
we
ourselves
would
assume,
with
centres
and
peripheries
in
some
unexpected
places’
(Pieke
et
al.,
2004,
p.
3).
Indeed,
this
paper
is
premised
on
a
desire
to
rethink
the
peripheral
and
to
view
the
world
from
the
migrant’s
perspective.
That
is
not
to
say
that
I
assume
that
migrants
do
not
perceive
‘periphery’
as
a
real
spatial
category
but
rather,
that
they
approach
the
periphery
in
a
certain
way
that
allows
them
to
thrive
where
others
have
previously
struggled.
1.2
The
Research
Site
Lesotho
is
one
of
many
African
countries
that
have
been
entirely
neglected
by
scholarship
on
Chinese
migration
to
Africa.
With
a
population
of
just
over
two
million
people
(World
Bank,
2009)
and
a
total
land-­‐area
of
approximately
30,355
km2
(roughly
the
size
of
Belgium
or
Taiwan),
the
Mountain
Kingdom
is
completely
surrounded
by
South
Africa,
the
continent’s
most
developed
country.
Lesotho
is
classified
by
the
UN
as
a
‘least
developed
country’
and,
with
a
GDP
per
capita
of
$764,
the
kingdom
is
ranked
156th
on
the
human
development
index
(World
Bank,
2009).
In
short,
Lesotho
occupies
a
position
within
conventional
imagined
geographies
of
development
that
is
undeniably
peripheral.
12

13.
Figure
1:
Map
of
Lesotho
Source:
Mapsget,
2011:
http://www.mapsget.com/bigmaps/africa/lesotho_pol90.jpg
Lesotho’s
peripherality
is,
in
part,
a
product
of
its
relative
poverty
compared
to
its
wealthier
neighbour,
South
Africa
–
a
country
that
is
increasingly
seeking
to
assert
itself
as
a
regional
hub
of
transnational
flows.
Turner
identifies
three
13

14. intermediate
causes
of
poverty
in
Lesotho.
These
are
unemployment
‘linked
to
the
heavy
retrenchments
of
Basotho
migrant
labour
from
the
South
African
mines
over
the
last
decade’
(Turner,
2005,
p.
5),
environmental
problems
such
as
‘frosts,
drought
and
floods’
(ibid.),
and
HIV/AIDS,
which
he
describes
as
‘both
a
cause
and
a
symptom
of
poverty’
(ibid.).
Lesotho
currently
has
the
third
highest
adult
HIV
prevalence
in
the
world
at
23.3%
(ALAFA,
2008)
and
the
pandemic
continues
to
be
a
source
of
‘enormous
hardship,
and
death,
for
rapidly
growing
numbers
of
people’
(Turner,
2005,
p.
6).
In
addition
to
these
intermediate
causes
of
poverty,
Lesotho’s
peripheral
position
within
Southern
Africa
is
perpetuated
by
its
history
as
a
labour
reserve
for
South
Africa,
its
prevalent
gender
inequality
and
its
record
of
inefficient
governance
(Turner,
2005
p.
5).
Low
fiscal
incomes
and
an
over-­‐bureaucratised
state
have
meant
that
poverty-­‐reduction
initiatives
in
Lesotho
frequently
fail
in
the
implementation
stage.
The
country
has
long
been
a
recipient
of
foreign
aid
but,
in
the
words
of
one
development
analyst,
the
history
of
foreign
aid
projects
in
Lesotho
has
been
one
of
‘almost
unremitting
failure’
(Murray
1981,
pg.
19
in
Ferguson
1990,
pg.
8).
Lesotho
has
virtually
no
natural
resources
other
than
water,
which
it
exports
to
South
Africa.
Consequently,
the
country
suffers
from
a
large
trade
deficit,
with
exports
representing
only
a
small
proportion
of
total
imports.
These
factors
have
cemented
Lesotho’s
position
at
the
margins
of
the
global
economic
system.
This
economic
marginalisation
is
complemented
by
cultural
marginalisation
at
the
14

15. international
level,
with
little
attention
being
given
to
Lesotho
by
the
international
media.
Estimates
of
the
total
population
of
Mainland
Chinese
currently
settled
in
Lesotho
range
from
five
to
twenty
thousand.
This
is
a
relatively
small
community
compared
to
the
populations
of
settled
Chinese
in
the
United
States
or
even
in
other
African
countries
and,
as
a
result,
Lesotho’s
Chinese
have
been
entirely
neglected
by
academic
scholarship.
My
research
has
shown
that
the
majority
of
the
Chinese
living
in
Lesotho
are
low-­‐skilled
economic
migrants
from
Fujian
province,
a
major
site
of
Chinese
emigration
(Pieke
et
al.,
2004).
Early
flows
of
Indian
and
skilled-­‐Chinese
migration
to
Lesotho
have,
since
1998,
been
eclipsed
by
the
comparatively
vast
influx
of
poorly-­‐skilled
migrants
from
Fujian’s
rural
interior.
This
new
group
of
migrants
has
established
a
retail
hegemony
in
Lesotho,
penetrating
corners
of
the
country
previously
unreached
by
either
local
or
foreign
businesses.
The
present
flow
of
Fujianese
migration
to
Lesotho
appears
to
have
followed
in
the
wake
of
earlier
flows
of
Taiwanese
and
Shanghainese
migration
to
the
country,
suggesting
that
migration
to
the
periphery
is
not
sustainable,
in
the
long
term,
by
migrants
from
a
single
region.
My
research
demonstrates
that
the
Fujianese
in
Lesotho
approach
the
country’s
mountainous
margins
with
a
set
of
strategies
that
allow
them
to
cultivate
the
periphery
as
a
prime
site
for
capital
accumulation.
These
strategies
include
group
purchase
and
transport
of
goods
and
targeted
pricing
campaigns
against
local
15

16. competitors.
Given
the
small
numbers
of
buyers
in
remote
areas,
Fujianese
traders
are
reliant
on
captive
markets
for
the
profitability
of
their
enterprises.
The
need
to
establish
a
small
monopoly
over
a
given
resource
in
a
given
area
produces
a
centrifugal
force
that
continuously
pushes
new
arrivals
from
Fujian
further
and
further
into
Lesotho’s
periphery.
16

17. Chapter
2.
A
Review
of
Literature
on
China’s
Engagement
with
Africa
There
has,
in
recent
years,
been
an
explosion
of
interest
in
‘China
and
Africa’.
While
the
socio-­‐economic
changes
brought
about
by
China’s
reforms
and
rapid
economic
ascendancy
have,
for
some
time,
been
a
focus
for
scholarly
interest,
it
is
only
in
the
last
two
decades
that
China’s
engagement
with
Africa
has
come
under
academic
scrutiny.
This
recent
scholarship
on
‘China
and
Africa’
has
focused
almost
exclusively
on
the
geopolitical
implications
of
China’s
activities
in
Africa.
In
reviewing
the
recent
body
of
literature
on
Sino-­‐African
relations
I
hope
to
demonstrate
the
extent
to
which
the
majority
of
these
writings
present
top-­‐down,
macro-­‐scale
narratives
of
Chinese
engagement
with
African
countries.
By
contrast,
there
is
a
conspicuous
dearth
of
ethnographic
studies
of
the
Chinese
diaspora
in
Africa
and
the
migratory
trajectories
that
have
brought
them
to
even
the
most
remote
corners
of
the
continent.
This
paper
is
intended
to
help
redress
this
gap
since,
as
Alden
rightly
explains,
‘for
most
ordinary
Africans
it
is
these
Chinese
small-­‐scale
entrepreneurs,
and
most
especially
retail
traders,
who
have
had
the
greatest
impact
on
their
lives’
(2007,
p.
37).
It
is
easy
to
see
why
the
geopolitics
of
Sino-­‐African
relations
has
recently
become
a
‘hot’
topic
amongst
academics
from
a
wide
range
of
disciplines.
There
is
a
sense
in
the
literature
that
the
academic
community
was
caught
off-­‐guard
by
China’s
sudden
(re)intensification
of
its
relationships
with
African
governments.
The
Chinese
Communist
Party
strongly
denies
claims
that
its
interests
in
Africa
are
17

18. opportunistic
and
instead
propounds
a
discourse
of
‘ongoing
partnership’
with
the
African
peoples,
dating
as
far
back
as
the
15th
century
(Alden
&
Alves,
2008,
p.
43).
However,
in
spite
of
the
warm
Communist
rhetoric,
there
have
been
clear
fluctuations
in
the
intensity
of
China’s
African
diplomacy,
at
least
over
the
last
sixty
years.
Writings
published
in
English
during
the
last
decade
by
African,
European
and
American
scholars
on
China’s
engagement
with
Africa
have
tended
to
emphasise
the
materialistic
dimension
of
China’s
relationships
with
African
governments
(Alves,
2008;
Ennes
Ferreira,
2008;
Kragelund,
2007;
Soares
de
Oliveira,
2008).
However,
during
the
Mao
years
(1949-­‐1976),
the
emphasis
of
China’s
African
diplomacy
was
unmistakably
ideological.
Indeed,
according
to
He,
it
was
the
Bandung
Conference
of
1955
that
set
the
precedent
for
the
future
of
Sino-­‐African
relations
(He,
2008,
p.
147).
Alden
&
Alves
argue
that
the
‘South-­‐South
solidarity’
expressed
in
the
Non-­‐
Aligned
movement
persists
to
this
day
in
China’s
strictly
bilateral
approach
and
emphasis
on
‘mutual
benefit’
(Alden
&
Alves,
2008,
p.
47).
However,
despite
this
politicised
language,
there
was
clearly
a
dilution
of
the
ideological
pro-­‐activism
of
Mao
Zedong
and
Zhou
Enlai
during
the
first
decade
under
Deng
Xiaoping
(1978–1989)
(Alden
et
al.,
2008,
p.
5).
Following
the
1978
reforms,
Beijing
has
tended
to
avoid
overtly
political
discourse
in
its
dealings
with
foreign
governments
and
instead
placed
a
greater
emphasis
on
economic
co-­‐operation
(Power
&
Mohan,
2008b,
p.
26).
18

19. The
latest
surge
in
scholarship
on
‘China
and
Africa’
has
been
in
response
to
the
stepping-­‐up
of
Sino-­‐African
relations
in
the
wake
of
the
Tiananmen
Square
uprisings
of
1989,
which
left
Beijing
in
desperate
need
of
political
allies.
The
subsequent
rapprochement
between
the
party-­‐state
and
African
governments
has
been
consolidated,
in
economic
terms,
by
the
‘Go
Out’
policy
(走出去战略）of
1999,
which
has
set
the
tone
for
more
proactive
overseas
investment
by
Chinese
companies.
It
is
clear
from
the
scholarly
literature
produced
outside
China
over
the
last
two
decades
that
China’s
’going
out’
to
Africa
has
become
a
cause
for
real
concern
amongst
many
who
have
traditionally
imagined
Africa
as
being
part
of
a
peripheral
space
at
the
hinterland
of
Western
economic
empires.
That
is
to
say
that
the
majority
of
scholarship
on
‘China
and
Africa’
appears
to
be
written
in
response
to
China’s
perceived
threat
to
the
geopolitical
status-­‐quo
rather
than
in
response
to
real
changes
happening
on
the
ground
as
a
result
of
interactions
between
Chinese
and
African
communities.
In
an
insightful
review
of
representations
of
Sino-­‐African
relations
in
British
broadsheet
newspapers,
Mawdsley
(2008)
identifies
a
number
of
recurring
discursive
patterns
that
pervade
reporting
on
China’s
activity
on
the
African
continent.
I
intend
to
borrow
Mawdsley’s
rubric
as
a
starting
point
from
which
to
frame
my
own
discussion
of
the
academic
literature
surrounding
contemporary
China-­‐Africa
relations.
Mawdsley’s
critique
highlights
a
number
of
characteristics,
which
define
recent
scholarly
accounts
of
China’s
engagement
with
Africa.
In
each
19

20. case,
these
characteristics
are
the
result
of
a
decided
preference
for
top-­‐down
appraisals
of
China’s
presence
in
Africa
and
a
failure
to
understand
the
significance
of
this
presence
from
the
perspective
of
the
Chinese
who
have
made
their
livelihoods
there.
The
first
trend
identified
by
Mawdsley
in
her
review
of
British
reporting
on
Sino-­‐African
relations
is
the
tendency
to
conflate
non-­‐Western
actors
in
accounts
of
engagement
between
‘China’
and
‘Africa’.
I
use
inverted
commas
to
highlight
the
need
to
disaggregate
‘China’
and
‘Africa’
since,
as
some
have
rightly
pointed
out,
‘neither
represents
a
coherent
and
uniform
set
of
motivations
and
opportunities’
(Power
&
Mohan,
2008b,
p.
19).
Even
within
academic
writing,
there
is
a
widespread
tendency
to
refer
to
‘the
Chinese’
in
Africa,
despite
the
fact
that
this
designation
encompasses
a
huge
range
of
different
actors
often
with
‘competing
and
contradictory
interests’
(Mawdsley,
2007,
p.
406).
Conflated
within
this
category
are
numerous
governmental
and
non-­‐governmental
bodies,
private
and
state-­‐owned
enterprises
as
well
as
diverse
settled
populations
of
Chinese
across
Africa.
Indeed,
there
is
a
tendency
to
speak
of
‘China’
and
‘Africa’
‘as
if
there
were
relationships
between
two
countries
instead
of
between
one
&
fifty-­‐three’
(Chan,
2007,
p.
2,
in
Power
&
Mohan,
2008b,
p.
34).
While
Mawdsley
is
right
to
be
critical
of
writing
which
collapses
the
interests
of
‘the
Chinese’
into
a
single
category,
there
is
just
as
much
scope
for
criticism
of
those
who
conflate
‘Africa’
and
African
actors.
Accounts
of
Chinese
dealings
with
‘Africans’
suggest
an
undifferentiated
and
nebulous
population
of
natives
passively
enduring
exploitation
by
‘China’
and
‘the
20

21. West’.
This
trend
manifests
itself
most
frequently
in
accounts
that
lump
African
countries
together
and
speak
of
‘Africa’
in
its
continental,
rather
than
its
political
configurations.
In
refusing
to
acknowledge
complexity
and
multiplicity
of
African
actors,
these
accounts
highlight
Africa’s
peripherality
as
a
vast
yet
marginalised
space
at
the
fringes
of
the
world
economy.
Mawdsley’s
second
observation
in
her
study
of
British
journalism
is
a
decided
preference
amongst
British
journalists
for
focusing
on
the
negative
aspects
of
China’s
engagement
with
Africa
(Mawdsley,
2008,
p.
518).
In
the
context
of
academic
writing,
I
intend
to
break
down
this
point
into
two
criticisms.
Firstly,
a
criticism
of
those
academic
writings
which
frame
‘China’
as
a
‘dragon’
or
‘ravenous
beast’
and
secondly,
a
criticism
of
those
academics
who
choose
to
focus
solely
on
‘issues
and
places
of
violence,
disorder
and
corruption’
(ibid.),
and
within
that
on
the
P.R.C.’s
engagement
with
odious
regimes
and
resource-­‐rich
countries
in
Africa.
The
image
of
China
as
a
dragon
or
rampant
leviathan
is
a
discursive
pattern
that
pre-­‐dates
the
recent
intensification
of
China’s
economic
relations
with
African
governments.
It
reflects
the
genuine
apprehension
felt
by
many
in
‘the
West’
in
the
face
of
China’s
accelerated
economic
development
and
increasingly
important
role
in
the
geopolitical
arena.
In
the
context
of
recent
activity
in
Africa,
China
is
frequently
described
in
academic
writing
as
‘a
monolithic
beast
with
an
insatiable
appetite
for
African
resources’
(Power
&
Mohan,
2008b,
p.
22).
This
discourse
simultaneously
reinforces
negative
narratives
of
Chinese
economic
development
and
reproduces
narratives
that
construct
‘Africa’
as
a
marginalised
space
of
plunder
21

22. within
a
binary
scenario
of
exploitation
by
major
economic
powers.
In
the
following
passage
we
see
an
extreme
example
of
this
kind
of
writing:
In
just
a
few
years,
the
People's
Republic
of
China
(P.R.C.)
has
become
the
most
aggressive
investor-­‐nation
in
Africa.
This
commercial
invasion
is
without
question
the
most
important
development
in
the
sub-­‐Sahara
since
the
end
of
the
Cold
War
-­‐-­‐
an
epic,
almost
primal
propulsion
that
is
redrawing
the
global
economic
map.
One
former
U.S.
assistant
secretary
of
state
has
called
it
a
"tsunami."
Some
are
even
calling
the
region
"ChinAfrica"(Behar,
2008,
p.
1).
Writing
such
as
this
serves
to
perpetuate
narratives
that
construct
China’s
presence
in
Africa
as
a
‘scramble’,
‘mad
dash’,
‘resource
grab’,
or
even
a
‘rape’(Power
&
Mohan,
2008b,
p.
24).
Criticisms
of
China’s
interest
in
African
natural
resources
are
often
voiced
explicitly
by
those
who
firmly
believe
that
Chinese
investment
in
Africa
is
part
of
a
long-­‐term
strategy
to
control
and
exploit
African
natural
resources,
particularly
oil
(Askouri,
2007,
p.
72).
Often,
China
is
portrayed
not
only
as
a
pillager
of
African
resources
but
also
as
a
direct
competitor
in
those
industries
that
are
seen
as
key
to
Africa’s
development.
Here,
China’s
presence
in
Africa,
like
America’s
presence
before
it,
is
regarded
as
problematic
because
it
is
thought
to
undermine
the
autonomy
of
African
societies
through
forms
of
imperialism
that
transcend
the
nation
state
(Hardt
&
Negri,
2000
and
Johnson,
2004):
The
undermining
of
manufacturing
in
Sub-­‐Saharan
Africa
as
a
consequence
of
Asian
Driver
competition
in
SSA
and
external
markets
is
likely
to
lead
to
increased
unemployment,
at
least
in
the
short
run,
and
heightened
levels
of
poverty
(Kaplinsky,
Robinson,
&
Willenbockel,
2007,
p.
25)
22

23. China’s
presence
is
also
considered
to
be
detrimental
to
the
pursuit
of
developmental
sustainability
in
Africa
because
of
its
disregard
for
good
governance.
Within
the
body
of
recent
academic
writing
on
China’s
engagement
with
Africa,
we
can
also
identify
a
distinct
preference
for
accounts
of
China’s
dealings
in
resource
rich
countries
(Alves,
2008,
Ennes
Ferreira,
2008,
Kragelund,
2007,
Power,
2008,
Soares
de
Oliveira,
2008)
and
those
countries
where
China
appears
to
be
supporting
odious
regimes
(Askouri,
2007,
Karumbidza,
2007,
Large,
2008a,
Tull,
2008).
This
tendency
is
a
clear
manifestation
of
the
desire,
within
the
non-­‐Chinese
academic
community,
to
highlight
the
negative
aspects
of
China’s
‘Going
out’
to
Africa.
The
positive
elements
of
Chinese
activity
in
Africa,
including
debt
cancellation,
investment,
commodity
price
impacts
and
support
for
a
greater
international
voice,
are
ignored
in
favour
of
a
focus
on
problem
issues
(Mawdsley,
2008,
p.
518).
This
concern
with
China’s
negative
impacts
on
the
continent
is
concurrent
with
a
postmodern
discourse
that
is
inherently
suspicious
of
global
economic
powers
and,
as
such,
fails
to
recognise
the
significance
of
day-­‐to-­‐day
interactions
between
Chinese
and
African
people.
One
notable
outcome
of
the
predominantly
macro-­‐
level
portrayal
of
China-­‐
Africa
relations
is
a
strongly
biased
interpretation
of
the
role
of
Africans
in
these
interactions.
Accounts
of
China’s
activity
in
Africa
regularly
portray
Africans
either
as
‘victims’
or
‘villains’
(Mawdsley,
2008,
p.
518)
,
and
sometimes
as
both,
thus
endorsing
images
of
a
politically
impotent
African
population,
perpetually
at
the
mercy
of
foreign
powers
and
corrupt
leaders.
As
Mawdsley
stresses
in
her
last
23

24. criticism
of
British
journalism
on
Sino-­‐African
relations,
the
intensity
of
this
focus
on
China
as
a
new
threat
to
African
prosperity
leaves
room
for
little
more
than
a
‘complacent
account’
of
the
West
and
its
past
and
present
dealings
with
African
peoples.
Within
this
uncritical
narrative,
Chinese
activity
in
Africa
is
negatively
contrasted
against
Europe’s
historical
forays
into
the
continent.
As
Mawdsley
explains,
‘Western
colonialisism
is
claimed
to
at
least
have
had
a
paternalistic/developmental
dimension
and
well-­‐intentioned
elements
-­‐
an
attitude
that
has
translated
into
an
ethical
concern
for
Africa
in
the
postcolonial
period’
(Mawdsley,
2008,
p.
519).
The
implication
is
therefore
that
Europe
and
the
U.S.
have
moved
on
to
a
more
enlightened
concern
for
Africa.
This
concern
implies
moral
superiority
over
any
Chinese
interests
on
the
continent,
which
are
assumed
to
be
purely
opportunistic.
This
configuration
constructs
the
Chinese
state
as
potent
force
of
chaos
in
the
African
context.
It
is
clear
from
numerous
writings
(Bräutigam,
2008b;
Campbell,
2007;
Gill,
Morrison,
&
Huang,
2008;
Marchal,
2008)
that
there
is
considerable
concern,
amongst
African,
European
and
American
academics,
regarding
Beijing’s
recent
foreign
policy
towards
Africa.
Criticisms
of
China’s
dealings
with
African
governments
arguably
reflect
a
broader
concern
that
China
represents
a
chaotic
force
which
seeks
to
undermine
Western
efforts
to
promote
good
governance,
global
security
and
debt
sustainability
in
Africa.
I
will
examine
each
of
these
points
in
turn,
concluding
that
these
simplistic
representations
ignore
the
complexity
of
24

25. ‘Chinese’
activity
in
Africa
and
the
many
faces
of
China’s
‘presence’
on
the
continent.
That
Beijing’s
African
policies
are
a
threat
to
the
promotion
of
good
governance
on
the
continent
is
a
mantra
frequently
repeated
in
recent
Sino-­‐African
scholarship
(see:
Breslin
&
Taylor,
2008;
Dahle
Huse
&
Muyakwa,
2008;
Karumbidza,
2007;
Naím,
2007;
Power,
2008;
Power
&
Mohan,
2008a).
These
critical
writings
accuse
China
of
undermining
efforts
to
improve
transparency
and
accountability
in
Africa
by
financing
and
supporting
authoritarian
leaders
and
states,
by
supplying
arms
in
conflict
situations,
by
doing
business
without
‘ethical’
conditionalities,
and
by
taking
advantage
of
corruption.
Many
Western
scholars
argue
that
China’s
behaviour
threatens
to
undo
the
fragile
gains
that
have
been
made
in
terms
of
democracy,
transparency
and
accountability
in
Africa
over
the
last
six
decades.
For
instance,
in
Zimbabwe,
China
is
accused
of
funding
the
state’s
‘acquisition
of
military-­‐strength
radio
jamming
equipment
to
block
opposition
equipment
ahead
of
the
2005
elections’
(Karumbidza,
2007).
Accusations
such
as
these
have
focused
on
Beijing’s
apparent
willingness
to
finance
corrupt
and
autocratic
regimes
in
Africa,
and
stories
such
as
these
are
often
denoted
as
being
emblematic
of
Sino-­‐African
ties.
Scholars
are
quick
to
point
out
China’s
attractiveness
as
a
lender
‘outside
the
existing
hegemony
of
development
actors
and
institutions
referred
to
as
‘traditional’
donors
or
‘the
West/Western
donors’
(Dahle
Huse
&
Muyakwa,
2008,
p.
8).
They
25

26. warn
that
China
appeals
to
African
leaders
through
its
discourses
of
‘respect’
and
‘mutual
benefit’,
stressing
that,
unlike
the
West
‘China
avoids
the
status
of
‘donor’
and
the
word
‘aid’
is
often
avoided
altogether
when
talking
about
Africa’
(Power,
2008).
The
post–9/11
security
agenda
has
included
a
greater
focus
on
‘failed
states’,
counterterrorism
activities
and
development.
China
now
represents
at
least
a
geopolitical
complication
in
Africa,
at
worst
a
threat
in
its
relations
with
states
and
groups
potentially
hostile
to
the
West
(Mawdsley,
2007,
p.
407).
Amongst
those
who
promulgate
narratives
which
view
China
as
a
‘hidden
dragon’,
there
are
many
who
view
China
as
a
‘threat
to
healthy,
sustainable
development’
arguing
that
China
is
‘effectively
pricing
responsible
and
well
meaning
organizations
out
of
the
market
in
the
very
places
they
are
needed
most’
whilst
‘underwriting
a
world
that
is
more
corrupt,
chaotic
and
authoritarian’
(Naím,
2007,
p.
95).
There
seems
to
be
a
real
fear
that
China’s
‘rogue
lending’
(Naím,
2007)
will
‘burden
poor
countries
with
debt—a
burden
from
which
many
have
only
just
escaped’
(Lancaster,
2008,
p.
1).
Dahle
Huse
and
Muyakwa
argue
that
the
lack
of
transparency
in
the
disbursement
process
of
Chinese
‘soft
loans’
to
African
governments
‘makes
it
difficult
to
assess
how
much
debt
is
being
contracted
and
on
what
terms’
(Dahle
Huse
&
Muyakwa,
2008,
p.
5).
They
argue
that
‘Zambian
NGOs,
donors
and
well-­‐wishers
need
to
keep
a
close
eye
on
Chinese
loans
and
raise
the
alarm
when
need
be’
(Dahle
Huse
&
Muyakwa,
2008,
p.
5).
26

27. In
summary;
accounts,
such
as
these,
which
frame
discussions
of
China’s
economic
impact
in
Africa
in
terms
of
its
role
as
an
irresponsible
financer
of
corrupt
African
regimes
and
general
promoter
of
disorder
in
African
economies,
are
characteristic
of
much
recent
writing
on
Sino-­‐African
relations.
Indeed,
in
analysing
writings
published
in
English
during
the
last
two
decades
by
African,
European
and
American
scholars
on
China’s
engagement
with
Africa,
we
can
identify
the
following
popular
tendencies:
1. A
preference
for
generalised
narratives
of
‘China’
and
‘Africa,’
which
flatten
both
sets
of
actors,
producing
a
series
of
simplistic
and
dichotomous
scenarios
that
ignore
the
complex
interactions
between
different
local
actors
and
different
Chinese
actors,
particularly
members
of
the
Chinese
diaspora.
2. A
preference
for
constructing
‘China’
as
a
powerful
and
homogenous
force
of
chaos
in
Africa,
suggesting
that
all
aspects
of
Chinese
activity
in
Africa
are
somehow
related
to
the
geopolitical
ambitions
of
the
Chinese
state.
3. Implicit
reference
to
supposedly
‘superior’
Western
intentions
and
practices
and
a
simplistic
and
half-­‐hearted
attempt
at
understanding
African
perspectives,
motivations
and
interests
with
relation
to
China’s
presence
on
the
continent.
While
these
tendencies
are
by
no
means
universal
in
writing
on
Sino-­‐African
relations,
they
define
the
default
parameters
of
imagined
configurations
of
‘China’
27

28. and
‘Africa’
in
which
much
academic
writing
on
Sino-­‐African
relations
is
situated.
For
instance,
accounts
of
Chinese
activity
in
Africa
have
typically
overlooked
the
hugely
important
role
played
by
Africa’s
diverse
Chinese
communities
in
changing
consumptive
habits
in
places
such
as
Lesotho.
While
it
is
certainly
true
that
the
presence
of
the
Chinese
diaspora
in
Lesotho
and
other
parts
of
Africa
is
an
outcome
of
political
and
economic
changes
in
China
mediated
by
the
Chinese
state,
my
research
shows
that
the
vast
majority
of
‘Chinese
activity’
in
Africa
is
completely
outside
state
control.
Indeed,
the
majority
of
Chinese
migration
to
Africa
occurs
through
non-­‐governmental
channels
and
even
in
instances
where
migration
was
organised
as
part
of
official
programmes
of
development
assistance
or
resource
extraction,
individuals
usually
disassociate
themselves
from
the
Chinese
state
within
a
few
years
of
arriving
in
Lesotho.
In
this
way,
Sino-­‐African
relations
are
increasingly
dominated
by
individual
interactions
that
transcend
the
nation-­‐state.
In
conclusion,
this
paper
seeks
to
fill
a
gap
in
the
literature
by
providing
a
more
balanced
account
of
the
multiplicity
and
complexity
of
engagements
between
‘China’
and
‘Africa,’
avoiding
the
tendencies
that
Mawdsley
argues
are
characteristic
of
so
much
writing
on
Sino-­‐African
relations.
The
intention
is
to
provide
a
lens
through
which
to
understand
the
ways
in
which
individual
migrants
deploy
potential
social
networks
to
make
a
living
in
some
of
Africa’s
poorest
regions.
28

29. Chapter
3.
Methodology
3.1
The
Ethnographic
Approach
The
essence
of
qualitative
research
is
that
it
can
construct
and
interpret
a
part
of
reality
based
on
what
grows
out
of
the
fieldwork
–
rather
than
on
the
researcher’s
a
priori
theories
and
knowledge
(Bu,
2006,
p.
223).
Bu’s
assertion
-­‐
that
good
qualitative
research
is
born
out
of
an
open-­‐minded
encounter
with
the
field
-­‐
was
highly
influential
in
shaping
my
methodological
approach
to
understanding
Fujianese
migration
to
Lesotho.
The
findings
outlined
in
this
paper
are
the
product
of
an
ethnographic
study
of
resident
Chinese
in
Lesotho,
based
on
semi-­‐structured
interviews
as
well
as
informal
conversations
and
participant
observation.
These
informal
meetings
allowed
me
to
corroborate
conclusions
drawn
from
my
semi-­‐structured
interviews,
a
technique
favoured
by
Kjellgren
(2006,
p.
237).
Bu
goes
on
to
highlight
the
importance
of
going
out
into
the
field
(Bu,
2006,
p.
221).
Although
this
may
seem
like
an
obvious
point
to
make,
it
is
worth
stressing
the
centrality
of
‘place’
in
studies
of
migration
and,
hence,
the
fundamental
importance
of
visiting
the
research
site.
Indeed,
Pieke
et
al.
argue
that
the
aim
of
ethnographic
research
should
be
to
seek
to
‘elucidate
the
social
processes
that
imagine,
produce
and
challenge
specific
places
and
communities’
(Pieke
et
al.
2004,
p.
6).
29

30. Speaking
from
experience,
Pieke
et
al.
point
out
that
official
figures
and
statistics
on
Fujianese
migration
are
scarce
and
often
unreliable.
Consequently,
they
propose
that
ethnographic
research
is
the
most
appropriate
path
for
understanding
the
contingent
and
dynamic
nature
of
Chinese
migration
(Pieke
et
al.
2004,
p.
6).
Furthermore,
Bu
stresses
that
insiders
and
outsiders
may
have
different
perceptions
of
the
same
event
and
that
going
out
and
speaking
to
people
is
the
only
way
to
gain
a
real
insight
into
their
worldview
(Bu,
2006,
p.
214).
A
good
example
of
this
is
the
extent
to
which
definitions
of
‘legal’
vs.
‘illegal’
are
dependent
on
context,
particularly
in
the
case
of
Chinese
migration.
As
Bu
points
out,
maintaining
a
sensibility
to
the
insider’s
perspective
can
provide
fascinating
insights
into
the
reasoning
behind
their
actions
and
strategies
(ibid.,
p.
223).
3.2 The
Fieldwork
For
the
purposes
of
this
investigation,
I
travelled
to
Maseru,
Lesotho’s
capital
and
first
port-­‐of-­‐call
for
foreign
migrants.
Unfortunately,
limited
time
and
resources
meant
that
a
wider
survey
of
Lesotho’s
resident
Fujianese
population
would
have
been
outside
the
scope
of
this
investigation.
Rather
than
spending
days
travelling
between
mountain
villages
in
the
hope
of
finding
willing
Fujianese
respondents,
I
chose
to
focus
my
efforts
on
interviewing
settled
migrants
in
the
Maseru
district,
which
contains
both
Lesotho’s
most
populous
urban
centre
and
the
country’s
highest
concentration
of
Chinese
immigrants.
30

31. In
total,
I
spent
17
days
in
Maseru,
from
the
3rd
to
the
20th
of
December
2010,
conducting
in-­‐depth
interviews
with
adult
male
and
female
urban
residents
of
Mainland
Chinese
origin.
Respondents
were
gathered
through
contacts
in
Lesotho,
and
later
through
‘snowball
sampling’
(Goodman,
1961).
All
interviews
were
conducted
in
Mandarin
and
lasted
between
30
and
90
minutes.
The
total
number
of
respondents
was
25,
ranging
from
shop-­‐owners
to
hairdressers.
The
objective
of
these
interviews
was
to
answer
the
following
questions:
1. What
were
the
migrant’s
aspirations
in
coming
to
Lesotho?
2. How
do
they
perceive
the
‘remoteness’
and
‘peripherality’
of
Lesotho
in
relation
to
China
and
other
‘marginal’
Third
World
spaces?
3. In
which
sectors
of
the
economy
are
they
established
and
how
did
they
become
established
in
those
sectors?
4. What
are
their
present
aspirations,
do
they
intend
to
return
to
China?
3.3 Gaining
Access
As
Heimer
and
Thøgersen
point
out,
good
contacts
are
often
a
necessary
prerequisite
for
doing
research,
particularly
when
doing
research
on
China
and
the
Chinese
(Thøgersen
&
Heimer,
2006).
Having
previously
researched
official
Chinese
development
assistance
to
Lesotho,
I
understood
the
importance
of
‘gatekeepers’
in
providing
access
to
research
respondents.
Fujianese
migration
to
Lesotho
was
an
entirely
new
research
field
for
me
and,
as
such,
I
had
no
Fujianese
contacts
on
the
ground
to
kick-­‐start
my
investigation.
Instead,
I
was
compelled
to
take
Solinger’s
31

32. advice
and
‘draw
upon
any
relationship
one
might
have
with
any
person
willing
to
be
of
help
in
one’s
ploy
to
meet
potential
subjects’
(Solinger,
2006,
p.
157).
Solinger
also
stresses
the
importance
of
retaining
old
contacts
(ibid.,
p.
158).
I
was
lucky
enough
to
be
able
to
remain
in
touch
with
one
of
the
respondents
from
a
previous
visit
to
the
field,
a
Taiwanese
shop
owner
by
the
name
of
Mr.
Lin.
His
practical
assistance
in
helping
to
arrange
meetings
with
Fujianese
migrants
gave
me
free
access
to
respondents
who
would
otherwise
have
been
intensely
suspicious
of
my
project.
Presumably
out
of
the
kindness
of
his
heart,
Mr.
Lin
devoted
every
afternoon
of
my
time
in
the
field
to
arranging
interviews
with
recent
Fujianese
migrants,
as
well
as
with
established
resident
Chinese
from
Shanghai
and
Taiwan.
When
I
offered
to
reimburse
him
for
his
troubles,
he
refused,
saying
that
he
felt
grateful
that
someone
from
a
reputable
academic
institution
had
taken
interest
in
the
plight
of
Lesotho’s
Chinese
community.
Mr.
Lin
would
meet
me
every
day
at
an
appointed
time
before
lunch
with
a
list
of
respondents
with
whom
he
had
arranged
meetings.
He
would
then
drive
in
his
pickup
truck
to
see
each
of
the
respondents,
negotiating
access
with
security
guards
and
escorting
me
onto
their
business
premises.
Not
only
was
Mr.
Lin’s
assistance
invaluable
in
terms
of
providing
practical
access
and
transport,
but
also
in
facilitating
introductions
and
sometimes
communication
with
Fujianese
migrants
to
Lesotho.
These
individuals
were
understandably
wary
of
a
foreigner
taking
such
a
close
interest
in
their
presence
in
the
country.
Although
the
majority
spoke
intelligible
Putonghua,
there
were
occasions
when
I
had
to
ask
Mr.
Lin
to
clarify
the
meaning
of
32

33. Fujianese
expressions
or
to
translate
from
the
Fujianese
dialect
into
Mandarin.
This,
he
did
willingly,
all
the
while
allaying
the
suspicions
of
my
respondents
and
helping
to
navigate
through
sensitive
issues.
Although
I
was
grateful
to
Mr.
Lin
for
sacrificing
so
much
of
his
personal
time
and
effort
to
assisting
me
in
my
research,
I
was
also
aware
that
his
positionality
as
an
economically
successful
Taiwanese
resident
in
Maseru
would
have
an
effect
on
the
findings
of
this
investigation.
As
a
result,
I
was
careful
to
maintain
a
critical
ear
throughout
my
time
in
the
field,
subjecting
Mr.
Lin’s
well-­‐meant
comments
and
theories
to
the
same
scrutiny
as
the
information
given
to
me
directly
by
my
respondents.
However,
despite
Mr.
Lin’s
inexplicable
dedication
to
helping
me
in
my
research,
I
have
no
reason
to
suspect
him
of
having
dubious
ulterior
motives
and
remain
enormously
grateful
for
all
his
help.
3.4 The
Interviews
Interviews
were
semi-­‐structured,
focusing
on
content
rather
than
on
the
questions
themselves.
The
approach
was
informant-­‐focused,
viewing
the
respondents
as
agents
in
an
unfolding
narrative,
rather
than
‘mere
vessels
of
answers’
(Silverman,
1997,
p.
149).
The
‘pyramid
strategy’
was
used
in
all
interviews.
‘Easy-­‐to-­‐answer
questions’
were
asked
first
and
‘abstract
and
general
questions’
were
asked
last
(Hay,
2000).
The
style
of
questioning
was
semi-­‐formal,
to
allow
for
conversational
development
towards
more
‘sensitive
issues’
(ibid.).
Notes
were
33

34. taken
during
all
the
interviews
and
I
typed
up
a
daily
report
of
my
research
findings
for
my
own
records.
The
difficulty
involved
in
earning
the
trust
of
my
respondents
made
me
reluctant
to
rouse
suspicions
by
seeking
to
record
interviews
electronically.
Previous
experience
of
interviews
with
Chinese
in
Lesotho
had
taught
me
that
the
mention
of
a
Dictaphone
could
either
end
an
interview
or
restrict
the
conversation
to
discussions
of
mundane
topics.
This
echoes
the
advice
given
to
Kjellgren
by
a
Chinese-­‐American
scholar
who
blankly
stated
that
‘‘you
definitely
want
to
avoid
carrying
a
tape-­‐recorder
if
you
want
people
to
talk”
(Kjellgren,
2006,
p.
232).
This
seemed
self-­‐evident,
given
the
ethical
considerations
involved
in
interviewing
illegal
migrants
operating
businesses
without
licenses.
As
a
rule,
I
followed
Solinger’s
advice
and
only
pushed
sensitive
topics
as
far
as
the
respondent
was
willing
to
go
(Solinger,
2006,
p.
164).
Given
the
emphasis
placed
by
numerous
authors
on
the
proper
acknowledgement
of
positionality
in
qualitative
research
(Pratt,
2000;
Rose,
1997;
Seale
et
al.,
2007;
Valentine,
1997),
I
was
aware,
going
into
the
field,
that
my
position
as
a
student
from
Oxford
with
Mosotho
ancestry
could
affect
my
investigation.
Bu
discusses
the
difficulties
encountered
by
‘outsiders’
in
seeking
to
gain
an
insight
into
the
lives
of
‘insiders’
and
the
comparable
difficulties
faced
by
foreigners
seeking
to
understand
aspects
of
Chinese
society
(Bu,
2006).
However,
Kjellgren
argues
that
these
dichotomies
are
often
unhelpful,
since
they
allow
little
room
for
ambiguity
in
terms
of
race
and
background:
34

35.
These
twin
dichotomies
allow
little
room
for
most
researchers
of
flesh
and
blood
since
few
if
any
fit
the
racial
and
cultural
stereotypes
that
come
together
with
them,
and
needless
to
say
they
leave
even
less
room
for
variation
among
the
people
on
the
other
side
of
the
notebook
(Kjellgren,
2006,
p.
225).
Also,
given
the
complex
interplay
of
numerous
prejudices
between
whites,
locals
and
Chinese
migrants
in
Lesotho,
I
was
unsure
of
how
I
-­‐
a
mixed
race
researcher
with
a
Sesotho
name
-­‐
would
be
treated
by
my
respondents.
Rather
than
opt
for
dissimulation,
I
chose
to
be
honest
about
my
origins
and
my
research
agenda.
Generally,
I
felt
this
was
conducive
to
openness
and,
thanks
to
the
mediatory
role
played
by
Mr.
Lin,
a
considerable
degree
of
trust
was
extended
to
me
by
my
informants.
Indeed,
as
I
will
explain,
my
ambiguous
background
often
proved
an
advantage
in
navigating
through
the
interview
process.
Solinger
asserts
that
better
knowledge
of
the
context
of
the
interview
leads
to
better
interviews
(Solinger,
2006,
p.
161).
She
argues
that
such
prior
knowledge
can
provide
a
‘springboard’
for
diving
much
deeper
into
more
complex
or
sensitive
issues
(ibid.).
For
this
reason
I
tried
to
read
as
much
as
possible
about
Fujianese
migration
to
Africa
before
heading
out
into
the
field.
Furthermore,
having
lived
in
Lesotho
before
and
being
partially
of
Basotho
descent,
I
was
able
to
display
a
degree
of
local
understanding
beyond
that
of
a
foreign
researcher.
However,
even
with
the
reassuring
presence
of
Mr
Lin
at
my
side,
many
of
my
respondents
were
initially
very
suspicious
and
unwilling
to
discuss
their
private
35

36. histories
of
migration
to
Lesotho.
When
asked
fairly
mundane
questions
about
the
Chinese
community
in
Maseru,
several
informants
tried
to
deflect
my
attention
onto
the
established
Indian
presence
in
Lesotho.
This
reluctance
to
communicate
highlights
the
fact
that
the
majority
of
Fujianese
migration
to
Lesotho
takes
place
through
illegal
channels
and
that
those
who
stay
in
Lesotho
often
live
outside
the
law.
In
most
cases
I
was
able
to
establish
a
workable
degree
of
trust
with
my
respondents
but
in
some
cases
I
was
left
to
extrapolate
information
from
their
silences
or
their
eagerness
to
discuss
other
topics.
Rather
than
being
disheartened
by
this
lack
of
cooperation,
I
tried
to
remember
Bu’s
assertion
that
‘even
if
we
do
not
discover
any
absolute
truths
we
can,
at
least,
get
somewhat
closer
to
the
realities’
(Bu,
2006,
p.
223).
My
informants,
like
those
questioned
by
Kjellgren,
were
keen
to
assess
my
level
of
understanding
at
an
early
stage
in
the
interview.
Like
Kjellgren’s
respondents,
they
wanted
to
know
whether
I
knew
enough
Mandarin
to
be
able
to
understand
them,
whether
I
knew
enough
about
China
to
understand
their
references
to
home
and
Chinese
culture,
and
whether
I
knew
enough
about
Lesotho
to
understand
the
local
situation
(Kjellgren,
2006,
p.
233).
When
seeking
answers
to
more
sensitive
questions
I
was
able
to
play
up
my
‘externality’
as
an
‘outsider’
unlikely
to
report
to
the
Lesotho
government
or
to
authorities
at
home
in
China.
By
contrast,
my
local
understanding
of
the
general
situation
of
Chinese
migration
to
Lesotho
helped
me
to
avoid
generic
discussions
and
focus
on
more
personal
accounts
of
transnational
mobility.
In
this
sense,
taking
36

37. the
time
at
the
start
of
each
interview
to
establish
my
positionality
as
an
insider/outsider,
rather
than
hindering
the
conversation,
worked
to
my
advantage,
establishing
a
common
framework
for
the
discussion
of
both
general
and
personal
topics.
In
this
way,
I
was
required
to
present
what
Solinger
terms
a
‘Daoist-­‐type’
ideal
of
understanding:
appearing
‘at
once
knowledgeable
but
ignorant,
knowing
and
not
knowing’
(Solinger,
2006,
p.
161).
37

38. Chapter
4.
Findings
and
Discussion
4.1
Lesotho’s
Established
Chinese
Communities
The
recent
flow
of
Mainland
Chinese
migrants
to
Lesotho
is
by
no
means
an
isolated
instance
of
transnational
mobility.
Indeed,
it
would
be
impossible
to
write
a
history
of
Mainland
Chinese
migration
to
Lesotho
without
referring
to
earlier
flows
of
‘pioneer
migrants’
from
Taiwan
and
Shanghai.
In
her
study
of
Chinese
communities
in
Zanzibar,
Hsu
identifies
three
distinct
groups
of
Chinese
on
the
island:
government-­‐sent
teams,
business
people
and
an
established
community
of
overseas
Chinese
(Hsu,
2007).
In
Lesotho
I
have
identified
three
comparable
but
distinct
Chinese
communities,
each
of
which
represents
a
different
phase
of
Chinese
migration,
reflecting
Lesotho’s
position
within
global
migratory
flows
at
different
periods
in
its
history.
First
among
these
groups
is
the
established
community
of
skilled
Taiwanese
experts,
originally
sent
to
Lesotho
during
the
early
70s
as
part
of
Taiwan’s
official
aid
to
Africa.
Second
is
the
community
of
skilled
Shanghainese
businesspeople,
recruited
by
Taiwanese
employers
during
the
early
90s
to
run
their
businesses
in
the
garment
and
retail
sectors.
Third
is
the
larger
community
of
recent
arrivals
from
Fujian,
consisting
predominantly
of
unskilled
traders
who
have
established
a
virtual
monopoly
over
the
retail
of
basic
consumer
goods,
penetrating
into
regions
of
Lesotho
previously
unreached
by
either
foreign
or
domestic
retailers.
Taking
38